Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Arab Labour Migration: A Review of Trends and Issues
Nasra M. Shah*
During the early 1990s international migration for employment involved as many as 70 million people. A majority were from developing coun- tries, working legally or illegally in other countries (Appleyard, 199 1). If migrants of all types are considered, the number of international migrants in 1992 could have been as high as 100 million. Labour migration to and from Arab countries is a numerically and economically significant aspect of global networks that have emerged during the last two decades. Host to about five and a quarter million temporary migrant workers drawn from all over the world in 1990, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries remain an important region for labour migra- tion. The region’s significance was highlighted during the recent occupation of Kuwait by Iraq which caused the mass return of temporary workers. Despite the magnitude oflabour migration, as well as economic and social impacts on sending and receiving countries, the phenomenon has attracted little research attention. Indeed, the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA, 1993) argues that the region still lacks essential data regarding volume and characteristics of mi- grants. Efforts to synthesize existing knowledge have also been limited.
The objectives set for this paper are to:
- provide an analysis of volume and trends in labour migration within the Arab region;
- discuss the major characteristics of the migrants, including demo- graphic features, types of economic activity, wage levels and duration of stay in host countries;
- outline and discuss the major issues in labour migration both from the sending and receiving countries.
The time period covered by the study is from the mid 1970s to the present.
* Faculty of Medicine, Kuwait University.
3
DATA AVAILABILITY AND RELIABILITY
In order to do justice to the first objective, it would be necessary to have access to information on annual flows of labour migrants between countries similar to that available for migration between some Asian countries and the Middle East. Data ofthis kind are not available for Arab countries. Data that are available in published form generally relate to the early or mid- 1980s and were drawn mainly from the writings of Birks and colleagues (1979,1980, 1988). Lack of regular information sources not only represents a major hindrance to assessing accurate trends, but has also led to widely different estimates of the stock and flow of labour migrants in the Arab region. Only three ofthe six GCC countries (Kuwait, Bahrain and UAE) held censuses during the 1980s. In Saudi Arabia, the largest labour receiving country, the absence of censuses between 1974 and 1992 forced researchers to rely on sources which are not always clear or consistent across studies. For example, data provided by ESCWA differed considerably from other estimates. Furthermore, available lit- erature as described by Seccombe (1985), is both “descriptive and judgmental”. Appleyard (1 989), in a review of the impact of migration on development, laments that dearth of research, especially within rigorous models of socio-economic research, has led to conclusions that are both “desultory and culture specific”. Similarly, Russell (1 986), in a comprehensive review of remittances, reports that data deficiencies for measuring the impact of remittances are so great that the exercise of organizing a systematic analysis appears to be hardly worth the effort.
LABOUR MIGRATION TRENDS
One approach to assessing labour migration flows is to categorize Arab countries as either capital rich or capital poor (Birks and Sinclair, 1982), on grounds that labour flows are predominantly from the capital poor (but labour rich) countries to the capital rich countries where high rates of economic growth depend on foreign-labour. Capital rich countries include the six GCC countries and Libya and Iraq; capital poor countries include Jordan, Yemen, Syrian Arab Republic, Egypt, Sudan, Lebanon, Tunisia and Morocco.
Labour migration of Arabs to the GCC countries pre-dates the oil price hike of 1973 (Choucri, 1983-4). For example, in Kuwait in 1965,76 per cent ofthe labour force comprised foreign nationals, 68 per cent ofwhom were Arabs. In 1975, 1.3 million of an estimated 1.7 million workers in the Middle East were Arabs and four out of five Arab workers were Egyptian or PalestiniadJordanian (Birks and Sinclair, 1982; Appleyard, 199 1). Between 1975 and 1980, temporary Arab emigration (including
4
worker migration) increased by 18 per cent a year. Jordan experienced a net labour outflow of 50,000 workers; about one million Yemenis were working abroad; and the number of Sudanese international migrants increased to 200,000 (Abella, 199 1).
Birks et al. (1 988) estimated that the flow of labour from Arab countries to the Middle East slowed down after the early 1980s. By 1985, the stock of Arab workers in the Middle East was 1.54 million, although other estimates suggest that the number of Arabs in the Gulf may have been higher during the early 1980s. In 1986, Nagi estimated 3.45 million as follows: Egyptians 2,000,000; Yemenis 680,000; Sudanese 200,000; Jordanians 300,000; Lebanese 140,000; Tunisian 80,000; and Omanis 50,000.
During the last 25 years, labour migration has been an important contributor to economic growth, demographic structure, and the overall development patterns of receiving countries. In 1985, the number of foreign workers in the Gulf labour force was estimated by Birks et al. (1988) to be 5.1 million, or 70 per cent of the labour force, and the number of foreign workers in the GCC states in 1985 was estimated by ESCWA (1993) to be 4.1 million. ESCWA also showedthat dependence on foreign workers increased in each of the six GCC countries between 1985 and 1990, although there were small declines in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain after 1985. Saudi Arabia, the largest labour importer among the GCC countries, increased its dependence on foreign workers from 32 per cent in 1975 to about 65 per cent in 1985, and 60 per cent in 1990. In UAE, Kuwait and Qatar, about 90 per cent of workers in 1990 were foreigners.
Table 2 (page 2 1) shows that Arab workers have historically constituted the majority of workers in the combined labour force of Gulf countries. In 1975, Arabs comprised 69 per cent, but by 1980 this had declined to 58 per cent while the percentage of Asians increased to an estimated 63 per cent by 1985. An analysis of entry and departure records of Saudi Arabia led the United Nations (1990: 217) to conclude that “Asian labour migration did indeed predominate over Arab migration in net terms during 1974-84”. Although Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had a predominance of Arab workers in 1975, by 1985 more than half the expatriate workers in each country were Asians. Other Gulf states have relied heavily on Asian workers since 1975.
The number of workers abroad as a percentage of total labour forces varies considerably between Arab sending countries. In 1975, between 20 and 28 per cent of workers from Jordan, Oman and Yemen were abroad. Indeed, Wardwell (1 990) estimated that during the early 1980s,
5
40 per cent of all actively employed Jordanians worked outside the country. In the case of Syria, Egypt and Sudan, workers abroad rep- resented less than five per cent of the labour force in 1975, although if Nagi’s figures (1986) are accepted, the percentage for Egypt for the early 1980s might have been closer to 1 8 per cent than the three per cent shown in Table 3 (page 22).
