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Are Forest Fires HOT?
Jean Carlson, UCSB
Background
• Much attention has been given to “complex adaptive systems” in the last decade.
• Popularization of information, entropy, phase transitions, criticality, fractals, self-similarity, power laws, chaos, emergence, self-organization, etc.
• Physicists emphasize emergent complexity via self-organization of a homogeneous substrate near a critical or bifurcation point (SOC/EOC)
Forest Fires: An Example of Self-Organized Critical BehaviorBruce D. Malamud, Gleb Morein, Donald L. Turcotte
18 Sep 1998
4 data sets
Criticality and power laws
• Tuning 1-2 parameters critical point• In certain model systems (percolation, Ising, …) power
laws and universality iff at criticality.• Physics: power laws are suggestive of criticality• Engineers/mathematicians have opposite interpretation:
– Power laws arise from tuning and optimization.
– Criticality is a very rare and extreme special case.
– What if many parameters are optimized?
– Are evolution and engineering design different? How?
• Which perspective has greater explanatory power for power laws in natural and man-made systems?
Highly Optimized
Tolerance (HOT)
• Complex systems in biology, ecology, technology, sociology, economics, …
• are driven by design or evolution to high-performance states which are also tolerant to uncertainty in the environment and components.
• This leads to specialized, modular, hierarchical structures, often with enormous “hidden” complexity,
• with new sensitivities to unknown or neglected perturbations and design flaws.
• “Robust, yet fragile!”
“Robust, yet fragile”
• Robust to uncertainties – that are common,– the system was designed for, or – has evolved to handle,
• …yet fragile otherwise
• This is the most important feature of complex systems (the essence of HOT).
Robustness of HOT systems
Robust
Fragile
Robust(to known anddesigned-foruncertainties)
Fragile(to unknown
or rareperturbations)
Uncertainties
ComplexityRobustness
Aim: simplest possible story
Interconnection
Square site percolation or simplified “forest fire” model.
The simplest possible spatial model of HOT.
Carlson and Doyle,PRE, Aug. 1999
empty square lattice occupied sites
connectednot connected clusters
20x20 lattice
A “spark” that hits an empty site does
nothing.
Assume one “spark” hits the
lattice at a single site.
A “spark” that hits a cluster causes
loss of that cluster.
Yield = the density after one spark
yield density loss
density=.5
yield =
6
375.*225.*40.2917
Average over configurations.
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
Y =(avg.)yield
= density
“critical point”
N=100
no sparks
sparks
sparktreesavgavg
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
limit N
“critical point”Y =(avg.)yield
= density
c = .5927
Cold
Fires don’t matter.
Y
Y
Burned
Everything burns.
Critical point
Y
critical phase transition
This picture is very generic and “universal.”
Y
Statistical physics:Phase transitions,
criticality, and power laws
100
101
102
103
104
10-1
100
101
102
Power laws
Criticality
cluster size
cumulativefrequency
Averagecumulativedistributions
clusters
fires
size
Power laws: only at the critical pointlow density
high density
cluster size
cumulativefrequency
Self-organized criticality (SOC)
Create a dynamical system around the
critical point
yield
density
Self-organized criticality (SOC)
Iterate on:
1. Pick n sites at random, and grow new trees on any which are empty.
2. Spark 1 site at random. If occupied, burn connected cluster.
.examplesin1.Use 2Nn
latticeNN
21 Nn
lattice
fire
distribution
density
yieldfires
0 200 400 600 800 10000
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
100
101
102
103
104
100
101
102
103
-.15
Forest Fires: An Example of Self-Organized Critical BehaviorBruce D. Malamud, Gleb Morein, Donald L. Turcotte
18 Sep 1998
4 data sets
10-2
10-1
100
101
102
103
104
100
101
102
103
SOC FF
Exponents are way off
-1/2
Edge-of-chaos, criticality, self-organized criticality
(EOC/SOC)
yieldyield
density
Essential claims:
• Nature is adequately described by generic configurations (with generic sensitivity).
• Interesting phenomena is at criticality (or near a bifurcation).
• Qualitatively appealing.• Power laws.• Yield/density curve.• “order for free”• “self-organization”• “emergence”• Lack of alternatives?• (Bak, Kauffman, SFI, …)• But...
• This is a testable hypothesis (in biology and engineering).• In fact, SOC/EOC is very rare.
Self-similarity?
What about high yield
configurations?
?
Forget random, generic
configurations.
Would you design a system this way?
Barriers
Barriers
What about high yield
configurations?
