Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes - World Bankiab.worldbank.org/.../FDI-Arbitrating-and-Mediating-Disputes.pdf · Commercial arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution

OCTOBER 2013

Arbitrating and Mediating DisputesBenchmarking arbitration and mediation regimes for commercial disputes related to foreign direct investment

SOPHIE POUGET

A product of the FDI Regulations database

Global Indicators and Analysis Department

Financial and Private Sector Development

The World Bank Group

THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 20132

Overview and main results

An effective commercial arbitration regime matters for foreign

investors. Commercial contracts are increasingly complex and

often require reliable, flexible dispute resolution mechanisms.

Commercial arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution

mechanisms give the parties the autonomy they need to create

systems tailored to their disputes. In addition, foreign investors

view arbitration as a way to mitigate risks by providing legal cer-

tainty on enforcement rights, due process, and access to justice.

The Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes indicators assess the legal

and institutional framework for commercial arbitration, mediation

and conciliation regimes in 100 economies. They assess the ease

of initiating, conducting, and resolving commercial disputes, and

the existence of judicial assistance for recognizing and enforcing

foreign arbitral awards.

Results include:

All surveyed economies recognize arbitration as a tool for

resolving commercial disputes.

Only nine economies have not acceded to the New York

Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign

Arbitral Awards.

High Income OECD and Eastern Europe and Central Asia are

the regions that reformed their laws on alternative dispute

resolution the most between 2011 and 2012.

Only seven economies do not have a consolidated law on

commercial arbitration and Iraq is the sole economy with

legislative provisions only on procedural aspects of commer-

cial arbitration.

Jordan, Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea only have media-

tion institutions, while Angola and Brunei Darussalam do not

have any private institutions dedicated to alternative dispute

resolution.

Thirty-nine economies host private institutions which offer

fast-track arbitration services, i.e., time-bound arbitration for

faster and less expensive resolution of the dispute, and 17

host institutions which offer online arbitration services, allow-

ing online arbitration proceedings to save time and expense.

Globally, arbitration proceedings take 326 days on average,

while recognition and enforcement proceedings of foreign

arbitral awards take 557 days on average. The fastest

economies are Kosovo and the Kyrgyz Republic for arbitra-

tion proceedings, and Singapore and the Slovak Republic for

recognition/enforcement proceedings.

The Arbitration and Mediating Disputes indicators are significantly

correlated with perception data on the importance of alterna-

tive dispute resolution, as well as other measures such as total

foreign direct investment inflows and inflows per capita, the

Doing Business 2013 Enforcing Contracts data, the World Bank

Group’s Governance Indicators, the World Economic Forum’s

Global Competitiveness Indicators, and the Multilateral Investment

Guarantee Agency’s World Investment and Political Risk data.

The paper concludes by identifying several opportunities for

improvement, such as greater flexibility for domestic arbitration

regimes, faster arbitration proceedings, and better domestic court

capabilities.

ARBITRATING AND MEDIATING DISPUTES 3

Acknowledgments

Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes (AMD) is part of the FDI

Regulations database of the Global Indicators and Analysis

Department (GIA) of the World Bank Group (WBG). The lead

author, Sophie Pouget, is a Private Sector Development Specialist

working in GIA. The author is grateful for valuable peer review

comments received from Thomas J. Mahaffey and Hoda Atia

Moustafa in the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),

World Bank Group (WBG); Fady Zeidan and Patricia O. Sulser in

the Legal Department of the International Finance Corporation

(IFC), WBG; Pierre Guislain, Christine Qiang and colleagues in

the Investment Climate Department of the IFC, WBG; Heike

Gramckow in the Legal Department of the World Bank; and

Meg Kinnear, Secretary-General of the International Center for

Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), WBG. Additional

valuable comments were received on earlier drafts of the paper

from Carolin Geginat, Hulya Hulku, Melissa Johns, Augusto Lopez-

Claros, Tanya Primiani and Federica Saliola from GIA. The author is

also grateful for contributions to the analysis made by Mohammad

Amin, John Anderson, Christian de la Medina de Soto and Martin

Schmidt from GIA, and by former colleague Marc Reifsnyder de

Chassey.

Two groups of people provided pro-bono contributions without

which this report and the AMD indicators could not have been

developed.

The first is the group of lawyers, law professors, representatives

of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) institutions and govern-

ment regulators in each of the 100 economies covered by the

report which responded to the AMD questionnaire. Their input

on ADR in their economy was the fundamental source of data

for the analysis. Grateful acknowledgement of these contributors

is made in the Contributors section at the end of this report.

Additional details about the contributors across all topics of the

FDI Regulation database are provided at http://iab.worldbank.org/

Local-Partners/2012. Particular acknowledgement is made of the

contribution of John W. Ffooks & Co, which responded to surveys

in nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The second is the expert consultative group formed to provide

technical input to the development of the AMD topic. This group

of global experts in alternative dispute resolution provided input

on the focus of the AMD questionnaire and on the methodology

to develop the AMD indicators. Members of the expert consulta-

tive group include:

Frédéric Bachand, Professor, McGill University, Canada

Mohamed Badissy, Attorney-Advisor, U.S. Department of

Commerce, USA

Markham Ball, Professor, Temple University Law School, USA

Yas Banifatemi, Partner, Shearman & Sterling LLP, France

Chiann Bao, Secretary-General, Hong Kong International

Arbitration Center, Hong Kong SAR, China

João Bosco Lee, Partner, Lee Taube Gabardo, Brazil

Karel Daele, Partner, Mishcon de Reya, United Kingdom

Jason Fry, Partner, Clifford Chance, France

Emmanuel Jolivet, General Counsel, ICC, France

Anna Joubin-Bret, Partner, Joubin-Bret Law Firm, France

Salem Nassar, Professor, São Paulo Law School, Brazil

Mohamed Abdel Raouf, Director, Cairo Regional Centre for

International Commercial Arbitration, Egypt

Eduardo Silva Romero, Partner, Dechert LLP, France

Thomas So, Partner, Mayer Brown JSM, Hong Kong SAR, China

Hannah Tümpel, Manager, ICC Dispute Resolution Services,

France

Don Wallace, Professor Emeritus and Chairman of the

International Law Institute, Georgetown Law, USA

Jason Yackee, Assistant Professor, University of Wisconsin Law

School, USA

Katia Yannaca-Small, Counsel, Shearman & Sterling LLP, USA

The content of this report was previously published as: Pouget, Sophie. 2013. “Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes: Benchmarking

Arbitration and Mediation Regimes for Commercial Disputes Related to Foreign Direct Investment.” World Bank Policy Research

Working Paper no. 6632.


1. Introduction

In Indonesia, it takes more than two years to enforce a foreign

arbitral award on average. The proceedings will be held before the

Central Jakarta District Court, which is not a specialized court. In

addition, the foreign investor must comply with several obliga-

tions and provide a substantial number of original documents,

specifically, a letter from his diplomatic representation stating

that his country has a bilateral relationship with Indonesia and is

bound by a convention on the recognition and enforcement of

foreign arbitral awards. In contrast, in the neighboring Philippines,

the process would take only nine months. The time frame of the

proceedings before the Regional Trial Court is strictly defined and

the documentation requested is less burdensome, as the investor

must provide only a copy of the arbitration agreement and the

appointment of the arbitral tribunal, along with a certified transla-

tion, if necessary.

The difference between the ease of recognition and enforcement

of foreign arbitral awards in Indonesia and the Philippines is critical

for a foreign investor who is looking for economies which can offer

business opportunities, but also legal certainty and time efficiency,

in case of the need to enforce an arbitral award. It is also critical

because, more generally, foreign investors often take into consider-

ation whether the economy they choose to invest in is supportive

of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).

ADR consists of specific procedures for settling disputes outside of

court litigation. It includes commercial arbitration, mediation and

conciliation.1

The Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes (AMD) study has collected

data and, to a limited extent, views, of lawyers, law professors,

representatives of ADR institutions and government regulators in

each of the 100 surveyed economies. It has been able to identify

the regions where the legal framework on ADR is perceived as a

moderate to severe obstacle to foreign direct investment (FDI).

Figure 1 shows that the Middle East and North Africa (MENA),

South Asia (SAR), Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and Eastern Europe

and Central Asia (ECA) are the regions in which the legal frame-

work on ADR is perceived as a moderate to minor obstacle to

FDI. In comparison, this perception decreases in East Asia and the

Pacific (EAP) and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and is

very low in high-income OECD economies (OECD).

The AMD indicators measure ADR regimes relevant for FDI across

100 economies across seven regions, providing comparable and

actionable information about this regulatory space (Annex 1). They

serve as a critical tool in order to track the evolution of ADR re-

gimes worldwide and capture the new reforms and best practices.

They measure the ease with which foreign investors can submit a

dispute arising out of the commercial relationship they have with

a local party and how easy it is for the appointed arbitral tribunal

to conduct the proceedings. They also look at whether foreign

investors can enforce a foreign arbitral award with the support of

domestic courts.

2. Context and importance of an effective Alternative Dispute Resolution system for foreign investors

ADR provides tailored dispute resolution mechanisms that are

particularly useful tools for complex commercial transactions, such

as foreign direct investments. Commercial arbitration enables the

parties to create systems tailored to their dispute and to guarantee

the necessary confidentiality to protect their commercial secrets

and their reputation. It also allows them to select arbitrators who

are experienced professionals with a particular expertise relevant

to the dispute.

Hence, ADR is now widely recognized as the preferred dispute

resolution mechanism for many investors and entrepreneurs

(McLaughlin 1979). Even if no systematic evidence has been

found regarding the impact of ADR on FDI (Governance and Social

Development Resource Centre 2013), authors recognize that

economies should improve their ADR regimes and allow for flex-

ible and faster dispute settlement in order to attract FDI. Studies

find that more than two-thirds of multinational corporations prefer

commercial arbitration over traditional litigation, either alone or in

combination with other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms,

FIGURE 1: Perception of the legal ADR framework as an obstacle to FDI, by region

0.0

0.5

1.0

1.5

2.0

2.5

3.0

MENASSASARECAEAPLACOECD

1.3

1.92.0

2.32.4

2.72.8

Note: The AMD Perception score measures the average perception of contributors, based on a scale from 1 to 5, of the extent to which their legal framework on ADR is an obstacle to FDI. The highest scores indicate the regions where the obstacle is perceived as bigger.Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.


to resolve cross-border disputes (PriceWaterhouseCoopers and

Queen Mary University 2006).

Commercial arbitration is considered to provide a neutral forum

for the settlement of disputes related to FDI, which can often be

sensitive and, hence, limits the risks associated with FDI (Schwartz

2009). Even if domestic courts could be considered as treating

foreign companies fairly, domestic firms often have an advan-

tage over foreign investors, as they are more familiar with local

court procedures and can use their own lawyers and language

(PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Queen Mary University 2006).

Moreover, a robust ADR framework, including laws and private

institutions that provide ADR services, contributes indirectly to

the rule of law. Because ADR is particularly attractive for foreign

investors, it is usually an incentive for greater accessibility to the

legal system, online and in English, thus attracting the international

business community. It also contributes to the training of judges

and lawyers, as many of them serve as arbitrators and mediators

and their obligations often include obtaining a certification and

placing emphasis on ethics, impartiality, and independence.

Arbitration is becoming recognized as a “growth industry” (Zaiwalla

2013) and benefits the reputation of an economy in the inter-

national arena. For instance, Singapore is now a recognized hub

for arbitration, and is often chosen by foreign investors as a place

where they can have their disputes settled. Two factors explain this

achievement: Singapore has consistently amended its legislation

on international arbitration and is now able to offer dynamic and

reliable arbitration services (Box 1).

Hence, policy reforms that remove barriers for investors to settle

their disputes are crucial. For instance, practitioners such as the

Secretary General of the International Chamber of Commerce’s

(ICC) Court of Arbitration recognize the need to have a faster

way to settle disputes and to enforce arbitral awards to attract

FDI (Bangkok Post 2012). Some stated that “if you are to bring

in more FDI you need fast-track arbitration,” that is, time-bound

arbitration where arbitrators have to observe specific time limits

(Zaiwalla 2013). Others have also indicated the need to guarantee

that foreign investors can freely appoint their lawyers. The Chair of

the Commission on arbitration for the ICC in Thailand suggested

that “granting short-term work permits or business visas for foreign

lawyers” could be an option (Bangkok Post 2012).

There is, thus, a need to assess ADR and to provide comprehen-

sive and substantive information on why and how ADR regimes

can be reformed. In an interdependent and interconnected world,

where FDI inflows are vital to economic growth, economies need

to have an attractive investment climate. This means that econo-

mies should be able to answer the growing and more complex

needs of the business community. This supposes, in particular,

that economies should offer up-to-date, stable and predictable

ADR regimes in order to better attract FDI. This is precisely what

the AMD indicators attempt to do by identifying and measuring

good practices, and developing a preliminary quantitative analysis

of the data, showing that the AMD indicators are significantly corre-

lated with several outcomes of specific interest for FDI.

3. Design of the Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes indicators

The AMD research includes three sets of indicators, as explained

below, providing comprehensive information and analysis on ADR in

the surveyed economies. These indicators look exclusively at com-

mercial arbitration—originating from the agreement of the parties2—

and do not cover investment arbitration.3 They look at all types of

commercial arbitration involving all kinds of parties, whether private,

state, or state entities involved in commercial relationships with

private parties. The AMD research also examines a variety of arbitra-

tion cases, whether administered by private arbitration institutions,

such as the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), the London

Court of International Arbitration (LCIA) or ad hoc arbitrations.4

The first set of indicators, AMD 1, measures the strength of ADR

laws and institutions, covering and including:

1. The domestic laws and regulations on ADR (Box 2), their

accessibility, and whether or not they are considered to follow

the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

(“UNCITRAL”) Model Laws on International Commercial

Arbitration and on International Commercial Conciliation5 that

states have the possibility to incorporate in their domestic

legislation; it also covers the New York Convention on the

BOX 1: Singapore, a hub for arbitration

In Singapore, international arbitration is regulated by the International Arbitration Act of 1994, which is frequently amended (see the International Arbitration Amendment Act 2012, No. 12 of 2012) in order to become more user-friendly and for Singapore to gain prominence as a seat for international arbitration (Wallace and Rosen 2012). Among oth-ers, the legal reforms include a wider definition of an arbitration agree-ment, clarify the courts’ power to award simple or compound interests, and provide more support for emergency arbitrators and interim orders (Choo 2012). A number of these amendments were aimed at aligning the legislation with UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration. In the last ten years, the Singapore International Arbitration Centre has become a hub for arbitration. In 2010 and 2011, according to a survey from the ICC, Singapore has ranked 5th in the list of preferred seats of arbitration out of 98 cities, following Paris, London, Geneva and Zurich (ICC, 2012).

Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.


Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,

1958 (the New York Convention).

2. Data on ADR private institutions, whether they exist in the

surveyed economies and follow specific rules, such as the

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976, revised in 2010.

3. Reporting on the specific ADR services available, such as

fast-track or online arbitration.

BOX 2: Key laws measured by the AMD indicators

National ADR laws (including civil code provisions) on commercial arbitration, mediation and conciliation

National civil codes, civil procedure codes/rules, regulations

Ratification of New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 1958


The second set of indicators, AMD 2, looks at the ease of process,

before and after initiating arbitration proceedings:

1. Before initiating arbitration proceedings, it measures whether

or not an arbitration agreement can be easily concluded, and

whether or not the economy surveyed allows for a distinction

between domestic and international arbitration;

2. It also looks at possible restrictions that parties may face when

appointing their arbitrators and counsels, and when conduct-

ing the arbitral process, for instance, freedom to choose the

language of the proceedings or the arbitrating institution. In

addition, it measures the ease of process once arbitration

proceedings are initiated, and through a standard case study

(Box 3), the usual length of arbitration proceedings;

3. It captures judicial assistance during arbitration proceedings:

whether domestic courts refer parties to arbitration when they

have a valid arbitration agreement, and whether there are other

measures they could offer in support of arbitration proceedings.

BOX 3: The AMD case studies on the length of proceedings

The AMD indicators rely on two case studies:

Case study on the length of arbitration proceedings: contributors are asked to give an estimate where a hypothetical party is in breach of a supply agreement and the other party seeks to recover US$100,000 through arbitration, without asking for assistance from the domestic courts.

Case study on the length of judicial proceedings related to foreign arbi-tral awards: contributors are asked to give an estimate of a hypothetical foreign arbitral award rendered in the amount of US$100,000, to be recognized and enforced in the surveyed economy.


The third set of indicators, AMD 3, deals with judicial assistance in

recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards:

1. All steps of the recognition and enforcement process are

measured, whether or not there are specialized courts and to

what extent these courts review the arbitral award.

2. Through a standard case study (Box 3), the length of the

usual recognition and enforcement proceedings for foreign

arbitral awards is established.

It is important to note that the data were gathered and reviewed

from late 2011 through mid-2012. Subsequent reforms to alterna-

tive dispute resolution regimes are not captured by the AMD

indicators.

4. AMD Results

AMD results on the strength of ADR laws and institutions6

Arbitration laws, statutes or provisions

Because of its numerous advantages, commercial arbitration

is important to the investment climate of an economy. For this

reason, it should be more widely recognized and made compre-

hensively accessible, in order to facilitate access to information for

foreign investors. Thus, it is critical to make all the substantial and

procedural provisions regulating commercial arbitration incorpo-

rated available in one single source of information, either a law

incorporated in a code or a specific statute.

All the economies surveyed recognize arbitration is, in one way or

another, a mechanism for dispute resolution. The AMD indicators

show that 93 percent of the economies surveyed have a specific

commercial arbitration statute or a chapter in a civil code setting

out provisions governing arbitration in their economy. The remain-

ing seven economies have some provisions scattered throughout

civil codes or other laws, but which do not provide sufficient

regulation of arbitration. These economies are: Albania, Argentina,

Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Montenegro.

Iraq is the economy which has the most limited framework for

commercial arbitration, in that it has no consolidated law or

provisions.

Online access of arbitration laws

To facilitate access to information, arbitration laws should be avail-

able online. As technology continues to develop, ease and speed

of access to information is becoming paramount for foreign inves-

tors and the investment climate of these economies in general.

About 93 percent of the economies surveyed were able to provide

websites where these laws could be found. However,


many of these sites were not official government sources, but

rather websites of private law firms. Among the economies where

arbitration laws are not accessible (Box 4), five are located in Sub-

Saharan Africa (SSA): Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Ghana and

Sierra Leone. In Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) and the

Middle East and North Africa (MENA), only Cyprus and Yemen do

not have arbitration laws accessible online.

BOX 4: Percentage of countries where ADR laws are not accessible online, by region

Sub Saharan Africa 71.5%Eastern Europe and Central Asia 14.25%Middle East and North Africa 14.25%OECD 0%East Asia and the Pacific 0%South Asia 0%Latin America and the Caribbean 0%


Arbitration laws following the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration

The fact that the law on commercial arbitration follows the UNCITRAL

Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration is a good indica-

tion of the degree of an economy’s support for arbitration.

The UNCITRAL Model Law aims to harmonize the discrepancies

that can exist in domestic laws, regarding various aspects of the

arbitration process, notably how arbitrators are selected and ap-

pointed, or how the arbitral tribunal can conduct arbitral proceed-

ings. Economies that follow the UNCITRAL Model law reduce the

uncertainties that the parties can face while choosing commercial

arbitration instead of traditional litigation of their dispute. The main

guiding principles on which the UNCITRAL Model Law is based are

the following: party autonomy, freedom to agree on the conduct

of arbitration proceedings, competence of arbitral tribunals to

decide on their own jurisdiction, judicial support to arbitration

coupled with restraint from undue interference.

