Are We Winning 2008

8/3/2019 Are We Winning 2008

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Measuring Progressin the StruggAgainst Violent Jihadis

AreWeWinning?

A M E R I C A N S E C U R I T Y P R O J E C

B e r n a r d I . F i n e l w i t h H o l l y C r y s t a l G e


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America needs a new national security vision or this new era and a

dialogue at home that is as robust as it is realistic.

A M E R I C A N S E C U R I T Y P R O J E C T

The American Security Project is organized around the belie that honest public discussion o national security

requires a better-inormed citizenryone that understands the dangers and opportunities o the twenty-rst

century and the spectrum o available policy responses.

Security is a undamental responsibility o government. In the new millennium, however, U.S. national security

policy has not kept pace with rapidly changing threats to American interests. Globalization has quickened, but

the United States has not built alliances or institutions to protect and advance American security. Terrorists have

expanded their reach and lethality, but the moral authority o the United States is at an all-time low. Changes

in the Earths climate are more evident every day, but the United States has ailed to act, alone or with allies, to

avoid disaster.

America needs a new national security vision or this new era and a dialogue at home that is as robust as it is

realistic. Yet the quality o our discussion on national security has been diminished. Fear has trumped conversa-

tion. Articial dierences have been created and real dierences have been let unexamined. The character o

our national dialogue has grown increasingly shrill while the need or honest discussion has grown more urgent.

Only by developing real analysis and thoughtul answers can a genuine oreign policy consensus be rebuilt or

a dangerous and decisive age. Only then will America again marshal all her resourcesmilitary, diplomatic,

economic, and moralto meet the challenges o a complex world.

Mission

A r e W e W i n n i n g ?


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S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 8 R E P O R T

The HonorableGary Hart

ASP Chairman

Brigadier GeneralStephen A. Cheney,USMC (Ret.)

Marine Military

Academy

Nelson W.Cunningham

McLarty Associates

The HonorableRichard L. Armitage

Armitage

International

Lieutenant GeneralDaniel Christman,USA (Ret.)

United States

Chamber of

Commerce

Kenneth M.Duberstein

The Duberstein Group

Lael Brainard

Brookings Institution

Gregory B. Craig

Williams &

Connolly LLP

Vice Admiral LeeGunn, USN (Ret.)

ASP President

The HonorableChuck Hagel

United States Senate

General Lester L.Lyles, USAF (Ret.)

The Lyles Group

The HonorableWarren B. Rudman

Stonebridge-

International LLC

Lieutenant GeneralClaudia Kennedy,USA (Ret.)

Population Action

International

The HonorableGeorge Mitchell

DLA Piper, Rudnick,

Gray, Cary

David Thorne

Adviser Investment

Management, Inc.

The HonorableJohn Kerry

United States Senate

Susan E. Rice

Brookings Institution

General AnthonyZinni, USMC (Ret.)

DynCorp,

International

James M. Ludes

Executive Director

Board o Directors


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IntroductionThe war on terror has morphed rom an imprecise, but comprehensible,

concept into little more than a cudgel to be wielded in American domestic

political debates by both the let and the right. What ought to be a policy

debate over threats and consequences, risks and capabilities, ends and means

is instead, too oten, an opportunistic weapon used without reerence to logic

or acts in order to gain political advantage. The result is a dizzying set o

changing assessments that encourage skepticism and cynicism instead o

consistency and clarity.

Ultimately, any approach to the challenge posed by violent jihadists must

acknowledge several basic propositions:

First, the threat is very real and likely to endure.

Second, any progress is likely to be incremental and will require years

o prudence and consistency to institutionalize.

Third, our adversaries are strategically savvy and will continually adaptto our actions to achieve their goals. Complacency can quickly turn

into catastrophe.

Our goal in theAre We Winning? series is to provide empirical data as the

oundation o reasoned discussion and principled debate. To this end, the

American Security Project has developed ten criteria to measure progress

or lack o progress in the struggle against violent jihadism. These metrics

are designed to be both reproducible and as objective as possible. They are

intended to comprise a holistic approach, examining causes and processes

associated with violent jihadism, in addition to outcomes.

Developments Since Are We Winning 2007The ndings in this report assess signicant trends that infuenced our key

metrics over the past year, but may refect developments that occurred as ar

back as 2006. Just as there are undoubtedly current developments whose

signicance is hard to discern, there were some trends whose importance was

not ully evident at the time o last years report.


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A Note About Terminology

There has been a great deal o debate over the appropriate use o various

terms associated ith the ar on terror, among government ocials and

policy experts alie. The American Security Project has chosen to continue

to use the term violent jihadism to reer to the terrorist violence motivatedby Islamism because e believe it provides the best balance beteen

accuracy and clarity. For a comprehensive discussion o Islamism and its

relation to terrorism, e invite the reader to reer to our earlier report, The

Causes o Violent Jihadism(ASP, 2007). A e caveats are nonetheless

important. Jihad is a term that is oten used in Islam to reer to pious and

peaceul struggles. Its use by terrorist organizations has oended many

Muslims. Our report narroly ocuses on only those ho engage in violent

jihad, and only those terrorists ho are inspired by a violent interpretation

Islam. Also, hile e reer to Islamist violence, e do not mean to imply

that Islamism that is, the political movement to organize and govern a

society according to the tenets o Islam is inherently violent.

Our report last year highlighted several troubling developments. In particular,

the establishment o a sae haven or al Qaeda in Pakistan and the deep

unpopularity o the Iraq war in the Muslim world undermined progress in

encouraging state cooperation against terrorists. The increasing number o

incidents o Islamist terror worldwide conrmed this pessimistic assessment.

This year, our ndings remain cause or concern despite modest

improvements. Jihadist violence seems to have stabilized, though at

historically high levels. Illicit markets continue to provide substantial

nancial resources or use by criminal and terrorist organizations. While

several terrorist organizations have been dramatically weakened through

popular rejectionas in Iraqand eective strikes against leadership

targetsas in the Philippines and Indonesiathe terrorist sae haven in

northwest Pakistan and the growing sophistication and productivity o the

jihadist media apparatus are major sources o concern.

On balance, these metrics indicate the United States is not winning the

war on terror.


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The metrics in this report are presented in order o importance. They are judged

against this question:

Do t rends in th is i nd icator demonstrate progress in the st ruggle against v io lent j ihad ism?

Summary oFindings


N O UNCERTAIN Y E S

I. Number o Terrorist Incidents

The number o attacs by Islamist terrorists remains at a historically high level. This is true even ithout

counting Iraq and Aghanistan, hich together account or hal o the total Islamist violence.

II. State o the Jihadist Leadership

Several senior leaders o jihadist groups have been illed or captured over the past eighteen month. Hoever,

the top leaders o al Qaeda continue to evade capture hile their ability to engage in aggressive outreach via

the Internet has gron.

III. Al Qaeda-Afliated Movements

The United States and its allies have made tremendous progress against al Qaeda-aliated groups in Iraq and

Southeast Asia, but the groth o jihadist groups in North and East Arica, as ell as the strengthened position

o the Taliban in Aghanistan, has oset the gains.

IV. State Sponsorship o Terrorism

State sponsorship o terrorism remains at historically lo levels, although toleration o terrorist activities

remains a signicant concern globally.

V. Public Attitudes in the Muslim World

Despite success in delegitimizing terrorism as a tactic, the United States continues to lose ground in the battle

o ideas because o the pervasive belie among Muslims that the United States sees to eaen Islam and

exert political dominance in the Muslim orld.


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VI. Public Attitudes in the United States

American public opinion in recent months has been more realistic about the extent o the terror threat. This

development refects a return to normalcy.

VII. Economic Prosperity and Political Freedom

Although poverty and political oppression persist at high levels throughout the Muslim orld, trends in the dataindicate improving conditions on both ronts. Large challenges remain, but progress is evident.

VIII. Ungoverned Spaces

The challenge o ungoverned spaces improved somehat since last year. Beteen the success o the

surge and Sunni Aaening in Iraq, and successul counter-insurgency activities in Southeast Asia, there

are eer areas o the orld no vulnerable to terrorist penetration. Hoever, the orsening o the situation

in Paistan and the explosion o Islamist violence in Somalia are signicant negative developments.

IX. International Cooperation Against Terrorism

International cooperation against terrorism remains solid, bolstered in particular by developments in estern

Arica and Oceania. Elsehere, hoever, developments have stalled due to concerns regarding civil liberties

and the appropriate ocus o counter-terror programs.

X. Terrorist Financing

The ability o terrorists to use the international nancial system has been curtailed, but their ability to raise

money through criminal activities and direct cash transers is largely unimpeded.