Oman and Jordan have served as both sending and receiving countries. In 1975,70,000 foreign workers were employed in Oman, while 38,400 nationals were working in Saudi Arabia and the UAE (Appleyard, 1991). In the early 1980s, 50,000 Omanis were working abroad while 145,000 foreigners were employed in Oman (Nagi, 1986). By the early 1980s, 40 per cent of all actively employed Jordanians were working outside the country, an outflow that has been partially offset by a substantial inflow, especially of Egyptians. By 1984,25 per cent of the domestic labour force was made up of foreigners (Wardwell, 1990).
Libya and Iraq, the two non-GCC capital rich countries, have also been important importers of Arab labour. Libya’s dependence on foreign labour increased rapidly during the 1970s but peaked in 198 1 with the employment of 500,000-750,000 foreign workers, mainly Egyptians. In 1983 and 1984 there were an estimated 1.5 to 2 million foreign workers in Iraq (now ravaged by the Gulf War and prior to that by the eight-year Iran-Iraq war), also mainly Egyptians (Kanovsky, 1986).
The main movement of labour in the north African Arab region was from Egypt to Libya (estimated at 200,000-300,000 in 1983) (Kanovsky, 1986) and from Tunisia to Egypt (an estimated 93,588 or 15 per cent of the total foreign population in 1983) (Seccombe and Lawless, 1985).
The impact of the Gulf War on labour migration, although not fully documented, has been especially severe for Arab countries. Jordan and Yemen have regained workers, but of the estimated 450,000 Palestin- ians in Kuwait (many of whom had Jordanian passports) before the Gulf War, more than 400,000 left, or were required to leave (Abella, 1991). Other nations whose citizens have not been invited back to Kuwait include Sudan, Yemen and Iraq. Also, 800,000 Yemenis were expelled from Saudi Arabia as a result of the position taken by the Yemeni government during the war (Russell, 1993; Addleton, 199 1). Substantial return migration, probably of a temporary nature, was also experienced by Egypt, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. In the case of Egypt, an estimated half a million workers returned as a result of the Gulf War (Abella, 199 1). ESCWA (1 993) claims that the return migra- tion of Arabs as a result of the Gulf War was smaller than previously
6
thought: Egyptian returnees 390,000, JordanianPalestinians 255,000 and Yemenis 723,000.
Many Palestinians who left Kuwait are unlikely to return. Their jobs have been progressively filled by Arabs, mainly from Egypt. The reappointment of Asians (as well as fresh appointments) have proceeded rapidly. For example, the Department of Immigration, Ministry of Interior, has calculated that between liberation and July 23, 1992, 128,603 housemaids entered the country.
CHARACTERISTICS
The characteristics of labour forces in Arab countries can best be understood in relation to the segmentation that exists in the region. The crude and refined activity rates of the nationals and non-nationals in GCC countries shown in Table 4 (page 23) clearly highlight differences between the two groups, although it must be mentioned, that with the exception of Kuwait, data are not separately available for Arab migrants within these countries. Although labour force participation (LFP) rates of the migrant population are very high, differences in the crude LFP rate exist between migrant populations in various GCC countries. For example, about half the migrant population was economically active in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia compared with 73 per cent in Bahrain. The low LFP rate suggests a certain amount of “settling” in Kuwait, for example, one-third of the migrant population in 1985 had been born in the country, the average duration of stay of the migrant workers being about 10 years. A tendency towards stability of the labour force had been pointed out by Al-Akhras (1 982) and analysed in some depth by Shah and Al-Qudsi (1 989).
Refined LFP rates of nationals are only a rough indicator of eventual dependence on foreign workers. The activity levels of nationals are low for several reasons, including a high percentage of children and students in the indigenous population and low activity levels of females. Less than five per cent of the Saudi and UAE indigenous workforce comprise women, compared with 20 per cent in Kuwait and Bahrain. However, by 1989, Kuwait females constituted 30 per cent of the indigenous labour force (Public Authority for Civil Information - PACI, 1989).
The mean age of the labour force may be used as a proxy .for experience of its members. For national male workers, the mean age was around 36-37 for all GCC countries except Kuwait, where the mean age was only 33 years (Table 4). Very early retirement in Kuwait results in withdrawal from the labour force of young, active persons just when their experience
7
could contribute most effectively to productivity. In Kuwait, aperson can retire with full service benefits after 20 years of service and having reached age 40. More important, he/she can “buy” part of the retirement fund on retirement. Financially, the best time to retire is just after aperson reaches age 40. Participation rates therefore decline rapidly after age 40: the 1985 Census showed that only 52 per cent of males aged 45-49 were in the labour force compared with 94 per cent of those aged 35-39.
The majority of expatriate labour in most GCC countries in 1985 was concentrated in three sectors: construction, community and personal services, and trade (Table 5, page 24). Sectoral distribution of migrant workers has remained stable: a comparison of 1975 and 1985 data for the combined migrant labour force in GCC countries showed that construction and services sectors absorbed 64 per cent and 56 per cent of workers at the two time periods. With the decline in the construction sector after 1985, manufacturing absorbed more migrant workers (Abella, 1991).
Other data indicate that the pattern of economic activity differs markedly by sex. About three-quarters of expatriate females in most GCC countries are employed in community and personal services. In Kuwait, Arab women comprise 30 per cent of the expatriate female workforce: 35 per cent are employed as teachers, 14 per cent as clerks and 12 per cent as medical and paramedical workers (Shah and Al-Qudsi, 1990). On the other hand, Asian women who comprised almost 69 per cent of expatriate workers were engaged primarily as domestic servants. The main sources of supply of housemaids have been Sri Lanka, Philippines and India, although in recent years Indonesian women have been added to the stream; 8,000 female domestics in 1979 and 50,000 in 1989 (Appleyard, 1991).
Data on other characteristics (education, hours worked, wages) are not routinely available for migrant workers in GCC countries. Kuwait is an exception. Its labour force surveys in 1977/1979,1983 and 1988 show that the average age of nationals is lower than the migrants, especially Palestinians/Jordanians (Table 6a and 6b, pages 25 and 26), partly because in 1983 Palestinian workers had been in Kuwait for an average of 18.5 years and had a relatively high dependency ratio (100 compared to 100.8 for Kuwaiti nationals). Similarly, Iraqis, Syrians and Lebanese had been in Kuwait for an average of 14 years. Egyptians, on the other hand, had been in Kuwait for much shorter periods. The permanent exodus of a majority of the most stable components of the labour force could have serious implications for the economy.
