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AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.1Titre présentation – Intervenant/réf. - 25 juillet 2013 - p.1
AREVA ComplementaryAREVA ComplementarySafety Assessments
La Hague reprocessing plantAtomic Energy Society of JapanAtomic Energy Society of Japan
Pierre Chambrette : AREVA Recycling Business Unit Safety Deputy DirectorChristophe Loy : AREVA La Hague Safety Deputy DirectorChristophe Loy : AREVA La Hague Safety Deputy Director
Albin Antunes : Engineering and Project Safety Engineer
SummarySummaryLa Hague Plant brief presentationFrench governance in nuclear safety mattersFrench governance in nuclear safety mattersFuel Cycle Industry : AREVA Complementary Safety Assessments – Phase 1 Identification of Severe Accident Scenarios
Fuel Cycle Industry : AREVA Complementary Safety Assessments – Phase 2 La Hague “Complementary Safety Assessment”
Delays before cliff edge effect Delays before cliff edge effect Severe Accident scenarios
Purpose of Hardened Safety Core Equipment Defense in depth and notion of Hardened-Safety-Coree e se dept a d ot o o a de ed Sa ety Co e Hardened Safety Core Equipment : Water Recovery for ponds and Fissile Products (FP) tanks
Main crisis management principles Diagnosis toolsg Hardened Safety Core organisational arrangements Orientations of AREVA new crisis management buildings
Conclusions
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.3
AREVA - La HagueComplementary Safety AssessmentsComplementary Safety Assessments
La Hague Reprocessing Plant
Brief presentation
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.4
La Hague Plant brief presentation
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.5
AREVA - La HagueComplementary Safety AssessmentsComplementary Safety Assessments
French governance
in nuclear safety matters
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.6
French governance in nuclear safety matters
ParliamentParliamentary office for assessment of
scientific and technological choices
Decrees and orders Inspection of installationsDecrees and orders
Government
Decisions of general or individual significance
Nuclear Safety AuthorityThe Mission for Nuclear Safety and Radiological protection
(Mission de la Sûreté Nucléaireet de la Radioprotection - MSNR)
y y(ASN)
High Level Committeeon transparency and information
on nuclearsafety
IRSN : Institute of radiological protection
and nuclear safety
Higher Council for the prevention of technological
risks
The High Councilfor public
health
The Environmental Authority
Central Commission for pressurised equipment
Permanent nuclearsection
Permanent groups of experts
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.7
French governance in nuclear safety mattersg y
ConstitutionThe environmental
charter
The hierarchy of standards applied in
French nuclear sector
Community LawEuratom Safety Directive
International LawAIEA
sector
Environnement regulation “Nuclear Security and Transparency”
and "Radioactive waste« Act
Decree
OrderOrder of 7 February 2012 setting the general rules
relative to basic nuclear installations
Decree"TSN Procedures“ Decree of 2 November 2007
ASN AREVA
(ASN Resolution)Individual Authorisations
ASN
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.8
Technical resolution (Former RFS)
ISO Standards AREVA Group Directives
ASNGuides
AREVA - La HagueComplementary Safety AssessmentsComplementary Safety Assessments
Fuel Cycle Industry - AREVA La Hague Complementary Safety Assessments (CSA)
Phase 1 : May 2011 to January 2012
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.9
La Hague Complementary Safety AssessmentsPhase 1 General contextPhase 1 – General context
15 September 2011 AREVA sent reports on Complementary
.La Hague Facilities
AREVA sent reports on ComplementarySafety Assessment post Fukushimato ASN for each site
C
Table of contents consistent with WENRA “Stress tests” specifications for reactors
1. IMMEDIATE LEARNING FROM FUKUSHIMA EVENT
...FBFC Plant2. GENERAL DATA ABOUT SITE AND ENVIRONMENT
3. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF SITE ACTIVITIES 4. ACCIDENTAL SCENARIOS .