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Do t rends in th is ind icator demonstrate progress in the st ruggle against v io lent j ihad ism?

The number o attacks by Islamist terrorists remains at a historically high level. This

is true even without counting Iraq and Aghanistan, which together account or hal

o the total Islamist violence.

I. Number oTerrorist IncidentsIncidents o Islamist terrorism around the world remain

at an all time high, even without counting attacks in Iraq,

Aghanistan, and Israel. According to data collected by

the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), there

were 271 such incidents in 2004, 342 in 2005, 311 in

2006, and 597 in 2007. I attacks in 2008 continue at

the same rate as in the rst quarter o this year, there will

be 664 attacks in 2008. This is roughly ten times higher

than the annual rate o the late 1990s, and is a clear sign

that the jihadist threat is increasing.

The number o casualties caused by Islamist terrorism

has shown some decline since 2004. However, a very

small number o incidents account or a disproportionate

percentage o the variation in trends, indicating a sig-

nicant random element. In 2006 and 2007, according

to the NCTC, there were 908 attacks by Islamist groups

outside o Iraq, Aghanistan, and Israel. O those, 491,

or more than hal, resulted in one or no casualties. These

908 attacks in total resulted in 7,929 casualties, but

1,099 o those were victims o a single attack in India

on July 11, 2006. The 10 worst attacks alone resulted in

3,017 o the total casualties.

Overall, violence is down in Iraq, but it is not clear that

the United States is making progress in deeating the

Islamist threat there. While subjective analyses are virtu-ally wholly in agreement that al Qaeda in Iraq has been

marginalized, NCTC data on Islamist violence in Iraq

has yet to show an unmistakable improvement in the situ-

ation. There is good reason to believe that progress has in

act occurred and the data is simply lagging, but this case

bears urther observation over the coming months.

INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM(Excluding iraq, aghanistan, and israEl)

200

150

100

50

0

Number

ofINcIdeNts

1-04

3-04

1-05

3-05

1-06

3-06

1-07

3-07

1-08

date (Quarter-Year)

CASUALTIES OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM(Excluding iraq, aghanistan, and israEl)

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0

Numberofcas

ualtIes

1-04

3-04

1-05

3-05

1-06

3-06

1-07

3-07

1-08

date (Quarter-Year)

INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN IRAQ200

150

100

50

0

NumberofINcIdeNt

s

1-04

3-04

1-05

3-05

1-06

3-06

1-07

3-07

1-08

date (Quarter-Year)

Source: NCTC Worldwide Incidents Tracking System




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N O UNCERTAIN Y E S S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 8 R E P O R T

Over hal o all terrorist incidents

attributed to Islamist groups in 2007

occurred in Iraq and Aghanistan.

Another one-th o the total occurred

either in Israel or the Gaza strip. As in

past years, the major areas o activity

were thus quite geographically limit-

ed. Nonetheless, there were incidents

in at least 24 countries and territories

around the world. Other hot spots

included Pakistan with 152 incidents,

Somalia with 105, India with 50, and

Algeria with 44.

There were some signicant changes in

the number o terrorist incidents in sev-

eral key countries. On the positive side

o the equation, the Philippines saw a

44% decline in Islamist terror incidents

conrming the subjective judgment o

many terrorism experts o progress in

that country. The Philippines high-

lights the decline o jihadist groups in

the Southeast Asian region. India alsosaw a signicant drop o o 62% in the

number o incidents, but this may be the

fip side o the story in Pakistan which

saw incidents increase by over 533%

rom 24 to 152. Pakistans success in

exporting jihadist violence in the past

seems to have ended, and the result is

increased violence within that country.

Another troubling development was

the explosion o incidents in Somalia,rom 3 reported in 2006 to 105 in 2007,

a trend which also matches subjective

assessments o the growing strength o

jihadist groups in East Arica.

INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM IN 200

m 0 m 1-10 m 11-20 m 21-50 m >50


CHANGE IN INCIDENTS OF ISLAMIST TERRORISM FROM 200 TO 200

m norecordedincidents m >50% decrease m 0-50% decrease m >0-50% increase m >50% increase



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10

Several senior leaders o jihadist groups have been killed or captured over the past eighteen

months. However, the top leaders o al Qaeda continue to evade capture while their ability to

engage in aggressive outreach via the Internet has grown.

II. State o the Jihadist LeadershipThere has been signicant progress against jihadist organiza-

tions in Southeast Asia. An important reason or this success

has been eective attacks against senior leadership targets.

Khadday Janjalani, the leader o Abu Sayya Group (ASG)

in the Philippines, was killed in clashes with government

troops at the end o 2006. Though ASG remains active, and

has continued to use kidnappings and other criminal activities

or unding, its ability to launch signicant terror attacks has

diminished signicantly.

Zarkasih, the leader o Jemaah Islamiah (JI), and Abu Duja-

na, the military commander o JI, were arrested in June 2007,

capping a series o arrests and imprisonments o JI leaders.

Eective targeting o leaders, as well as additional pressures

in the orm o asset seizures and police raids, seems to have

weakened JI considerably. In addition, the pressure on the

group has caused a schism, with some elements seeking to

jettison terrorism in avor o legitimate political action.

There has also been some good news on the central ront

Pakistan. Mullah Dadullah Akhund, the senior military

commander o the Taliban, was killed in Aghanistan in May

2007. Abu Laith al-Libi, a senior al Qaeda leader, was killed

by a U.S. airstrike in Pakistan in late January 2008. Unortu-

nately, these accomplishments have not oset the develop-

ment o an increasingly secure base or al Qaeda and Taliban

ghters on the Aghan-Pakistani border.

Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri remain at large,

providing both inspiration and, in the case o Zawahiri,

a public ace to al Qaeda. Similarly, despite the death o

Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban remains active and resilient,

and has metastasized into two separate insurgencies, one in

Aghanistan and one in Pakistan.

Osama bin Laden: he e onder nd eder o qed. Born nsd arb o n en my w more n 50 bn, e fr ook

n nere n voen imm wen e beme nvoved n e Mm

Broerood. he er o w e Mjdeen n ann n

e sove. aer n sdn be or rnn mp n e ery

1990, e ed oner-error eor ere o ee n ann.

Ayman al-Zawahiri: he qe eo omm,

ey ke e em e e, voe, po o eozo. i ome oy o Eyp, e be oz voeim e e o 15. he me Om b le we wok eo o e re cee soey 1980.

Mohamad Noordin Top: he beeve o be mpo ofe,ee, bombmke, e o Jem im, ke o ev-e bomb ioe B. i ap 2006, poe e oe Jv o p e w ee. a oe epo o e eemee y e pe me noo w pe, b ee poe e w o ee e me o e .

Abu Dujana: aee Je 2007, dj w e ee o Jemim. he e bee o y o ep eo eee o 15 ye j. i beeve e e omb epeeew e Mjee a e 1980 oeo oOm b le.

Mullah Dadullah Akhund: a e P, e o esove opo w e Mjee, w me e o e omb. he we o o beome e eo my omme o etb e w ke 2007 by oo oe.

Khaday Janjalani: he e yoe boe o e oe o absyy, ook ove ee e e. Jj e

be o e w Pppe oop sepembe 2006, b ove efo o boy w o me Jy 2007.

Abu Laith al-Libi: a enor qed eder ked by cia rrke n

Pkn. O lbyn deen, e w ormery eder o e lbyn im

n grop. sne en, e beome n mporn fed ommnder

or qed. amon k e beeve o be reponbe or pnnn

nd exen re bombn ode e u.s. ofe o rnn or e

sd non rd n 1995 or w e w mproned nd e bomb-

n Brm ar Be drn Ve Preden ceney v n ery 2007.

i

capturedi

ii

i

atlargei

i

i

i

killedi

ii

i

atlargeii

i

i

atlargei

i

i

i

killedi

ii

i

killedi

ii


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11N O UNCERTAIN Y E S S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 8 R E P O R T

The institutional capacity o terrorist organizations is

dicult to measure. Terrorist attacks are oten quite

opportunistic and recent actions do not always refect

institutional capacity. Nevertheless, the organizational

capacity o al Qaeda is visible in its media presencewhich is growing in size and sophistication.

Al Qaedas media wing, As-Sahab, has been producing

high-quality videos or global distribution or several

years. In 2002, it produced six videos. In 2007 the

number was nearly 100. These videos are not the

product o cave-dwelling ugitives, but rather o a

sophisticated organization with access to production and

editing acilities as well as secure distribution channels.