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
• Rare, nongeneric, measure zero.• Structured, stylized configurations.• Essentially ignored in stat. physics.• Ubiquitous in
• engineering• biology• geophysical phenomena?
What about high yield
configurations?
critical
Cold
Highly Optimized Tolerance (HOT)
Burned
Why power laws?Why power laws?
Almost any distribution
of sparks
OptimizeYield
Power law distribution
of events
both analytic and numerical results.
Special casesSpecial cases
Singleton(a priori
known spark)
Uniformspark
OptimizeYield
Uniformgrid
OptimizeYield
No fires
Special casesSpecial cases
No fires
Uniformgrid
In both cases, yields 1 as N .
Generally….Generally….
1. Gaussian2. Exponential3. Power law4. ….
OptimizeYield
Power law distribution
of events
5 10 15 20 25 30
5
10
15
20
25
30
0.1902 2.9529e-016
2.8655e-011 4.4486e-026
Probability distribution (tail of normal)
High probability region
Grid design: optimize the position of “cuts.”
cuts = empty sites in an otherwise fully occupied lattice.
Compute the global optimum for this constraint.
Optimized grid
density = 0.8496yield = 0.7752
Small events likely
large events are unlikely
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
random
grid
High yields.
Optimized grid
density = 0.8496yield = 0.7752
“grow” one site at a time to maximize incremental (local) yield
Local incrementalalgorithm
density= 0.8yield = 0.8
“grow” one site at a time to maximize incremental (local) yield
density= 0.9yield = 0.9
“grow” one site at a time to maximize incremental (local) yield
Optimal density= 0.97yield = 0.96
“grow” one site at a time to maximize incremental (local) yield
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
random
density
Very sharp “phase transition.”
optimized
100
101
102
103
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
grid
“grown”
“critical”
size
Cum.Prob.
All producePower laws
HOT
SOC
d=1
dd=1d
• HOT decreases with dimension.• SOC increases with dimension.
SOC and HOT have very different power laws.
1
d 1
10
d
• HOT yields compact events of nontrivial size.• SOC has infinitesimal, fractal events.
HOT
SOC
sizeinfinitesimal large
A HOT forest fire abstraction…
Burnt regions are 2-d
Fire suppression mechanisms must stop a 1-d front.
Optimal strategies must tradeoff resources with risk.
Generalized “coding” problems
Fires
Web
Data compressionOptimizing d-1 dimensional cuts in d dimensional spaces.
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Size of events
Cumulative
Frequency
Decimated dataLog (base 10)
Forest fires1000 km2
(Malamud)
WWW filesMbytes
(Crovella)
Data compression
(Huffman)
(codewords, files, fires)
Los Alamos fire
d=0d=1
d=2
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
Size of events
FrequencyFires
Web filesCodewords
Cumulative
Log (base 10)
-1/2
-1
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
WWWDC
Data + Model/Theory
Forest fire
SOC = .15
-6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
FF
WWWDC
Data + PLR HOT Model
HOT
SOC
SOC HOT Data
Max event size Infinitesimal Large Large
Large event shape Fractal Compact Compact
Slope Small Large Large
Dimension d d-1 1/d 1/d
SOC and HOT are extremely different.
SOC HOT & Data
Max event size Infinitesimal LargeLarge event shape Fractal Compact
Slope Small LargeDimension d d-1 1/d
SOC and HOT are extremely different.
HOT
SOC
HOT: many mechanisms
grid grown or evolved DDOF
All produce:
• High densities• Modular structures reflecting external disturbance patterns• Efficient barriers, limiting losses in cascading failure• Power laws
Robust, yet fragile?
Robust, yet fragile?
Extreme robustness and extreme hypersensitivity.
Small flaws
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 10
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1
If probability of sparks changes.
disaster
Tradeoffs?
Sensitivity to:
sparks
flawsassumed
p(i,j)
Critical percolation and SOC forest fire models
HOT forest fire models
Optimized
• SOC & HOT have completely different characteristics.• SOC vs HOT story is consistent across different models.
Characteristic Critical HOT
Densities Low HighYields Low HighRobustness Generic Robust, yet fragile
Events/structure Generic, fractal Structured, stylizedself-similar self-dissimilar
External behavior Complex Nominally simpleInternally Simple Complex
Statistics Power laws Power lawsonly at criticality at all densities
Characteristic Critical HOT
Densities Low HighYields Low HighRobustness Generic Robust, yet fragile.
Events/structure Generic, fractal Structured, stylizedself-similar self-dissimilar
External behavior Complex Nominally simpleInternally Simple Complex
Statistics Power laws Power lawsonly at criticality at all densities
Characteristics
Toy models
?• Power systems• Computers• Internet• Software • Ecosystems • Extinction• Turbulence
Examples/Applications
• Power systems• Computers• Internet• Software • Ecosystems • Extinction• Turbulence
But when we look in detail at any of these examples...
