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Aristotle and Political ResponsibilityAuthor(s): Delba WinthropSource: Political Theory, Vol. 3, No. 4 (Nov., 1975), pp. 406-422Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/190837 .

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ARISTOTLE AND

POLITICAL

RESPONSIBILITY

DELBA

WINTHROP

University

f

Virginia

HEN

CITIZENS TAKE POLITICS

SERIOUSLY,

their

ctions

and

their

unsophisticatedxplanations

f

them mply

that

politics s

something

n

which

hey,

s

rational nd moral

beings,

an have

some

effect: hey

make

deliberate

hoices,

nd

suchchoices

re

asserted

o

be

essential

n

politics.

When

political

scientists

ake

politics

eriously,

however, heir cience eads themto denythe reasonablenessf the

premise n

which esponsible

itizenship

ests.

hey

find hat

he

ause

of

politics

s not

deliberate

hoice,

but

the

preferences

f

those

with

influence,nd preferences

nd

the

distribution

f

nfluence

re

aid

either

to

be arbitrary

r

to

be

traceable

o certain

ecessary

auses.

Thus

politics

and

political cience

est n different

resuppositions.

et

we

might ish

thatpolitical cience

could

do

justice

to

politics

nd

at

the

same time

satisfy s

that

t

s scientific.

ypurpose

ere

s

to

study

his

roblemnd

Aristotle'sroposed olution o it,as foundnthe first art fthethird

book

of

his

Politics.

At

the

beginning

f Book

II

of

the

olitics,

ristotlesks

what

he

city

is; one reason

orhis

doing o,

he

says,

s

that

isputes

rise

boutwhether

a

deed

was

done

by

the

city

r

rather

y

the

oligarchy

r

the

tyrant.n

mentioning

hiskind f

dispute,

ristotle

ay

emind

omeof hiU

eaders

of

a

speech

n

Thucydides

hat

was made before he

gates

of

beseiged

Plataea.2

n that

peech

heThebans re

nconsistentecause

hey eem o

POLITICAL

THEORY, Vol.

3

No.

4,

November 1975

? 1975

Sage Publications,

Inc.

[406]







Winthrop

ARISTOTLE

[4071

say that

political esponsibility

roperly

ies

with

many

r

all,

not

a

few,

or

with

he

best,however ew.

They

re

consistent

n

holding

hatnotthe

fact

of

authority,

ut

the

end

for

which

uthority

s

used

obliges

itizens

to obey governmentsnd cities to keep alliances.Although heir

argumentsbout responsibility

re

made withreference

o international

affairs,he standardshey pply ould

as

well

be used with

egard

o

any

responsibilities. hy s

this

typicaldispute

over

political

esponsibility

linked

y Aristotle

o

a

definitionf

what

he

city

s?

The

examinationf the- ity

beginswith ur sking hat

citizen

s,

as

if thecitizen

were

a

partthat

made the nature

f

the whole manifest:

The

city

s

some

multitude

f

citizens, 1274b41)

and t is

'lust

like

some other

whole put together

f

manyparts

1274b39-40).

What s

done

to

explain

the

citizen

s,

in

part,

o make the

reader

rivy

o

a

dispute

etween democraticitizen nd

an

oligarchic

itizen bout

what

a

citizen

s.

A

citizen,

we

are

told,

is

defined

by nothing

o

much as by

participating

n

udgment

nd

n

rule

1275a22-23).

n thefirst

nstance,

the definitionought

s of an

unmade

itizen.

resumably

n

unmade

citizen

musthave

been born citizen.

f

so,we can understandhy he

law excludes

from

itizenship

esident liens nd

slaves,who werenot

bom

of

citizens.

ut then

we cannotunderstand

hy

children nd

old

men,born

of

citizens,

re said

by

the

speaker

o be

incompleteitizens.

Childrennd old men

must

e

excluded

ecause

he

citizen

s

one

who s

fully

man.

Being ully

man

s

manifested

n

doing

he

work

f

a

citizen,

in

ruling

nd

udging.

We then

wonderwhy blemetics

nd slaves eedbe

excluded, specially

f

all

citizen-born

re

presumed

o

be

able

and all

included.Whatdoesbeing ble to rule ndbeing manhaveto do with

being

born

n a

city?

A

citizen

s a

citizen

n

being

citizen, nd the

definitioneither

ustifies

he

emphasis

n

origin

or

clarifieshe

quality

enabling

ne to

be a

citizen. pparently ristotle'sitizen asnot

thought

much bout

what

he

auses

f

being citizen

re.He

begins rom isown

city,

he

onlycity

he

knows,

nd

the

imits

f

hishorizon re

reflectedn

both the form nd substance

f his

argument.3

or

him,

democratic

citizen

s

the same

as

citizen

simply.

He

knows

that

some

men are

excluded rom itizenship,ut he cannot pecify consistentrinciplef

exclusion r

inclusion.

e

does not

argue

r

speakwell;he

says

hathe s

uninterestedn

quibbling

bout

names

nd

definitions.

Others, owever,

o seem

o

require recision

nd

to be

fond f

making

fine

distinctions.ristotle ow

presents

n

objection

rom

omeonewho

says

hat he

definition

oesnot

give

ue

weight

o the

obvious

ifferences







[4081

POLITICAL

THEORY/

NOVEMBER

1975

among

egimes.n some

regimes

specially,ot ll

menhave

part

n

rule.

The

objector

mmediatelynsists

n

differenceshile he

democrat

eeks

definition

oughly

itting

ost

ases.

t

is the

objector

who dentifies

he

first efmitions peculiar odemocracy. his peaker akes shispoint f

reference

hathe sees,

but he

nevertheless

refaces

isobservation

ith

principleustifying

is

emphasis

n

differing

egimes-the

rinciple

hat

things

differingn

form

re more

differenthansimilar. et

how he

reasons

rom his

principles unclear:

or

xample, e seems o

identify

the

unerring

ith he

prior nd

the

rringnd deviant

ith he atter,

s

if

he

were

prejudicedn

favor f

what

s

old.4 The form

f

his

argument

suggestshathe s

an

oligarch,nd

the

gist

s

that

t

s not

always

ecessary

to allow themany o rule.5Hisargumentonsistsmainlyncontradicting

the

democraticefinition

y

giving

xamplesfmore r

ess

ristocratic

r

oligarchicities.