Changing characteristics of Arab labour migrants have affected their salary levels and working hours. The educational level of Egyptians has
8
declined from an average 12.8 grades to 6 grades, due mainly to the increased percentage of Egyptians in the labour force. Later entrants were less educated and took up blue collar, production jobs (Shah and Al-Qudsi, 1989). As a result, the average monthly salary of Egyptian workers declined from KD 273 to 251 between 1977179 and 1983, whereas the other Arab groups made substantial gains. The differentials in salary and the relative progress made by Arabs during their stay in Kuwait have been analysed in detail by Al-Qudsi and Shah (1 99 l), who conclude that the differential between the nationals and expatriates is persistently large and has increased over time. While Kuwaiti nationals earned about two and a half times more than non-Kuwaitis in 1988, migrant workers from all nationalities were able to make considerable progress in Kuwait’s labour market as the duration of their stay length- ened and they gained experience in the labour market. The relative progress of workers from Arab countries was greater than for non-Arabs. It seems that knowledge of the language and culture makes it easier for Arabs to convert their skills (education, home country experience) into earnings.
Wide differentials occur in hours worked by persons from various countries. In 1983, Arabs worked 2.5 to 5.8 hours more than Kuwaiti nationals, differences being smallest for Palestinians/Jordanians and Iraqis, and largest for Syrians and Lebanese. The number of hours worked depends to a large extent on whether employment was in the public or private sector-the latter having much longer hours. About 90 per cent of Kuwaiti males were employed in the public sector in 1989 compared with 22 per cent of non-Kuwaiti males (PACI, 1989). In 1988, Kuwaitis (of both sexes) worked 39 hours per week compared with 52 worked by non-Kuwaitis. One reason for the excessive number of hours worked by the latter group relates to the growing presence of service workers, particularly women in domestic service; this group worked for 63.6 hours per week in 1983 (Shah et al., 1991).
ISSUES RELATING TO ARAB LABOUR MIGRATION
Issues relating to Arab labour migration may be analysed separately from the perspectives of labour sending countries and labour receiving coun- tries and be broadly categorized as economic and social/political.
Economic Issues for Labour Sending Countries
The economic issues involved in labour export from capital poor coun- tries fall within three separate but related areas: remittances, impacts on the labour market, and overall impacts on development. Remittances are at the heart of the debate on whether labour migration is beneficial to
9
sending countries. The consensus seems to be that remittances sent home by migrants to their families have both positive and negative impacts (Russell, 1986). Among positive impacts is easing of foreign exchange constraints which assist economic growth. At the household level, remittances raise standards of living and in some cases may actually enable the very survival of families (Eelens, 1990). Negative impacts of remittances include unpredictability, the fact that they are usually spent on consumption (hence increasing inflation) rather than investment, and may exacerbate dependency by generating laziness in the labour force.
Because remittances can constitute large percentages of total foreign exchange earnings, sending country governments invariably look with favour on labour migration. In the early 1980s, remittances comprised about 12.6 per cent of Egypt’s gross domestic product (GDP), 22.5 per cent of Jordan’s and 40.9 per cent of North Yemen’s (Abella, 1991). Even so, the unpredictability of remittances can pose serious problems for development planners. If their strategies rely upon projected hard currency remittance earnings, an unexpected large shortfall reduces the prospect of achieving development objectives. The sudden and unex- pected movement of labour migrants (and their families) as a result of the Gulf War illustrates the unpredictability of remittance flows. The return of almost half a million Egyptians was recognized by the Ministry of Emigration and Expatriates as a serious problem in the country’s social and economic development. An estimated 1.5 million persons (including dependents) were affected by the unexpected return of workers. Public expenditure on education, health and job creation was estimated at US$ 5-6 billion and forced the government to rely upon foreign assist- ance (International Organization for Migration - IOM, 1991). The return to Jordan of Palestinian/Jordanian nationals from Kuwait not only dried up remittance flows, but greatly increased outlays on social services, and the return of 8O0,OOO Yemenis from Saudi Arabia is likely to have serious economic consequences because of that country’s dependence upon remittance income.
The use of remittances for non-productive consumption expenditures has often been criticized. Fergany (1983: 778) holds that “workers’ remit- tances made it possible for the Yemen Arab Republic to go on a buying spree in the international market for everything it wanted. The country developed a voracious appetite for anything money could buy”. Other criticisms include increase in demand for imported goods, the demon- stration effect, and the inability of the banking system to capture remittances, including those sent home through money merchants. Choucri (1986) holds that the informal remittance system has created a hidden economy outside the control of monetary authorities. On the basis
10
of the record from various countries, Appleyard (1989: 494) concludes that “benefits are greatest if certain conditions are met: diverse economic structure, adequate supply of labour and a financial system capable of handling remittances effectively”.
In terms of the impact on labour markets, general conclusions are thwarted by the paucity of data as well as specific labour market conditions, underlying demographic factors, characteristics of migrants, and overall structure of the economies in question (Russell, 1993). Major issues concerning the labour market relate to the effects on unemploy- ment, labour shortages, skill depletion and de-skilling of the labour force. Because emigration can reduce unemployment and underemployment, it has been referred to as a safety valve against mass discontent and deterioration in living standards, although this clearly varies between countries. In the case of Egypt, for example, Ibrahim (1982) found that migration in the 1970s did not reduce unemployment from its earlier level of 1 1 per cent. On the other hand, Amin and Awny (1985) calculated that if new entrants are taken into account, potential unemployment may have been reduced by as much as 75 per cent.
While decreased unemployment is generally considered to be a benefit of migration, it has also led to serious shortages of manpower in Jordan, Oman, Yemen and Egypt (Tabbarah, 1988). Farrag (1987) has claimed that emigration of Egyptian construction workers led to a decline in productivity in that sector and a significant increase in wage levels. Emigration to OPEC countries from Jordan during the early 1980s comprised mainly highly-skilled workers from the cities. While replace- ment migration from rural to urban areas partially filled such gaps, one domestic consequence was a shortage of labour in construction, agricul- ture and other rural industries. In some parts of the country, 65 per cent of the labour force engaged in agriculture were non-Jordanians, mainly Egyptians (Wardwell, 1990). Labour shortages in Yemen became so acute that children were filling full-time jobs normally held by adults. In 1978, about 20 per cent of all government posts were vacant; indeed technical departments experienced vacancy rates as high as 50 per cent (Fergany, 1983). As a result of labour shortages, Jordan, Oman and Yemen had to import workers from abroad.
