Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit ... · Ecopetrol´s Cartagena Colombia refining has an alkylation plant catalyzed with HF which represents a potential hazards

Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid at Ecopetrol Refinery in Cartagena – Colombia

Stefanny Paola Figueroa Jimenez Stefany Carolina Lombana Carmona

Ingry Raquel Ruiz De La Cruz

Report to the internship in the Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center Texas A&M University

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1. PROJECT IDENTIFICATION

1.1 GENERAL INFORMATION

Report Type: Partial Final Report No. _2_ of 2015

Delivery Date of Report

PROJECT TITLE Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid at Ecopetrol

Refinery in Cartagena – Colombia

Code

Advisor Dr. Sam Mannan

Researchers Stefanny Paola Figueroa Jimenez, Stefany Carolina Lombana Carmona, Ingry Raquel Ruiz De La Cruz

Financial entity Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center- Texas A&M University

Project Start Date January 12 to Jun 30 of 2015

City/ Country College Station Texas – United States

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OUTLINE

3. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................................................................................................... 6

4. OBJECTIVE ........................................................................................................................................................................................................... 7

4.1. General Objective ........................................................................................................................................................................................... 7

4.2. Specific Objectives ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 7

ACHIEVEMENT OF GOALS ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 8

Achievement of general objective ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 8

Achievement of specific objective - ................................................................................................................................................................................... 9

5. BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................................................................................................... 14

6. METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 15

7. LITERATURE REVIEW ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 28

7.1. HF ALKYLATION ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 28

7.2. HAZARD AND OPERABILITY “HAZOP” ......................................................................................................................................................... 31

7.3. LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS “LOPA” ................................................................................................................................................ 33

7.4. SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL “SIL” ................................................................................................................................................................. 38

8. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM ........................................................................................................................................................................... 40

9. IDENTIFICATION OF IMPORTANT ISSUES .......................................................................................................................................................... 41

10. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES..................................................................................................................................................................................... 42

10.1. HAZOP ........................................................................................................................................................................................................ 42

10.2. LOPA & SIL ................................................................................................................................................................................................. 62

11. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 84

12. FUTURE WORKS ............................................................................................................................................................................................ 85

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13. SCHEDULE ..................................................................................................................................................................................................... 86

14. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ................................................................................................................................................................. 88

15. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS .................................................................................................................................................................................... 90

16. REFERENCES................................................................................................................................................................................................. 91

17. LIST OF ANNEXES .......................................................................................................................................................................................... 94

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LIST OF ANNEX

Annex 1 Application of HAZOP methodology to Selective Hydrogenation Section............................................................................... 94

Annex 2 Application of HAZOP methodology to Charge and Drying section ...................................................................................... 117

Annex 3 Application of HAZOP methodology to Reaction section ..................................................................................................... 128

Annex 4 Application of HAZOP methodology to Acid Storage section ............................................................................................... 134

Annex 5 Application of HAZOP methodology to Cooling Water Tower – TAE- section ...................................................................... 137

Annex 6 Application of HAZOP methodology to Isostripper section ................................................................................................... 139

Annex 7 Application of HAZOP methodology to Depropanizer and HF Stripper section .................................................................... 147

Annex 8 Application of HAZOP methodology to Propane Treatment section ..................................................................................... 159

Annex 9 Application of HAZOP methodology to Debutanization and Alkylate Treatment section ...................................................... 166

Annex 10 Application of HAZOP methodology to N-Butane Treatment section ................................................................................. 173

Annex 11 Application of HAZOP methodology to ALKAD Regeneration section ................................................................................ 184

Annex 12 Application of HAZOP methodology to HF Regeneration section....................................................................................... 192

Annex 13 Application of HAZOP methodology to Effluent Treatment section .................................................................................... 206

Annex 14 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Selective Hydrogenation section ................................................................. 213

Annex 15 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Charge and Drying section ......................................................................... 214

Annex 16 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Reaction section ......................................................................................... 215

Annex 17 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Propane Treatment section ......................................................................... 216

Annex 18 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Debutanization and Alkylate Treatment section .......................................... 217

Annex 19 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to N-Butane Treatment section ....................................................................... 218

Annex 20 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Cooling Water Tower -TAE- section ............................................................ 219

Annex 21 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to HF Regeneration section ............................................................................ 220

Annex 22 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Effluent Treatment section .......................................................................... 223

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2. SUMMARY

In a refinery, an alkylation unit is the process of producing gasoline range material (alkylate) from olefins such as propylene, butylenes and amylene, and

isobutene. This unit comes after a fluid catalytic cracking unit (FCCU) with the purpose of convert the high molecular weight hydrocarbons into smaller particles

and more volatile compounds. The alkylation process is used to comply with specific requirements through the conversion of octane in a component of high octane

gasoline. Usually the feed stream to the alkylation unit comes from the FCC, but the components react in the presence of a strong catalyst as hydrofluoric acid or

sulfuric acid. Ecopetrol's refinery in Cartagena Colombia use hydrofluoric acid as catalyst. The HF is a very corrosive and toxic inorganic acid. The HF is used in

the production of aluminum and chlorofluorocarbons, and in the glass etching and chemical industries. Acute (short-term) inhalation exposure to gaseous

hydrogen fluoride can cause severe respiratory damage in humans, including severe irritation and pulmonary edema, severe ocular irritation and dermal burns

may occur following eye or skin exposure in humans [US EPA, 2000]; for these reason it is necessary to treat with extreme care, especially in process which water

is used for cleaning process.

Considering the safety of the plant, hydrofluoric acid raises the most issues due to its properties and the effects to humans, flora, and fauna. One of the most

relevant properties of the hydrofluoric acid is the low vapor pressure, so it is easily vaporized if leak occurs in the units. HF can travel significant distance

downward as a dense vapor. Even though a small concentration of hydrofluoric acid is used in the reaction, it is still enough to cause human and environmental

problems. The objective of this research was to decrease the HF hazards applying HAZOP, LOPA and SIL methodologies. This study is based on the assumption

that the process always operating inside intended design, thus the risks and operability problems are unlikely to occur. The methodology used is to guide words to

identify deviations in the process including the design of the HF alkylation unit.

We evaluated potentially hazardous scenarios and generated recommendations to mitigate these consequences or improve operational capability. Hazardous

scenarios and any associated recommendations were categorized during the research was: safety, environmental and financial; each topic was also risk ranked to

assess the strength of existing safeguards. These causes were identified including human error, equipment failure and external events. Severity of deviations was

evaluated without any protection or safeguards.

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HF alkylation plant has 13 units which were evaluated and studied and we obtained1092 possible deviations or causes and recommendations in the HAZOP study.

24 of these scenarios are considered significant and high risk and were analyzed in detailed analysis applying LOPA and SIL methodologies. These analysis

providing layers protections to mitigate the hazardous scenarios founded in the HAZOP study, then is necessary identify which of these layer protection are

considered independent protection layer and assign a value of PFD (probability of failure on demand) of each safeguards that was used to get the SIL range.

The detailed issues about the safety study in the unit is provided in this report to show a summary with the recommendations and conclusions obtained through the

study generating a worksheet which has the possible causes, safeguards and risk ranking were evaluated.

3. INTRODUCTION

The petroleum refining industry has always accepted the potential for hazard created by the alkylation units due to uses two systems, either Sulfuric acid or

Hydrofluoric acid, both are considered hazardous substances and has been consistently secured, by the mechanical, metallurgical specifications and operational

practice utilized in the design, construction and the operation of these units which it has achieved a high level of security. [Ecopetrol, 2014]

In this study is evaluated the alkylation process catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid. The alkylation unit performs an important role due to that it produces a high-value

alkylate, which is used as a gasoline blending component. Consequently, refineries operating HF alkylation units are under increasing pressure to maximize the

safety of the unit, product quality, the operational procedures and decreasing of the environmental impact. The efficient operation of alkylation units with HF is a

difficult task and subject to the most testing of operating regimes. This is due to a number of industry-specific constraints and operating issues that stretch the

processing capability of the plant. [Simpson, et al. 2007]

Ecopetrol´s Cartagena Colombia refining has an alkylation plant catalyzed with HF which represents a potential hazards. This kind of process required a detailed

study about the safety and the best operability practices; HAZOP methodology is used to identify major process hazards or operability issues related to the

process design, the most hazardous scenarios include the release of hazardous materials and/or energy like hydrofluoric acid.

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The aim of this research is analyze the different incidents present in the unit which may impact on health and public safety, worker safety in the workplace,

economic losses, the environment and the company’s reputation. It is required a SIL/ LOPA study since these serves to assess the adequacy of the Safety

Protection Layers (SPLs) or Safeguards that are in place to mitigate events hazardous relating with the process hazards, identify those SPLs or Safeguards that

they are not sufficient to reduce this scenario and to suggest reasonable recommendations which can hazard generates a residual risk that needs further risk

reduction. This is done by defining the tolerable frequency (TF) [Binghman, et al. 2004]. The TF of the process deviation is a number which is derived from the

level of the risk identified from the HAZOP study and we can get it in the risk matrix that Ecopetrol Works. It indicates the period of occurrence, in terms of years, of

the process deviation. The TF values are showing it in the table 2.

4. OBJECTIVE

4.1. General Objective

To develop a study to identify and review best safety practices for proper operation and performance of the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric

acid (HF) at the Ecopetrol Refinery in Cartagena-Colombia applying HAZOP, LOPA and SIL methodologies.

4.2. Specific Objectives

Make a literature review to get information about the process operating and general information of the alkylation unit catalyzed with

hydrofluoric acid.

Develop a detailed study concerning the alkylation process, how it works and find the principals variables of the process.

Identify the operating principles of the alkylation unit to select the corresponding nodes which they will be evaluated in detail in each

section of the unit.

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Generate an Excel document that contain the recommendations and analysis obtained from the investigation divided by the nodes

selected and principals variables

Identify the criteria and process safety mechanisms used in the alkylation plant with hydrofluoric acid and compare with the results

obtained to ensure that they are optimal for its operation.

Publish articles in index journals from the results obtained in the investigation

ACHIEVEMENT OF GOALS

Achievement of general objective

GENERAL OBJECTIVE:

To develop a study to identify and review best safety practices for proper operation and performance of the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid (HF) at the Ecopetrol Refinery in Cartagena-Colombia using HAZOP, LOPA and SIL methodologies.

% of compliance: 100%

RESULTS ANNEX, DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT AND

RESULTS DIFFICULTIES OBSERVATIONS

Study of the

methodologies

HAZOP, LOPA and

SIL to generate the

best safety practices

in the HF alkylation

Unit

HAZOP, LOPA and SIL Worksheets that contain

the recommendations and final Project report to

Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center and

San Buenaventura Committee.

The detailed study and information

about the process a part of this the

personal training in the safety process

topic.

Is important before to start a

study about this kind of the

plant take care with the

selected nodes and the

principals variables that affect

the process directly.

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Achievement of specific objective -

SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: 1 Make a literature review to get information about the process operating and general information of the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid


RESULT PRODUCT

(if applicable)

ANNEX, DEVELOPMENT

SUPPORT AND RESULTS OBSERVATIONS

Resolve doubt about the

process and personal training in

alkylation units catalyzed with

hydrofluoric acid and process

safety methodologies.

Report submitted to

Universidad de San

Buenaventura Cartagena and

personal training.

Report that contain part of the

literature review used in the project.

When realized this kind of review is

recommendable get information

about similar plants and process

safety methodologies.

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SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: 2 Develop a detailed study concerning the alkylation process, how it works and find the principals variables of the process.


RESULT PRODUCT

(if applicable)

ANNEX, DEVELOPMENT


Study of the process with the 3

methodologies selected which

are: HAZOP, LOPA and SIL

Report submitted to

Universidad de San

Buenaventura Cartagena and

personal training.

Process safety management

course to help us to get the

necessary information to select the

best safety methodologies.

Take different curses about process

safety and resolve any doubt about

the procedures in the methodologies

selected.

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SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: 3 Identify the operating principles of the alkylation unit to select the corresponding nodes which they will be evaluated in detail in each section of the unit.


RESULT PRODUCT

(if applicable)

ANNEX, DEVELOPMENT


The nodes that help us to divide

each section of the unit and

develop a detailed study of

them.

HAZOP, LOPA and SIL studies

development at Excel

documents.

Worksheets and reports that

contain the selected nodes and the

recommendations generated from

them attachment at this report

Take care when choosing the nodes

due to them could do more ease or

difficult our study.

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SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: 4 Generate an Excel document that contain the recommendations and analysis obtained from the investigation divided by the nodes selected and principals variables


RESULT PRODUCT

(if applicable)

ANNEX, DEVELOPMENT


Recommendations from the

detailed study to generate the

conclusions necessary to the

project.

Excel documents when the

person can get the detailed

study and the recommendations

that we got from each possible

scenario of the process.

Excel with worksheets that contain

the selected nodes, principal

variables and possible scenarios

that were used to get the

recommendations about the best

safety practices in the process

attachment at this report.

Did a study about the general

worksheet used in this methodologies

(HAZOP, LOPA and SIL).

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SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: 5 Identify the criteria and process safety mechanisms used in the alkylation plant with hydrofluoric acid and compare with the results obtained to ensure that they are optimal for its operation.


RESULT PRODUCT

(if applicable)

ANNEX, DEVELOPMENT


A report that contain the

conclusions and

recommendations generates

during the investigation

This document and other report

delivered to Mary Kay O’Connor

process safety center which are

has some conclusions and

recommendations about the best

safety practices in the HF

alkylation unit embodied at

recommendations generated from

HAZOP, LOPA and SIL analysis

Reports to the Mary Kay O’Connor

Process Safety Center and San

Buenaventura University Committee

to show all information generated

from the project and the results

Did a specific study about the

methodologies used by Ecopetrol

Refinery and the methodologies used

for international refineries.

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SPECIFIC OBJECTIVE: 6 Publish articles in index journals from the results obtained in the investigation


RESULT PRODUCT

(if applicable)

ANNEX, DEVELOPMENT


Publication of articles from the

results obtained of the

investigations

Developing In this moment we are developing the

article to send it to some scientific

journals

5. BACKGROUND

The HAZOP, LOPA and SIL studies are excellent tools to analyze and provide recommendations and good practices for prevent accidents and risks in a work

place or plant. The scope of this study included all process equipment, piping, and instrumentation for the systems defined using the Process Flow Diagrams

(PFDs), Piping & Instrument Diagrams (P&lDs) and operating under normal steady state conditions or in response to a process variation.

