Aristotel on Interpreting

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    On Interpretation

    By Aristotle

    Written 350 BCE

    Translated by E. M. Edghill

    SECTION 1

    Part 1

    First we must define the terms

    'noun' and 'erb'! then the terms

    'denial' and 'affirmation'! then

    '"ro"osition' and 'senten#e.'

    $"o%en words are the symbols of

    mental e&"erien#e and written

    words are the symbols of s"o%en

    words. ust as all men hae not

    the same writing! so all men hae

    not the same s"ee#h sounds! but

    the mental e&"erien#es! whi#h

    these dire#tly symboli(e! are the

    same for all! as also are those

    things of whi#h our e&"erien#es

    are the images.

    This matter has! howeer! been

    dis#ussed in my treatise about the

    soul! for it belongs to an

    inestigation distin#t from that

    whi#h lies before us.

    )s there are in the mind thoughts

    whi#h do not inole truth or

    falsity! and also those whi#h must

    be either true or false! so it is in

    s"ee#h.

    For truth and falsity im"ly#ombination and se"aration.

    *ouns and erbs! "roided nothing

    is added! are li%e thoughts without

    #ombination or se"aration+ 'man'

    and 'white'! as isolated terms! are

    not yet either true or false. ,n

    "roof of this! #onsider the word

    'goat-stag.' ,t has signifi#an#e! but

    there is no truth or falsity about

    it! unless 'is' or 'is not' is added!

    either in the "resent or in some

    other tense.

    Part 2

    By a noun we mean a sound

    signifi#ant by #onention! whi#h

    has no referen#e to time! and of

    whi#h no "art is signifi#ant a"art

    from the rest. ,n the noun

    'Fairsteed!' the "art 'steed' has no

    signifi#an#e in and by itself! as in

    the "hrase 'fair steed.' et there is

    a differen#e between sim"le and

    #om"osite nouns+ for in the former

    the "art is in no way signifi#ant! in

    the latter it #ontributes to the

    meaning of the whole! although it

    has not an inde"endent meaning.

    /

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    Thus in the word '"irate-boat' the

    word 'boat' has no meaning ee"t

    as "art of the whole word.

    The limitation 'by #onention' was

    introdu#ed be#ause nothing is by

    nature a noun or name-it is only so

    when it be#omes a symbol+

    inarti#ulate sounds! su#h as those

    whi#h brutes "rodu#e! are

    signifi#ant! yet none of these

    #onstitutes a noun.

    The e&"ression 'not-man' is not a

    noun. There is indeed no

    re#ogni(ed term by whi#h we may

    denote su#h an e&"ression! for it is

    not a senten#e or a denial. et it

    then be #alled an indefinite noun.

    The e&"ressions 'of 1hilo'! 'to

    1hilo'! and so on! #onstitute not

    nouns! but #ases of a noun. The

    definition of these #ases of a noun

    is in other res"e#ts the same as

    that of the noun "ro"er! but!

    when #ou"led with 'is'! 'was'! or

    will be'! they do not! as they are!

    form a "ro"osition either true or

    false! and this the noun "ro"er

    always does! under these

    #onditions. Ta%e the words 'of

    1hilo is' or 'of or 'of 1hilo is not'+

    these words do not! as they stand!

    form either a true or a false

    "ro"osition.

    Part 3

    ) erb is that whi#h! in addition to

    its "ro"er meaning! #arries with it

    the notion of time. *o "art of it

    has any inde"endent meaning! and

    it is a sign of something said of

    something else.

    , will e&"lain what , mean by

    saying that it #arries with it the

    notion of time. '2ealth' is a noun!

    but 'is healthy' is a erb+ for

    besides its "ro"er meaning it

    indi#ates the "resent e&isten#e of

    the state in uestion.

    Moreoer! a erb is always a sign

    of something said of something

    else! i.e. of something either

    "redi#able of or "resent in some

    other thing.

    $u#h e&"ressions as 'is not-

    healthy'! 'is not! ill'! , do not

    des#ribe as erbs+ for though they

    #arry the additional note of time!

    and always form a "redi#ate!

    there is no s"e#ified name for this

    ariety+ but let them be #alled

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    indefinite erbs! sin#e they a""ly

    eually well to that whi#h e&ists

    and to that whi#h does not.

    $imilarly 'he was healthy'! 'he will

    be healthy'! are not erbs! but

    tenses of a erb+ the differen#e

    lies in the fa#t that the erb

    indi#ates "resent time! while the

    tenses of the erb indi#ate those

    times whi#h lie outside the

    "resent.

    erbs in and by themseles are

    substantial and hae signifi#an#e!

    for he who uses su#h e&"ressions

    arrests the hearer's mind! and

    fi&es his attention+ but they do

    not! as they stand! e&"ress any

    6udgement! either "ositie or

    negatie. For neither are 'to be'

    and 'not to be' the "arti#i"le

    'being' signifi#ant of any fa#t!

    unless something is added+ for

    they do not themseles indi#ate

    anything! but im"ly a #o"ulation!

    of whi#h we #annot form a

    #on#e"tion a"art from the things

    #ou"led.

    Part 4

    ) senten#e is a signifi#ant "ortion

    of s"ee#h! some "arts of whi#h

    hae an inde"endent meaning!

    that is to say! as an utteran#e!

    though not as the e&"ression of

    any "ositie 6udgement. et me

    e&"lain. The word 'human' has

    meaning! but does not #onstitute a

    "ro"osition! either "ositie or

    negatie. ,t is only when other

    words are added that the whole

    will form an affirmation or denial.

    But if we se"arate one syllable of

    the word 'human' from the other!

    it has no meaning+ similarly in the

    word 'mouse'! the "art 'ouse' has

    no meaning in itself! but is merely

    a sound. ,n #om"osite words!

    indeed! the "arts #ontribute to the

    meaning of the whole+ yet! as has

    been "ointed out! they hae not

    an inde"endent meaning.

    Eery senten#e has meaning! not

    as being the natural means by

    whi#h a "hysi#al fa#ulty is

    reali(ed! but! as we hae said! by

    #onention. et eery senten#e is

    not a "ro"osition+ only su#h are

    "ro"ositions as hae in them

    either truth or falsity. Thus a

    "rayer is a senten#e! but is neither

    true nor false.

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    et us therefore dismiss all other

    ty"es of senten#e but the

    "ro"osition! for this last #on#erns

    our "resent inuiry! whereas the

    inestigation of the others belongs

    rather to the study of rhetori# or

    of "oetry.

    Part 5

    The first #lass of sim"le

    "ro"ositions is the sim"le

    affirmation! the ne&t! the sim"le

    denial+ all others are only one by

    #on6un#tion.

    Eery "ro"osition must #ontain a

    erb or the tense of a erb. The

    "hrase whi#h defines the s"e#ies

    'man'! if no erb in "resent! "ast!

    or future time be added! is not a

    "ro"osition. ,t may be as%ed how

    the e&"ression 'a footed animal

    with two feet' #an be #alled single+

    for it is not the #ir#umstan#e that

    the words follow in unbro%en

    su##ession that effe#ts the unity.

    This inuiry! howeer! finds its

    "la#e in an inestigation foreign to

    that before us.

    We #all those "ro"ositions single

    whi#h indi#ate a single fa#t! or the

    #on6un#tion of the "arts of whi#h

    results in unity7 those

    "ro"ositions! on the other hand!

    are se"arate and many in number!

    whi#h indi#ate many fa#ts! or

    whose "arts hae no #on6un#tion.

    et us! moreoer! #onsent to #all a

    noun or a erb an e&"ression only!

    and not a "ro"osition! sin#e it is

    not "ossible for a man to s"ea% in

    this way when he is e&"ressing

    something! in su#h a way as to

    ma%e a statement! whether his

    utteran#e is an answer to a

    uestion or an a#t of his own

    initiation.