Seventeen economies which do not rely on the UNCITRAL

Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, according to

our contributors, are: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bosnia

and Herzegovina, Burundi, Ecuador, Ethiopia, France, Iraq, Italy,

Montenegro, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Saudi Arabia, Sierra

Leone and the United States. However, since some of these

economies have sophisticated regimes and pro-arbitration domestic

courts, such as France, they do not follow the UNCITRAL Model Law

but are still based on the same guiding principles mentioned above.

New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards

Given the extent of cross-border transactions in today’s world, as

well as the numerous locations for holding assets, recognition

of a foreign arbitral award can be a very important stage in the

arbitration process. In that respect, the AMD indicators look at the

New York Convention, a powerful instrument for the recognition

and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.7

The New York Convention is critical to a good legal framework on

commercial arbitration, as it requires national courts to recognize

foreign arbitral awards, i.e., to grant them the same validity as a

judgment. As a result, it also means that domestic courts must

enforce foreign arbitral awards in the case where a debtor refuses

to abide by its terms.

Nine economies have still not acceded to the New York

Convention.8 The latest surveyed economy to accede to the

New York Convention was Rwanda in 2008; and the Democratic

Republic of Congo is about to be the most recent party to the

Convention.

Mediation and conciliation laws

Mediation and conciliation services are not widely used. Indeed,

54 percent of the economies surveyed do not have a consoli-

dated law encompassing substantially all aspects of commercial

mediation or conciliation. Out of the 46 percent of economies

that do have a consolidated law, only half are considered by our

contributors to follow the UNCITRAL Model Law on International

Commercial Conciliation.

However, 64 percent of the economies surveyed do have laws

that provide for court referral of cases to mediation or concilia-

tion in commercial disputes where court proceedings have been

initiated. Some of these laws can be restrictive and narrow down

the type of cases that may be submitted to mediation or concilia-

tion services under certain conditions. For example, in Colombia,

conciliation is a prerequisite before litigation in commercial, family,

and administrative law cases. During commercial trials, there is

a special preliminary hearing for the purpose of conciliation, in

which the judge acts as a conciliator. In addition, according to

the 2010–2011 statistics provided by the Colombian Ministry of

Justice Website, some 50 percent of the cases referred to concilia-

tion are settled, highlighting the importance of such practices.

Arbitration and mediation institutions

The vast majority of the surveyed economies have arbitration insti-

tutions. These arbitration institutions are crucial, as very often the

parties decide that their arbitration case should be administered by

an institution which will provide both the necessary support and

control of the arbitral tribunal.


Only five economies do not have arbitration institutions admin-

istering arbitration cases: Angola, Brunei Darussalam, Jordan,

Pakistan, and Papua New Guinea. However, four of these

economies have mediation institutions. Only Angola and Brunei

Darussalam have neither an arbitration nor a mediation institution.

In 86 economies, these institutions operate under their own rules.

Only a limited number of institutions—in Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Egypt,

Malaysia, Mozambique, Singapore, Senegal, and Zambia—follow

the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, which make a comprehensive set

of regulations related to arbitration proceedings available to parties

who wish to use them.9

Arbitration institutions are encouraged to offer a roster of arbitrators

or mediators, provided that the parties can remain free to choose

arbitrators or mediators which are not on the roster. This is particu-

larly useful for foreign investors, who are not familiar with the host

economy, and who have to appoint an arbitrator from that econo-

my, either because it is required by the law, or for practical reasons,

such as the necessity to appoint an arbitrator familiar with some

local industrial, technical, or environmental aspects of the dispute.

Eighty-seven economies have ADR institutions which provide for a

roster of arbitrators or mediators. However, 20 of these arbitration

institutions have rosters where fewer than 10 percent of the arbitra-

tors are women, and 20 arbitration institutions have rosters where

fewer than 10 percent of the arbitrators are foreign nationals.

Only a limited number of economies possess ADR institutions

which offer attractive services for foreign investors, such as fast-

track or online arbitration. Indeed, 39 economies host an arbitra-

tion institution which offers fast-track arbitration services, enabling

the parties to opt for time-bound arbitration proceedings—in

practice, usually six months renewable once—which the arbitra-

tors must duly respect. Only 17 economies have ADR institutions

which offer online arbitration services, allowing the parties to carry

out the arbitration proceedings online, including the initial filing of

the request for arbitration, the appointment of the arbitrator(s),

oral hearings if needed, and the rendering of the arbitral award.

For example, some arbitration centers have created specific rules

for fast-track arbitration, such as the Bangladesh International

Arbitration Center, which finalized and adopted its Rules of

Procedure in April 2012 (Annex 3).

Last but not least, only four economies (Bangladesh, Burundi,

Uganda, and Zambia) have arbitration institutions that do not have

an official website.

AMD results on the ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings

Entering into an arbitration agreement

Before initiating arbitration proceedings, the parties must first

consent, through an arbitration agreement, to submit their dispute

to arbitration instead of taking it to domestic courts.

This arbitration agreement, which serves as the basis of the

parties’ consent to arbitration, must follow certain formal require-

ments. The parties can conclude the arbitration agreement in

writing, by email or fax, by a reference in another document, an

exchange of statements of claim and defense in the course of

the proceedings, by oral agreement, or by their conduct. In this

respect, some economies are more restrictive than others when it

comes to particular methods of concluding an arbitration agree-

ment (Figure 2). In only four economies are parties unable to

conclude an arbitration agreement by email: Afghanistan, Ethiopia,

Haiti and Mali. In addition, only 18 economies allow parties to

enter into an arbitration agreement by conduct (i.e., recognizing

the arbitration through the behavior of the parties); in only nine

economies can the parties conclude the agreement orally.

Arbitration agreements must also deal with disputes which can

be submitted to arbitration, that is, disputes considered arbitrable

according to the domestic laws of the economy.

The most frequent commercial disputes are generally considered

arbitrable and only a few economies have specific restrictions. For

instance, finance and banking activities are not arbitrable in only

three economies; patent law or other intellectual property disputes

are not considered arbitrable in six economies and intra-corporate

disputes are not arbitrable in nine economies. However, disputes

involving rights over immoveable property are not arbitrable in

twenty economies (Annex 4).

FIGURE 2: Accepted methods of concluding an arbitration agreement, in %

0 20 40 60 80 100

By oral agreement

By conduct

Percent

By an exchange of statements of

claim and defense

By email or fax

By writing

By incorporation by reference

18%

90%

94%

9%

100%

100%



The ease of process before initiating arbitration proceedings

In terms of commercial arbitration, economies can be categorized

into two groups: a) those which recognize two types (domestic

and international) and b) those with no distinction.

The distinction between international and domestic arbitration

is key, as it shows to what extent an economy is willing to offer

foreign parties a regime which is flexible and answers their specific

needs during the course of the arbitration proceedings. The AMD

indicators show that 58 economies distinguish between domestic

and international arbitration, in their laws or in case law (Figure 3).

For these economies, the AMD indicators compare the two

regimes and show that laws on international arbitration offer

more flexibility to the parties than laws on domestic arbitration

(Figures 4 and 5).

As shown in these figures, economies recognizing international arbitra-

tion have few restrictions on how international arbitration proceed-

ings are conducted; for example, the nationality of the appointed

arbitrators, the language of the proceedings, and the seat of the

proceedings. However, economies, such as Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone,

and Vietnam have restrictions regarding the language of domestic

arbitration proceedings. Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka also

place restrictions on the seat of domestic arbitration proceedings.

Of these 58 economies, only 28 rely on an economic definition

of international arbitration, according to which the arbitration

is considered international if international trade interests are at

stake (Figure 6). This broad definition allows the parties involved

in a commercial relationship with an international component to

benefit from the laws on international arbitration.

Of these 58 economies, some specific criteria, such as whether

the place of registration of a party is abroad or not, or whether

substantial part of the obligations of the commercial relationship is

performed outside of the economy, could be enough to make the

arbitration qualify as international. Hence, 52 economies recognize

an arbitration dispute as international if one of the parties is regis-

tered in a foreign economy. However, only 14 economies consider

a commercial arbitration to be international if one of the parties is

a company with foreign ownership (Figure 6).

Length of arbitration proceedings

While it is important for foreign investors to rely on a comprehensive

legal framework on commercial arbitration allowing them to tailor their

FIGURE 4: Restrictions on the appointment of arbitrators and foreign counsels

0

20

40

60

80

100

Domestic arbitrationInternational arbitration

On the appointmentof foreign counsels

On the legalqualifications

of the arbitrators

On the languagespoken by

the arbitrators

On the nationalityof the arbitrators

2%7% 4%

17%14%

26%

12%

28%

Note: These restrictions have been measured across economies which distinguish between international and domestic arbitration and provide for two distinct legal regimes.Source: FDI Regulations database, 2012.

FIGURE 5: Restrictions on the rules of procedure of the arbitration

0

20

40

60

80

100

Domestic arbitrationInternational arbitration

On the number ofappointed arbitrators

On the seatof arbitration

On the languagueof the arbitration

proceedings

On the locationof the arbitration

hearings

On the choiceof an arbitration

institution

0%

12%5%

12%5%

17% 16%21%

31%36%


FIGURE 3: Percentage of economies which make a distinction between international and domestic arbitration, in %

No distinction

Distinction by case-law

Distinction by law

42% 55%

3%



disputes according to their needs, it is also important to assure them

that arbitration proceedings will be conducted in a timely manner.

In 2012, based on one of the case studies mentioned in Box 3, it

takes an average of 326 days to conduct arbitration proceedings.

Arbitration proceedings can also take longer, as in Brazil (560

days), India (569 days), Croatia (679 days), and Iraq (910 days).

As shown in Box 5, Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) is the

region where arbitration proceedings are the fastest and Sub-

Saharan Africa the region where they take the longest, although

there is very limited data available for SSA.

BOX 5: Average length of arbitration proceedings by region

Eastern Europe and Central Asia 36 weeksEast Asia and the Pacific 41 weeksLatin America and the Caribbean 41 weeksHigh-Income OECD 48 weeksMiddle East and North Africa 58 weeksSouth Asia 63 weeksSub Saharan Africa 65 weeks


AMD results on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards

Specialized judicial assistance

Since commercial arbitration is based on consent, when an arbitral

award is rendered, the parties usually voluntarily comply with the

decision and no further action is necessary. However, if the debtor

refuses to pay, the winning party may bring enforcement proceed-

ings in the local courts.

The AMD indicators look at foreign arbitral awards only, in order to

measure whether economies comply with the New York Convention,

as foreign investors rely on it often when they need to enforce an

arbitral award. Foreign arbitral awards are those which are rendered

in arbitration proceedings conducted outside of an economy and,

when applicable, awards rendered within an economy which are not

considered as domestic according to national laws.

In a case where the debtor refuses to comply with the foreign arbi-

tral award, the foreign investor must request judicial enforcement

of the award. In such an event, economies which have courts with

specific jurisdiction over the recognition and enforcement of foreign

arbitral awards are more familiar with arbitration and provide greater

security to foreign investors. Only 23 economies have specialized

courts with specific jurisdiction to recognize and enforce arbitral

awards. In addition, 78 economies allow for an appeal. Some of

these appeal courts are judicial, but they can also be administrative

or constitutional courts (see Annex 5 for some examples).

Length of recognition and enforcement proceedings for foreign arbitral awards

As mentioned above, foreign investors take into consideration

the length of the proceedings that they would potentially have to

conduct in a particular economy.

In 2012, based on one of the case studies mentioned in Box 3,

it takes an average of 557 days or 80 weeks to recognize and

enforce foreign arbitral awards in the surveyed economies. As

shown in Box 6, recognition and enforcement proceedings are

the fastest in the East Asia and the Pacific region, whereas they

take longest in South Asia; once again, there is very limited data

available for SAR.

The length of recognition and enforcement proceedings is affected

by different factors, such as the number of steps required to

execute the foreign arbitral award in the economy. In 71 econo-

mies, parties are required to apply for recognition of a foreign

arbitral award prior to its enforcement before the competent court.

The recognition phase is the conversion of the arbitral award into

a court judgment. However, some economies, such as Belarus,

Georgia, and the Philippines allow for this phase to be conducted

simultaneously with the enforcement phase.

FIGURE 6: Factors by which arbitration is recognized as international, in %

0 20 40 60 80 100

Foreign ownership of a party

Headquarters of the arbitration institution located

outside the economy

Company headquarters located outside the economy

Agreement between the parties that the subject matter of the dispute

relates to more than one economy

Subject-matter of the dispute connected to a place

outside the economy

Substantial part of the contract performed outside the economy

Seat of arbitration located outside the economy

Place of registration of a party outside the economy

71%

64%

74%

69%

86%

74%

36%

22%



Contributing to the longer procedure are the many requirements

imposed to prove the consent to arbitration and the validity of the

arbitration proceedings. For instance, in Albania, the requesting

party must provide the competent court with confirmation from

the arbitral tribunal that the arbitral award is final, if necessary with

a notarized translation (as mentioned by our contributors). In India,

the entire contract would have to be produced and, if in a foreign

language, translated, in the event that the arbitration agreement is a

provision within the original contract between the parties.

However, some requirements serve as a guarantee of greater

legal certainty and are therefore necessary. The type of evidence

usually required by courts, in support of a request to recognize

and enforce a foreign arbitral award include the production by the

requested party of a certified copy of the original foreign arbitral

award (93 economies), and a certified copy of the arbitration

agreement (94 economies).

Only six economies: Burundi, Haiti, Morocco, Papua New Guinea,

Sierra Leone, and Zambia do not require any of these.

Finally, some legal provisions can facilitate recognition and enforce-

ment proceedings.

An example is the possibility of conducting ex parte proceedings:

e.g., if the losing party refuses to attend the hearings, the domestic

courts may still be able to make a decision. As shown in Figure 7,

only 23 percent of economies do not provide for the possibility for

a party to conduct ex parte proceedings.

5. Trends for ADR in 2011 and 2012

In 2011 and 2012, 59 percent of OECD economies and 43

percent of ECA economies have amended, adopted, or are

about to adopt new laws/provisions on international commercial

arbitration, mediation, or conciliation. On the other hand, only 11

percent of Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and 12.5 percent

of Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) economies have reformed their laws

in that time period.

Figure 8 shows, in dark blue, the 31 economies which have re-

vised their ADR regime in 2011 or 2012.10 These economies are:

Albania; Australia; Austria; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Colombia;

Congo, Dem. Rep.; Costa Rica; Croatia; Czech Republic; France;

Germany; Hong Kong SAR, China; Ireland; Kazakhstan; Mexico;

Moldova; Nepal; the Netherlands; Nigeria; Pakistan; Russian

Fed.; Saudi Arabia; Serbia; Singapore; South Africa; Spain; Turkey;

Ukraine; United States and Vietnam.

Among them, three economies, Colombia, Congo, Dem. Rep. and

Saudi Arabia, have adopted a pro-arbitration approach through

new laws on commercial arbitration in 2012:

1. In Colombia, the new National and International Arbitration

Statute (Law 1563/2012), enacted on July 12, 2012, ap-

pears to be based on the UNCITRAL Model law and governs

both domestic and international arbitration.11

2. Saudi Arabia enacted a new law on arbitration (the 2012

Law) which came into force on July 8, 2012.

3. Finally, Congo, Dem. Rep., signed the Treaty on the

Harmonization of Business Law in Africa in 2012 and joined

the Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in

Africa (OHADA, Annex 2). As a result, all OHADA Uniform

Acts are part of the Congolese legal framework, including the

Uniform Act on Arbitration of 1999.

As shown in Figure 9, Sub-Saharan Africa has witnessed a significant

increase in the number of arbitration, mediation, and conciliation

institutions. SSA economies colored in dark blue have created

new arbitration institutions in 2011 or 2012. These economies

are: Cameroon, Congo, Dem. Rep., Kenya, Mauritius, Nigeria, and

BOX 6: Average length of recognition/enforcement proceedings by region, in weeks

East Asia and the Pacific 39 weeks

High-Income OECD 43 weeks

Sub-Saharan Africa 65 weeks

Middle East and North Africa 68 weeks

Eastern Europe and Central Asia 75 weeks

Latin America and the Caribbean 90 weeksSouth Asia 386 weeks


FIGURE 7: Percentage of economies recognizing ex parte proceedings, in %

No ex parte proceedings

Ex parte proceedings

23%

77%



FIGURE 8: Economies which have revised their ADR laws in 2011–2012

IBRD40362 SEPTEMBER 2013This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Economies which have revised their ADR legalframework in 2011 or 2012

Other surveyed economies

Economies not covered by AMD

FIGURE 9: Sub-Saharan African economies which have created ADR institutions in 2011–2012

IBRD40363 SEPTEMBER 2013This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank.The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.

Economies which have created new ADR institutions in 2011 or 2012

Other surveyed economies

Economies not covered by AMD




Rwanda. Gray is for SSA economies which have not created new

arbitration institutions over the past two years.

In 2011 and 2012, the following private ADR institutions were

created or launched in these economies:

1. Cameroon: the Permanent Centre for Arbitration and Mediation

(Centre Permanent d’Arbitrage et de Médiation), launched in

April 2012 by the African Centre for Law and Development;

2. Congo, Dem. Rep.: as a new member State of OHADA,

Congo has now access to the Common Court of Justice and

Arbitration of OHADA;

3. Kenya: the Nairobi Centre for Arbitration Act was approved

by the President of Kenya in January 2013 and is expected

to become the second largest arbitration institution in the

East Africa Community, along with the Kigali International

Arbitration Center;

4. Mauritius: the LCIA-MIAC Arbitration Centre, established in 2011

and fully operational since October 2012, with the support

of the London Court of International Arbitration, the Mauritius

International Arbitration Centre and the government of Mauritius;

5. Nigeria: the Lagos Court of Arbitration launched in November

2012, with the support of the Lagos State government;

6. Rwanda: the Kigali International Arbitration Centre, launched

in May 2012, on the initiative of the Private Sector Federation

in partnership with the government of Rwanda.

6. Correlation analysis of AMD indicators

The results presented thus far have been primarily descriptive in

nature. This section presents preliminary quantitative analysis of

the data, demonstrating that the AMD indicators at the economy

level are significantly correlated with outcome indicators of interest.

It should be stressed that these correlations do not imply causality,

and more rigorous econometric analysis will be necessary to better

understand the relation between the AMD data and these and

other economic variables. Nonetheless, these correlations provide

a useful starting point by showing that the indicators are signifi-

cantly associated with measures of economic performance.

The AMD data that was used for the quantitative analysis below

relies on the results of three AMD sub-indicators, which are

scored on a scale from 0 to 1, with higher values corresponding

to better outcomes:

1. AMD indicators on the strength of laws and institutions

(AMD 1)

2. AMD indicators on the ease of initiating and conducting

arbitration proceedings (AMD 2)

3. AMD indicators on the ease of recognition and enforcement

of foreign arbitral awards (AMD 3).

In the following analysis, the AMD sub-indicators 1, 2 and 3 have

been most of the time averaged across the surveyed economies to

measure potential correlations of the overall quality of alternative

dispute resolution regimes with other economic variables.

These variables, considered as relevant for the investment climate,

are the following:

1. AMD indicators on the perception of contributors of the

quality of the legal framework on ADR of their economy

(AMD Perception)

2. Total FDI inflows

3. FDI inflows per capita

4. Doing Business 2013 Enforcing Contracts data

5. World Bank Group’s World Governance Indicators

6. World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Indicators

7. MIGA’s World Investment and Political Risk.

AMD correlations with AMD Perception indicatorsOne of the first interesting correlations found was between the

average of AMD 1, 2 and 3 and the AMD perception indicators

(Figure 10).