The hazard scenarios were categorized during the research as being:

• Safety (S): including catastrophic events such as explosions or fires, other personnel injury events, and off-site consequences.

• Environmental (E): including any legal or company violation.

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• Financial (F): including equipment damage or operability issues.

Each scenario was also risk ranked to assess the strength of existing safeguards. When employed properly, a risk ranking system helps to identify gaps in

process safety.

6. METHODOLOGY

The methodology used to elaborate HAZOP, LOPA and SIL study are described below:

The P&IDs were divided into manageable sections called nodes. These systems were systematically analyzed. The HF alkylation unit study contains forty eight

(48) nodes. The details of these nodes are show in the Worksheet in a excel document which are attached with this documents.

HAZOP analysis is a process hazard analysis method which has been widely used in chemical process industries, especially in some complex process plants.

Processes, human operations, many pieces of equipment, a mass of material, a number of instruments, several control systems, safety and environment, etc.,

interweave to form a complex process plant. Human operations always play a tremendous role in running the plant. In an analysis process, P&ID of the complex

process plant should be examined by a multi-disciplinary team of experts systematically, and all conceivable deviations far from design intentions in the plant can

be identified and all the possible abnormal causes and the adverse consequences of these deviations can be determined.

The considerations of the experts are provided in the following two aspects: 1) determining whether a given operation or activity has the potential to give rise to a

hazardous situation, 2) determining the range of hazardous events that the operation or activity could present.

In the process we found some of the possible causes that can divert the conditions of the process, which are::

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Failure in the equipment, instrumentation, or in the piping. Equipment failures were not considered at a specific level. For example, the form that the

equipment fails including the instruments control that this has.

Human error such as performing a wrong operation, failing to perform a required operation, misdiagnosing an operating problem, performing an operation

at the wrong time, mal-operation of equipment, and administrative failure in which a faulty system causes a hazard

External events such as loss of utilities to the process unit (electrical power, steam, cooling water, instrument air), climatic conditions (e.g. solar heating),

or external fire

Long-term processes which, if ignored, could cause potential hazardous deviations. Examples fouling in exchangers, corrosion/erosion possibilities. If this

not is ensured could represent a hazardous for the unit

Previous incidents

When we based if occur a deviation from equipment and process design was necessary follow these steps to identify possible consequences and generate

recommendations to mitigate the deviations.

1. First consider that the consequences don't have any safeguards, that is for studying the worst case scenario and generate the correctly

recommendations that can avoid that this consequence occur

2. Take the most severity consequence. In some cases, that might be considering the most consequence and lower likelihood, while in other cases it might

be most likely but less consequential outcome.

3. Consequences shall be identified according to Safety, Environmental, and Financial.

We document the safeguards for prevention and/or mitigation of the consequences. The unit has a system which is defined between the P&IDs, PFD and general

information about it, that for know how to prevent or mitigate the hazard from the recommendations that was found:

1. Safeguards (engineering and administrative controls)

2. Typical safeguards that prevent or minimize consequences and likelihoods which include:

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• Process design

• Control (basic process control systems, process alarms, operating procedures, Operator intervention)

• Prevention (safety critical process alarms, safety instrumented systems)

Each cause-consequence combination which constitutes a hazard scenario was ranked, wherever possible, by us according to its estimated severity and likelihood

of occurrence. Most causes have multiple consequences where each consequence has a likelihood of occurrence.

Specifically ranking the likelihood of different consequences recognizes that a hazardous scenario may be interrupted or mitigated by shutdown instrumentation,

operator intervention, or emergency response before the hazard can fully develop.

Thus, while the severity level of consequences can increase dramatically as each consequence is considered, the likelihood of occurrence may decrease

significantly.

The company uses 5 levels severities which were assigned to each consequence, assuming that any safeguards within the process unit did not respond as

designed. However, the likelihoods were assigned assuming that safeguards function fully and work as designed. The definitions for the severity levels used in the

study are given in Table 1, and the definitions for the likelihood levels are given in Table 2.

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Table 1. Severity code desviations

Table 2. Likelihood Definitions

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The severity and likelihood are considered jointly using a Risk Ranking Matrix to determine appropriate prioritization of the scenarios and associated

recommendations as shown in Table 3 below.

Table 3. Risk Matrix

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The risk ranking has a meaning depending of the color which will show in the table 4.

Table 4. Risk Ranking Definitions

Layers of protection analysis (LOPA) is a powerful analytical tool for assessing the adequacy of protection layers used to mitigate process risk. LOPA builds upon

well-known process hazards analysis techniques, applying semi-quantitative measures to the evaluation of the frequency of potential incidents and the probability

of failure of the protection layers.

However, risks of incidents caused by reactive chemicals have not been well addressed due partly to sparse failure frequency data. In this paper, the semi-

quantitative layer of protection analysis (LOPA) approach is used to estimate reactive chemical risk, and the probabilities or frequencies of failure scenarios are

addressed. Using LOPA, reactive risks can be evaluated with respect to predefined criteria, and the effectiveness of risk reduction measures can be assessed

In other words, the concept of layers of protection is illustrated in Figure 1. The combined effects of the protection layers and the consequences are compared

against some risk tolerance criteria that for Ecopetrol S.A. is 1x10^-8/years.

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Figure 1. Layers of protection to lower the frequency of a specific accident

Physical protection (Relief Devices)

Plant Emergency Response

Community Emergency Response

Process Design

Community Emergency Response

Physical protection (Relief Devices)

Plant Emergency Response

Post-Response Physical Protection

Safety Instrumented Functions

Critical Alarms and Human

Basic Process Control Sytems

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The major steps for LOPA study include:

Extract the possible causes from HAZOP study which are categorized in High and Significant risk.

Estimate the potential risk (severity, frequency, exposition factor …) of event no mitigated.

Define tolerable risk (tolerable maximum frequency of mitigated event).

Analyze the layers protections and establish the independent protection layers and assign a risk factor reduction.

Estimate the overall consequence frequency multiplying the value of PFD of each safeguards and frequency to comparison with acceptable risk

criteria that in this case the value is 1x10^-8/years.

Evaluate and repeat the process if is necessary. If the value of the overall consequence is higher than the acceptable risk criteria is necessary reduce

it suggesting others independent protection layer (IPL) and calculate a new overall consequence until the value is lower or equal to the acceptable

risk criteria.

All these steps are repeated for the scenarios categorized in high and significant risk.

Layers protection

The safeguards identified during the HAZOP study, then establish which of these safeguards are consider independent protection layers (IPLs):

Process control system

Alarms and operator actions

Active barriers:

- Security events

- Sprinklers, dikes, water curtains….

It’s possible that all of these layers not be independent protection layers.

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Frequency

Performing a LOPA study we determined the failure frequency of the initiating event from table 2 worked in the company, this table it was assigned due to value

obtained in the HAZOP study, so, from this value it was related in the table 2 and in this form assigned the frequency of this possible cause.

The failure frequencies for the common initiating events of an accident scenario are show in table 5.

Table 5. Typical Frequency Values Assigned to Initiating Eventsa

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A part of these PFDs it was necessary included PFDs for passive IPLs that are show in table 6 and PFDs for active IPLs and Human Actions that are show in table

7.

Table 6. PFDs for Passive IPLs

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Table 7. PFDs for Active IPLs and Human Factors

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From these values it was possible obtain the PFDs of each safeguards and with the frequency we could calculate the overall consequence frequency and compare

with the acceptable risk criteria to know if the deviation needed other IPL to mitigate the hazardous.

The deviations that not exceeded the value assigned for the refinery it was necessary to generate more recommendations or suggest some safeguards to mitigate

the risk.

The last method that we used is Safety integrity level (SIL), which is verification plays a critical role in reliability assessment of safety related systems. In the

industry they ask, to what extent can a process be expected to perform safely? And, in the event of a failure, to what extent can the process be expected to fail

safely? These questions are answered through the assignment of a target Safety Integrity Level (SIL). SILs are measures of the safety risk of a given process.

Safety Integrity Level is a way to indicate the tolerable failure rate of a particular safety function. Standards require the assignment of a target SIL for any new or

retrofitted SIF within the SIS. The assignment of the target SIL is a decision requiring the extension of the Hazards Analysis. The SIL assignment is based on the

amount of risk reduction that is necessary to maintain the risk at an acceptable level. All of the SIS design, operation and maintenance choices must then be

verified against the target SIL. This ensures that the SIS can mitigate the assigned process risk.

Historically, safety thinking categorized a process as being either safe or unsafe. For the new standards, however, safety isn’t considered a binary attribute; rather,

it is stratified into four discrete levels of safety. Each level represents an order of magnitude of risk reduction. The higher the SIL level, the greater the impact of a

failure and the lower the failure rate that is acceptable. In the table 8 shown these level which are accepted in the chemical process industry.

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Table 8. SIL values

SIL Availability PFDavg Risk Reduction Qualitative Consequences

4 >99.99% 10-5 to <10-4 100,000 to 10,000 Potential for fatalities in the

community

3 99.9% 10-4 to <10-3 10,000 to 1,000 Potential for multiple on-site

fatalities

2 99 to 99.9% 10-3 to <10-2 1,000 to 100 Potential for major on-site injuries

1 90 to 99% 10-2 to <10-1 100 to 10 Potential for minor on-site injuries

This value is obtained from equation 1 when the deviation no exceeded the acceptable risk criteria; if this exceeded this value that is mean the process has the

enough safeguards to mitigate the deviation.

In this case the maximum value for SIL that we obtained was SIL 1 and SIL2

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7. LITERATURE REVIEW

7.1. HF ALKYLATION

ALKYLATION CURRENT EVENTS, Pam Pryor, 2001

<http://www2.dupont.com/Clean_Technologies/es_MX/assets/downloads/AlkyCurrentEvents2001.pdf>

Alkylation’s importance to refiners continues to grow as alkylate has been termed “liquid gold” for reformulated gasoline. Although well established in the United

States, growth in alkylation capacity has continued through the last decade as U.S. refiners have revamped and expanded existing units, replaced obsolete units,

and in a few cases, added new grassroots units.

Alkylation capacity outside the United States continues to grow as well. Increasing conversion capacity plus increasing demand for gasoline in many areas of the

world has led to the installation of new grassroots alkylation units. Coupled with the need for more gasoline is the need for cleaner gasoline. We see alkylate filling

those needs.

ISOBUTANE ALKYLATION: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES, Sven Ivar Hommeltoft, 2001

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0926860X01008171>

Alkylation serves to dispose of the C3–C4 cut from the FCC unit by converting much of this cut into alkylate, which is a valuable blending component for the

gasoline pool. The alkylate contains no olefins or aromatics but consists exclusively of isoalkanes. It has a low vapor pressure and a high octane number.There is

little doubt that as long as cars are operatedon high-octane gasoline, isobutane alkylate willcontinue to be a desirable blending component. The trend in motor

gasoline formulation as forced by the legislative requirements has been and will probably continue to be to lower the content of olefins and aromatics and

impurities such as sulfur and nitrogen compounds in order to make the fuel more environmentally friendly.

http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0926860X01008171

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HYDROFLUORIC ACID ALKYLATION, ABB and ConocoPhillips develop a critical new process analysis tool, Michael B. Simpson, Michael

Kester, 2007

<http://www09.abb.com/global/scot/scot271.nsf/veritydisplay/1b9c3c80511554ef8325734b004198cf/$file/22-26%203M774_ENG72dpi.pdf>

The HF alkylation unit (HFU) remains of key importance to this day. It plays a critical role in providing one of the most important feeds to the final pro duct gasoline

blending pool. Its significancehas grown side by side withthe increasing number of fluid catalyticcracking (FCC) units in refineries.The FCC adds value to the heavy

endof crude distillation by catalytically cracking heavy feeds into lighter products such as light cycle oil and FCC gasoline, which can be used either directly or after

hydrotreating in final product blending operations. The downside of this process is that light olefins, typically butene and propene, are also produced in FCC

operations. These are essentially worthless as feedstock. Similarly, in any crude distillation process an excess of light end products such as butane tend to be

produced that are of limited use. N-butane can easily be converted to iso-butane, and in this form it joins the FCC c3 or c4 olefins (butene or propene) as the

combined feeds to the HF alkylation unit.

ABB–ConocoPhillips solution for HFU reactor optimization offers ABB multivariable control technology underpinned by a unique capability for rapid online

characterization of HF acid, recycle iC4, olefin/iC4 makeup feeds and alkylate. Thesolution delivers the following significantoperating improvements to HFalkylation

reactors:

Feed rates, alkylate yield, and alkylate octane are maximized to an economic optimum, subject to operating constraints

Isobutane:olefin (I:O) ratio and energy consumption can be reduced while meeting alkylate quality and yield targets with minimum acid consumption.

Isobutane makeup rate can be optimized while respecting iC4 inventory constraints

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FUNDAMENTALS OF PETROLEUM REFINING, Chapter 10 – Alkylation, Mohamed A. Fahim, Taher A. Alsahhaf, AmalElkilani, 2010

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/B9780444527851000103>

This chapter describes alkylation, a process of producing gasoline range material (alkylates) from olefins such as propylene, butylenes and amylene, and

isobutane. Butylene is the most widely used olefin because of the high quality of the alkylate produced. The current trend toward elimination of methyl tertiary butyl

ether has resulted in increased attention to alkylation technology. In alkylation, refinery gases produced from different units are collected and sent to the gas plant.

Olefins and isobutanes are separated and used as a feed to the alkylation plant. Olefins are sent to the polymerization unit. Both alkylation and polymerization

units produce gasoline, which can be sent to the gasoline pool.

The alkylation process consists of running the hydrocarbons in liquid form (enough pressure is used to ensure that) and at low temperature and with a high

isobutane (iC4) to olefin ratio. The reaction products are sent to an acid settler where the acid is recycled back to the reactor. Products are then separated into

gaseous LPG propane and n-butane and the desired product of alkylate.

