Araneta v DinglasanG.R. No. L-2044 August 26, 1949Tuason, J.:

Facts:1. The petitions challenged the validity of executive orders issued by virtue of CA No. 671 or the Emergency Powers Act. CA 671 declared a state of emergency as a result of war and authorized the President to promulgate rules and regulations to meet such emergency. However, the Act did not fix the duration of its effectivity.

2.EO 62 regulates rentals for houses and lots for residential buildings. The petitioner, Araneta, is under prosecution in the CFI for violation of the provisions of this EO 62 and prays for the issuance of the writ of prohibition.

3.EO 192, aims to control exports from the Philippines. Leon Ma. Guerrero seeks a writ ofmandamusto compel the Administrator of the Sugar Quota Office and the Commissioner of Customs to permit the exportation of shoes. Both officials refuse to issue the required export license on the ground that the exportation of shoes from the Philippines is forbidden by this EO.

4.EO 225, which appropriates funds for the operation of the Government during the period from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and for other purposes was assailed by petitioner Eulogio Rodriguez, Sr., as a tax-payer, elector, and president of the Nacionalista Party. He applied for a writ of prohibition to restrain the Treasurer of the Philippines from disbursing the funds by virtue of this EO.

5. Finally, EO 226, which appropriated P6M to defray the expenses in connection with the national elections in 1949. was questioned by Antonio Barredo, as a citizen, tax-payer and voter. He asked the Court to prevent "the respondents from disbursing, spending or otherwise disposing of that amount or any part of it."

ISSUE: Whether or not CA 671 ceased to have any force and effect

YES.1. The Act fixed a definite limited period. The Court held that it became inoperative when Congress met during the opening of the regular session on May 1946 and that EOs 62, 192, 225 and 226 were issued without authority of law . The session of the Congress is the point of expiration of the Act and not the first special session after it.2. Executive Orders No. 62 (dated June 21, 1947) regulating house and lot rentals, No. 192 (dated December 24, 1948) regulating exports, Nos. 225 and 226 (dated June 15,1949) the first appropriation funds for the operation of the Government from July 1, 1949 to June 30, 1950, and the second appropriating funds for election expenses in November 1949, were therefore declared null and void for having been issued after Act No. 671 had lapsed and/or after the Congress had enacted legislation on the same subjects. This is based on the language of Act 671 that the National Assembly restricted the life of the emergency powers of the President to the time the Legislature was prevented from holding sessions due to enemy action or other causes brought on by the war.

G.R. No. 170139, August 05, 2014SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC.,Petitioner,v.JOY C. CABILES,Respondent.FACTS OF THE CASE:Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan, and signed witha one-year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.The agency required her to pay a placement fee of70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.She was deployed to work in Taiwan for Wacoal, but was given a position as a cutter.Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport.She was asked to prepare for immediate repatriation.Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000.According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.She filed afiled a complaintwith the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner and Wacoal for illegal dismissal.Sameers Defense: Respondents termination was due to her inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her failure to comply with the work requirements [of] her foreign [employer]; The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of NT$70,000.00 (evidenced by an OR bearing NT%20,360.00); Petitioner added that Wacoals accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. (Aug. 06, 1997) thus, obligation is substituted withPacific, which the latter deniedLabor ArbiterRuling: Case is dismissed Rationale: Complaint is based on mere allegations. No excess payment of placement fees, based on the official receipt presented by petitioner Transfer of obligation to Pacific is immaterialNLRC Ruling: Joy is illegally dismissed Reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show that the dismissal was based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer It found that Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for termination. There was no sufficient proof to show that respondent was inefficient in her work and that she failed to comply with company requirements.41Furthermore, procedural due process was not observed in terminating respondent. Did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of placement fees for lack of jurisdiction It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged transfer of obligations to Pacific. It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor Arbiters decision not to rule on the matter.Sameer filed for MR but NLRC dismissed; filed for petition for certiorari at CACARuling: Affirmed NLRCwith respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joys entitlement to the equivalent of three months worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorneys fees. Remanded case to NLRC to addressthe validity of petitioners allegations against Pacific.ISSUE OF THE CASE:1. WONthe Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorneys fees despite the alleged existence of just causes of termination;2. WON therewas a just cause for termination because there was a finding of Wacoal that respondent was inefficient in her work;3. WON Pacific that should now assume responsibility for Wacoals contractual obligations to the workers originally recruited by petitionerSC RULING/RATIONALE:1.) JUST CAUSE: Sameer Overseas Placement Agencys petition is without merit. SCfind for respondent. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joys dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law. Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at work.They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with these standards.59Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.Certainly, employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of an employee who is guilty of acts that are inimical to the interest of the employer.While the law acknowledges the plight and vulnerability of workers, it does not authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the employer.Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence.This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is tempered with the employees right to security of tenure.Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before termination. They may not be removed from employment without a valid or just cause as determined by law and without going through the proper procedure.Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, follow the principle oflex loci contractus. Pinned Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. Thus: Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives;(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. Petitioners allegation that respondent was inefficient in her work and negligent in her dutiesmay, therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only if petitioner was able to prove it. The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. The employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a justifiable cause.Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that:1. the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged;2. the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee; and3. the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employees performance assessment. The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she meets all the standards for employment. Courts should remain vigilant on allegations of the employers failure to communicate work standards that would govern ones employment if [these are] to discharge in good faith [their] duty to adjudicate.2.)DUE PROCESS REQUIREMENT Petitioner failed to comply withthe due process requirement A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal.The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before termination. One of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal.77The other notice must [inform] the employee of the employers decision.Aside from the notice requirement, the employee must also be given an opportunity to be heard.3.)Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorneys fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary. Sec 10 of RA 1082 MONEY CLAIMS SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND The reinstatement of the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondents termination from work in 1997.Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case. Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. SC reiterate theirfinding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of respondents salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would, in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFWs security of tenure which an employment contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law. Respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her money claims from the finality of this judgment.4.) LIABILITIES OF EMPLOYER SCclarify the liabilities of Wacoal as principal and petitioner as the employment agency that facilitated respondents overseas employment. Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer and the local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money claims including claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship and/or damages. This section also provides that the performance bond filed by the local agency shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if they were awarded to the employee. This provision is in line with the states policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating workers plight. The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers have recourse in law despite the circumstances of their employment. By providing that the liability of the foreign employer may be enforced to the full extentagainst the local agent, the overseas worker is assured of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. Pinned Prieto vs NLRC The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their own country. While these workers may indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no reason why, in their very own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full measure for the redress of their grievances.The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment. Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay respondent attorneys fees of NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.The clause, or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.