    To return7 of "ro"ositions one %ind

    is sim"le! i.e. that whi#h asserts

    or denies something of something!

    the other #om"osite! i.e. that

    whi#h is #om"ounded of sim"le

    "ro"ositions. ) sim"le "ro"osition

    is a statement! with meaning! as

    to the "resen#e of something in a

    sub6e#t or its absen#e! in the

    "resent! "ast! or future! a##ording

    to the diisions of time.

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    Part 6

    )n affirmation is a "ositie

    assertion of something about

    something! a denial a negatie

    assertion.

    *ow it is "ossible both to affirm

    and to deny the "resen#e of

    something whi#h is "resent or of

    something whi#h is not! and sin#e

    these same affirmations and

    denials are "ossible with referen#e

    to those times whi#h lie outside

    the "resent! it would be "ossible

    to #ontradi#t any affirmation or

    denial. Thus it is "lain that eery

    affirmation has an o""osite denial!

    and similarly eery denial an

    o""osite affirmation.

    We will #all su#h a "air of

    "ro"ositions a "air of

    #ontradi#tories. Those "ositie and

    negatie "ro"ositions are said to

    be #ontradi#tory whi#h hae the

    same sub6e#t and "redi#ate. The

    identity of sub6e#t and of

    "redi#ate must not be 'euio#al'.

    ,ndeed there are definitie

    ualifi#ations besides this! whi#h

    we ma%e to meet the #asuistries

    of so"hists.

    Part 7

    $ome things are uniersal! others

    indiidual. By the term 'uniersal' ,

    mean that whi#h is of su#h a

    nature as to be "redi#ated of

    many sub6e#ts! by 'indiidual' that

    whi#h is not thus "redi#ated. Thus

    'man' is a uniersal! 'Callias' an

    indiidual.

    9ur "ro"ositions ne#essarily

    sometimes #on#ern a uniersal

    sub6e#t! sometimes an indiidual.

    ,f! then! a man states a "ositie

    and a negatie "ro"osition of

    uniersal #hara#ter with regard to

    a uniersal! these two "ro"ositions

    are '#ontrary'. By the e&"ression 'a

    "ro"osition of uniersal #hara#ter

    with regard to a uniersal'! su#h

    "ro"ositions as 'eery man is

    white'! 'no man is white' are

    meant. When! on the other hand!

    the "ositie and negatie

    "ro"ositions! though they hae

    regard to a uniersal! are yet not

    of uniersal #hara#ter! they will

    not be #ontrary! albeit the

    meaning intended is sometimes

    #ontrary. )s instan#es of

    "ro"ositions made with regard to a

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    uniersal! but not of uniersal

    #hara#ter! we may ta%e the

    '"ro"ositions 'man is white'! 'man is

    not white'. 'Man' is a uniersal! but

    the "ro"osition is not made as of

    uniersal #hara#ter+ for the word

    'eery' does not ma%e the sub6e#t

    a uniersal! but rather gies the

    "ro"osition a uniersal #hara#ter.

    ,f! howeer! both "redi#ate and

    sub6e#t are distributed! the

    "ro"osition thus #onstituted is

    #ontrary to truth+ no affirmation

    will! under su#h #ir#umstan#es! be

    true.

    The "ro"osition 'eery man is

    eery animal' is an e&am"le of this

    ty"e.

    )n affirmation is o""osed to a

    denial in the sense whi#h , denote

    by the term '#ontradi#tory'! when!

    while the sub6e#t remains the

    same! the affirmation is of

    uniersal #hara#ter and the denial

    is not. The affirmation 'eery man

    is white' is the #ontradi#tory of the

    denial 'not eery man is white'! or

    again! the "ro"osition 'no man is

    white' is the #ontradi#tory of the

    "ro"osition 'some men are white'.

    But "ro"ositions are o""osed as

    #ontraries when both the

    affirmation and the denial are

    uniersal! as in the senten#es

    'eery man is white'! 'no man is

    white'! 'eery man is 6ust'! 'no man

    is 6ust'.

    We see that in a "air of this sort

    both "ro"ositions #annot be true!

    but the #ontradi#tories of a "air of

    #ontraries #an sometimes both be

    true with referen#e to the same

    sub6e#t+ for instan#e 'not eery

    man is white' and some men are

    white' are both true. 9f su#h

    #orres"onding "ositie and

    negatie "ro"ositions as refer to

    uniersals and hae a uniersal

    #hara#ter+ one must be true and

    the other false. This is the #ase

    also when the referen#e is to

    indiiduals! as in the "ro"ositions

    '$o#rates is white'! '$o#rates is not

    white'.

    When! on the other hand! the

    referen#e is to uniersals! but the

    "ro"ositions are not uniersal! it is

    not always the #ase that one is

    true and the other false! for it is

    "ossible to state truly that man is

    white and that man is not white

    and that man is beautiful and that

    man is not beautiful+ for if a man

    is deformed he is the reerse of

    :

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    beautiful! also if he is "rogressing

    towards beauty he is not yet

    beautiful.

    This statement might seem at first

    sight to #arry with it a

    #ontradi#tion! owing to the fa#t

    that the "ro"osition 'man is not

    white' a""ears to be euialent to

    the "ro"osition 'no man is white'.

    This! howeer! is not the #ase! nor

    are they ne#essarily at the same

    time true or false.

    ,t is eident also that the denial

    #orres"onding to a single

    affirmation is itself single+ for the

    denial must deny 6ust that whi#h

    the affirmation affirms #on#erning

    the same sub6e#t! and must

    #orres"ond with the affirmation

    both in the uniersal or "arti#ular

    #hara#ter of the sub6e#t and in the

    distributed or undistributed sense

    in whi#h it is understood.

    For instan#e! the affirmation

    '$o#rates is white' has its "ro"er

    denial in the "ro"osition '$o#rates

    is not white'. ,f anything else be

    negatiely "redi#ated of the

    sub6e#t or if anything else be the

    sub6e#t though the "redi#ate

    remain the same! the denial will

    not be the denial "ro"er to that

    affirmation! but on that is

    distin#t.

    The denial "ro"er to the

    affirmation 'eery man is white' is

    'not eery man is white'+ that

    "ro"er to the affirmation 'some

    men are white' is 'no man is white'!

    while that "ro"er to the

    affirmation 'man is white' is 'man is

    not white'.

    We hae shown further that a

    single denial is #ontradi#torily

    o""osite to a single affirmation

    and we hae e&"lained whi#h

    these are+ we hae also stated

    that #ontrary are distin#t from

    #ontradi#tory "ro"ositions and

    whi#h the #ontrary are+ also that

    with regard to a "air of o""osite

    "ro"ositions it is not always the

    #ase that one is true and the other

    false. We hae "ointed out!

    moreoer! what the reason of this

    is and under what #ir#umstan#es

    the truth of the one inoles the

    falsity of the other.

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    Part 8

    )n affirmation or denial is single!

    if it indi#ates some one fa#t about

    some one sub6e#t+ it matters not

    whether the sub6e#t is uniersal

    and whether the statement has a

    uniersal #hara#ter! or whether

    this is not so. $u#h single

    "ro"ositions are7 'eery man is

    white'! 'not eery man is white'+'

    man is white'! 'man is not white'+

    'no man is white'! 'some men are

    white'+ "roided the word 'white'

    has one meaning.

    ,f! on the other hand! one word

    has two meanings whi#h do not

    #ombine to form one! the

    affirmation is not single. For

    instan#e! if a man should establish

    the symbol 'garment' as signifi#ant

    both of a horse and of a man! the

    "ro"osition 'garment is white'

    would not be a single affirmation!

    nor its o""osite a single denial.

    For it is euialent to the

    "ro"osition 'horse and man are

    white'! whi#h! again! is euialent

    to the two "ro"ositions 'horse is

    white'! 'man is white'. ,f! then!

    these two "ro"ositions hae more

    than a single signifi#an#e! and do

    not form a single "ro"osition! it is

    "lain that the first "ro"osition

    either has more than one

    signifi#an#e or else has none+ for a

    "arti#ular man is not a horse.