A RISK TOO GREAT: HYDROFLUORIC ACID IN U.S. REFINERIES, Gary Beevers, Teddy Bender, Kristin Bradley-Bul, et al. 2013

<http://www.usw.org/workplaces/oil/A-Risk-Too-Great.pdf>

Fifty U.S. oil refineries use large volumes of highly concentrated hydrofluoric acid (HF) as chemical catalysts in a process called alkylation. Alkylation creates

additives that boost the octane of gasoline. On average, these 50 refineries each store 212,000 pounds of HF. If released in the atmosphere, HF rapidly forms

dense vapor clouds that hover near land and can travel great distances. Like other powerful acids, HF can cause deep severe burns and damage the eyes, skin,

nose, throat and respiratory system. But the fluoride ion is also poisonous. Entering the body through a burn or by the lungs, it can cause internal damage

throughout the body. At high enough exposures, HF can kill. The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) regulate HF as highly toxic.

31

7.2. HAZARD AND OPERABILITY “HAZOP”

HAZARD AND OPERABILITY (HAZOP) ANALYSIS. A LITERATURE REVIEW, JordiDunjó, VasilisFthenakis, Juan A. Vílchez, JosepArnaldos,

2009

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304389409013727 >

Hazard and operability (HAZOP) methodology is a Process Hazard Analysis (PHA) technique used worldwide for studying not only the hazards of a system, but

also its operability problems, by exploring the effects of any deviations from design conditions.

Our paper is the first HAZOP review intended to gather HAZOP-related literature from books, guidelines, standards, major journals, and conference proceedings,

with the purpose of classifying the research conducted over the years and define the HAZOP state-of-the-art.

A NEW INTELLIGENT ASSISTANT SYSTEM FOR HAZOP ANALYSIS OF COMPLEX PROCESS PLANT, Feng Wang, , JinjiGao, Huaqing Wang,

2012

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0950423012000228>

HAZOP analysis is a process hazard analysis method which has been widely used in chemical process industries, especially in some complex process plants.

Processes, human operations, many pieces of equipment, a mass of material, a number of instruments, several control systems, safety and environment, etc.,

interweave to form a complex process plant. Human operations always play a tremendous role in running the plant. In an analysis process, P&ID of the complex

process plant should be examined by a multi-disciplinary team of experts systematically, and all conceivable deviations far from design intentions in the plant can

be identified and all the possible abnormal causes and the adverse consequences of these deviations can be determined.

32

The considerations of the experts are provided in the following four aspects: 1) determining whether a given operation or activity has the potential to give rise to a

hazardous situation, 2) determining the range of hazardous events that the operation or activity could present.

HAZOP STUDY TRAINING FROM THE 1970S TO TODAY, Brian J. Tyler, 2012


The role of Trevor Kletz in the development of several safety methods is well known and widely acknowledged. These methods include HAZOP study, HAZAN and

inherent safety. Indeed, HAZOP study has been adopted worldwide1 to the point where it is probably the most widely used hazard study method in the process

industry. Less well known is the influence of Kletz on the training methods used for HAZOP study. This paper records his early contributions and continued

influence as well as describing some important developments during the last 40 years. It is based on my experience of organising, since 1978, over 50 public

courses on HAZOP study for the IChemE, over 100 in-company courses for 50 different companies and, most recently, creating an e-learning course in HAZOP

study which has been made available through the IChemE.

PROCESS SAFETY DATA MANAGEMENT PROGRAM BASED ON HAZOP ANALYSIS AND ITS APPLICATION TO AN ETHYLENE

OXIDE/ETHYLENE GLYCOL PLANT, FengWanga, Yankun Zhao, Ou Yang, JingboCai, Mei Deng, 2013


HAZOP analysis is a process hazard analysis method that has been widely applied both within and outside the chemical processing industries. This paper

presents a design method for a process safety data management program for petrochemical plants based on HAZOP analysis and demonstrates the steps of

application involved in building a process safety data management system for an ethylene oxide/ethylene glycol production plant. Firstly, the production data files

and relevant documents of the plants should be classified and stored in the program database as reference documents and treatment schemes for coping with

abnormal situations should be collected and summarized as guidance documents. Secondly, the HAZOP analysis method is employed to identify all the dangerous

deviations possibly existing in the production process of the ethylene oxide/ethylene glycol plant. Then, the relationships among the deviations, the reference

documents and the guidance documents should be considered and evaluated.

33

Finally, each dangerous deviation will be given a corresponding reference document and guidance document. The reference documents and guidance documents

stored in the expert system can be utilized to help operators solve the corresponding technical problems and cope with abnormal situations. The process safety

data management program will contribute to the identification, analysis and resolution of operation problems. When an abnormal situation occurs, according to the

deviations exhibited in the system, the necessary reference documents and guidance documents will be quickly consulted by the operators, and an appropriate

decision will be made to address the abnormal situation. Therefore, by using the process safety data management program, plant security and human safety in the

petrochemical industries will be improved.

7.3. LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS “LOPA”

SCENARIO IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION FOR LAYERS OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS, Kenneth First, 2000

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S095042301000094X>

The identification and screening of scenarios has been identified as a source of variation in Layers of Protection Analysis (LOPA). Often the experience of the

analyst is a significant factor in determining what scenarios are evaluated and the worst credible consequences. This paper presents a simplified chemical process

risk analysis that is effective in providing a semi-quantitative measure of consequence that may include human harm and is independent of the analyst. This

process may be used in evaluation of Management of Change, inherently safer design decisions for capital projects and LOPA re-validation.

Conditional and relational logic may be captured with the use of simple spreadsheets to further improve overall efficiency. For example, this method minimizes the

overall time required for scenario development and re-validation relative to Hazard and Operability studies (HAZOP). The technique simplifies established models

used by engineers engaged in the operation or design of a chemical manufacturing facility without special software or training. The results of this technique are

realistic and may be directly compared with corporate or regulatory guidelines for risk of fatality or injury. At each step in the risk analysis process, more detailed or

sophisticated methods may be used to refine the technique. Furthermore, results from any step may indicate that the hazard from a specific scenario case is not

sufficient to continue with subsequent analysis steps.

34

INTRODUCTION TO LAYERS OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS, Angela E. Summers, 2003


Layers of protection analysis (LOPA) is a powerful analytical tool for assessing the adequacy of protection layers used to mitigate process risk. LOPA builds upon

well-known process hazards analysis techniques, applying semi-quantitative measures to the evaluation of the frequency ofpotential incidents and the probability

of failure of the protection layers. This paper will provide anoverview of the LOPA process, highlighting the key considerations.

LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS FOR REACTIVE CHEMICAL RISK ASSESSMENT, Chunyang Wei, William J. Rogers and M. Sam Mannan,

2008


Reactive chemical hazards have been a significant concern for the chemical process industries (CPI). Without sufficient control and mitigation of chemical reaction

hazards, reactive incidents have led to severe consequences, such as release of flammable and toxic materials, fires and explosions, and threats to human lives,

properties, and the environment. Consequence of reactive hazards can bewell understood through calorimetric testing and computational techniques.

However, risks of incidents caused by reactive chemicals have not been well addressed due partly to sparse failure frequency data. In this paper, the semi-

quantitative layer of protection analysis (LOPA) approach is used to estimate reactive chemical risk, and the probabilities or frequencies of failure scenarios are

addressed. Using LOPA, reactive risks can be evaluated with respect to predefined criteria, and the effectiveness of risk reduction measures can be assessed.

The hydroxylamine (HA) production system is employed as a case study to demonstrate the application of LOPA to reactive chemical risk assessment

35

RISK ASSESSMENT OF LNG IMPORTATION TERMINALS USING THE: BAYESIAN–LOPA METHODOLOGY, GeunWoong Yun, William J. Rogers

and M. Sam Mannan, 2009


In order to meet the fast growing LNG (Liquefied Natural Gas) demand, many LNG importation terminals are now in operation. Therefore, it is important to estimate

potential risks of LNG terminals using LOPA (Layer of Protection Analysis), which can provide quantified results with less time and effort than other methods. For

LOPA applications, failure data are essential to compute risk frequencies. However, available failure data from the LNG industry are sparse and often statistically

unreliable. Therefore, Bayesian estimation, which can update generic failure data with plant-specific failure data, was used to compensate for insufficient LNG

system failure data. This paper shows the need for the Bayesian–LOPA methodology, how to develop the method, and a case study to demonstrate application of

the method. Finally, this paper proposes that the Bayesian–LOPA method is a powerful tool for risk assessment of not only the LNG industry but also in other

industries, such as petrochemical, nuclear, and aerospace.

ExSys-LOPA FOR THE CHEMICAL PROCESS INDUSTRY, Adam S. Markowski and M. Sam Mannan, 2010


The chemical process industries are characterized by the use, processing, and storage of large amounts of dangerous chemical substances and/or energy. Among

different missions of chemical plants there are two very important ones, which: 1. provide a safe work environment, 2. fully protect the environment. These

important missions can be achieved only by design of adequate safeguards for identified process hazards.

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) can successfully answer this question. This technique is a simplified process of quantitative risk assessment, using the order

of magnitude categories for initiating cause frequency, consequence severity, and the likelihood of failure of independent protection layers to analyze and assess

the risk of particular accident scenarios. LOPA requires application of qualitative hazard evaluation methods to identify accident scenarios, including initiating

causes and appropriate safeguards. This can be well fulfilled, e.g., by HAZOP Studies or What-If Analysis.

36

However, those techniques require extensive experience, efforts by teams of experts as well as significant time commitments, especially for complex chemical

process units. In order to simplify that process, this paper presents another strategy that is a combination of an expert system for accident scenario identification

with subsequent application of LOPA. The concept is called ExSys-LOPA, which employs, prepared in advance, values from engineering databases for

identification of loss events specific to the selected target process and subsequently an accident scenario barrier model developed as an input for LOPA.

Such consistent rulesfor the identification of accident scenarios to be analyzed can facilitate and expedite the analysis andthereby incorporate many more

scenarios and analyze those for adequacy of the safeguards. An associated computer program is under development. The proposed technique supports and

extends the Layer of Protection Analysis application, especially for safety assurance assessment of risk-based determination for the process industries. A case

study concerning HF alkylation plant illustrates the proposed method.

A FORMULATION TO OPTIMIZE THE RISK REDUCTION PROCESS BASED ON LOPA, ClementinaRamírez-Marengo, Julio de Lira-Flores,

AntiocoLópez-Molina, RichartVázquez-Román, Victor Carreto-Vázquez and M. Sam Mannan, 2013


LOPA is a semi-quantitative methodology used in risk analysis. LOPA assesses the scenarios such as loss of containment, which can lead into major accidents,

and it also proposes a series of hierarchically organized protective layers. Protective layers are placed to lower the frequency of undesired consequences. The

methodology typically uses order of magnitude to express the initial event frequency, the probability of failure on demand of the independent protection layers and

the magnitude of the consequence.

LOPA methodology typically builds on the information developed during a qualitative hazard evaluation. Then, layers of protection are intended to independently

comply with three main functions: Prevention, protection and mitigation. To be considered as independent protection layers (IPL’s), safeguards need to satisfy

some characteristics: independence, specificity, dependability and auditability (Summers, 2003).

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LAYER OF PROTECTION ANALYSIS E QUANTIFYING HUMAN PERFORMANCE IN INITIATING EVENTS AND INDEPENDENT PROTECTION

LAYERS, Philip M. Myers, 2013

<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S095042301200099X>

Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a highly valued, semiquantitative risk methodology embraced by the process industries and in widespread use. LOPA uses

a relatively simple, scenariobased approach that can effectively address many risk related issues, providing a timely and cost-effective tool to conduct engineering

analyses as an aid to decision making. LOPA is typically used to determine if existing layers of protection are sufficient, and to develop risk reduction measures for

specific scenarios of concern.

A LOPA scenario consists of a single, unique initiating event consequence pair. Generally used for high consequence or high risk scenarios, LOPA generates

additional support and a greater degree of confidence in decisions made as compared to those relying on the use of purely qualitative tools such as Process

Hazard Analysis (PHA). Over the years since the introduction of LOPA to the process industries (CCPS,1993; Dowell,1997), and with the requirements of industry

standards for functional safety (ISA, 2004), it has been used extensively, with a wealth of application experience gained.

There are now many variations of LOPA in practice e some are highly simplified, order-of-magnitude approaches with simple calculations, while others are more

detailed and complex with extensions to quantitative techniques such as Human Reliability Analysis (HRA), Event Tree Analysis (ETA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA),

and Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA). LOPA has been stretched in many respects, with new developments in and applications for the methodology, and also

limitations and problems encountered in practical use of LOPA (HSE, 2009a, 2009b; Myers, 2010).

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7.4. SAFETY INTEGRITY LEVEL “SIL”

DERIVATION OF AN EQUATION FOR QUANTITATIVE SIL ASSIGNMENT, Edward M. Marszal, 2003


As engineers become more experienced with the application of safety instrumented systems (SIS’s), quantitative risk analysis for selection of safety integrity levels

(SIL’s) is becoming more and more common. SIS practitioners have found that qualitative methods for selecting SIL’s are unsatisfactory because they are overly

conservative. The inflated requirements yielded by these qualitative methods are unnecessarily increasing both the capital expense and the ongoing maintenance

cost of SIS’s.

To address the high equipment costs and poor results associated with qualitative selection methods, many sophisticated users of SIS’s are turning to quantitative

methods such as layer of protection analysis and full quantitative risk analysis. Procedures for applying quantitative methods to the SIL selection problem are in the

early stages of development. Literature explaining the use of fully quantitative methods for SIL selection is virtually nonexistent. For these two reasons, many

engineers are forced to use ad hoc methods for the selection process, arriving at equations through questionable methods, some of which are mathematically

incorrect.

A SIL QUANTIFICATION APPROACH BASED ON AN OPERATING SITUATION MODEL FOR SAFETY EVALUATION IN COMPLEX GUIDED

TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS, J. Beugin, D. Renaux and L. Cauffriez, 2007


Safety analysis in guided transportation systems is essential to avoid rare but potentially catastrophic accidents. This article presents a quantitative probabilistic

model that integrates Safety Integrity Levels (SIL) for evaluating the safety of such systems. The standardized SIL indicator allows the safety requirements of each

safety subsystem, function and/or piece of equipment to be specified, making SILs pivotal parameters in safety evaluation. However, different interpretations of SIL

exist, and faced with the complexity of guided transportation systems, the current SIL allocation methods are inadequate for the task of safety assessment.