G.R. No. 154198 January 20, 2003PETRONILA S. RULLODAvs.COMELECand REMEGIO PLACIDO

Facts:Comelec denied petitioners request to substitute her deceased husband in the Barangay Chairman Candidacy despite the fact that petitioner apparently garnered the highest votes when constituents wrote her name in the ballots. Respondents cited resolution 4801 and Section 7 of the Omnibus Election Code which prohibits substitution of candidates. Private respondent Placido contended that it was only right that he be proclaimed winner since he was the only one who filed a certificate of candidacy and, hence, the only candidate running.

Issue:Whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion when Comelec denied petitioners request that she be allowed to run for elections.

Ruling:There being no specific provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections, a prohibition against said substitution cannot be said to exist.

Petitioners letter-request was considered a certificate of candidacy when COMELEC issued its resolution denying the same. In the contested election, it was petitioner who obtained the plurality of votes. Technicalities and procedural niceties in election cases should not be made to stand in the way of the true will of the electorate. Laws governing election contests must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by mere technical objections.

Tanada vs Tuvera L-63915, April 24, 1985| 136 SCRA 27

FACTS:

Petitioners seek a writ of mandamus in compelling respondent public officials to publish and/ or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letter of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.

The general rule in seeking writ of mandamus is that it would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved.

The legal capacity of a private citizen was recognized by court to make the said petition for the reason that the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land.

ISSUE:Whether publication in the Official Gazette is still required considering the clause in Article 2 unless otherwise provided.

HELD:

Unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not with the publication requirement which cannot be omitted as public needs to be notified for the law to become effective. The necessity for the publication in the Official Gazette of all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, was affirmed by the court on April 24, 1985. This is necessary to provide the general public adequate notice of the various laws which regulate actions and conduct as citizens. Without this, there would be no basis for Art 3 of the Civil Code Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication;2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.

Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK UNION VS. BENJAMIN VEGA 360 SCRA 32In 1985, the Central Bank of the Philippines filed a petition for assistance in the liquidation of the Philippine Veterans Bank (PVB), in the RTC of Manila, Branch 39. Thereafter, the PVB Employees Union filed claim for accrued and unpaid employee wages and benefits.On January 2, 1992, R.A. 7169 (An Act to Rehabilitate the PVB) was signed into law by then Pres. Corazon Aquino and was published in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992. This law sought the rehabilitation of the PVB which means that Congress mandated that the PVB be not dissolved.However, the liquidation judge, Judge Benjamin Vega, did not immediately stop the liquidation proceeding. In fact he went on with it.When questioned, Vega argued that R.A. 7169 did not immediately take effect and that it only took effect 15 days after publication in the Official Gazette or on March 10, 1992.ISSUE:Whether or not Judge Benjamin Vega is correct.HELD:No. R.A. 7169 provides in its effectivity clause that:Sec. 10. Effectivity. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.As a rule, laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. However,the legislature has the authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause unless otherwise provided.Hence, it is clear that the legislature intended to make the law effective immediately upon its approval. It is undisputed that R.A. No. 7169 was signed into law by President Corazon C. Aquino on January 2, 1992. Therefore, said law became effective on said date.Assuming for the sake of argument that publication is necessary for the effectivity of R.A. No. 7169, then it became legally effective on February 24, 1992, the date when the same was published in the Official Gazette, and not on March 10, 1992.