This

oligarch,

hen,

nsists hat he

democratic

efinitione

revised.

e

says

that citizen s

one

who

has the

possibility

f

sharing

n

the

office

of

deliberatingnd

udging

with

kill, nd

that

city

s

a

multitude

f

suchmen

ufficientor

elf-sufficiency

f ife

1

27b1

-21).

Thus

ll free

born

men are not

full

citizens n

all regimes.

He

also

improves

he

democratic efinitionn

suggesting,

mbiguously,

hat the

origin

f

a

citizen

s in a

right

r a

capacity

nd that

he

quality

f a

citizen

s

doing

the

work

with kill.

Furthermore,e

adds

a final

ause:

citizenship

s for

the

sake

of the

self-sufficiency

f the

city.

He

clarifiesnd modifies he

first

efinition,lthough

e

does so

bymaking

ssertions,

ot

by

giving

reasons.

Whatever

isagreement

here

mightbe between

democrats

nd

ol-

igarchs,

ristotle

ausesus

to

realize rom

hat ollows1275b22-34) hat

theres

more

greed pon

than

not. n

ordinary

ircumstances,ne who s

descended

rom itizen

tock n

both

ides s bom

and

s

now

a

citizen,

and no

question s

everraised.

hat

deliberating

nd

udging e

donewell

rather

han

by most

or all

is of

concern o

some,

but tdoes

not

seem o

be as

essential

o the

itizen

s an

unimpeachable

enealogy ighte.

No

citizen,

owever,

as an

unimpeachableenealogy.

t

this

oint n

the

text,Aristotle

alls

our attention

o

the bon mot

of

Gorgias,

he

rhetorician.he citizens oughtto define n unmade citizen,but

Gorgias,

sking

how the first

itizen

ould have

been

born

of citizen

parents,

rges

hat

Larissaean

itizens

avebeen

made

by

Larissaean

magistrates

called

demiourgoi)

n the

same

waythat ther

Larissaeans

(a

larissa

was

a

kettle) re

made by

other

demiourgoi

the word

for

craftsmen).

he

opinion

heldby

citizens nd

reported y

Aristotles

that







Winthrop

ARISTOTLE

[4091

tihe

itle f citizen s inherited

rom

ne's

parents.

ut as the

first

itizen

obviously ould

not

have

nherited

is

title,

e musthavebeen made

a

citizen

y himself

r someone lse.Either

e

was

merely

made

citizen

r

he deservedo be a citizen.Weare edtowonderwhy he citizennsists

that

itle o rule sconferred

rimarilyy citizen

irth,

ot

ability.

Aristotle's

orrected

efinition

f

a

citizen

was

political

ecause

t

ambiguouslyeproducedhe

city's haracteristic

oncernwith

raditional

forms nd unconcernwith excellence.

Gorgias

mockinglyxposes

the

citizen's

ifficulty

o

his

own

profit,

orhe

claims

o teach n

art f

rule

to

citizens f

various ities.Hispunmeans hat ll

cities

re

conventional,

or

made, nd

that he trueruler

s

the

artificer.

uling

s

making.

orgias

thus alls ntoquestion heclaim hat ny raditionalrdermight aveon

a

citizen's

llegiance,or

t

seems

hat hecitizen

whowants

o

mitate he

first itizen lso

ought

o

makehimself,

r make

omething

f

himself

y

himself.

Political artisansre closer

o one

another han o

foreignhetoricians

because

hey

akethe ncestral rder

nd

their

wn

capacities

or

ranted,

but

t

is

unclearwhereAristotletands.What e

apparentlypposes

most

is

Gorgias'outspoken

mockery

f citizen

dignity.6

et

if

Gorgias

f

Leontinimocks, he LittleLion perhaps eeks o know s

well.7

What

claim

hould

he

given

olitical

rder aveon a

citizen,

nd

why

hould

t

be

assumed

hat

the

capacity

o

rule comes from

birth,

not from n

acquired rt? Thesemaynotbe

the

citizen's

uestions,

ut

they

re

our

questions,nd they

may

be

Aristotle's.

orgias,

he killed

peaker nd

the

man

who

raises doubt, 8

reveals o us the

city's

ncompleteness,oth

in its

unconcern

orthe arts

withwhichGorgias s

fascinatednd

n its

inabilityo defend

tself

gainst is tellingmockery.

Moreover,t

is only

afterGorgias' hetoricalisplay hatAristotle efersowhat weassert,

that s, to his

ownphilosophic

eaching.9

The text

reads

s if

Aristotle imself ad now

enterednto a

dialogue

with hecitizens

nd

Gorgias1

275b34-1276a6). he

possibilityhat

here

is

some art f

rulings

suggestedy Gorgias nd s not

denied y

Aristotle.

But

Aristotle

tresses is

attachmento

Athens y meansof his

xamples

and rejects

he use

of a

criterion f artful uling or

udging

thenians,

thus

ndicatinghat hebest

ttained y

any ctual

Athenian ulers more

likely o be rule naccordancewith hebestAthenian ustom hanwith

some

transcultural

rt. He

does insist n

the criterionf ustice,

bout

which

Gorgias

was silent.He

thus

nnounces is

ntentionf protecting

kind

of

good

citizenship ossible for

untutored

Athenians.

His first

political

ct is

an

attempt

o

save

the

dignity f the city-perhaps

o that

one

might

e

indignant ith

t

when

t

s not

dignified.







[4101 POLITICAL

THEORY

/

NOVEMBER

1975

Aristotle ay

have some dditional

urpose

n

makingustice

he

focus

of

the citizens' ispute.

he

citizenswho

seekthe definition

f

a

citizen

simply, s

distinguishedrom made

citizen,

nvoke distinction

f

which heymight ot be fully ognizant.orthe citizen s a citizen,he

city

s

hiswhole, he

world

n

which

e dwells

nd from

which

e takes

his

own definition.

e

gives

o

explanation

f

how

the

whole

of

which

e s

a

part

came to be.