39

To remedy these problems, the model developed in this paper seeks to verify, during the design phase of guided transportation system, whether or not the safety

specifications established by the transport authorities allow the overall safety target to be attained (i.e., if the SIL allocated to the different safety functions are

sufficient to ensure the required level of safety). To meet this objective, the model is based both on the operating situation concept and on Monte Carlo simulation.

The former allows safety systems to be formalized and their dynamics to be analyzed in order to show the evolution of the system in time and space, and the latter

make it possible to perform probabilistic calculations based on the scenario structure obtained.

A NOVEL METHOD FOR SIL VERIFICATION BASED ON SYSTEM DEGRADATION USING RELIABILITY BLOCK DIAGRAM, Long Ding, Hong

Wang, Kai Kang and Kai Wang, 2014


Safety integrity level (SIL) verification plays a critical role in reliability assessment of safety related systems. However, current methods available for SIL verification

are too complicated to be applied in practice. Therefore, a novel method for SIL verification, which is based on system degradation using reliability block diagram

(RBD) is proposed in this paper. The key idea of the method proposed is to perform RBD analysis and calculation of average probability of dangerous failure on

demand (PFDG) at each stage of system degradation, which is caused by failures of redundant channels. The method has been applied to several classical

redundant architectures of safety related systems, and could make the SIL verification process simpler. Further, the formulae obtained are identical with those

given in IEC 61508.

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8. DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM

In the early days of oil refining in the 20s and 30s of last century, most gasoline blending components were composed of materials obtained directly from the crude

distillation unit. The situation changed significantly during World War II when there was a great need for aviation gasoline high octane. One response to this need

for high-octane gasoline was the development of a conversion unit refinery: the alkylation unit with hydrofluoric acid (HF), which currently remains as a key process

in the production of fuels with high standards.

Ecopetrol refinery is located at the industrial area of Mamonal and is one of the largest in the country and Latin America (Ecopetrol, 2014) features an alkylation

unit with hydrofluoric acid. This is one of the new units at the refinery expansion project. Since, alkylation processes catalyzed by concentrated sulfuric acid or

hydrofluoric acid are associated to problems of pollution and environmental safety (Xueqi, et al, 2012), it is important to follow an adequate safety system for the

operation of the hydrofluoric acid alkylation plant, because it represents a potentially high risk to the people who operate and to the process itself.

In the unit there are several chemicals that are potentially harmful to health and environment such as hydrofluoric acid (HF), which acts as a catalyst in the

alkylation reaction, acid water, alkylate, alumina, beta-picoline (ALKAD) , slaked lime, fuel gas, combustion gas, liquefied gases, liquid hydrocarbons, hydrogen,

potassium hydroxide (KOH), carbon monoxide (CO) in the flue gas, nitrogen and vapor. This is why environmental laws and regulations related to these processes

are increasingly stringent. Due to the potential impact area of an unplanned leak of any of the above mentioned chemicals, especially hydrofluoric acid, whose

corrosive properties make it toxic by ingestion, inhalation and dermal exposure causing serious and irreversible damage to the body (Gad and Sullivan, 2014), it is

necessary to optimize the safety system and practices, that meet the requirements for a safe, clean and profitable process (Ecopetrol, 2014).

Alkylation unit at the Ecopetrol’s refinery in Cartagena has thirteen sections which are:

• Selective Hydrogenation

• Charge and Drying

• Reaction

• Acid Storage

41

• Cooling Water Tower TAE

• Isostripper

• Depropanizer and HF Stripper

• Propane treatment

• Debutanization and Alkylate treatment

• N-Butane treatment

• ALKAD Regeneration

• HF Regeneration

• Effluent Treatment

Due to the high risk presented by the alkylation unit will apply three different methodologies which are HAZOP, LOPA and SIL which help to reduce risks and

improve the safety of the plant. During these times these methodologies have been implemented and have shown excellent results.

9. IDENTIFICATION OF IMPORTANT ISSUES

The refinery in Cartagena Colombia applies the alkylation unit to produce gasoline range material from olefins catalyzed by a strong acid in this case hydrofluoric.

The hydrofluoric acid is a dangerous inorganic acid, can cause severe corrosive effects and systemic toxicity (Xingang, 2014)

When comparing hydrofluoric and sulfuric acid, many differences can be noted, including costs, additional utilities, hazards, and inconveniences. Some alkylation

processes already use hydrofluoric acid as catalyst, making it difficult and costly to change the catalyst to sulfuric acid. When choosing which acid catalyst to use

in an alkylation processing units, companies mostly rely on the economic analysis rather than the safety aspects. Supporters of the hydrofluoric acid process argue

that both capital and total operating costs are less than those of sulfuric acid processes (Akpabio and Neeka, 2013) for the following reasons:

42

1. Smaller and simpler reactor designs are feasible.

2. Cooling water can be used instead of refrigeration.

3. Smaller settling devices are needed for emulsions.

4. Essentially complete regeneration of the hydrofluoric acid catalyst occurs. Hence, hydrofluoric acid consumption and costs are very low. Disposal of

spent acid is not necessary.

5. There is increased flexibility of operation relative to temperature, external ratio of isobutane to olefin, etc.

6. There is decreased need for turbulence or agitation when acid and hydrocarbon streams are combined.

This executive report presents the results of the application of Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP), Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) and Safety Integrity

Level (SIL) to the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid to isolate the risk in the alkylation plant and identify why the safety practices in it.

10. ANALYSIS OF ISSUES

The unit counts with fourteen section and we are apply the methodologies above mentioned, the results shown below are the recommendations obtained for the

scenarios studied, so it is which of these were the most significant identified and are LOPA and SIL methodology applied to reduce the risk of possible causes

occurred. The results have been organized in each of the methodologies studied.

10.1. HAZOP

The simulation and analysis through the HAZOP methodology in alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid allowed to determine the possible failures of

operability and how these failures are can affect the process based on the risk matrix used by Ecopetrol described above in table 3. It also allows obtaining

43

recommendations for the unit studied. In the unit 1092 scenarios were studied in 13 units of 14 because not have the P&IDs of one of them, recommendations for

each of the scenarios were obtained and in this part a summary of these is presented.

In all the unit some lines counts with the necessary safeguards but it is important to realize periodic maintenance and monitoring to the vessels, pipes, existing

safeguards, indicators, valves, equipment and immediately report about the real state of the vessel and to prevent that indicators or controllers send a bad signal to

the control room or valve. Do a schedule to realize the action requires and delegate people to do the scheduled activity. Likewise make constant operator

procedures, monitoring, training and sampling procedures when it’s necessary.

The process generally has a security system such as bypass and relief or vent system to avoid potential explosion for overpressure in the vessels or pipes, so is

important realize constant check to TEA system, bypass and vent system to avoid leak and ensure the correct operability. In the same manner the good

communication between employees is critical to mitigate the consequences of possible causes analyzed and is recommendable realize training to all employees to

behavior based safety to ensure the best practices and implement it in the refinery.

The process started with a selective hydrogenation. The charges for this section are diolefins, olefins and hydrogen. The objective is decrease the content of

diolefins and increases the concentration olefins with the purpose to obtain the best quality of the charge from the unit. Hydrogen reacts with hydrocarbon in

presence of a catalyzer for obtain the olefins and also of this obtain oily water. In this section four nodes were identify.

The first one is the feed surge drum D-201 The process parameter studied by the team are temperature, pressure and level with high, less and no as deviation, the

HAZOP team identify some recommendations in this node as shown below:

- Install a temperature, pressure and flow indicators which works with an indicator controls and create a control loops to ensure the correct performance

- Install additional temperature, pressure and flow sensor in some parts of the process

- Consider an automation of the oily water drainage system to avoid an overpressure and presence of pollutants

- Installation a pressure indicator that worked with some pressure indicators valves to ensure that the pressure profile don't change

- Constant check to TEA, bypass and vent system to avoid leak and ensure the correct operability

- Good communication between employees and is recommendable implementing behavior based safety to ensure the best practices

44

The second node is the heat exchangers E-201 and the same parameters studied in the first node are studied in this node with the same deviations. The

recommendations obtain in this node are:

- Install an analyzer in the inlet pipe to heat exchangers E-201 for check the quality of the stream and prevent the generation of possible pollutants

- Constant maintenance and check the driers heat exchangers E-201 to prevent possible fails and inform the real state of the equipment

- Implement control loops that working with a temperature, pressure and flow indicator to ensure the correct operation range

- Considerer install a bypass system due to this can prevent possible injures if the control valve fail

- Installation of temperature, pressure and flow Indicator and in some case indicator control or indicator alarm due to the process required more control in

this part.

- Periodic checks to pipeline where we can get the correct status of them for avoid possible changes or risk in the process

The third node is the condenser D – 204 and the recommendations for this equipment are:

- Constant maintenance the pipeline to prevent ruptures, leaks or hold for corrosion or external events and contamination of the other streams of the

process

- Due to the process has an important safety system is recommendable activate bypass system and the valve that before control valve to stabilize the

process

- Installation of temperature, pressure and flow Indicator and in some case indicator control or indicator alarm due to the process required more control

The fourth node is the reactors R-201/202 and the same parameters were studied. The recommendations founds for the HAZOP team were:

- Constant monitoring to the operation conditions and reactors R-201/202 to prevent ruptures, leaks or hold for corrosion or external events and

contamination of the other streams of the process


- Install a sampling point FY in some stream to prevent presence of contaminants that can affect the process

- Periodic reactivation of catalyst to ensure the correct conversion and the reaction time

45

- Implement a cooling system to the reactor for control the temperature runway

- Install a Flow Indicator in the hydrogen line to prevent losses or possible deactivation of the catalyst and deviations in the process

- Maintenance to the hydrogen filters to ensure the correct convert and reaction time


this part

- Install an analyzer in the inlet of the process to prevent changes and deviations due to contaminants

The last node is the stripper T-201. The recommendations found for the team studying the same parameters and deviations are:

- Increase and decrease the flow in the inputs and outputs of the tower V-02 including reflux flow depending on what is required for the process for maintain

constant the variables like temperature, pressure and level in the process

- Is required some controllers like pressure, temperature and level indicator controls (PI – TI – LI) having a constant monitoring of the loops control to avoid

possible fails.


this part.


The olefins obtain in the selective hydrogenation go to the second step which is the charge and drying section to remove humidity and obtained the olefins and

oily water, this step is a pretreatment section. In this section identifies four nodes and obtains some recommendations for each one analyzing three operational

variable as temperature, pressure and level with deviation high and less.

The recommendations obtain in the first node, surge drum D-02, and are:

- Install a Temperature Indicator in the inlet line to the drum D-02 to monitoring this operational variable in the control room

- Consider install a Flow Indicator after valve FV 1000 or changing the location of FIC 1000

- Install a Flow Indicator in the drain line of oily water and in the inlet and outlet line

46

- Consider to install a flow indicator with lower and higher alarm in the drum.

- Consider adding a low flow alarm on FIC 1000

- Consider install a PT/PI with high pressure alarm on surge drum D-02

- Consider adding an HF/Water acid analyzer on the E-28/E-28A reactor acid circulation loop

The second and third nodes are the olefins feed dryers in use/regenerating. The parameters studied in this part are temperature, pressure, water

concentration in the inlet stream, water concentration in the outlet stream, inlet flow with deviation less and high and the recommendations obtain for the team in

these nodes are:

- Install a pressure indicator in each dryer and a manual valve after valves XV 1352/1353.

- In the inlet line consider install a pressure indicator

- Install a flow indicator control (FIC) which works with a control valve in the inlet stream to monitoring the flow in the dryer, an analyzer, bypass system

- If it is possible install a FI in the inlet line in the E-01 and other one after valves 1346/1347 to monitoring the flow in the inlet stream

- Install a PDI in each olefins feed driers

- Install a bypass system around valves 1346/1347 and around the valves XV 1350/1351

- Install a analyzer in the inlet pipe and realize sampling procedures in the stream

The fourth one is the condenser D-24 the recommendation obtains is:

- Install a temperature indicator and a flow indicator in the inlet steam line and the inlet of the D-24.

The last one is the coalesce D-01, the team evaluates the same parameters, temperature, pressure and level with the same deviation, the recommendation obtain

are:

- Install a flow indicator control in the inlet stream of each trim condenser and operator monitoring to these flow indicators.

- Install a flow indicator in the inlet line of olefin regenerantcoalescer.

47

The dryers olefins go to the reaction section which is the third segment in the unit, is consider such as the heart of the unit due to the olefins and isobutene reacts

in presence of hydrofluoric acid as catalyzer for obtain the alkylate. The acid will enters in the reactors comes of acid storage and additive originated in the additive

regeneration section ALKAD. This additive is added to acid with the end of decrease the volatility, in this form; minimize the vaporization when the acid is in contact

with the atmosphere in case of a leak. The reactors have always been the equipment that should have more security in an alkylation unit. In this section identifies

two nodes and analyzes temperature, pressure, level, and relation isobutene/olefins as operational variables with deviation less and high.

The first node is the reactors E28/28A, this node is the heart of the unit and count with a lot of safeguards. The recommendations found by the team are:

- Install a Flow Indicator in the inlet line when the streams are mixed to verify that the flow is correct

- Flow Indicator and Low Flow Alarm to provide an immediate indication of cooling loss

- High Temperature Alarm to alert the operator in the event of cooling function loss

- Pressure Indicator Control PIC in the exit of the cooling pipe to control the pressure from the control room

- Flow Indicator with higher and lower Alarm in case that the valve fails closed and show the inlet flow of the reactors and maintain the relation

isobutane/olefins and HF/HC

- Flow Indicator Control after the HV 1908/1056 and loops work which work with those valves.

- Install a high temperature shutdown system that would automatically shut down the process in the event of a high reactor temperature. The shutdown

temperature would be higher than the alarm temperature to provide the operator with the opportunity to restore cooling before the reactor is shut down

and realize evaluation of the cooling water source to consider any possible interruption and contamination of the supply.

- In the process is necessary monitoring the flow of olefins, butane, isobutane and acid to maintain the operation in case of fails in the reactor and close the

valves FV 1047/1900 and FV 1059/1903 to cut the inlet flow

- Periodic monitoring of the controllers to avoid undesirable reactions and maintain the production of alkylate, of the Cooling System to maintain the

operation temperature in the range of operating, of the cooling pipe and PSV valve to avoid an incident and maintain the good operation in the reactors

and analyze when is necessary the activate bypass system to control of the flow in case that fails valves.