ESTRADA,vsCASEDAG.R. No. L-1560

Facts:

On September 5, 1945, plaintiff brought this suit, for unlawful detainer, because one of her married daughters was going to occupy them by the first of the following month; that defendant refused to leave. On October 13, 1945, Judge Mariano Nable, then of the municipal court, gave judgment for plaintiff with order for defendant to pay the rent from October 1, 1945, at the rate of P26 a month. On the case being appealed to the CFI, Judge Rafael Dinglasan presiding, cited "Commonwealth Act No. 689. The court correctly held that the fact that the premises under lease were needed by plaintiff's married daughter was not comprehended in the said Act. The requirements to evict occupants were provided in above-mentioned Act, which was approved on October 15, 1945. Section 14 of that Act provided that the same "shall be in force for a period of two years after its approval." Republic Act No. 66, approved on October 18, 1946, amended section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689 so as to read as follows: "Section 14. This Act shall be in force for a period of four years after its approval."

Issue:

Whether or not there is retroactivity of the amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 689 By RA No. 66.

Held:

Commonwealth Act No. 689, as amended by Republic Act No. 66, cannot be given retroactive effect. The provision of Republic Act No. 66 amending section 14 of Commonwealth Act No. 689, related back to, and should be computed from the date of the approval of the amended act, that is October 15, 1945. The period as thus construed expired on October 15, 1949.The cause of action in the case at bar arose before the passage of the Acts. An amended act is ordinarily to be construed as if the original statute had been repealed, and a new and independent act in the amended form had been adopted in its stead.

TAC-AN vs. CAG.R. No. L-38736, May 21, 1984

FACTS:Eleuterio Acopiado and Maximo Acopiado conveyed a parcel of land to Tac-an through a document entitled Deed of Quitclaim as payment for legal services. After the execution of the deed, the Acopiados told Tac-an that they were terminating his services because their wives and parents did not agree that the land be given to pay for his services and that they had hired another lawyer, a relative, to defend them. But Tac-an continued to represent them. Moreover, Eleuterio Acopiado sold his share of the land previously conveyed to Tac-an to Jesus Paghasian and Pilar Libetario.On July 2, 1964, Tac-an secured the approval of the Provincial Governor of Zamboanga del Norte to the Deed of Quitclaim. And on October 7, 1964, he filed a complaint against the Acopiado brothers, Paghasian and Pilar Libetario in CFI of Zamboanga del Norte praying that he be declared the owner of the land and that the sale made in favor of Paghasian and Libetario be annulled and he be paid for damages, attorney s fee, etc. The CFI decided in favor of Tac-an whereupon the Acopiados, et.al appealed to CA. The CA voided the transfer of the land to Tac-an applying section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu Contracts w/ Non-Christians Requisites.On April 12, 1965 while Tac-an suit was pending in the trial court, the Governor of Zamboanga del Norte, revoked his approval to the deed of quitclaim for the reason of Sec. 145 being the Acopiados as non-Christians. The petitioner asserts that the revocation of the approval which had been given by the Provincial Governor has no legal effect and cannot affect his right to the land which had already vested.

ISSUE:Are the requisites in Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao & Sulu still necessary when it is already repealed by RA 4252?

HELD:Yes, because when the deed of quitclaim was executed, when the approval by the Provincial Governor was given and when the approval was revoked, Section 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature, the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect. All requisites are still necessary.National Power Corporation vs. AngasMay 8, 1992

Facts: On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974, petitioner NationalPower Corporation filed two complaints for eminent domain againstprivate respondents before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lanaodel Sur, for the purpose of the development of hydro-electric powerand production of electricity as well as the erection of suchsubsidiary works and constructions.

On May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents (Sittie Sohra Batara)filed an ex-parte motion praying that petitioner be directed to payher the unpaid balance for the lands expropriated, including thelegal interest which she computes 6% per annum as being contemplatedin Art. 2209 of the Civil Code.

On February 10, 1981, one of the private respondents (PangonatanCosna Tagol), filed another ex-parte motion praying that the legalinterest of the just compensation awarded to her by the court becomputed at 12% per annum as allegedly authorized under and by virtueof Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank, in the absence of expresscontract.

Petitioner contended that the legal interest for just compensation ofthe lands condemned should be 6% per annum as contemplated in Art.2209 of the Civil Code and not Central Bank Circular No. 416 whichallows 12% interest per annum.

Issue: Whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate ofinterest on just computation for expropriated lands, the lawapplicable is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6%legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed thelegal interest rate at 12% per annum.

Ruling: Central Bank Circular No. 416 and Art. 2209 of the Civil Codecontemplate different situations and apply to different transactions.In transactions involving loan or forbearance of money, goods orcredits and the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of expresscontract, the Central Bank circular applies. Private respondents,however, take exception to the inclusion of the term "judgments" inthe said circular, claiming that such term refers to any judgmentdirecting the payment of legal interest.