Instead, e attemptso distinguish

t and ts

parts

rom

the thingswhose

genesiswe can

explain:purposive

uman roductions.

What

s made byman's rts smade

because he

rtisan

ntends

t for

ome

end. Whathas not

been made byman's arts

for

his

use

is

difficult

o

define,

ecause he

maker's ntention

ay

notbe obvious

nd

because

we

cannot onfrontim.Weknow goodlarissaa kettle)whenwesee t at

work as

a

larissa.

We

do not know

a

good

Larissaean rom

ooking

At

Larissaeans

t

work s

citizens nless

we knowwhat

Larissaeans

for.A

kettle

s

made

for

ooking, utwhatuse

has

a

citizen?

Upon reflection,owever, e

might onsider hether

olitics ught

o

be contrasted

o

art.

n

implicitly

ontrastingolitics

o

art,

he

citizen

makes

distinctionhatreminds

s

of

a

philosophic

istinction

etween

natural nd artificial,r between

hingswhich re

not and which

re of

human

making.

orgias alls our

ttentiono

this

istinction.

he citizens

seekan unmade itizen, nd the

city,Aristotle as

said,

s a

whole ust

like

some

other

whole.The citizenn his

thinkingubstitutes

he

city

or

the

whole of

nature,

or all

that

s

not man-made.

ut

in

making

distinctionetween

he

political

nd the

artful, aralleling

hedistinction

between atural

nd

artificial,

he

citizen orgetshat tmay

be a

part f

man's

nature o

makewith rt,

ccordingo reason. t

might e possible o

understandature

s devoid f

artful eings, ut s

Gorgias

otcorrectn

suggestinghat a

ruler,who is

human nd therefore potentially

rtful

being,might pply

his skill opolitics? he correct

istinction aynot

be

between olitics

nd art, s the

citizen irst ishes t,forpoliticsmay

be

more rtful

han

natural.

By

natural

s

meantwhat s given, hat s, not

madeby man.What

s

natural,s

distinguishedrom

man-made, ust we ts xistence o

chance

or

necessity.

What

existsby necessitys the

subjectof science,

ot

art.'1 Thissciencemight ry o understandature s if t weremattern

motion,

with

nothing nalogous o human

ntentionnd reason

manifest

in

it.'2 Thus

paralleling r underlyinghe

citizen'sperhaps

ncorrect

distinction

etween

he political

whole and art s a

natural cience hat

makes

problematiceparation

etween henatural

hole nd humanrt

or

purposive

aking.







Winthrop

ARISTOTLE

[41

1]

Gorgias alls o our ttention othman's

bility

o

make

hings

o

meet

his needs,

ike

kettles,nd

his

ownability

o

speak

nd reason.

He reminds

us of human makingswhich

are

perhaps

not

merely

onventional

r

arbitrary. orgias oes notmakethis rgumentorhimself, owever. e

not

only

fails o

giveduerecognition

o

thenatural

apacity

or rt

found

in

human eings, ut he

seemsunaware

f theconditions

hich

make

rt

possible

n this

world.

These

conditions

most

obviously

nclude

the

material

ecessary

o effect

ne's

object,

uch s metal

n the

casting f

kettles. hey ess obviouslynclude egularities

n

the order f

cause

and

effectwhichmay nstigate urmakings

nd

allow

us

to

replicate

hem.

Theseconditions annot

e understood

o havebeen made

by

the

rtisan

himself;heymust egiven,r natural.

When

he citizen

ttempts

o

connect itizen

irth,

hus

ausation,

o

making

man's

humanity

manifest

hrough oliticalwork,

we

are

led to

expect

hat

itizen

irth

will

be

shown

o be

a

cause

of

human

xcellence

in the same manner s

natural

genesis,

for the

citizen,

o

repeat,

understandshe

city

s

an

unmade

whole,

s nature.To natural

enesis

Gorgias pposes

human

productiony art,

with

onsequences

ubversive

to

the dignity f citizens

nd their

opinions.

Aristotle

llows

us

to

recognize his ntagonism.

s presented

n

Book

III,

his

philosophizing

beginswith

the

reinterpretation

f

nature nd causation

or

he sake of

rescuing easonable olitical

pinion

rom he

critique

f

expertise,hile

at

the same ime

nsuring

hat

olitical pinion

s

reasonable

ycorrecting

it in the lightof Gorgias'

easonable ritique f it. Gorgias'

isplay

f

man's

capacities

or

speech, nquiry,

nd

art

ought

o be

given

olitical

recognition,nd the expert

Gorgias ught o do justiceto the

citizen's

respect or somethingiven,whichboth imits nd stabilizes uman rt.

For

Aristotle proper

nderstandingf politics mbodies ndtherefore

gives s accessto a plausible nderstandingf therelation

etween ature

and human urposiveness.

In

order to

elucidate

this thesis, et us reconsider he

arguments

summarizedhus ar romhis oint f view.

In the first

ttempt

o define

citizen,he itizenssaid o be

one who

participatesn the rchewhich s beyond efinition.rchemeans

otonly

office r ruler, ut beginningnd first r governingrinciple.o the

citizen

who rules

s

meant o

be the

truebeginningnd cause of all

things. hiscitizen imply,

e are told, s not citizen y chancingo be a

citizen;

he is a

citizen ither

lwaysorby someregular nd

explicable

cause.

He is

said to be

responsible

or ll or the

most

overeign

hings.

e

reminds

s not

so much f a Socrates, ho,when ccused f

nquiringnto







[412] POLITICAL

THEORY

/

NOVEMBER

1975

the heavens nd

under

he

arth, as

compelled

o defend

hilosophy,

ut

rather f what

Socrates nquired fter,

he first

rinciple y

which

he

being f all things

nd

of

their eing

whole

s

known.13

The citizenparticipatesy judging s well as byruling, owever,nd

the judge does suggest man.

