Aquinas Environmental Ethics Providence.pdf

Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics: A Reconsideration of Providence and SalvationAuthor(s): Francisco BenzoniSource: The Journal of Religion, Vol. 85, No. 3 (July 2005), pp. 446-476Published by: The University of Chicago PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/429574 .

Accessed: 21/10/2013 11:24

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to TheJournal of Religion.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 153.106.142.212 on Mon, 21 Oct 2013 11:24:48 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ucpress

http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/429574?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


446

� 2005 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.0022-4189/2005/8503-0004$10.00

Thomas Aquinas and EnvironmentalEthics: A Reconsideration of Providenceand Salvation*

Francisco Benzoni / Duke University

introduction

The aim of this article is to clarify the basic parameters to which anyenvironmental ethic must conform if it is to take its philosophical andtheological bearings from the thought of Thomas Aquinas. I argue thatany Thomistic environmental ethic must be consistently anthropocen-tric, where this means that nonhuman creatures are finally instrumentsto the human good. Any duties toward (or restrictions on our activitiestoward) such creatures must find their moral grounding in the humangood. The point of this article, then, is not to flesh out a Thomisticenvironmental ethic or to offer an argument about its adequacy.Rather, as noted, it is to outline the parameters within which such anethic must be developed. Still, my larger project is critical of Thomas’sunderstanding, and I close with a few brief comments on some fun-damental reformulations necessary to sustain a promising strand inThomas’s own position.

I have found it useful to use Willis Jenkins’s thoughtful and provoc-ative essay, “Biodiversity and Salvation: Thomistic Roots for Environ-mental Ethics,”1 as a conversation partner to clarify the thought of Tho-mas. In his essay, Jenkins draws on the thought of Thomas to argue fora Christian environmental ethic that views nature and other creaturesnoninstrumentally. He also maintains that there is a powerful Thomis-

* I would like to thank two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and Eric Gregoryfor pointing me to Willis Jenkins’s article. In a few places in the notes, I have included theLatin, or portions of the Latin, where particular, precise terms are emphasized or needed tosustain my argument, or where I thought it might be helpful to demonstrate that the trans-lation I have used accurately reflects Thomas’s intention.

1 Willis Jenkins, “Biodiversity and Salvation: Thomistic Roots for Environmental Ethics,”Journal of Religion 83 (2003): 201–20.



Thomas Aquinas and Environmental Ethics

447

tic argument for the preservation of biological diversity. While his ar-gument draws on several intriguing strands in Thomas’s work in orderto develop a stewardship ethic (and I find the argument attractive inmany respects), there are important systemic reasons to reject callingit “Thomistic.” Specifically, the understandings of providence and sal-vation, as well as the attendant conception of justice, espoused by (orpresupposed by) Jenkins are not true to the thought of Thomas.

Now, one might argue that Jenkins merely uses certain images fromThomas’s theology in order to develop a profoundly motivating spiri-tuality that inspires a life of ecological virtue.2 In that case, my argu-ment that Jenkins’s approach is not consistent with Thomas’s largerproject is not directly to the point. And Jenkins’s and my aims converge,since we both seek a robust ecological ethic grounded in God’s relationto the world in which all creatures are accorded more than instrumen-tal value. But, in fact, as we will see below, Jenkins does insist—thoughperhaps he need not—that he is deriving his conclusions from the workof Thomas. In this article, I delineate the limitations of a thorough-going Thomistic approach to ecological ethics. Jenkins’s argument ishelpful in achieving this agenda; I have made every effort to give it afair reading.

Where Jenkins finds continuity, Thomas insists upon discontinuity.That is, Jenkins’s argument is successful only if God is truly affected bythe world and if human beings are truly ontologically continuous withthe rest of creation. But precisely these continuities are rejected byThomas, who insists that God, as ipsum esse subsistens, cannot be affectedby the world and that material entities and immaterial entities (whichentities include the human soul—albeit in a qualified sense) differ ge-nerically.3 The discontinuity between God and the world undercuts the

2 I thank one of the anonymous reviewers for this formulation.3 Summa Theologiae, trans. English Dominicans (New York: Christian Classics, 1981), pt. Ia,

Question 13, Article 7 (hereafter, all Summa Theologiae citations are given as, e.g., Ia, 13, 7).In Thomas’s day, the question of the soul presented itself in stark alternatives—the soul isthe form of the body and perishes with the death of the body or the soul is a completesubstance only accidentally united to the body—pitting Aristotelians against Platonists. Fortheological and philosophical reasons, neither of these alternatives was acceptable to Thomas.Among other places, he addresses this issue in the opening question of his disputation,Questions on the Soul, when he asks “whether the soul can be both an entity and a form.” Anentity is an individual in the category of substance and a form is that by which a substancehas existence. Thomas’s conclusion is that the soul is the form of the body. However, it is asubsistent form that survives the death of body but requires the body for its own essentialoperation and so is itself an incomplete substance. In short, it is a special kind of form of amaterial entity—one that subsists—and a special kind of immaterial entity—one that is anincomplete substance or is incomplete in species. Thomas does, at times, refer to the humansoul as an “immaterial substance.” (See, e.g., Summa Theologiae, Ia, 118, 2; Summa Contra Gentiles,trans. English Dominicans [London: Burns, Oates, & Washbourne, 1934], bk. II, chap. 77



The Journal of Religion

448

sensibility of Jenkins’s exhortation that human beings ought to pre-serve biological diversity. God infallibly wills that these species remainin existence in order that God’s primary purpose in creating—the per-fection of the universe—be fulfilled. The discontinuity between hu-mans and other material creatures, which discontinuity is crucial toThomas’s understanding of salvation, undercuts Jenkins’s claim thatnonhuman creatures have something “better than” intrinsic value. Jen-kins’s account of Thomas’s soteriology inexplicably neglects the salva-tion part—that is, Thomas’s account of the second perfection of theuniverse when all motion will cease and, among “mixed bodies,” onlyhuman beings will remain.

Let me offer a roadmap. I begin by briefly considering Jenkins’s ar-gument in order to bring out several features that are germane to thepresent discussion. I then show that Thomas’s understanding of divineprovidence and divine justice undermine Jenkins’s account. Once weunderstand Thomas’s own position, it is no longer possible to employhis thought to construct an ethic that exhorts human beings to preservebiological diversity. I demonstrate that a strictly instrumental under-standing of other creatures is reflected in Thomas’s understanding ofprovidence and in his moral theory. I next further explore some of thesystematic reasons for this position—namely, the discontinuities be-tween God and the world and between humans and nonhumans. I con-clude with some thoughts on the need for some fundamental refor-

[hereafter, all Summa Contra Gentiles citations are given as, e.g., II, 77]; Disputed Questions onTruth, vol. 1, trans. Robert William Mulligan; vol. 2, trans. James V. McGlynn; vol. 3, trans.Robert W. Schmidt [Chicago: Regnery, 1952–54], Question 19, Article 1 [hereafter, all DisputedQuestions on Truth citations are given as, e.g., 19, 1]; Questions on the Soul, trans. James H. Robb[Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984], Question 7.) And, indeed, it is, though aunique one. (For an especially helpful work on this topic, see Anton C. Pegis’s St. Thomasand the Problem of the Soul in the Thirteenth Century [Toronto: Pontifical Institute of MedievalStudies, 1978].) Because they are in the category of substance, the notion that immaterialand material entities are generically different means that they differ metaphysically sincethere is no higher category in which they can both be placed. Of course, one might arguethat since immaterial and material creatures have their source and end in God, then thiscommon feature might be used to show that there is, metaphysically, a common metricaccording to which they can be compared. However, this does not provide a common univocaldesignation because “source” and “end” do not apply to God and creatures univocally. Sothis commonality is not, finally, relevant to the claim that immaterial and material creaturesare creatures in metaphysically differing senses of “creature.” There is, as Thomas says, “noproper and adequate proportion between material and immaterial things” (Summa Theologiae,Ia, 88, 2 ad 1: “quia non est sufficiens comparatio rerum materialium ad immateriales”; seealso Summa Theologiae, Ia, 88, 2 ad 3). Or, again, “Created immaterial substances are not inthe same natural genus as material substances” (Summa Theologiae, Ia, 88, 2 ad 4: “substantiaeimmateriales creatae in genere quidem naturali non conveniunt cum substantiis materiali-bus”). Though they belong in the same logical genus insofar as both are creatures, this isjust to say that there are metaphysically differing senses of “creature” because the bare factof essence differing from esse does not place creatures in a common natural (or ontological)genus—as Thomas recognizes.




449

mulations of Thomas’s project to make justice applicable to othercreatures.

jenkins’s “thomistic” stewardship ethic

Jenkins explores the work of Thomas in order to develop a Christianenvironmental ethic rooted in soteriology. He proposes that ratherpassing over those teachings in Thomas that concentrate on the hu-man, there is “a way of approaching the traditional (human-centered)doctrines with a view to their environmental virtue.”4 He argues that“the way of human salvation in Thomas implies a robust ecologicalethics.”5 Standing within the Christian faith, he maintains, we have pow-erful soteriological reasons for preserving the diversity of creation.