Applying ejusdem generis to Central Bank Circular No. 416, theterm "judgments" only refer to judgments in cases involving loans orforbearance of any money, goods or credits.

On the other hand, in cases requiring the payment of indemnities asdamages, in connection with any delay in the performance of anobligation other than those involving loan or forbearance of money,goods or credits, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies.

In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan orforbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of certainparcels of land for a public purpose, and the legal interest requiredto be paid on the amount of just compensation for the propertiesexpropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages forthe delay in the payment thereof. Obviously, Art. 2209 of the CivilCode shall apply, declaring that the computation of legal interest beat 6% per annum, which is the correct and valid legal interest.

Judgment annulled and set aside.

G.R. No. L-27714 November 5, 1981ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS, in his capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila,petitioner-appellee, vs.ABELARDO SUBIDO, in his capacity as Commissioner of Civil Service,respondent-appellant.

Section 14.The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamentalequality before the law of women and men.

FACTS:

Pursuant to Memorandum Circular No. 18, s. 1964, on the subject: "Women in LaborerPositionsissued by Villegas, he said that this Office ( Manila City ) will disapprove all appointments extended to females as street sweepers, when the same are submitted to this Office.

In pursuant to the same memorandum he said that the 91 women working as street sweepers orwomen laborers must be replaced by men because making them perform manual labor outside office premises exposes them to contempt and ridicule and constitutes a violation of the traditional dignity and respect accorded Filipino womanhood.

The said Memorandum was denied by the Office of the President and that it has no force and effect therefore Villegas had no legal basis in trying to remove the 91 women from their jobs.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Commissioner through Memorandum-circular No. 18 violated the rights ofwomen in the Philippine Constitution(Particularly Article 2, Section 14)

HELD:

It might be said by way of a concluding observation that for the past six years at least, Filipino women have been serving in that capacity among others as Metro Aides, an innovation introduced by the First Lady. They have contributed along with the male employees in keeping Metro Manila clean, attractive, and hygienic. There has been no offense to the well known Filipino tradition of holding the women in high esteem and respect. Moreover, as is quite obvious in civic parades where a contingent of them usually takes part, they take pride and justly so in what they are doing. There would even be lessjustification then even from the policy standpoint for a Memorandum Circular similar to that issued by respondent and justifiably nullified by the Office of the President. Moreover, the trend towards greater and greater recognition of equal rights for both sexes under the shelter of the equal protection clause argues most strongly against this kind of discrimination. WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is affirmed. No cost.

Hagad v. Gozo-Dadole

Facts:On July 22, 1992, criminal and administrative complaints were filed against Mayor Ouano, Vice Mayor Canete and Councilor Mayol, all public officials of Mandaue City by Councilors Dionson, Baricede. There respondents were charged with having violated R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), as amended,Articles 170 (falsification of legislative documents) and 171 (falsification by public officers) of the Revised Penal Code; and R.A. No. 6713 (Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers). The respondent officials were allegedly causing alteration of Ordinance No. 018/92 by increasing the allotted appropriation from P3.5M to P7M without authority from Sangguniang Panlungsod of Mandaue.

The respondent officialsprayed for the dismissal of the complaint on the ground that the Ombudsman supposedly was bereft of jurisdiction to try, hear and decide the administrative case filed against them since, under Section 63 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the power to investigate and impose administrative sanctions against said local officials, as well as to effect their preventive suspension, had now been vested with the Office of the President. On September 1992, a TRO against Hagad was filed and granted to the petitioners by RTC Mandaue to restrain him from enforcing suspension.

Issue:Whether or not the Ombudsman under RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1898) has been divested of his authority toconductadministrative investigations over local elective official by virtue of subsequent enactment of RA 7160.

Held:No. The authority of the Ombudsman over local officials pursuant to RA 6770 is not removed by LG Code of 1991.There is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed, whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The two statutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other . Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication are not favored, 16 and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. The rule is expressed in the maxim, interpretare et concordare legibus est optimus interpretendi, i.e., every statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with other laws as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The fundament is that the legislature should be presumed to have known the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted conflicting statutes. Hence, all doubts must be resolved against any implied repeal, and all efforts should be exerted in order to harmonize and give effect to all laws on the subject.