To speak of

participatingn the first

principle y udgings to imply,t

wouldseem, hat

he

first

rinciple

s

somethingntelligentr intelligible.14

et

this s not

specified;

he

first

principles

undefined, r

unlimited, nd what s common o

udge

and rulers nameless. ailing o

name his

ommunity ight ause ome

to

questionts

xistence, or he

mind hat udges eems o have

nothingn

common

with

what

has

brought

ll

things

nto

being

f

ll

things

re

body,

neither aused nor governed y intelligence. he Athenian emocrat

cannot

cogentlyink

citizen

irth

o citizen apacity

f

he thinks f an

undefined irst

ause.

In

the

meantime,he

philosophic democrat,

n

failing o articulate

hemanner f

being f thefirst

ause, atisfieseither

our

public-spiritedoncern

or

olitics

orourdesire o

be

wise.

We

can

now

better nderstandhe

objection

ffered

y

the

oligarch,

who

insists

hat

all

things

re

subordinateo

eide,

forms

r

species.

His

argument eginswith

the

obvious nd reasonable riticismo

which

he

first efinitions subject: someoneusinghis senses,not to mention

sensible

man, perceives

hat

a

man,

for

example,

ooks and

acts

and,

therefore, erhaps s

different rom

a

beast.

Visible differences

re

indications

f

different

atures.

The whole

is

composed

of

parts

subordinateo

differentorms,nd differencen

form

s

more mportant

than

he dentity

f

substance.

The

oligarch roceeds

o

explain

hat n the

regimes

hich

we

see,

one

judgesonlypartly

y

the

first

rinciple,

r

one

udges

ome

hings y

one

principlend others y another. urthermore,n characterizinghe first

definition f a

citizenas

democratic,

he

oligarch

ays

that n

some

regimes,

he

non-democraticnes,

participation

s

possible,but not

necessary.

n

particular,

an's

perfection

oes not fall

wholly

within

the

necessary orkingsf nature.

ut

t s

perhaps

nnecessarylso nthe

sense hat

udging

nd

deliberating

n

the basisof certain

pinions

might

be

a

sufficient

ubstitute

or

wisdom.

The

oligarch

peaks

of a

limited

ruling rinciple. en,but

not other

eings,

re

ruled

y human

rudence,

a deliberationnthe ight fanopinion bout hehuman ood.1 Perhaps

thephilosophic

oligarch

oo

could

bespeak judgmentbout hewhole

by

defining

t

withreference

o some

partial

whole

within

t,

the

political

whole.

Such

a

definition,

owever

ecessary

s

a

beginning,

ouldremain

hypothetical

ntil

t

could

be

shown

that

the

whole

s

similar o the

political

hole.







Winthrop

ARISTOTLE

[413]

The

oligarchic

correction

s

closer

to both reasonable

non-

philosophic ommon ense and

to the

tradition f

political

hilosophy

initiated

y

Plato or the

Platonic

ocrates.

t

begins

with ense

perception

ora teachingboutforms. uman ommonense ndpolitical hilosophy

take the

same side against

democracy

nd

a

certain

kind of natural

philosophy.

Citizens

quate

being

man

with

being

political,

nd

they

ssume

hat

man is

naturally

part

of

a

whole.

It

appears

o us from

Aristotle's

presentation,owever,

hat hey o

notgive n explanationf

what auses

a

whole

nd tsparts o be

as they

re. n

addition,hey

ail o

account

or

purposive uman

making.

he

philosophers

oo have

attempted

o

define

therelation f

rulingitizens

o

their

ity,

hat

s,

the

whole

f

nature,

nd

they too fail to

make

intelligible

o us how

the

citizens, e

they

first

substance

r

forms,

re

responsible

or he

being

f

each and

every art

f

the

whole nd for

he

whole's eing

what

t

s.

Thedifficulty,

s Aristotle

emindss with

he

prompting

f

Gorgias,

s

not

only

that

we ought o

consider hether

olitics

s

more

rtificial

han

natural,

ut

that

the

cause

of

genesis

nd

change,

r

responsibility

or

being, eedstobeclarified.orgiasskshowcities nd citizens ave ome

to

be

as

they re,

nd heasserts hat

hey

avebeenmadebyart.

Aristotle

connects

Gorgias' eflection

n

founders

o

changes

n

regimes,

ence o

changes.

orgias

upposes

hat rt s

prior

o

politics

nd to nature

s the

cause

of

their

eing nd

changes.

e

thinks

hat

n

speaking

f art

he

can

make

genesis nd

change

ntelligible,

hereas n

speaking

f

nature

s

hitherto

efined

we couldnothave

done o.

The democrat ho

postulates

that being s

one in

participating

n one eternal

ubstance

ouldnot

accountfordifference,uch ess change r

generation.16

The oligarch

who

postulates

hatbeing

s form

ouldnot explain

how

somethingan

change

ts

form

nd still e

saidto

be.' Gorgias,he

Little

ion,doesnot

offer

more

satisfactory

ccount

fnature,which

he

understandso be

material

or

human

roductions.

ather, e denigrateshe

mportancef

the

material y

turningis

ttentiono themaker. e

thereby

mplies hat

purposive

making as

no

natural r

necessaryimits;

hemaker r

changer

need

not

respect

natures.Then

both the citizen's

respect for the

traditional holehehasbeen given nd thephilosopher'sxaminationf

the

natural

whole

re

senseless ecause hey

re

unnecessary.

orgiass a

little

lion

in

reminding

s

that

political

and natural

causation

re

problematicnd

that heymight e

comprehendedy using

man's rt

s a

model

of

causation.

But

he is only a

little

ion,

for

although

e

implicitly

ontends hat

the

artisan as no

need to reason

boutwhat

s







[414] POLITICAL

THEORY

/

NOVEMBER

1975

given,we doubt thatevery eingwe perceive ould

be

cast

nto

a

good

larissa.

Aristotlepparentlyhares urdoubt

s

well

s ourdebt

o

Gorgias,

or

he leads us to reexaminehequestion fwhat he itys. Nowhe asksnot

what the citizen s, but how the city

or the whole can be said to

be

responsible

or ts

deeds and

how

it

can be

said to

maintain

ts

dentity

(1276a8-9, 1276al7-19). In otherwords,he asks how we can say

that

something

s a

cause

of

being r

s responsibleor eing.