The second node is the acid settler D-04, the parameters studied were temperature, pressure and level and the recommendations found in this drum are:

48

- Install some controllers such as a Temperature Indicator Alarm Control in the inlet stream of the D-04 to avoid the reduction of the sedimentation time

- Install a Temperature Indicator (TI) in the streams from the isostripper to maintain the temperature of operation in the D-04

- Install a Low Level Alarm to alert the operator in the event of leak or hole in the tank and a Flow Indicator in the inlet pipe

- Install a high level alarm to avoid HF losses and maintain the process in the unit and a pressure Indicator in the outside of line to prevent operational

problems in the next section and avoid contamination of the stream and Pressure Indicator in the pipe to show that the pipe no is obstructed

- In the process is necessary an increasing of the inlet flow to maintain the level in the D-04 and a decreasing the inlet flow to maintain the level in the D-04

in case the level is from top to toe

The acid storage section has the objective to receive the unreacted acid from the reaction section and send acid to reactors. This sections are compound for

drums and some of the scenarios studied have enough safeguards and only recommended do a periodic maintenance and monitoring to the controls, valves,

pipes, equipment and the existing safeguards. Sometimes is necessary reestablishing the set point of some controllers and loops controls. Eliminate the presence

of water in the vessels and pipes to avoid corrosion and possible release of acid in the plant. Also, realize operator procedures, inspections, training and sampling

procedures.

The first node of this section is the HF acid container (truck) the parameters analyzed were pressure, level and temperature but in the case of temperature was

considered but nothing significant identified and the recommendation found are:

- Eliminate the presence of pollutants in the HF acid container (truck) to avoid sedimentation in the pipe.

- Install a high level alarm in it and install a pressure indicator in the top of the tank to monitoring this property.

The second node is the acid storage drum D-30 and the same parameters were considered and the recommendations obtain are:

- Consider install a humidity analyzer in the inlet stream to the acid storage drum and a bypass system in the line were located the valve XV 1045

- Consider install a flow indicator in the inlet line after valve XV 1045 to monitoring the flow in this line.

49

The third node is the acid dump drum and the pressure, level and temperature was analyze but for the temperature nothing significant issues were identified and

the recommendation found for the others parameters are:

- Install a flow indicator in the outlet pipe and a pressure indicator in the top and in the inlet stream of acid dump drum to monitoring these properties

constantly in the control room.

- Install o replace the PI 1081 for a PIC which works in a loop control with valve XV 1077 to avoid human error.

- Install a shutdown system to cut the inlet flow of N2 in the tank and a high level alarm in the acid dump drum. Install a PSV to send the acid to another

vessel (header).

The isostripper section is the section in which the different fractions generated in the reaction are separated. In the top the light hydrocarbons go out such as

propane, isobutene and all traces of HF which is drawn with the hydrocarbon and in the bottom the heavy compounds like alkylate and butane go out. This section

was divide in four nodes which are the principals equipment’s.

The first node is the isostripper surge drum D-05 and the parameters temperature, pressure and level with deviation less and high are studied and found these

recommendations:

- Install some controllers such as a Temperature Indicator (TI), Pressure Indicator (PI) and Flow Indicator (FI) to maintain the operation in the Isostripper V-

02

- Is indispensable the monitoring of the pressure and flow controllers to avoid fails in the operation in the isostripper surge drum D-05 and prevent that

these controllers send bad signal to the valves or control room

The second node is the isostripper tower V-02 and the same parameters were studied with the same deviations, the team found these recommendations:

- Increase and decrease the flow in the inputs and outputs of the tower V-02 including reflux flow depending on what is required for the process for maintain

stabilize of the variables like temperature, pressure and level.

50

- Is required in some controllers like pressure, temperature and level indicator controls (PI – TI – LI) requiring a constant monitoring of the loops control to

avoid possible fails.

- In some parts of the isostripper install flow, temperature and pressure indicator alarm (FA-TA-PA) due to the process required most control and

immediately actions if some cause could occur

- Install a bypass and relief system where the process is requires like in flow indicator controls due to this system is one of the best safeguards.

- Due to furnace H-01 is one of the principal heat sources of the tower V-02 is necessary increase and decrease the flow when the process is requires

stabilizing operating conditions.

- In some cases is necessary decrease and increase the steam generated from reboiler stabilizing operating conditions

- Maintenance of the heat exchanger and reboiler of the isostripper tower V-02 to maintain the temperature of operation and a good separation inside of the

tower V-02.

- Install a Flow Indicator Alarm in the reflux inlet in case of have a problems before the FV 2319 valve

The third one is the depropanizer feed settler D-12, the team considers that in this part is appropriate:

- Install a Temperature indicator (TI) and Pressure Indicator (PI) due to that are parameters important in the process of the tank and is necessary the

control

- Install a Bypass system in the depropanizer feed settler D-12 to control the flow to avoid operational problems in this tank

- Monitoring and maintenance to the heat exchanger to prevent that temperature is less or high and maintain the separation in the depropanizer feed

settler D-12, also the pipes of inlet and exit and controllers are very important due to that maintains the good operation in the tank D-12

- Feedback to employees on good operating practices and application of the Behaviour Based Safety (BBS)

In the depropanizer and HF stripper section enters the light hydrocarbon like propane and HF traces with the purpose to recover the non-reactant propane and

ensure complete removal of HF acid of the hydrocarbon recirculation. In this section is obtained stripping isobutane and propane. In this section five node were

studied and analyzed.

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The first node is the depropanizer V-04 and the recommendations were got by the team are:

- Review of the process in the isostripper V-02 to maintain the temperature of the inlet stream of the Depropanizer V-04 and avoid bad separation in this

tower

- Decreasing the inlet flow and reflux flow in the tower to maintain the right temperature in the Depropanizer V-04

- It is necessary install some controllers such as a Temperature Indicator Alarm (TIA), Flow Indicator (FI), Flow Indicator Alarm (FIA) and an Alarm in case

that the temperature or flow is less or high and do the right procedures to avoid operational problems in the Depropanizer V-04 and the next sections

causing a decreasing in the efficiency of the process

- Increasing the inlet flow and reflux flow in the tower to maintain the right temperature in the V-04

The second node is the depropanizer receiver D-13 and the recommendations obtain for the parameters studied are:

- Constantly monitoring to the cooling system to maintain the heat transfer in the heat exchanger, also the controllers is necessary to avoid bad signal in

the control room or valve and prevent operational problems in the depropanizer receiver D-13

- Is important to install some controller to maintain better the operation, in this equipment is necessary to install a Flow Indicator (FI), Flow Indicator Control

(FIC), Pressure Indicator (PI) and Pressure Indicator Alarm (PIA) to avoid problems in the tank and maintain the efficiency of the process

- Control of the process variable in the depropanizer and HF Stripper to avoid possible damage in the next equipments and prevent the decreasing of the

efficiency of the process in the next sections of the unit

The third one is the isobutene flush filter S-04A/B and the only recommendation were obtain in this node is realize constantly monitoring of the filter to maintain the

operation and to avoid that the isobutane stream comes with pollutants.

The fourth node is the HF stripper V-05. For this node is indispensable the monitoring of the Depropanizer and receiver D-13, Pressure Safety Valve (PSV) and

controllers of flow and level to avoid fails in the operation in the HF stripper, prevent that these controllers send bad signal to the valves or control room and obtain

propane in a good condition. The other recommendations are:

52

- Increasing of the steam in the reboiler to maintain of the operating temperature in the tower

- Install other controllers as a Temperature Indicator (TI), Flow Indicator Alarm (FIA) and Flow Indicator (FI) to maintain of the operation parameters of the

process and avoid problems in the unit

The last one is the propane flush filter S-06A/B and the team consider that filters counts with enough safeguards, the controllers and indicators are located in the

correct place, only need to realize constantly monitoring of the process in the HF stripper V-05 to avoid that the propane stream come with contaminant.

The propane recover in the depropanizer enter to the next step which is propane treatment to remove possible traces of acid in the stream. In this section the

parameters consider were temperature, pressure and level in the three nodes.

The first node is the exchanger E-25 and the recommendations were obtain are:

- Review constant of the operation in the HF stripper, flow and heat exchangers to avoid problems in the remove of the organic fluorides and maintain of

the operation

- Install other controllers to maintain of the operation in the section

- Install a Flow Indicator Alarm (FIA) and Pressure Indicator Control (PIC) to avoid operational problems and obtain a good propane

The second node is the propane alumina treaters D- 14 A/B and the recommendations were obtained are:

- Review of the operation in the heat exchanger E-25 to maintain the removing of the fluorides in the treaters

- To maintain the good operation in the treaters is necessary install a pressure Indicator (PI) and Flow Indicator (FI) to show that the flow and pressure is

right to maintain of the operation in the propane treatment

- In this section is necessary apply monitoring to the controllers and valves to avoid fails in the process to maintain the operation in the D-14 A/B and

propane KOH treater

The third node is the propane KOH treaters D-15 and the recommendations were obtained are:

53

- In the propane KOH treaters D-15 is important a monitoring constantly of the cooling system, HF stripper and pipes to verify that the process variables are

right and avoid an incident in the plant

- In this equipment is necessary install a Flow Indicator (FI) to verify that the flow is right and avoid problems in the process of the Propane KOH Treaters

D-15

Alkylate and butane stream enter to other step in the unit which are the debutanizer and alkylate treatment, in this part the normal butane is removed from the

alkylate, after that the stream is conditioned and contaminants are removed. The butane stream proceeds to step for remove any part of acid and is sent to another

unit.

The first node is debutanizer tower V-01 and the recommendations obtain when the parameters were analyzed are:

- Increase and decrease the flow that inputs and outputs of the tower depending on what is required for the process for maintain stabilize of the variables

like temperature, pressure and level.

- In some cases is necessary decrease and increase the steam generated from reboiler E-09 stabilizing operating conditions due to this is the principal

equipment in the hot generation to tower V-01

- Installation a Pressure Indicator Alarm PIA, Temperature indicator alarm TIA, flow indicator alarm FIA, due to process required in some parts of him for

prevent possible leak, rupture, hold or release to control this fail

- Installation bypass and relief system where the process is requires due to this system is one of the best safeguards

The second node is reflux drum D-08 and the recommendations obtain are:

- Decrease or increase the flow of secondary water that coming in into 08 A/B Exchanger for increase or decrease the temperature of vapors and liquid in

the tower for controlling the operational range.

- Increase and decrease the flow in that inputs and outputs of the reflux drum D-08 depending on what is required for the process for maintain stabilize of

the variables like temperature, pressure and level.

- Decrease the flow outside the column V-01 in the bottoms part for decrease the temperature, pressure and level and stabilize the profile.

54

- Due to the process has a security system in some parts of him which is bypass and relief system is recommendable if the possible cause occur activate

bypass and relief system for mitigate or prevent injuries or risk


this part to control better.

The third node is alkylate filters S-05A/B and we obtained the follow recommendations:





The last one is the alkylate treatment drum D-06 and is important to realize constant maintenance to the pipeline and drum D-06 to prevent ruptures, leaks or hold

for corrosion or external events and contamination of the other streams of the process. Due to the process has a security system in some parts of him which is

bypass and relief system is recommendable if the possible cause occur activate bypass and relief system for mitigate or prevent injuries or risk.

The normal-butane treatment has the objective to remove possible traces of HF acid in the stream to send the normal butane to another unit in the refinery. In this

part the temperature, pressure and level were analyzed and five nodes are identified.

The first one is the heat exchangers E-14/14A and condenser D 27/27A. In this section the process count with a bypass and relief system therefore is

recommendable if the pressure or temperature increase inside the vessels activate these system for mitigate or prevent injuries or risk. Others recommendations

obtain for these nodes are:

- Installation a flow indicator control with lower and higher alarm due to process required in some parts of it for prevent possible leak, rupture, hold or

release to control this fail

- Decrease the cooling water that enter in the heat exchanger D 27/27A for decrease the temperature of the flow that coming out

55

The second node is the treaters with alumina D-09A-D and the team found the following recommendations:

- Decrease the flow that enter to alumina treaters D-09A-D and increase the steam flow in the heat exchanger E-14/14A for stabilize the variables like

temperature, pressure and level and maintain the operability process.



- Feedback to employees on good operating practices and is recommendable using behavior based safety for prevent human errors



- Install a flow indicator system in the inlet stream which is for control the flow that enter in the alumina treaters additional to this is required a constant

monitoring for prevent possible malfunctions and risk to process and employees

The third node is the coalescers D-10/10A and the recommendations obtain for these vessels are:

- Install a flow indicator system in the inlet stream for control the flow and level in the tank because this depends on the separation of substances and

prevents possible contaminants

- Due to heat exchangers has the responsibility of control the temperature that enter in the coalescer is necessary increase the cool secondary water in the

heat exchangers E-16/16A for maintenance the temperature



- Installation a bypass system due to is the most effective system for control tamponed or fails in the valves and taking into account that if the valve is

important and the flow is dangerous if this is in contact with the environment

For the fourth node the KOH treatments drum D-11/11A the recommendations obtain are:

56


this part.

- Due to N-Butane sometimes contain more water than normal is necessary decrease the inlet flow at treatments drum D 11/11A for avoid possible

damages

- In some parts he process has a manual valves which are can activate if the principal valve fails in this case is recommendable activate manual valves

The last one is the additive treatments for this node the recommendations are:



- Decrease the flow and increase the temperature in the coalesce D 10/10A for remove complete the pollutants

- Installation of a pressure indicator that worked with some pressure indicators valves to ensure that the pressure profile don't change

- Constant maintenance to the state of the additive treatments to ensure proper operation and avoid possible operational problems and is recommendable

have a constant report about the tank state

Other important part in this unit is the HF regenerator. The purpose in this part is removing soluble contaminants in the acid and thus maintains the purity of the

acid also enters isobotune stripping. For this section four nodes were obtained and analyzed.

The team evaluates the first node which is the acid regenerator V-03 including the IsobutaneSuperheater E-17 and IsobutaneSuperheater Condensate Pot D-28

and obtains the follow recommendation:

- Install a FIC in the inlet stream which works with FIC 1180 to regulate the steam flow rate to ensure the correct inlet temperature and another one in the

inlet line of the regenerator V-03 (after valve FV 1171) which works with a flow valve in the intermittent inlet line to increase the flow rate in case of this

valve or FIC 1171 which regulate the valve fails and maintain the operational range (626 BDP)

- Install a TIC in each line (Regeneration isobutane from the depropanizer and HF stripper and HF from the Reaction section) to monitoring the inlet

temperature and do a loop control with a valve which controls the inlet flow rate to hot isobutane in the bottom of the column V-03.