The authority to conduct administrative investigation and to impose preventive suspension over elective provincial or city officials was at that time entrusted to the Minister of Local Government until it became concurrent with the Ombudsman upon the enactment of R.A. No. 6770, specifically under Sections 21 and 24 thereof, to the extent of the common grant. The Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), in fine, did not effect a change from what already prevailed, the modification being only in the substitution of the Secretary (the Minister) of Local Government by the Office of the President.People v. AlmueteG.R. No. L-26551, February 27, 1976

FACTS:Wenceslao Almuete, Fernando Fronda, Cipriano Fronda and Fausto Durion were charged with a violation of section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law. It was alleged in the information that the accused being tenants of Margarita Fernando in her riceland, without notice to her or without her consent, pre-threshed a portion of their respective harvests of five cavans of palay each to her damage.The lower held that the information is basically deficient because it does not describe the circumstances under which the cavans of palay were found in the possession of the accused tenants; it does not specify the date agreed upon for the threshing of the harvests, and it does not allege that the palay found in the tenants' possession exceeded ten percent of their net share based on the last normal harvest.

ISSUE:Whether or not the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is punishable pursuant to Sec. 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law.

HELD:No.The prohibition against pre-reaping or pre-threshing found in section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law of 1954 is premised on the existence of the rice share tenancy system. The evident purpose is to prevent the tenant and the landholder from defrauding each other in the division of the harvests. Thus, the legal maxim, cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex (the reason for the law ceasing, the law itself also ceases). applies to this case.Section 4 of the Code of Agrarian Reforms declared agricultural share tenancy throughout the country as contrary to public policy and automatically converted it to agricultural leasehold. Presidential Decree No. 2 proclaimed the entire country "as a land reform area".The legislative intent not to punish anymore the tenant's act of pre- reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord is inferable from the fact that the Code of Agrarian Reforms did not reenact section 39 of the Agricultural Tenancy Law and that it abolished share tenancy which is the basis for penalizing clandestine pre-reaping and pre-threshing.As held in the Adillo case, the act of pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to the landlord, which is an offense under the Agricultural Tenancy Law, had ceased to be an offense under the subsequent law, the Code of Agrarian Reforms. To prosecute it as an offense when the Code of Agrarian Reforms is already in force would be repugnant or abhorrent to the policy and spirit of that Code and would subvert the manifest legislative intent not to punish anymore pre-reaping and pre-threshing without notice to landholder.

David v COMELECPanganiban, 1997

FACTS: David, in his capacity as barangay chairman and as president of the Ligangmga Barangay saPilipinas, filed a petition to prohibit the holding of the barangay election scheduled on the second Monday of May 1997. Meanwhile, Ligangmga Barangay Quezon City Chapter also filed a petition to seek a judicial review by certiorari to declare as unconstitutional: (1) Section 43(c) of R.A. 7160; (2) COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2880 and 2887 fixing the date of the holding of the barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other activities related thereto; and, (3) The budgetary appropriation of P400 million contained in Republic Act No. 8250 (General Appropriations Act of 1997) intended to defray the costs and expenses in holding the 1997 barangay elections. Petitioners contend that under RA 6679, the term of office of barangay officials is 5 years. Although the LGC reduced the term of office of all local elective officials to three years, such reduction does not apply to barangay officials. As amicus curiae, former Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. urges the Court to deny the petitions.

ISSUES & HELD: Which law governs the term of office of barangay officials: RA 7160 or RA 6679? (RA 7160 3 years) Is RA 7160 insofar as it shortened such term to only three years constitutional? (YES) Are petitioners estopped from claiming a term other than that provided under RA 7160? (YES)

RATIO:

Clear Legislative Intent and Design to Limit Term to Three Years RA 7160 was enacted later than RA 6679. It is basic that in case of an irreconciliable conflict between two laws, the later enactment prevails. (Legisposteriorespriorescontrariasabrogant.) During the barangay elections held on May 9, 1994 (second Monday), the voters actually and directly elected one punong barangay and seven kagawads (as in the Code). In enacting the general appropriations act of 1997,Congress appropriated the amount of P400 million to cover expenses for the holding of barangay elections this year. Likewise, under Sec. 7 of RA 8189, Congress ordained that a general registration of voters shall be held immediately after the barangay elections in 1997. These are clear and express contemporaneous statements of Congress that barangay officials shall be elected this May, in accordance with Sec. 43-c of RA 7160. In Paras vs. Comelec,this Court said that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely 7 months away, the same having been scheduled in May, 1997. This judicial decision is part of the legal system of the Philippines (NCC 8). RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that specifically applies to local government units. It specifically and definitively provides in its Sec. 43-c that the term of office of barangay officials shall be for three years. It is a special provision that applies only to the term of barangay officials who were elected on the second Monday of May 1994. With such particularity, the provision cannot be deemed a general law.

Three-Year Term Not Repugnant to Constitution The Constitution did not expressly prohibit Congress from fixing any term of office for barangay officials. It merely left the determination of such term to the lawmaking body, without any specific limitation or prohibition, thereby leaving to the lawmakers full discretion to fix such term in accordance with the exigencies of public service. It must be remembered that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The petitioners have miserably failed to discharge this burden and to show clearly the unconstitutionality they aver. Constitutional Commission on how long the term of barangay officials is: As may be determined by law; more precisely, as provided for in the Local Autonomy Code (Sec 43-c limits their term to 3 years).