Jenkins’s argument rests on what he calls the “soteriological episte-mology” of Thomas. He summarizes this epistemology as follows:“While we live on earth we know God through His likeness reflected increatures. The value of every creature is that it is a visable [sic] partic-ipation of God and so functions as an icon into the divine life. Clearlyhere is in Thomas a theological mandate to preserve ecological diver-sity, for to do so is to preserve the multifarious character of the avail-ability of God for us.”6 We name God from creatures, and the greaterthe diversity of creatures, the greater is our capacity to bless and praiseGod. Indeed, the loss of biological diversity increases the threat of idol-atry, of naming God not from creatures but “from things made in ourown image.”7

This understanding, Jenkins argues, does not result in soteriologicalinstrumentalization (such that nature is understood as solely instru-mental to human salvation) because knowing God through creaturesdoes not concern the essence of creation but says something about theintrinsic nature of human beings. “Creation is not human gift by es-sential nature, but by proximate function, relative to human nature andGod’s love for us.”8 The crucial point is that in coming to know Godthrough creatures, we also come to see creatures as God sees them.The ethic that results entails an understanding of nature as God’s giftfor us, and “in receiving nature as God’s gift for us . . . we find some-thing special to say about it—something like, but better than, ‘intrinsic

4 Jenkins, “Biodiversity and Salvation,” 402.5 Ibid., 403.6 Ibid., 408.7 Ibid., 412.8 Ibid., 409.




450

value.’”9 The specialness of nature is best affirmed “by saying that cre-ation is for us the grace of God.”10 And this understanding of creation,as “an instrument of grace,”11 refutes “the very idea of nature’s instru-mentality.”12 This is so because this grace “allows us to see God and, byseeing God, to appreciate better the diversity of things who also receiveGod’s grace and communicate themselves to knowers as intelligibleonly as such receivers.”13 Our knowledge of diverse creatures, whensuch knowledge is formed in faith, both (1) gives us diverse ways ofblessing and praising God in whom all the perfections that we see increatures preexist most eminently and (2) enables us to appreciate thegift, the grace of God, that each of these creatures embodies. As Jenkinssays, “In the actualization of our desire for God (through our partici-pation in God by grace), we are provoked by sensory knowledge of thenatural world to realize something of the character of God, and thenin this knowledge to apprehend the perfection of the entity that me-diates our vision.”14 To repeat, we come to know God through creatures,and, in knowing God, we come to see creatures as God’s communica-tion of grace—as God sees them. As Jenkins explains, “it is by gracethat one will be able to see snail darters more relevantly approximateto the way God sees them.”15 In coming to see that other creatures notonly lead us to God but also share in—are manifestations of—God’sgrace, we can affirm the specialness of nature as God’s grace. This is“better than trying to say that nature is intrinsically valuable.”16 Othercreatures “are intrinsically given-to and so caught up with us into thedivine commerce of grace.”17

Jenkins argues on the basis of this giftedness of creation—both forus and to other creatures—that human beings have “a responsibility to

9 Ibid., 408. The notion of “intrinsic value,” Jenkins states, raises some problems in envi-ronmental discourses. In a footnote, he states, “The point cannot be pursued here, but itseems to me that environmental thinkers find it difficult to describe an intrinsic value thatis at once verifiably ‘there’ and yet does not appeal at bottom to the self-valuing of rationalagents” (ibid., 411 n. 34). Though Jenkins merely mentions it in passing, it is not at all clearto me that the notion of intrinsic value is invariably problematic. A relational understandingof intrinsic value coupled with an understanding of subjectivity as characterizing all levels ofcreated reality makes irrelevant the notion that intrinsic value can, or ought to be, specifiedas statically “there.” Further, such an understanding of intrinsic value does not in any wayrely on the “self-valuing of rational agents,” or, indeed, on creaturely rational agents at all.

10 Ibid., 411.11 Ibid., 410.12 Ibid.13 Ibid.14 Ibid., 407.15 Ibid., 406; italics added.16 Ibid., 411.17 Ibid.




451

preserve species and wildlands.”18 To fail to do so, to impoverish bio-diversity, would result in “the loss of that by which to bless God.”19 Itwould also fail to acknowledge God’s gift of love (and so being) toother creatures. It is the human responsibility not only to take care ofthe earth “but . . . also our vocation to . . . gather up the various lovesof the earth and return them to their Lover.”20 When, in faith, we cometo know the nature of the relationship between God and creation, itbecomes our responsibility to care for and return the love of God—inthe form of the being of creatures—to God, to care for creation asGod’s own gift. This is eucharistic biodiversity. “The sort of anthropo-centrism we find in Thomas . . . is one that centers creation aroundhumanity only insofar as humans receive God’s giving to creation.”21

Jenkins draws on Thomas’s discussion of government to bolster hisclaim to ground a stewardship ethic in Thomas’s thought. Jenkinsquotes Thomas’s argument that government has two effects: “the pres-ervation of things in their goodness and the moving of things togood.”22 Jenkins maintains, “Stewardship, therefore, as the mediationof divine providence, is defined by Thomas as being both about con-servation and careful tending; we are to protect the participations ofgoodness and to move things to their ordained end, which is proxi-mately their natural perfection and ultimately is God.”23 Jenkins goesso far as to state that “seeking the good of every creature under ourpower, and in manner appropriate to divine wisdom, is how rationalanimals seek their own good. Providential care of nonhuman beings isintegral to the vocation of being human.”24

Jenkins puts his stewardship ethic in terms of justice. He argues, “ForThomas, stewardship is rooted in justice, and justice is an act of God’sprovidence.”25 Or, again, “The ecological task of stewardship is the dis-pensation of justice, giving each its due ‘according to the equality ofproportion,’”26 so that “the work of stewardship is to be a minister ofGod’s justice.”27 To act justly, human beings must be responsible stew-

18 Ibid., 413.19 Ibid., 412.20 Ibid., 413.21 Ibid., 411.22 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 103, 4. Cited in Jenkins, “Biodiversity and Salvation,” 417. Jenkins

also cites Thomas’s discussion in Question 103, Article 6, where Thomas states, “Now it is agreater perfection for a thing to be good in itself and also the cause of goodness in others,than only to be good in itself” (Summa Theologiae, Ia, 103, 6).

23 Jenkins, “Biodiversity and Salvation,” 417.24 Ibid., 419.25 Ibid., 414.26 Ibid.27 Ibid.




452

ards of God’s creation. Justice demands that we seek the good of allcreatures, and so it governs not only our relations to other humanbeings, but also our relations to nonhuman creatures.

god’s view of creatures: providence and justice

I want now to turn to a critical examination of Jenkins’s argument.Jenkins confuses “ontological goodness,” the goodness each creaturehas by virtue of its participation in the divine goodness, with what mightbe termed “moral worth,” or the worthiness of each creature to directmoral consideration by human beings. All creatures are ontologicallygood, good in their very being and, insofar, they seek to preserve andaugment their own being. But this is a metaphysical or metaethical,and not yet ethical, matter. The bare fact of ontological goodness saysnothing about how human beings ought to behave in relation to othercreatures; it says nothing about the moral worth of such creatures.While it is beyond dispute that in Thomas’s thought all creatures areontologically good, or gifts of grace, and so participate in the divineeconomy of grace, the moral implications Jenkins draws (e.g., that hu-man beings have a moral responsibility to other creatures and oughtto preserve biological diversity) do not follow. To understand the moralimplications of Thomas’s ontology, one must examine carefully his tel-eology—a task that I turn to below and that in significant and relevantrespects Jenkins forgoes.

I want to focus on two of Jenkins’s central (and interrelated) claims—namely, (1) that Thomas’s position supports an understanding of non-human creatures as having intrinsic value (or rather something “betterthan” intrinsic value) and (2) that the resulting stewardship ethic canbe specified in terms of Thomas’s understanding of justice. I argue thatThomas’s understanding of divine providence and divine justice un-dermines these claims.

I begin with Jenkins’s claim that Thomas’s scheme supports some-thing “better than” the intrinsic value of nonhuman creatures. On Jen-kins’s reading, once we come to see creatures in faith as gifts of God,once we come to see creatures as God sees them, then a reverentialattitude follows that enables us to view, and so to treat, these creaturesnoninstrumentally. Let us then consider what it would mean, in Tho-mas’s thought, to see creatures “as God sees them.” Far from legiti-mating a noninstrumental understanding of other creatures, seeingcreatures as God sees them lends legitimacy to the view that other crea-tures are strictly instrumental to the human good. God cares for crea-tures as God sees them. Indeed, it is precisely because of the way God




453

sees creatures that God cares for them the way he does. So one way ofgetting a handle on how God “sees” other creatures is to consider God’sprovidential care for them.

Thomas’s Summa Contra Gentiles, book IIIb, chapter 112, is a richsource for this topic. This chapter is titled “That rational creatures aregoverned for their own sake, and other creatures, as directed tothem.”28 As is typical in this work, Thomas clarifies his position througha string of arguments designed to reach his desired conclusion. Eachargument in the string of arguments concludes with a statement of howThomas views God’s providential care of nonhuman creatures, and sohow God “sees” these creatures. So, for example, he states, “divine prov-idence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its own sake,but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature.”29 Or,again, “the intellectual nature alone is requisite for its own sake in theuniverse, and all others for its sake.”30 It seems, therefore, that to seeother creatures as God sees them is to see them as instruments for thehuman good. To be sure, they are properly seen as gifts from God butas gifts to be used as instruments and not as creatures with something“better than” intrinsic value.