In addition to the videos, jihadist groups remain

extremely active on the Internet, with a wide variety

o websites devoted to recruiting, propaganda, and

community building. In December 2007, al-Zawahiri

oered to answer questions rom journalists and

jihadists posted online. In April 2008, he made good

on his promise, addressing a wide variety o issues,

including several questions critical o al Qaedas

priorities and the legitimacy o attacking civilians.

There have been some suggestions that recent criticism

rom within the jihadist community is a sign o the

weakening o the movement. An alternative assessment

would ocus on the traditional importance o debate and

public justication in jihadist circles. There is a rich

and spirited debate happening on jihadist websites. This

may demonstrate the vitality o the movement more so

than its imminent collapse.

Ayman al-Zawahiri

i e ye om My 2007 o ap 2008, aym -Zw poe 16

o veo mee w a-sb Me.

Jihadi media has demolished by the

grace of Allah the monopoly of the

Western and governmental information

outlets which we have been suffering

from for decades, and has offered to the

world the hidden facts which they used

to seek to cover up.

aym -Zw epoe o eo bme oe.

ANNUAL AS-SAHAB PRODUCTION

YEAR NUMBER OF MESSAGES

2002

2003 11

2004 1

2005 1

2006

2007

Source: IntelCenter


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12

The United States and its allies have made tremendous progress against al Qaeda-

aliated groups in Iraq and Southeast Asia, but the growth o jihadist groups

in North and East Arica, as well as the strengthened position o the Taliban in

Aghanistan, has oset the gains.

III. Al Qaeda-Afliated Movements

North Arica A

Jihadist groups in North Arica are increasingly coordinating

their actions and increasingly willing to unction under the

banner o al Qaeda. The impact o the Iraq War has turned

a series o disjointed movements, each motivated by local

grievances, into more globally-oriented groups. Part or all o the

Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, the Moroccan Islamic Combat

Group, and the Tunisian Combatant Group are now operating

as al Qaeda aliates. Aside rom Saudi Arabia, North Arica

has been the most signicant source o oreign ghters in Iraq.

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, are now major recruiting centers

or al Qaeda.

A MEMRI report argues:

Never in the past has Al-Qaeda had such a solid territorial

base in such proximity to Western states, and it has threatened

to employ this base to attack Europe. The unication o the

North Arican jihad groups under the banner o Al-Qaeda,

the use o the Sahara or training and arms-smuggling, and

the number o North Arican cells discovered in Europe in

the past all indicate the magnitude o the threat.

Aghanistan-Pakistan B

Over the past seven years, al Qaeda has established a secure

base along the border between Aghanistan and Pakistan.

The new Pakistani government o Prime Minister Yousa

Raza Gillani has been even less willing to pursue jihadist

groups than its military predecessor. Instead, Pakistan is now

more aggressively pursuing negotiations with extremists and

autonomy agreements with tribal leaders in hopes o deusing

the growing insurgency in Pakistan. Unortunately, autonomy

agreements have ailed in the past, and despite the unpopularity

o the jihadists in Pakistan, there is little reason to expect

that new agreements will contain the threat any better. The

increasing number o terrorist attacks in Pakistan and the

growing tension between Pakistan and Aghanistan over cross-

border incursions make it seem likely that, rather than abating,

the threat in this part o the world is increasing.


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A

C

B

D

East Arica C

In 2006, an Islamist group, the Islamic Courts Union (ICU),

seemed on the verge o establishing complete control over

Somalia, potentially providing the country with a uniedgovernment or the rst time in over a decade. In December

o 2006, however, ghting between ICU and Ethiopian-backed

Somali groups escalated into open warare with Ethiopian

troops ultimately driving the ICU rom Mogadishu. Since

then, the ICU has waged a guerilla campaign, largely under

the banner o a group called the Shabab. The confict has also

provided additional legitimacy to several existing al Qaeda-a-

liated groups in Somalia, most notably al-Itihaad al-Islaami

(AIAI). The level o jihadist violence in Somalia has esca-

lated dramatically over the past year and ought to be a major

cause o concern or the uture.

Southeast Asia D

Southeast Asia is a tremendously encouraging region in the

global struggle against violent jihadism. The combination o

eective government action, quiet U.S. support, and highly per-sonalized (and thus vulnerable) jihadist movements has resulted

in a signicant diminution o the jihadist threat in the region. A

ew years ago, this region seemed like a hotbed o activity, but

eective attacks on the leadership o Jemaah Islamiah and Abu

Sayya Group have dramatically weakened those movements.

The insurgency in southern Thailand became markedly more

violent ollowing the military coup o 2006, but its integration

into the broader jihadist community remains ambiguous.


14/32



1

State sponsorship o terrorism remains at historically low levels, although toleration

o terrorist activities remains a signicant concern globally.

IV.State Sponsorship o TerrorismActive state sponsorship o terrorism remains at historically low levels. Even countries that demonstrably support terrorist organiza-

tions are mostly guilty o supporting groups that have attributes o quasi-statehood particularly Hamas and Hezbollah. Support or

purely terrorist organizations is less common, refecting the established international consensus that terrorism is illegitimate. Iran is

the only country that seems to support groups that actively target Americans. Pakistans policies are also troubling. While it is pos-

sible that Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) is a rogue element within the Pakistani government, it seems more likely that

ISIs support or anti-Indian terrorism, and its ties to the Aghan Taliban, refect a deliberate state policy o using terrorism in support

o strategic objectives.

Five levels o state sponsorship and toleration o terrorist activity are identied below, in declining order o severity.

Active sponsors are countries that directly support terrorist organizations with unds, arms, and intelligence. They also provide politi-

cal support to terrorist groups and largely reuse to cooperate with international eorts to reign in terrorism.

In the second category are states that negotiate agreements with terrorists. These agreements include oers o amnesty in return or

unveried cooperation, as well as regional autonomy agreements that institutionalize ungoverned spaces.

States that tolerate undraising knowingly allow agents o terrorist groups to operate on their soil and openly solicit unds or their

activities abroad.

In the ourth category, there are states that tolerate the presence o known terrorists on their soil and ail to either arrest or extradite

terrorist operatives.

Countries that have ailed to pass laws and regulations to enorce their international obligations constitute the th category. This is

distinct rom countries that simply lack the capacity to implement their laws (a category o states addressed in the eighth metric o this

report, which discusses ungoverned spaces).

Additionally, there are those states that ormally cooperate with counter-terrorism eorts, but whose actions are actually at odds withthe goals o the eort. These are states that use counter-terrorism as a shield or domestic repression. Though these states may be

cooperative, their actions ultimately delegitimize counter-terrorism and ought to be condemned.


15/32



STATE SPONSORSHIP OF TERRORISM

m activesponsors m agreementswithterrorists m toleratefundraising m toleratepresence

m failuretoprosecute/failuretopassorimplementlaws m abuseofcounter-terrorismfordomesticrepression

State Sponsorship and Political Symbolism

i Je o ye, Pee B oe e ee o e no Koe of e poo o eom. te se

depme bee pe eee y ebe eo ey ymbo. te me pe eee ee no Koe

o bee vove o eom e 1987 b e eo o e w epoe o bmo o oe o

e pom.

smy, o cb oe o be bee e poo o eom, e se depme epo o eev ve oe o

eop w oe ey oveme e o oopee e w o eo. te ue se e cb o bo-

eo b o o ppo e ve. cey ee e e o moe eo oe ve bee me by poy epe

Pk.

t pozo o e of eo o e poo o eom mke poo me w w o e e o

ob eom.


16/32



1

Despite success in delegitimizing terrorism as a tactic, the United States continues

to lose ground in the battle o ideas because o the pervasive belie among Muslims

that the United States seeks to weaken Islam and exert political dominance in the

Muslim world.

V. Public Attitudes in the Muslim WorldThe United States aces a tremendous public diplomacy challenge

in the Muslim world. There are three core sets o attitudes that are

relevant to the U.S. struggle against violent jihadism. The rst is

attitudes towards terrorism and jihadist groups. The second relates

to comparative views o the United States and jihadists in general.

The third ocuses on the perception o American intentions.

Muslims virtually everywhere overwhelmingly reject terrorism.

In most countries, less than twenty percent o the population con-

siders suicide bombings and attacks on civilians at all justiable,

and the percentage that considers such attacks strongly justied

or oten justied is even lower. This rejection o terrorism in the

abstract has translated into a lower opinion o Osama bin Laden

and al Qaeda specically and terrorist groups generally.

This nding is signicant, though not a huge source o com-

ort. Analysts believe that there are ewer than 50,000 members

o jihadist organizations worldwide, so the jihadist movementrepresents a tiny percentage o even those Muslims who consider

violence justied. We may have reached the practical limits o re-

jection o terrorism among Muslim populations, and, even at these

low numbers, terrorists are easily able to recruit new members.