Tricastin Facilities5. EARTHQUAKES6. FLOODING 7. EXTREME WEATHER CONDITIONS 8 LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER AND LOSS OF COOLING
MELOX Plant
8. LOSS OF ELECTRICAL POWER AND LOSS OF COOLING9. SEVERE ACCIDENT MANAGEMENT 10. USE OF CONTRACTORS 11. CONCLUSION
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.10
La Hague Complementary Safety AssessmentsPhase 1 - Severe Accidents Scenarios
La Hague spent fuel reprocessing utilities L f h f h i
Phase 1 Severe Accidents Scenarios
Loss of heat transfer chain Explosion with radiolysis hydrogen accumulation Loss of containment in legacy waste storage facilities Loss of containment in legacy waste storage facilities
MELOX MOX Fuel Fabrication plant Loss of cooling function in fuel rod storage Loss of containment functions
Tricastin Uranium conversion and enrichment utilities Ch i l l Chemical release :
hydrogen fluoride gas HF, hexafluoride UF6, chlorine trifluorine ClF3, chlorine Cl.
Romans FBFC Fuel fabrication plant Chemical release : HF, UF6
Criticality accident
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.11
Criticality accident
La Hague Complementary Safety AssessmentsPhase 1 - Conclusions
Conclusions of AREVA CSA forL H i l t i S t b 2011La Hague reprocessing plant in September 2011 3rd level of defense in depth resilient to natural extreme event 4th level of defense in depth not always taken into account in design
To be reinforced 5th level of defense in depth to be reinforced
Creation of a national intervention team shall be analyzed in AREVA group (FINA)Creation of a national intervention team shall be analyzed in AREVA group (FINA)
3rd January 2012 : ASN delivered its report on the CSA to the Prime Minister, who forwarded it to the European Commissionwho forwarded it to the European Commission ASN considered that no shut down of any facility was required ASN has issued an opinion n° 2012-AV-0139 concerning CSA
idi i i i h b f f ili i i iproviding provisions to improve the robustness of facilities to extreme situations
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.12
AREVA - La HagueComplementary Safety AssessmentsComplementary Safety Assessments
Fuel Cycle Industry - AREVA La HagueFuel Cycle Industry AREVA La Hague Complementary Safety Assessments (CSA)
Phase 2 : January 2011 to April 2013
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.13
La Hague Complementary Safety AssessmentsPhase 2 - Scope of workp
1. Extend the work on conformity check to the whole facility2. Perform some supplementary studies
on severe accident scenarios regarding an available grace period3 Defined Material and Organization reinforced arrangements3. Defined Material and Organization reinforced arrangementsDefinition of “hardened safety core” in terms of :
material and organisational supplementary arrangements specifications and procedures to improve the robustness in exceptional situations
4. Upgrade crisis management tools and organisationfor beyond design accidentAvailability of robust emergency management rooms satisfyingbasic safety functions requirements of Hardened safety Core
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.14
La Hague Complementary Safety AssessmentPhase 2 Hardened safety core equipment
Following severe accident situations are taken into accountibl l i f E l i di h D i
Phase 2 – Hardened safety core equipment
possibly resulting from External aggression exceeding the Design Basis Events (DBE) Risks associated with heat transfer chain Risks associated with heat transfer chain
Loss of power supply and/or loss of cooling-Cooling of spent fuel storage poolsC li f t k ith Fi i P d t (FP t k )-Cooling of tanks with Fission Products (FP tanks)
-Cooling of evaporators condensers-De-clogging of agglomerated fine fuel particles in Pendulum CentrifugeDecanters (PCD) to avoid ruthenium (RuO ) releaseDecanters (PCD) to avoid ruthenium (RuO4) release
-Cooling of PuO2 containers storage of facility whose design does not forecastnatural convection cooling
Risk of explosion associated with radiolysis hydrogen accumulation Loss of power supply leading to loss of hydrogen dilution devices
Fine fuel suspended particles tanks
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.15
-Fine fuel suspended particles tanks
La Hague Complementary Safety AssessmentPhase 2 – Delays before cliff edge effect
t =0
Radiolysis Hydrogen
Phase 2 – Delays before cliff edge effect
(7,5h to 85h)
DPC(14h)
FP Tanks (16h to 26h)
PuO2 StoragePuO2 Storage(20h)
FP Evaporators(34h to 48h)
t 268 hours
Spent Fuels Storage pools(145h to 268h)
t =268 hours
Legacy waste Silos
A few weeks (mitigation)Initial
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.16GP/CSLUD des 3 et 4 avril 2013 : suite des ECS AREVA, CEA et ILL