Because labour markets in host countries have progressively required higher percentages of technical and skilled workers, some sectors (even in large, high fertility countries) have experienced labour shortages. The emigration of skilled and experienced workers reduced overall skill and experience levels in sending countries. In some instances, the skill development of new entrants in those sectors was impeded by the emigration of teachers. “De-skilling”, described by Stahl (198 1) as a
1 1
process whereby overseas workers, because of their willingness to take lower-skilled jobs for higher monetary return, actually lose previously- held skills has also occurred. Filipino college graduates who work as domestics is one example. Another is Sri Lankan workers in western Asia: Athukorala (1990) shows that one-third had accepted jobs requir- ing lower status and qualifications than they had achieved prior to emigration. The exodus of professional and highly-skilled workers, mainly to the so-called traditional receivers (US, Canada and Australia), is another controversial issue. Tabbarah (1988) showed that between 40 and 70 per cent of migrants from Arab countries to the US were in professional and managerial categories.
The literature provides examples of situations where migration has had net beneficial impacts and others where the beneficial impacts are not so obvious. Kandil and Metwally (1990) report that, in Egypt, remittances have had a more positive effect on private consumption spending than on private investment spending. Looney (1990) argues that while remit- tances to Arab labour migration countries have undoubtedly raised the overall standard of living of recipients, they contribute marginally at best to the development process. The case of Yemen suggests that migration may have actually retarded the development process (Fergany, 1983). Birks and Sinclair’s (1980) comparison of the Jordanian and Egyptian experience suggests that countries that encourage occupational mobility are more likely to maximize the benefits of migration. The Egyptian labour market is typified by a lack of internal readjustment within the labour market to compensate for export of certain types of manpower, while occupational mobility is high within both the private and public sectors of Jordan’s labour market. Jordanians have also undertaken the type of skill training needed in oil-rich countries.
Social Impacts on Labour Sending Arab Countries
Research on the role of the wife left behind (especially if she is the only adult in the household) indicates, in the case of Jordan, that she makes and implements economic decisions for the family. A major reason why international migration seems to have had little or no effect on fertility is the absence of change in the traditional patriarchal structures that maintain high fertility (Wardwell, 1990). Indeed, the pattern of migration from Jordan has reinforced the existing patriarchal structure and may have enhanced the perceived value of sons in society. Persistent high fertility has also been facilitated by the selective nature of emigra- tion favouring the educated, high occupation groups that are likely to have lower fertility. Consequently, “the non-migrant population remain- ing in Jordan may be characterized by higher than expected fertility in part because labour emigration is selecting for a significant portion of
12
the lower fertility component of the population” (Wardwell, 1990: 180). Migration has also acted as a continuing stimulus to the exceptional value placed on secondary and higher education. For example, Jordan main- tains its competitive edge in labour markets through the high productivity of its well-educated labour force (Wardwell, 1990). The return of JordaniansPalestinians after the Gulf War has probably maintained the emphasis on education, returnee children from Kuwait having been attuned to high levels of education. Although research on the subject has not been systematic, a number of studies suggest that the children of migrant families in various sending countries are more likely to be educated to higher levels than are children of non-migrant households (Russell, 1993).
Research by Khafagy (1 983 and 1984) on 200 migrant and non-migrant families in an Egyptian village indicated that women left behind became more involved in cultivation, management of financial affairs and household decision making. On the other hand, Taylor (1984) reported that male emigration for a village in Giza did not lead to any permanent change in the lifestyle of productive roles of migrants’ wives. Mynitti’s (1984) research in the Taizz province of the Yemen Arab Republic, showed that female seclusion increased in the households of successful migrants. Women left in the care of male relatives were withdrawn from household production on their own land. A study of 74 families in Jordan by Kamiar and Ismail (1991) concluded that labour migration weakened traditional family ties and increased intra-family problems in situations where the wife and children were left behind.
Research findings suggest not only that the social impacts of migration are highly culture specific, but also that they may vary markedly within a country depending upon such factors as socio-economic level of the migrant household, life cycle stage of the family and social support available to persons left behind.
Economic Issues for Labour Receiving Countries
Major economic issues for receiving countries pertain to impacts of labour migration on the structure of the indigenous labour force and manpower development of the indigenous population. For Gulf coun- tries, the easy and inexpensive supply of migrant workers has altered labour force structure so that arduous and less prestigious jobs are now performed almost entirely by migrant workers. For example, between 1965 and 1988, the percentage of Kuwaiti males engaged in production occupations declined from 30 per cent to 11 per cent, while the number employed in the public sector increased. Such jobs have been described as a sinecure awarded solely on the basis of nationality (Nagi, 1986). In
13
1989, nine-tenths of Kuwaiti male workers and 97 per cent of Kuwaiti female workers were employed in public sector jobs guaranteed for nationals with the required qualifications. Once hired, the person con- tinues to occupy the position regardless of performance.
Kuwait is an exception to other Gulf countries in terms of duration for which an average person stays in the labour force. As already noted, the average age of Kuwaiti male workers is three to four years lower than in other Gulf countries. Experienced workers withdraw from the labour force after 20-25 years service in the public sector.
Manpower development in capital rich countries suffers from high drop- out rates and poor motivation of students. Technical and vocational education are virtually ignored and motivation to participate in the modem, private sector is low (Birks and Sinclair, 1982). In Saudi Arabia, overwhelming dependence on foreign labour has occurred with little significant change in the overall skill level of the Saudi population (Kanovsky, 1986). Rather than taking up a taxing private sector job, locals engage in rewarding (and less demanding) activities in which they can charge commissions as sponsors (kafeel), or take desk jobs in the government bureaucracy. In his analysis of Saudi Arabia’s national plans, Looney (1988) concluded that shortage of indigenous labour, and the absence of skills required to run new industries would be important constraints.
The large exodus of specific nationality groups (e.g., Palestinians from Kuwait) has created labour shortages in specific sectors. Before the Iraqi invasion on 2 August 1990, the Palestinians occupied many middle and top management positions: one year after the liberation, a leading economist noted that Kuwait had “Kuwaitis in top positions and lots of unskilled labourers, but no-one in the middle. The loss of professional and other skills has reflected itself negatively in the economy” (Arab Times, 14 March 1992). The private sector has experienced difficulty in recruiting professional and technical workers from Arab or Asian coun- tries because of restrictions on the entry of dependents.