Moreover, rejection o terrorism in the abstract has not reduced hos-

tility toward the United States. The challenge or American policy

is not the small number o extremists, but rather the generalized

antipathy or the United States and skepticism o American motives

that makes anti-Americanism not just legitimate, but popular.

There are ew Muslim countries in the world where even hal

the population has a avorable view o the United States. In

many countries including Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Turkey,

Egypt, Malaysia, and Morocco ewer than 30% o respondents

expressed a avorable view o the United States. By contrast, in

2007 78% o Moroccans thought the goal o American policy

around the world was to weaken and divide Islam. 92% o

Egyptians subscribed to this notion, as did 73% o Indonesians.

PERCENTAGE OF MUSLIMS WHO VIEW SUICIDEBOMBING AS JUSTIFIED OFTEN/SOMETIMES

COUNTRY 2002 200 200 200 2002002-0

CHANGE

Lebannon 74 -- 39 -- 34 -40

Bangladesh 44 -- -- -- 20 -24

Paistan 33 41 25 14 9 -24

Jordan 43 -- 57 29 23 -20

Indonesia 26 -- 15 10 10 -16

Tanzania 18 -- -- -- 11 -7

Nigeria 47 -- -- 46 42 -5

Turey 13 15 14 17 16 +3

coe w vbe e ow. Be o Mm epoe.Source: Pew Global Attitudes Projec

SUPPORT FOR ATTACKS ON CIVILIANShow jfe e k o v ee o oe o eve po o?

COUNTRY STRONGLY JUSTIFIED WEAKLY NOT AT ALL

Morocco 2 6 19 57

Egypt 7 8 6 77

Paistan 1 4 8 81

Indonesia 1 3 7 84

Source: Pew Global Attitudes Projec

U.S. GOAL: WEAKEN AND DIVIDE ISLAMPee e me yo k e oow e o e ou.s. o: to weke ve e im wo.

m definitely/probably m definitelynot/probablynot

COUNTRY RESULTS

Morocco 11

Egypt 2

Paistan

Indonesia 1

Source: WorldPublicOpinion.or


17/32



Polling data rom Pakistan and Saudi Arabia illustrates the chal-

lenge. In these U.S.-allied countries, the United States is seen

unavorably by a majority o the population. Only 16.9% o

Pakistanis hold a avorable opinion o the United States, while in

Saudi Arabia 39.5% o respondents did. Al Qaeda is signicantlymore popular in Pakistan, with 32.2% o the population viewing

the group avorably. In Saudi Arabia the news is much better,

with only 9.5% having a avorable opinion o al Qaeda.

The collapse o support or al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia is mirrored

by extremely high levels o support or combating terrorism

within Saudi Arabia. The challenge in Pakistan is unortunately

much more complicated. Not only is the United States in a los-

ing popularity contest with al Qaeda, there is deeper skepticism

o American motives. 57.9% o Pakistanis consider the real

purpose o the war on terror to be to weaken and divide the

Islamic world, while 15.1% believe the goal is to ensure Ameri

can domination over Pakistan.

This skepticism explains why 69.1% o Pakistanis oppose having

the U.S. military work with the Pakistani military to pursueTaliban and al Qaeda ghters inside Pakistan. The implication

is that, despite Pakistani opposition to the presence o al

Qaeda ghters, and an overwhelming rejection o terrorism,

many Pakistanis respect Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda or

standing up to the West. This respect or al Qaeda is not borne

o a desire to spread Islam or support or suicide bombing, but is

rather a unction o suspicion o American motives.

VIEWS OF THE U.S., 200-200-COUNTRY TOTAL

geey pek, yo e ow e ue se:

m 2006 m 2008

ATTITUDE RESULTS

Very Favorable%

%

Somehat Favorable%

11%

Somehat Unavorable21%

1%

Very Unavorable%

%

Survey conducted March 2008 in Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the UAESource: Shibley Telhami

VIEWS OF AL QAEDAm pakistanmay/june2008 m saudiarabiadecember2007

ATTITUDE RESULTS

Very Favorable.1%

.%

Somehat Favorable 2.1%.%

Somehat Unavorable22.1%

%

Very Unavorable2.%

.%

Source: Terror Free Tomorrow

PAKISTAN MAY/JUNE 200W o yo k e e ppoe o e us-e w o eo?

m toweaken&divideislamicworld

m todefeatalqaeda&itsallies

m toensureamericandominationoverpakistan

m todefeatterroristsaroundworld

m other

m refused/dontknow

do yo ppo o oppoe e Pk my ptb a qe fe e Pk?

m stronglysupport

m somewhatsupport

m somewhatoppose

m stronglyoppose

m refused/dontknow

i yo peoy ve vobe opo [o Om ble qe], w wo yo y e mompo eo yo ve vobe opo?

m osamabinladen&alqaedastanduptoamerica

m osamabinladen&alqaedaleaddefensivejihadagainstamerica

m osamabinladenandalqaedafightagainstrepressivegovts

m osamabinladen&alqaedastandupfordignityofmuslimsworldwide

m refused/dontknow

Source: Terror Free Tomorrow

.%

1%

1.1%

.2%0.2% .%

1%

2%

20.%

20.%

12.1%

.%

20.%

1.%

1.%

.%


18/32



1

American public opinion in recent months has been more realistic about the extent

o the terror threat. This development refects a return to normalcy.

VI. Public Attitudes in the United StatesThe eectiveness o terrorism can be measured, in part, by the reaction it prompts. Regardless o what terrorists do, they cannot be

successul i their targets are not terrorized. Thereore, one method o assessing progress in the war on terror is to examine how

threatened Americans eel. It appears that, in act, the level o public concern about terrorism has declined signicantly, and yet still

refects a level o anxiety inconsistent with the actual level o the threat.

The war on terror remains an important political issue, but various developments are beginning to move it back into the realm o

policy and out o the realm o politics. The troubles in the American economy, in particular, have pushed terrorism o the ront pages.

Furthermore, the stabilization o the situation in Iraq has stemmed some o the gloomier views o the jihadist threat. Only 7% o likely

voters in a July 2008 poll identied terrorism as the most important issue in the presidential election, whereas polls rom 2004 showed

terrorism as the most important issue or closer to 20% o the American electorate.

This declining political relevance refects increased public optimism on the subject o terrorism. Americans increasingly see the war

on terror in positive terms, with only 20% seeing the terrorists winning, while over 50% see the U.S. and its allies as gaining the

upper hand. This is a dramatic reversal rom the 2006 numbers, which showed the two about even. Finally, the expectation o a poten

tial terrorist attack in the coming weeks has declined to its lowest levels since 9/11, with only 35% o the electorate considering such

an attack likely or very likely.

In reality, even these numbers refect a dramatically infated level o concern. Violent jihadists, though capable o inficting signicant

suering on American citizens, are not capable o deeating the United States in any plausible scenario. Given that there has not been

an attack on U.S. soil since 9/11, the persistence o even a 35% perceived chance o an attack in the next several weeks overstates the

threat by an order o magnitude. Fear o terrorism has decreased, and this is a positive development, but the memory o the 9/11 at-

tacks clearly persists, and its distorting eect on American politics remains.

In addition to being worried about attacks, another way to assess how threatened the American public eels is by the measures it is

willing to take to promote security. Although we still have not had a comprehensive debate on the tradeo between security and civil

liberties, Americans on the whole seem satised with the current balance between the two. This is somewhat surprising, however,

because there appears to be cause or legitimate concern. As surveillance o the American public has increased, the number o pros-ecutions or terrorism-related crimes is actually declining. That this disconnect has not caused surveillance policy to be aggressively

challenged seems to imply a continuing belie that Americans must do whatever it takes to curb the threat o terrorism.


19/32



doe o e yem woy oo m bo poe v o woy oo m bo poe o ey?

m individualrights

m nationalsecurity

m balanceisaboutright

m notsure

W o e oow w be e e mo mpoe yo voe e eeo o Pee ye?

m terrorism

m thewariniraq

m theeconomy

m illegalimmigration

m healthcare

m somethingelse

m na/notsure

Source: Quinnipiac University Poll

Source: Rasmussen Report

%

1%

%

%

11%

% %

2%

2%

2%

%

HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT THERE WILL BE FURTHER ACTS OF TERRORISMIN THE UNITED STATES OVER THE NEXT SEVERAL WEEKS?

m VERY LIkELY/SOMEwHAT LIkELY m NOT TOO LIkELY/NOT AT ALL LIkELY

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

PerceNtageofresPoNdeNts

AUG06

OCT06

DEC06

FEB07

APR07

JUN

07

AUG07

OCT07

DEC07

FEB08

APR08

JUN

08

date

Source: CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll

WHO IS WINNING THE WAR ON TERROR?

m U.S. & ALLIES m TERRORISTS

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

PerceNtag

eofresPoNdeNts

JAN07

FEB07

MAR07

APR07

MAY07

JUN07

JUL07

AUG07

SEP07

OCT07

NOV07

DEC07

JAN08

FEB08

MAR08

APR08

MAY08

JUN08

JUL08

date

Source: CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll


20/32



20

Although poverty and political oppression persist at high levels throughout the

Muslim world, trends in the data indicate improving conditions on both ronts.