As presented,he nquiry riginates

n a

political ispute.

t

begins

with

an

allegation ut forth y some

who choosenotto keep heir ontracts

because he contracts ereundertakenot by the ity, utby the yrant.

These some are more concernedwithdoingwhat s fittinghanwith

obedience o any aw or authority

erely ecause t is in force, or hey

specify he conditions nderwhich

heymight eep their ontracts

y

distinguishingegimes

hat re

for

he akeof thebenefit

n

common

9

from egimes hat re by being

trong. ustice,nternationalr internal,

usually means nothing

o

much

as keepingone's contracts,20nd

a

politicalcommunityeems to

be kept

a

whole by

the

laws,

or the

contracts

willed

by

the

strongest

orce

n

a

community. change

f

regime,

owever,means hatthepowerof law no longer btains, nda

man s

presented ith

n

opportunity

o

pass udgment

n the

aw and to

choosewhether

r not

to

obey

t.

n

effect,

e

must

emake he

whole

or

himself.

n

politicalpractice, heopportunity

or

making

uch

choices

s

accompanied y thenecessity f

appealing o some standard or hoice f

that

making

s

to seemnot arbitrarynd thereby

o

acquiremoral s well

as

physicaluthority.

TheargumenteqWred ythemanwhomustmake political hoice,

that there re regimes hat are

forthe benefitn common, ut arenot

necessarilytrong,

nd

that

by

reference

o

them

one

justifies reaking

contracts,

s said

to be

akin

o another

ifficulty:

hen

o

say

that

he

city

is the

same,

not

the

same,

or other,when,

for

example,

he

human

beings

become unharnessed 2

and make theirhomes n another

place.

This

n turn

s

similar o

the

difficulty

f

when

o

believe hat

he

city

n

which

human

eings

make

heir

omes

own

or

settle

own s

one city. In attemptingo resolve these difficulties,ristotle irst

mentions

superficial pproach

which

egards

he

place,

notthe

human

beings. erhaps

human

beings

ecome

unharnessed

ot

only

from his

or

that

place,

but

from

lace

altogether;

or

search

fthem

onducted

n

a

city spoken

bout wouldbe tamer.

Neither

earch

s

made

at

this

time. hysical ontinuity

annotmake

unity

f

theparts

f

thewhole,

s







Winthrop

ARISTOTLE

[415]

we are

remindedhat he

Peloponnesusould

not be madeone by

a

wall

surroundingt. As

perceived, ody s particular,

ot unified.

easonable

speech,

or human

being,

s

one's own, but seems to

be common

preciselyn beingperceived.22f there reregimeshat rebyvirtue f

their

enefitingnd

bringingogether

hat

s

common,

hey

re

better

understood

ithreference

o

rational

eings

han

o bodies.

Nevertheless,

our first

oncern

s

with

human

eings

who

settle own

or ive n

cities,

notto

mention

odies.

Aristotle

irst

oses two

alternative

ssertionsbout

wholes:

ither ne

asserts hat the

city

remains he same

f its

race,

or

genus

genos),

of

settlers

s the

same, exactly

s we

are n

the

habit f

saying

hat

river

or stream emains he sameeven s its matters corruptedndborn ;or

one

asserts hat hehuman

eings

re the

same,

but the

city

s other.

Of

course

not all

of

us are n the

habit

of

speaking

bout

riversn this

way.

Heraclituss

renowned

or

having

sserted

hat

ne can never

tep

nto he

same river

wice

because

the river s

its

particles

f

matter nd

these,

always

being corrupted nd

born,

are

not

the

same,

but

different

particles.2

Aristotlemakes

no

explicit

eferenceo

Heracitus,

ut

he

mentions

river

whose

parts

re

always oming

nto

being

nd

being

orrupted,

nd

he contrastshe

consequent roblem

f

affirming

he

dentity

fthe

river

to

what

we

are n thehabit f

saying.

e

thus

uggests

o us

that

he

has

in

mind

philosophy

r

science

as

opposed

to

everyday

speech

nd a

philosophy xemplified

y Heracitus' doctrine

f

flux. n the

Meta-

physics,we

are

told that

Heracitus

aught

hat

ll

sensible

hings

re n

flux

nd

that

he

convictionhat

Heraclitus as

corrected

Platoto posit

thetheory f forms,ternal eings, ecausethere anbe no science f

what

s in

flux.24 lato

taught

hat

being

ies

n

the

separated

ntelligible

forms n

which all sensible

thingsparticipate.Without

mmediately

attempting

o

resolve

he

theoreticalssues

nvolved,

et

us

consider

hat

the

political mplication f

Heracitus' teaching

s

conventionalismr

historicism:

ince

beings

nd the

totality

f

beings

re

radically emporal

and

variable,

ll

assertionsbout the

natural

elations f beings o one

another

must

be

similarlyontingent.he

political

mplicationf Plato's

assertedesponse o Heracitus anperhaps ebest tated yrecallinghat

the

ust

city f the

Republic s madepossible

nlyby an

abstractionrom

body

and

s

therefore

mpossible.2

Plato's political eaching

s paradoxi-

cal.

Aristotle's

ntention, e suggest,s not

only to oppose

Heracitus'

theoretical atural

cience, ut

Plato's

paradoxical ssertionss well.To

both

of

these he

opposes first

common sense

perception, hen a









Winthrop ARISTOTLE [417]

any

moderate nd

lawful rder.They

do

not sense

any

need

to

defend

their ttachmento

Thebes,

lthough hey nsist hat

olitics,

ot

culture,

determineshe

being

f Thebes.

They

acknowledge

hat here

might

e

a

legitimateange fopinions boutwhich ormsre ust,but

they equire

that

there be some

lawfulorderwhichmakes ts end the

benefilt

n

common.

Let

us

now consider

Aristotle's

we

assert :

if

the

city

is

some

community,

t

is

a

community

f

citizens

n

a

regime,

nd

becoming

ther

in form

nd different

n regime,

t

necessarily

eems

to be not

the

same-exactly

s

we assert hat chorus

s

other

when omic

han

when

tragic

1276bl4).