    This! then! is another instan#e of

    those "ro"ositions of whi#h both

    the "ositie and the negatie

    forms may be true or false

    simultaneously.

    Part 9

    ,n the #ase of that whi#h is or

    whi#h has ta%en "la#e!

    "ro"ositions! whether "ositie or

    negatie! must be true or false.

    )gain! in the #ase of a "air of

    #ontradi#tories! either when the

    sub6e#t is uniersal and the

    "ro"ositions are of a uniersal

    #hara#ter! or when it is indiidual!

    as has been said!' one of the two

    must be true and the other false+

    whereas when the sub6e#t is

    uniersal! but the "ro"ositions are

    not of a uniersal #hara#ter! there

    is no su#h ne#essity. We hae

    dis#ussed this ty"e also in a

    "reious #ha"ter.

    When the sub6e#t! howeer! is

    indiidual! and that whi#h is

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    "redi#ated of it relates to the

    future! the #ase is altered. For if

    all "ro"ositions whether "ositie

    or negatie are either true or

    false! then any gien "redi#ate

    must either belong to the sub6e#t

    or not! so that if one man affirms

    that an eent of a gien #hara#ter

    will ta%e "la#e and another denies

    it! it is "lain that the statement of

    the one will #orres"ond with

    reality and that of the other will

    not. For the "redi#ate #annot both

    belong and not belong to the

    sub6e#t at one and the same time

    with regard to the future.

    Thus! if it is true to say that a

    thing is white! it must ne#essarily

    be white+ if the reerse

    "ro"osition is true! it will of

    ne#essity not be white. )gain! if it

    is white! the "ro"osition stating

    that it is white was true+ if it is

    not white! the "ro"osition to the

    o""osite effe#t was true. )nd if it

    is not white! the man who states

    that it is ma%ing a false

    statement+ and if the man who

    states that it is white is ma%ing a

    false statement! it follows that it

    is not white. ,t may therefore be

    argued that it is ne#essary that

    affirmations or denials must be

    either true or false.

    *ow if this be so! nothing is or

    ta%es "la#e fortuitously! either in

    the "resent or in the future! and

    there are no real alternaties+

    eerything ta%es "la#e of ne#essity

    and is fi&ed. For either he that

    affirms that it will ta%e "la#e or

    he that denies this is in

    #orres"onden#e with fa#t!

    whereas if things did not ta%e

    "la#e of ne#essity! an eent might

    6ust as easily not ha""en as

    ha""en+ for the meaning of the

    word 'fortuitous' with regard to

    "resent or future eents is that

    reality is so #onstituted that it

    may issue in either of two o""osite

    dire#tions. )gain! if a thing is

    white now! it was true before to

    say that it would be white! so that

    of anything that has ta%en "la#e it

    was always true to say 'it is' or 'it

    will be'. But if it was always true

    to say that a thing is or will be! it

    is not "ossible that it should not

    be or not be about to be! and

    when a thing #annot not #ome to

    be! it is im"ossible that it should

    not #ome to be! and when it is

    im"ossible that it should not #ome

    =

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    to be! it must #ome to be. )ll!

    then! that is about to be must of

    ne#essity ta%e "la#e. ,t results

    from this that nothing is un#ertain

    or fortuitous! for if it were

    fortuitous it would not be

    ne#essary.

    )gain! to say that neither the

    affirmation nor the denial is true!

    maintaining! let us say! that an

    eent neither will ta%e "la#e nor

    will not ta%e "la#e! is to ta%e u" a

    "osition im"ossible to defend.

    ,n the first "la#e! though fa#ts

    should "roe the one "ro"osition

    false! the o""osite would still be

    untrue. $e#ondly! if it was true to

    say that a thing was both white

    and large! both these ualities

    must ne#essarily belong to it+ and

    if they will belong to it the ne&t

    day! they must ne#essarily belong

    to it the ne&t day. But if an eent

    is neither to ta%e "la#e nor not to

    ta%e "la#e the ne&t day! the

    element of #han#e will be

    eliminated. For e&am"le! it would

    be ne#essary that a sea-fight

    should neither ta%e "la#e nor fail

    to ta%e "la#e on the ne&t day.

    These aw%ward results and others

    of the same %ind follow! if it is an

    irrefragable law that of eery "air

    of #ontradi#tory "ro"ositions!

    whether they hae regard to

    uniersals and are stated as

    uniersally a""li#able! or whether

    they hae regard to indiiduals!

    one must be true and the other

    false! and that there are no real

    alternaties! but that all that is or

    ta%es "la#e is the out#ome of

    ne#essity. There would be no need

    to deliberate or to ta%e trouble!

    on the su""osition that if we

    should ado"t a #ertain #ourse! a

    #ertain result would follow! while!

    if we did not! the result would not

    follow. For a man may "redi#t

    an eent ten thousand years

    beforehand! and another may

    "redi#t the reerse+ that whi#h

    was truly "redi#ted at the moment

    in the "ast will of ne#essity ta%e

    "la#e in the fullness of time.

    Further! it ma%es no differen#e

    whether "eo"le hae or hae not

    a#tually made the #ontradi#tory

    statements. For it is manifest that

    the #ir#umstan#es are not

    influen#ed by the fa#t of an

    affirmation or denial on the "art

    of anyone. For eents will not ta%e

    "la#e or fail to ta%e "la#e be#ause

    /0

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    it was stated that they would or

    would not ta%e "la#e! nor is this

    any more the #ase if the

    "redi#tion dates ba#% ten

    thousand years or any other s"a#e

    of time. Wherefore! if through all

    time the nature of things was so

    #onstituted that a "redi#tion

    about an eent was true! then

    through all time it was ne#essary

    that that should find fulfilment+

    and with regard to all eents!

    #ir#umstan#es hae always been

    su#h that their o##urren#e is a

    matter of ne#essity. For that of

    whi#h someone has said truly that

    it will be! #annot fail to ta%e

    "la#e+ and of that whi#h ta%es

    "la#e! it was always true to say

    that it would be.

    et this iew leads to an

    im"ossible #on#lusion+ for we see

    that both deliberation and a#tion

    are #ausatie with regard to the

    future! and that! to s"ea% more

    generally! in those things whi#h

    are not #ontinuously a#tual there

    is "otentiality in either dire#tion.

    $u#h things may either be or not

    be+ eents also therefore may

    either ta%e "la#e or not ta%e

    "la#e. There are many obious

    instan#es of this. ,t is "ossible that

    this #oat may be #ut in half! and

    yet it may not be #ut in half! but

    wear out first. ,n the same way! it

    is "ossible that it should not be

    #ut in half+ unless this were so! it

    would not be "ossible that it

    should wear out first. $o it is

    therefore with all other eents

    whi#h "ossess this %ind of

    "otentiality. ,t is therefore "lain

    that it is not of ne#essity that

    eerything is or ta%es "la#e+ but in

    some instan#es there are real

    alternaties! in whi#h #ase the

    affirmation is no more true and no

    more false than the denial+ while

    some e&hibit a "redis"osition and

    general tenden#y in one dire#tion

    or the other! and yet #an issue in

    the o""osite dire#tion by

    ee"tion.

    *ow that whi#h is must needs be

    when it is! and that whi#h is not

    must needs not be when it is not.

    et it #annot be said without

    ualifi#ation that all e&isten#e and

    non-e&isten#e is the out#ome of

    ne#essity. For there is a differen#e

    between saying that that whi#h is!

    when it is! must needs be! and

    sim"ly saying that all that is must

    //

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    needs be! and similarly in the #ase

    of that whi#h is not. ,n the #ase!

    also! of two #ontradi#tory

    "ro"ositions this holds good.