Indeed, several of Thomas’s arguments are put explicitly in terms ofthe instrumentality of nonhuman, nonrational creatures. For example,his first argument proceeds as follows:

the very condition of the rational creature, in that it has dominion over itsactions, requires that the care of providence should be bestowed on it for itsown sake: whereas the condition of other things that have not dominion overtheir actions shows that they are cared for, not for their own sake, but as beingdirected to other things. Because that which acts only when moved by another,is like an instrument; whereas that which acts by itself, is like a principal agent.Now an instrument is required, not for its own sake, but that the principalagent may use it.31 Hence whatever is done for the care of the instruments mustbe referred to the principal agent as its end: whereas any such action directedto the principal agent as such, either by the agent itself or by another, is forthe sake of the same principal agent. Accordingly intellectual creatures are

28 Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIb, 112. “Quod creaturae rationales gubernantur propter seipsas,aliae vero in ordine ad eas.”

29 Ibid.30 Ibid.31 The Latin up to this point goes as follows: “ipsa conditio intellectualis naturae, secundum

quam est domina sui actus, providentiae curam requirit qua sibi propter se provideatur:aliorum vero conditio, quae non habent dominium sui actus, hoc indicat, quod eis non propteripsa cura impendatur, sed velut ad alia ordinatis. Quod enim ab altero tantum agitur, rationeminstrumenti habet: quod vero per se agit, habet rationem principalis agentis. Instrumentumautem non quaeritur propter seipsum, sed ut eo principale agens utatur” (ibid.).




454

ruled by God, as though He cared for them for their own sake, while othercreatures are ruled as being directed to rational creatures.32

Thomas’s argument is clear and concise: humans have dominion overtheir own actions (or, we might say, they have rational freedom or afree will or are causa sui) and so are cared by God for their own sakes;other creatures lack freedom and so are like instruments to be used bythe free.33 Nonrational creatures are moved by another; for example,some (like arrows) are moved directly by a rational creature and others(like sheep) are moved by natural instinct. As such, they are “slaves”34

to be used as “instruments”35 by the free. Note that by arguing thatnonhuman creatures are “cared for, not for their own sake, but as beingdirected to other things”36 and finally to human beings, this argumentstates the strict instrumental ordering of the nonhuman to the human(rather than this instrumental ordering being in addition to any moralworth that such a creature might have).

Thomas puts this instrumental ordering in clear, one might say stark,terms when he writes, “Hereby is refuted the error of those who said itis sinful for a man to kill dumb animals: for by divine providence they areintended for man’s use in the natural order. Hence it is no wrong for manto make use of them, either by killing or in any other way whatever.”37 Theconclusion seems inescapable: to see other creatures as God sees themmeans to see them as mere instruments to the human good. It is “bydivine providence” that other creatures are ordered instrumentally tothe human good. Even cruelty or harm to animals is morally proscribedonly because of its effects (or potential effects) on human beings. AsThomas explains, “If any passages of Holy Writ seem to forbid us to becruel to dumb animals, for instance to kill a bird with its young: this iseither to remove man’s thoughts from being cruel to other men, andlest through being cruel to animals one become cruel to human beings:or because injury to an animal leads to the temporal hurt of man, either

32 The second argument is similar: “That which has dominion over its own act, is free inits action, because he is free who is cause of himself: whereas that which by some kind ofnecessity is moved by another to act, is subject to slavery. Therefore every other creature isnaturally under slavery; the intellectual nature alone is free. Now, in every government pro-vision is made for the free for their own sake; but for slaves that they may be useful to thefree. Accordingly divine providence makes provision for the intellectual creature for its ownsake, but for other creatures for the sake of the intellectual creature” (ibid.).

33 Ibid.34 Ibid. From “servus” (m. and f. as subst.): a slave, servant.35 Ibid. From “instrumentum” (n.): equipment, instrument, tool, implement.36 Ibid.; italics added.37 Ibid.; italics added. “Per haec autem excluditur error ponentium homini esse peccatum

si animalia bruta occidat. Ex divina enim providentia naturali ordine in usum hominis or-dinantur. Unde absque iniuria eis utitur homo, vel occidendo, vel quolibet alio modo.”




455

of the doer of the deed, or of another.”38 We could continue to look atother arguments in this question. Such an undertaking would only re-inforce the conclusion articulated above. Thomas’s position is clear (aseven the title of the question reflects): God cares for nonhuman crea-tures for the sake of human beings and not for their own sakes. (Below,we will examine Thomas’s claim that such creatures are also for thesake of the perfection of the universe.)

Let us turn now to the second point articulated above, namely, Jen-kins’s claim that his stewardship ethic can be grounded in Thomas’saccount of justice.39 Jenkins rightly sees human justice in terms of di-vine justice40 and rightly maintains that “justice is an act of divine prov-idence.”41 Still, it is not the case that one can derive any noninstru-mental stewardship ethic from Thomas’s understanding of justice. Onthe contrary, precisely because the divine justice is an act of God’s prov-idence (which providential care cares for the lower strictly for the sakeof the higher—as we saw above) and because human justice is modeledon the divine justice, the virtue of justice cannot include the well-beingof other creatures within its ambit. Jenkins is mistaken, then, when hemaintains, “the ecological task of stewardship [where this includes non-instrumental valuation of nonhuman creatures and the moral exhor-tation that human beings ought to preserve biological diversity] is thedispensation of justice.”42

As we saw above, in our discussion of divine providence, God caresfor nonhuman creatures for the sake of the rational creature. God’sprovidential care for creatures reflects the ordering of the universe andso the divine will and the divine justice. As Thomas says, “the order ofthe universe, which is seen both in effects of nature and in effects ofwill, shows forth the justice of God.”43 He puts in terms of divine justicewhat I discussed above in providential terms. “It is . . . due to a createdthing that it should possess what is ordered to it; thus it is due to manto have hands, and that other animals should serve him. Thus . . . Godexercises justice, when He gives to each thing what is due to it by its

38 Ibid.39 Jenkins, “Biodiversity and Salvation,” 414.40 As Thomas says, “The first thing upon which the essential character of all justice depends

is the wisdom of the divine intellect, which constitutes things in their due proportion” (DisputedQuestions on Truth, 23, 6; italics added). Thomas also argues that “everyone is obliged toconform his will to God’s” (Disputed Questions on Truth, 23, 7). A will that is habituated well(i.e., has the virtue of justice) is disposed to follow the divine will. Human justice is modeledon divine justice. (See, e.g., Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, 87, 8; IIaIIae, 64, 2; IIaIIae, 64, 4; IIaIIae,65, 3; IIaIIae, 67, 3.)

41 Jenkins, “Biodiversity and Salvation,” 414.42 Ibid.43 Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, 21, 1.




456

nature and condition.”44 So the divine justice, the divine ordering ofthe universe, dictates that nonhuman creatures be instrumentally or-dered to human beings. That ordering is giving each creature its due.Nonhuman creatures are cared for, and indeed were created, not fortheir own sakes but for the sake of the human being (as well as for theperfection of the universe—which, as noted, we will look at below).

We can see this account reflected in Thomas’s discussion of the car-dinal virtue of justice. Equality is the bedrock and foundation of Tho-mas’s conception of justice. As Thomas puts it, “justice is a kind ofequality.”45 Or, again, “it belongs to justice to establish equality in ourrelations with others,”46 “equality is the general form of justice,”47 and“the essential character of justice consists in rendering to another hisdue according to equality.”48 Because nonhuman creatures lack the req-uisite ontological equality with (or are essentially less perfect than) hu-man beings, they are excluded from the ambit of justice. They are be-yond the moral pale. (We might note parenthetically that thisunderstanding is also reflected in Thomas’s division of sin accordingto its object. Thomas holds that sin is fittingly divided into sin againstoneself, sin against one’s neighbor, and sin against God. There is noroom for sin against nonhuman creatures.)

Thomas’s analysis of justice does not, and cannot, ground an ecolog-ical ethic of the sort advocated by Jenkins. Justice is divided into twospecies—commutative justice and distributive justice. In his account ofcommutative justice, Thomas considers the vices or sins to which it isopposed. In this discussion, he considers “whether it is unlawful to killany living thing.”49 He maintains, “there is no sin in using a thing forthe purpose for which it is. Now the order of things is such that theimperfect are for the perfect.”50 He concludes, therefore, that “it islawful [and so in accord with commutative justice] both to take lifefrom plants for the use of animals, and from animals for the use ofmen. In fact this is in keeping with the commandment of God him-self.”51 Because it lacks the requisite ontological equality, a nonhuman

44 Ibid., IaIIae, 21, 1 ad 1.45 Ibid., IaIIae, 114, 1. “Iustitia autem aequalitas quaedam est.”46 Ibid., IIaIIae, 79, 1. “Ad iustitiam enim pertinet aequalitatem constituere in his quae sunt

ad alterum.”47 Ibid., IIaIIae, 61, 2 ad 2. “Generalis forma iustitiae est aequalitas.”48 Ibid., IIaIIae, 80, 1. “Ratio vero iustitiae consistit in hoc quod alteri reddatur quod ei

debetur secundum aequalitatem.” See also, e.g., ibid., IIaIIae, 117, 2 ad 3, and IIaIIae, 62, 2.49 Ibid., IIaIIae, 64, 1.50 Ibid.51 Ibid.