The

being

of

each chorus

s determined

hiefly y

its

specific

orm,

ven

f

the

dentity

f the

genus, horus,

s

necessary

o

permit

he

comparison.

We

know

that

Greek

omic

and

tragic

horuses

differed

n

the

arrangements

f the ines

nd files f

chorus

members. his

visible ifference as caused

by

the

particular

rder

iven

he

parts,

nd

n

identifying

he

chorus, ts order,or

form,

not

the individual

horus

members,

r

matter,

s

whatwe

must

erceive.

By

analogy, hen,

ne needs o

knowhowAthenians

ave

constituted

their

political order as well as

that they are

Athenians

n

order o

determine

hether thens

s

or is not the

same

city.

The

political

rder,

theway

n which

multitudefhuman eings

rderstself

r

maintainsn

order

s

the

definitiveause of the

city.

Aristotle

rings

he

deliberate

content f

politics

o the fore

without

enying

hat

t

has a

non-rational

matrix,

orhe

says

hat

ameness

nd othernessre

determined

chiefly -

not

only-by

the

regime. itizens

re

rightn

taking

eriously

he

political

order f the

city

n

which hey

havebeen born.The form f the

whole,

which s determinedy the orderof theparts,s the most mportant

political

fact,

and the

parts might

rearrange

hemselves. eason

and

intention re

added

to culture hrough

olitics. his s

how

one

makes

politically esponsible

ssertionbout

citieswhose

parts

re

both race

of

settlers

nd

human

eings.

Aristotle

ells us that

chorus

s similar o

all other

ommunitiesnd

compounds,

he

example

f

which

s

a

harmony

f

sounds.

he

examples

of

harmonies

sed

are

Dorian

and

Phrygian.

lsewheren the

Politics,

these re used to representligarchs, ho areprecise ndmasterful,nd

democrats,

ho

are

open

and

soft.26

Ultimately,hey

re

thymos nd

eros, arts

f the

oul.

That he

being

f a

city

an be known y

ooldng

t

its

regime

s an

analogue f the

teaching hat

ne knows human oul

n

knowing

ts

order.27

Man's

makings

re

circumscribed

y

psychic

harmonies,

s

well

as

by

the

customs f

political eings.

Art

mitates

r







[418] POLITICAL

THEORY

/

NOVEMBER 1975

perfects

ature.28

What

he

political

rt

makes

s

a beautiful hole

which

resembles human oul,

for this s the nature

hatthe

political

rt

imitatesnd perfects.

We have contendedthat Aristotle's ssertions re meantto be

politically esponsible,orthey llow making

given

egime

s good as

possible eem reasonable hing o do.29 We also contend

hat

Aristotle

wishes

us to learn about

responsibility,

ausation

n general, rom

politics and from citizens' assertions bout political wholes.3

All

communities

nd

compounds

re

compared

o

a

chorus

yAristotle;ny

other rder an be understood y analogy.Reflection pon

the apparent

order fvisible hings,uchas theheavens,eadsone towonderbout

he

cause of its order.Aboutthe efficientause, he citizen ansay nothing

politicallyseful nd thephilosopheran saynothingertain.Whatwe can

ascertain bout perceptible holes s that the

form

onstitutedy

the

parts

n an

order

s

thebeing f thewhole.The cause

s

the form

which

inheres n the matter, nd the matter s

a

cause incidentally,ot

essentially.erception f the order s an ordermight e

said

to

be

a

cause

of ts

order

n

another ay.

We

thought

he

citizens'

efinitions

f

a

citizen nacceptable

ecause

they old us littleor nothing bout how the origin nd the quality

f a

citizen

re

related.

n

fact,however,hey

old us almost

verything,

nd

we failed o

see

this

because we did not

think hatforms

re

causesof

being.

The

citizen old us almost verything

ecause

hey

did

not

tell

us

how partsmight

iffer

nd yetbe related

o

one

another

ndto

purposive

human

making.

ristotle's

onsiderationfwhen

he

city an

be

said

to

be

the same or other s meant o answer hese uestions. hisdifficulty,e

recall, s akinto the difficultyonfrontedy the citizenwhowishes o

disregardegalcontracts,

ence

orms,ecause hey

renotfor he

benefit

in

common.This citizen easons hatall forms

ustly

onstituted ust

intend s

their nd thebenefitn

common. ccording

o his

reasoning,

he

distinctiveness

f

formss transcendedot n seeking he imilarityfthe

matter f

which ll

of formedmatter artakes, ut

n

considering

hat

end the forms hare.Change s ustified ith eferenceo that nd,hence

explained. Change s effected r a new whole generated y human

beingswho ntend hat nd.Artisans,oo, ntendhebeneficial,ndwhat

movesthe artisan

o

make s better

rticulated

y

the

citizen

han

by

Gorgias.Nevertheless,

ristotle's eferences

o

Gorgias

with

his universal

art,

o

true

hings nseen,

o

regimes

hat renot

trong,o human

eings

unharnessednd

iving s

one in

a

city poken bout, nd

to

compounds

likeharmonies

emind s of a human oul and ts speech ndof a nature







Winthrop ARISTOTLE [419]

with

which

t is in

harmony.

he whole s

completed

ywisdom,

he nd

towardwhich uman peech nd

the

desire

o

perfect

t

point.

Purpose s perceivedwithin

he

whole

when

one asks bout

the

final,

not thematerialrefficient,auseof forms. ponreflection,hecauseby

which

he

chorus,

nd

therefore

ther

wholes,

s

fully ntelligible

s the

intention o have manifest eautybeheld.

Both

politics

nd

nature,

s

formedmatter, re

in

themselves.

et their

being

coincides

with the

purposive umanmakingwhich

s the

making

f wholes n

speech.31

If

the whole of naturehas a

first

ause,

that

s a

cause

which

s

logically

prior,

t

is contemplation,

he final

cause

towardwhich

ntellect

nd

intelligibles ove.