    Eerything must either be or not

    be! whether in the "resent or in

    the future! but it is not always

    "ossible to distinguish and state

    determinately whi#h of these

    alternaties must ne#essarily #ome

    about.

    et me illustrate. ) sea-fight must

    either ta%e "la#e to-morrow or

    not! but it is not ne#essary that it

    should ta%e "la#e to-morrow!

    neither is it ne#essary that it

    should not ta%e "la#e! yet it is

    ne#essary that it either should or

    should not ta%e "la#e to-morrow.

    $in#e "ro"ositions #orres"ond with

    fa#ts! it is eident that when in

    future eents there is a real

    alternatie! and a "otentiality in

    #ontrary dire#tions! the

    #orres"onding affirmation and

    denial hae the same #hara#ter.

    This is the #ase with regard to that

    whi#h is not always e&istent or not

    always none&istent. 9ne of the

    two "ro"ositions in su#h instan#es

    must be true and the other false!

    but we #annot say determinately

    that this or that is false! but must

    leae the alternatie unde#ided.

    9ne may indeed be more li%ely to

    be true than the other! but it

    #annot be either a#tually true or

    a#tually false. ,t is therefore "lain

    that it is not ne#essary that of an

    affirmation and a denial one

    should be true and the other false.

    For in the #ase of that whi#h e&ists

    "otentially! but not a#tually! the

    rule whi#h a""lies to that whi#h

    e&ists a#tually does not hold good.

    The #ase is rather as we hae

    indi#ated.

    Part 1

    )n affirmation is the statement of

    a fa#t with regard to a sub6e#t!

    and this sub6e#t is either a noun or

    that whi#h has no name+ the

    sub6e#t and "redi#ate in an

    affirmation must ea#h denote a

    single thing. , hae already

    e&"lained' what is meant by a

    noun and by that whi#h has no

    name+ for , stated that the

    e&"ression 'not-man' was not a

    noun! in the "ro"er sense of the

    word! but an indefinite noun!

    denoting as it does in a #ertain

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    sense a single thing. $imilarly the

    e&"ression 'does not en6oy health'

    is not a erb "ro"er! but an

    indefinite erb. Eery affirmation!

    then! and eery denial! will

    #onsist of a noun and a erb!

    either definite or indefinite.

    There #an be no affirmation or

    denial without a erb+ for the

    e&"ressions 'is'! 'will be'! 'was'! 'is

    #oming to be'! and the li%e are

    erbs a##ording to our definition!

    sin#e besides their s"e#ifi#

    meaning they #oney the notion of

    time. Thus the "rimary affirmation

    and denial are 'as follows7 'man is'!

    'man is not'. *e&t to these! there

    are the "ro"ositions7 'not-man is'!

    'not-man is not'. )gain we hae the

    "ro"ositions7 'eery man is! 'eery

    man is not'! 'all that is not-man is'!

    'all that is not-man is not'. The

    same #lassifi#ation holds good

    with regard to su#h "eriods of

    time as lie outside the "resent.

    When the erb 'is' is used as a third

    element in the senten#e! there

    #an be "ositie and negatie

    "ro"ositions of two sorts. Thus in

    the senten#e 'man is 6ust' the erb

    'is' is used as a third element! #all

    it erb or noun! whi#h you will.

    Four "ro"ositions! therefore!

    instead of two #an be formed with

    these materials. Two of the four!

    as regards their affirmation and

    denial! #orres"ond in their logi#al

    seuen#e with the "ro"ositions

    whi#h deal with a #ondition of

    "riation+ the other two do not

    #orres"ond with these.

    , mean that the erb 'is' is added

    either to the term '6ust' or to the

    term 'not-6ust'! and two negatie

    "ro"ositions are formed in the

    same way. Thus we hae the four

    "ro"ositions. >eferen#e to the

    sub6oined table will ma%e matters

    #lear7

    A! A""ir#ation B! $enial %an is

    &'st %an is not &'st ( ) * ) ( $!

    $enial C! A""ir#ation %an is

    not not+&'st %an is not+&'st

    ,ere -is- an. -is not- are a..e.

    eit/er to -&'st- or to -not+&'st-!

    This then is the "ro"er s#heme for

    these "ro"ositions! as has been

    said in the )nalyti#s. The same

    rule holds good! if the sub6e#t

    isdistributed. Thus we hae the

    table7

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    A-! A""ir#ation B-! $enial

    E0ery #an is &'st Not e0ery

    #an is &'st ( ) * $-! $enial ) (

    C-! A""ir#ation

    *ot eery man is not-6ust Eery

    man is not-6ust et here it is not

    "ossible! in the same way as in the

    former #ase! that the "ro"ositions

    6oined in the table by a diagonal

    line should both be true+ thoughunder #ertain #ir#umstan#es this is

    the #ase.

    We hae thus set out two "airs of

    o""osite "ro"ositions+ there are

    moreoer two other "airs! if a

    term be #on6oined with 'not-man'!

    the latter forming a %ind of

    sub6e#t. Thus7

    A! B! Not+#an is &'st

    Not+#an is not &'st (

    ) + *

    $! ) ( C! Not+#an is not

    not+&'st Not+#an is not+&'st

    This is an e&haustie enumeration

    of all the "airs of o""osite

    "ro"ositions that #an "ossibly be

    framed. This last grou" should

    remain distin#t from those whi#h

    "re#eded it! sin#e it em"loys as its

    sub6e#t the e&"ression 'not-man'.

    When the erb 'is' does not fit the

    stru#ture of the senten#e ?for

    instan#e! when the erbs 'wal%s'!

    'en6oys health' are used@! that

    s#heme a""lies! whi#h a""lied

    when the word 'is' was added.

    Thus we hae the "ro"ositions7

    'eery man en6oys health'! 'eery

    man does-not-en6oy-health'! 'all

    that is not-man en6oys health'! 'all

    that is not-man does-not-en6oy-

    health'. We must not in these

    "ro"ositions use the e&"ression

    'not eery man'. The negatie must

    be atta#hed to the word 'man'! for

    the word 'eery' does not gie to

    the sub6e#t a uniersal

    signifi#an#e! but im"lies that! as a

    sub6e#t! it is distributed.

    This is "lain from the following

    "airs7 'man en6oys health'! 'man

    does not en6oy health'+ 'not-man

    en6oys health'! 'not man does not

    en6oy health'. These "ro"ositions

    differ from the former in being

    indefinite and not uniersal in

    #hara#ter. Thus the ad6e#ties

    'eery' and no additional

    signifi#an#e ee"t that the

    sub6e#t! whether in a "ositie or

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    in a negatie senten#e! is

    distributed. The rest of the

    senten#e! therefore! will in ea#h

    #ase be the same.

    $in#e the #ontrary of the

    "ro"osition 'eery animal is 6ust' is

    'no animal is 6ust'! it is "lain that

    these two "ro"ositions will neer

    both be true at the same time or

    with referen#e to the same

    sub6e#t. $ometimes! howeer! the

    #ontradi#tories of these #ontraries

    will both be true! as in the

    instan#e before us7 the

    "ro"ositions 'not eery animal is

    6ust' and 'some animals are 6ust'

    are both true.

    Further! the "ro"osition 'no man is

    6ust' follows from the "ro"osition

    'eery man is not 6ust' and the

    "ro"osition 'not eery man is not

    6ust'! whi#h is the o""osite of

    'eery man is not-6ust'! follows

    from the "ro"osition 'some men

    are 6ust'+ for if this be true! there

    must be some 6ust men.

    ,t is eident! also! that when the

    sub6e#t is indiidual! if a uestion

    is as%ed and the negatie answer

    is the true one! a #ertain "ositie

    "ro"osition is also true. Thus! if

    the uestion were as%ed $o#rates

    wiseA' and the negatie answer

    were the true one! the "ositie

    inferen#e 'Then $o#rates is unwise'

    is #orre#t. But no su#h inferen#e is

    #orre#t in the #ase of uniersals!

    but rather a negatie "ro"osition.