The AMD perception score indicates the extent to which contribu-

tors perceived that the quality of the legal framework on ADR in

their economy could be an obstacle to foreign direct investment.

Their perception of the legal framework on ADR is reported as:

1 = no obstacle, 2 = minor obstacle, 3 = moderate, 4 = heavy,

5 = severe. This outcome variable shows a strong negative correla-

tion with the average of the three input variables.

As shown in Figure 10, the perceived obstacle of the ADR regime

decreases in economies with higher-quality arbitration frameworks

and practices as measured by the AMD indicators.

A strong negative correlation was also identified between AMD 1

and the AMD perception indicators.

AMD correlations with total FDI inflows and FDI inflows per capitaThis second set of correlations finds that economies that score

better on the AMD indicators tend to receive more FDI inflows.


A strong and positive correlation was found between the average

of AMD 1, 2 and 3 and actual FDI inflows (millions), as shown

in Figure 11. Similar and somewhat stronger results are obtained

when the average of the three input variables are correlated with

a five-year average of FDI inflows per capita (Figure 12). These

correlations clearly indicate that there is a relationship between

ADR regimes and FDI.

However, as noted above, the correlations do not imply causation.

For example, the high correlation between AMD indicators and FDI

inflows per capita may be partially capturing the effects of a higher

stage of development (as reflected in a higher income per capita)

on the overall quality of a country’s legal framework.

More robust quantitative research will be needed to better

understand the relationship between alternative dispute resolution

mechanisms and global FDI flows.

Strong positive correlations have also been identified between

AMD 1 and these two output variables.

AMD correlations with Doing Business 2013 Enforcing ContractsThe AMD research shows that economies where the time to

enforce a contract in court is shorter are economies where the

time to enforce an arbitral award is also shorter (Figure 13).

FIGURE 10: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and AMD Perception

Note: The Pearson correlation is very strong (-0.499) and significant at the 1% level.

AFG

ALB

DZA

AGO

ARG

ARM

AUS AUT

AZE

BGD

BLR

BOL

BIH

BRA

BRN

BGR

BFABDI KHM

CMR

CAN

TCD

CHL

COL

CRI

CRI

CIV

HRVCYP

CZEDOMECU EGY

ETH

FRA

GEO

DEU

GHA

GRCGTM

HND

HKG

IND

IDNIRQ

IRL

ITA

JPN

JORKAZ

KEN

KOR

Kos

KGZ

MKD

MDG

MYSMLI

MUS

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NLDNZL

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PER

PHL

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TWN

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VEN

VNM

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12

34

5A

MD

Per

cept

ion

.4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

FIGURE 11: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and total FDI inflows

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.202 and significant at the 5% level. This correlation becomes stronger after controlling for outlier economies after controlling for outlier (the United States). Source: UNCTADstat for FDI data.

AFG ALBDZAAGO

ARGARM

AUS

AUTAZEBGDBLRBOLBIH

BRA

BRN BGRBFABDI KHM CMR

CAN

TCD

CHLCOLCRICRI CIVHRVCYP CZEDOMECU EGYETH

FRA

GEO

DEU

GHAGRCGTM HTI HND

HKG

INDIDN

IRQIRL

ITA

JPN JORKAZ

KENKORKGZ MKDMDGMYSMLIMUS

MEX

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NLD

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PHL

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RUS

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ESP

LKATWN TZATHA

TUN

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UGAUKR

GBR

USA

VENVNMYEMZMB0

5000

010

0000

1500

0020

0000

2500

00T

otal

FD

I Inf

low

s (m

illion)


FIGURE 12: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and FDI inflows per capita over a five-year average

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.225 and significant at the 5% level. The correlation exists, even if a little bit weaker, after controlling for outliers (Hong Kong SAR, China; and Singapore). Source: UNCTADstat for FDI data.

AFGALB

DZAAGOARG ARM

AUSAUT

AZEBGDBLRBOLBIH BRA

BRN

BGR

BFABDI KHM CMR

CAN

TCD

CHL

COLCRICRI

CIV

HRV

CYP

CZEDOMECU EGYETH

FRA

GEODEU

GHAGRCGTM HTI HND

HKG

INDIDNIRQ

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KENKORKGZ MKDMDGMYSMLI

MUS MEXMDA

MNE

MAR MOZNPL

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PERPHLPOLROMRUS

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GBR

USA

VENVNMYEMZMB020

0040

0060

0080

0010

000

FD

I Inf

low

s pe

r ca

pita


FIGURE 13: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and Doing Business 2013 Enforcing Contracts

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.407 and significant at the 1% level. The correlation is strong also after controlling for outlier (Pakistan).

ALB

ARGARM

AUT AZE

BGD

BLR

BOL

BIH

BRA

BRN

KHMCAN

CHL

COL

CRI

HRVCYP

CZE DOM

ECU

EGY

FRADEU

GRC

HND

HKG

IND

IDN

IRL

ITA

JPN

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KORMYS

MUS

MEX

MNE

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PHL

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VNM

ZMB

010

020

030

040

0D

B E

nfor

cem

ent (

# da

ys)

0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500AMD Enforcement (# days)


The World Bank’s Doing Business assesses the efficiency of the

judicial system yearly, with the Enforcing Contract indicators.12

The indicators follow the evolution of a commercial sale dispute

over the quality of goods and track the time, cost, and number of

procedures involved from the moment the plaintiff files the lawsuit

up until payment is received. This includes the time to file the

lawsuit, to serve the case, to issue and enforce a judgment.

The AMD indicators have collected data on the length of judicial

proceedings related to the recognition and the enforcement of a

foreign arbitral award. This data has been collected on the basis of

a case study mentioned in Box 3.

A strong positive correlation has been evidenced, after control-

ling for outlier economies, between AMD data on the length of

recognition and enforcement proceedings (measured in days) and

Doing Business Enforcing Contracts data (measured in days).

AMD correlations with the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness IndicatorsThe AMD data correlated with the data provided by World

Economic Forum’s yearly report on Global Competitiveness show

that economies which are more competitive, and particularly

economies which have good public and private institutions, also

tend to have better ADR regimes.

The Global Competitiveness report provides an assessment of

the competiveness of 144 economies.13 In order to measure the

drivers of these economies’ productivity and prosperity, the report

relies on the Global Competiveness Index (GCI), which covers both

macroeconomic and micro/business aspects of competiveness.

The GCI includes economic indicators divided into several different

broad categories capturing aspects of the quality of institutions, the

macroeconomic environment, skills and education, the efficiency of

markets, business sophistication and Innovation, among others.

Positive correlations have been identified with the GCI (Figure 14)

and, more specifically, with those variables captured under its “institu-

tions” component (Figure 15). These correlations are strong and their

level of significance is robust. In addition, the same positive correla-

tions have also been identified with the following specific variables:

judicial independence, efficiency of legal framework in settling

disputes, and efficiency of legal framework in challenging regulations.

AMD correlations with MIGA’s World Investment and Political Risk dataThe AMD quantitative analysis shows that, in the 36 countries

surveyed by the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA)

in 2009, companies perceive that political risks are higher in the

countries where the ADR framework is weaker.

MIGA, whose mission is to promote FDI into developing countries

by insuring eligible projects against certain risks, publishes a yearly

report examining perceptions of political risk and risk-mitigation

strategies.14 The World Investment and Political Risk Report pub-

lished in 2009 looks, in particular, at companies’ overall percep-

tion of the political risks related to investing in certain emerging

markets (and it allocates high scores to economies where the

political risk is perceived as high).

This data shows that there is a negative correlation between the

average of AMD indicators 1, 2 and 3 and the fact that some com-

panies perceived political risks in a certain numbers of countries

(Figure 16).

FIGURE 14: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and the Global Competiveness Index 2012-2013

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.295 and significant at the 1% level.Source:

ALB

DZAARG

ARM

AUSAUT

AZE

BGDBOL

BIH

BRA

BRN

BGR

BFA

BDI

KHM

CMR

CAN

TCD

CHL

COLCRI

CIV

HRV

CYP

CZE

DOM

ECU

EGY

ETH

FRA

GEO

DEU

GHAGRC

GTM

HTI

HND

HKG

INDIDN

IRL

ITA

JPN

JORKAZ

KEN

KOR

KGZ

MKD

MDG

MYS

MLI

MUS MEX

MDA

MNE MAR

MOZ

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NLD

NZL

NICNGAPAK

PER PHL

POL

ROMRUSRWA

SAU

SEN

SRB

SLE

SGP

SVK

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ESP

LKA

TWN

TZA

THA TUR

UGA

UKR

GBRUSA

VEN

VNM

YEM

ZMB

34

56

)

.5 .6 .8 .9Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

FIGURE 15: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and the GCI 1st Pillar on Institutions

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.289 and significant at the 1% level.Source:

ALB

DZAARG

ARM

AUS

AUT

AZE

BGDBOL

BIHBRA

BRN

BGR

BFA

BDI

KHM

CMR

CAN

TCD

CHL

COL

CRI

CIV

HRV

CYP

CZE

DOMECU

EGY

ETH

FRA

GEO

DEU

GHA

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HTI

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INDIDN

IRL

ITA

JPN

JOR

KAZ

KEN

KOR

KGZ

MKD

MDG

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PHL

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23

45

6)

.5 .6 .8 .93


This analysis is relative, and has to be put into perspective, given

that this data reflects perceptions from a limited number of com-

panies. However, it is consistent with the other correlations that

have been identified and reinforce the fact that a well-functioning

ADR regime is an indicator of a good business climate.

AMD correlations with the Worldwide Governance IndicatorsFinally, another correlation was identified between AMD sub-

indicators 1 on the quality of the legal framework and some

governance indicators developed by the Worldwide Governance

Indicators (WGI) project15 of the World Bank.

The WGI project reports aggregate and individual governance

indicators for 215 economies over the period 1996–2011, for six

dimensions of governance: a) Voice and Accountability, b) Political

Stability and Absence of Violence, c) Government Effectiveness, d)

Regulatory Quality, e) Rule of Law and f) Control of Corruption.

These aggregate indicators combine the views of a large number

of enterprise, citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial

and developing countries. Just as AMD indicators, they are scored

with higher values corresponding to better outcomes (but scaled

differently depending on individual data sources).

Strong positive correlations have been identified between AMD

1 on the strength of ADR laws and institutions and the following

relevant issues measured by the WGI:

1. The Control of Corruption indicators, which captures

perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised

for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of cor-

ruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private

interests (Figure 17);

2. The Governance Effectiveness indicators, which represent

perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the

civil service and the degree of its independence from political

pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementa-

tion, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to

such policies (Figure 18);

3. The Regulatory Quality indicators, which reflects perceptions

of the ability of the government to formulate and implement

sound policies and regulations that permit and promote

private sector development (Figure 19);

4. The Rule of Law indicators, which gather perceptions of the

extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by

the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract

enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as

well as the likelihood of crime and violence (Figure 20).

Strong positive correlations have also been identified between

AMD 1 and these four output variables.

FIGURE 16: Correlation between the average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3, and the perception, by companies, of political risks

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.207 and significant at the 25% level.

AFG

DZA

ARG

BGD

BRA

COL

CRI

EGY

ETHGHA

IND

IDN

KEN

MYS MEX

MAR

MOZ

NGA

PAK

PER

PHL

POL

ROM

RUS

ZAF

LKATZATHA

TUR

UGA

UKR

VEN

VNM

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1.5

22.

53

3.5

MIG

A P

oliti

cal R

isk

.5 .6 .7 .8 .9Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

FIGURE 17: Correlation between AMD 1 and the WGI Control of Corruption Indicators

Note: The Pearson correlation is 0.407 and significant at at the 1% level.

AFG

ALB

DZA

AGO

ARG ARM

AUS AUT

AZEBGD

BLR

BOL

BIH

BRA

BRN

BGR

BFA

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CAN

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CHL

COL

CRI

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HRV

CYP

CZE

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IDN

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IRL

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JPN

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KAZ

KEN

KOR

KosKGZ

MKD

MDG

MYS

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MUS

MEX

MDA

MNE

MAR

MOZ

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NLDNZL

NIC

NGA

PAKPNG

PERPHL

POL

ROMRUS

RWA

SAU SEN

SRB

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SVK

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ESP

LKA

TWN

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THATUN

TUR

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GBRUSA

VEN

VNM

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ZMB

0W

GI G

over

nmen

t Effe

ctiv

enes

s

.4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .93

FIGURE 18: Correlation between AMD 1 and the WGI Governance Effectiveness Indicators


AFG

ALB

DZAAGO

ARG

ARM

AUS

AUT

AZE

BGD

BLR

BOL

BIH

BRA

BRN

BGR

BFA

BDI

KHM

CMR

CAN

TCD

CHL

COL

CRI

CRI

CIV

HRV

CYP CZE

DOM

ECU

EGY

ETH

FRA

GEO

DEU

GHA

GRC

GTM

HTI

HND

HKG

INDIDN

IRQ

IRL

ITAJPN

JOR

KAZKEN

KOR

KosKGZ

MKD

MDG

MYS

MLI

MUS

MEX

MDAMNE MAR

MOZ

NPL

NLDNZL

NIC

NGAPAKPNG

PER

PHL

POL

ROM

RUS

RWASAU

SEN

SRB

SLE

SGP

SVK

ZAF

ESP

LKA

TWN

TZA

THA

TUN

TUR

UGA

UKR

GBRUSA

VEN

VNMYEM

ZMB

0W

GI R

egul

ator

y Q

ualit

y

.4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .93


7. Policy implications and regulatory reform considerations

Foreign investors, when facing a dispute, need to be able to

rely on effective and updated ADR regimes. AMD data identifies

those economies which have adopted generally accepted good

practices, including consolidated ADR laws, regulations following

the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration

and laws encompassing substantially all aspects of commercial

mediation and conciliation. The data also identify where functional

ADR institutions exist to assure the efficient conduct of the arbitra-

tion proceedings, a greater likelihood that time limits assigned by

the arbitral tribunal will be respected and greater certainty that the

arbitral award will withstand the scrutiny of a domestic court.

Several opportunities for improvement also arise out of the AMD

data. First is greater flexibility in domestic arbitration regimes,

through the recognition of international arbitration. The AMD indica-

tors find that when an economy provides for two distinct regimes

for domestic and international arbitration—either through its laws

or case law—international arbitration laws are less restrictive than

domestic arbitration laws. This affects rules on the appointment of

arbitrators and counsels, the choice of the seat of the arbitration, the

choice of the language of the arbitration proceedings, etc., which in

turn affects the desirability for firms to use domestic ADR services.

Access to domestic courts is also key—domestic court regulations

in many jurisdictions do not adequately support arbitrator(s) when

they need to obtain, through the courts, the production of witnesses

or documents or certain enforcement measures (for example, the

freezing of assets or ordering interim payments).

In addition, the length of arbitration proceedings can be signifi-

cantly reduced in many parts of the world. Online arbitration can

be especially effective for small commercial disputes, making

them shorter and less administratively demanding and cheaper

than international disputes. One potential area of reform in many

economies would be to offer such services through state agencies

or by supporting private initiatives.

A final policy implication from the AMD data applies to domestic

court capabilities. Given the technical nature of arbitral awards,

specialized courts have been most effective in a variety of jurisdic-

tions. These are high-level courts or specially designated courts

with the capacity and experience to deal with commercial arbitral

awards. These economies have also acceded to the New York

Convention to recognize and enforce arbitral awards.

Reforms to ADR regimes allow economies to offer a more attractive

investment climate to foreign investors. With commercial contracts

becoming more and more complex, it is important that economies

not only recognize and offer alternative dispute resolution mecha-

nisms but also constantly adapt their laws and regulations to reflect

the best practices in alternative dispute resolution.

FIGURE 19: Correlation between AMD 1 and the WGI Regulatory Quality Indicators


AFG

ALB

DZA

AGO

ARGARM

AUS AUT

AZEBGD

BLRBOL

BIH

BRA

BRN

BGR

BFA

BDIKHM CMR

CAN

TCD

CHL

COL

CRI

CRI

CIV

HRV

CYP CZE

DOM

ECU

EGY

ETH

FRA

GEO

DEU

GHA

GRC

GTM

HTI

HND

HKG

IND

IDN

IRQ

IRL

ITA

JPN

JOR

KAZ

KEN

KOR

Kos

KGZ

MKD

MDG

MYS

MLI

MUS

MEXMDA

MNE

MAR

MOZ

NPL

NLDNZL

NIC

NGA

PAKPNG

PERPHL

POL

ROM

RUS

RWA

SAU

SENSRB

SLE

SGP

SVK

ZAF

ESP

LKA

TWN

TZA

THATUN

TUR

UGA

UKR

GBRUSA

VEN

VNM

YEM

ZMB

0W

GI R

ule

of L

aw

.4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .93

FIGURE 20: Correlation between AMD 1 and the WGI Rule of Law Indicators


AFG

ALBDZA

AGO

ARG

ARM

AUS

AUT

AZEBGD

BLR

BOLBIH

BRA

BRN

BGRBFA

BDI KHMCMR

CAN

TCD

CHL

COL

CRI

CRI

CIV

HRV

CYP

CZE

DOMECUEGYETH

FRA

GEO

DEU

GHA

GRC

GTM

HTI

HND

HKG

INDIDN

IRQ

IRL

ITA

JPN

JOR

KAZKEN

KOR

Kos

KGZ

MKD

MDG

MYS

MLI

MUS

MEX

MDA

MNE MARMOZ

NPL

NLDNZL

NIC

NGAPAK

PNG

PER

PHL

POL

ROM

RUS

RWA

SAU

SEN

SRB

SLE

SGP

SVK

ZAF

ESP

LKA

TWN

TZATHA

TUN

TUR

UGAUKR

GBR

USA

VEN

VNM

YEM

ZMB

0W

GI C

ontr

ol o

f Cor

rupt

ion

.4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .93


ENDNOTES

1 Through commercial arbitration, the parties agree to submit their dispute to an independent and impartial arbitrator or arbitral tribunal which issues a final and binding arbitral award. Mediation is a structured and interest-focused process enabling the parties, facilitated by one or more mediators, to agree on the resolution of their dispute through a mediation agreement. Conciliation is a process where the parties are assisted in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of their dispute.

2 This is an agreement by the parties to submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen or which may arise between them out of a defined legal relationship.

3 Investment arbitration is based on either: a) an investment treaty, such as the 1965 multilateral Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (ICSID); b) a bilateral treaty (BIT), which provides for particular and limited standards of protec-tion of foreign investors such as, expropriation; c) an invest-ment law issued by the host state, which protects foreign investors; or d) in some cases, an investment agreement. In practice, investment arbitration is typically brought under the ICSID Convention or ad hoc, using UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. Differences between commercial and investment arbitration exist when it comes to the legal framework and applicable law, the selection of arbitrators, the type of jurisdictional issues that can be addressed, the case management, the confidentiality and transparency of proceedings, and the application of the New York Convention. See Böckstiegel, Karl-Heinz. 2012. “Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different are they Today? (Lalive Lecture 2012),” in Arbitration International 2012, Vol.28, Issue 4.

4 Ad hoc arbitration allows the parties to determine and agree on their own arbitration procedure, rather than having a procedure imposed by a private arbitration institution.