457

creature cannot be the object of an act of (commutative) justice. Suchcreatures, as less perfect, are ordered to the human being, as moreperfect, in a strictly instrumental manner.52 It is lawful to kill livingthings for human use because this use is the very purpose for whichsuch beings exist.53

Distributive justice might seem promising as an avenue to incorpo-rate direct moral concern for nonhuman creatures into Thomas’smoral theory. Perhaps there might be some sort of proportion betweenhuman beings and nonhuman creatures. Maintaining the equality ofproportion would then entail that some of the common goods are dueto nonhuman creatures as a matter of (distributive) justice. However,Thomas’s ontology militates against any proportionality between ra-tional and nonrational creatures. Whatever similarity there is betweenhumans and nonhumans, the immaterial subsistent soul of the humanso separates us from other creatures that no such proportionality ispossible. There can be no proportion between material and immaterialentities. There is no common metric according to which these two ge-nerically different54 types of entity can be compared. To be sure, onemight argue that the comparison is not between nonrational creaturesand the human soul but between nonrational creatures and humanbeings (i.e., body and soul). But this approach does not help becausethe problem remains of somehow comparing an entity without a sub-sistent soul to an entity with a subsistent soul, when those parts aresimply not comparable on the basis of any common metric.

Further, Thomas’s own understanding of distributive justice does notinclude any mention of the justice due to nonrational creatures andhis more general account of justice makes it clear that human justiceis only between human beings. For example, he maintains, “the matterof justice is an external operation in so far as either it or the thing weuse by it is made proportionate to some other person to whom we arerelated by justice.”55 Or, again, “justice in the proper sense is always

52 Indeed, as noted, the basis of the claim that transactions between individuals morallybinds each of them to treat the other with justice, to render each his due according to equality,to give in equal measure as has been received, is the ontological equality of participants inthe transaction. This ontological equality can only be the equality of rational agents. Withoutpresupposing such equality, the equality of justice cannot itself be justified. Outside therelations between human beings little sense can be made of this equality of (commutative)justice.

53 See, e.g., Disputed Questions on Truth, 24, 2, ad 6.54 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 51, 1.55 Ibid., IIaIIae, 58, 11; italics added. “Materia iustitiae est operatio exterior secundum quod

ipsa, vel res qua per eam utimur, proportionatur alteri personae.” See also, e.g., ibid., IaIIae,100, 12; IIaIIae, 58, 2; IIaIIae, 67, 3; Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 93.




458

between different persons.”56 He even states point blank, “There is nojustice between man and irrational beings.”57 And even though thisstatement is articulated in an objection, it is clear from Thomas’s re-sponse that he takes this particular point for granted.58 (One mightnote here that Thomas’s understanding of distributive justice wasstrongly influenced by Greek, especially Aristotelian, conceptions ofjustice. And, as such, it is thoroughly sociological matter—primarilyconcerned with maintaining peace and stability within the human com-munity by distributing the common goods to an individual in accor-dance with her or his position in the community.)

Human justice, the virtue of the will, is modeled on divine justice.59

The human will ought to be conformed to the divine will in the sensethat human beings act justly when we order our relations to one an-other and to other creatures in such a way as to conform to the divineordering of creation, which ordering reflects the divine justice. In thepresent discussion, this entails that human justice cannot include ourrelations to nonhuman creatures precisely because the divine justiceorders the lower to the higher instrumentally, as is made especiallyclear in Thomas’s discussion of divine providence. It is interesting thatprecisely because divine justice orders of all creatures to one another(and orders them as it does), human justice only includes the orderingof human relations. We can sum up this portion of the discussion bysaying that seeing creatures as God sees them means seeing them asinstruments to the human good and modeling human justice on thedivine justice means excluding our relations to other creatures fromthe ambit of justice (except insofar as these relations might affect hu-man beings).

thomas’s bifurcations

I want to consider now the systematic reasons that Thomas’s concep-tions of God and of creatures do not, and cannot, underwrite a non-instrumental understanding of nonhuman creatures. Jenkins’s confu-sion of ontological goodness and moral worth is part of the largerconfusion of seeing continuity where Thomas sees discontinuity. First,

56 Disputed Questions on Truth, 28, 1. “Iustitia proprie dicta semper existente inter diversaspersonas.” See also, e.g., Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, 100, 12; IIaIIae, 58, 2; IIaIIae, 67, 3; SummaContra Gentiles, I, 93.

57 Summa Theologiae, IaIIae, 46, 7 obj 1.58 See ibid., IaIIae, 47, 7, obj 1 and ad 1.59 See, e.g., Summa Theologiae, IIaIIae, 67, 3 obj 1 and ad 1; IIaIIae, 64, 2 obj 2 and ad 2;

Disputed Questions on Truth, 23, 7. See also n. 40 above.




459

if God was truly continuous with the world, if God was truly affectedby the world, then it might be sensible to exhort human beings not tothwart God’s primary purpose in creating, which is that creation bediverse so as to most fully reflect the divine goodness. But God is whollyperfect, ipsum esse subsistens, utterly complete, and so cannot be affectedby the world. The divine will (fulfilled infallibly by the infinite divinepower) cannot be thwarted by the agency of creatures. Since the re-flection of the divine goodness is God’s primary purpose in creating,then the diversity that is necessary to fulfill that purpose is directlywilled by God. Human beings cannot affect the divine will. Second, ifhuman beings were truly ontologically continuous with the rest of cre-ation, then one might be able to make a Thomistic case for the moralworth of all creatures. But material entities differ generically from im-material entities (which entities include the human soul, though in aqualified sense).60 These entities have separate destinies, and onlythrough a further consideration of Thomas’s teleology can the fullmoral import of his ontology be clarified. This teleology demonstratesthe solely instrumental worth of nonhuman creatures.

A useful way to organize this portion of our discussion is through aconsideration of the first and second perfections of the universe. Thefirst perfection is “the completeness of the universe at its first found-ing.”61 This first perfection concerns the universe and the order amongcreatures in the created state of time and movement. The second per-fection, “which is the end of the whole universe, is the perfect beatitudeof the saints at the consummation of the world.”62 In the second orfinal perfection, movement and time cease. By considering Thomas’sunderstanding of the divine will in bringing about the first perfection,or in creating, as well as the divine providence in preserving this cre-ation, we will see that Jenkins’s exhortation that human beings oughtto preserve the diversity of species is not sensible within Thomas’sframework.63 By then considering salvation and the second perfectionof the universe, we will see that Jenkins’s claim to base the noninstru-mental value of nonhuman creatures in the thought of Thomas cannotbe sustained. Let consider these topics in turn.

60 See n. 3 above.61 Ibid., Ia, 73, 1.62 Ibid.63 The obvious fact that this exhortation is, in fact, very sensible is not the point in the

present conversation. The point here is to demonstrate that Jenkins’s line of reasoning, soevident to us today, is foreign to Thomas’s way of thinking and indeed offers an impliedcritique of Thomas’s understanding of God and God’s relation to the world.




460

God and World

Thomas holds, “God in bringing all creatures into being out of nothing,himself instated the first perfection of the universe, consisting of theprincipal parts thereof, and the various species of things.”64 Thomasargues extensively and often that the distinction of things is from God,not from chance or merit/demerit or secondary causes.65 For our dis-cussion, it is instructive to consider one of his numerous argumentsthat the distinction between creatures is not from chance. He arguesthe following:

The form of anything that proceeds from an intellectual voluntary agent isintended by the agent. Now the universe of creatures has for its author GodWho is an agent by His will and intellect. . . . Nor can there be any defect inHis power, so that He fail of His intention: since His power is infinite. . . . Itfollows therefore that the form of the universe is intended and willed by God.Therefore it is not from chance: for we ascribe to chance those things whichare beside the intention of the agent. Now the form of the universe consists inthe distinction and order of its parts. Therefore the distinction of things is notfrom chance.66

Unpacking this argument and its implications will demonstrate thatJenkins’s exhortation that human beings ought to preserve biologicaldiversity is so far from being grounded in the thought of Thomas thatit offers a direct, though implicit, challenge to Thomas’s conceptionsof the nature of God and God’s relation to the world.

Because of its relevance to our later discussion, it is worth noting thatThomas maintains that the production of diversity by secondary agentsreduces to the production of diversity by chance. Thomas arguesagainst the opinion that “does not assign one cause to the entire diver-sity of things, but a different cause to each particular effect: and theentire diversity of things it ascribes to the concurrence of all causes.Now we say that those things happen by chance, which result from theconcurrence of various causes, and not from one determinate cause.Wherefore the distinction of things and the order of the universe wouldbe the result of chance.”67 If the distinction of things, the existence ofdiverse species, were from the concurrence of various uncoordinated

64 On the Power of God, trans. English Dominicans (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne,1932–34), bk. I, Question 2, Article 5 ad 5 (hereafter, all On the Power of God citations aregiven as, e.g., I, 2, 5 ad 5).

65 See, e.g., Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 39–44; Summa Theologiae, Ia, 47.66 Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 39.67 Ibid., II, 42; italics added.