Large challenges remain, but progress is evident.

VII.Economic Prosperity & Political FreedomPolitical FreedomThough the links between lack o political reedom and support or violent jihadism are dicult to discern precisely, it is clear that at

least some o the support or jihadist groups is borne o rustration with authoritarian elites.

There is a pervasive lack o political reedom in the Muslim world. In 2008, Freedom House rated twenty-our majority-Muslim

countries as non-ree, while twenty-one were rated as partially ree. Only three majority-Muslim countries were ree in 2008.This leads to overly pessimistic conclusions, however.

Though reedom is lacking, encouraging trends can be identied. Examining changes in political reedom and civil liberties over the

past ve years, with a special emphasis on recent developments, there are nine countries in the Muslim world that have seen signican

positive changes and another nine with smaller but still positive improvements in this area. Twenty-three Muslim nations have seen no

change in their level o political reedom and only seven have seen any sort o decline. This reinorces an assessment o slow progress

in the area o political reedom in the Muslim world.

The uture remains tremendously uncertain. Several states that are making moves toward democracy, notably Iraq and Pakistan,

remain extremely unpredictable and are currently wracked with political violence. There is a simmering undercurrent o dissent in

countries like Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Syria, and ethnic and sectarian divides could undermine progress in many countries.

Source: Freedom Hous

FREE PARTIALLY FREE NOT FREE

m significantimprovement m someimprovement m nochange m someregression m significantregression


21/32



Economic ProgressThe Muslim world remains overwhelmingly poor. Twenty-eight Muslim-majority nations had a GDP per capita o less than $2,000

according to recent CIA Factbook data. Only seven Muslim states had per capita GDPs o over $20,000, and all o those were oil

producing nations riding the wave o surging oil prices. Poverty in the Muslim world remains endemic, with many countries crippled

by corruption, inecient and bloated state sectors, and social policies that systematically devalue the potential contributions o women

in the work orce.

There are, however, some positive trends in the economic data as well. Twenty-three Muslim-majority nations saw their economies

grow at a rate o 6% or greater, and another thirteen had growth rates exceeding 4% but less than 6%. I sustainable, these growth

rates would go a long way to easing the challenges o unemployment that afict many young men in Muslim countries and help create

conditions or greater social stability.

One o the great challenges, however, is the existence o several countries where poverty is endemic and growth rates are lagging.

Somalia, Mali, Chad, and the Palestinian territories seem to have ew prospects in the near uture. Also problematic are countries

characterized by stagnation Yemen, Morocco, and Syria which have relatively low incomes and anemic growth rates.

Source: CIA World Factboo

LESS THAN $1,000 GDP PER CAPITA $1,000-$,000 GDP PER CAPITA $,001-$10,000 GDP PER CAPITA$10,001-$20,000 GDP PER CAPITA GREATER THAN $20,000 GDP PER CAPITA

m lessthan0%gdpgrowth m 0-2%gdpgrowth m 2-4%gdpgrowth m 4-6%gdpgrowth m greaterthan6%gdpgrowth


22/32



22

The challenge o ungoverned spaces improved somewhat since last year. Between the

success o the surge and Sunni Awakening in Iraq, and successul counter-insurgency

activities in Southeast Asia, there are ewer areas o the world now vulnerable to terroristpenetration. However, the worsening o the situation in Pakistan and the explosion o

Islamist violence in Somalia are signicant negative developments.

VIII.Ungoverned SpacesThe challenge o ungoverned spaces remains a core issue in the

management o the threat posed by violent jihadism. Lack o

government capacity allows these groups to nd sanctuary. In

some cases, the collapse o government authority creates an open-

ing or extremist groups to gain legitimacy through the provision

o public goods minimally security, but in many cases services

as well. The rise o the Taliban in Aghanistan in the 1990s and o

the Islamic Courts Union in Somalia in 2006 are examples o the

security element, while the success o Hezbollah in Lebanon and

Hamas in Gaza are examples o success through the provision o

services as well.

World Bank governance eectiveness indicators refect minimal

global improvements in government eectiveness since last year.

These gains, in South America and Southeast Asia, do not change

the overall assessment o the challenge, which still highlights gov-

ernmental weakness throughout Arica and the Middle East.

Poorly governed spaces have been a particularly challenging issue

in the past, most notably in Somalia and the Northwest provinces

o Pakistan. Pakistans domestic instability, culminating in the

marginalization o President Pervez Musharra, the assassination

o Benazir Bhutto, and the ultimate ascension o Yousa Raza

Gillani to the position o Prime Minister, ensured that restor-

ing government authority to the Federally Administered Tribal

Areas (FATA) was not a priority or Islamabad. Indeed, Gillanis

government has sought to negotiate another round o agreements

with local leaders that will likely replicate the ailures o the 2006

agreement which eectively institutionalized the sae haven pro-

vided there to al Qaeda and Taliban ghters.

Source: World Ban

GOVERNMENT EFFECTIVENESS(PErcEntilE ranKing)m 0-10 m >10-25 m >25-20 m >50-75 m >75-90 m >90


23/32



THE OLD UNGOVERNED SPACES: RURAL AND SPARSELY INHABITED

THE NEW UNGOVERNED SPACES: URBAN AND CROWDED

KARACHI, PAKISTAN

Ungoverned spaces are areas with limited

government penetration. Oten, these are

remote areas, with ew or no roads. They

lack electricity and sewage systems. Though

mobile phone penetration is quite impressivein much o the developing world, there are

many areas where the only communication

available is through expensive and unreliable

satellite phones. These areas may oer sae

havens, but their very remoteness also ensures

that threats they oster are likely to be limited

and localized.

While terrorists can hide in rural areas, they can

also hide in urban centers. Urban populations

around the world are growing at impressive

rates. Dhaka, in Bangladesh, grew rom a pop-

ulation o 3.3 million in 1980 to 13.4 million

in 2007. In that same time, Jakarta expanded

rom 5.9 million to 9.1 million inhabitants, and

Lahore went rom a population o 2.8 million

to 6.6 million. Overall, the urban population in

the developing world grew rom 995 million in

1980 to nearly 2.5 billion today, and is project-

ed to grow to nearly 4 billion by 2030.

As this urbanization intensies, so does the

danger posed by urban ungoverned spaces,

such as slums, which make particularly valu-

able staging areas or terrorist attacks. Karachi

is an interesting case study. While Karachis

population has grown dramatically, rom 5.0

million in 1980 to 12.3 million in 2007, govern

ment control has declined. Although tools like

Google Earth are beginning to make inroads

into the problem, there has not been an updated

street map o Karachi produced since 1990.


24/32



2

International cooperation against terrorism remains solid, bolstered in particular by

developments in western Arica and Oceania. Elsewhere, however, developments

have stalled due to concerns regarding civil liberties and the appropriate ocus o

counter-terror programs.

IX.International Cooperation Against TerrorismBi-Lateral Cooperation A

According to State Department reports, virtually every country in the world is cooperating with the U.S. governments counter-

terrorism eorts. The exceptions are the ve countries Iran, Syria, Cuba, Sudan, and, until recently, North Korea designated as

state sponsors o terrorism, as well as Venezuela which has been singled out or its less than ully cooperative behavior. In practice,

however, the range o cooperation is vast and, as is detailed in the section o this report that addresses state sponsorship o terrorism,

there are several states that tolerate the political presence and undraising activities o terrorist groups. Furthermore, there are a large

number o states whose compliance with counter-terrorism eorts is hampered by limited state capacity. As a result, the eective

cooperation o states around the world is quite varied.