5 The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, adopted in 1985 and amended in 2006, aims at harmonizing national laws on international commercial arbitra-tion. The UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation was adopted in 2002 and aims to harmonize national laws on international commercial conciliation. Please note that the FDI Regulations project only reports contributors’ explanations on whether their domestic laws follow UNCITRAL Model Laws. More information on the status of enactment of such Model Laws can be found on UNCITRAL’s website: http://www.uncitral.org.

6 For detailed data on each economy measured, please see Annex 6.

7 Foreign arbitral awards are not considered to be domestic awards in the economy where the recognition and enforce-ment of the arbitral award is sought.

8 Angola, Burundi, Chad, Ethiopia, Iraq, Kosovo, Papua New Guinea, Sierra Leone and Yemen.

9 However, some economies have arbitration institutions that also host arbitration under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, in addi-tion to their own rules (for instance, Germany).

10 The AMD topic collected data in 2012, and does not cover changes which have occurred after September 2012. It is worth mentioning that Mauritius amended its International Arbitration Act (IAA) on May 25, 2013, further reinforcing its’ pro-arbitration approach.

11 AMD contributors have indicated that the new Colombian law broadly follows UNCITRAL Model law. However, it excludes the UNCITRAL Model Law’s provision which states that arbitration is “international” when the place of arbitration is situated outside the state in which the parties have their places of business. It defines it more broadly, by stating that parties can agree on an international arbitration if the dispute referred to arbitra-tion affects the interests of international commerce. This last definition incorporates the economic criterion of internationality, recognizing arbitration as international when international trade interests are at stake, and follows in that sense a few other economies which have adopted the same broad definition of international arbitration, for example France, in its Article 1504 of the Code of Civil procedure.

12 http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts

13 http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness

14 http://www.miga.org/resources/index.cfm?stid=1866

15 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/


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Böckstiegel, Karl-Heinz. 2012. “Commercial and Investment Arbitration: How Different are they Today? (Lalive Lecture 2012),” in Arbitration International 2012 Vol.28, Issue 4.

Choo, Jonathan. 2012. “Singapore amends International Arbitration Act increasing attractiveness of Singapore as arbitration venue,” Singapore International Arbitration Blog, April 12, 2012. Available at: http://singaporeinternationalarbitration .com/2012/04/12/singapore-amends-international- arbitration-act-increasing-attractiveness-of-singapore-as-arbitration-venue/

Gonzalez, Daniel E., George F. Hritz, Marcos Rios, and Richard C. Lorenzo. 2003. International Arbitration: Practical Considerations with a Latin American Focus. The Journal of Structured and Project Finance (Spring 2003): pp. 33–43.

Governance and Social Development Resource Centre. 2013. Helpdesk research Report: The influence of international commercial and investment law and procedure on foreign investment and economic development/growth. Available at: http://www.gsdrc.org/go/display&type=Helpdesk&id=881

Hamilton, Jonathan C. and Michael Roche. 2010. White & Case Survey of Latin American Arbitration 2010. Available at: http://www.latinarbitrationlaw.com/survey-of-latin-american-arbitration-201/

International Chamber of Commerce. 2011. Statistical Report for 2010, Vol. 22, No. 1.

International Chamber of Commerce. 2012. Statistical Report for 2011, Vol. 23, No. 1.

MIGA. 2009. World Investment and Political Risk Report 2009. Available at: http://www.miga.org/resources/index.cfm?aid=2486

McLaughlin, Joseph. 1979. Arbitrating and developing countries. International Law 13: 211–232.

Prager, Dietmar W. 2011. Costa Rica has a new arbitra-tion law. Kluwer Arbitration Blog, June. Available at: http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2011/06/04/costa-rica-has-a-new-arbitration-law/

PriceWaterhouseCoopers and Queen Mary University. 2006. “International Arbitration Study: Corporate Attitudes and Practices.” Available at: http://www.arbitrationonline.org/docs/IAstudy_2006.pdf

Schwartz, Eric A. 2009. “The role of international arbitration in economic development.” International Trade and Business Law Review 12: 127–139.

UNCITRAL website on International Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation. Available at: http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration.html

Wallace, Julian and Glen Rosen. 2012. “Recent Amendments to the International Arbitration Act and their Iinfluence on the Insurance Industry.” Singapore International Arbitration Centre Publication. Available at: http://www.siac.org.sg/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=344:recent- amendments-to-the-international-arbitration-act-and-their- influence-on-the-insurance-industry&catid=56:articles&Itemid=171

Zaiwalla, Sarosh. 2013. “Fast-track arbitration can help attract FDI.” Sudipto Dey, February 4, 2013. Available at: http://www.business-standard.com/article/opinion/fast-track-arbitration-can-help-attract-fdi-sarosh-zaiwalla-113020400006_1.html

Zuleta, Eduardo. 2012. “Introduction – Latin America.” The Arbitration Review of the Americas. Available at: http://www.globalarbitrationreview.com/reviews/48/sections/165/chapters/1859/introduction-latin-america/

Word Bank. 2013. Doing Business 2013 Enforcing Contracts. Available at: http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/enforcing-contracts

World Bank. 2012. FDI Regulations Database. Available at: http://iab.worldbank.org/~/media/FPDKM/IAB/Documents/What-is-Foreign-Direct-Investment.pdf

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World Economic Forum, 2013 Global Competitiveness Report 2012-2013. Available at: http://www.weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness


Annex 1. Methodology and coverage of the AMD indicators (100 economies across 7 regions)

The Arbitrating and Mediating Disputes (AMD) indicators were

developed using data gathered about alternative dispute resolu-

tion laws, regulations, and practice relevant for FDI through a

standard questionnaire of arbitration, mediation and conciliation

experts in 100 economies, including lawyers, law professors,

arbitrators, members of arbitration and mediation institutions, and

government regulators, on a pro-bono basis. The questionnaire

was distributed in late 2011, with responses received through

mid-2012. The questionnaire was partly based on standard case

studies so that responses can be comparable across economies.

The responses were reviewed and harmonized and supplemented

with desk research.

TABLE A1: Coverage of the AMD indicators: 100 economies across 7 regions

Region Economies

East Asia and the Pacific 11 economies

Brunei Darussalam; Cambodia; Hong Kong SAR, China; Indonesia; Malaysia; Papua New Guinea; Philippines; Singapore; Taiwan, China; Thailand; Vietnam

Eastern Europe and Central Asia 21 economies

Albania; Armenia; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Croatia; Cyprus; Georgia; Kazakhstan; Kosovo; Kyrgyz Republic; Macedonia, FYR; Moldova; Montenegro; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Serbia; Turkey; Ukraine

Latin America & the Caribbean 15 economies

Argentina; Bolivia; Brazil; Chile; Colombia; Costa Rica; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Guatemala; Haiti; Honduras; Mexico; Nicaragua; Peru; Venezuela, R.B.

Middle East and North Africa 8 economies

Algeria; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Iraq; Jordan; Morocco; Saudi Arabia; Tunisia; Yemen, Rep.

High Income OECD 17 economies

Australia; Austria; Canada; Czech Republic; France; Germany; Greece; Ireland; Italy; Japan; Korea, Rep.; Netherlands; New Zealand; Slovak Republic; Spain; United Kingdom; United States

South Asia 6 economies

Afghanistan; Bangladesh; India; Nepal; Pakistan; Sri Lanka

Sub-Saharan Africa 22 economies

Angola; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Cameroon; Chad; Congo, Dem. Rep.; Cote d’Ivoire; Ethiopia; Ghana; Kenya; Madagascar; Mali; Mauritius; Mozambique; Nigeria; Rwanda; Senegal; Sierra Leone; South Africa; Tanzania; Uganda; Zambia


General presentation of the methodology The AMD indicators quantify three aspects of ADR regimes that are

important for companies seeking to resolve commercial disputes

outside of domestic courts. These factors are the strength of an

economy’s commercial arbitration laws (including adherence to

international conventions on commercial arbitration); the ease

of process for the parties initiating and conducting arbitration

proceedings in that economy; and the extent to which domestic

courts assist the arbitration process, both during the proceedings

and regarding the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards. These

three factors also measure, to a certain extent, other elements

of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), that is to say mediation

and conciliation. These elements are considered essential to the

operation of an effective arbitration regime that prioritizes predict-

ability, transparency, efficiency, due process and party autonomy.

These indicators look exclusively at commercial arbitration—origi-

nating from the agreement of the parties—and do not cover invest-

ment arbitration. They look at all types of commercial arbitration

involving all kinds of parties, whether private, state, or state entities

involved in commercial relationships with private parties. It also

examines a variety of arbitration cases, whether administered by

private arbitration institutions, such as the International Chamber

of Commerce (ICC), the London Court of International Arbitration

(LCIA) or ad hoc arbitrations.

There are two types of questions asked in the Arbitrating and

Mediating Disputes indicators:

Legal questions, measuring the quality of laws and regulations

applicable to foreign-owned companies in the respective

economy. Responses to these survey questions are based on

the provisions of the laws, regulations and judicial precedents,

if applicable. These questions are therefore de jure, meaning

that they measure what the law states.

Procedural questions, measuring the duration and difficulty

of arbitration related procedures. Responses to these survey

questions are based on the contributors’ practical experience.

These questions are de facto, meaning that they measure

what exists in fact, or in other words, practice on the ground.

This Annex presents a brief overview of the AMD indicators’

methodology. A complete methodology with question details for

each sub-indicator is available from the author upon request.

Presentation of the methodology for the AMD indicatorsThere are three sets of indicators, providing comprehensive

information and analysis on ADR in the surveyed economies:

1. AMD indicators on the strength of laws and institutions

(AMD 1)


2. AMD indicators on the ease of initiating and conducting

arbitration proceedings (AMD 2)

3. AMD indicators on the ease of recognition and enforcement

of foreign arbitral awards (AMD 3).

The first set of indicators, AMD 1, measures the strength of ADR

laws and institutions, covering and including:

1. The domestic laws and regulations on ADR, their accessibility,

and whether or not, according to contributors, they follow

the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

(“UNCITRAL”) Model Laws on International Commercial

Arbitration and on International Commercial Conciliation that

states have the possibility to incorporate in their domestic

legislation; it also covers the New York Convention on the

Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,

1958 (the New York Convention);

2. Data on ADR private institutions, whether they exist in the

surveyed economies and follow specific rules, such as the

UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules of 1976, revised in 2010;

3. Reporting on the specific ADR services available, such as

fast-track or online arbitration.

AMD 1 compares the strength of economies’ ADR regimes by

examining the laws and regulations that an economy relies on

to regulate its domestic and international arbitrations, as well

the economy’s adherence to specific international conventions.

Specifically, AMD 1 focuses on:

(a) What laws on alternative dispute resolution are in place,

whether different laws apply to domestic and international

arbitrations taking place in that economy, and whether the

economy has entered into leading international conventions

on arbitration, specifically the New York Convention;

(b) Whether the economy hosts arbitration and mediation

institutions, and if yes, what is their structure, and if they offer

specific services such as fast-track or online arbitration.

The second set of indicators, AMD 2, looks at the ease of process,

before and after initiating arbitration proceedings:

1. Before initiating arbitration proceedings, it measures whether

or not an arbitration agreement can be easily concluded, and

whether or not the economy surveyed allows for a distinction

between domestic and international arbitration;

2. It also looks at possible restrictions that parties may face

when appointing their arbitrators and counsels, and when

conducting the arbitral process, for instance, freedom to

choose the language of the proceedings or the arbitrating

institution. In addition, it measures the ease of process once

arbitration proceedings are initiated, and through a standard

case study, the usual length of arbitration proceedings;

3. It captures judicial assistance during arbitration proceedings:

whether domestic courts are willing to enforce an arbitration

agreement by recognizing that they do not have jurisdiction,

and whether there are other measures they could offer in

support of arbitration proceedings.

AMD 2 compares the ease of parties to design arbitration pro-

ceedings in their chosen manner and conduct fair and predictable

arbitrations in the economy that respect due process. Specifically,

it looks at several concepts:

(a) Form of the arbitration agreement: whether the law restricts

the form that an arbitration agreement can take in order to be

legally binding on the parties;

(b) Arbitrability: whether the law restricts the subject matter of

commercial disputes being submitted to arbitration;

(c) Party autonomy: this is an essential value underpinning ar-

bitration as a dispute resolution tool, and laws may enshrine

it by providing parties with the freedom to select integral

elements of the arbitration process including, any seat of

arbitration, any particular ADR institution, any arbitrators and

foreign counsel;

(d) Judicial assistance: how domestic courts assist the arbitral

process; whether domestic courts support arbitration and have

articulated a “pro-arbitration” policy, as well as upholding the

parties’ agreement that the arbitration tribunal can rule on its

own jurisdiction, whether the law expressly provides for courts

to assist the arbitration process by ordering interim relief, the

production of documents and the appearance of witnesses;

(e) Practice: practitioners’ estimates regarding the average period

of time to establish an arbitral tribunal in the economy’s most

used arbitration institution.

The third set of indicators, AMD 3, deals with judicial assistance in

recognizing and enforcing foreign arbitral awards:

1. All steps of the recognition and enforcement process are

measured, whether or not there are specialized courts and to

what extent these courts review the arbitral award;

2. Through a standard case study (Box 3), the length of the

usual recognition and enforcement proceedings for foreign

arbitral awards is established.

AMD 3 compares the ease of the recognition and enforcement of

foreign arbitral awards across economies. It includes:

(a) De jure and de facto questions relating to how domestic

courts assist parties in the recognition and enforcement

process of a foreign arbitral awards;


(b) Practice: practitioners’ estimates regarding the average period

of time to enforce an arbitral award in a local court of the

surveyed economy.

The case studies used to measure the length of arbitration

proceedings and the length of the recognition and enforcement of

foreign arbitral awards is standard. In both cases, contributors are

asked to give an estimate where a hypothetical party is in breach

of a supply agreement and the other party seeks to recover

US$100,000 through arbitration, either by initiating arbitration pro-

ceedings or by initiating recognition and enforcement proceedings

concerning a foreign arbitral award rendered in the same amount.

Limitations of the AMD indicators The methodology of Arbitrating Disputes indicators is primarily

limited to analyzing verifiable data, such as the legal framework

and most common practices in each economy. The survey uses

a specific methodology that consists of mostly “Yes” or “No”

questions and has few perception-based questions. Practice is

therefore covered in a limited manner, given the survey methodol-

ogy and the nature of arbitration, which is private and confidential.

There is no such thing as a “one size fits all” arbitration regime.

However, by asking a standardized set of questions in our survey,

we aim to identify good practices that can assist countries in

benchmarking the quality of their arbitration regimes.

The AMD indicators represent a rather extensive measurement of

economies’ alternative dispute resolution frameworks with a focus

on commercial arbitration. However, the indicators do not cover

many other issues related to dispute resolution such as:

1. Evaluation of arbitration clauses in bilateral investment trea-

ties, investment chapters of free trade agreements, invest-

ment treaty arbitrations and enforcement of ICSID arbitration

awards;

2. Level of awareness and acceptance of arbitration practices by

the economies’ legal and business community;

3. Level of training of economies’ arbitration practitioners and

judges;

4. Effectiveness of arbitral institutions;

5. Extent to which arbitration is preferred over other dispute

resolution tools in each economy;

6. Effectiveness of commercial litigation (already measured by

the World Bank Group’s Doing Business Enforcing Contracts

indicator).

Glossary of termsAlternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) – Specific procedures

for settling disputes by means other than court litigation.

These methods include among others mediation, conciliation

and arbitration.

Arbitrability – Whether the claim could be subject to arbitra-

tion. Certain categories of claims are considered as being

incapable of resolution by arbitration and deemed “non –

arbitrable” because of their perceived public importance.

Arbitration – ADR method, by which parties agree to submit

their dispute to an independent and impartial arbitrator or

arbitral tribunal appointed by mutual consent or statutory

provision and to issue a final and binding arbitral award.

Arbitration Agreement – An agreement by the parties to

submit to arbitration all or certain disputes which have arisen

or which may arise between them in respect of a defined

legal relationship.

Commercial has the meaning ascribed to it in the 1985

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial

Arbitration. A note to the text of the Model Law states: “The

term ‘commercial’ should be given a wide interpretation so as

to cover matters arising from all relationships of a commercial

nature, whether contractual or not. […]”

Conciliation – The term “conciliation” is used as a broad

notion encompassing mediation, and refers to ADR proceed-

ings in which a person or a panel of persons assists the

parties in their attempt to reach an amicable settlement of

their dispute.

Enforcement of an Arbitral Award – The conversion of the

arbitral award into a court judgment with all the sanctions

that a court judgment entails, such as the right to have the

debtor’s assets seized.

Fast-track Arbitration – Time bound arbitration, which does

not differ from traditional arbitration except that the parties or

the arbitrator(s) have to observe specific time limits.

Foreign Arbitral Award – Foreign arbitral award has the

meaning ascribed to it in the New York Convention. It is an

arbitral award rendered outside of your state in arbitration

proceedings conducted outside of your state (and, if ap-

plicable, awards issued in your country through international

arbitration proceedings).

Interim Measures – Temporary measures issued by courts or

arbitral tribunals to prevent immediate and irreparable injury

(e.g., sequestration of property, attachment of bank accounts,

and preservation of evidence).

Mediation – ADR method, by which a structured and

interest-focused process enables the parties, with the facilia-

tion of one or more mediators, to agree on the resolution of

their dispute.

New York Convention or Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards – Signed in


1958 and entered into force in 1959, the Convention re-

quires national courts to recognize and enforce foreign arbitral

awards and recognize the validity of arbitration agreements. It

also require national courts to refer parties to arbitration when

they have entered into a valid agreement to arbitrate that is

subject to the Convention.

Seat of Arbitration – The location of the arbitration forum.

The seat of arbitration has a number of significant effects

upon the arbitration, including the potential of national court

interference with arbitration proceedings, national court’s

assistance with arbitration proceedings, the law applicable to

the arbitration agreement if the parties have not agreed oth-

erwise, and national court’s enforcement of arbitral awards.

Severable – The severability or separability doctrine provides

that an arbitration agreement, even though included in and

related closely to an underlying commercial contract, is a

separate and autonomous agreement.

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration – Adopted by the United Nations Commission on

International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) in 1985 and amended

in 2006, the Model Law aims at harmonizing national laws

on international commercial arbitration. States may incorpo-

rate it into their domestic legislation.

UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Conciliation – Adopted by UNCITRAL in 2002, the Model

Law aims at harmonizing national laws on international com-

mercial conciliation.


Annex 2. OHADA and the Uniform Act on Arbitration of 1999

Legal FrameworkIn 1993, 14 countries along the Gulf of Guinea signed the Treaty on

the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa (OHADA). Three States

joined since then: Comorros, Guinea-Conakry, and Congo, Dem.

Rep. Through OHADA, the States have to apply several uniform

acts, including the Uniform Act on Arbitration of 1999 (AUA). As a

consequence, the 17 OHADA member-States have their arbitration

legal framework governed by the AUA. Under its Article 35, the AUA

has a direct effect and applies to all arbitration proceedings initiated

after its enactment in a member State. In addition, the ratifying

countries are not allowed to enact conflicting laws.

On June 26, 2012, the World Bank approved an International

Development Association (IDA) US$15 million technical assistance

grant to OHADA, in order to support investment climate reforms

and provide businesses with a more secure and cost-effective

business legal framework. Because judicial security is key and

because international investors favor arbitration, one component

of the project is the strengthening of the Common Court of Justice

and Arbitration, the revision of the Uniform Act on Arbitration (to

possibly introduce fast-track arbitration) and the creation of train-

ings and awareness programs on the best practices in ADR.