    For instan#e! if to the uestion ',s

    eery man wiseA' the answer is 'no'!

    the inferen#e 'Then eery man is

    unwise' is false. But under these

    #ir#umstan#es the inferen#e '*ot

    eery man is wise' is #orre#t. This

    last is the #ontradi#tory! the

    former the #ontrary. *egatie

    e&"ressions! whi#h #onsist of an

    indefinite noun or "redi#ate! su#h

    as 'not-man' or 'not-6ust'! may

    seem to be denials #ontaining

    neither noun nor erb in the

    "ro"er sense of the words. But

    they are not. For a denial must

    always be either true or false! and

    he that uses the e&"ression 'not

    man'! if nothing more be added! is

    not nearer but rather further from

    ma%ing a true or a false statement

    than he who uses the e&"ression

    'man'.

    The "ro"ositions 'eerything that is

    not man is 6ust'! and the

    #ontradi#tory of this! are not

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    euialent to any of the other

    "ro"ositions+ on the other hand!

    the "ro"osition 'eerything that is

    not man is not 6ust' is euialent

    to the "ro"osition 'nothing that is

    not man is 6ust'.

    The #onersion of the "osition of

    sub6e#t and "redi#ate in a

    senten#e inoles no differen#e in

    its meaning. Thus we say 'man is

    white' and 'white is man'. ,f these

    were not euialent! there would

    be more than one #ontradi#tory to

    the same "ro"osition! whereas it

    has been demonstrated' that ea#h

    "ro"osition has one "ro"er

    #ontradi#tory and one only. For of

    the "ro"osition 'man is white' the

    a""ro"riate #ontradi#tory is 'man

    is not white'! and of the

    "ro"osition 'white is man'! if its

    meaning be different! the

    #ontradi#tory will either be 'white

    is not not-man' or 'white is not

    man'. *ow the former of these is

    the #ontradi#tory of the

    "ro"osition 'white is not-man'! and

    the latter of these is the

    #ontradi#tory of the "ro"osition

    'man is white'+ thus there will be

    two #ontradi#tories to one

    "ro"osition.

    ,t is eident! therefore! that the

    inersion of the relatie "osition

    of sub6e#t and "redi#ate does not

    affe#t the sense of affirmations

    and denials.

    /:

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    SECTION 2

    Part 11

    There is no unity about an

    affirmation or denial whi#h! either

    "ositiely or negatiely!

    "redi#ates one thing of many

    sub6e#ts! or many things of the

    same sub6e#t! unless that whi#h is

    indi#ated by the many is really

    some one thing. do not a""ly this

    word 'one' to those things whi#h!

    though they hae a single

    re#ogni(ed name! yet do not

    #ombine to form a unity. Thus!

    man may be an animal! and bi"ed!

    and domesti#ated! but these three

    "redi#ates #ombine to form a

    unity. 9n the other hand! the

    "redi#ates 'white'! 'man'! and

    'wal%ing' do not thus #ombine.

    *either! therefore! if these three

    form the sub6e#t of an

    affirmation! nor if they form its

    "redi#ate! is there any unity about

    that affirmation. ,n both #ases the

    unity is linguisti#! but not real.

    ,f therefore the diale#ti#al

    uestion is a reuest for an

    answer! i.e. either for the

    admission of a "remiss or for the

    admission of one of two

    #ontradi#tories-and the "remiss is

    itself always one of two

    #ontradi#tories-the answer to su#h

    a uestion as #ontains the aboe

    "redi#ates #annot be a single

    "ro"osition. For as , hae

    e&"lained in the To"i#s! uestion

    is not a single one! een if the

    answer as%ed for is true.

    )t the same time it is "lain that a

    uestion of the form 'what is itA' is

    not a diale#ti#al uestion! for a

    diale#ti#al uestioner must by the

    form of his uestion gie his

    o""onent the #han#e of

    announ#ing one of two

    alternaties! whi#heer he wishes.

    2e must therefore "ut the

    uestion into a more definite

    form! and inuire! e.g. whether

    man has su#h and su#h a

    #hara#teristi# or not.

    $ome #ombinations of "redi#ates

    are su#h that the se"arate

    "redi#ates unite to form a single

    "redi#ate. et us #onsider under

    what #onditions this is and is not

    "ossible. We may either state in

    two se"arate "ro"ositions that

    man is an animal and that man is a

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    bi"ed! or we may #ombine the

    two! and state that man is an

    animal with two feet. $imilarly we

    may use 'man' and 'white' as

    se"arate "redi#ates! or unite them

    into one.

    et if a man is a shoema%er and is

    also good! we #annot #onstru#t a

    #om"osite "ro"osition and say that

    he is a good shoema%er. For if!

    wheneer two se"arate "redi#ates

    truly belong to a sub6e#t! it

    follows that the "redi#ate

    resulting from their #ombination

    also truly belongs to the sub6e#t!

    many absurd results ensue. For

    instan#e! a man is man and white.

    Therefore! if "redi#ates may

    always be #ombined! he is a white

    man. )gain! if the "redi#ate

    'white' belongs to him! then the

    #ombination of that "redi#ate with

    the former #om"osite "redi#ate

    will be "ermissible. Thus it will be

    right to say that he is a white man

    so on indefinitely. 9r! again! we

    may #ombine the "redi#ates

    'musi#al'! 'white'! and 'wal%ing'!

    and these may be #ombined many

    times. $imilarly we may say that

    $o#rates is $o#rates and a man!

    and that therefore he is the man

    $o#rates! or that $o#rates is a man

    and a bi"ed! and that therefore he

    is a two-footed man. Thus it is

    manifest that if man states

    un#onditionally that "redi#ates

    #an always be #ombined! many

    absurd #onseuen#es ensue.

    We will now e&"lain what ought to

    be laid down. Those "redi#ates!

    and terms forming the sub6e#t of

    "redi#ation! whi#h are a##idental

    either to the same sub6e#t or to

    one another! do not #ombine to

    form a unity. Ta%e the "ro"osition

    'man is white of #om"le&ion and

    musi#al'. Whiteness and being

    musi#al do not #oales#e to form a

    unity! for they belong only

    a##identally to the same sub6e#t.

    *or yet! if it were true to say that

    that whi#h is white is musi#al!

    would the terms 'musi#al' and

    'white' form a unity! for it is only

    in#identally that that whi#h is

    musi#al is white+ the #ombination

    of the two will! therefore! not

    form a unity.

    Thus! again! whereas! if a man is

    both good and a shoema%er! we

    #annot #ombine the two

    "ro"ositions and say sim"ly that

    he is a good shoema%er! we are! at

    the same time! able to #ombine

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    the "redi#ates 'animal' and 'bi"ed'

    and say that a man is an animal

    with two feet! for these

    "redi#ates are not a##idental.

    Those "redi#ates! again! #annot

    form a unity! of whi#h the one is

    im"li#it in the other7 thus we

    #annot #ombine the "redi#ate

    'white' again and again with that

    whi#h already #ontains the notion

    'white'! nor is it right to #all a man

    an animal-man or a two-footed

    man+ for the notions 'animal' and

    'bi"ed' are im"li#it in the word

    'man'. 9n the other hand! it is

    "ossible to "redi#ate a term

    sim"ly of any one instan#e! and to

    say that some one "arti#ular man

    is a man or that some one white

    man is a white man.

    et this is not always "ossible7

    indeed! when in the ad6un#t there

    is some o""osite whi#h inoles a

    #ontradi#tion! the "redi#ation of

    the sim"le term is im"ossible.

    Thus it is not right to #all a dead

    man a man. When! howeer! this

    is not the #ase! it is not

    im"ossible.

    et the fa#ts of the #ase might

    rather be stated thus7 when some

    su#h o""osite elements are

    "resent! resolution is neer

    "ossible! but when they are not

    "resent! resolution is neertheless

    not always "ossible.