Petitioners Estopped From Challenging Their Three-Year Terms Barangay officials are estopped from asking for any term other than that which they ran for and were elected to, under the law governing their very claim to such offices: namely, the LGC. Petitioners belated claim of ignorance as to what law governed their election to office in 1994 is unacceptable because under NCC 3, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.Laguna Lake Development Authority vs CA

GR No. 120865-71; Dec. 7 1995

FACTS:

The Laguna Lake Development Authority (LLDA) was created through Republic Act No. 4850. It was granted, inter alia, exclusive jurisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any project or activity in or affecting the said region including navigation, construction, and operation of fishpens, fish enclosures, fish corrals and the like.Then came RA 7160, the Local Government Code of 1991. The municipalities in the Laguna Lake region interpreted its provisions to mean that the newly passed law gave municipal governments the exclusive jurisdiction to issue fishing privileges within their municipal waters.

ISSUE:

Who should exercise jurisdiction over the Laguna Lake and its environs insofar as the issuance of permits for fishing privileges is concerned, the LLDA or the towns and municipalities comprising the region?

HELD:

LLDA has jurisdiction over such matters because the charter of the LLDA prevails over the Local Government Code of 1991. The said charter constitutes a special law, while the latter is a general law. It is basic in statutory construction that the enactment of a later legislation which is a general law, cannot be construed to have repealed a special law. The special law is to be taken as an exception to the general law in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

In addition, the charter of the LLDA embodies a valid exercise of police power for the purpose of protecting and developing the Laguna Lake region, as opposed to the Local Government Code, which grants powers to municipalities to issue fishing permits for revenue purposes.

Thus it has to be concluded that the charter of the LLDA should prevail over the Local Government Code of 1991 on matters affecting Laguna de Bay.

MAGTAJAS VS. PRYCE PROPERTIES CORP.,GR # 111097 July 20, 1994

FACTS: Petitioners opposed the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro and enacted Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of business permit and cancelling existing business permit to establishment for the operation of casino, and Ordinance No. 3375-93, prohibiting the operation of casino and providing penalty for its violation.Respondents assailed the validity of the ordinances on the ground that both violated P.D. 1869, permitting the operation of casinos centralized and regulated by PAGCOR.Petitioners contends that pursuant to the Local Government Code, they have the police power authority to prohibit the operation of casino for the general welfare.ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid exercise of police power.HELD: No. The ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has the character and force of a statute as well as the public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in general. Ordinances should not contravene a statute because local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred to them by Congress.Petition is denied.

Gaerlan vs CatubigGR No. 23964, June 1, 1966

Facts:In the 1963 elections, among the registered candidates for councilors in the eight -seatCity Council of Dagupan were Gregorio Gaerlan and Luis Catubig. The latter obtainedthe third highest number of votes and was proclaimed one of the elected councilorswhile the former lost his bid.

Gaerlan went to the Court to challenge Catubigs eligibility for office on the averment of non-age. Catubig was born in Dagupan City on May 19, 1939. At the time he presented his certificate of candidacy on September 10, 1963, he was 24 years, 3 months and 22 days; on election day, November 12, 1963, he was 24 years, 5 months and 24 days; and at the time he took his oath of office as councilor on January 1, 1964,3 he was 24 years, 7 months and 13 days. Whether his age be reckoned as of the date of the filing of certificate of candidacy, or the election date, or the date set by law for the assumption of office the - result is the same. Whichever date is adopted, still, respondent was below 25 years of age. The judgment held Catubig ineligible and declared his seat vacant.

Catubig appealed and alleged that the question of age eligibility should be governed not by R.A. 170, and not by R.A. 2259. Republic Act No. 484 amending, inter alia, Section 12 of the Dagupan City Charter, took effect on June 10, 1950; whereas, Republic Act No. 2259 became law on June 19, 1959 - nine years later.

R .A .170, as amendedSec. 12 x xx the elective members of the Municipality Board shall be qualifiedelectors of the city, residents therein for at least one year, and not less than twenty- three years of age. xxx"

R .A .2 2 5 9Sec. 6.No person shall be a City Mayor, Vice-Mayor, or Councilor unless he is at least twenty-five years of age, resident of the city for one year prior to his election and is a qualified voter.

Issue:Whether or not Sec. 12 of R.A. 170 of the Dagupan City Charter, as amended, has been repealed by Sec. 6 of R.A. 2259

Decision:Yes. The judgment appealed from was affirmed.The question of whether or not a special law has been repealed or amended by oneor more subsequent general laws is dependent mainly on the intent of the Congress in enacting the latter. The discussions on the floor of Congress show beyond doubt that its members intended to amend o r repeal all provisions of special laws inconsistent with the provisions of Republic Act No. 2259, except those which are expressly excluded from the operation thereof. In fact, Section 9 of R.A. 2259 states that

AllActs or parts ofActs, Executive Orders, rules and regulations inconsistent with theprovisions of thisAct, are hereby repealed.