Arbitration InstitutionsThe OHADA possesses its own arbitral institution, the Common

Court of Justice and Arbitration (CCJA). The CCJA has two roles.

As an appellate court, the CCJA is a body acting as supreme court

in the judicial systems of OHADA member States on matters of

award enforcement. As a arbitration institution, the CCJA is an

optional institution that parties may choose in order to administer

and monitor their arbitration. Each year, the CCJA establishes a

list of arbitrators, which is not binding as parties are allowed to

appoint freely their arbitrators.

Arbitration ProceedingsThe Uniform Act is modeled after the UNCITRAL Model Law

on International Commercial Arbitration, but applies widely to

every arbitration case when the seat of the tribunal is in one of

the OHADA member-States, regardless of whether the case is

domestic or international or whether it is in a commercial or civil

matter. The State itself and its entities can be brought before an

OHADA arbitral tribunal. The AUA limits the time for completion

of an arbitration case to 6 months from the time the last arbitrator

accepted his mission, time which can be extended by the parties.

Local courts may interfere with the proceedings, at the request

of a party, for specific reasons mentioned in the AUA such as:

choosing an arbitrator, extending the 6 months mandatory period,

or administering evidence.

Foreign Arbitral AwardsAn OHADA foreign award is not self-executing in an OHADA

member State. These awards need an order of recognition by the

national courts where enforcement is sought. For foreign award

issued in one of the OHADA member States, the party seeking

enforcement must produce the arbitral award and the arbitration

agreement. For awards issued under rules different from the

OHADA rules, including awards issued outside OHADA commu-

nity, the UAU provides that the applicable treaties on recognition

should apply (in most cases, the New York Convention) when the

recognition is sought in an OHADA member-State. In the absence

of an applicable treaty, the OHADA rules should apply.


Annex 3. The Bangladesh International Arbitration Center (BIAC)

BIAC is the first alternative dispute resolution center in Bangladesh

and was launched on April 9, 2011 (http://biac.org.bd/). BIAC was

established by a consortium of three key Bangladeshi business

associations, the Dhaka Chamber of Commerce and Industry,

the Metropolitan Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the

International Chamber of Commerce – Bangladesh, with support

from the International Finance Corporation (IFC), Uk-Aid (DFID)

and the European Union (EU). It was formally inaugurated by

the Honorable Minister of Law Justice and Parliamentary Affairs

Barrister Shafique Ahmed and Dr. Mashiur Rahman, Economic

Advisor to the PM was the chief guest at the event - both

extremely supportive of this private sector led initiative.

IFC has been supporting the establishment of BIAC since March

2010 through the Bangladesh Investment Climate Fund (BICF),

following an ADR feasibility study prepared for IFC by the

London-based Centre for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR).

In summary, the study found that the conditions for developing a

viable ADR center were largely in place, and all key stakeholders

were on board. The study also pointed out that engagement of

the right people, and a lot of promotional and awareness-raising

work would need to be done to make BIAC an effective venue for

out-of-court dispute resolution.

Since its establishment, BIAC has made significant progress to-

wards becoming an arbitration center of excellence for businesses

in Bangladesh. BIAC organized workshops for local lawyers, busi-

nesses, judges and other stakeholders on arbitration-related topics

such as enforcement of arbitration awards, arbitration proceedings

and drafting of arbitration agreements.

After series of consultations with IFC, international experts and

local legal community, BIAC finalized and formally announced

its Rules of Procedure, Fee Schedule and Constitution of the

Arbitration Committee in April 2012. Since 2012, BIAC publishes a

quarterly newsletter informing the Center’s users of its most recent

developments, including the ongoing initiative to introduce com-

mercial mediation. Over 43 arbitrations have been administered at

BIAC since the Center’s establishment under Rules chosen by the

parties (in the absence of BIAC Rules). Fifteen of them involved a

state company.

The most recent initiatives carried out by BIAC are a negotiation

course for businesses to be delivered by BIAC CEO, Dr. Toufiq Ali

in July 2012, and developing an awareness-raising campaign to

promote the use of BIAC Rules and model arbitration clause.


Annex 4. Categories of disputes considered as non arbitrable, per economy

TABLE A2: Categories of dispute

Categories of dispute Economy

Disputes involving rights over immoveable property

Afghanistan; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Burkina Faso; Cambodia; Egypt; Kazakhstan; Kosovo; Macedonia; Mexico; Moldova; Montenegro; Serbia; Slovak Republic; Tanzania; Turkey; Ukraine and Vietnam

Intra-corporate disputes Belarus; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Bulgaria; Kazakhstan Montenegro; Romania; Russian Federation; Turkey and Ukraine

Patent law or intellectual property (IP) disputes

Azerbaijan; Belarus; Korea; Mexico; Nepal;a Russian Federation and Singapore

Finance and banking disputes Bosnia and Herzegovina; Cambodia and Sierra Leone

Insolvency, bankruptcy or liquidation disputes

Albania; Algeria; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Dominican Republic; Egypt; France; Ghana; Greece; Guatemala; India; Indonesia; Italy; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea; Kyrgyz Republic; Macedonia; Mexico; Moldova; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Nepal; Netherlands; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Serbia; Slovak Republic; Spain; Sri Lanka; Thailand; Tunisia; Turkey; Ukraine and Zambia

Tax and customs disputes

Albania; Algeria; Angola; Argentina; Armenia; Austria; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Bolivia; Bosnia and Herzegovina; Brazil; Brunei Darussalam; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Cameroon; Chile; Colombia; Congo; Dem. Rep.; Costa Rica; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Dominican Republic; Ecuador; Egypt; Ethiopia; Georgia; Germany; Ghana; Guatemala; Honk Kong; India; Indonesia; Iraq; Italy; Japan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea; Kosovo; Kyrgyz Republic; Macedonia; Madagascar; Mali; Mexico; Moldova; Montenegro; Morocco; Mozambique; Nepal; New Zealand; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Philippines; Poland; Romania; Russian Federation; Serbia; Slovak Republic; Spain; Sri Lanka; Taiwan, China; Thailand; Tunisia; Turkey; Ukraine; United States; Venezuela; Vietnam and Zambia

Antitrust or unfair competition disputes

Algeria; Argentina; Armenia; Australia; Azerbaijan; Bangladesh; Belarus; Bolivia; Brazil; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Chile; Colombia; Congo; Dem. Rep.; Croatia; Cyprus; Czech Republic; Ecuador; Georgia; Guatemala; India; Indonesia; Iraq; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Korea; Kosovo; Kyrgyz Republic; Mexico; Montenegro; Nepal; Nicaragua; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; Romania; Russian Federation; Sierra Leone; Sri Lanka; Taiwan, China; Thailand; Ukraine; Venezuela; Vietnam and Zambia

Currency convertibility disputes

Algeria; Austria; Bangladesh; Belarus; Bolivia; Bulgaria; Cambodia; Chile; Congo; Dem. Rep.; Czech Republic; France; Georgia; India; Iraq; Korea; Montenegro; Mozambique; Nepal; Nicaragua; Romania; Sierra Leone; Thailand; Turkey; Ukraine and Venezuela

Employment contracts’ disputes

Algeria; Argentina; Azerbaijan; Belarus; Bolivia; Brazil; Bulgaria; Chile; Costa Rica; Ecuador; Egypt; France; Guatemala; Ireland; Italy; Korea; Kyrgyz Republic; Mauritius; Mexico; Nepal;b New Zealand; Nicaragua; Philippines; Romania; Russian Federation; Sierra Leone; Thailand; Ukraine; Venezuela and Vietnam

a. In Nepal, even if most of these disputes could be arbitrable, disputes relating to infringement of IP rights are not arbitrable and are settled by the Department of Industries.

b. In Nepal, if 10 or more employees are employed by a company, the Labor Law requires that employment disputes involving an employee should be settled by the Labor Court. However, managerial employment contracts generally provide for dispute resolution through arbitration.


Annex 5. Examples of administrative and constitutional courts before which a party can file an appeal once enforcement is granted

TABLE A3: Examples of specialized courts

Specialized courts Economy and name of the court Length of proceedings in practice

Administrative court Thailand: Supreme Administrative Court No data

Constitutional courts

Armenia: RA Constitutional Court 4 to 6 months

Azerbaijan: Constitutional Court of the Republic 6 months

Brazil: Supreme Federal Court 1 to 2 years

Colombia: Constitutional Court 1 month

Croatia: Constitutional Court 1 year

Czech Republic: Constitutional Court 6 months to 2 years

Dominican Republic: Supreme Court 6 months to 1 year

Honduras: Supreme Court 6 months

Japan: Supreme Court 2 to 4 months

Mexico: Federal Unitary Circuit Court or the Federal District Judge 2 months to 1 year

Peru: Constitutional Court Up to 2 years

Philippines: Supreme Court 15 days

Poland: Supreme Court No data

Slovak Republic: Constitutional Court 1 year

South Africa: Constitutional Court 18 months

Spain: Constitutional Court No data


Annex 6. AMD Dataset

AMD 1 on the strength of ADR laws and institutions - Data and Score

Economy Cons

olid

ated

law

on

com

mer

cial a

rbitr

atio

n

UN

CITR

AL M

odel

Law

on

Inte

rnat

iona

l Com

mer

cial

Arbi

tratio

n

Scat

tere

d pr

ovisi

ons o

n co

mm

ercia

l arb

itrat

ion

Prov

ision

s on

proc

edur

al

aspe

cts o

f com

mer

cial

arbi

tratio

n

Gove

rnm

ent-s

uppo

rted

web

site

Adhe

sion

to th

e N

ew Y

ork

Conv

entio

n

Cons

olid

ated

law

on

com

mer

cial m

edia

tion

or

conc

iliat

ion

UN

CITR

AL M

odel

Law

on

Inte

rnat

iona

l Com

mer

cial

Conc

iliat

ion

Cour

t ref

erra

ls of

cas

es to

m

edia

tion

/con

cilia

tion

Dom

estic

ADR

priv

ate

inst

itutio

n

Onl

ine

ADR

Fast

-trac

k ar

bitra

tion

AMD

1 on

the

stre

ngth

of

ADR

law

s and

inst

itutio

ns

- Sco

re

Brunei Darussalam 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 0 0 0 0.55

Cambodia 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.64

Hong Kong SAR (China) 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 1 1 0.82

Indonesia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.75

Malaysia 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0.58

Papua New Guinea 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.58

Philippines 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.75

Singapore 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 1 1 0.73

Taiwan, China 1 1 0 0 1 N/A 0 N/A 1 1 0 1 0.60

Thailand 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0.64

Vietnam 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0.73

East Asia/Pacific Regional Average 0.67

Albania 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.58

Armenia 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.55

Azerbaijan 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.64

Belarus 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0.83

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0 N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.73

Bulgaria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00

Croatia 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.75

Cyprus 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 1 0.55

Georgia 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 1 0.64

Kazakhstan 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.75

Kosovo 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.67

Kyrgyz Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 1 0.73

Macedonia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.83

Moldova 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.58

Montenegro 0 N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.73

Poland 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.75

Romania 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0.83

Russian Federation 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.83

Serbia 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.75

Turkey 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.64

Ukraine 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.55

Europe/Central Asia Regional Average 0.71

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of the answers collected for each data point. (continued)


(continued)


Economy Cons

olid

ated

law

on

com

mer

cial a

rbitr

atio

n

UN

CITR

AL M

odel

Law

on

Inte

rnat

iona

l Com

mer

cial

Arbi

tratio

n

Scat

tere

d pr

ovisi

ons o

n co

mm

ercia

l arb

itrat

ion

Prov

ision

s on

proc

edur

al

aspe

cts o

f com

mer

cial

arbi

tratio

n

Gove

rnm

ent-s

uppo

rted

web

site

Adhe

sion

to th

e N

ew Y

ork

Conv

entio

n

Cons

olid

ated

law

on

com

mer

cial m

edia

tion

or

conc

iliat

ion

UN

CITR

AL M

odel

Law

on

Inte

rnat

iona

l Com

mer

cial

Conc

iliat

ion

Cour

t ref

erra

ls of

cas

es to

m

edia

tion

/con

cilia

tion

Dom

estic

ADR

priv

ate

inst

itutio

n

Onl

ine

ADR

Fast

-trac

k ar

bitra

tion

AMD

1 on

the

stre

ngth

of

ADR

law

s and

inst

itutio

ns

- Sco

re

Argentina 0 N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.64

Bolivia 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.67

Brazil 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 1 0.64

Chile 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 1 0 0.73

Colombia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.83

Costa Rica 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.67

Dominican Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0.73

Ecuador 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.67

Guatemala 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.67

Haiti 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.60

Honduras 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.75

Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.92

Nicaragua 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.83

Peru 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.45

Venezuela 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 1 0.73

Latin America/Carib. Regional Average 0.70

Algeria 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.50

Egypt 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.55

Iraq 0 N/A 0 1 1 0 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.30

Jordan 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.67

Morocco 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.58

Saudi Arabia 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.45

Tunisia 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.55

Yemen 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 N/A 0 1 0 1 0.45

Middle East/N. Africa Regional Average 0.51

Australia 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 1 0.73

Austria 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0.75

Canada 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.83

Czech Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 1 1 0.91

France 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.67

Germany 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 1 1 0.82

Greece 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.75

Ireland 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0.55

Italy 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.75

Japan 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.67

Korea 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 1 0.64

Netherlands 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 1 1 0.64

New Zealand 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 1 0.73

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of the answers collected for each data point.

(continued)



Economy Cons

olid

ated

law

on

com

mer

cial a

rbitr

atio

n

UN

CITR

AL M

odel

Law

on

Inte

rnat

iona

l Com

mer

cial

Arbi

tratio

n

Scat

tere

d pr

ovisi

ons o

n co

mm

ercia

l arb

itrat

ion

Prov

ision

s on

proc

edur

al

aspe

cts o

f com

mer

cial

arbi

tratio

n

Gove

rnm

ent-s

uppo

rted

web

site

Adhe

sion

to th

e N

ew Y

ork

Conv

entio

n

Cons

olid

ated

law

on

com

mer

cial m

edia

tion

or

conc

iliat

ion

UN

CITR

AL M

odel

Law

on

Inte

rnat

iona

l Com

mer

cial

Conc

iliat

ion

Cour

t ref

erra

ls of

cas

es to

m

edia

tion

/con

cilia

tion

Dom

estic

ADR

priv

ate

inst

itutio

n

Onl

ine

ADR

Fast

-trac

k ar

bitra

tion

AMD

1 on

the

stre

ngth

of

ADR

law

s and

inst

itutio

ns

- Sco

re

Slovak Republic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.92

Spain 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 1 1 0.73

United Kingdom 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 1 1 0.82

United States 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 1 1 0.64

High Income OECD Regional Average 0.74

Afghanistan 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0.58

Bangladesh 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 1 0.82

India 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00

Nepal 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.67

Pakistan 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0.64

Sri Lanka 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.83

South Asia Regional Average 0.76

Angola 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 N/A 0 0 0 0 0.27

Burkina Faso 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 1 0.64

Burundi 0 N/A 1 0 1 0 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.30

Cameroon 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0.73

Chad 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.36

Congo, D.R. 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.55

Côte d’Ivoire 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 1 0.64

Ethiopia 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.30

Ghana 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0.67

Kenya 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0.73

Madagascar 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0.55

Mali 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0.64

Mauritius 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0.75

Mozambique 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.83

Nigeria 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.75

Rwanda 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.67

Senegal 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 0 0.64

Sierra Leone 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 N/A 0 1 0 1 0.45

South Africa 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 N/A 0 1 0 1 0.73

Tanzania 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0.64

Uganda 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0.67

Zambia 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 N/A 1 1 0 0 0.55

Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Average 0.59

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of the answers collected for each data point.

(continued)


AMD 2 on the ease of initiating and conducting arbitration proceedings - Data and Score

Economy How

arb

itrat

ion

agre

emen

ts

are

conc

lude

d *

Type

s of a

rbitr

able

disp

utes

*

Econ

omic

defin

ition

of

inte

rnat

iona

l arb

itrat

ion

**

Elem

ents

that

, if f

orei

gn,

mak

e th

e ar

bitra

tion

inte

rnat

iona

l* *

*

Free

dom

of t

he p

artie

s to

choo

se a

rbitr

ator

s*

Free

dom

of t

he p

artie

s to

choo

se fo

reig

n co

unse

ls

Legi

slate

d ar

bitra

tor

inde

pend

ence

Legi

slate

d ar

bitra

tor

impa

rtial

ity

Legi

slate

d us

e of

inte

rim

mea

sure

s by

arbi

trato

rs

Free

dom

of t

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artie

s to

choo

se th

e m

odal

ity o

f the

ar

bitra

tion

proc

eedi

ngs *

AMD

2 on

the

ease

of

initi

atin

g an

d co

nduc

ting

arbi

tratio

n pr

ocee

ding

s - S

core

Brunei Darussalam 0.67 0.78 1 0.88 1 0 1 1 0 0.93 0.72

Cambodia 0.67 0.33 0 0.88 0.75 0 1 1 0.5 0.86 0.60

Hong Kong SAR (China) 0.67 0.89 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.94

Indonesia 0.67 0.67 0 0.13 0.75 1 1 1 0.5 0.79 0.65

Malaysia 0.67 1 0 0.63 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.83

Papua New Guinea 1 No data N/A N/A 1 0 0 0 No data 0.00 0.33

Philippines 0.67 0.78 1 0.75 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.92

Singapore 0.67 0.89 0 0.75 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.93 0.77

Taiwan, China 0.67 0.75 0 0.38 1 1 1 1 0 0.86 0.66

Thailand 0.67 0.44 N/A N/A 1 0 1 1 0 0.86 0.62

Vietnam 0.67 0.56 N/A N/A 0.75 1 1 1 1 0.57 0.82


Albania 0.50 0.78 0 0.63 1 0 1 1 1 0.71 0.66

Armenia 0.67 0.67 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.90

Azerbaijan 0.67 0.33 1 0.88 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.79

Belarus 0.67 0.11 1 0.13 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.93 0.73

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.67 0.44 N/A N/A 0.50 0 0 0 0 0.71 0.29

Bulgaria 0.83 0.22 1 0.13 0.75 1 1 1 0.5 0.79 0.72

Croatia 0.67 0.67 0 0.50 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.79 0.66

Cyprus 0.67 0.67 1 0.13 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.80

Georgia 0.67 0.67 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.92

Kazakhstan 0.67 0.44 0 0.25 0.75 1 1 1 0.5 0.79 0.64

Kosovo 0.67 0.67 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.90

Kyrgyz Republic 0.50 0.56 N/A N/A 0.75 1 1 1 1 1 0.85

Macedonia 0.67 0.67 1 0.88 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.79 0.85

Moldova 0.67 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.86 0.87

Montenegro 0.67 0.33 0 0.13 1 1 0 0 0 0.85 0.40

Poland 0.67 0.78 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.93

Romania 0.67 0.33 1 0.50 0.88 0.5 1 1 1 0.79 0.77

Russian Federation 0.67 0.33 1 0.63 0.88 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.84

Serbia 0.83 0.67 0 0.88 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.64 0.75

Turkey 0.67 0.44 0 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.57 0.67

Ukraine 0.67 0.22 1 0.88 0.88 1 1 1 0.5 0.86 0.80


Argentina 0.50 0.56 N/A N/A 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.38

Bolivia 0.50 0.44 0 0.50 0.88 0 1 1 0.5 0.86 0.57

Brazil 0.67 0.56 N/A N/A 1 0 1 1 1 0.86 0.76

NB: The data presented should be read as:”1=yes” and “0=no”. The final score is an average of each data point.* Average of the scores collected for each sub-question. ** Score only for economies recognizing international arbitration.