461

causes, then the order of the universe would be from chance ratherthan design.68

Thomas argues that, in creating, God directly wills the distinctionbetween creatures. That is, God directly wills the existence of speciesor “grades of goodness.” It is helpful here to consider the nature ofthe will of God. Thomas maintains, “The will of God must needs alwaysbe fulfilled.”69 One way Thomas argues this is by arguing that God’swill is the universal cause of all things. (One can also say, as Thomasdoes, that God’s will is infallibly fulfilled because it is carried out bythe agency of God’s infinite power.) A particular cause can fail in itseffect because of the hindrance of some other particular cause. Allparticular causes are included in the order of the universal cause, sothat “the effect cannot possibly escape the order of the universal cause.. . . Since, then, the will of God is the universal cause of all things, itis impossible that the divine will should not produce its effect. Hencethat which seems to depart from the divine will in one order, returnsto it in another order; as does the sinner, who by sin falls away fromthe divine will as much as it lies in him, yet falls back into the order ofthat will, when by its justice he is punished.”70 The perfection of theuniverse is the universal order, consisting in the order among species.

God wills only one thing necessarily—God’s own goodness. There-fore, God wills to create freely. And in willing to create, God seeks tocommunicate God’s goodness to creation. It is the perfection of theuniverse as a whole that is the nearest thing to divine goodness in thecreated order.71 “The best among all things caused is the order of theuniverse, wherein the good of the universe consists.”72 Therefore, “thatwhich is chiefly willed and caused by God is the good consisting in the

68 As a parenthetic comment, this conclusion, it seems to me, follows only if one presupposesthat the universal cause must act by coercion rather than persuasion. After all, the effect thatresults from secondary causes could be the result of genuine agency on the part of theseparticular causes and the persuasive force of the universe cause or the divine agency—andso need not be considered as “chance” because the causes both act freely and are coordinated(though persuasively rather coercively).

69 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 19, 6.70 Ibid.71 See Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIa, 64. As Thomas says in this question, “Whoever has an

end in view, cares more for what is nearest to the last end: because the other ends are directedto this. Now the last end of God’s will is His goodness, the nearest thing to which amongcreated things is the good consisting in the order of the universe: because every particulargood of this or that thing is ordained thereto as its end, just as the less perfect is ordainedto that which is more perfect: even as each part is for the sake of its whole. Consequentlythat which God cares for most in created things, is the order of the universe: and thereforeHe governs it” (ibid.).

72 Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 42.




462

order of things of which He is the cause.”73 In creating, what God willsabove all else, what God wills universally, is the perfection of the uni-verse. And since this perfection consists in the order among species, itcan also be said that what God primarily wills in creating is the ordereddiversity of species.

For Thomas, the diversity between species is not mere difference butis ontologically ordered diversity; it is a scale of being and perfection.As Thomas says, “formal distinction always requires inequality, because. . . the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by ad-dition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things species seem tobe arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than theelements, and plants than minerals, and animals than plants, and menthan other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect thanothers.”74 Species are like numbers in the sense that a species higher inthe hierarchy has an additional essential perfection lacked by thosebelow it. It is the order among all these species that constitute the orderof the universe and so all are necessary for the perfection of the uni-verse.75 The reason the multitude of diverse creatures in the universemost fully reflects the divine goodness is because, in God, goodness is“simple and uniform” in the sense that God’s essence is goodness itself,completely perfect, ipsum esse subsistens. But in creatures goodness ispartial and divided. The whole universe of diverse creatures, then, withall of its species or “grades of goodness,” better represents the goodnessof God than can any single creature.76

The diversity of things necessary for the perfection of the universerefers primarily to species rather than individuals. It is species, and notindividuals, that differ in their essential perfections. So it is the orderamong diverse species that constitutes the perfection of the universe.

73 Ibid., bk. IIIa, chap. 64; see also Summa Theologiae, Ia, 49, 2.74 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 47, 2; italics added.75 Species are arranged in degrees so that, for example, species of animals are more perfect

than species of plants. But within each genus, the species are also hierarchically arranged.So it is not simply inanimate creatures, living creatures, living and conscious creatures, con-scious and rational creatures, and so forth, that are needed, but all the wonderful diversityof creatures within each of these categories are also needed for the universe’s perfection.

76 As Thomas summarizes, God “brought things into being in order that His goodness mightbe communicated to creatures, and be represented by them; and because His goodness couldnot be adequately represented by one creature alone, He produced many and diverse crea-tures, that what was wanting to one in the representation of the divine goodness might besupplied by another. For goodness, which in God is simple and uniform, in creatures ismanifold and divided and hence the whole universe together participates the divine goodnessmore perfectly, and represents it better than any single creature whatever” (Summa Theologiae,Ia, 47, 1). As he also puts it, “the good and the best in the universe consists in the mutualorder of its parts, which is impossible without distinction: since by this order the universe isestablished as one whole, and this is its best” (Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 39).




463

Species are also more enduring than corruptible individuals. “Spiritualsubstances and heavenly bodies, which are perpetual both as speciesand as individuals, are provided for on their own account both as spe-cies and as individuals. Corruptible things, however, are perpetual onlyas a species; hence, these species are looked after for their own sake,but the individual[s] . . . [are provided] to keep the species in per-petual existence.”77 Though it is not strictly the case that species in thischangeable universe are perpetual for Thomas,78 his point here is clear.Corruptible individuals are for the sake of their species because it isthe species that continue indefinitely and that are necessary for theperfection of the universe. As Thomas puts it, “even though the cor-ruption of a thing in the universe is not good for that thing, it is goodfor the perfection of the entire universe, because the continual gen-eration and corruption of individuals makes it possible for the speciesto be perpetual; and it is in this that the perfection of the universeessentially consists.”79 Thomas maintains that species are maintained“for their own sakes” precisely because they are necessary for the per-fection of the universe.80

In an interesting discussion of predestination,81 Thomas clarifies thedifference between the preordination of the predestined human soulsand the preordination of other things. The predestined are determinednot only with regard to the total number but also with regard to theidentity of the individuals who are so predestined. Without this speci-ficity, the certainty of predestination would be destroyed. This is incontrast to God’s preordination of other creatures. It is instructive toexamine the relevant portion of Thomas’s discussion.

Whosoever intends some definite measure in his effect thinks out some definitenumber in the essential parts, which are by their very nature required for theperfection of the whole. For of those things which are required not principally,

77 Disputed Questions on Truth, 5, 3.78 Thomas sometimes puts this in terms of “a certain perpetuity.” See, e.g., On the Power of

God, I, 3, 10.79 Disputed Questions on Truth, 5, 3.80 See, e.g., ibid. This discussion has been framed in terms of God’s free creation, in terms

of the first perfection or the perfection of the universe at its first founding—and so in termsof the divine will. But it can also be put in terms of the divine providence. In demonstratingthat God exercises providence over creation, Thomas argues, “Things in nature distinct donot converge into one order, unless they be brought together by one controller. Now theuniverse is composed of things distinct from one another and of contrary natures; and yetthey all converge into one order, some things acting on others, some helping or directingothers. Therefore there must be one ordainer and governor of the universe” (Summa ContraGentiles, IIIa, 64). In creating, God properly orders diverse creatures to one another in ac-cordance with their diverse essential perfections. In governing, God properly orders theoperations of these creatures to one another for the sake of the perfection of the whole.

81 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 23, 7.




464

but only on account of something else, he does not select any definite number“per se”; but he accepts and uses them in such numbers as are necessary onaccount of that other thing. . . . [God] pre-ordained . . . what number wouldbefit the essential parts of that universe—that is to say, which have in some waybeen ordained in perpetuity; . . . [including] how many species.82 Individuals. . . are not ordained as it were chiefly for the good of the universe, but in asecondary way, inasmuch as the good of the species is preserved through them.Whence, although God knows the total number of individuals, the number ofoxen, flies and such like, is not pre-ordained by God “per se”; but divine provi-dence produces just so many as are sufficient for the preservation of the species.83

Species, as essential to the perfection of the universe, “have in someway been ordained in perpetuity.”84 God is not directly concerned withthe individual members of nonrational species because they are not“per se” necessary for the perfection of the universe (in contradistinc-tion from immaterial entities), but the species of which they are a partare necessary for this perfection. Therefore, the divine providence pre-serves as many individuals as are necessary for the continuance of thespecies. The essential point for our discussion is that God directly willsthat species continue in existence. God has assigned to the heavenlybodies the role of preserving the diversity of material creation.85

In light of this discussion, I want to look at Jenkins’s statement thatin the thought of Thomas we find “a theological mandate to preserveecological diversity”86 both because we know God through creatures(i.e., they are salvifically important for the human being) and becauseother creatures are gifted beings “caught up with us into the divinecommerce of grace.”87 Given our present awareness of evolution, ofspecies generation and extinction, of past mass extinctions, and ourpresent human-induced simplification of the diversity of life,88 it is vir-

82 This last sentence, in full, in Latin: “Praeordinavit enim in qua mensura deberet essetotum universum, et quis numerus esset conveniens essentialibus partibus universi, quae scil-icet habent aliquo modo ordinem ad perpetuitatem; quot scilicet sphaerae, quot stellae, quotelementa, quot species rerum” (ibid.; italics added).