57

- Change the location of the existing FI in the line after valve TV1168 and install a higher temperature alarm in the TIC which controls this valve.

- Install a manual valve and FI in the line from ALKAD regeneration section and close the intermittent flow and also install another FI in the outlet pipe in the

bottom of the regenerator and consider if it is possible install other in the inlet pipe (in the bottom of the tower).

- Change the manual valve GBCF22 in the top of the regenerator for a security valve (PSV) with a bypass system and send the stream to flare header to

reduce the risk for the employees to contaminate with HF and install a pressure indicator in the top of the column.

The second node is the polymer surge drum D-16 and the team consider necessary:

- Install a temperature indicator and flow indicator in the inlet line (steam line and polymer from V-03 line) and only flow indicator in the nitrogen line and a

flow indicator control with a flow valve to control the inlet flow from the alkad section D-101, if it is possible install a temperature valve in the steam line

which works with a TIC located in the polymer from V-03 line to regulate the steam flow.

- Replace the manual valve LWCS01 for a temperature valve controlled by TIC to avoid human errors and consider install a pressure indicator in the top of

the drum to control the pressure inside the vessel and avoid possible explosion and potential fire.

The third one is the polymer neutralizer D-17 and the recommendation obtain for this node are show below.

- Install a flow indicator in the nitrogen line and in the inlet line to the polymer neutralizer D-17 from D-16

- Install a pressure indicator in the top of the drum and a level indicator control with high and low level alarm with control these variable in the vessel

- Consider if it is necessary the manual valve GWCS07 in the vessel

The last node is the closed drain drum D-404 and the recommendations are:

- Consider moving the PI-2714 and restrictive orifice (RO) in the nitrogen line to D-404 vent downstream of the bypass PCV-2700.

- Install a pressure indicator in the top of the drum with the objective of monitoring this operational variable and revising the design pressure of the D-404

Closed Drain Drum because the maximum nitrogen pressure on the purge to the drum and vent piping is approximately 95 psig and the current design

pressure of the drum is 50 psig.

58

- Change the TI 2704 for a TIC and consider change the location of TI 2704 or install another temperature indicator in the vessel and higher temperature

alarm

- Install a temperature valve in the inlet steam pipe which works with this controller.

- Consider install a TI in the vessel and consider installing a bypass system in the inlet steam pipe line. Install a flow indicator in the line to monitoring this

operational variable.

- Consider if it is necessary the manual valve GWCS03 in the vessel and analyze if this valve can change for a safety valve (PSV)

The effluent treatment in the section has the purpose to recollect all the oily water produced in the unit and performed a proper treatment of these streams

efficiently and safely, minimizing the risk inherent a possible discharge of hazardous substances. In general realize periodic maintenance to equipment, existing

safeguards and operator procedures in the plant, training and sampling procedures and check the NPSH with the objective to avoid mechanical damage in pumps.

Delegate the function to check the status of the pump and do a schedule to realize the monitoring procedures.

The first node is liquid knockout drum D-18 and the analyze parameters such as temperature, pressure and level but when the temperature and pressure were

considered but nothing significant identified. Only found one recommendation in this node which is install a manual or control valve in the inlet line of liquid

knockout drum and change the LI 1272 for a LIC and this controller works with the level valve.

The second node is the neutralizing drum D-19 and the recommendations are:

- Install a flow indicator in the steam line

- Install an acid analyzer in the inlet line in the neutralizing drum to control the presence of acid in this section and a high temperature alarm in TI 2540.

The third node is the relief gas scrubber V-06 and the recommendations are:

- Consider install a temperature indicator control in the relief gas scrubber which works with a temperature valve localized in the inlet steam line to control

the temperature inside.

59

- Change the GACF06 in the relief gas scrubber for a safety valve to avoid human error and overpressure in the vessel with potential fire, spill of substance

in the unit and risk to employees

The fourth node is the KOH regeneration tank D-20 and the recommendations were found are:

- Consider install a flow indicator in the inlet line to the KOH regeneration tank to control the flow rate which enters in the reboiler and a hydrometer to

confirm the KOH solution density

- Install a shutdown system in the eductor S-03 which works with a temperature indicator to control the temperature inside the tank

- Ensure there is a gap between the Regeneration Tank drain line and the Neutralization Basin to see if there is plugging in the drain line and to minimize

KOH losses

The last node is the neutralizing basin TK-001A/B in this node the parameter pressure is not applicable because this tank is open to atmosphere and the

temperature was analyzed but nothing important significant identify. Thus, for the level the recommendations found are:

- Determine the means to clean and how to handle solids that might accumulate in the Neutralizing Basin

- Provide a line to divert the AWS water from the Neutralizing Basin to the potentially contaminated storm water sump

The KOH mixer tank D-22 was analyzed and nothing important issues were found, for this reason was not analyzed such a node in this part.

The section counts which its own cooling water tower to recovers the refrigerant properties of primary cooling water tower, in this section only one node

was identified and the parameter studied are temperature, pressure, level and composition (water purity), in general the team recommended the following items:

- Realize constant check of the process to ensure the adequate functioning of the unit. Check all the procedures with the same goal include the cooling

water system failures

- Constant check of the parameters studied to avoid the spill of water and revision of the existing safeguards.

- Periodic sampling procedures in the treatment procedures and training to the operator to do these procedures safely.

60

- Check the pressure in each cooling water exchanger to guarantee the correct operation of this and avoid damage in the exchangers

- Install a low pressure alarm on PI 1382 in the high pressure steam supply and a measuring element level low (LEL) in the cooling system.

The last section analyze was the Alkad regeneration and four node were identify. The objective in this section is regenerate the additive with isobutene stripping

which is added to the reaction section to decrease the volatility, in this form; minimize the vaporization when the acid is in contact with the atmosphere in case of a

leak.

The first node is the fresh additive charge and additive storage drum D-103. The recommendations for this node are:

- Due to the process count with a relief system which is one of the most important safety systems is required opened if the pressure increase inside the

vessel

- Considering install a bypass system for avoid problems if the principal valve fails

- Periodic maintenance of pumps P-104A because an inopportune damage of this can generate large overpressures in pipes and equipment

The second node is the additive stripper T-101. Analyzing the possible causes the team found the following recommendation:

- Decrease the acid stream that passes through the heat exchangers E-104A-D for control de temperature and avoid possible injures due to an acid relief



- Increase and decrease the flow in that inputs and outputs of the Drum D-103 including reflux flow depending on what is required for the process for

maintain stabilize of the variables like temperature, pressure and level.

- In some cases is recommendable close or open the manual valve which is before or after the control valve depends of the possible deviation for mitigate

the risk



61

- Constant maintenance the pipeline and additive stripper T-101 to prevent ruptures, leaks or hold for corrosion or external events and contamination of the

other streams of the process.



The third node is additive stripper receiver D-102 and the recommendation that the team found are:

- Periodic check to the equipment stripper D-102 and pipeline where we can get the correct status of them for avoid possible changes or risk in the process

- In some cases is recommendable close or open the manual valve which is before or after the control valve depends of the possible deviation for mitigate

the risk



The fourth node is the additive stripper bottoms separator D-101 and the recommendations are:

- Install a flow indicator FI in the Cooling Water system to ensure the temperature profile in the column and avoid pollutants in the outside streams

- Periodic check to the stripper D-101 and pipeline where we can get the correct status of them for avoid possible changes or risk in the process

- Periodic maintenance of pump P-101 because an inopportune damage of this can generate large overpressures in pipes and equipment

- Considered install a turbine for generate more energy in the pump P-101 and ensure their function



- Stop Polymer flow to the Polymer Surge Drum for decrease the level until stabilize the temperature and pressure for avoid possible loss of the product

62

10.2. LOPA & SIL

The LOPA and SIL report show the results obtain in the study of alkylation unit with hydrofluoric acid. A risk tolerance criterion of 10-8 is stated in the LOPA as

applying for all risks environmental, financial and safety. This risk tolerance criteria description is unclear and may be inappropriate for the following reasons:

- Environmental, financial and safety risks should be assessed separately and relevant criteria applied.

- This LOPA dos not state what the risk tolerance criteria are, for example, risk of what, to what and from what.

- It is not clear whether the Individual Risk (IR) target represent s all risks the hypothetical individual person faces on site or just those associated with a

single tank and single hazard.

- No justification for the chosen criteria is presented in the LOPA assessment report.

For do LOPA the significant and high risks obtained in HAZOP were chosen, thus obtaining 24 scenarios divided into selective hydrogenation, reaction, propane

treatment, debutanization and alkylate treatment, N-Butane treatment, HF Regeneration, Cooling water and Effluent treatment unit.

For each scenarios were identified the independent protection layer (IPL) and using the methodology described above. Using the values of PFDs for each

safeguards show in tables 5, 6 and 7, we create a table 9 with the most common values for do this study.

63

Table 9. Typical Protection Layer used in this study

INDEPENDENT PROTECTION LAYER PFD

Process Design (Indicator of Temperature, Pressure and Flow)

Process Design (Manual valve; Bypass system)

BPCS (Control Loop)

Alarm

Procedures Table 7

SIS

Relief Device (Pressure Safety Valve)

Emergency Response (Fires)

Using the frequency we could calculate the overall consequence frequency and compare with acceptable risk criteria to know if the deviation needed another IPL

to mitigate the hazardous scenarios. The deviations that not exceeded or is the same value assigned for the refinery it was necessary to generate more

recommendations to mitigate the risk. The safety integrity level (SIL) focuses on the adequacy of safeguards to mitigate hazardous scenarios (ACM Facility Safety,

2006)

64

SELECTIVE HYDROGENATION

In the Selective Hydrogenation section we were obtained 176 scenarios in the HAZOP study of which 4 were evaluated with a significant risk and was analyze in

the LOPA and SIL study, these are:

The first one cause was in the Feed Surge Drum D-201,the process parameter is pressure with a deviation Less and the possible cause was “PIC 4007 fails

opened PV 4007A due to malfunctions” which has the following safeguards “Pressure of Nitrogen is 95 psig and pressure of the drum is 180 psig using for

decrease the pressure inside the tank, Relief valve (Fuel gas purges to the refinery flare system), Bypass system (LWCS01), Manual valves before and after PV

4007A (GWCS01) and Operator procedures and training and response”

With this possible cause we obtained a Severity of 5, Frequency of 3 and Risk of 15 S. In this part were acquired 3 Independents Protection Layers which are:

- Process Design

- Procedures

- Emergency Response

The overall consequence frequency for this deviation was this value is lower than so the hazard from this equipment generates with this

deviation was mitigated with the safeguards that the process has.

65

The second and third one cause were in the Reactors R-201/202, the process parameter is pressure with a deviation High and the possible cause was “The valve

PSV 4037 or PSV 4047 fails open due to malfunctions” which has the following safeguards “Manual valve GBCF03 and Operator procedures and training and

response”


- Process Design

- Procedures


The overall consequence frequency for this deviation was this value is lower than so the hazard from this equipment generates with this


The process parameter for the other to other deviation for this equipment was High and the possible cause was “Due to malfunctions the PCV 4149 fails opened

increased the nitrogen flow” which has the following safeguards “Relief valve (Fuel gas purges to the refinery flare system) and Operator procedures and training

and response”


- Procedures

- Relief device

66

- Emergency response

The overall consequence frequency for this deviation was this value is equal to so the hazard from this equipment generates with this


The last one cause were Stripper T-201, the process parameter is temperature with a deviation High, the possible cause was “Due to malfunctions the PV 4051

fails closed interrupting the olefins flow” which has the following safeguards “ Bypass System (LBCF01), manual valves GBCF01 before and after at pressure valve

and operator procedures, training and response”


- Procedures


The overall consequence frequency for this deviation was this value is less than so the hazard from this equipment generates with this


67

CHARGE AND DRYING

In the charge and drying section we obtained one hundred thirteen scenarios which three scenarios of these were applied the LOPA and SIL methodologies.

These three scenarios are found in the surge drum D-02.

In the first initiating event the process parameter was Level and the deviation was Less. The possible cause was “Rupture or leak in the principle inlet line to D-02”

which has the following safeguards “Manuals valves CBCF01/ LWCS03/ LBCF06 to close the inlet flow for each streams, XV 2453, FV1006, Operator procedures,

training and response, and Emergency response”.

With this possible cause we obtained a Severity of 4, Frequency of 3 and Risk of 12S. In this part were acquired 5 Independent Protection Layers which are:

- Process Design

- BPCS

- Procedures

- SIS


Performing the different calculations the Overall Consequence Frequency was , in this case is not necessary suggest any recommendation to mitigate

this possible cause due to the existing independent protection layer may mitigate completely this possible cause.

68

In the second initiating event the process parameter was Level and the deviation was Less. The possible cause was “Rupture or leak in the outlet lines of the drum

D-02” which has the following safeguards “LI 1005 with low level and low-low alarm, Manual valve GWCS03, XV 1516, Operator procedures, training and

response, and Emergency response”.

With this possible cause we obtained a Severity of 4, Frequency of 3 and Risk of 12 S. In this part were acquired 6 Independent Protection Layers which are:

- Process Design

- BPCS

- Alarm

- Procedures

- SIS




In the third initiating event the process parameter was Level and the deviation was High. The possible cause was “LV 1004 fails closed for example bad transmitter

or loss of instrument air” which has the following safeguards “Bypass system around valve LV 1004 with manual valve LWCS03, LI 1005 with low level and low-low

alarm and high level and high - high alarm”.

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With this possible cause we obtained a Severity of 4, Frequency of 3 and Risk of 12 S. In this part were acquired 4 Independent Protection Layer which are:

- Process Design

- Alarm

- Procedures




REACTION SECTION

In the reaction section we obtained fifty scenarios which one scenarios it was applied the LOPA methodologies. This cause it was in the reactors E28/28A, the

process parameter was Temperature and the deviation was High. The possible cause was “The cooling flow is interrupted due to the FBCF01 fails closed” which

has the following safeguards “TI 1548; PI1546; Operator procedure training and response”.