Neither fascination ithnatural ciencewhicheadsus toforgethat

man

s an

exemplary art

of nature or a fascination ith

rt

which eads

us to

forget

hatman s

a

part

of nature

ermits

he

olution

ffered

y

political hilosophy, hich egins y taking olitics

eriously

n

its

own

terms. ausation, ccording o Aristotle,s correctly nderstood y

the

citizen

whose oncern

or

his

city

auseshim

o

wonder

bout

disavowing

responsibilityor ts deeds

f its

laws have

not

been beneficial. ristotle

mustdemonstrate

o

such man, s

he does n

the

Politics nd

the

Ethics,

thatthe truebenefitn commons philosophizingboutpolitical eings

and wholes esemblingoliticalwholes, uthe neednotdemonstrateow

to look at

a

whole, for this the philosopher as himself

earned rom

politics.3

According

o

Aristotle,hen, olitical cience,

n

order

o be

scientific,

need not

refer o causes differentrom hose bout

which responsible

citizen

ends o think.

Aristotle's heoretical

cience

n

its

most

obvious

formulations,

is

assertions, ttempts

o

demonstrate

he

plausibility

f

a political perspective. his argumentbout howthewhole s to be

comprehendedeedsto be made because

heres

always possibilityhat

someone will make

assertions

bout

theoretical cience

which make

common ense

eem enseless.33

For

Aristotle,olitics, roperlynderstood,

s

form

r order onscious-

ly

maintained

nd occasionally eformed

or

he

sake of forminghebest

human

eings.Nature, roperly nderstood,

s

an orderwhosefirst

ause

is

made manifest y the best humanbeing.Both

are

given o man,yet

both

are

gracedby

man

whenhe intends is own excellence.

ristotle's

science an be

a

science f reasonable ommon ense nd he can demand

that

philosophers e politically esponsible ecause

he holds that the

common

ense

f

a

good citizen

s

responsible.







[420]

POLITICAL THEORY

/

NOVEMBER 1975

NOTES

1. Politics, 274b31-1276bl5.

his

s

the first f six

examinations

n

Book

III. Allreferencesreto theOxford lassical ext fthe olitics,Oxford, 957).

2. Thucydides,

istory f

the

PeloponnesianWar, Cambridge,

ass.,1919),

Book II, Ch. 61-67.

3. As in a

democracy, citizen

s

said o participate ithoutimit

f

time

n

the

jury

nd n

the ssembly.

he

man ffering

he

definition,

resumablyavinglways

lived

n

a democracy,peaks fofficesimited r

unlimited

n

time ecause

e

knows

only

ot or

rotation, ot

election,

s themeans

f filling

ffices. t one

point,

e

substitutes embershipn

the ssembly or he

magistracies,ecause he ssemblys

sovereignna democracy.

f. 1317bl7-1818a3

or list

f

democratic odes.

4.

At

1275a38-b3 t is said thatregimes

iffer,

hat

ome

are ater nd

some

prior, ndthat he rringnddeviant egimesrenecessarilyater. ntheMetaphysics

(Bloomington,nd.,

1966, 1018b9-1019al4),Aristotle xplains

that temporal

priority

s

only

one kind

f

priority,o theusagen the olitics oesnot

necessarily

mean arliern

time.

5.

The

speakers more

worldly,

orhe

has information,

oreor

ess

correct,

about

foreignegimes;e

makes uthoritativetatements;espeaks f

necessitiesnd

self-sufficiencys might

business an.He

distinguishesimselfromther itizens,

revealingdistaste

or

he

emos.

6. The corrected efinition f a citizen was

ambiguous

nsofar

s

the

requirementf skillwas added,butnotemphasized,nd the end was said to be

self-sufficiency,

hich s similar o

utility.

t

1275b31,

Aristotle

efers

o the

previouslyrated

definition, husbidding s to

compare

is

rhetorico thatof

Gorgias.

7. Aristotlentroduces

orgias

s

Gorgias

f

Leontini,

hichs both he

name

f

his

city

nd

Of

theLittle ions. At

1284al5

Aristotle,

n

reporting

n assertionf

Antisthenes',acitly

ompares hilosophers

o lions.The

leonine

uality

s

the

use of

speech

r reason o understand

peech

n contrasto

the

use

of speech

or

political

nds,

s

Gorgiasmay

se

t.

8.

'To raise a

doubt,

or to

be

at a

loss, aporeo)

s

frequently

sed

byAristotleo ndicate hat philosophicnquirysbeing ressed.

9.

Some

hings

re

said

by

Aristotle

lego,

he oot

f

ogos,

eason, peech,

r

reasonable

peech)

n the

way

thatone

mightrgue

with

reasonableman.Other

things

re

asserted,

pheme)

n the

way

that

one

might ope

to

discourage

argument

ith

display

f

self-confidence,

s for

xample,

hen

xpressingolitical

opinions

nd

n

teaching.

10. Aristotle,hysics,

Cambridge, ass.,

929), 192b8-9,

95b30-196b9.

11.

Aristotle,

icomachean

thics,Oxford,

894),1139b22-23,

140al7-18.

12. In the

last

portion

f the

second

book of

the

Physics,

99b33-200b9,

Aristotle istinguishesetweenunderstandingsf naturalnecessitywhich are

mechanisticr

mathematical

nd

his,

which s

purposive.

ne

might peak of

necessity

n

the ense hat

heavy bject

necessarily

alls

o earth

r

n the

ense hat

the

ngles

f

triangleecessarilyqual

two

right

ngles.

utone

might

lso

speak f

necessity

n

the sense

hat ricks re

necessary

n the

building

f

a house, lthough

bricks annot

e

said to

cause

the

houseas does the

purpose f the rchitect;he

bricks re

hypotheticallyecessary

o

effect he

purpose.

Construing atural







Winthrop

ARISTOTLE

[421]

causation as

analogous

to artful

ausation,

Aristotle

equires

he

physicist

o

consider

not only the

material, but the causes of

motion,

which

can be

understood

as

purposive,

r

intending

n

end.

13. The citizen s

distinguished

rom

metic,

a resident

lien,

of

whom

t is

said

that

he

mayparticipate

n the

city's ustice

so

far s to be involved n lawsuits nd

to

need a

patron to

representhim

in

court.

The reader

may

thus

be

reminded

of

Socrates'

trial and defense of

philosophy

before

the

city.

n that

defense,

ocrates

portrays is activities

s

a vindication

f the oracle or

the

god,

who

may,

of

course,

also be

thought

f

by

many

s the first

ause.