Social Impacts on Receiving Countries
Despite the dearth of research on social impacts of migration on receiving countries, some studies have been made of living conditions, especially of domestic servants. Although the treatment of housemaids has attracted international attention, observations having been made concerning their segregated living patterns, hardly any empirical data are available on socio-cultural borrowing, intermarriages, friendship relationships, im- pact on language, religious institutions and the family.
14
Concerning native reaction towards increased labour migration, Russell (1986) pointed out that by the early 1980s there was growing antipathy towards Filipino workers in Saudi Arabia. It had also been noted that immigration was a source of social tension in the region. The obligation to provide migrant workers (and their families) with health, housing, education, and transportation, etc., was greeted with little sympathy, and migrants were often blamed for domestic problems (Central Statistical Office - CSO, 1987). These negative reactions led to a reaffirmation of policy favouring Arab rather than Asian workers. In Kuwait, for ex- ample, emphasis on Arabization of the labour force was a stated goal of the 1984/5-1989/90 Plan, although surveys indicate that by 1989 this goal had not been achieved. Concern at being a minority in their own country became an important issue in Kuwait after liberation, and the Government framed a policy of restricting to 35 per cent expatriate employees in Government offices and establishments.
The effect of foreign housemaids on the upbringing of children has also attracted attention in the press, although little empirical research has been undertaken. In Kuwait, a Ministry of Social Affairs (1983) study showed that there were no significant differences in the adjustment and develop- ment of children in households with and without maids.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Labour migration in the Arab world, from the capital poor to the capital rich countries, has facilitated the economic development of receiving countries and provided considerable foreign exchange for the sending countries. The proportion of Arab migrant workers has declined relative to Asian workers who, by 1985, comprised 63 per cent of the GCC countries’ expatriate labour force. The impact of the Gulf War on the volume and trends of Arab migration has been especially significant. About 1.7 million Arab workers (800,000 Yemenis, 400,000 Palestin- ians/Jordanians, 500,000 Egyptians) moved as a result of political decisions following the Gulf War. While the emigration of Palestinian and Jordanian workers from Kuwait is likely to be permanent, some Yemenis from Saudi Arabia may return as seasonal agricultural labourers (Addleton, 1991). While the Yemen government has made concerted efforts to resolve its differences with GCC countries, Egyptians have gained an advantage in the labour market as a result of the political favour their government won, following its stance in the Gulf War. Indeed, Egyptian workers may largely replace Lebanese and PalestiniadJor- danians in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, although Fergany (1992) argues that replacement of Yemenis may not be easy. They were the only nationality group who did not need a Saudi sponsor in order to participate in
15
economic activities such as petty trading and service. Egyptians may not easily replicate that role. Choucri (1983-4) concludes that Egyptians will not be dislodged from their positions of control of education systems in various Gulf states. Language and cultural ties make Arab nationals the first choice in service and government sector jobs. However, experience from Kuwait suggests that educational institutions and government sector jobs are the first ones to attract qualified nationals. Not only is the lower cost of the Asian workers likely to give them a relative advantage, but South and Southeast Asians have developed highly effective formal (through recruitment agents ) and informal networks (through friends and relatives).
In view of the dearth of data and conflicting information provided by various sources, there is an urgent need for comprehensive information on the volume, characteristics and dynamics of the migration process. No survey on international migration had been conducted in the Arab world until the mid-l980s, although surveys have since been conducted in Egypt, Jordan and Tunisia (Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia - ESCWA, 1993). There is an immediate need for the dissemination of findings from such surveys as well as censuses. The Saudi census of 1992 is especially important because Saudi Arabia is the main receiver of migrant labour in the region. Disaggregation of results by nationality of workers would indicate volume and characteristics of migration from each country.
High priority should also be accorded research on the social impacts of migration on receiving countries and on the living conditions and treatment of migrant workers. This has become a sensitive issue in a market where labour demand is declining and labour supply in sending countries is increasing. Worker exploitation is likely to increase in such situations.
Recent research on the economic consequences of labour migration for sending countries includes that sponsored by ILO/ARTEP (Asian Regional Team for Employment Promotion) (Amjad, 1989; Isaac, 1992), and by the United Nations University (Gunatilake, 1986, 1991, 1992). These studies have focused on countries in South, Southeast and East Asia. Similar studies in the Arab world would facilitate understanding of dynamics and trends, especially comparative studies between the various sending and receiving Arab nations.
16
REFERENCES
Abella, M. 1991 “International Migration in the Middle East: Patterns and Implica-
tions for Sending Countries”, United Nations Population Fund, United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Informal Expert Group Meeting on International Migration, 16-19 July 1991, Geneva, Switzerland: 1-57.
“The Impact of the Gulf War on Migration and Remittances in Asia and the Middle East”, International Migration, 29(4): 509-526.
“Aspects of Immigrant Labour Force Stability in the State of Kuwait”, Population and Development in the Middle East, 1 1 :2 13-227, United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia, Beirut.
Al-Qudsi, S. S., and N. M. Shah “The Relative Economic Progress of Male Foreign Workers in Kuwait, International Migration Review, 25( 1): 141-166.
International Migration of Egyptian Labour: A Review of the State of the Art. Manuscript report, International Development Research Centre, Ottawa.
To the Gulf and Back: Studies on the Economic Impact of Asian Labour Migration, United Nations Development Programme and International Labour Organisation, Asian Employment Programme, New Delhi.
“Migration and Development: Myths and Reality”, International Migration Review, 23(3): 486-499. International Migration. Challenge for the Nineties, International Organization for Migration (IOM), Switzerland.
Report in daily newspaper, 14 March.
“International Contract Migration and the Reintegration of Return Migrants: The Experience of Sri Lanka”, International Migration Review, 24(2): 323-346.
“Migration and Development: The Changing Perspective of the Poor Arab Countries”, Journal of International Afairs, 33(2):
1980 “Arab Labour Markets: A Broad Assessment”, Arab Manpower: The Crisis of Development, 20:339-366, Croom Helm Ltd, London.
1982 “Contemporary International Migration and Human Resources Development in the Arab Region: Background and Policy Issues”, Population and Development in the Middle East, 13:259-272, United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia, Beirut.
Addleton, J. 1991
Al-Akhras, S. 1982
1991
Amin, B. A., and E. Awny 1985
Amjad, R. 1989
Appleyard, R. T. 1989
199 1
Arab Times
Athukorala, P. 1992
1990
Birks, J. S., and C. A. Sinclair 1979
285-309.