Section 1 of R.A. 2259 makes reference to "all chartered cities in the Philippines,whereas Section 8 excludes from the operation of the Act "the cities of Manila, Cavite, Trece Martires and Tagaytay", and Section 4 contains a proviso exclusively for the City of Baguio, thus showing clearly that all cities not particularly excepted from the provisions of said Act are subject thereto. The only reference to Dagupan City in R.A. 2259 is found in Section 2 stating that voters in said city, and in the City of Iloilo, are expressly precluded to vote for provincial officials.

Since Dagupan City is removed from the exceptions of R.A. 2259, it stands to reason itself that its charter provision on the age limit is thereby repealed. Until Congress decrees otherwise, we are not to tamper with the present statutory set-up. Rather, we should go by what the legislative body has expressly ordained.

It is accordingly held that respondent is disqualified on the ground of non -age because at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy, at the time of the election, and at the time he took his oath of office, he was below the age of 25 years.

City of Manila vs. Genaro N. Teotico and CAG.R. No. L-23052. 29 January 1968.

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the CA

Concepcion, J.:

Facts:On January 27, 1958, Teotico was at the corner of the Old Luneta and P. Burgos Avenue, Manila, within a "loading and unloading" zone, waiting for a jeepney. As he stepped down from the curb to board the jeepney he hailed, and took a few steps, he fell inside an uncovered and unlighted catch basin or manhole on P. Burgos Avenue. Due to the fall, Teotico suffered injuries. Teotico filed with the CFI Mla complaint against the City which dismissed the same. On appeal, CA sentenced the City of Manila to pay damages.

Issue:WON the City of Manila have control or supervision over P. Burgos Ave making it responsible for the damages suffered by Teotico.

Ruling:Decision affirmed.

In its answer to the complaint, the City, alleged that "the streets aforementioned were and have been constantly kept in good conditionand manholes thereof covered by the defendant City and the officers concerned" Thus, the City had, in effect, admitted that P. Burgos Avenue was and is under its control and supervision.

Under Article 2189 CC, it is not necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or supervision" over said street or road. Even if P. Burgos Avenue were, therefore, a national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from the City's "control or supervision."

City Government of San Pablo v. Reyes

FACTS: Sec. 1 PD 551 provides that any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchise to generate, distribute, and sell electric current for light, heat, and power shall be 25 of their gross receipts.

Sec. 137 of the LGC states: Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the province may impose a tax on business enjoying a franchise at a rate not exceeding 50% of 1% of the gross annul receipts.

RULING:the phrase is all-encompassing and clear that the legislature intended to withdraw all tax exemptions enjoyed by franchise holders and this intent is made more manifest by Sec. 193 of the Code, when it provides that unless otherwise provided in this code tax exemptions or incentives granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons, except local water districts, cooperatives, and non-stock and non-profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the effectivity of the Code.

Lagman vs. City of Manila 17 SCRA 579 (1966) Facts:Petitioner was granted a certificate of public convenience by the Public service Commission to operate for public service fifteen (15) auti trucks with fixed routes and regular terminal for the transportation of passengers and freight. Pursuant to the said certificate, petitioner who is doing business under the name and style of Marco Transit, began operating twelve (12) passenger buses along his authorized line.

On june 17, 1964, the Municipal Board of respondent City of Manila, in pursuance to section 18, paragraph hh, of RA no. 409, as amended (otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila), enacted ordinance no. 4986, entitled an ordinance Rerouting Traffic on Roads and Streets within the City of Manila, and for other purposes, which the city mayor approved. The pertinent provisions of said ordinance includes;

Section 1. As a positive measure to relieve the critical congestion in the City of Manila, which has grown to alarming and emergency proportions, and in the best interest of public welfare and convenience, xxx

Petitioner Lagman claims that the enactment and enforcement of ordinance no. 4986 is unconstitutional, illegal, ultra vires, and null and void. He contends that regulation and control relating to the use of and traffic of which are vested, under Commonwealth Act no. 548, in the Director of Public Works, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. He also contends that the public Service Commission has the only right to enact Ordinance amending or modifying a certificate of public convenience granted by the said office. In compliance with Sec. 16(m), public service Act.

Issue:WON R.A. no. 409, as amended (Revised charter of the City of Manila) prevails over Commonwealth Act no. 598 and Public Service law (C.A. no. 146, as amended)?

Held:Republic act no. 409 prevails. The said act is a special law and of later enactment than C.A. no 548 and the Public Service law (C.A. no 146, as amended) so that even if a conflict exist between the provisions of the former and the latter acts, Republic Act no. 409 should prevail.

Although the Public Service Commission is empowered, under Sec. 16(m) of C.A. no 146 to amend, modify or revoke certificates of public convenience after notice and hearing, there is no provision which can be found in this statute vesting power in the Public Service Commission to superintend, regulate or control the streets of the city of manila or suspend its power to license or prohibit the occupancy thereof. On the other hand, this authority is conferred upon the city of manila. The power vested in the public service commission under section 16(m) is, therefore, subordinate to the authority granted to the said city under section 18(hh) of its revised charter.