…they have all the HOT features...
Characteristic Critical HOT
Densities Low HighYields Low HighRobustness Generic Robust, yet fragile.
Events/structure Generic, fractal Structured, stylizedself-similar self-dissimilar
External behavior Complex Nominally simpleInternally Simple Complex
Statistics Power laws Power lawsonly at criticality at all densities
HOT features of ecosystems
• Organisms are constantly challenged by environmental uncertainties,
• And have evolved a diversity of mechanisms to minimize the consequences by exploiting the regularities in the uncertainty.
• The resulting specialization, modularity, structure, and redundancy leads to high densities and high throughputs,
• But increased sensitivity to novel perturbations not included in evolutionary history.
• Robust, yet fragile!
Tong Zhou
HOT and evolution : mutation and natural selection in a community
Barriers to cascading failure: an abstraction of biological mechanisms for robustness
• Begin with 1000 random lattices, equally divided between tortoise and hare families• Each parent gives rise to two offspring• Small probability of mutation per site • Sparks are drawn from P(i,j)• Fitness= Yield (1 spark for hares, full P(i,j) for tortoises)• Death if Fitness<0.4• Natural selection acts on remaining lattices• Competition for space in a community of bounded size
Genotype (heritable traits): lattice layoutPhenotype (characteristics which can be observed in the environment): cell sizes and probabilitiesFitness (based on performance in the organisms lifetime): Yield
Fast mutators (hares)Slow mutators (tortoises)
Hares: -noisy patterns -lack protection for rare events
hares tortoises
(Primitive) Punctuated Equilibrium:
Hares win in theshort run.
But face episodicextinction due to rare events (nicheprotects 50).
Tortoises takeover, and diversity increases.
Until hares win again.
Tortoise population exhibits power lawsHares have excess large events
Convergent Evolution: Species which evolve in spatiallyseparate, but otherwise similar habitats develop similarphenotypic traits. They are not genetically close, but havedeveloped similar adaptations to their environmental niches.
Our analogy: different runs with the same P(i,j) evolve towardsphenotypically similar, genotypically dissimilar lattice populations
The five great extinctions are associated with a rate ofdisappearance of species well in excess of the background, asdeduced from the fossil record.
Paleontologists attribute these to rare disturbances, such asmeteor impacts. Robust, yet Fragile!
Punctuated Equilibrium (left) vs. Gradualism (right): PE: rapid, burstsof change (horizontal lines), followed by extended periodsof relative stability (verticallines), followed by extinction.Our analogy: aftera transient periodof rapid evolutionlattices havebarrier patterns,which are relativelystable until extinction
Large extinctionevents are typicallyfollowed by increased diversity.The recovery periodis the time lapsebetween the peak extinction rate, andthe maximum rate of origination of new species.
Our analogy: extinction of the hares is arefollowed by diversification ofboth families
The current mass extinction is frequently attributed to overpopulation and causes which can be attributed to humans, such as deforestation
Our analogy: large eventscan be due to rare disturbances, especiallyif they are not not part of the evolutionaryhistory of the (vulnerable)species.
Robust, yet Fragile!
UniformSparks
SkewedSparks
Evolution by natural selection in coupled communities with different environments:
Fitness based on a single spark.Eliminate protective niches.Fixed maximum capacity for each habitat. Fast and slow mutation rates (rate subject to mutation).
Coupled Habitats: Fast and slow mutators compete with each otherin each habitat, with a small chance of migration from one habitatto the other.
Efficient barrier patterns develop in the uniform habitat. Afteran extinction in the skewed habitat, uniform lattices invade, andsubsequently lose their lower right barriers: a successful strategyin the short term, but leads to vulnerability on longer time scales
Patterns of extinction, invasion, evolution
Over an extended time window, spanning the two previous extinctions,we see the long term fitness <Y> initially increases as the invadinglattices adapt to their new environment. This is followed by a suddendecline when the lattices lose a barrier. This adaptation is beneficial for common events, but fatal for rare events.
HOT
Disturbance
Evolution and extinction
Specialization
density
fitness
• In a model which retains abstract notions of genotype, phenotype, and fitness, highly evolved lattices develop efficient barriers to cascading failure, similar to those obtained by deliberate design.
HOT and Evolution
• Robustness in an uncertain environment provides a mechanism which leads to a variety of phenomena consistent with observations in the fossil record (large extinctions associated with rare disturbance, punctuated equilibrium, genotypic divergence, phenotypic convergence).