17
Birks, J. S., et al. 1988 “Labour Migration in the Arab Gulf States: Patterns, Trends and
Prospects”, International Migration, 26( 3): 267-286.
Migration and Non-national Labour in GCC Countries: An Analysis of Trends, Pattern of Employment and Problems, Research Studies on Population 1985 Census Analysis, No. 5, Ministry of Planning, Kuwait. Final Results of Labour Force Sample Survey Research, 1 (in Arabic), Ministry of Planning, Kuwait.
Central Statistical Office (CSO) 1987
1988
Choucri, N. 198314 “Migration in the Middle East: Transformation and Change”,
Middle East Review, 16(2): 16-27. 1986 “The Hidden Economy: A New View of Remittances in the Arab
World”, World Development, 14(6): 697-7 12.
Demographic and Related Socio-Economic Data Sheets, United
Arab Labour Migration to the Gulf Size, Impact and Major Policy Issues. Discussion note contributed to the UN Expert Group Meeting on Population and Migration, 18-22 January 1993, Santa Cruz, Bolivia.
“Sri Lankan Women in the Middle East”, United Nations Expert Group Meeting on International Migration Policies and the Status of Female Migrants, 27-30 March, 1990, San Miniato, Italy.
International Migration Policies with Particular Reference to Egypt and the Arab Region. Paper presented to the OECDKICRED Semi- nar on International Migration, Paris.
Trends, Patterns and Issues of Labour Migration in Egypt. Paper presented at the IOMEgyptian Government Seminar on Interna- tional Migration in Egypt and the Arab World, 2-4 November 1992, Cairo. “The Impact of Emigration on National Development in the Arab Region: The Case of the Yemen Arab Republic”, International Migration Review, 16(4): 757-780.
Migration of Asian Workers to the Arab World, United Nations University Press, Tokyo. Migration to the Arab World: Experience of Returning Migrants, United Nations University Press, Tokyo. The Impact of Labour Migration on Households: A Comparative Study in Seven Asian Countries, United Nations University Press, Tokyo.
The New Arab Social Order: A Study of the Social Impact of Oil, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado.
Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) 1985) 1987) Nations, Baghdad. 1993
Eelens, F. 1990
Farrag, A. M. 1987
Fergany, N. 1992
1983
Gunatilake, G. 1986
1991
1992
Ibrahim, S. 1982
18
International Organization for Migration (IOM) 1991 South-North Migration. Report of the Ninth IOM Seminar on
Migration, 4-6 December 1990, Geneva, Switzerland.
Economic Consequences of the Gulf Crisis: A Study of India with Special Reference to Kerala, ILO/ARTEP, New Delhi.
“Family Ties and Economic Stability Concerns of Migrant Labour Families in Jordan”, International Migration, 29(4): 561 -572.
“The Impact of Migrants’ Remittances on the Egyptian Economy”, International Migration, 28(2): 159- 180.
“Migration from the Poor to the Rich Arab Countries”, Middle East Review, 17(3): 28-36.
“Socio-economic Impact of Emigration from a Giza Village”, in A. Richards and P. L. Martin (Eds), Migration, Mechanisation and Agricultural Labour Markets in Egypt, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado. “Women and Labour Migration: One Village in Egypt”, Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), 124: 17-24.
“Manpower in a Capital-Rich Country: The Case of Saudi Arabia”, Population Bulletin of ESCWA, 32: 3 1-54. “Macroeconomic Impacts of Worker Remittances on Arab World
Isaac, T. T. M. 1992
Kamiar, M. S., and H. F. Ismail 1991
Kandil, M., and M. F. Metwally 1990
Kanovsky, E. 1986
Khafagy, F. 1983
1984
Looney, R. E. 1988
1990 Labour Exporting Countries”, International Migration, 28( 1): 25-45.
Ministry of Social Affairs and Labour, Kuwait 1983
Mynitti, C. 1984
“Athr al-Murabiyat al-Ajnabiat ala al-Usr al-Kuwaitiya”, in Arabic (Effect of Foreign housemaids on Kuwaiti Family), Kuwait.
“Yemeni Workers Abroad: The Impact on Women”, Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), 124: 11-16.
“Determinants of Current Trends in Labour Migration and the Future Outlook”, in F. Arnold and N. M. Shah (Eds), Asian Labour Migration: Pipeline to the Middle East, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 3: 47-64.
Directory of Civil Information: Population and Labour Force, Kuwait Government.
Nagi, H. M. 1986
Public Authority for Civil Information (PACI) 1989
Russell, S. Stanton 1986 “Remittances from International Migration: A Review in Per-
spective”, World Development, 14(6): 677-696. 1993 International Migration in Europe, and Central Asia, The Middle
East and North Africa: Issues for the World Bank. The World Bank, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa Technical Department, Population and Human Resources Division, FY 93-02, Washington D.C.
19
Seccombe, I. J. 1985 “International Labour Migration in the Middle East: A Review of
Literature and Research, 1974-84”, International Migration Review, 19(2): 335-352.
Seccombe, I. J., and R. J. Lawless 1985 “Some New Trends in Mediterranean Labour Migration: The
Middle East Connection”, International Migration, 23( 1): 123- 147.
“The Changing Characteristics of Migrant Workers in Kuwait”, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 21( 1): 31-55. “Female Work Roles in a Traditional Oil Economy: Kuwait”, in R. Frank, I. Serageldin and A. Sorkin (Eds), Female Labour Force Participation: Research in Human Capital and Development, Baltimore.
Shah, N. M., and S. Al-Qudsi 1989
1990
Shah, N. M., et al. 199 1 “Asian Women Workers in Kuwait”, International Migration
Review, 25(3): 464-486. Stahl, c. w.
1981 Economic Development and the Export of Labour Services. ASEAN-Australian Economic Relations Research Project, Aus- tralian National University, Canberra.
“Human Resources Development and its Population Dimension in the Arab World”, Population Bulletin of ESCWA, 32: 3-29.
“Egyptian Migration and Peasant Wives”, Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP), 124: 3-10.
World Population Monitoring 1989, Special Report: The Population Situation in the Least Developed Countries, United Nations, New York, USA.
“Jordan”, in W. J. Serow et al., Handbook on International Migra- tion, Greenwood, USA: 167-187.