InitialHazard
Ultimate protection to guarantee or to ensure appropriated
Purpose of Hardened Safety Core Equipment
Ultimate protection to guarantee or to ensure appropriated management of consequences of a severe accident, due to: an external and huge aggression out of design basis long duration loss of power supply and cooling supposed failure of design basis protection means
(due to an exceptional and huge event)
Hardened Safety Core of material and organisational arrangements, specifications and procedures includes elements which contribute:specifications and procedures includes elements which contribute: to prevent or limit a severe accident to limit massive discharge (radioactive/chemical release) to allow severe accident management
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.17
Defense in depth and Hardened Safety CoreHard Core : limited number of SSC (Systems, Structures and Components)
Provisions to managesituations increasingly degraded
L l 4
Level 5(« crisis » Means)
« Crisis Management»
« Limitation of
Level 3
Level 4( « SA » Means)
« Limitation of consequences of SA»« Prévention of SAm
ity
Level 2(« Detection » Means)
(« back-up » Means) SA »
s of
con
form
Mar
gins
nce
Level 1(Normal Operations means)
Dev
iatio
ns M
Res
ilien
CSA BDBE (hardened Core)Natural Event
of referential
Level of Natural Event
SA = Severe AccidentsCSA = Complementary Safety Assessments
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.18
CSA Complementary Safety AssessmentsBDBE = Beyond Design Basis Event
Hardened Safety Core EquipmentWater Recovery for ponds and PF tanks
(4) FA ponds : Avoid loss of water due to boiling, leading to a too high dose levelWest
Reservoir
Water Recovery for ponds and PF tanks
Reservoir
North
(27) Highly Active storage tanks of concentrated solutions of fission products : Restore cooling to avoid boiling and release in the atmosphere
Moulinets Dam
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.19
Hardened Safety Core EquipmentWater Recovery for ponds and PF tanks
Function Remediation StrategyHardened Core Equipment
Water Recovery for ponds and PF tanks
gySupplementary Existing
To supply SF pools with lost water in order
Fixed and mobile pipes of general and specific (pools) network
− Supplementary fixed pipe for ultimate backup− Water level and
Cooling of Spent Fuels
storage pools
to maintain constant the water level of ponds (from West
Pond and/or Moulinets )
network Fixed or mobile Moto pumps Clarinets for water supply Portable data acquisition
Water level and temperature measurements safety system
dam) Portable data acquisition system (water level and temperature) Fixed and mobile pipes of
l d ifi ( l )− Supply pipes +
li il i id
Cooling of FP Storage Tanks
To supply water, with an « open loop », to
internal loops for cooling of Fission
general and specific (pools) network Fixed or mobile Moto pumps
Cl i t f t l
cooling coils inside tanks− Temperature measurement safety
tgand Buffers
CPF
gProduct Tanks (from
West Pond and/or Moulinets dam)
Clarinets for water supply Supplementary specific nozzles Portable data acquisition
t (t t )
system
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.20
system (temperature)
AREVA - La HagueComplementary Safety AssessmentsComplementary Safety Assessments
Fuel Cycle Industry - AREVA La HagueFuel Cycle Industry AREVA La Hague Complementary Safety Assessments (CSA)
Phase 2 : Upgrade crisis management tools
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.21
La Hague Complementary Safety Assessments Ph 2 Di i t lPhase 2 - Diagnosis tools
I iti l t t i d fi d th b i f th ti i f ti thInitial state is defined on the basis of a synthetic information on the source terms contained in the facilities requiring a priority intervention Operational arrangements are made in order to collect information based on the
last value of process parameter recorded before extreme event occurrencelast value of process parameter recorded before extreme event occurrence A diagnosis of the correct or incorrect operating of the safeguard system of
equipment concerned by the serious accidents
Monitoring after natural external event Priority is given to the equipment associated with the mitigation of serious accident
iscenarios The requisite information is relayed to the crisis management structures located as
near as possible to the facilities and/or the Emergency Centre headquarter Complementary mobile means are provided in case of failure Complementary mobile means are provided in case of failure
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.22
La Hague Complementary Safety Assessments Ph 2 M i i i t i i lPhase 2 - Main crisis management principles