(continued)



Economy How

arb

itrat

ion

agre

emen

ts

are

conc

lude

d *

Type

s of a

rbitr

able

disp

utes

*

Econ

omic

defin

ition

of

inte

rnat

iona

l arb

itrat

ion

**

Elem

ents

that

, if f

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gn,

mak

e th

e ar

bitra

tion

inte

rnat

iona

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*

Free

dom

of t

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s to

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se a

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ator

s*

Free

dom

of t

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se fo

reig

n co

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ls

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slate

d ar

bitra

tor

inde

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ence

Legi

slate

d ar

bitra

tor

impa

rtial

ity

Legi

slate

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e of

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odal

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f the

ar

bitra

tion

proc

eedi

ngs *

AMD

2 on

the

ease

of

initi

atin

g an

d co

nduc

ting

arbi

tratio

n pr

ocee

ding

s - S

core

Chile 0.67 0.50 1 0.75 0.75 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.64 0.73

Colombia 0.50 0.78 1 0.63 0.63 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.43 0.70

Costa Rica 0.67 0.78 1 0.75 0.75 0.5 1 1 0 0.71 0.72

Dominican Republic 0.83 0.78 0 0.38 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.75

Ecuador 0.50 0.67 1 0.63 0.75 0 0 0 0.5 0.86 0.49

Guatemala 0.67 0.56 1 0.75 1 1 1 1 1 0.93 0.89

Haiti No data No data N/A N/A 0.75 1 1 1 No data 0.80 0.91

Honduras 0.83 1 0 0.88 0.88 0 1 1 0 0.93 0.65

Mexico 0.67 0.33 0 0.63 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.93 0.71

Nicaragua 0.67 0.44 1 0.75 0.75 1 1 1 0.5 0.86 0.80

Peru 0.83 0.67 0 0.63 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.76

Venezuela 0.67 0.56 0 0.75 0.75 1 1 1 1 0.79 0.75


Algeria 0.67 0.44 1 0.63 0.38 1 1 0 0.5 0.93 0.65

Egypt 0.67 0.56 1 N/A 1 1 0 1 1 0.75 0.77

Iraq 0.67 0.67 N/A N/A 1 0 0 0 0 1 0.42

Jordan 0.67 1 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.96

Morocco 0.67 0.78 1 0.50 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.86 0.83

Saudi Arabia 1 1 0 0.25 0.63 1 1 1 1 0.07 0.69

Tunisia 0.83 0.71 1 0.88 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.86 0.88

Yemen 0.67 1 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 No data 1 0.95


Australia 0.67 0.78 0 0.75 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.77

Austria 0.67 0.67 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.90

Canada 1 1 0 0.75 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 0.83

Czech Republic 0.67 0.56 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 0 0.86 0.76

France 1 0.67 1 0.25 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.86 0.83

Germany 0.83 0.89 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.97

Greece 0.83 0.89 0 0.88 1 1 1 1 0 0.93 0.75

Ireland 0.67 0.89 0 0.75 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.93 0.77

Italy 0.67 0.67 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 0 1 0.79

Japan 0.67 0.89 N/A N/A 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.82

Korea 0.67 0.33 N/A N/A 0.75 0 1 1 1 1 0.72

Netherlands 0.83 0.89 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.95

New Zealand 1 0.67 0 0.75 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.79

Slovak Republic 0.67 0.67 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.71 0.88

Spain 0.83 0.78 1 0.63 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.93 0.87


(continued)

(continued)



Economy How

arb

itrat

ion

agre

emen

ts

are

conc

lude

d *

Type

s of a

rbitr

able

disp

utes

*

Econ

omic

defin

ition

of

inte

rnat

iona

l arb

itrat

ion

**

Elem

ents

that

, if f

orei

gn,

mak

e th

e ar

bitra

tion

inte

rnat

iona

l* *

*

Free

dom

of t

he p

artie

s to

choo

se a

rbitr

ator

s*

Free

dom

of t

he p

artie

s to

choo

se fo

reig

n co

unse

ls

Legi

slate

d ar

bitra

tor

inde

pend

ence

Legi

slate

d ar

bitra

tor

impa

rtial

ity

Legi

slate

d us

e of

inte

rim

mea

sure

s by

arbi

trato

rs

Free

dom

of t

he p

artie

s to

choo

se th

e m

odal

ity o

f the

ar

bitra

tion

proc

eedi

ngs *

AMD

2 on

the

ease

of

initi

atin

g an

d co

nduc

ting

arbi

tratio

n pr

ocee

ding

s - S

core

United Kingdom 1 1 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1.00

United States 1 0.89 N/A N/A 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.74


Afghanistan 0.33 0.89 1 0.88 0.50 0 1 1 0 0.57 0.62

Bangladesh 0.67 0.56 0 0.75 1 0 1 1 0.5 1 0.65

India 0.67 0.56 0 0.38 0.88 1 1 1 0.5 0.86 0.68

Nepal 0.67 0.50 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.71 0.86

Pakistan 0.67 0.67 0 0.25 1 1 0.5 0 0.5 0.58 0.52

Sri Lanka 0.50 0.67 N/A N/A 1 0 1 1 1 0.71 0.74


Angola 0.67 0.89 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.96

Burkina Faso 0.67 0.89 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.93

Burundi 1 1 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.98

Cameroon 0.67 0.89 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.93

Chad 0.67 1 N/A N/A 1 No data 1 1 1 0.86 0.93

Congo, D.R. 0.67 0.67 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.90

Côte d’Ivoire 0.67 1 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.71 0.92

Ethiopia 0.33 0.89 N/A N/A 0.75 0 1 1 1 1 0.75

Ghana 0.67 0.78 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.93

Kenya 0.67 0.67 0 0.63 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.75

Madagascar 0.67 0.89 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.91

Mali 0.50 0.89 N/A N/A 0.75 No data 1 1 1 0.86 0.86

Mauritius 0.67 0.89 0 0.38 1 0.5 1 1 0 0.64 0.61

Mozambique 0.67 0.67 1 0.88 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.79 0.85

Nigeria 0.67 0.67 0 0.75 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 0.76

Rwanda 0.67 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.97

Senegal 0.67 1 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 0.86 0.94

Sierra Leone 0.67 0.56 N/A N/A 1 1 0 0 0 0.00 0.40

South Africa 0.67 1 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.96

Tanzania 0.67 0.89 0 0.13 0.63 1 0.5 1 0.5 0.62 0.59

Uganda 0.67 1 N/A N/A 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.96

Zambia 1 0.67 N/A N/A 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.83



(continued)


AM

D 3

on

the

ease

of

reco

gnit

ion

and

enfo

rcem

ent

of f

orei

gn a

rbit

ral a

war

ds -

Dat

a an

d Sc

ore

Econ

omy

Specialized court for arbitration cases

Possible appeal against a judgement on an arbitration agreement or award

Courts decline to hear a case where there is valid arbitration agreement

Courts control only the validity of the arbitration agreement and not the merits of the case

Recognition of the principle of kompetenz-kompetenz

Possibility for the courts to appoint an arbitrator when a party is defaulting

Possibility for the courts to assist during arbitration proceedings by ordering: the production of documents; the appearance of witnesses or the appearance of experts *

In practice, courts issuing injunctions to assist the arbitration process

Possibility for the courts to order interim measures to assist the arbitration process

In practice, courts ordering interim measures to assist the arbitration process

Possibility for a party to request enforcement of an arbitral award granting interim relief

Existence of a specialized court for the recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral awards

In practice, courts apply the New York Convention

In practice, courts favorable to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards

AMD 3 on the ease of recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards - Score

Brun

ei D

arus

sala

m0

11

11

01

11

11

01

10.

79

Cam

bodi

a1

11

01

11

11

11

01

00.

79

Hong

Kon

g SA

R (C

hina

)1

11

11

11

11

11

11

11

Indo

nesia

01

11

11

00

00.

50.

50

10

0.50

Mal

aysia

01

10

11

11

11

10

11

0.79

Papu

a N

ew G

uine

a1

No d

ata

10

No d

ata

11

No d

ata

No d

ata

1No

dat

a0

No d

ata

00.

63

Phili

ppin

es0

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

86

Sing

apor

e0

11

11

01

11

11

01

10.

79

Taiw

an, C

hina

01

11

10.

50.

50

0.25

0.5

00

01

0.48

Thai

land

01

10

11

11

11

10

01

0.71

Viet

nam

01

11

11

11

11

10

10

0.79

East

Asia

/Pac

ific

Regi

onal

Ave

rage

0.74

Alba

nia

01

11

11

10

11

11

11

0.86

Arm

enia

11

11

11

11

11

10

11

0.93

Azer

baija

n1

01

11

11

11

11

10

10.

86

Bela

rus

11

11

10

0.67

01

11

01

10.

76

Bosn

ia a

nd H

erze

govi

na1

11

11

11

01

11

00

00.

71

Bulg

aria

11

01

10

0.5

01

11

01

10.

68

Croa

tia1

11

01

11

11

0.5

10

11

0.82

Cypr

us0

11

11

11

10.

751

10

11

0.84

Geor

gia

10

11

11

11

0.5

11

11

10.

89

Kaza

khst

an0

11

11

00.

51

11

11

11

0.82

NB:

The

dat

a pr

esen

ted

shou

ld b

e re

ad a

s:”1=

yes”

and

“0=n

o”. T

he fi

nal s

core

is a

n av

erag

e of

eac

h da

ta p

oint

.*

Aver

age

of th

e sc

ores

colle

cted

for e

ach

sub-

ques

tion

(con

tinue

d)


(con

tinue

d)

AM

D 3

on

the

ease

of

reco

gnit

ion

and

enfo

rcem

ent

of f

orei

gn a

rbit

ral a

war

ds -

Dat

a an

d Sc

ore

Econ

omy
















Koso

vo1

11

11

11

11

11

10

10.

93

Kyrg

yz R

epub

lic1

11

11

00

00

11

11

10.

71

Mac

edon

ia1

1

11

11

11

11

01

10.

92

Mol

dova

11

11

11

10

11

No d

ata

1No

dat

a1

0.92

Mon

tene

gro

01

10

11

0.67

01

11

11

10.

76

Pola

nd0

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

86

Rom

ania

01

10

11

11

11

10

11

0.79

Russ

ian

Fede

ratio

n0

11

11

00

11

10

11

10.

71

Serb

ia1

11

01

11

11

11

11

10.

93

Turk

ey0

11

01

11

11

11

01

10.

79

Ukra

ine

01

11

10

0.17

00

0.5

00

11

0.48

Euro

pe/C

entra

l Asia

Reg

iona

l Ave

rage

0.81

Arge

ntin

a0

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

86

Boliv

ia0

01

11

11

10

11

11

00.

71

Braz

il0

11

11

11

10.

51

11

11

0.89

Chile

11

11

11

11

11

10

11

0.93

Colo

mbi

a0

11

11

10

00

0.5

11

11

0.68

Cost

a Ri

ca1

11

0.5

10.

50.1

70.

51

11

11

10.

83

Dom

inica

n Re

publ

ic0

11

11

11

10.

51

10

11

0.82

Ecua

dor

00

11

10

00

10.

51

01

10.

54

Guat

emal

a1

01

11

11

01

0.5

10

11

0.75

Haiti

01

11

No d

ata

No d

ata

0No

dat

a1

No d

ata

No d

ata

0

10.

63

NB:

The

dat

a pr

esen

ted

shou

ld b

e re

ad a

s:”1=

yes”

and

“0=n

o”. T

he fi

nal s

core

is a

n av

erag

e of

eac

h da

ta p

oint

.*

Aver

age

of th

e sc

ores

colle

cted

for e

ach

sub-

ques

tion

(con

tinue

d)


AM

D 3

on

the

ease

of

reco

gnit

ion

and

enfo

rcem

ent

of f

orei

gn a

rbit

ral a

war

ds -

Dat

a an

d Sc

ore

Econ

omy
















Hond

uras

01

11

10

11

11

11

11

0.86

Mex

ico0

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

86

Nica

ragu

a0

11

11

10

01

11

11

10.

79

Peru

10

11

10

11

0.75

11

11

10.

84

Vene

zuel

a0

11

11

11

01

11

01

10.

79

Latin

Am

erica

/Car

ib. R

egio

nal A

vera

ge0.

78

Alge

ria0

10.

51

0.5

11

01

11

01

10.

71

Egyp

t1

00.

51

11

11

11

10

11

0.82

Iraq

01

11

11

0.33

11

10

00

00.

60

Jord

an1

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

93

Mor

occo

01

11

11

00

11

10

11

0.71

Saud

i Ara

bia

11

10

01

11

11

10

10

0.71

Tuni

sia1

11

11

11

0.5

0.75

11

11

10.

95

Yem

en0

11

11

11

01

11

0

10.

77

Mid

dle

East

/N. A

frica

Reg

iona

l Ave

rage

0.78

Aust

ralia

01

11

10.

51

11

11

01

10.

82

Aust

ria1

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

93

Cana

da0

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

86

Czec

h Re

publ

ic0

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

86

Fran

ce1

11

11

11

10.

51

10

11

0.89

Germ

any

11

11

11

11

11

11

11

1

Gree

ce1

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

93

NB:

The

dat

a pr

esen

ted

shou

ld b

e re

ad a

s:”1=

yes”

and

“0=n

o”. T

he fi

nal s

core

is a

n av

erag

e of

eac

h da

ta p

oint

.*

Aver

age

of th

e sc

ores

colle

cted

for e

ach

sub-

ques

tion

(con

tinue

d)

(con

tinue

d)


(con

tinue

d)

AM

D 3

on

the

ease

of

reco

gnit

ion

and

enfo

rcem

ent

of f

orei

gn a

rbit

ral a

war

ds -

Dat

a an

d Sc

ore

Econ

omy
















Irela

nd1

01

11

11

11

11

01

10.

86

Italy

01

11

11

0.33

01

10

01

10.

67

Japa

n0

11

11

11

11

11

00

10.

79

Kore

a0

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

86

Net

herla

nds

01

11

11

10

11

10

11

0.79

New

Zea

land

11

11

11

11

11

10

01

0.86

Slov

ak R

epub

lic0

11

No d

ata

11

11

0.5

11

01

10.

81

Spai

n1

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

93

Unite

d Ki

ngdo

m1

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

93

Unite

d St

ates

01

11

11

11

11

10

11

0.86

High

Inco

me

OEC

D Re

gion

al A

vera

ge0.

86

Afgh

anist

an1

00

0No

dat

a1

1No

dat

a1

0.5

00

No d

ata

No d

ata

0.45

Bang

lade

sh1

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

93

Indi

a0

11

11

11

11

11

00

10.

79

Nep

al0

11

11

11

00

11

0No

dat

aNo

dat

a0.

67

Paki

stan

01

11

01

11

11

11

10

0.79

Sri L

anka

11

10

11

11

11

10

01

0.79

Sout

h As

ia R

egio

nal A

vera

ge0.

73

Ango

la0

11

11

11

10.

51

10

00

0.68

Burk

ina

Faso

01

11

11

1No

dat

a1

11

01

10.

85

Buru

ndi

10

10

No d

ata

00

0No

dat

a1

10

01

0.42

Cam

eroo

n1

11

11

11

No d

ata

11

10

11

0.92

NB:

The

dat

a pr

esen

ted

shou

ld b

e re

ad a

s:”1=

yes”

and

“0=n

o”. T

he fi

nal s

core

is a

n av

erag

e of

eac

h da

ta p

oint

.*

Aver

age

of th

e sc

ores

colle

cted

for e

ach

sub-

ques

tion

(con

tinue

d)


AM

D 3

on

the

ease

of

reco

gnit

ion

and

enfo

rcem

ent

of f

orei

gn a

rbit

ral a

war

ds -

Dat

a an

d Sc

ore

Econ

omy
















Chad

0

11

11

10

11

No d

ata

00

10.

67

Cong

o, D

.R.

01

11

11

11

11

10

01

0.79

Côte

d’Iv

oire

11

10

11

11

11

10

10

0.79

Ethi

opia

01

11

11

11

11

10

01

0.79

Ghan

a1

11

11

11

11

11

01

10.

93

Keny

a1

11

01

11

11

11

01

10.

86

Mad

agas

car

11

11

01

10

11

10

11

0.79

Mal

i0

01

11

11

01

11

01

10.

71

Mau

ritiu

s1

11

01

11

10.

51

11

11

0.89

Moz

ambi

que

11

11

11

10

10.

51

10

10.

82

Nig

eria

01

11

11

11

11

10

11

0.86

Rwan

da0

11

11

11

01

0.5

10

11

0.75

Sene

gal

11

11

11

10

11

10

11

0.86

Sier

ra L

eone

11

11

No d

ata

11

00

10

0No

dat

a1

0.67

Sout

h Af

rica

01

11

11

11

11

10

11

0.86

Tanz

ania

11

0.5

00.

51

11

11

No d

ata

01

10.

77

Ugan

da1

11

11

11

11

11

01

00.

86

Zam

bia

11

10

11

11

11

10

11

0.86

Sub-

Saha

ran

Afric

a Re

gion

al A

vera

ge0.