Unortunately, ocial government reports are highly politicized as well as personalized. There are many jihadists radicalized in Saudi

Arabia by videos produced by al Qaeda in Pakistan who travel to Iraq through Syria. In State Department reports, Syria is singled

out in this chain o actions or special condemnation, though it is not at all clear that Syrias inability or unwillingness to control its

borders is really the most signicant issue. Venezuela is condemned or its political ties to Iran, but Irans major trading partners are

China, Germany, South Korea, Japan, France, Russia and Italy, and Iran works closely on the key issue o oil with such OPEC partners

as Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, and Indonesia. Syrias support or terrorist groups in Lebanon and Venezuelas relations with

the FARC have earned them legitimate condemnation, but some o the criticism o those regimes is inconsistent with the assessmentso other countries.

International Community

a e eve o e eo yem, poe mpeme e ppo o oe-eom ey e. to e ue no epey eo membe o beome pe o e oveoe w eom, ee bee o poe e e key eo e ee poe byo eom. ao oveo e eeyo y pobem pe o oe-eom, e oow:

te o pee membe o eo ozope by e e;

te e o eo;

te obo o e e e peveo o kem om e o, e epo o eo e bo.

A


25/32



Regional Initiative BThe Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism

Partnership (TSCTP) builds on the earlier

Pan-Sahel Initiative implemented ater

9/11. The TSCTP, begun in 2005 as an

eort to increase partner capacity with

Mauritania, Mali, Chad, Niger, Nigeria

and Senegal, expanded its eorts in 2007

to help improve cooperation with Algeria,

Morocco, and Tunisia. British and French

liaisons have also been active in supporting

the TSCTP, and the process has managed

to gain signicant interagency cooperation

within the U.S. Government. The result

has been a multiaceted integration o

development assistance, military training,

inormation sharing, and public diplomacy.

Regional Initiative C

In Europe, recent developments have been

mixed. There have been eective eorts

to share inormation, share and adopt best

practices, and generate unds to support ca-

pacity building in several Eastern European

countries. Nonetheless, a clear divide in

counter-terrorism policy continued to devel-

op over the past year as the U.S. ocus on

developing actionable intelligence against

transnational terrorist groups and move-

ments came into confict with the growing

European ocus on the challenge o radi-

calization at home. In addition, the Bush

Administrations weak commitment to

transparency has stalled eorts to develop

eective, high-level data exchanges, includ-

ing on such issues as travel documents.

Regional Initiative D

Institutionalization o regional counter-

terrorism initiatives has paid o most

clearly in Oceania and Southeast Asia.

Institutions promoted by the United

States, Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and

Australia provided numerous orums to

share inormation and best practices and

to establish eective capacity building

programs. This region shares Ameri-

can concerns about transnational actors,

and the presence o committed regional

partners to share the lead on developing

counter-terrorism initiatives makes this

region a model worth emulating in the

development o international cooperation

on the counter-terrorism ront.

B

C

D


26/32



The ability o terrorists to use the international nancial system has been curtailed,

but their ability to raise money through criminal activities and direct cash transers

is largely unimpeded.

X. Terrorist FinancingEstimated Cost oMajor Terrorist Attacks

2

ATTACKS ON NEW YORKAND WASHINGTON

DATE: SEPTEMBER 11, 2001

COST: $00,000

EAST AFRICAEMBASSY BOMBINGS

DATE: AUGUST , 1

COST: $0,000

BALI NIGHTCLUBBOMBINGS

DATE: OCTOBER 12, 2002COST: $0,000

MADRID TRAINBOMBINGS

DATE: MARCH 11, 200COST: $10,000

USS COLEATTACK

DATE: OCTOBER 12, 2000COST: $10,000

LONDON TRAINAND BUS BOMBINGS

DATE: JULY , 200COST: $1,000-$10,000

INDIVIDUAL IEDATTACK IN IRAQ

DATE: NUMEROUSCOST: $100

Methods o Terrorist Financing

d fk oe o e mo f ebe oe o o eoozo. te ee ve o oby oy $100 bo, o bo e gdPo Kw. teo ozo e ve

vo e o e mke. tey pove poeo o o,eo e om me, ome e e vey vove e poo bo o e o.


27/32



Aghanistan

Poppy poo oe o ow a, py t-b-ooe e. te ve o a Poppy eee $1 bope ye, ee evee e tb ey vove

fk efe eoe o o poo o e wpoppy poo.

seve eoozoe pye o

oe-k.se 1992, o e, e-me e ab syy gop e Pppe oee e$31 mo om pyme.rom pyme e oeyeepoe by oveme woeek o e e voveme ee pyme me w o vo eo om eoe ke.

sne 2001, e

nernon

ommny

been m

more eeven onron nd prevenn e

ndn o errorm by nernon

re, b e probem no

woy reoved. te Penn

terrore, or nne, onne o

reeve nfn nd rom bo

prve ondon nd nern-

on fnn d. some o ee

nd, ndenby, ep ppor

errorm by hm.

a e re

o ndependen

rd on-

ne o row,

e ene

o oppn errorm fnnn

nree drmy. tee nd-

vd e-fnne k ro

vrey o ow-rde rmn

ve, ndn ree rme,

red rd rd, nd were

be. umey, m error

operon ey fnned by n

ndvd or m rop.

terrors groups

operang n

ungoverned or

poorly governed

spaces ofen

ake on some of he funcons of

governmen. in hese regons,

errors groups are able o ax

local populaons, eher n

reurn for servces or hrough

proecon schemes.

OPIUM POPPY CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN2005-2007

TURKMENISTAN

IRAN

PAKISTAN

TAJIKISTANUZBEKISTAN

m AREA wITH LIGHT TALIBAN

PRESENCEm AREA wITH SUBSTANTIAL

TALIBAN PRESENCE

m AREA wITH ENTRENCHEDTALIBAN PRESENCE

CULTIVATION YEAR:

m 2005 m 2006 m 2007

Source: Map combines elements taken from both the UNODC and the Senlis Counc

GRAPH OF CULTIVATION OF POPPYIN AFGHANISTAN IN HECTARES

YEARHECTARES

(A UNIT OF AREA EQUAL TO 10,000 SQUARE METERS, EQUIVALENT TO 2.471 ACRES)

1994 1,000

1995 ,000

1996 ,000

1997 ,000

1998 ,000

1999 1,000

2000 2,000

2001 ,000

2002 ,000

2003 0,000

2004 11,000

2005 10,000

2006 1,000

2007 1,000


28/32


2

Recommendations


This section reproduces the recommendations rom last years report in italics, provides assessments o counter-terrorism policy over

the past year, and provides updated recommendations or the ollowing year.

I. Number oTerrorist Incidents

The United States must abandon the notionthat victory on any central ront will lead to an

elimination o the jihadist threat. The challenge

is global and growing, and policies based on

an oversimplifcation o the threat are likely to

produce unintended negative consequences

that might actually strengthen the jihadist

movement, as the war in Iraq has done.

ASSESSMENT:Over the past year, the United States hasmoved urther aay rom achieving this goalas made apparent in the current central rontdebate. Some analysts, notably those close to

the Administration, have argued that Iraq as

indeed the central ront and that progress inIraq is translating into victory in the ar on

terror. Others are claiming that the centralront has shited eastard and that, no,containing Iran is the ey to victory. Still otheranalysts, ould lie to shit the central ronteven urther east, to Aghanistan. Each o

these conceptual rameors obscures theissue by trying to narro a global challenge toa specic theater o confict.

UPDATED RECOMMENDATION:The United States must abandon the notion thatvictory on any central ront including Iraq,Aghanistan, or Iran ill eliminate the threat

o violent jihadism. Addressing challengesposed by those countries is an important part oa broader strategy, but is not a substitute or acomprehensive strategy.

II. State o theJihadist LeadershipThe jihadist movement has two primary

strengths a dynamic ideology that is appeal-

ing to millions in the Muslim world, and iconic

leaders whose defance o the international

community makes them heroes to their sup-

porters. A successul strategy in the struggle

against violent jihadism will ocus on these

centers o gravity.

ASSESSMENT:The United States has again failed to bringto justice the iconic leadership of the jihadistmovement. worse, their visibility in publicstatements and Internet presence has in-creased. The ideology of jihad is as strong asever, even though there is an emerging debateover tactics ithin the movement.

UPDATED RECOMMENDATION:The United States must pursue the seniorleaders o al Qaeda and undermine the jihadistrhetoric that blames the United States or all

the ills o the Muslim orld.

III. Al Qaeda-AfliatedMovementsTo deeat violent jihadism, the United States

must balance stability with justice by securing

cooperation rom leaders in the Muslim world

while maintaining a distance rom repressive

regimes. Making allies o oppressive authori-

tarian regimes has the eect o pushing those

governments legitimate domestic opponents

into the arms o the jihadist movement.