- Process Design

- Procedures

- Relief Device

70

- Emergency

Performing the different calculations the Overall Consequence Frequency was , in this case is no necessary suggest some recommendation to mitigate

this possible cause but we consider apply this recommendation which was:

- Install a Flow Indicator Control with Low Flow Alarm which is located in the inlet pipe of the cooling water to maintain the process flow in the reactors

Performing the new calculations the New Overall was , I mean, that applying these recommendations may mitigate completely this possible cause.

PROPANE TREATMENT SECTION

In the next section which is Propane Treatment we obtained sixty two scenarios therefore two scenarios go to the LOPA analysis. These scenarios were acquired

in the node 3 which is the Propane KOH Treaters D-15. The LOPA analysis to these two scenarios was in the process parameter of Level.

The first deviation was Less, the possible cause was “PV-2417 valve fails open due to malfunctions” which count with the next safeguards “FIC-2415 with low flow

alarm, Operator procedures and training, GBCF 16 Manual valve located after of the PV 2417”. With this scenario we obtained a Severity of 4, Frequency of 3 and

Risk of 12 S. The independent protection layers to this possible cause were 5 which are:

- Process Design

- BPCS

- Alarm

- Procedures

71


Performing the different calculations the Overall Consequence Frequency was , in this case no is necessary suggest some recommendation due to

that this scenario account whit the enough safeguards to mitigate this possible cause.

The second deviation was High, the possible cause was “PV-2417 fails closed due to malfunctions” which count with the next safeguards “Bypass around PV-

2417, FIC-2415 minimum flow controller with low flow alarm, PSV-2414 on the KOH treater, PSV-2407/2408 on the Alumina treater, Operator procedures and

training”. With this scenario we obtained a Severity of 4, Frequency of 3 and Risk of 12 S. The independent protection layers to this possible cause were 6 which

are:

- Process Design

- BPCS

- Alarm

- Procedures

- Relief Device


Performing the different calculations the Overall Consequence Frequency was , in this case no is necessary suggest some recommendation due to

that this scenario account whit the enough safeguards to mitigate this possible cause.

72

DEBUTANIZATION AND ALKYLATE TREATMENT

In the Debutanization and Alkylate Treatment section we were obtained 72 scenarios in the HAZOP study of which 1 was evaluated with a significant risk and was

analyze in the LOPA and SIL study, these is:

In the first node in the equipment Alkylate Filter S-05 A/B with Level as process parameter and a deviation Less, the possible cause was “Loss of turbine pump P-

04A from either mechanical damage or loss of steam if using turbine as primary pump” which has the following safeguards “Pumps status in the PCS connected to

loops control, FI 2538, separate pump with separate power sources and operator procedures, training and response”


- Procedures

- BPCS


The overall consequence frequency for this deviation was this value is less than so the hazard from this equipment generates

with this deviation was mitigated with the safeguards that the process has.

73

N-BUTANE TREATMENT

In the N-Butane treatments section we were obtained 103 scenarios in the HAZOP study of which 2 were evaluated with a significant risk and was analyze in the

LOPA and SIL study, these are:

The first one was in the Theaters with alumina D-09 A-D with Pressure as process parameter and High as deviation; the possible cause was “Manual valve

GBCF13 it will close due to human factors” which has the following safeguards “Operator procedures, training and response”

With this possible cause we obtained a Severity of 3, Frequency of 4 and Risk of 12 S. In this part was acquired 1 Independent Protection Layer which is:


Performing the different calculations the Overall Consequence Frequency was , in this case is necessary suggest some recommendation to mitigate

this possible cause, which was:

- Is necessary install a loop control (BPCS) that worked with a flow valve worked with a Bypass System that worked between pressure control valve to avoid

problems

Performing the new calculations the New Overall was therefore this new result means that applying these recommendations may mitigate completely

this possible cause, hence the acceptable criteria of risk tolerated by the company is .

74

The last one was N-butane coalescers D10/10A with pressure as process parameter and High as deviation; the possible cause was “Tamponed in the outside

pipeline of the N-Butane exit due to presence of impurities in the stream and bad maintenance of the piping” which has the following safeguards “PIC 1219/ 1984

worked with a control valve and operator procedures, training and response”.


- BPCS




- Is required a bypass system between pressure indicator control to avoid problems due to overpressure that can cause risks.



75

HF REGENERATION

In the HF Regeneration section we obtained one hundred twelve scenarios which five scenarios of these were applied the LOPA and SIL methodologies. Three of

these scenarios are found in the acid regenerator V-03 and the other two scenarios are found in the closed drain drum D-404.

In the first initiating event the process parameter was Temperature and the deviation was High. The possible cause was “FV 1171 fails closed” which has the

following safeguards “Intermittent flow from ALKAD section, Lab sampling, hand wheel on FV 1171, TIC 1168 which will add reflux to maintain the overhead

temperature of the regenerator, Operator procedures, training and response”.


- Process Design

- BPCS

- Procedures



In the second initiating event the process parameter was Temperature and the deviation was High. The possible cause was “TV 1168 malfunctions closed” which

has the following safeguards “FI-1170 flow indication, TI-1625 temperature indication, Hand wheel on TV-1168, Operator procedures, training and response”.


76

- Process Design

- Procedures

Performing the different calculations the Overall Consequence Frequency was , in this case is no necessary suggest any recommendation to mitigate


In the third initiating event the process parameter was Pressure and the deviation was Less. The possible cause was “Manual valve GBCF22 in the top of the

regenerator is open” which has the following safeguards “Operator procedures, training and response”.


- Procedures




- Change the manual valve located in the top of the vessel for a relief valve to prevent air pollution and system from exceeding specified overpressure. The

effectiveness of this device is sensitive to service and experience.



77

In the fourth initiating event the process parameter was Pressure and the deviation was High in the closed drum D-404. The possible cause was “Bypass system of

PCV 2700 is opened increasing the nitrogen flow rate” which has the following safeguards “PI 2714, RO2716, Operator procedures, training and response”.

With this possible cause we obtained a Severity of 5, Frequency of 4 and Risk of 20 H. In this part were acquired 3 Independent Protection Layer which are:

- Process Design

- Procedures




- Install a high pressure alarm with the existing pressure indicator



In the fifth initiating event the process parameter was Pressure and the deviation was High in the closed drum D-404. The possible cause was “PCV 2700 fails

opened increasing the N2 inlet flow” which has the following safeguards “PI 2714, RO2716, Operator procedures, training and response”.

With this possible cause we obtained a Severity of 5, Frequency of 4 and Risk of 20 H. In this part were acquired 3 Independent Protection Layers which are:

78

- Process Design

- Procedures




- Install a high pressure alarm with the existing pressure indicator



COOLING WATER

In the cooling water section we obtained fifteen scenarios which only one scenario it was applied the LOPA and SIL methodologies. This initiating event was in the

cooling tower CT-401, the process parameter was composition (water purity) and the deviation was less. The possible cause was “Leak of hydrocarbon” which has

the following safeguards “AI 2003, Interlock UC 31, AIC 2026, AI 2027, Additive to maintain equipment integrity, Sampling procedures, Operator procedures,

training and response”.


- BPCS

79

- Procedures



this possible cause.

EFFLUENT TREATMENT

In the effluent treatment section we obtained seventy one scenarios which five scenarios of these were applied the LOPA and SIL methodologies. Two of these

scenarios are found in the relief gas scrubber V-06 and other three are found in the neutralizing basin TK-001A/B.

In the first initiating event the process parameter was Pressure and the deviation was less in the relief gas scrubber V-06. The possible cause was “Manual valve

GACF06 is open” which has the following safeguards “Operator procedures, training and response”.

With this possible cause we obtained a Severity of 4, Frequency of 3 and Risk of 12 S. In this part was acquired 1 Independent Protection Layer which is:

- Procedures



80

- Change the manual valve located in the top of the vessel for a relief valve to prevent air pollution and system from exceeding specified overpressure. The

effectiveness of this device is sensitive to service and experience.



In the second initiating event the process parameter was Level and the deviation was less in the relief gas scrubber V-06. The possible cause was “P-11A/B

pumps shut down from either mechanical damage or loss of power.” which has the following safeguards “FIC 1290 with low flow alarm, Operator procedures,

training and response”.


- BPCS

- Alarm

- Procedures



- Due to is a damage in the pump recommend to install an active IPL as Human action with no more than 20 min of response time to simple well-documented

action with clear and reliable indications that the action is required.

81



In the third initiating event the process parameter was Level and the deviation was high in the neutralizing basin TK-001A/B. The possible cause was “LIC 1725

fails stopping the pump P-13A/B.” which has the following safeguards “HS, Pump status with local start/stop, LT 1725 Ultrasonic, Operator procedures, training

and response”


- Process design

- Procedures



- Consider installing a passive IPL like a dike or underground drainage system to reduce the frequency of large consequences (widespread spill) of a tank

overfill.



82

In the fourth initiating event the process parameter was Level and the deviation was high in the neutralizing basin TK-001A/B. The possible cause was “Flooding in

the unit and the neutralizing basin area due to heavy rain” which has the following safeguards “Operator procedures, training and response”

With this possible cause we obtained a Severity of 4, Frequency of 4 and Risk of 16 S. In this part was acquired 1 Independent Protection Layer which are:

- Procedures




overfill.

Performing the new calculations the New Overall was therefore this new result means that applying these recommendations cannot mitigate

completely this possible cause, so is necessary apply or suggest other recommendation to mitigate the initiating event, which was:

- Install a level indicator with a high alarm in the neutralizing basin tank



83

In the fifth initiating event the process parameter was Level and the deviation was high in the neutralizing basin TK-001A/B. The possible cause was “Pumps P-

13A/B shut down” which has the following safeguards “HS, Pump status with local start/stop, LT 1725 Ultrasonic, Operator procedures, training and response”


- Process design

- Procedures




overfill.

Performing the new calculations the New Overall was therefore this new result means that applying these recommendations can mitigate completely


84

11. CONCLUSIONS

As a result of our research we can conclude that through the application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL methodologies which were identified possible risks that may

occur in the Alkylation unit at the Ecopetrol’s refinery in Cartagena - Colombia.

Through the study of HAZOP which is a technique of risk identification based on the assumption that the risks, accidents or operability problems, occurring as a

consequence of a deviation of process variables with respect to normal parameters of operation in a given system and a determined stage, that’s mean, evaluate

in all lines and on all equipment’s the consequences of the possible deviations in all sections of the process. In our research we identified and analyzed the causes

and consequences of each of the deviations from the most important process variables which were temperature, pressure, level and concentration developed

through of guides’ words which are less, high and no. With this study were obtained 1092 scenarios found in thirteen section of the alkylation plant.

Furthermore, the scenarios that had significant and high risk were studied and sent to LOPA and SIL analysis. The LOPA analysis is a technique of risk

assessment which aims to determine the frequency of an undesired consequence that can be avoided through a set of protection layers. The approach evaluates

the worst case scenario, where all the protection layers must be failing for the consequence occurs; the frequency of this consequence is calculated using the

probability of failure on demand (PFD) of the different protection layers. With LOPA analysis 24 scenarios were found in nine units of the alkylation plant. Each of

these scenarios were calculated the frequency of the undesired consequence and compared with the acceptable risk criteria to identified the risk reduction

required, then the appropriate SIL level is selected.

This study also allowed fulfilling the overall objective of this research which was identified and reviews the best safety practices applying HAZOP, LOPA and SIL

for proper operation and performance of the Alkylation Unit catalyzed with Hydrofluoric Acid at the Ecopetrol’s Refinery in Cartagena- Colombia. To get the desired

85

result was necessary to make a review of the literature in order to obtain all the information about the process and how operate the alkylation unit including the

operational principles. Also a detailed analysis of hydrofluoric acid to consider all possible consequences if a leak occur in this study was done. Furthermore, we

found that the unit has a safety system considered fairly and count with the enough controllers and protection layers to prevent risks but in some parts of the plant

is necessary implement more safeguards to mitigate these hazardous scenarios.

12. FUTURE WORKS

We recommend perform the next activities for this research:

• Create an operational manual from of the recommendations obtained in the HAZOP, LOPA and SIL analysis

• Perform a study of Human Factor in the unit

• Evaluate the process design of the equipment’s

• Participation in international and national events

• Elaboration of papers for publication in indexed journals

86

13. SCHEDULE

ACTIVITIES OBJECTIVE RELATED EXECUTION DATE

Year: 2015

Literature review about HF

Alkylation unit

Make a literature review to get information about the process operating

and general information of the alkylation unit catalyzed with

hydrofluoric acid.

January 15 to January 20

Study detailed of the process

Development a detailed study about the how process worked and found the principals variables.


Select the principals variables like

pressure, temperature, level, etc.

to develop the safety study

Development a detailed study about the how process worked and found the principals variables.


Identify and establish the nodes for

each section of the plant

Identify the operating principles of the alkylation unit to select the corresponding nodes which they will be evaluated in detail in each section of the unit..

January 27 to May 15

Create the HAZOP worksheet on

Excel

Generate an Excel document that contain the recommendations and analysis obtained from the investigation divided by the nodes selected and principals variables.

February 2 to February 4

87

Development of the HAZOP study divided in the selected nodes

Identify the criteria and process safety mechanisms used in the alkylation plant with hydrofluoric acid and compare with the results obtained to ensure that they are optimal for its operation.

February 4 to May 15

Create the LOPA and SIL worksheet on Excel

Generate an Excel document that contain the recommendations and analysis obtained from the investigation divided by the nodes selected and principals variables.

May 16

Development of LOPA and SIL study from the most significant scenarios obtained in HAZOP study

Identify the criteria and process safety mechanisms used in the alkylation plant with hydrofluoric acid and compare with the results obtained to ensure that they are optimal for its operation.

May 16 to May 30

Analysis of results obtained to make conclusions and recommendations of the project

Publish articles in index journals from the results obtained in the investigation.

May 30 to Jun 5

Made a report to Mary Kay O’Connor Process Safety Center that includes general information about the project, the results, conclusion, recommendations and future work.

Publish articles in index journals from the results obtained in the investigation

Jun 2 to Jun 13

88

Development a report to Universidad de San Buenaventura based in the results and information about the process.

Publish articles in index journals from the results obtained in the investigation.