79

NB:

The

dat

a pr

esen

ted

shou

ld b

e re

ad a

s:”1=

yes”

and

“0=n

o”. T

he fi

nal s

core

is a

n av

erag

e of

eac

h da

ta p

oint

.*

Aver

age

of th

e sc

ores

colle

cted

for e

ach

sub-

ques

tion

(con

tinue

d)


Average of AMD 1, 2 and 3

Economy Average of AMD 1, AMD 2 and AMD 3

Brunei Darussalam 0.69

Cambodia 0.67

Hong Kong SAR (China) 0.92

Indonesia 0.63

Malaysia 0.73

Papua New Guinea 0.51

Philippines 0.84

Singapore 0.76

Taiwan, China 0.58

Thailand 0.66

Vietnam 0.78


Albania 0.70

Armenia 0.79

Azerbaijan 0.76

Belarus 0.78

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.58

Bulgaria 0.80

Croatia 0.74

Cyprus 0.73

Georgia 0.82

Kazakhstan 0.74

Kosovo 0.83

Kyrgyz Republic 0.76

Macedonia 0.87

Moldova 0.79

Montenegro 0.63

Poland 0.84

Romania 0.80

Russian Federation 0.79

Serbia 0.81

Turkey 0.70

Ukraine 0.61


Argentina 0.62

Bolivia 0.65

Brazil 0.76

Chile 0.80

Colombia 0.74

Costa Rica 0.74

Dominican Republic 0.77

Ecuador 0.56

Guatemala 0.54

Haiti 0.71


Honduras 0.75

Mexico 0.83

Nicaragua 0.81

Peru 0.69

Venezuela 0.75


Algeria 0.62

Egypt 0.71

Iraq 0.44

Jordan 0.85

Morocco 0.71

Saudi Arabia 0.57

Tunisia 0.79

Yemen 0.73


Australia 0.77

Austria 0.86

Canada 0.84

Czech Republic 0.84

France 0.80

Germany 0.93

Greece 0.81

Ireland 0.73

Italy 0.74

Japan 0.76

Korea 0.74

Netherlands 0.87

New Zealand 0.79

Slovak Republic 0.87

Spain 0.84

United Kingdom 0.92

United States 0.74


Afghanistan 0.55

Bangladesh 0.80

India 0.82

Nepal 0.73

Pakistan 0.65

Sri Lanka 0.78


Angola 0.68

Burkina Faso 0.80

Burundi 0.57

Cameroon 0.86

(continued)


Average of AMD 1, 2 and 3


Brunei Darussalam 0.69

Cambodia 0.67

Hong Kong SAR (China) 0.92

Indonesia 0.63

Malaysia 0.73

Papua New Guinea 0.51

Philippines 0.84

Singapore 0.76

Taiwan, China 0.58

Thailand 0.66

Vietnam 0.78


Albania 0.70

Armenia 0.79

Azerbaijan 0.76

Belarus 0.78

Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.58

Bulgaria 0.80

Croatia 0.74

Cyprus 0.73

Georgia 0.82

Kazakhstan 0.74

Kosovo 0.83

Kyrgyz Republic 0.76

Macedonia 0.87

Moldova 0.79

Montenegro 0.63

Poland 0.84

Romania 0.80

Russian Federation 0.79

Serbia 0.81

Turkey 0.70

Ukraine 0.61


Argentina 0.62

Bolivia 0.65

Brazil 0.76

Chile 0.80

Colombia 0.74

Costa Rica 0.74

Dominican Republic 0.77

Ecuador 0.56

Guatemala 0.54

Haiti 0.71


Honduras 0.75

Mexico 0.83

Nicaragua 0.81

Peru 0.69

Venezuela 0.75


Algeria 0.62

Egypt 0.71

Iraq 0.44

Jordan 0.85

Morocco 0.71

Saudi Arabia 0.57

Tunisia 0.79

Yemen 0.73


Australia 0.77

Austria 0.86

Canada 0.84

Czech Republic 0.84

France 0.80

Germany 0.93

Greece 0.81

Ireland 0.73

Italy 0.74

Japan 0.76

Korea 0.74

Netherlands 0.87

New Zealand 0.79

Slovak Republic 0.87

Spain 0.84

United Kingdom 0.92

United States 0.74


Afghanistan 0.55

Bangladesh 0.80

India 0.82

Nepal 0.73

Pakistan 0.65

Sri Lanka 0.78


Angola 0.68

Burkina Faso 0.80

Burundi 0.57

Cameroon 0.86

(continued)

(continued)



Chad 0.65

Congo, D.R. 0.74

Côte d’Ivoire 0.78

Ethiopia 0.61

Ghana 0.84

Kenya 0.78

Madagascar 0.75

Mali 0.74

Mauritius 0.75

Mozambique 0.83

Nigeria 0.79

Rwanda 0.79

Senegal 0.81

Sierra Leone 0.51

South Africa 0.85

Tanzania 0.67

Uganda 0.83

Zambia 0.75


Average of AMD 1, 2 and 3 (continued)


AMD data on the length of arbitration proceedings and of recognition and enforcement proceedings

Economy

AMD length of arbitration proceedings

(# days)

AMD length of recognition and

enforcement proceedings

(# days)

Cambodia 90 75

Hong Kong (SAR) 361 83

Indonesia 200 773

Malaysia 482 353

Philippines 278 281

Singapore 336 47

Taiwan, China 259 479

Thailand 450 No data

Vietnam 154 93

East Asia/Pacific Regional Average 290 273

Albania 210 292

Armenia 118 153

Azerbaidjan 337 615

Belarus 213 1168

Bosnia and Herzegovina 232 204

Bulgaria 241 551

Croatia 679 869

Cyprus 347 706

Georgia 212 No data

Kazakhstan 196 No data

Kosovo 74 No data

Kyrgyz Republic 89 No data

Macedonia 164 No data

Moldova 180 No data

Montenegro 313 818

Poland 304 143

Romania 294 365

Russian Federation 119 138

Serbia 325 678

Turkey 449 625

Ukraine 141 598

Europe/Central Asia Regional Average 249 528

Argentina 343 395

Bolivia 228 221

Brazil 560 2,325

Chile 496 592

Colombia 316 917

Costa Rica 162 433

Dominican Republic 185 616

Ecuador 320 320

Guatemala 341 No data

Honduras 112 336

Mexico 254 521

Nicaragua 116 157

Peru 317 752

Economy

AMD length of arbitration proceedings

(# days)

AMD length of recognition and

enforcement proceedings

(# days)

Venezuela 246 567

Latin America/Carib. Reg. Average 285 627

Egypt 540 247

Iraq 910 No data

Jordan 435 448

Morocco 226 No data

Saudi Arabia 229 906

Tunisia 249 300

Yemen 280 No data

Middle East/N. Africa Reg. Average 410 475

Austria 410 410

Canada 495 77

Czech Republic 158 477

France 386 116

Germany 332 128

Greece 377 482

Ireland 238 126

Italy 385 527

Japan 289 96

Korea 252 494

Netherlands 281 400

New Zealand 340 No data

Slovak Republic 355 68

Spain 226 345

United Kingdom 431 397

United States 403 388

High Income OECD Regional Average 335 302

Bangladesh 278 836

India 569 1654

Pakistan 479 5610

South Asia Regional Average 442 2700

Congo, D.R. 307 No data

Ethiopia 571 No data

Kenya 172 No data

Mali 525 No data

Mauritius 526 155

Mozambique 536 No data

Nigeria 521 523

Senegal 201 No data

South Africa 528 1178

Tanzania 515 196

Uganda 583 No data

Zambia No data 217

Sub-Saharan Africa Regional Average 453 454


Contributors

GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTRIBUTORS AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA)

BAKER & MCKENZIE

DELOITTE

DLA PIPER

ERNST & YOUNG

GIDE LOYRETTE & NOUEL

JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

KPMG

MAYER BROWN

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (PWC)

SALANS

TALAL ABU-GHAZALEH LEGAL

WHITE & CASE

WOLF THEISS

WORLD LAW GROUP

AFGHANISTANAbdul Basir BaktashAFGHANISTAN INVESTMENT SUPPORT AGENCY

ALBANIAJonida Braja (Melani)WOLF THEISS RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Eniana DupiAECO. CONSULTING

Dorant EkmekçiuHOXHA, MEMI & HOXHA

Valbona GjoncariBOGA & ASSOCIATES

Elona HoxhajBOGA & ASSOCIATES

Alexandros KarakitisERNST & YOUNG ALBANIA

Denita KatragjiniAPICELLA & PARTNERS

Jonida LakuriqiERNST & YOUNG ALBANIA

Fatos LazimiKALO & ASSOCIATES

Florian PiperiOPTIMA LEGAL & FINANCIAL

Alban RuliDRAKOPOULOS LAW FIRM

Gerti TartaleDRAKOPOULOS LAW FIRM

Mario VangjeliDELOITTE ALBANIA

Gerhard VelajBOGA & ASSOCIATES

ALGERIA Adnane BouchaibBOUCHAIB LAW FIRM

Ahmed DjouadiDJOUADI & HAMOU LAW FIRM

Abdelkader HabibiHABIBI LAW FIRM

Amine SatorC.M.S. BUREAU FRANCIS LEFEBVRE

Mostefa TraritaniUNIVERSITÉ D’ORAN, FACULTÉ DE DROIT

CABINET HERICHE

ANGOLAMaria Manuela CunhaMARIA MANUELA MORAIS CUNHA ADVOGADOS

Itweva NogueiraCFRA | ADVOGADOS ASSOCIADOS

Nair PitraCFRA | ADVOGADOS ASSOCIADOS

Candice SaraivaMaria Manuela Morais Cunha Advogados

GABINETE LEGAL ANGOLA ADROGADOS

ARGENTINARicardo Barreiro DeymonnazRATTAGAN, MACCHIAVELLO, AROCENA & PEÑA ROBIROSA

Alejandro Juan Pablo BreitNEGRI & TEIJEIRO LAW FIRM

Federico CampolietiM. & M. BOMCHIL

Leandro CaputoBRUCHOU, FERNANDEZ MADERO & LOMBARDI

Pedro Luis de la FuenteRATTAGAN, MACCHIAVELLO, AROCENA & PEÑA ROBIROSA

Juan Pablo De LucaRATTAGAN, MACCHIAVELLO, AROCENA & PEÑA ROBIROSA

Mariano FabrizioDFG ABOGADOS

Gonzalo García DelatourESTUDIO BECCAR VARELA

Monica LupiSANCHEZ, LUPI & ASSOCIATES

Ignacio Minorini LimaMARVAL, O’FARRELL & MAIRAL

Gonzalo SanchezSANCHEZ, LUPI & ASSOCIATES

Octavio SillittiDFG ABOGADOS

Santiago SoriaMARVAL, O’FARRELL & MAIRAL

Pablo StaszewskiSTASZEWSKI & ASOC

Guido Santiago TawilM. & M. BOMCHIL

Emilio VogeliusESTUDIO BECCAR VARELA

ALFARO ABOGADOS

ESTUDIO MOLTEDO

ARMENIASayad BadalyanINVESTMENT LAW GROUP

Arshak KarapetyanINVESTMENT LAW GROUP

Edith KhachatourianINTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSULTING (ILC)

Naira MeliksetyanAMERICAN UNIVERSITY OF ARMENIA

Suren PetrosyanINTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSULTING (ILC)

David SargsyanAMERIA C.J.S.C.

Liana VoskerchyanGRIGORYAN & PARTNERS LAW FIRM

ARMENIAN DEVELOPMENT AGENCY

AUSTRALIARobert ClarkeALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON

Tim MaxwellALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON

Rachel NicolsonALLENS ARTHUR ROBINSON

Robert ReganCORRS CHAMBERS WESTGARTH

Cameron ScholesCORRS CHAMBERS WESTGARTH

AUSTRALIAN INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES CENTRE (AIDC)

FREEHILLS

AUSTRIAGünther J. HorvathFRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP

Matthias BrzezinskiWOLF THEISS RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Alexander ForsterC.M.S. REICH - ROHRWIG HAINZ RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Anne-Karin GrillBINDER GRÖSSWANG RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Christian HerbstSCHOENHERR RECHTSANWAELTE GMBH

Christian KlauseggerBINDER GRÖSSWANG RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Christoph LiebscherWOLF THEISS RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Barbara Helene SteindlBRAUNEIS KLAUSER PRÄNDL RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Carmen ThorntonC.M.S. REICH - ROHRWIG HAINZ RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

Eva WiesingerFRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP

Alma ZadicFRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP

Dieter ZandlerC.M.S. REICH - ROHRWIG HAINZ RECHTSANWÄLTE GMBH

AUSTRIAN BUSINESS AGENCY

AZERBAIJANSharafat AhmadliDELOITTE & TOUCHE LLC

Rashid AliyevBAKER & MCKENZIE (BAKU)

Elnur AliyevBHM BAKU LAW CENTRE

Anar BaghirovBHM BAKU LAW CENTRE

Natavan BaghirovaBM INTERNATIONAL LLC

Arzu HajiyevaERNST & YOUNG HOLDINGS (CIS) B.V.

James HoganSALANS UK LIMITED (AZERBAIJAN BRANCH)

Ruhiyya IsayevaSALANS UK LIMITED (AZERBAIJAN BRANCH)

Nuran KerimovDELOITTE & TOUCHE LLC

Vugar MammadovDELOITTE & TOUCHE LLC

Mustafa SalamovBM INTERNATIONAL LLC

Turkan YusibovaBAKER & MCKENZIE (BAKU)

BANGLADESHGalib Al-NahiyanSHAWN NOVEL & ASSOCIATES

Shamsud DoulahDOULAH & DOULAH

Anamul KabirAF KABIR & ASSOCIATES

Ishrat NabilaSHAWN NOVEL & ASSOCIATES

Shawn NovelSHAWN NOVEL & ASSOCIATES

BELARUSKira BondarevaVLASOVA MIKHEL AND PARTNERS LLC

Elena HmelevaBUSINESSCONSULT LAW FIRM

Natallia KazlouskayaCIERECH, NEVIADOUSKI & PARTNERS

Alexander KhrapoutskiSTEPANOVSKI, PAPAKUL & PARTNERS

Sergei MakarchukCERHA HEMPEL SPIEGELFELD HLAWATI

Uladzimir NescierKPMG LLC (BELARUS)

Tatiana OstrovskayaKPMG LLC (BELARUS)

Volha ParfenchykCERHA HEMPEL SPIEGELFELD HLAWATI

Tamara SakolchykSORAINEN & PARTNERS FLLC

Dennis TurovetsEGOROV, PUGINSKY, AFANASIEV & PARTNERS

Maryia YahoravaEGOROV, PUGINSKY, AFANASIEV & PARTNERS

Maria Yurieva SORAINEN & PARTNERS FLLC

BOLIVIAEnrique BarriosGUEVARA & GUTIERREZ S.C.

Mauricio Becerra de la Roca DonosoBECERRA DE LA ROCA DONOSO & ASOCIADOS (BDA ABOGADOS)

Ramiro Moreno BaldiviesoMORENO BALDIVIESO LAW FIRM

Carlos MostajoMOSTAJO SOCIEDAD CIVIL - FIRMA LEGAL

Denise MostajoMOSTAJO SOCIEDAD CIVIL - FIRMA LEGAL

Sergio MostajoMOSTAJO SOCIEDAD CIVIL - FIRMA LEGAL

Claudia PaccieriCONCILIATION AND COMMERCE ARBITRATION CENTER (CAINCO)

Alejandro PelaezINDACOCHEA & ASOCIADOS, ABOGADOS

Fernando Rodriguez MendozaCONSULTORA JURIDICA RODRIGUEZ MENDOZA SOC. CIV.

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS S.R.L.

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINAMubera BrkovicPRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

Sabina CelikPRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS

Femil urtFEMIL URT LAW FIRM

Visnja DizdarevicMARIC & CO

Dina Durakovi -MorankiWOLF THEISS

Nusmir HuskicMARIC & CO

Nevena JevremoviWOLF THEISS

FOREIGN INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY

BRAZILAndre AbbudBARBOSA, MÜSSNICH & ARAGÃO ADVOGADOS

Letícia Barbosa e Silva AbdallaWALD E ASSOCIADOS ADVOGADOS

Antonio Barbuto NetoTOZZINI FREIRE ADVOGADOS

Luciano Benetti TimmCARVALHO, MACHADO, TIMM & DEFFENTI ADVOGADOS

Eliane CarvalhoMACHADO, MEYER, SENDACZ, OPICE ADVOGADOS (MMSO)

Fabiano DeffentiCARVALHO, MACHADO, TIMM & DEFFENTI ADVOGADOS

Renato Fernandes CoutinhoLOBO & DE RIZZO ADVOGADOS

Ana Gerdau de BorjaWALD E ASSOCIADOS ADVOGADOS

Gilberto GiustiPINHEIRO NETO ADVOGADOS

Renato GrionPINHEIRO NETO ADVOGADOS

Ana Paula Hubinger AraujoLOBO & DE RIZZO ADVOGADOS

Gustavo KuleszaBARBOSA, MÜSSNICH & ARAGÃO ADVOGADOS

Giovanni NanniTOZZINI FREIRE ADVOGADOS

Rafael PassaroMACHADO, MEYER, SENDACZ, OPICE ADVOGADOS (MMSO)

Fernando Eduardo SerecTOZZINI FREIRE ADVOGADOS


Rafael SoaresMACHADO, MEYER, SENDACZ, OPICE ADVOGADOS (MMSO)

Jorge Vargas NetoPINHEIRO NETO ADVOGADOS

Arnoldo WaldWALD E ASSOCIADOS ADVOGADOS

BRUNEI DARUSSALAMAhmad Jefri Abd. RahmanATTORNEY GENERAL’S CHAMBERS

BULGARIA Anton AndreevANDREEV, STOYANOV & TSEKOVA

Metodi BaykushevDIMITROV, PETROV & CO LAW FIRM

Kina ChuturkovaBOYANOV & CO. LAW FIRM

Assen GeorgievCMS CAMERON MCKENNA LLP - BULGARIA BRANCH/DUNCAN WESTON

Milena GinevaI.K.ROKAS & PARTNERS LAW FIRM - BRANCH BULGARIA IOANNIS ROKAS

Velyana HristovaPENKOV, MARKOV & PARTNERS - ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Dimitar KarabelovDIMITROV, PETROV & CO LAW FIRM

Ilya KomarevskiTSVETKOVA, BEBOV AND PARTNERS, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW, A PWC CONNECTED LAW FIRM

Ivan LutskanovKPMG BULGARIA

Ivan MarkovPENKOV, MARKOV & PARTNERS - ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Juliana MateevaKPMG BULGARIA

Boyana MilchevaDIMITROV, PETROV & CO LAW FIRM

Galina NenchevaYORDANOVA, RIZOVA & PARTNERS

Diana PashovaBOYANOV & CO. LAW FIRM

Vladimir PenkovPENKOV, MARKOV & PARTNERS - ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Milena RizovaYORDANOVA, RIZOVA & PARTNERS

Yavor RuskovYORDANOVA, RIZOVA & PARTNERS

Lyubomir TalevI.K.ROKAS & PARTNERS LAW FIRM - BRANCH BULGARIA IOANNIS ROKAS

Ralitza TihovaI.K.ROKAS & PARTNERS LAW FIRM - BRANCH BULGARIA IOANNIS ROKAS

SCHÖNHERR RECHTSANWÄLTE

BURKINA FASOBoli BintouCENTRE D’ARBITRAGE DE MÉDIATION ET DE CONCILIATION DE OUAGADOUGOU

JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

BURUNDIDéo Nitereka

Gustave Niyonzima

JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

CAMBODIAOlivier KryDFDL MEKONG LEGAL & TAX ADVISERS

Vathana SarDFDL MEKONG LEGAL & TAX ADVISERS

CAMEROONDavid Etah AkohETAH - NAN & C (ATTORNEYS)

Henri Pierre JobHENRI JOB LAW FIRM

Gaston Kenfack Douajni

Reagan Mboule EsoneHENRI JOB LAW FIRM

Sadjo OusmanouCENTRE PERMANENT D’ARBITRAGE ET DE MÉDIATION DU CADEV

Charline Patricia Wandjou NgatchaETAH - NAN & C (ATTORNEYS)

JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

CANADAHenri AlvarezFASKEN MARTINEAU DUMOULIN LLP

Christina BeharryFOLEY HOAG LLP

Young ParkFRASER MILNER CASGRAIN LLP

Rahim PunjaniFRASNER MILNER CASGRAIN LLP

INVEST IN CANADA

CHADKossi Mangua NabiaFECMA AUDIT FIRM

JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

CHILEFélix AntolínBOFILL MIR & ÁLVAREZ JANA ABOGADOS

Charles BunceERNST & YOUNG LTDA. CHILE

Gonzalo CorderoMORALES & BESA LTDA.

Ines de Ros C. Ramon DominguezNOGUERA LARRAIN & DULANTO

Felipe FriasNOGUERA LARRAIN & DULANTO

Rodrigo GilBOFILL MIR & ÁLVAREZ JANA ABOGADOS

Paulo LarrainNOGUERA LARRAIN & DULANTO

Cristián LefevreERNST & YOUNG LTDA.

Antonio LopezMORALES & BESA LTDA.

Federico Santa María RojasCARIOLA, DIEZ, PÉREZ-COTAPOS Y CÍA. LTDA

Kiara SpoererERNST & YOUNG LTDA.

Mónica van der Schraft GreveCARIOLA, DIEZ, PÉREZ-COTAPOS Y CÍA. LTDA

Karen Werner FerisCARIOLA, DIEZ, PÉREZ-COTAPOS Y CÍA. LTDA

COLOMBIAEnrique AlvarezLLOREDA CAMACHO & CO.