ASSESSMENT:United States policy remained tied to PresidentMusharra or too long, and in Iraq Americanpolicy has become too bound up ith the politi-cal ortunes o Nouri al-Malii. Our apparentinability to distinguish American interests rom

the interests o local elites continues to open upthe United States to the transormation o localgrievances into anti-Americanism.

UPDATED RECOMMENDATION:The United States should actively distinguish

threats to the United States rom threats toregional allies. while e cannot in thisstruggle ithout allies, e cannot succeed ie allo our interests to be dened by theirneeds and desires.

IV. State Sponsorshipo TerrorismThe United States must apply the state spon-

sor o terror designation consistently in order

to establish international standards o behavior

Keeping Cuba on the list o state sponsors o

terrorism, while exempting ostensible allies in

the war on terror, delegitimizes the desig-

nation and undermines the development o

consensus about permissible state behaviorunder international norms.

ASSESSMENT:keeping Cuba on the list o state sponsors,hile shielding Paistan maes a mocery o

the entire concept o an ocial list o statesponsors. The ambiguous situation o Sudan,hich largely cooperates ith counter-terroractivities hile remaining on the list becauseo actions in genocide highlights the conu-sion inherent in the list. The admission that thedecision to tae North korea o the list o statesponsors as a response to their cooperationon nuclear issues conrms that the government

is not committed to using relevant criteria ordesignation o state sponsors.

UPDATED RECOMMENDATION:The United States should either rationalize theocial list o state sponsors using objective cri-

teria or simply retire the list altogether. Thereis utility in tying sanctions to state support or

terrorism, but the eect o such an approach iscontingent on the air and rational applicationo objective criteria.


29/32


2S E P T E M B E R 2 0 0 8 R E P O R T

V. Public Attitudes inthe Muslim WorldAmerican policy and public diplomacy must go

hand-in-hand. Ritualistic denunciations of ter-

rorism in the abstract must be joined by policies

and public diplomacy that demonstrate a positivevision of the future across societies and faiths.

ASSESSMENT:Anti-Americanism remains a poerul senti-ment in the Muslim orld, as does suspicion oAmerican actions and motives.

UPDATED RECOMMENDATION:The end o the Bush Administration representsa signicant opportunity or the next president

to establish a ne image o the United Statesin the Muslim orld. The next president shouldbe prepared to engage the Muslim orld ith a

thoughtul, comprehensive approach rom day one.There ill be no time to aste, and missing theopportunity early on ould be a strategic disaster.

VI. Public Attitudes inthe United StatesAmerican political leaders must stop using

terrorism as an electoral wedge issue. Instead,

they must engage in a serious discussion with

the public over the real level o risk Americans

ace and the price the nation is willing to pay to

combat the violent jihadist threat.

ASSESSMENT:Despite the best eorts o many Americanpoliticians to continue to use terrorism as aedge issue, the eaening U.S. economyhas pushed terrorism o the center stage.The result has been a more reasoned debateabout combating terrorism as ell as a pro-ductive compromise over domestic surveil-lance in the FISA bill.

UPDATED RECOMMENDATION:U.S. leaders should tae advantage o therelatively lo prole o the terrorism issue asell as the change in administration to revisitall the organizational and legal changes madein the name o homeland security over the

past seven years. Both the creation o theDepartment o Homeland Security and thereorganization o the Intelligence Communityere done ith insucient strategic planning. Itmay also be possible to increase the capabilitieso domestic intelligence and la enorcementhile better saeguarding civil liberties.

VII. Economic Prosperityand Political FreedomThe United States must lead the world in a tran-

sition away rom oil-based economies to limit

its stake in the internal aairs o the Middle

East. It must also encourage oil-rich nations tomove toward sustainable, post-oil economies.

ASSESSMENT:Oil prices rose dramatically since last yearsreport, eaening any incentives toardsdeveloping post-oil economies or oil producingnations. The Bush Administrations response toincreased oil prices has been to push or moreoil exploration rather than pursuing alternativeenergy. In short, no progress has been made inthis area.

UPDATE RECOMMENDATION:The United States government should redoubleits eorts to transition to a post-oil economy.The United States should also strongly encour-age all oil producing nations to invest their ind-all prots in inrastructure and education sothey are ready or the period ater the oil boom.

VIII. Ungoverned SpacesThe United States must lead the world in

developing an international law or ungoverned

spaces that clearly defnes state responsibili-

ties or establishing governance. This law must

also create a set o rights and obligations or the

international community to respond to threats to

international peace and security that emanaterom these areas o limited governance.

ASSESSMENT:The United States has made minor progress inreducing ungoverned spaces through capac-ity-building programs, especially in SoutheastAsia. Unortunately, the international com-munity is no closer to developing a la oungoverned spaces that ould normalizeinternational behavior in those areas.

UPDATED RECOMMENDATION:Capacity-building programs only or ith ill-ing partners. The United States must develop

tools to meet the challenge o ungovernedspaces, especially in areas here there isno illing partner ith hom to cooperate,leveraging the capacity o local elites, privatebusiness, the international community, and non-governmental organization.

IX. International CooperationAgainst TerrorismThe United States must prioritize international

cooperation and consensus above unilateral-

ism and reedom o action in order to enhance

its ability to counter violent jihadism mosteectively.

ASSESSMENT:International cooperation remains ocused on

the acquisition o actionable intelligence andon nancial controls. The challenge o violentjihadism is much broader than the level ointernational cooperation refects.

UPDATED RECOMMENDATION:The United States must see ays to broadeninternational cooperation, including by devel-oping a la o ungoverned spaces, creatingmultinational approaches to public diplomacy,and coordinating economic assistance and

trade promotion programs to support a counter-jihadism strategy.

X. Terrorist FinancingThe illicit market created by the war on drugs

is one source o unding or terrorists. Policy

makers must create policies that eectively

address this linkage.

ASSESSMENT:Most analyses suggest that terrorist groups areincreasingly unded by drug money.

UPDATED RECOMMENDATION:The United States should adopt recommenda-

tions made by the Senlis Group to establish aPoppy For Medicine program in Aghanistan

that ould bring poppy production into thelegitimate economy. It is virtually impossible toengage in systematic crop eradication even inareas o clear government control, and literallyimpossible to do so in the midst o an insurgen-cy. The United States ill lose in Aghanistanunless drug money can someho be denied to

the Taliban insurgency.


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0A r e W e W i n n i n g ?

SourcesI. Number oTerrorist IncidentsThe charts in the section ere built on data dranexclusively rom the worldide Incidents TracingSystem (wITS) maintained by the U.S. NationalCounter-Terrorism Center (NCTC) and refects thedataset available on June 30, 2008. The wITS/NCTC

data is available at http://its.nctc.gov/. The wITSdata is dran rom open sources and uses trans-parent coding criteria. while there are reasons toquestion the comprehensiveness o the data due

to limitations inherent in open-source research(notably the reliance on media reports to generateincident data), wITS, on the hole, is the best andmost balanced source providing up-to-date incidentdata to terrorism researchers. The conclusion

that Islamist terrorism remains at historically highlevels is documented in last years iteration o thisreport (available at http://.americansecurity-project.org/issues/reports/are_e_inning) andas dran rom data taen rom the no-deunctTerrorism knoledge Base dataset compiled andmaintained jointly by the Memorial Institute or thePrevention o Terrorism and the RAND Corporation.

II. State o theJihadist LeadershipThe assessment o the state o the jihadist lead-ership is dran rom numerous sources. StateDepartment Country Reports on Terrorism (avail-able at http://.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/) detailmany o the developments. Also useul in trac-ing development are regular posts at Long warJournal (http://longarsjournal.org) and Coun-terterrorism Blog (http://counterterrorismblog.org). Bill Roggios post The State o Jihad: 2007,

December 31, 2007, (http://.longarjournal.org/archives/2007/12/the_state_o_jihad_2.php)provides a useul summary o developments.Also o value are the articles, The Rebel-lion within by Larence wright (http://.neyorer.com/reporting/2008/06/02/080602a_act_right/) and The Unravelling by PeterBergen and Paul Cruicshan (http://.tnr.com/politics/story.html?id=702b6d5-a37a-4e3e-a491-d72b6a9da1), ound in The New YorkerandThe New Republic, respectively. There remains a

great deal o uncertainty in tracing senior jihad-ist leaders. Their use o multiple pseudonymsand lac o solid conrming evidence hen theyare reported illed leads to requent mistaes.we also relied on several organizations thattrac jihadist media, including IntelCenter hichproduced the al-Qaeda Messaging/AttacksTimeline 1992-2007(Alexandria, VA: IntelCenter,2008) hich e used or the count o messagesby bin Laden and al-Zaahiri. we supplementedthis publication ith online updates available athttp://.intelcenter.com/qaeda-timeline-v6-9.pd. Other useul resources include the MiddleEast Media Research Institute (MEMRI) Islamistwebsite Monitor Project (http://.memriimp.org/); the SITE Intelligence Group carries onmany o the activities o the SITE Institute, thoughis less useul no because o its or-prot orien-tation (http://.siteintelgroup.org/). See also,the Craig whitloc, Al-Qaedas Groing OnlineOensive Washington Post, June 24, 2008, p.A01. Translations o Zaahiris responses to on-line question is available at http://.lauraman-seld.com/OpenMeetingZaahiri_Part%201.pd.