Tabbarah, R. 1988
Taylor, E. 1984
United Nations 1990
Wardwell, J. M. 1990
20
GCC States S. Arabia Kuwait Oman Bahrain Qatar UAE
Libya Iraq
Sources: A. Kubursi, The Economies of the Arabian Guy: A Statistical Sourcebook; Birks et al., 1987 (cited in Abella, 1991).
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
0.10 0.17 0.27 0.40 0.53 0.79 0.73 0.78 0.74 0.7 1 0.78 0.80
0.34 0.87 0.39 0.8 1 0.48
0.15 0.67 0.84 0.89 0.88 0.02 0.06 0.16 0.33 0.34
0.02 0.14
TABLE 2
PER CENT DISTRIBUTION OF NON-NATIONAL LABOUR FORCE IN GCC STATES BY COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE
AND NATIONALITY, 1975 AND 1985
Country of Residence
Nationality Arabs Asians Euro./ Others
Amer.
1975 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar S. Arabia UAE Total
20.7 62.0 14.7 2.6 80.1 18.3 1.4 0.2 12.7 83.2 4.1 27.9 70.6 1.5 90.5 6.2 1.9 1.4
69.1 27.9 2.2 0.8 24.6 73.4 2.0
1985 Bahrain Kuwait Oman Qatar S. Arabia UAE Total
7.8 84.3 7.9 46.5 50.3 3.2
6.6 90.9 3.2 23.2 71.0 5.8 32.8 59.4 7.8 16.0 79.0 5.0 30.1 63.3 6.6
Total No.
100.0 25,285 100.0 208.00 1 100.0 70,700 100.0 53,716 100.0 773,400 100.0 25 1,500 100.0 1,382,602
100.0 96,900 100.0 543,900 100.0 314,100 100.0 70,700 100.0 3,522,700 100.0 598,500 100.0 5,146,800
Sources: Birks and Sinclair, 1979: 288; Birks et al., 1988: 274.
21
TABLE 3
COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN OF ARAB MIGRANT WORKERS, 1975
Country
Jordan (East Bank)
Oman
Yemen
Syrian Arab Republic
Egypt
Sudan
Total
GNP in US$ per capita
( 1 976)
61 1
2,680
250
780
280
290
Size of workforce
532,800
137,000
1,425,900
1,838,900
12,522,200
3,700,000
20,156,800
Workers abroad
No. % of labour force
150,000 28.1 (27)*
38,400 28.0 (17)*
290,100 20.3 (19,26)**
70,400 3.8 (3)*
397,500 3.2 (18)*
45,900 1.2 (4)*
992,300 4.9
* Estimates for 1980/8 I by Nagi ( 1986). ** 19% for People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and 26% for Arab Republic
of Yemen.
Source: Birks and Sinclair, 1979: 289.
22
w
w
Yea
r
TABL
E 4
CH
AR
AC
TER
ISTI
CS
OF
IND
IGEN
OU
S A
ND
MIG
RA
NT
WO
RK
ERS
IN G
CC
CO
UN
TRIE
S, 1
980s
Cru
de A
ctiv
ity R
ate
(%)
Cou
ntry
Bahr
ain
Kuw
ait
Om
an
Qat
ar
Saud
i Ara
bia
UA
E
1986
1986
__ 19
86
1984
1986
Nat
iona
l N
on-n
atio
nal
27.5
73
.2
18.3
53
.6
__ __
19.2
61
.8
16.0
52
.8
18.1
65
.6
Ref
ined
Act
ivity
Rat
e (%
)
Nat
iona
l N
on-n
atio
nal
48.7
86
.3
36.2
75
.4
__ __
38.0
77
.6
31.7
74
.4
36.7
84
.4
Ave
rage
age
of
mal
e w
orke
rs (y
ears
)
Nat
iona
l N
on-n
atio
nal
35.9
33
.0
33.1
36
.0
__ __
36.2
35
.3
36.1
35
.0
37.0
32
.6
% o
f lab
our f
orce
th
at is
fem
ale
Nat
iona
l N
on-n
atio
nal
19.9
9.
7
21.3
20
.4
__ __
10.2
8.
7
4.9
2.3
3.9
6.8
-- F
igur
es fo
r Om
an n
ot a
vaila
ble.
Sour
ce:
Cal
cula
ted
from
ESC
WA
, 198
5, 1
987.
TABL
E 5
GC
C: N
ON
-NA
TIO
NA
L W
OR
KFO
RC
E ST
OC
KS
BY
SEC
TOR
OF
EMPL
OY
MEN
T, 1
985
%
~~
Eco
nom
ic S
ecto
r:
Agr
icul
ture
and
fishi
ng
Min
ing
and
quar
ryin
g M
anuf
actu
ring
U
tiliti
es
Con
stru
ctio
n Tr
ade
Tran
spor
t and
com
mun
icat
ions
Fi
nanc
ial s
ervi
ces
Serv
ices
Tota
l
Num
ber
Bahr
ain
Kuw
ait
Om
an
Qat
ar
Saud
i Ara
bia
UA
E
1.2
0.8
7.1
1.5
32.6
15.7
8.2
0.9
32.0
100.
0
96,7
50
1.8
0.8
8.6 1.1
22.7
13.0
5.5
3.1
43.4
100.
0
543,
900
3.5
1.2
2.3
0.4
47.3
20.7
0.8 1.6
22.2
100.
0
314,
100
6.3
15.4
1.5
22.2
18.9
8.9
4.8
22.0
100.
0
70,5
50
11.2
1 .o
10.2
4.1
29.0
13.3
5.0 1.8
24.4
100.
0
3,52
2,70
0
5.4
2.0
8.9
1.8
21.5
14.9
8.1
2.7
34.7
100.
0
598,
500
Tota
l
8.8 1.1
9.4
3.2
28.6
14.0
5.3
2.0
27.6
100.
0
5,146
,5OO
Sour
ce:
Birk
s et a
l.. 1
988:
275
.
TAB
LE 6
a
A S
OC
IO-D
EMO
GR
APH
IC P
RO
FILE
OF
WO
RK
ERS
IN THE M
AJO
R N
ATI
ON
ALI
TY G
RO
UPS
IN K
UW
AIT
: 19
77/1
979
Nat
iona
lity
Age
M
onth
ly
Educ
atio
nal
Wor
king
hou
rs/
Dur
atio
n of
sta
y D
epen
denc
y N
o.
sala
ry (
KD
) gr
ades
w
eek
(in y
ears
) ra
tioa
Kuw
aiti
Pale
stin
ian
& J
orda
nian
Eg
yptia
n Ir
aqi
Syria
n &
Leb
anes
e In
dian
, Pak
ista
ni &
B
angl
ades
hi
Euro
pean
, Am
eric
an,
othe
r
Tot
al
34.1
37
.8
38.2
36
.9
35.8
36
.2
37.3
35.7
217
224
273
160
223
162
194
215
1977
/197
9 4.