• Robustness barriers are central in natural and man made complex systems. They may be physical (skin) or in the state space (immune system) of a complex, interconnected system.
• Forest Fires: a case where a common disturbance type (fires)• Acts over a broad range of scales (terrestrial ecosystems)• Power law statistics describing the distribution of fire sizes.• Exponents are consistent with the simplest HOT model involving optimal allocation of resources (suppress fires).• Evolutionary dynamics are much more complex.
Forest Fires: An Example of Self-Organized Critical BehaviorBruce D. Malamud, Gleb Morein, Donald L. Turcotte
18 Sep 1998
4 data sets
10
-410
-310
-210
-110
010
110
0
101
102
103
104
All four data sets are fit with the PLR model with α=1/2.
Size (1000 km2)
Rankorder
Forest fires dynamics
IntensityFrequency
Extent
WeatherSpark sources
Flora and fauna
TopographySoil type
Climate/season
Los Padres National ForestMax Moritz
Yellow: lightning (at high altitudes in ponderosa pines)
Red: human ignitions(near roads)
Ignition and vegetation patterns in Los Padres National Forest
Brown: chaperalPink: Pinon Juniper
Santa Monica Mountains Max Moritz and Marco Morais
SAMO Fire History
Fires 1991-1995
Fires 1930-1990
Fires are compact regions of nontrivial area.
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
100
101
102
103
104
4 Science data sets+LPNF + HFIREs (SA=2)
PLR
SM
Rescaling data for frequency and large size cutoff gives excellent agreement, except for the SM data set
Cumulative P(size)
size
We are developing a realistic fire spread model HFIREs:
GIS data for Landscape images
Models for Fuel SuccessionRegrowth modeled by vegetation succession models
1996 Calabasas Fire
Historical fire spread
Simulated fire spread
Suppression?
HFIREs Simulation Environment
• Topography and vegetation initialized with recent observations (100 m GIS resolution) for Santa Monica Mountains• Weather based on historical data (SA rate treated as a separate parameter)• Fire spread modeled using Rothermel equations• Fuel regrowth based on succession models
• 8 ignitions per year• Weather sampled stochastically from distribution (4 day SA at prescribed rate)• Fire terminates in a cell when rate of spread (RoS) falls below a specified value
• Generate 600 year catalogs, omit data for first 100 years in our statistics
Preliminary results from the HFIRES simulations (no extreme weather conditions included)
(we have generated many 600 year catalogs varying both extreme weather and suppression)
Data: typical five year period HFIREs simulations: typical five year period
Fire scar shapes are compact
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
100
101
102
103
104
LPNF
PLR
HFIRE SA=2,RoS=.033 m/s,FC=46 yr
Excellent agreement between data, HFIREs and the PLR HOT model
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-1
100
101
100
101
102
103
104
4 Science +LPNF + Hfire (SA=2)
PLR
SM
• small: incomplete• large: short catalog, or aggressive human intervention (inhomogeneous)
SM discrepancy?
100
101
102
103
104
105
100
101
102
103
Deviations from typical regional values for suppression (RoS) and the number of extreme weather events (SA), lead to deviations from the α=1/2 fit, and unrealistic values of the fire cycle (FC)
SA=0, vary stopping rate
SA= 1, 2, 4, 6
SA=2, =.5
SA=4, =.5SA=6, =.3
SA=0, =.65
102
103
104
105
100
101
102
103
Increased rate of SA leads to flatter curves, shorter fire cycles
Type conversion!
What is the optimization problem?
• Fire is a dominant disturbance which shapes terrestrial ecosystems• Vegetation adapts to the local fire regime• Natural and human suppression plays an important role• Over time, ecosystems evolve resilience to common variations • But may be vulnerable to rare events• Regardless of whether the initial trigger for the event is large or small
(we have not answered this question for fires today)
• We assume forests have evolved this resiliency (GIS topography and fuel models)• For the disturbance patterns in California (ignitions, weather models)• And study the more recent effect of human suppression• Find consistency with HOT theory• But it remains to be seen whether a model which is optimized or evolves on geological times scales will produce similar results
Plausibility Argument:
HFIREs Simulations:
The shape of trees by Karl Niklas
• L: Light from the sun (no overlapping branches)• R: Reproductive success (tall to spread seeds)• M: Mechanical stability (few horizontal branches)• L,R,M: All three look like real trees
Simulations of selectivepressure shaping earlyplants
Our hypothesis is that robustness in an uncertain environment is thedominant force shaping complexity in most biological, ecological, andtechnological systems