Furthermore, C.A. no. 548 does not confer an exclusive power or authority upon the Director of public works------to promulgate rules and regulations relating to the use of and traffic on national roads and streets. This being the case, section 18(m) of the revised charter of the city of manila is deemed enacted as an exception to the provisions of C.A. no. 548, for repeals by implication are not favored, and special law must be taken as intended to constitute an exception to the general law, in the absence of special circumstances forcing a contrary conclusion.

Wherefore, petition for prohibition is hereby dismissed. With cost against petitioner Benedicto C. Lagman.

JG SUMMIT HOLDINGS, INC., vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION, ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST and PHILYARDS HOLDINGS G.R. No. 124293. November 20, 2000

FACTS:National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC) and Kawasaki Heavy Industries entered into a Joint Venture Agreement in a shipyard business named PHILSECO, with a shareholding of 60-40 respectively. NIDCs interest was later transferred to the National Government.

Pursuant to President Aquinos Proclamation No.5, which established the Committee on Privatization (COP) and Asset Privatization Trust (APT), and allowed for the disposition of the governments non-performing assets, the latter allowed Kawasaki Heavy Industries to choose a company to which it has stockholdings, to top the winning bid of JG Summit Holdings over PHILSECO. JG Summit protested alleging that such act would effectively increase Kawasakis interest in PHILSECOa shipyard is a public utility--and thus violative of the Constitution.

ISSUE:Whether or not respondents act is valid.

HELD:No. A shipyard such as PHILSECO being a public utility as provided by law, the following provision of the Article XII of the Constitution applies:

Sec. 11. No franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association shall be citizens of the Philippines.xx x

Notably, paragraph 1.4 of the JVA accorded the parties the right of first refusal under the same terms. This phrase implies that when either party exercises the right of first refusal under paragraph 1.4, they can only do so to the extent allowed them by paragraphs 1.2 and 1.3 of the JVA or under the proportion of 60%-40% of the shares of stock. Thus, should the NIDC opt to sell its shares of stock to a third party, Kawasaki could only exercise its right of first refusal to the extent that its total shares of stock would not exceed 40% of the entire shares of stock of SNS or PHILSECO. The NIDC, on the other hand, may purchase even beyond 60% of the total shares. As a government corporation and necessarily a 100% Filipino-owned corporation, there is nothing to prevent its purchase of stocks even beyond 60% of the capitalization as the Constitution clearly limits only foreign capitalization.MR, September 24, 2003

MR, January 31, 2005

PALANCA VS. GUIDES452 SCRA 461Facts: On 23 August 1983, petitioner Simplicio Palanca executed a Contract to Sell a parcel of land on installment with a certain Josefa A. Jopson for P11, 250.00. In accordance with the contract, Jopson paid petitioner P1, 650.00 as her down payment, leaving a balance of P9, 600.00.Sometime in December 1983, Jopson assigned and transferred all her rights and interests over the property in question in favor of the respondent Ulyssis Guides.In the deed of transfer, respondent undertook to assume the balance of Jopsons account and to pay the same in accordance with the terms and conditions of the Contract to Sell .After reimbursing Jopson P1,650.00, respondent acquired possession of the lot and paid petitioner the stipulated amortizations which were in turn acknowledged by petitioner through receipts Issued in the name of respondent.

Believing that she had fully paid the purchase price of the lot, respondent verified the status of the lot with the Register of Deeds, only to find out that title thereto was not in the name of the petitioner as it was covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 105742 Issued on 26 September 1978 in the name of a certain Carissa T. de Leon. Respondent went to petitioners office to secure the title to the lot, but petitioner informed her that she could notas she still had unpaid accounts. Thereafter, respondent, through a lawyer, sent a letter to petitioner demanding compliance with his obligation and the release of the title in her name. As petitioner did not heed her demands, respondent, joined by her husband, filed a Complaint for specific performance with damages on 16 December 1987.

Issue: WON there was substantial payment made.

Ruling: Primarily preventing petitioner from recovering the amounts claimed from respondent is the effective waiver of these charges. Assuming that said charges are due, petitioner waived the same when he accepted respondents payments without qualification, without any specific demand for the individual charges he now seeks to recover. The same goes true for the alleged forfeiture of the down payment made by Jopson. From its own Statement of Accounts & Payments Made, petitioner credited to respondents account the P1,650.0 down payment paid by Jopson at the commencement of the contract. There is no indication that he informed respondent of the alleged forfeiture, much more demanded the payment again of the amount previously paid by Jopson.

Thus, when petitioner accepted respondents installment payments despite the alleged charges incurred by the latter, and without any showing that he protested the irregularity of such payment, nor demanded the payment of the alleged charges, respondents liability, if any for said charges, is deemed fully satisfied.