    Ta%e the "ro"osition '2omer is so-

    and-so'! say 'a "oet'+ does it follow

    that 2omer is! or does it notA The

    erb 'is' is here used of 2omer only

    in#identally! the "ro"osition being

    that 2omer is a "oet! not that he

    is! in the inde"endent sense of the

    word.

    Thus! in the #ase of those

    "redi#ations whi#h hae within

    them no #ontradi#tion when the

    nouns are e&"anded into

    definitions! and wherein the

    "redi#ates belong to the sub6e#t in

    their own "ro"er sense and not in

    any indire#t way! the indiidual

    may be the sub6e#t of the sim"le

    "ro"ositions as well as of the

    #om"osite. But in the #ase of that

    whi#h is not! it is not true to say

    that be#ause it is the ob6e#t of

    o"inion! it is+ for the o"inion held

    about it is that it is not! not that it

    is.

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    Part 12

    )s these distin#tions hae been

    made! we must #onsider the

    mutual relation of those

    affirmations and denials whi#h

    assert or deny "ossibility or

    #ontingen#y! im"ossibility or

    ne#essity7 for the sub6e#t is not

    without diffi#ulty.

    We admit that of #om"osite

    e&"ressions those are

    #ontradi#tory ea#h to ea#h whi#h

    hae the erb 'to be' its "ositie

    and negatie form res"e#tiely.

    Thus the #ontradi#tory of the

    "ro"osition 'man is' is 'man is not'!

    not 'not-man is'! and the

    #ontradi#tory of 'man is white' is

    'man is not white'! not 'man is not-

    white'. For otherwise! sin#e either

    the "ositie or the negatie

    "ro"osition is true of any sub6e#t!

    it will turn out true to say that a

    "ie#e of wood is a man that is not

    white.

    *ow if this is the #ase! in those

    "ro"ositions whi#h do not #ontain

    the erb 'to be' the erb whi#h

    ta%es its "la#e will e&er#ise the

    same fun#tion. Thus the

    #ontradi#tory of 'man wal%s' is

    'man does not wal%'! not 'not-man

    wal%s'+ for to say 'man wal%s'

    merely euialent to saying 'man is

    wal%ing'.

    ,f then this rule is uniersal! the

    #ontradi#tory of 'it may be' is may

    not be'! not 'it #annot be'.

    *ow it a""ears that the same

    thing both may and may not be+

    for instan#e! eerything that may

    be #ut or may wal% may also

    es#a"e #utting and refrain from

    wal%ing+ and the reason is that

    those things that hae "otentiality

    in this sense are not always

    a#tual. ,n su#h #ases! both the

    "ositie and the negatie

    "ro"ositions will be true+ for that

    whi#h is #a"able of wal%ing or of

    being seen has also a "otentiality

    in the o""osite dire#tion.

    But sin#e it is im"ossible that

    #ontradi#tory "ro"ositions should

    both be true of the same sub6e#t!

    it follows that' it may not be' is not

    the #ontradi#tory of 'it may be'.

    For it is a logi#al #onseuen#e of

    what we hae said! either that the

    same "redi#ate #an be both

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    a""li#able and ina""li#able to one

    and the same sub6e#t at the same

    time! or that it is not by the

    addition of the erbs 'be' and 'not

    be'! res"e#tiely! that "ositie and

    negatie "ro"ositions are formed.

    ,f the former of these alternaties

    must be re6e#ted! we must #hoose

    the latter.

    The #ontradi#tory! then! of 'it may

    be' is 'it #annot be'. The same rule

    a""lies to the "ro"osition 'it is

    #ontingent that it should be'+ the

    #ontradi#tory of this is 'it is not

    #ontingent that it should be'. The

    similar "ro"ositions! su#h as 'it is

    ne#essary' and 'it is im"ossible'!

    may be dealt with in the same

    manner. For it #omes about that

    6ust as in the former instan#es the

    erbs 'is' and 'is not' were added to

    the sub6e#t-matter of the

    senten#e 'white' and 'man'! so here

    'that it should be' and 'that it

    should not be' are the sub6e#t-

    matter and 'is "ossible'! 'is

    #ontingent'! are added. These

    indi#ate that a #ertain thing is or

    is not "ossible! 6ust as in the

    former instan#es 'is' and 'is not'

    indi#ated that #ertain things were

    or were not the #ase.

    The #ontradi#tory! then! of 'it may

    not be' is not 'it #annot be'! but 'it

    #annot not be'! and the

    #ontradi#tory of 'it may be' is not

    'it may not be'! but #annot be'.

    Thus the "ro"ositions 'it may be'

    and 'it may not be' a""ear ea#h to

    im"ly the other7 for! sin#e these

    two "ro"ositions are not

    #ontradi#tory! the same thing both

    may and may not be. But the

    "ro"ositions 'it may be' and 'it

    #annot be' #an neer be true of

    the same sub6e#t at the same

    time! for they are #ontradi#tory.

    *or #an the "ro"ositions 'it may

    not be' and 'it #annot not be' be at

    on#e true of the same sub6e#t.

    The "ro"ositions whi#h hae to do

    with ne#essity are goerned by the

    same "rin#i"le. The #ontradi#tory

    of 'it is ne#essary that it should

    be'! is not 'it is ne#essary that it

    should not be!' but 'it is not

    ne#essary that it should be'! and

    the #ontradi#tory of 'it is

    ne#essary that it should not be' is

    'it is not ne#essary that it should

    not be'.

    )gain! the #ontradi#tory of 'it is

    im"ossible that it should be' is not

    'it is im"ossible that it should not

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    be' but 'it is not im"ossible that it

    should be'! and the #ontradi#tory

    of 'it is im"ossible that it should

    not be' is 'it is not im"ossible that

    it should not be'.

    To generali(e! we must! as has

    been stated! define the #lauses

    'that it should be' and 'that it

    should not be' as the sub6e#t-

    matter of the "ro"ositions! and in

    ma%ing these terms into

    affirmations and denials we must

    #ombine them with 'that it should

    be' and 'that it should not be'

    res"e#tiely.

    We must #onsider the following

    "airs as #ontradi#tory

    "ro"ositions7

    ,t may be. ,t #annot be.

    ,t is #ontingent. ,t is not

    #ontingent.

    ,t is im"ossible. ,t is not

    im"ossible.

    ,t is ne#essary. ,t is not

    ne#essary.

    ,t is true. ,t is not true.

    Part 13

    ogi#al seuen#es follow in due

    #ourse when we hae arranged the

    "ro"ositions thus. From the

    "ro"osition 'it may be' it follows

    that it is #ontingent! and the

    relation is re#i"ro#al. ,t follows

    also that it is not im"ossible and

    not ne#essary.

    From the "ro"osition 'it may not

    be' or 'it is #ontingent that it

    should not be' it follows that it is

    not ne#essary that it should not be

    and that it is not im"ossible that it

    should not be. From the

    "ro"osition 'it #annot be' or 'it is

    not #ontingent' it follows that it is

    ne#essary that it should not be

    and that it is im"ossible that it

    should be. From the "ro"osition 'it

    #annot not be' or 'it is not

    #ontingent that it should not be' it

    follows that it is ne#essary that it

    should be and that it is im"ossible

    that it should not be.

    et us #onsider these statements

    by the hel" of a table7

    A! B!

    ,t may be. ,t #annot be.

    ,t is #ontingent. ,t is not

    #ontingent.

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    ,t is not im"ossible ,t is

    im"ossible that it

    that it should be. should be.

    ,t is not ne#essary ,t is

    ne#essary that it

    that it should be. should not

    be.

    C! $!

    ,t may not be. ,t #annot not

    be.

    ,t is #ontingent that it ,t is not

    #ontingent that

    should not be. it should not

    be.

    ,t is not im"ossible ,t is

    im"ossible thatit

    that it should not be. should not

    be.

    ,t is not ne#essary that ,t is

    ne#essary that it

    it should not be. should be.