Biographical inormation on terrorists is taenrom a variety o sources, including the BBCworld Nes Service, the washington Post, andGlobalSecurity.org

III. Al Qaeda-AfliatedMovementsInormation about al Qaeda-aliated movementscan be ound rom a number o sources. Oparticular interest is Global Terrorist Analysis romthe Jameston Foundation (http://jameston.org/terrorism/) and especially their regular TerrorismMonitor(http://jameston.org/terrorism/AboutTM.php). we corroborated the analysis in thesereports by doing country-by-country comparisonso attac data in the NCTC database. The quotein the North Arica section about al Qaeda istaen rom The Al-Qaeda Organization in theIslamic Maghreb: The Evolving Terrorist Pres-ence in North Arica, by Daniel Lav, published byMEMRI in the Inquiry and Analysis Series, No. 332on March 7, 2007 (http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=ia&ID=IA33207).

IV. State Sponsorshipo TerrorismThe data on state sponsorship o terrorism comesalmost exclusively rom a country-by-countryanalysis o the State Departments CountryReports on Terrorism. The country and regionalbriengs are highly detailed and provide much

more nuance than the U.S. governments o-cial designations o State Sponsorship ando states that are not cooperating ully (i.e.Venezuela) ith counter-terrorism programs.See also, Daniel L. Byman, Deadly Connections:States that Sponsor Terrorism(Cambridge: Cam-bridge University Press, 2005); and Mar Mazzettiand Eric Schmitt, Paistanis Aided Attac inkabul, U.S. Ocials Say New York Times, Augus1, 2008. As a practical matter, the line beteena state being unilling and being unable to actagainst a terrorist has a subjective element to it.we tried to hold states only responsible or hate believe they could reasonably accomplishgiven resources constraints and other conditionsStates may lac the capacity to control remoteborders, but they ought to be able to pass las.A ailure to pass las due to political divides isnot a lac o capacity, but a lac o political il l.

V. Public Attitudes inthe Muslim WorldThe data on public opinion in the Muslim orldcomes rom our surveys:

(1) Terror Free Tomorro, Results o a NeNationide Public Opinion Survey o Paistanbeore the June 2008 Paistani By-Elections(http://.terrorreetomorro.org/upim-agestt/PaistanPollReportJune08.pd);

(2) Terror Free Tomorro, Results o a NeNationide Public Opinion Survey o SaudiArabia, (http://.terrorreetomorro.org/upimagestt/TFT%20Saudi%20Arabia%20Survey.pd);

(3) Terror Free Tomorro, Results o a NeNationide Public Opinion Survey o Iran(http://.terrorreetomorro.org/upim-agestt/TFT%20Ne%20Iran%20Survey%20Report%20March%202008.pd); and


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(4) Shibley Telhami, 2008 Annual Arab PublicOpinion 2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion Poll(http://.brooings.edu/topics/~/media/Files/events/2008/0414_middle_east/0414_middle_east_telhami.pd).

w.Peglobal.org and .worldPublicO-

pinion.org also have useul resources to measurepublic opinion in the Muslim orld. See, in par-ticular, the Pe poll published at National InterestOnline: Andre kohut and Richard wie, All theworlds a Stage, May 6, 2008 (http://.nation-alinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17502). Basically,all polling data agrees on the major issues sup-port or terrorism is in decline, but concern overAmerican intentions remains extremely high, andas a result the U.S. is vieed very unavorably.

VI. Public Attitudes inthe United StatesThe data on U.S. Public Opinion comes rom

three polls:(1) Quinnipiac University Poll, July 8-13,

2008 (http://.quinnipiac.edu/x1295.xml?ReleaseID=1192);

(2) Rasmussen Report, Voters Oay ith StatusQuo on wiretapping Friday, June 20, 2008,(http://.rasmussenreports.com/pub-lic_content/politics/general_politics/vot-ers_oay_ith_status_quo_on_iretapping);and

(3) CNN/Opinion Research Corporation Poll, June26-29, 2008 (http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2008/images/07/01/july1noon.pd). See also ullpolling data on terrorism at http://.pollin-

greport.com/terror.htm.One o the most interesting ndings is thatpollsters are including eer questions in theUnited States about terrorism in their surveys.Some questions that ere ased 5-6 times a yearin 2002 such as polling about hether peoplebelieve ne terrorist attacs are imminent -- areno ased only once every other year.

VII. Economic Prosperityand Political FreedomData on political reedom comes rom FreedomHouse (http://.reedomhouse.org/uploads/FI-wAllScores.xls). we created a eighted raningo improvements or regression in political ree-dom by eighting recent changes (over the pastyear) as tice as signicant as changes over theprevious ve. Data on economic prosperity camerom the CIA world Factboo, most notably the

pages that ran countries by GDP (https://.cia.gov/library/publications/the-orld-actboo/ranorder/2004ran.html) and by GDP groth(https://.cia.gov/library/publications/the-orld-actboo/ranorder/2003ran.html).Despite the dates in the URL, the data is updated

through 2007. See also United Nations Develop-ment Program reports, notably the neest annualreport at (http://.undp.org/publications/an-nualreport2008/pd/IAR2008_ENG_lo.pd).

VIII. Ungoverned SpacesData on ungoverned spaces came rom threesources. Global data came rom the worldBans measures o government eectiveness(http://ino.orldban.org/governance/gi/in-dex.asp). we used their measures o govern-ment eectiveness as a surrogate or data onungoverned spaces. A more detailed loo atspecic regions can be ound at Angel Rabasa,et. al. Ungoverned Territories: A Unique Frontin the war on Terrorism (Santa Monica: RAND,2007) (http://.rand.org/pubs/research_bries/RB233/). Also useul ere the State DepartmentsCountry Reports on Terrorism. On karachi,please also see Roman Pryjomo, ArcVie GISSupports Crime Analysis in karachi, Paistan(http://pbosnia.entla.edu/projects/arcrimes/gis/victor/articles/paistan.html). On urbanizationin general, please see data available rom theUN Department o Economic and Social Aairsworld Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revi-sion Population Database (http://esa.un.org/unup/index.asp?panel=2).

IX. International CooperationAgainst TerrorismThe data about international cooperation againstterrorism comes rom three major sources. werelied heavily on the State Departments CountryReports on Terrorism, the Treasury DepartmentsOce o Terrorism and Financial Intelligence(http://treasury.gov/oces/enorcement/),the United Nations Counter-Terrorism OnlineHandboo (http://.un.org/terrorism/), and the

Organization or Security and Cooperation in Eu-rope, Action against Terrorism Unit (http://.osce.org/atu/). Richard Thurston, Europe justees aay rom data sharing deal ith FBI,SC Magazine, July 01, 2008 (http://.scmaga-zineu.com/Europe-just-ees-aay-rom-data-

sharing-deal-ith-FBI/article/111987/). The U.S.and Europe have been negotiating or over a yearon data sharing issues. These tals seem to bereaching a conclusion, but ere not completed intime or us to report.

X. Terrorist FinancingData on the cost o attacs came rom numeroussources. Some o the most useul are LorettaNapoleoni, Terror Incorporated(Ne Yor: SevenStories Press, 2005); Organization or Securityand Cooperation in Europe, Financial Action TasForce report on Terrorist Financing (http://.at-ga.org/dataoecd/28/43/40285899.pd);Michael Buchanan, London Bombs Cost JustHundreds, BBC Nes, January 3, 2006 (http://nes.bbc.co.u/1/hi/u/4576346.stm); AndreScutro, Metz: IEDs a strategic eapon MilitaryTimes, June 20, 2008 (http://.militarytimes.com/nes/2008/06/military_metz_ieds_061808/).Data on drug production comes rom the UnitedNations Oce on Drugs and Crime (http://.unodc.org/), and particularly its report: Afghani-stan Opium Survey 2007(http://.unodc.org/pd/research/Aghanistan_Opium_Survey_2007.pd); and the Senlis Councils program PoppyFor Medicine (http://.senliscouncil.net/modules/P4M).

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Are We Winning 2008