6 38
.0
8.8
38.8
12
.8
38.9
4.
9 39
.6
7.0
41.9
8.
5 47
.2
4.5
44.8
7.1
39.6
NA
15
.2
7.2
16.5
12
.7
8.9
13.2
12.8
118.
6 13
0.4
72.8
10
2.0
97.6
50
.7
108.
1
112.
8
~
2,78
6 1,
390
394
191
366
424
266
5,81
7
NA
= n
ot a
pplic
able
. a)
D
efin
ed a
s th
e ra
tio o
f per
sons
age
d le
ss th
an 1
5 an
d 65
+ to
per
sons
age
d 15
-64
x 10
0.
Sour
ces:
Sha
h an
d A
l-Qud
si,
1989
; CSO
, 198
8.
TAB
LE 6
b
A S
OC
IO-D
EMO
GR
APH
IC P
RO
FILE
OF
WO
RK
ERS
IN T
HE
MA
JOR
NA
TIO
NA
LITY
GR
OU
PS IN
KU
WA
IT:
1983
MA
LES,
and 1
988 B
OTH
SEX
ES
Nat
iona
lity
Age
M
onth
ly
Educ
atio
nal
Wor
king
hou
rs1
Dur
atio
n of
sta
y D
epen
denc
y N
o.
sala
ry (K
D)
grad
es
wee
k (in
yea
rs)
ratio
a
1983
K
uwai
ti 32
.7
424
7.4
40.9
N
A
100.
8 2,
360
Pale
stin
ian
& Jo
rdan
ian
38.8
35
8 10
.2
43.5
18
.5
100.
0 1,
254
Egyp
tian
35.8
25
1
6.0
46.3
6.
2 23
.4
2,34
2 Ir
aqi
35.6
30
7 7.
3 43
.5
15.6
68
.2
295
Syria
n &
Leb
anes
e 35
.2
448
7.2
46.7
14
.0
67.5
47
0 In
dian
33
.9
192
6.7
49.0
7.
1 19
.5
1,25
4 Pa
kist
ani &
33
.2
20 1
5.
5 47
.6
6.6
18.6
81
1 B
angl
ades
hi
othe
r
Tot
al
34.9
31
2 6.
9 45
.1
9.9
63.9
9,
581
Kuw
aiti
32.3
51
1 39
N
A
76.7
1 1
5,33
2b
Non
-Kuw
aiti
37.4
21
8 52
10
52
.3
614,
583
Euro
pean
, Am
eric
an:
36.8
36
2 6.
7 47
.7
11.6
50
.9
795
1988
*
* B
oth
sexe
s, e
xcep
t age
whi
ch is
for m
ales
. -
Not
ava
ilabl
e; N
A =
not
app
licab
le.
a) D
efin
ed a
s the
ratio
of p
erso
ns a
ged
less
than
15
and
65+
to p
erso
ns a
ged
15-6
4 x
100.
b)
Kuw
aiti
citiz
ens,
exc
ludi
ng B
idoo
ns (w
ithou
t nat
iona
lity)
.
Sour
ces:
Sha
h an
d A
l-Qud
si,
1989
; CSO
, 198
8.
TENDANCES ET PROBLEMES DE LA MIGRATION DE MAIN-D’OEUVRE A W E
Cet expose passe en revue la littkrature disponible sur les mouvements rkcents et les caractkristiques de la migration de main-d’oeuvre dans le monde arabe, ainsi que les problkmes kconomiques et sociaux y affkrents. L’auteur en tire les grandes conclusions suivantes :
- les donnkes disponibles pour apprkcier les tendances en la matikre sont trks maigres, et les estimations provenant de diffkrentes sources sont souvent divergentes;
- bien que cette migration de main-d’oeuvre s’effectue comme on peut s’y attendre des pays pauvres en direction des pays riches, elle est devenue un facteur majeur du dkveloppement kconomique des pays d’accueil et une source importante de devises pour les pays exportateurs de cette main-d’oeuvre;
- le pourcentage d’Arabes dans la main-d’oeuvre expatrike des pays du Conseil de coopkration du Golfe est passke de 69 pour cent en 1975 21 30 pour cent en 1985;
- ktant donnk les kcarts considkrables des effets de la migration de main-d’oeuvre sur le dkveloppement Cconomique et social entre les pays de depart et les pays d’accueil, il est difficile d’knoncer des gknkralitks;
- la migration n’est qu’une variable du dkveloppement parmi d’autres;
- les flux de main-d’oeuvre spectaculaires que l’on a pu observer h I’occasion de la guerre du Golfe et de la reconstruction du Koweit atteste de l’interdkpendance persistante des pays arabes export- ateurs et importateurs de main-d’oeuvre.
27
MIGRACION DE MAN0 DE OBRA ARABE: EXAMEN DE LAS TENDENCIAS Y CUESTIONES
Este articulo examina la literatura sobre el reciente volumen y caractensticas de la mano de obra en el mundo kabe, asi como las cuestiones concomitantes de caracter econ6mico y social. En este articulo se llegan a las siguientes conclusiones generales:
- a menudo, la informaci6n disponible para evaluar las tendencias es limitada y hay discrepancias en las previsiones de fuentes diferentes;
- si bien la migracion laboral ha estado encaminada desde las capitales de 10s paises pobres hacia las capitales de 10s paises ricos, se ha convertido en un importante factor en el desarrollo econ6mico de 10s paises anfitriones, y en una importante fuente de divisas para 10s paises de envio;
- el porcentaje de arabes que constituye la fuerza laboral expatriada de 10s paises CCG ha disminuido pasando del 69 por ciento en 1975 a1 30 por ciento en 1985;
- debido a que las repercusiones de la migraci6n laboral en el desarrollo econ6mico y social de 10s paises de envio y de acogida vm’an considerablemente, es dificil generalizar;
- la migraci6n es s610 una de las variables que influye en el desarrollo;
- se observa la interdependencia persistente de 10s paises arabes de envio y de acogida en un context0 de extraordinarias conientes de mano de obra como consecuencia de la reciente guerra del Golfo y de la reconstrucci6n de Kuwait.
28