    *ow the "ro"ositions 'it is

    im"ossible that it should be' and 'it

    is not im"ossible that it should be'

    are #onseuent u"on the

    "ro"ositions 'it may be'! 'it is

    #ontingent'! and 'it #annot be'! 'it

    is not #ontingent'! the

    #ontradi#tories u"on the

    #ontradi#tories. But there is

    inersion.

    The negatie of the "ro"osition 'it

    is im"ossible' is #onseuent u"on

    the "ro"osition 'it may be' and the

    #orres"onding "ositie in the first

    #ase u"on the negatie in the

    se#ond. For 'it is im"ossible' is a

    "ositie "ro"osition and 'it is not

    im"ossible' is negatie.

    We must inestigate the relation

    subsisting between these

    "ro"ositions and those whi#h

    "redi#ate ne#essity. That there is

    a distin#tion is #lear. ,n this #ase!

    #ontrary "ro"ositions follow

    res"e#tiely from #ontradi#tory

    "ro"ositions! and the

    #ontradi#tory "ro"ositions belong

    to se"arate seuen#es. For the

    "ro"osition 'it is not ne#essary that

    it should be' is not the negatie of

    'it is ne#essary that it should not

    be'! for both these "ro"ositions

    may be true of the same sub6e#t+

    for when it is ne#essary that a

    thing should not be! it is not

    ne#essary that it should be. The

    reason why the "ro"ositions

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    "redi#ating ne#essity do not follow

    in the same %ind of seuen#e as

    the rest! lies in the fa#t that the

    "ro"osition 'it is im"ossible' is

    euialent! when used with a

    #ontrary sub6e#t! to the

    "ro"osition 'it is ne#essary'. For

    when it is im"ossible that a thing

    should be! it is ne#essary! not that

    it should be! but that it should not

    be! and when it is im"ossible that

    a thing should not be! it is

    ne#essary that it should be. Thus!

    if the "ro"ositions "redi#ating

    im"ossibility or non-im"ossibility

    follow without #hange of sub6e#t

    from those "redi#ating "ossibility

    or non-"ossibility! those

    "redi#ating ne#essity must follow

    with the #ontrary sub6e#t+ for the

    "ro"ositions 'it is im"ossible' and 'it

    is ne#essary' are not euialent!

    but! as has been said! inersely

    #onne#ted.

    et "erha"s it is im"ossible that

    the #ontradi#tory "ro"ositions

    "redi#ating ne#essity should be

    thus arranged. For when it is

    ne#essary that a thing should be!

    it is "ossible that it should be. ?For

    if not! the o""osite follows! sin#e

    one or the other must follow+ so!

    if it is not "ossible! it is

    im"ossible! and it is thus

    im"ossible that a thing should be!

    whi#h must ne#essarily be+ whi#h

    is absurd.@

    et from the "ro"osition 'it may

    be' it follows that it is not

    im"ossible! and from that it

    follows that it is not ne#essary+ it

    #omes about therefore that the

    thing whi#h must ne#essarily be

    need not be+ whi#h is absurd. But

    again! the "ro"osition 'it is

    ne#essary that it should be' does

    not follow from the "ro"osition 'it

    may be'! nor does the "ro"osition

    'it is ne#essary that it should not

    be'. For the "ro"osition 'it may be'

    im"lies a twofold "ossibility!

    while! if either of the two former

    "ro"ositions is true! the twofold

    "ossibility anishes.

    For if a thing may be! it may also

    not be! but if it is ne#essary that it

    should be or that it should not be!

    one of the two alternaties will be

    eluded. ,t remains+ therefore!

    that the "ro"osition 'it is not

    ne#essary that it should not be'

    follows from the "ro"osition 'it

    may be'. For this is true also of

    that whi#h must ne#essarily be.

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    Moreoer the "ro"osition 'it is not

    ne#essary that it should not be' is

    the #ontradi#tory of that whi#h

    follows from the "ro"osition 'it

    #annot be'+ for 'it #annot be' is

    followed by 'it is im"ossible that it

    should be' and by 'it is ne#essary

    that it should not be'! and the

    #ontradi#tory of this is the

    "ro"osition 'it is not ne#essary that

    it should not be'. Thus in this #ase

    also #ontradi#tory "ro"ositions

    follow #ontradi#tory in the way

    indi#ated! and no logi#al

    im"ossibilities o##ur when they

    are thus arranged.

    ,t may be uestioned whether the

    "ro"osition 'it may be' follows from

    the "ro"osition 'it is ne#essary that

    it should be'. ,f not! the

    #ontradi#tory must follow! namely

    that it #annot be! or! if a man

    should maintain that this is not the

    #ontradi#tory! then the

    "ro"osition 'it may not be'.

    *ow both of these are false of that

    whi#h ne#essarily is. )t the same

    time! it is thought that if a thing

    may be #ut it may also not be #ut!

    if a thing may be it may also not

    be! and thus it would follow that a

    thing whi#h must ne#essarily be

    may "ossibly not be+ whi#h is

    false. ,t is eident! then! that it is

    not always the #ase that that

    whi#h may be or may wal%

    "ossesses also a "otentiality in the

    other dire#tion. There are

    ee"tions. ,n the first "la#e we

    must ee"t those things whi#h

    "ossess a "otentiality not in

    a##ordan#e with a rational

    "rin#i"le! as fire "ossesses the

    "otentiality of giing out heat!

    that is! an irrational #a"a#ity.

    Those "otentialities whi#h inole

    a rational "rin#i"le are

    "otentialities of more than one

    result! that is! of #ontrary results+

    those that are irrational are not

    always thus #onstituted. )s , hae

    said! fire #annot both heat and not

    heat! neither has anything that is

    always a#tual any twofold

    "otentiality.

    et some een of those

    "otentialities whi#h are irrational

    admit of o""osite results.

    2oweer! thus mu#h has been said

    to em"hasi(e the truth that it is

    not eery "otentiality whi#h

    admits of o""osite results! een

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    where the word is used always in

    the same sense.

    But in some #ases the word is used

    euio#ally. For the term '"ossible'

    is ambiguous! being used in the

    one #ase with referen#e to fa#ts!

    to that whi#h is a#tuali(ed! as

    when a man is said to find wal%ing

    "ossible be#ause he is a#tually

    wal%ing! and generally when a

    #a"a#ity is "redi#ated be#ause it

    is a#tually reali(ed+ in the other

    #ase! with referen#e to a state in

    whi#h reali(ation is #onditionally

    "ra#ti#able! as when a man is said

    to find wal%ing "ossible be#ause

    under #ertain #onditions he would

    wal%. This last sort of "otentiality

    belongs only to that whi#h #an be

    in motion! the former #an e&ist

    also in the #ase of that whi#h has

    not this "ower. Both of that whi#h

    is wal%ing and is a#tual! and of

    that whi#h has the #a"a#ity though

    not ne#essarily reali(ed! it is true

    to say that it is not im"ossible that

    it should wal% ?or! in the other

    #ase! that it should be@! but while

    we #annot "redi#ate this latter

    %ind of "otentiality of that whi#h

    is ne#essary in the unualified

    sense of the word! we #an

    "redi#ate the former.

    9ur #on#lusion! then! is this7 that

    sin#e the uniersal is #onseuent

    u"on the "arti#ular! that whi#h is

    ne#essary is also "ossible! though

    not in eery sense in whi#h the

    word may be used.

    We may "erha"s state that

    ne#essity and its absen#e are the

    initial "rin#i"les of e&isten#e and

    non-e&isten#e! and that all else

    must be regarded as "osterior to

    these.

    ,t is "lain from what has been said

    that that whi#h is of ne#essity is

    a#tual. Thus! if that whi#h is

    eternal is "rior! a#tuality also is

    "rior to "otentiality. $ome things

    are a#tualities without

    "otentiality! namely! the "rimary

    substan#es+ a se#ond #lass #onsists

    of those things whi#h are a#tual

    but also "otential! whose a#tuality

    is in nature "rior to their

    "otentiality! though "osterior in

    time+ a third #lass #om"rises those

    things whi#h are neer a#tuali(ed!

    but are "ure "otentialities.