83 Ibid.; italics added. This last sentence in Latin: “Unde, licet Deus sciat numerum omniumindividuorum, non tamen numerus vel boum vel culicum, vel aliorum huiusmodi, est per sepraeordinatus a Deo, sed tot ex huiusmodi divina providentia produxit, quot sufficiunt adspecierum conservationem.”

84 Ibid.85 See, e.g., Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIa, 22; Summa Theologiae, Ia, 104, 2; Ia, 115, 3 ad 2; Ia,

70, 1 ad 4; Ia, 25, 2; Ia, 19, 6; Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 39; II, 42.86 Jenkins, “Biodiversity and Salvation,” 408.87 Ibid., 411.88 Though the modern classification of creatures into species took its bearings from Aristotle

and though the precise meaning of the term is a matter for debate today, it is neverthelessclear that talking of “species” in Thomas’s sense of the term is not equivalent to what is meantby the term today. Still, for the purposes of this article there is sufficient overlap to allow usto bypass trying to sort out what is an undoubtedly complex and contentious matter. Specif-




465

tually axiomatic that human beings are responsible for—if not morallyresponsible, at least responsible in the sense of “being the cause of”—species extinction. In this context, it is natural to look to our traditionsfor grounding moral prohibitions against the activities that lead to suchextinction. And Thomas stands out as a giant in the Christian tradition.He thought long, hard, and fruitfully about the moral nature of theuniverse as well as the place of human beings and other creatureswithin this whole.

However, it is a mistake to look to Thomas for moral prohibitionsagainst human-induced species extinction. For such prohibitions to be-come operative would entail a sweeping reformulation of his concep-tion of the divine nature and divine providence as well as the humanrelation to the rest of creation. Thomas’s conception of divine provi-dence, far from being an ally in Jenkins’s argument, militates againstit at every turn. God’s primary purpose in creating is the perfection ofthe universe, and this perfection consists in the order among species.Therefore, God wills that these species remain in existence, as we sawabove. And God’s power is infinite, and so God’s will cannot be frus-trated by worldly agency. One way to put this is to say that God is ex-ternally related to the world, though the world is internally related toGod. As Thomas states, “Since . . . God is outside the whole order ofcreation, and all creatures are ordered to Him, and not conversely, itis manifest that creatures are really related to God Himself; whereas inGod there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation only in idea,inasmuch as creatures are referred to Him.”89 And arguing that theheavenly bodies are the (secondary) cause of material diversity effec-tively removes any agency from earthly creatures to affect the very ex-istence of species.

To argue that God’s will, God’s primary purpose in creating, can befrustrated by human agency is to argue, in effect, that God’s will is notnecessarily fulfilled, that God is really related to or truly affected by theworld, God is not ipsum esse subsistens (since if he was subsistent beingitself, he could not be so affected), that the effect of secondary causescan act outside or alter the effect of the universal cause. In short, it isto offer an implied, and rather sweeping, critique of Thomas’s under-standing of the divine nature and God’s relation to the world. Whateverthe merits of this critique, it is hard to see how a position that implies

ically, it seems safe to say that if we confine our attention to living creatures, both Thomas’sunderstanding of species and the modern understanding of species would entail that thegreater the number of species the greater the diversity of life. This common understandingof what constitutes diversity (of species), rather than a common understanding of constitutesspecies themselves, is all we require for the purposes of this article.

89 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 13, 7.




466

such a critique—as Jenkins’ position does—can be “Thomistic.” Jen-kins’s position would, from within a Thomistic framework, make theperfection of the world a result of chance, not in the sense that un-coordinated secondary causes create species but in the sense that theydestroy species. Either way, these uncoordinated causes alter the uni-verse’s perfection—making it the result of chance.90

Before moving on, there are two objections I want to address brieflyin order to clarify my argument. First, one might argue that humanbeings frustrate God’s will all the time through sin. Second, why doesfrustrating God’s will imply that God thereby changes? Let me beginwith the first objection. As we saw above, the will of God is the universalcause of things, so that what “seems to depart from the will of God inone order returns to it in another.” So the sinner falls away from thedivine will to the extent he or she can, but never from the universalorder of the divine justice, which orders all things. With the destructionof species, it is precisely this universal causality, this universal ordering,that is frustrated. What could be more universal than causing the orderof the universe itself and all its parts? Human action frustrates God’sprimary purpose, God’s universal purpose, in creating; human actiondestroys species whose existence God preordained and whose existenceGod’s providence preserves. It is difficult, then, not to take Jenkins’sexhortation that human beings ought to preserve the diversity of crea-tion as a critique of Thomas’s understanding of God and God’s relationto the world. To move to the second issue, for human beings truly tofrustrate the divine (universal) will implies that God changes because,in that case, God must react to the world in order to know it, love it,and save it. True frustration cannot be eternally anticipated or preor-dained, so God must learn about (and react to) the activities thatcaused this frustration in “real time.” Such learning entails change.

Humans and Nonhumans (or Immaterial and Material Entities)

Not only does Jenkins see continuity between God and the world, healso sees continuity between human beings and the rest of materialcreation. So let us now turn to a consideration of Thomas’s understand-

90 For Thomas, the radical discontinuity between God and the world can be specified interms of “being” or “esse,” which is, in his thought, an analogical term. God is being by God’sown essence, all other entities are being by participation. Jenkins’s position, by implicitlymaintaining that human beings can frustrate the divine will (by effectively negating God’sprimary purpose in creating), challenges this fundamental plank, perhaps the fundamentalplank, in Thomas metaphysics. Such frustration of the divine will could only happen if Godwas affected by the world and, to be affected by the world God, God could not be ipsum essesubsistens.




467

ing of the radical discontinuity between human beings and other crea-tures,91 and the implications this understanding has for a Thomisticenvironmental ethic. The difference between humans and nonhumansbecomes especially salient in Thomas’s soteriology. It is useful to beginby returning to Thomas’s discussion in book IIIb, chapter 112, of theSumma Contra Gentiles. In that question, Thomas argues that the instru-mental subordination of the nonrational to the rational is not in con-tradiction to his repeated arguments, especially against Origen, that allthe species or “grades of goodness” are necessary for the perfection ofthe universe. He writes,

The fact that all the parts of the universe are directed to the perfection of thewhole is not in contradiction with the foregoing conclusion [i.e., that nonhu-man creatures are instrumentally ordered to human beings]: since all the partsare directed to the perfection of the whole, in so far as one part serves another.Thus in the human body it is clear that the lungs belong to the body’s perfec-tion, in that they serve the heart: wherefore there is no contradiction in thelungs being for the sake of the heart, and for the sake of the whole animal. Ina like manner that other natures are on account of the intellectual is not con-trary to their being for the perfection of the universe: for without the thingsrequired for the perfection of the intellectual substance, the universe wouldnot be complete.92

Nonhuman creatures, then, seemingly have a twofold end, neither ofwhich is subordinate to the other. Just as the lungs are for the sake ofthe heart and the whole body, nonhuman creatures are for the sake ofthe higher creature (and finally the human being) and for the sake ofthe perfection of the universe. But Thomas’s gloss—“for without thethings required for the perfection of the intellectual substance, theuniverse would not be complete”—does, in fact, seem to reassert a strictinstrumentalization that is in tension with his repeated arguments thatthe diversity of species is itself necessary for the universe most fully toreflect the divine goodness. It drains these arguments of their force tomaintain that the diversity is not itself directly willed by God, but whatis willed by God is whatever is needed for the human being or thehuman good (because the human being is essential for the perfectionof the universe). And, it turns out, all the tremendous diversity of cre-ation is necessary for the human good and so for the perfection of theuniverse. If the diversity is not itself necessary, then Thomas’s positionturns out to be not so different from that of Origen. The ordering of

91 Ibid., Ia, 51, 1.92 Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIb, 112.




468

creatures to the perfection of the universe seems to be subordinatedto their ordering to the human good.

But one might maintain that Thomas’s gloss, or at least this inter-pretation of Thomas’s gloss, is not in line with his more systematicconclusion—that nonhuman creatures have two morally relevant ends,the human good and the perfection of the universe, neither of whichis subordinate to the other.93 As he says in a passage we will look atmore closely below, “The end of minerals, plants and animals is two-fold. One is the completion of the universe. . . . The other end isman.”94 Perhaps, then, we have grounds for holding that nonhumancreatures are worthy of direct moral consideration (because of theirrelation to the perfection of the universe) and are not merely subor-dinate to the human good.95 The systematic problem with this readingbecomes apparent when we consider Thomas’s soteriology, which dif-fers markedly, and in crucial respects, from the depiction given in Jen-kins’s account. Whereas Jenkins focuses on a this-worldly account ofsalvation as coming to know God through creatures, and whereas Jen-kins sees continuity between human salvation and the good of othercreatures,96 Thomas offers an other-worldly account in which the finalgood of the human is radically discontinuous with the good of non-human creatures. Thomas’s arguments on the need for diverse speciesand the subordination of the part to the whole97 can only play the rolethat Jenkins assigns to them—the role of displaying other creatures’noninstrumental value or “specialness”—if we ignore Thomas’s own so-teriology in favor of Jenkins’s this-worldly soteriology in which “seeking

93 As Jenkins’s notes, Thomas articulates a fourfold end for creatures as well. This includestheir own perfection and God, in addition to the lower being for the higher and every creaturebeing for the perfection of the universe. But having as an end one’s own perfection andhaving as an end God are identical in Thomas’s ontology. What Aquinas says in this regardwhen speaking of things devoid of knowledge applies to all creatures: “they seek a divinelikeness, as well as their own perfection. Nor does it matter in which way we express it, theformer or the latter. Because by tending to their own perfection, they tend to a good, sincea thing is good forasmuch as it is perfect. And according as a thing tends to be good, it tendsto a divine likeness: since a thing is like unto God forasmuch as it is good. . . . It is cleartherefore that all things seek a divine likeness as their last end” (Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIa,24). And that each creature is created to pursue its own perfection, or is ontologically good,says nothing about how rational creatures ought to act in relation to such creatures. It is ametaphysical and not yet ethical matter. Jenkins here confuses ontological goodness withmoral worth.