14.

For a

comparison

f the

metaphysician

o

a

judge,

see

Aristotle,

Metaphysics,

translated y

Hippocrates

G.

Apostle,

Bloomington,

nd.,1966),

995b3-4.

15. Ethics,

1097a30-35, 1141a20-29.

16. In both

the

Physics

and

the

Metaphysics

Aristotle

begins by

reviewing

he

teachings f hispredecessors.He insists hatwe mustbegin hestudyofnaturewith

what

is

most

familiar nd

clear to

us,

that

s,

the observation f wholes and

motion,

although

he

himselfbegins

by

refuting

heorieswhich make this

kind of

beginning

seem

not to lead to

correct

onclusions Physics,

184al1-b14,

185al3-14).

Neither

those, ike

Parmenides,who hold

thatnature s

one

nor thosewho hold thatnature s

unlimited

matter can

make these

phenomena

intelligible

Physics,

184bl5ff,

187al2ff;Metaphysics,

88b23-32).

17.

Those

who spoke of

forms are, of

course, Socrates and

Plato. The first

application

of

forms was in the

examination

of the

moral virtues,

lthough

Plato

expanded their

use

(Metaphysics,

987a30-bl4,

1078b9-32).

Cf.

Plato,

Phaedo,

(Cambridge,

Mass., 1914),

97B-102A,

for

the PlatonicSocrates'

account

of

his

study

of

nature.

According to

Aristotle,

he separated

forms

do

not

explainmotion

and

change

Metaphysics,

079b

1

2

ff.).

1i. Cf.

Physics

199al9-20.

The

progression

f Books

I

and II as

a

whole

should

be

considered n

this ight:

fromthetheories riticized

n Book

I,

to the

distinction

between

natural

and artificial

at the

beginning

f Book

II,

to the

increasingly

emphasized

omparison fnatural

ausation

to artful ausation.

19. To

koine

sympheron.

ympheron

means the

bringing ogether

s well

as

benefit. To

koine

symperhon, s

distinguished

rom

o

koinon

ympheron,means

bringing ogetherntowhat s common,whichmustbe a feminine, ingular ounas is

arche,

for

example. Or koine is an

adverbial ative, nd the

meaning s

then

benefit

or

bringing ogether

y

commonefforts. o

koinon

sympheron

uggests

benefit o

or

bringing ogether f

those who

have somethingn

common, s well

as theordinary

in

contrast o the rare.

20.

Cf.

Plato,

Republic, (New York,

1968)

331C, the first

efinition f

ustice;

Thomas

Hobbes, Leviathan

(Harmondsworth,

Eng., 1968),

p.

202, where

the

definition f

justice is the

performance f

covenants. olitics,

1280a25ff:

Aristotle

opposes

the opinion

thatthe city

s no

more than a

mutually

beneficial

ontractual

alliance for

preservation.

21. Cf. Politics, 1262a21-24. Phaedo, 88B (a reference o the soul's

becoming

unharnessedn

death).

22.

Politics,

1253a7-18:

Reason

(logos)

is

unique (idios) to

man

among all

creatures, ut t

is perhapswhat s

most

one's own

(idios)

to each

man.

23.

Heraclitus, r. 12

(Diels):

Upon those who

step nto

the same

rivers ifferent

and

again

different

atersflow. Socrates'

paraphrase s: Heraclitus

..

likens the







[422]

POLITICAL THEORY

/

NOVEMBER 1975

beings to a river,

aying hat you

cannot

step

into the same

river wice

(Cratylus,

Cambridge,Mass.,

1926: 402A).

24.

Metaphysics, 078bl2-17.

25. Republic, 479A, 472B-E, 462C. Aristotle'scriticism f the Republic, at

1261al0-14, is

that

this

city

is

impossible

and

Socrates

does

not

make clear what

ought o be done instead.

26. Politics,

1290a20-29.

27. Politics,

1253alS-19,

1285b29-33.

28.

Physics,199al5-17.

29. In Book IV, at

1289al-5,

Aristotle gainbids men to assume

responsibility y

reforming given

order,but therehe likens

reforming regime

o

relearning. pon

reflection, hat needsrelearning as not been learned

ightly

r well.

30. At the

end

of Book

II of

the

Physics,

198blO-200bll,

Aristotle

rgues

that

nature s purposeful.Nature is considered as if it mightbe an artifact199a8-21),

except that natural

things ave a principle f motion

within hemselves199bl6-17).

The

end,

or final

cause,

of a natural

being

s

its

form

199a31-33). Cf.Metaphysics,

1075al 1-16: We must lso

inquire

n

which of two

ways

the

nature f thewhole has

the

good and thehighest ood, whether s something

eparate nd by itself, r as the

order of its parts.Or does it have t in both ways, as in

the case of an army? or in an

armygoodness

exists both in the order and in thegeneral, nd rather n the general;

for

t is not because of the

order

hat

he exists,but theorder xistsbecause of him.

31.

Politics,

1278bl-5, 1287al-3, 1287a8-10, 1288a37-1288b2.

32. The reader's attention s called to the topic of the argument mmediately

following

he

present

one:

is the virtueof the good

man

and the serious citizen he

same?

The mostexplicit praise of the philosophic ife

s, of course, hat n whichthe

Ethics culminates

1177al2-1179a32). For the utility fanalyzingpolitical wholes,

cf.

Politics,

1283a3-17 and

context; Ethics,

1155bl-10 with 1167b28-29

and

1170al3-14: Aristotle

offers

more

natural

physical) explanation t theend of

hisanalysisof

friendship,

hich

beginswith n explicit

bstraction rom he opinions

of

men

like

Euripides, Heraclitus, nd Empedocles, who seek a

deeper and more

natural

physical)

explanation

f

human

friendship.

33. Consider the

context of

Aristotle'scriticism

f

Plato's

idea of the

good in

Book I of the Ethics: a considerationof the happy or good life. Cf. Politics,

1252a7-9.

Aristotle

frequently uzzles

over

the

implications

f the

assertions of

some.

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