Pedro AlvarezPOSSE HERRERA RUIZ

Mario Andrade PerillaDELOITTE

Carlos Gustavo ArrietaARRIETA MANTILLA & ASOCIADOS

Marcela BlancoDIAZ, REUS & TARG LLP

Juan Sebastián CañónPROEXPORT

Michael DiazDIAZ, REUS & TARG LLP

Alfredo LewinLEWIN Y WILLS

Nicolás LozadaMINISTRY OF JUSTICE AND LAW (MINISTERIO DE JUSTICIA Y DEL DERECHO)

Fabián MorenoLLOREDA CAMACHO & CO

Mariana NaranjoLLOREDA CAMACHO & CO

Hernando Otero1492 AMERICAS

Carolina PosadaPOSSE HERRERA RUIZ

Santiago WillsLEWIN Y WILLS

CONGO, DEM. REP.Grégoire Bakandeja wa MpunguUNIVERSITÉ DE KINSHASA, UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DU CONGO, UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 - SORBONNE

Nicaise ChikuruCHIKURU & ASSOCIÉS, AVOCATS/LAWYERS

Kolongele EberandeUNIVERSITÉ DE KINSHASA ET UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DU CONGO

Ndela Kubokoso

David Luboya KayayaEBIC EXPERTISE BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION

COSTA RICARafael E. CañasFACIO ABOGADOS

Roberto EsquivelOLLER ABOGADOS

Freddy FachlerPACHECO COTO

Allan HernandezPACHECO COTO

Aracelly López

Andres MercadoOLLER ABOGADOS

Tomas NassarPACHECO COTO

Sergio PerezLEXINCORP COSTA RICA

Carlos E. Valenciano GóngoraFACIO ABOGADOS

CÔTE D’IVOIREKimbefo OuattaraDELOITTE & TOUCHE CI

Marc WabiDELOITTE & TOUCHE CI

JOHN W FFOOKS & CO

CROATIAIskra BubašVERŠI MARUŠI LAW OFFICE

Ivan ukVUKMIR & ASSOCIATES

Tonka GjoiLAW FIRM GLINSKA & MIŠKOVI LTD.

Josip MarohniLAW FIRM GLINSKA & MIŠKOVI LTD.

Igor MucaloVERŠI MARUŠI LAW OFFICE

Karlo NovoselLAW FIRM KARLO NOVOSEL

Marija PetrovicLAW FIRM DIVJAK, TOPI , BAHTIJAREVI

Danijel PribaniWOLF THEISS ZAGREB BRANCH

Boris ŠavoriŠAVORI & PARTNERS, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Toni Smr ekŠAVORI & PARTNERS, ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Sutvid UglešLAW FIRM DIVJAK, TOPI , BAHTIJAREVI

Melita Verši MarušiVERŠI MARUŠI LAW OFFICE

Mladen VukmirVUKMIR & ASSOCIATES

Ivan ŽupanLAW FIRM KARLO NOVOSEL

DELOITTE

CYPRUSPantelis ChristofidesL. PAPAPHILIPPOU & CO. ADVOCATES AND LEGAL CONSULTANTS

Chrysanthos ChristoforouANDREAS NEOCLEOUS & CO LLC

Costas ChristoforouCYPROMAN SERVICES LIMITED

Marcos DracosCYPRUS EURASIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ARBITRATION CENTER (CEDRAC)

Andri KaraoliKPMG

Chrysseida KleanthousKPMG

Zacharias PalexasCYPRUS EURASIA DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND ARBITRATION CENTER (CEDRAC)

Maria Pilikou Costas TsiridesCYPRUS ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION CENTER

CZECH REPUBLICVladimir AmbruzAMBRUZ & DARK LAW FIRM / DELOITTE LEGAL LAW FIRM

Filip eladníkPETERKA & PARTNERS V.O.S. ADVOKÁTNÍ KANCELÁ

Ji í erný PETERKA & PARTNERS V.O.S. ADVOKÁTNÍ KANCELÁ

Hana Hrbá ováSALANS EUROPE LLP

Ludvik JurickaAMBRUZ & DARK LAW FIRM / DELOITTE LEGAL LAW FIRM

Petr KotábSALANS EUROPE LLP

Lenka NemcovaAMBRUZ & DARK LAW FIRM / DELOITTE LEGAL LAW FIRM

Michal NulicekHOGAN LOVELLS (PRAGUE) LLP

Rostislav PekaSQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY, V.O.S., ADVOKÁTNÍ KANCELÁ

Vladimír Petrá ekWEINHOLD LEGAL, V.O.S.

Dalibor Šime ekWEINHOLD LEGAL, V.O.S.

Kristyna SledrovaHOGAN LOVELLS (PRAGUE) LLP

Martin Špi kaWEINHOLD LEGAL, V.O.S.

Zuzana ValouskovaNORTON ROSE V.O.S., ADVOKÁTNÍ KANCELÁ

DLA PIPER PRAGUE LLP

LAW OFFICES BêLOHLÁVEK

WOLF THEISS

DOMINICAN REPUBLICAmelle OrtizPELLERANO & HERRERA

Luis RivasPELLERANO & HERRERA

RUSSIN, VECCHI & HEREDIA BONETTI

ECUADORJuan Carlos BustamanteBUSTAMANTE & BUSTAMANTE LAW FIRM

Manuel CartagenaDELOITTE

Sandra CevallosPÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE & PONCE, ABOGADOS

Sebastian CortezNOBOA, PEÑA, LARREA & TORRES LAW FIRM

Mario FlorBUSTAMANTE & BUSTAMANTE LAW FIRM

Hugo García LarrivaCENTER OF ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION OF AMCHAM QUITO

Leopoldo GonzálezPAZ HOROWITZ ROBALINO GARCÉS, ABOGADOS

Gonzalo Gonzalez GalarzaGONZALEZ PEÑAHERRERA & ASOCIADOS, ABOGADOS

María de Lourdes MaldonadoTOBAR & BUSTAMANTE

Agustín Mora-BowenTOBAR & BUSTAMANTE

Esteban OrtizPÉREZ, BUSTAMANTE & PONCE, ABOGADOS

Patricio PenaNOBOA, PEÑA, LARREA & TORRES LAW FIRM

Alvaro PolitNOBOA, PEÑA, LARREA & TORRES LAW FIRM

Ana Belen PossoGONZALEZ PEÑAHERRERA & ASOCIADOS, ABOGADOS

Daniel RobalinoPAZ HOROWITZ ROBALINO GARCÉS, ABOGADOS

Francisco RosalesCORRAL & ROSALES, LAW FIRM

María Fernanda Saá-JaramilloBUSTAMANTE & BUSTAMANTE LAW FIRM


EGYPT, ARAB REP.Mohamed Abdel RaoufCAIRO REGIONAL CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (CRCICA)

Arig AliTROWERS & HAMLINS

Sara El ShaarawyDLA MATOUK BASSIOUNY

Laila El ShentenawiCAIRO REGIONAL CENTRE FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (CRCICA)

Eslam El-harmyDLA MATOUK BASSIOUNY

Karim HafezHAFEZ

Rami Sadek

Ismail SelimZULFICAR & PARTNERS LAW FIRM

ETHIOPIATamrat Assefa LibanTAMRAT ASSEFA LIBAN LAW OFFICES

TADESSE LAW FIRM

FRANCEMathias AuditARAGO LAW FIRM

Denis Bensaude

Jean-Georges BettoHOGAN LOVELLS LLP (PARIS)

Sébastien BonnardLACOURTE BALAS RAQUIN

Jean-Michel BriquetERNST & YOUNG SOCIÉTÉ D’AVOCATS

María Beatriz BurghettoHUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP

Adrien CanivetHOGAN LOVELLS LLP

Laurent Cohen-TanugiCABINET DE LAURENT COHEN-TANUGI

Coralie DarrigadeSHEARMAN & STERLING LLP

Laurence Franc-MengetHERBERT SMITH

Jean-Pierre HarbJONES DAY

Emmanuel JacomySHEARMAN & STERLING LLP

Dany KhayatMAYER BROWN

Benoit Le BarsLAZAREFF LE BARS

Hervé Le LayLACOURTE BALAS RAQUIN

Caroline Mercier-HavsteenERNST & YOUNG SOCIÉTÉ D’AVOCATS

José RosellHUGHES HUBBARD & REED LLP

Vanessa ThieffryLAZAREFF LE BARS

ERNST & YOUNG SOCIÉTÉ D’AVOCATS

GEORGIANino BogveradzeKORDZADZE LAW OFFICE LP

Gia GetsadzeGETSADZE & PATEISHVILI LLC

Lasha GogiberidzeBGI ADVISORY SERVICES GEORGIA, LTD (BGI LEGAL)

Eka GordadzeVASHAKIDZE AND BAZERASHVILI ATTORNEYS - VBAT LAW FIRM

Tamar KvintradzeGETSADZE & PATEISHVILI LLC

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Abdulhakeem Tijani AbdulqadirOLANIWUN AJAYI LP

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Alizeh BashirKABRAJI & TALIBUDDIN

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Ursula CaroRUBIO LEGUÍA NORMAND

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Javier de Belaunde Lopez de RomañaESTUDIO ECHECOPAR ATTORNEYS AT LAW

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Leysser LeónESTUDIO FERRERO ABOGADOS - PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD CATÓLICA DEL PERÚ

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Michał JochemczakSalans

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Sylwester PieckowskiChadbourne & Parke LLP Warsaw

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Zizi PopaGILESCU & PARTENERII

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RUSSIAN FEDERATIONTimur AskhadullinWHITE & CASE LLC

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Ho Choon ChiaKHATTARWONG

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DLA PIPER SINGAPORE

SLOVAK REPUBLICMartin abákHILLBRIDGES, S.R.O.

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Martin MagálALLEN & OVERY BRATISLAVA, S.R.O.

Jana Pal ikováWOLF THEISS

Martin ProvazníkBNT ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Andrej SchwarzWOLF THEISS

Rudolf SivakFUTEJ & PARTNERS, S.R.O.

ALLEN & OVERY BRATISLAVA, S.R.O.

SOUTH AFRICADoron BlockEDWARD NATHAN SONNENBERGS INC.

John BrandBOWMAN GILFILLAN INC.

Lloyd ChaterBOWMAN GILFILLAN INC.

Natasha RechBOWMAN GILFILLAN INC.

Tania SteenkampEDWARD NATHAN SONNENBERGS INC.

Roger WakefieldWERKSMANS


SPAINJorge AngellL.C. RODRIGO ABOGADOS

Sandra CajalB. CREMADES & ASOCIADOS

Bernardo M. CremadesB. CREMADES & ASOCIADOS

Alberto Fortún CosteaCUATRECASAS, GONÇALVES PEREIRA

Miguel Ángel Malo ValenzuelaCUATRECASAS, GONÇALVES PEREIRA

Maribel Rodríguez VargasCUATRECASAS, GONÇALVES PEREIRA

Miguel VirgósURÍA MENÉNDEZ

Marta ZamoraL.C. RODRIGO ABOGADOS

PÉREZ-LLORCA ABOGADOS S.L.P. Y CÍA. S.COM.P.

SRI LANKARaneesha de AlwisF. J. & G. DE SARAM, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Avindra RodrigoF. J. & G. DE SARAM, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

TAIWAN, CHINAChun-yih ChengFORMOSA TRANSNATIONAL ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Meng-Ying FangPRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LEGAL

Hsin-Ying KuoPRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LEGAL

Chung Teh LeeLEE, TSAI & PARTNERS, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

(Anita) Yu-Chin LiaoFORMOSA TRANSNATIONAL ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Alan T.L. LinLEE AND LI, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Angela Y. LinLEE AND LI, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

George LinLIN & PARTNERS, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Eric TsaiPRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LEGAL

Yang-Hung WeiLIN & PARTNERS, ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

TANZANIAKarel DaeleMKONO & CO ADVOCATES

Filip TackMKONO & CO ADVOCATES

THAILANDChotiwit NgamsuwanHUNTON AND WILLIAMS (THAILAND) LTD.

James RixMAYER BROWN JSM (THAILAND) LIMITED

Maythawee SarathaiMAYER BROWN JSM (THAILAND) LIMITED

Pakpoom SuntornvipatHUNTON AND WILLIAMS (THAILAND) LTD.

DLA PIPER

TUNISIAMaya BoureghdaJURISMED

Imed ChorfiERNST & YOUNG

Molka Ellouze OssanlouCABINET DONIA HEDDA ELLOUZE

Karim HammamiJURISMED

Donia Hedda EllouzeCABINET DONIA HEDDA ELLOUZE

Mohamed KallelERNST & YOUNG

TURKEYZehra Betül AyrancıMEHMET GUN & PARTNERS

Gökçe Çiçek Balcıo luÖZEL & ÖZEL ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Haluk BilgiçGIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL (WITH CORRESPONDENT FIRM ÖHB)

Bilge BinayBIRSEL LAW OFFICES

Sarper BozHERGÜNER BILGEN ÖZEKE ATTORNEY PARTNERSHIP

Aslı BudakHERGÜNER BILGEN ÖZEKE ATTORNEY PARTNERSHIP

Ali ya Bengi Danı manMEHMET GUN & PARTNERS

Aslı ErsanlıMORO LU ARSEVEN

Can ErtugrulICTEM LEGAL ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Kurtcebe Noyan GöksuHERGÜNER BILGEN ÖZEKE ATTORNEY PARTNERSHIP

Tevfik A. GurGUR LAW FIRM

Göksan GürelÖZEL & ÖZEL ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Gönenç GürkaynakELIG ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Serkan IctemICTEM LEGAL ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

Fulya KazbayBIRSEL LAW OFFICES

Asena Aytu KeserMEHMET GUN & PARTNERS

Mehmet Köso luGIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL (WITH CORRESPONDENT FIRM ÖHB)

S. Tunc LokmanhekimELIG ATTORNEYS AT LAW

Erhan Seyfi Moro luMORO LU ARSEVEN

Ak it Berkay NoyanGIDE LOYRETTE NOUEL (WITH CORRESPONDENT FIRM ÖHB)

Aslı PamukkaleBIRSEL LAW OFFICES

Ferhat PekinPEKIN & BAYAR LAW FIRM

Burcu Tuzcu ErsinMORO LU ARSEVEN

Zeynep UnluturkICTEM LEGAL ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW

UGANDAEnoch Barata

Jackie KatendeJN KIRKLAND AND ASSOCIATES

Hellen MukasaJN KIRKLAND AND ASSOCIATES

Benson Ndung’uKPMG

UKRAINETaras AleshkoBAKER & MCKENZIE - CIS, LIMITED

Olga GlukhovskaEGOROV, PUGINSKY, AFANASIEV & PARTNERS

Andrii GrebonkinCLIFFORD CHANCE LLC

Denys KopiiINTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM INTEGRITES

Yuriy KorchevINTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM INTEGRITES

Volodymyr KutsenkoPJSC “DELOITTE & TOUCHE USC”

Grigory PavlotskyPJSC “DELOITTE & TOUCHE USC”

Olena PerepelynskaSAYENKO KHARENKO

Alexander PoelsPETERKA & PARTNERS LLC

Svitlana RomanovaBAKER & MCKENZIE - CIS, LIMITED

Yaroslava SakhnoAS CONSULTING

Serhii SviribaEGOROV, PUGINSKY, AFANASIEV & PARTNERS

Nina SydorenkoPETERKA & PARTNERS LLC

Andriy TsvyetkovAS CONSULTING

Glib TsvyetkovAS CONSULTING

Anna TyshchenkoINTERNATIONAL LAW FIRM INTEGRITES

Vladimir ZakhvataevSALANS

Julia ZozuliaGRISCHENKO AND PARTNERS

SQUIRE SANDERS

UNITED KINGDOMBenjamin BarratCLIFFORD CHANCE LLP

Oliver BrowneLATHAM & WATKINS

Jennifer BuckbyLATHAM & WATKINS

Lee CoffeyJONES DAY

Antony CrockettCLIFFORD CHANCE LLP

Jamie DrinnanWRAGGE & CO LLP

Susan KennedyLATHAM & WATKINS

Felix Lautenschlager

George MalingNABARRO LLP

Tim SalesNABARRO LLP

Audley SheppardCLIFFORD CHANCE LLP

Camilla ter HaarFIVE PAPER

Stuart YoungWRAGGE & CO LLP

MAYER BROWN INTERNATIONAL LLP

UNITED STATESStephen AnwaySQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY (US) LLP

Jennifer GorskieCHAFFETZ LINDSEY LLP

Jonathan GreenblattSHEARMAN & STERLING LLP

James HoskingCHAFFETZ LINDSEY LLP

David KayDRINKER BIDDLE & REATH LLP

Raúl MañónSQUIRE, SANDERS & DEMPSEY (US) LLP

Christopher RyanSHEARMAN & STERLING LLP

VENEZUELA, RBLuisa Acedo de LepervancheMENDOZA, PALACIOS, ACEDO, BORJAS, PÁEZ PUMAR & CÍA

Ramón AlvinsDESPACHO DE ABOGADOS MIEMBROS DE MACLEOD DIXON S.C

Luis Alfredo Araque BenzoARAQUE REYNA SOSA VISO & ASOCIADOS

Dailyng AyestaránMENDOZA, PALACIOS, ACEDO, BORJAS, PÁEZ PUMAR & CÍA

Milagros Betancourt C.CENTRO EMPRESARIAL DE CONCILIACIÓN Y ARBITRAJE CEDCA

Hernando Diaz-CandiaWDA LEGAL, S.C.

Eugenio Hernández-BretónBAKER & MCKENZIE

Fulvio ItalianiD’EMPAIRE REYNA ABOGADOS

Angélica María Marcano PeñaRODNER, MARTÍNEZ & ASOCIADOS

Rodrigo Moncho StefaniARAQUE REYNA SOSA VISO & ASOCIADOS

Greyza OjedaCENTRO EMPRESARIAL DE CONCILIACIÓN Y ARBITRAJE CEDCA

Pedro Luis Planchart PocaterraARAQUE REYNA SOSA VISO & ASOCIADOS

Eduardo PorcarelliVENEZUELA COUNCIL FOR INVESTMENT PROMOTION - CONAPRI

Melissa PugaVENEZUELA COUNCIL FOR INVESTMENT PROMOTION - CONAPRI

James Otis RodnerRODNER, MARTÍNEZ & ASOCIADOS

Pedro SaghyDESPACHO DE ABOGADOS MIEMBROS DE MACLEOD DIXON S.C

Paula Serra FreireD’EMPAIRE REYNA ABOGADOS

Anhelisa VillarroelVENEZUELA COUNCIL FOR INVESTMENT PROMOTION - CONAPRI

Cristhian ZambranoMENDOZA, PALACIOS, ACEDO, BORJAS, PÁEZ PUMAR & CÍA

VIETNAMQuang Thuan DinhPHUOC & PARTNERS LAW CO., LTD

Kevin HawkinsMAYER BROWN JSM (VIETNAM)

Hang MaiRUSSIN & VECCHI

Viet Hoa NgoRUSSIN & VECCHI

Lang NguyenFRESHFIELDS BRUCKHAUS DERINGER LLP

Thi Minh Phuong NguyenMAYER BROWN JSM (VIETNAM)

Suong Dao NguyenMAYER BROWN JSM (VIETNAM)

FRASERS LAW COMPANY

YEMEN, REP.Adel AldhahabALSANABANI & ALDHAHAB LAW OFFICE

ZAMBIAMulambo HaimbeMALAMBO AND COMPANY


THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 201350 THE WORLD BANK GROUP – OCTOBER 201350