1st phase : human resources available for the intervention which are a1 phase : human resources available for the intervention which are a major asset in the management of accidental situations Local Security units, operational teams, Health Physics and maintenance shift teams
2 d h t till i t t th t th it d i2nd phase : arrangements still exist to ensure that the site concerned is provided with the requisite resources to face the potential situations examined from the Site Emergency Plan (P.U.I.) organization On-site recall of the trained and experienced on call staff able to meet the
requirements related to potential serious scenarios
3rd phase : AREVA aims at implementing an organization on the Group scale enabling an efficient mobilization, within 48 hours, of available human and practical means for the damaged site FINA : National Intervention Team of AREVA Groupp
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.23
La Hague Complementary Safety Assessments Phase 2 - AREVA Organisation
Event
g
Emergency management in autonomy with minimal staff
on site
DiagnosisAREVA National Intervention
Team FINADiagnosis(State of Facilities, Collect the last value of process
parameter, On callSafety
Team FINA
CEA EDF AREVA mutualized intervention
Alert (Group, Authority)
Intervention dedicated to
Safety staff Alert
mutualized intervention means
(GIE INTRA)Intervention dedicated to severe accident situation
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.24
AREVA National Emergency Organization
La Hague Complementary Safety Assessments Phase 2 - Hardened core organisational arrangements
Upgrade numberof workforce
T0
(BC UP3)(BC UP3)
Only the equipment used for remediation
Event
UP3
(BC UP3)(BC UP3)UP3
UP3 Standard organization
in normal m «
OK
»
All peopleUP2-800
Pools
(R2)(R2)UP2-800 UP2-400
UP2-800
Pools
in normal operation
with minimum
safetyemergency ua
rdsy
stem Availability
of safeguard system
All people are usedfor concerned
Pools
Pools
emergency workforce
Safe
g
PUI
Collect the last value of process parameters
Ch k fi t b bl
equipmentremediation
Alert Normal operatingCoordination and
Remediation Remediation
PUI organization
Check first observable function’Ok or not OK’
DiagnosisNormal operating Remediation
preparation Remediation
and then monitoring
La Hague Complementary Safety Assessments Phase 2 - new crisis emergency buildings
Construction of new buildings which meet the hardened core requirements on the 4 sites
Block
Commandment(command alert communication)Final (command, alert, communication)
Storage (Facilities - ISO containers Shed)
Final buildings for Emergency
Management
(Facilities ISO containers Shed)
Emergency Rescue Brigade FLS
Transitory
► ECC Adaptation of UP3 Control Room
Adaptation of R2 RoomTransitorydispositions ► Supply and implementation
Satellite communication means
Diagnosis means
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.26
ag os s ea s
1st intervention team and clearing means
La Hague Complementary Safety Assessments
30 June 2012 :
Phase 2 - Fuel Cycle Industry
30 June 2012 :Transmission of AREVA studies requested by ASN Resolution for this date13th December 2012 :“Permanent Group of Experts” performed a rewiew of Licensees reportsPermanent Group of Experts performed a rewiew of Licensees reportsfor reactors with technical support IRSN Aiming at the validation of “hardened safety core” level natural aggressions
(Earthquake, Flooding, extreme wind…) beyond current baseline safety standard ( q g ) y yproposed by licensees
3rd and 4th April 2013 :p“Permanent Group of Experts” performed a review of AREVA reportswith technical support IRSN Definition of material and organization reinforced arrangements Crisis management process Emergency management centres resilience
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.27
La Hague Complementary Safety AssessmentsPhase 2 - Conclusions
Conclusions of Complementary Safety Assessment – Phase 2 Hardened Safety Core strategy has been globally approved by Permanent y gy g y pp y
Group of experts and IRSN reports AREVA took several commitments to perform complementary studies
between 2013 and 2014 to definitely justify the perimeter of severe accident scenarios, the natural extreme event description and hardened safety core prevention/mitigation means proposed
Commitment to perform major Investments in Phase 3b t 2013 d 2017 t k b tibetween 2013 and 2017 were taken by operating managers Emergency building center Hardened Safety Core Equipment
AREVA i ti f h b t t F k hi lAREVA is pro active for exchange about post Fukushima lessons learned with other International operators Collaboration with Sellafield Ltd (UK) or JNFL (Japan) Adhesion of AREVA La Hague to WANO
AREVA Complementary Safety Assessement – Atomic Energy Society of Japan – June 2013 the 3rd p.28