94 On the Power of God, II, 5, 9.95 Note that this line of argument does not focus on the value of the individual creature

per se. This line of reasoning has been undermined by the previous consideration of God’sprovidential care for creatures. But, as we will see, this conclusion will be further reinforcedthrough an analysis of Thomas’s soteriology.

96 See, e.g., Jenkins, “Biodiversity and Salvation,” 419.97 See, e.g., ibid., 415.




469

the good of every creature under our power . . . is how rational crea-tures seek their own good.”98 Thomas’s account of salvation yields anorder to the ends of nonhuman creatures in which the final good ofthe human takes precedence over the perfection of the universe itselfin its changeable state. This is so because the entire universe in its change-able state is finally for the sake of the completion of the number of theelect,99 and so is subordinated to the human good. This analysis un-dercuts Jenkins’s claim to ground the noninstrumental value of non-human creatures in Thomas’s thought.

The entire discussion of the divine preservation of species is relevantonly to this changeable universe. But, as noted, this universe of timeand movement is itself finally for the sake of the final perfection of theuniverse, when all motion will cease. The entire mutable universe canbe considered as “ontologically instrumental” to the universe in its fi-nal, unchangeable state. The final perfection is “the end of the wholeuniverse.”100 This understanding of the final perfection of the universeinevitably instrumentalizes nonrational creatures because the rationalcreature alone has an incorruptible soul, making it alone suitable forthis final perfection.

I want to turn now to Thomas’s understanding of this second per-fection in order to bring out the implications of this understanding forthe moral status of nonhuman creatures. One of Thomas’s most com-plete treatments of this matter is in On the Power of God, Question 5,where he discusses God’s preservation of things. In article 5 of thatquestion, Thomas considers whether the heavenly movement will ceaseat any time. This question is germane to our discussion because, onThomas’s physics, the movement of heavenly bodies is the cause ofgeneration of, and diversity among, lower bodies. Thomas explains thatbecause the movement of the heavenly bodies is circular, it does notresult in them reaching a “whereabouts” to which they are inclined bynature. And because nature never tends to movement as such, butmovement is always for the sake of some definite result, this circularmovement can be “natural” to heavenly bodies only in the sense thatthey have a natural aptitude for this kind of movement; they containin themselves the passive principle of that movement. The active prin-ciple, Thomas maintains, must be some separate substance, such as Godor angels. Therefore, and this is Thomas’s point, the permanence ofthe movement of heavenly bodies cannot be argued on the basis of the

98 Ibid., 419.99 See, e.g., Summa Theologiae, Ia, 73, 1.100 Ibid.




470

nature of such bodies since they contain only an aptitude for suchmovement.

We must then look for the reason why the active principle causes thismovement. So Thomas inquires into the end of the heavenly move-ment. If this end requires perpetual heavenly movement, then suchmovement will not cease. If this end will be reached in time (and re-quires that this movement stop), then the heavens will ceased to bemoved. Thomas argues, “The movement of the heavens is for the com-pletion of the number of the elect. For the rational soul is more ex-cellent than any body whatsoever, even than the heavens: whereforethere is nothing unreasonable in supposing that the end of the heav-enly movement is the multiplication of rational souls. . . . Thereforeit is a definite number of souls that is the end of the heavenly move-ment: and when this is reached the movement will cease.”101 We havenow reached the reason or end or purpose for heavenly motion—it isfor the completion of the number of the elect. Upon the achievementof this purpose, heavenly motion will cease. There will be no more time,no more movement. Since heavenly movement is “the first principle ofgeneration and corruption,”102 since “the heaven’s movement gives lifeto all nature in its state of mutability,”103 let us now consider what hap-pens to plants and animals when the number of the elect has beenachieved.

Thomas addresses this question in article 9. He begins with the clearstatement that in the “renewal of the world no mixed body [i.e., nomineral, plant, or animal] will remain except the human body.”104 Tho-mas argues for this view in terms of the four causes. He begins with thefinal cause, the cause of the other causes.

The end of minerals, plants and animals is twofold. One is the completion ofthe universe, to which end all the parts of the universe are ordained: yet theaforesaid things are not ordained to this end as though by their very natureand essentially they were required for the universe’s perfection, since they con-tain nothing that is not to be found in the principal parts of the world [namely,the heavenly bodies and the elements] as their active and material principles.Consequently the things in question are particular effects of those universalcauses which are essential parts of the universe, so that they belong to theperfection of the universe only in the point of their production by their causes,and this is by movement. Hence they belong to the perfection of the universe not

101 On the Power of God, II, 5, 5.102 Ibid., II, 5, 7.103 Ibid., II, 5, 7 ad 17.104 Ibid., II, 5, 9.




471

absolutely speaking but only as long as the latter is in motion. Wherefore as soon asmovement in the universe ceases these things must cease to exist.105

In light of the final perfection, Thomas seriously qualifies his numerousarguments that the diversity of species is necessary for the universe’sperfection. Mixed bodies, it turns out, are not “by their very naturesand essentially” required for the perfection of the universe but are onlyprovisionally necessary for “as long as the [universe] is in motion.” Itappears that plants and animals are necessary for the universe mostfully to reflect the divine goodness only in this changeable state of theuniverse. Once the universe passes from its first to its final perfection,such creatures will no longer be necessary for this perfection, whichrequires incorruptibility in its members.

Further, the universe is in motion for the sake of human beings—forthe sake of the generation of the requisite number of the elect. Whenthe preordained number of the elect has been reached, this motionwill cease. And with this cessation of motion, the existence of all mixedbodies, with the exception of the human body,106 will end. By under-standing mixed bodies as necessary only to the perfection of the uni-verse in its changeable state and by understanding the changeable uni-verse itself to be directed to the human good, Thomas can maintainboth that all species of creatures are necessary for the perfection of theuniverse (in its changeable state) and that nonhuman creatures aremerely instrumental to the human good. To be sure, there is a cost inthis reconciliation—the end of the perfection of the universe (at leastin its changeable state) is in effect subordinated to the end of the hu-man good.

Thomas explicates this issue further in his discussion of the secondend of mixed bodies: “The other end is man, because . . . things thatare imperfect in nature are ordained to those that are perfect, as theirend . . . : it follows that plants are for animals being prepared by na-ture to be the latter’s food; and animals are for man, to whom they arenecessary as food and for other purposes. Now this necessity lasts aslong as man’s animal life endures. But this life will cease in that finalrenewal of the universe, because the body will rise not natural but spir-

105 Ibid.; italics added. In Latin, the last two sentences are as follows: “Unde pertinent adperfectionem universi sub motu existentis, non autem ad perfectionem universi simpliciter. Et ideocessante mutabilitate universi, oportet quod praedicta cessent” (italics added).

106 Thomas’s explanation for why the human body continues in existence is as follows: “Byits perfect union with God the soul will have complete sway over the body: so that althoughmatter, if left to itself, is corruptible, it will acquire incorruption by the power of the soul”(On the Power of God, II, 5, 10 ad 3).




472

itual: hence animals and plants will also cease to exist then.”107 Thisputs the matter clearly, indeed, bluntly. Human beings need plants andanimals as long as we have an “animal life.” Once this animal life passeswith the advent of the final renewal of the universe, there is no reasonfor the continued existence of plants and animals. This offers a strikingsummary statement of the solely instrumental value of plants and ani-mals. When they can no longer serve the human being, their very ex-istence ceases, and, indeed, insofar as they are not suited for the finalperfection, they were created such that their existence must cease whenhuman beings move on to a state where we have no need for such“mixed bodies.”108

Thomas also discusses this issue (of why mixed bodies will not existafter the end of the mutable world) in terms of formal, material, andefficient causation. He maintains that this understanding is consistentwith the matter and form of these material things. They contain matter,the principle of corruption, and are without a self-subsistent form topreserve them in existence. With regard to efficient causation, “the verysouls of plants and animals are wholly subject to the influence of theheavenly bodies.”109 When the heavenly movement ceases, when thenumber of the elect has been realized, such material creatures cannotretain movement or life. This analysis is unsurprising since, given thepurpose or final cause for which these creatures exist, the other causesmust be consistent with the extinction of nonhuman creatures whenhuman beings no longer have need of them.