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    Part 14

    The uestion arises whether an

    affirmation finds its #ontrary in a

    denial or in another affirmation+

    whether the "ro"osition 'eery

    man is 6ust' finds its #ontrary in

    the "ro"osition 'no man is 6ust'! or

    in the "ro"osition 'eery man is

    un6ust'. Ta%e the "ro"ositions

    'Callias is 6ust'! 'Callias is not 6ust'!

    'Callias is un6ust'+ we hae to

    dis#oer whi#h of these form

    #ontraries.

    *ow if the s"o%en word

    #orres"onds with the 6udgement of

    the mind! and if! in thought! that

    6udgement is the #ontrary of

    another! whi#h "ronoun#es a

    #ontrary fa#t! in the way! for

    instan#e! in whi#h the 6udgement

    'eery man is 6ust' "ronoun#es a

    #ontrary to that "ronoun#ed by

    the 6udgement 'eery man is

    un6ust'! the same must needs hold

    good with regard to s"o%en

    affirmations.

    But if! in thought! it is not the

    6udgement whi#h "ronoun#es a

    #ontrary fa#t that is the #ontrary

    of another! then one affirmation

    will not find its #ontrary in

    another! but rather in the

    #orres"onding denial. We must

    therefore #onsider whi#h true

    6udgement is the #ontrary of the

    false! that whi#h forms the denial

    of the false 6udgement or that

    whi#h affirms the #ontrary fa#t.

    et me illustrate. There is a true

    6udgement #on#erning that whi#h

    is good! that it is good+ another! a

    false 6udgement! that it is not

    good+ and a third! whi#h is

    distin#t! that it is bad. Whi#h of

    these two is #ontrary to the trueA

    )nd if they are one and the same!

    whi#h mode of e&"ression forms

    the #ontraryA

    ,t is an error to su""ose that

    6udgements are to be defined as

    #ontrary in irtue of the fa#t that

    they hae #ontrary sub6e#ts+ for

    the 6udgement #on#erning a good

    thing! that it is good! and that

    #on#erning a bad thing! that it is

    bad! may be one and the same!

    and whether they are so or not!

    they both re"resent the truth. et

    the sub6e#ts here are #ontrary.

    But 6udgements are not #ontrary

    be#ause they hae #ontrary

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    sub6e#ts! but be#ause they are to

    the #ontrary effe#t.

    *ow if we ta%e the 6udgement

    that that whi#h is good is good!

    and another that it is not good!

    and if there are at the same time

    other attributes! whi#h do not and

    #annot belong to the good! we

    must neertheless refuse to treat

    as the #ontraries of the true

    6udgement those whi#h o"ine that

    some other attribute subsists

    whi#h does not subsist! as also

    those that o"ine that some other

    attribute does not subsist whi#h

    does subsist! for both these #lasses

    of 6udgement are of unlimited

    #ontent.

    Those 6udgements must rather be

    termed #ontrary to the true

    6udgements! in whi#h error is

    "resent. *ow these 6udgements

    are those whi#h are #on#erned

    with the starting "oints of

    generation! and generation is the

    "assing from one e&treme to its

    o""osite+ therefore error is a li%e

    transition.

    *ow that whi#h is good is both

    good and not bad. The first uality

    is "art of its essen#e! the se#ond

    a##idental+ for it is by a##ident

    that it is not bad. But if that true

    6udgement is most really true!

    whi#h #on#erns the sub6e#t's

    intrinsi# nature! then that false

    6udgement li%ewise is most really

    false! whi#h #on#erns its intrinsi#

    nature. *ow the 6udgement that

    that is good is not good is a false

    6udgement #on#erning its intrinsi#

    nature! the 6udgement that it is

    bad is one #on#erning that whi#h

    is a##idental. Thus the 6udgement

    whi#h denies the true 6udgement

    is more really false than that

    whi#h "ositiely asserts the

    "resen#e of the #ontrary uality.

    But it is the man who forms that

    6udgement whi#h is #ontrary to

    the true who is most thoroughly

    de#eied! for #ontraries are

    among the things whi#h differ

    most widely within the same #lass.

    ,f then of the two 6udgements one

    is #ontrary to the true 6udgement!

    but that whi#h is #ontradi#tory is

    the more truly #ontrary! then the

    latter! it seems! is the real

    #ontrary. The 6udgement that that

    whi#h is good is bad is #om"osite.

    For "resumably the man who

    forms that 6udgement must at the

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    same time understand that that

    whi#h is good is not good.

    Further! the #ontradi#tory is

    either always the #ontrary or

    neer+ therefore! if it must

    ne#essarily be so in all other

    #ases! our #on#lusion in the #ase

    6ust dealt with would seem to be

    #orre#t. *ow where terms hae no

    #ontrary! that 6udgement is false!

    whi#h forms the negatie of the

    true+ for instan#e! he who thin%s a

    man is not a man forms a false

    6udgement. ,f then in these #ases

    the negatie is the #ontrary! then

    the "rin#i"le is uniersal in its

    a""li#ation.

    )gain! the 6udgement that that

    whi#h is not good is not good is

    "arallel with the 6udgement that

    that whi#h is good is good. Besides

    these there is the 6udgement that

    that whi#h is good is not good!

    "arallel with the 6udgement that

    that that is not good is good. et

    us #onsider! therefore! what would

    form the #ontrary of the true

    6udgement that that whi#h is not

    good is not good. The 6udgement

    that it is bad would! of #ourse! fail

    to meet the #ase! sin#e two true

    6udgements are neer #ontrary

    and this 6udgement might be true

    at the same time as that with

    whi#h it is #onne#ted. For sin#e

    some things whi#h are not good

    are bad! both 6udgements may be

    true. *or is the 6udgement that it

    is not bad the #ontrary! for this

    too might be true! sin#e both

    ualities might be "redi#ated of

    the same sub6e#t. ,t remains!

    therefore! that of the 6udgement

    #on#erning that whi#h is not good!

    that it is not good! the #ontrary

    6udgement is that it is good+ for

    this is false. ,n the same way!

    moreoer! the 6udgement

    #on#erning that whi#h is good!

    that it is not good! is the #ontrary

    of the 6udgement that it is good.

    ,t is eident that it will ma%e no

    differen#e if we uniersali(e the

    "ositie 6udgement! for the

    uniersal negatie 6udgement will

    form the #ontrary. For instan#e!

    the #ontrary of the 6udgement

    that eerything that is good is

    good is that nothing that is good is

    good. For the 6udgement that that

    whi#h is good is good! if the

    sub6e#t be understood in a

    uniersal sense! is euialent to

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    the 6udgement that whateer is

    good is good! and this is identi#al

    with the 6udgement that

    eerything that is good is good.

    We may deal similarly with

    6udgements #on#erning that whi#h

    is not good.

    ,f therefore this is the rule with

    6udgements! and if s"o%en

    affirmations and denials are

    6udgements e&"ressed in words! it

    is "lain that the uniersal denial is

    the #ontrary of the affirmation

    about the same sub6e#t. Thus the

    "ro"ositions 'eerything good is

    good'! 'eery man is good'! hae for

    their #ontraries the "ro"ositions

    'nothing good is good'! 'no man is

    good'. The #ontradi#tory

    "ro"ositions! on the other hand!

    are 'not eerything good is good'!

    'not eery man is good'.

    ,t is eident! also! that neither

    true 6udgements nor true

    "ro"ositions #an be #ontrary the

    one to the other. For whereas!

    when two "ro"ositions are true! a

    man may state both at the same

    time without in#onsisten#y!

    #ontrary "ro"ositions are those

    whi#h state #ontrary #onditions!

    and #ontrary #onditions #annot

    subsist at one and the same time

    in the same sub6e#t.

    T,E EN$

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    3/