In light of this soteriology, Jenkins’s argument that Thomas’s thoughtcan ground the noninstrumental value of nonhuman creatures is unten-able. The very existence of these creatures ceases when, and because,their instrumental usefulness to human beings comes to an end. It isdifficult to formulate a clearer statement of the solely instrumental valueof nonhuman creatures.110 Looking ahead to Thomas’s understanding

107 Ibid., II, 5, 9.108 See, e.g., Disputed Questions on Truth, 24, 2, ad 6. See also, e.g., Thomas’s response to the

objection that elements are rewarded for their service to humans during their time on earthas wayfarers, so too then should plants and animals be so rewarded. Thomas responds: “Theelements are said to be rewarded not in themselves, because in themselves they had no merit;but because men will be rewarded in them, inasmuch as their brightness will conduce to theglory of the elect. As to plants and animals they will be of no use to man like the elementswhich will be as it were the place of their glory: hence the comparison fails” On the Power ofGod, II, 5, 9 ad 9).

109 On the Power of God, II, 5, 9.110 This analysis, one might object, is heavily dependent on an obviously outdated and

seriously flawed physics, so that if we excise this physics from Thomas’s work, the instrumen-talization of nonhuman creatures might similarly fall away. But this objection is misguidedbecause Thomas’s analysis is guided by his understanding of the end of creatures. He explicateshow this end manifests itself in terms of an outdated physics, but the end itself (i.e., that




473

of the end times clarifies the moral status of nonhuman creatures in thepresent because it demonstrates dramatically that such creatures are fi-nally for the sake of the human good. Thomas’s thought systematicallyexcludes the direct moral consideration of nonhuman creatures. Itsdeep (and finally metaphysical) bifurcations, with the attendant under-standings of divine providence, salvation, and justice, make untenableany assertion that this system of thought can ground a noninstrumentalenvironmental ethic. Any Thomistic environmental ethic, then, must bedeveloped within strictly anthropocentric parameters.

conclusion

I want to conclude by briefly considering what is perhaps the mostintriguing (ecologically relevant) strand in Thomas’s thought—his dis-cussion of government in which he claims that “the creature becomeslike God by moving others to goodness.”111 Though this strand cannotcarry the burden Jenkins assigns to it—the burden of grounding a ste-wardship ethic in which human beings are, or ought to be, the “‘mid-dle cause’ of the preservation of things”112—it does offer the oppor-tunity to suggest in summary form the reformulations needed to make“moving others to goodness” a universal injunction that could groundan ecological ethic.

It is the bifurcations between God and the world, and between hu-mans and nonhumans, that undermine Jenkins’s claim that Thomas’sunderstanding of government can lend support to a stewardship ethic.Within Thomas’s larger system of thought, it simply cannot do thework to which Jenkins puts it. First, as our discussion above demon-strates, no “middle cause” can thwart God’s primary purpose in cre-ating. This is God’s “universal purpose,” the purpose for the whole.And God’s will is infallibly carried out by God’s infinite power. There-fore, without rejecting central elements of Thomas’s theology, it can-not be an operative moral injunction that human beings ought to pre-serve biological diversity. This much seems clear from our previousdiscussion. Second, the bifurcation between the final goods of humansand nonhumans means that one cannot use Thomas’s thought to sus-

nonhuman creatures are for the sake of the perfection of the universe in its changeable stateand are merely instrumental to the human good) does not depend crucially on any particularphysics but rather on a metaphysic. (After all, modern physics, it seems fair to say, wouldagree that the cessation of motion would result in the annihilation of material creatures.)The dichotomy between the changeable/unchangeable is the crucial issue. The point ofThomas’s analysis is to explain, in terms of the physics of his day, the twofold end of nonhumancreatures. It is this twofold end itself that is of concern here.

111 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 103, 3.112 Jenkins, “Biodiversity and Salvation,” 417.




474

tain a universal injunction that human beings ought to pursue thegood of other creatures. This point requires some development.

In his discussion of government, Thomas is primarily concerned withthe good of the one governing, and the good of the one governed onlyinsofar as it contributes to the good of the governor. The pursuit ofthe good of the governed is a means to the good of governor. Thomasis considering the effect of government “on the part of those means ofwhich the creature is made like to God.”113 Thomas maintains, “Thereare in general two effects of the government. For the creature is assim-ilated to God in two things; first, with regard to this, that God is good;and so the creature becomes like Him by being good; and secondly,with regard to this, that God is the cause of goodness in others; andso the creature becomes like God by moving others to goodness.”114

There is considerable ambiguity here. The “others” spoken of mightbe human others in which case no stewardship ethic would follow. Still,the context indicates that Thomas’s concerns are broader than this.But a stewardship ethic of the sort advocated by Jenkins follows onlyon the assumption of a coincidence between the human good and thegood of other creatures—an assumption Jenkins seems to make.115 Ofcourse, in an abstract sense there is such a coincidence since the good-ness of all creatures is actuality. But Jenkins’s argument is tenable onlyif the human good is necessarily enhanced by human beings pursuingthe good of other creatures. It is clear that Thomas does not hold tothe coincidence of the human good and the good of the individualnonhuman creature. To the contrary, as we saw, it is morally permis-sible for humans to kill other creatures or treat them in any way what-soever.116 More fundamentally, the final goods of the human and ofother creatures diverge irreconcilably. Thomas’s depiction of the sec-ond perfection, when the final good of the human will be realized andother creatures will cease to exist, displays his strictly instrumental un-derstanding of nonhuman creatures.

What, then, can Thomas mean in his discussion of government? Per-haps “moving others to goodness” means moving others to the good

113 Summa Theologiae, Ia, 103, 4; italics added.114 Ibid., Ia, 103, 3.115 See Jenkins, “Biodiversity and Salvation,” 419.116 Summa Contra Gentiles, IIIb, 112. That the death of a creature is not good for that creature

seems obvious on its face, and Thomas’s thought reflects this understanding. For example,he states, “even though the corruption of a thing in the universe is not good for that thing,it is good for the perfection of the entire universe, because the continual generation andcorruption of individuals makes it possible for the species to be perpetual; and it is in thisthat the perfection of the universe essentially consists” (Disputed Questions on Truth, 5, 3, ad2).




475

of their species or to the good of the universe or, indeed, to the humangood (which, after all, is the end of other creatures) rather than theirown individual good. These interpretations do not seem to be indi-cated by the text. But even if one of them is what Thomas intends,they do not help in building a stewardship ethic in which nonhumancreatures have noninstrumental value and in which human beingsought to preserve biological diversity. This is transparently the casewhen “moving others to goodness” is interpreted to mean “moving oth-ers to the human good” (since to avoid instrumentalization this inter-pretation requires the dubious assumption of the coincidence of thehuman good and the good of other individual creatures). As for theother two interpretations, as we saw, the entire changeable universe isfinally for the sake of the human good and species—the order amongwhich constitutes the perfection of the universe—are preserved in ex-istence by God’s will (through the mediation of the heavenly bodies)and so cannot be affected by human agency. The order among speciesconstitutes God’s primary purpose in creating, and God’s will (as co-incident with God’s essence) cannot be affected by worldly activity.

Thomas’s discussion of government can ground a stewardship ethic,then, only if one ignores the larger context in which this discussion isembedded. When one takes this context into account, Thomas’s ar-gument to the effect that human perfection is greater when a humanis not only good in itself but also the cause of goodness in others isunproblematic when circumscribed to relations between human be-ings. But when these “others” include nonhuman creatures, Thomas’sstatement can mean one of two things. First, it might mean humanbeings are to seek the good of other creatures in those instances wheredoing so enhances the human good, making this pursuit conditionaland instrumental to the human good rather than a universal moralinjunction. Second, if it is meant as a universal moral injunction, thenit stands in contradiction to Thomas’s larger project in which the finalgoods of humans and nonhumans are separate and irreconcilable andin which God infallibly wills that species remain in existence.

To summarize, it is Thomas’s articulation of the discontinuities be-tween God and the world and between human beings and nonrationalcreatures that finally undermine Jenkins’s attempt to build a robustecological ethic on Thomistic grounds. Reformulating this largerframework in order to make it consistent with the claim that humanbeings ought to seek the good of all creatures and that humans andother creatures share the same telos is a promising route for one seek-ing to develop a robust ecological ethic. And understanding God astruly affected by worldly activity can be understood as complementary




476

to this conception of human beings as continuous with the rest ofcreation. If all creatures contribute to the divine good, then all crea-tures share the same telos, which consists in making a real contributionto the richness of the divine experience. With an understanding of therelation between God and the world such as this, the relation betweenhumans and nonhumans can be truly understood in noninstrumentalterms. Nonhuman creatures would have noninstrumental value, or in-trinsic value, for the same reason human beings do—they are creativesubjects that make an everlasting contribution (each according to itsown capacity) to the Universal Good. One could then make sense ofthe universal injunction that human beings ought to “mov[e] othersto goodness” because by doing so we contribute to the telos of theuniverse and to God’s experience. In light of our present experiencein which human activity threatens the well-being of so many speciesand ecosystems, it is worth considering seriously this deep reformula-tion of traditional conceptions of God, human beings, and the rest ofcreation. Fleshing out the details of this reformulation is the work foranother project.117

117 I have begun work in that direction in my book, Ecological Ethics and the Human Soul(Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming).



Documents

Aquinas Environmental Ethics Providence.pdf