July 31 to August 5

14. ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

ALKAD: beta-picoline

BBS: Behavior Based Safety

BPD: Barrels equivalent per day

CO: carbon monoxide

CPI: chemical process industries

E: Environmental

ETA: Event Tree Analysis

F: Financial

FCCU: fluid catalytic cracking unit

FTA: Fault Tree Analysis

89

HA: hydroxylamine

HAZAN: Hazard Analysis

HAZOP: Hazard and Operability Study

HF: hydrofluoric acid

HRA: Human Reliability Analysis

IPL: Independent protection layer

IR: Individual Risk

KOH: potassium hydroxide

LEL: element level low

LNG: Liquefied Natural Gas

LOPA: Layer of Protection Analysis

PFD: probability of failure on demand

PFDs: Process Flow Diagrams

PFDG: probability of dangerous failure on demand

PHA: Process Hazard Analysis

90

P&lDs: Piping & Instrument Diagrams

QRA: Quantitative Risk Analysis

RBD: reliability block diagram

RO: Restrictive Orifice

S: Safety

SIL: Safety Integrity Level

SIS’s: safety instrumented systems

SPLs: Safety Protection Layers

TF: tolerable frequency

15. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors are grateful to Dr. Sam Mannan and Ms.Valerie Green for the opportunity to they gave us to perform this internship at the center, for their support,

understanding and all the lessons learned who gave us during these six months so that this experience was rewarding and will be held with success each of the

objectives. Likewise we want to say thank you to all the members of the Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety (MKOPSC) especially to Dr. Sonny Sachdeva, Dr. Yi

Liu, Dr. Richart Vazquez and Dr. Chad Mashuga.

Also, we want to say thanks to the Universidad de San Buenaventura-Cartagena for the formation that they gave us during our major and our mentor Dr. Juliana

Puello.

91

Engineer Jorge Espinosa from Ecopetrol S.A for his collaboration, providing information to complete the project and especially for being available to give us

necessary information and each of the engineers who took some time to explain some things about the process that was studied.

Finally we want to say thanks to our parents who gave us their unconditional support, for supporting us financially in this process, to always be there guiding us

and encouraging us at difficult times. Likewise for providing the best legacy than they can give us: education.

16. REFERENCES

Akpabio, E., Neeka J., 2013. Review of Petroleum Refinery Acid Catalyzed Alkylation Processes: A Message to Nigerian Refineries. Petroleum Technology

Development Journal: An International Journal, 3, 84- 97. ISSN 1595-9104

American Institute of Chemical Engineers Guidelines for Hazards Evaluation Procedures. Second Edition with Worked Examples.Copirigh. ISBN 0-8169-0491-X

Barril de petróleo. 2009 copyright Yupirramos. Accessed March 11 2015 < http://sp.depositphotos.com/7970527/stock-illustration-oil-barrel.html>

Bertolini, J., 1992. Hydrofluoric acid: A review of toxicity. The Journal of Emergency Medicine, 10, 163-168

Binghman K. and Goteti P., 2004. Integrating HAZOP and SIL/LOPA analysis: best practice recommendations. The instrumentation system and Automation

Society. Houston Texas. Available on web <http://www.keesofferman.nl/calculators/integrating_hazop_and_sil.pdf> Date: 05/31/2015

Cartagena de Indias – Colombia, n. d. Photograph. Accessed March 12 2015.< http://nodocios.com.ar/sumando-valor-en-universidad-san-buenaventura-

cartagena-de-indias-colombia/>

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. NIOSH Pocket Guide to Chemical Hazards: Hydrogen Fluoride. Date: 04-01-2015

Crowl D. and Louvar J.,2011. Chemical Process Safety Fundamentals with Application.ThirdEdition. Prentice Hall. ISBN 0-13-138226-8

Ecopetrol S.A., 2014. Manual de descripción del proceso de la unidad de alquilacion HF y TAE (U-044). Cartagena: Refineria Cartagena S.A (Reficar S.A)

Ecopetrol, 2015 copyright ACIPET.Accessed March 12 2015.http://petroguia.com.co/empresademo/ecopetrol-3/

92

EPA united States Environmental Protection Agency. Hydrogen Fluoride (Hydrofluric Acid). Revised Date [January 2000].

[http://www.epa.gov/ttnatw01/hlthef/hydrogen.html] Date: 07-01-2015

DuPont.Comparison of H2SO4 & HF Alkylation Process Technologies. [http://www.dupont.com/content/dam/assets/products-and-services/consulting-services-

process-technologies/articles/documents/H2SO4_vs._HF.pdf] Date: 04-02-2015

Fahim M., Alsahhaf T. and Elkilano A., 2010.Fundamentals of Petroleum Refining. Chapter 14 - Safety in Petroleum Refineries, 357-376. Department of Chemical

Engineering, Kuwait University, Khaldeya, Kuwait

Flanker, 2006.The hazard symbol for highly toxic substances according to directive 67/548/EWG by European Chemical

Bureau.http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hazard_TT.svg. Date: 04-01-2015

Gad SE, Sullivan DW. (2014). Encyclopedia of Toxicology: Hydrofluoric acid (Third edition). Elsevier, Inc

Kletz T., 2006. Hazop and Hazan. Identifying and assessing process industry hazards. Fourth Edition.Institution of Chemical Engineers (IChemE). ISBN:

9780852955062

Lockwood J., 2013. Process Safety Management Fundamentals.Texas A&M University. College Station

Matthias M., 2006. The hazard symbol for corrosive substances according to directive 67/548/EWG by the European Chemicals

Bureau.http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Hazard_C.svg. Date: 04-01-2015

Meyer E. Chemistry of Hazardous Materials. Regents/Prentice Hall. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey OPEN CHEMESTRY DATABASE. Hydrofluoric Acid. Date: 04-

01-2015

Peterson R., 1998. Alkylate is key for cleaner burning gasoline. STRATCO, Inc. [https://web.anl.gov/PCS/acsfuel/preprint%20archive/Files/41_3_ORLANDO_08-

96_0916.pdf] Date: 04-02-2015

Producción Grupo Empresarial Alcanza los 750 mil barriles por Dia en junio. 2014 copyright wpadimn. Accessed March 11 2015 <

http://www.ecopetrol.com.co/wps/portal/es/ecopetrol-web/>

Refinería de Cartagena. 2015 COLPRENSA. Accessed March 11 2015 < http://www.elcolombiano.com/refineria-de-cartagena-iniciaria-operaciones-en-segundo-

semestre-de-2015-ecopetrol-DY1414306>

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Ricardo R., 2011, Petroleum Refining. Atlantic international university. Honolulu, Hawaii. SIGMA-ALDRICH. 339261 - Hydrofluoric acid. Date: 03-30-2015

Simpson M y Kester M. (2007).Hydrofluric acid alkylation. ABB and ConocoPhilips develop a critical new process analysis tool. Texas: ConocoPhillips

UNC Environment, Health & Safety.Hydrofluoric Acid – Chemical Safety Information. Date:04-01-2015

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF LABOR. OSHA Occupational Chemical Database: Hydrogen Fluoride. Date: 04-01-2015

U.S. EPA.Hydrogen Fluoride Study. Report to Congress, Section 112. Clean Air Act As Amended

Universidad de San Buenaventura Cartagena, n. d. Photograph. Accessed March 12 2015.http://www.guiaacademica.com/sitios/s408/index.aspx?id=408

Xueqi X, Guoying Z, Jianzhong C y Suojiang Z. (2012). Isobutane alkylation using acidic ionic liquid catalysts. China: Department of chemestry, Tianjin University.

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17. LIST OF ANNEXES

NODE DESCRIPTION NODE PROCESS PARAMETERS DEVIATION POSSIBLE CAUSE EXISTING SAFEGUARDS CONSEQUENCES S F R RECOMMENDATION

1.1 .1

Temperature Indicator

with electrical signal in

the inlet stream (TI

4152)

Decrease in the

separation time

between

hydrocarbon and

water.

The Temperature Indicator (TI 4152)

works with a flow valve control in the

inlet stream.

Change the TI 4152 for a Temperature

Indicator Alarm Control to ensure the

correct control of the temperature and

avoid possible fails

1.1.2 Same as 1.1.1

Injection of N2

due to the less

pressure in the

Surge Drum (D-

201)

Constantly monitoring of the PIC 4007

and valve PV-4007A for avoid possibles

ruptures and other damages that can

affect the separation

1.1.3

Stream

temperature from

P-201A/B is cooler

than normal

TI 4008Same as 1.1.1 and

1.1.21 1 1-L

Consider install a Temperature

Indicator Control in the stream from P-

201A/B to avoid possibles fails and

losses of the olefins

1.1.4

TE 4152 failed and

send a wrong

signal to the TI

4152 due to

malfunctions

Same as 1.1.1 Same as 1.1.1 and

1.1.21 1 1-L

Install an additional temperature

sensor (TE) with an electrical signal

after of the TE 4152.

1.1.5

Decrease in the

pressure tank (<75

psig) due to

external events

Pressure Indicator

Control (PIC 4007)

Increase in the N2

flow into the tank 1 1 1-L

Install an additional pressure

transmitter (PT) conect with the PIC

4007 to control the process and the

operational profile

Constantly monitoring of the PIC 4007

for avoid possible damages and

deviations of the process due to

external events

1.2.1

Temperature of

inlet is higher than

normal (>110°F)

Temperature Indicator

with electrical signal in

the inlet stream (TI

4152)

Separation time

between

hydrocarbon and

water is higher.

1 1 1-L Same as 1.1.1

1.2.2

Stream

temperature from

P-201AA/B is

higher than normal

Same as 1.2.1 Same as 1.2.1 1 5 5-M Same as 1.1.3

1.2.3

TE 4152 failed and

send a wrong

signal to the TI

4152

Same as 1.2.1 Same as 1.2.1 1 1 1-L Same as 1.1.4

1.2.4

Increase in the

pressure tank due

to generation

vapor (>75psig)

Same as 1.1.5

Air pollution due

to an increase in

the gas stream to

the TEA system.

2 3 6-M Same as 1.1.5.

1 1 1-L

Temperature of

inlet is cooler than

normal (<110°F)

LESS

TEMPERATURE

HAZOP WORKSHEET - ANNEX 1 Project Title: Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid

Study Section: Selective Hydrogenation Process: The objective is the removal of diolefins and light fractions of the olefins stream

HAZOP Team: Figueroa Stefanny, Lombana Stefany and Ruiz Ingry Meeting days: All days of Febrary to June

HIGH

FEED SURGE DRUM

D-201 1

Date: Febrary to June Page 1 of 1

Annex 1 Application of HAZOP methodology to Selective Hydrogenation Section

95


1.3.1

Break in the N2

line after valve PV

4007A due to

corrosion or

human factors

Pressure Indicator

Control (PIC 4007);

bypass system in the

valve PV 4007B

(LWXS01) with two

manual valves before

and after control valve

(GWSC01); Manual

valve in the enter of

the tank GWCY01

Air pollution with

nitrogen and

possible potential

fire

3 2 6-M

Install a Flow Indicator after valve PV

4007 A and is recommendable make a

control loops to ensure the correct

performance

Constantly monitoring in the pipeline

where we can get the correct status of

them for avoid possible changes or risk

in the process

1.3.3

PIC 4007 fails

opened PV 4007A

due to

malfunctions

Pressure of Nitrogen

is 95 psig and pressure

of the drum is 180 psig

using for decreasse

the pressure inside

the tank

Relief valve (Fuel gas

purges to the refinery

flare system)

Bypass system

(LWCS01)

Manual valves before

and after PV 4007A

(GWCS01)

Higher flow rate

of Nitrogen to the

flare to the plant

flare header.

Potential impact

to the flare (loss

of the flare).

Releasing to the

atmosphere

unburnt

Hydrocarbons,

potential ground

fires.

Environmental

issue and

potential for

personnel injury.

5 3 15-SConstant check if the Nitrogen purge

flow worked in the permits limits

1.3.4

PIC 4007 fails

opening PV 4007B

due to

malfunctions

Bypass system in the

valve PV 4007B

(LWXS01) with two



(GWSC01); Manual


the tank GWCY01

All Gas into the

tank is sent to the

TEA system.

Implode the tank

5 1 5-M

Due to the process count with

excellent safety system is convenient

activate bypass system until flow is

stabilize

Constant check to the pipeline to

guarantee that the process operated in

the operational range

PRESSURE FEED SURGE DRUM

D-201 1




LESS


96


1.4.1

Increase the

temperature

inside the tank due

to a desviation in

the operation

PIC 4007; TI 4152;

Safety valve PSV 4005

with a bypass system

(LWSC01) with two

manual valves GACF04

Hydrocarbon

traces to the TEA

system

1 5 5-M

Same as 1.3.3.

Constant check of the TEA systen for

avoid leak of the olefins and the

correct operability

1.4.2

PIC 4007 fails

closing PV 4007B

due to

malfunctions

LIC 4003; bypass

system in the valve PV

4007B (LWXS01) with

two manual valves

before and after

control valve

(GWSC01); Manual


the tank GWCY01

Gas accumulation

into the tank

generating

possible

explosion due to

overpressure

5 1 5-M Same as 1.3.3

1.4.3

Increase in the

level of the tank

(overfill tank) due

to possibles

desviation in the

process like a

damages in valves

LIC 4003; LI 4001;

manual valves in the

water exit of the tank

GBCF03 and a XV 4126

with a SIS UC30 system

in the olefins exit

Entrainment of

fraction liquid

into the TEA

system.

1 2 2-L

Constant monitoring of level indicator

control LIC 4003 - 4001 to ensure the

correct level in this case 50% and the

correct separation

Opening the valves located in the exit

of the tank until have the level range

1.4.4

Impurities (volatile

impurities) in the

inlet stream

PIC 4007; FI 4000; XV

4125 with a SIS UC29

system

Decrease in the

diolefins flow at

the out stream.

Air pollution

2 2 4-L

Consider install a FY to get a sampling

wich worked to control of pollutants in

the stream

PRESSUREFEED SURGE DRUM

D-201 1




HIGH


97


1.5.1

FIC 4013 fails

closing the valve

FV 4013 due to

malfunctions

Bypass LWCS 01 with

two manial valves

before and after

control valve (GDCF01)

Decrease in the

pressure tank.

The NPSH is less

than normal and

cause cavitation in

the pump P

201A/B.

1 4 4-L

Due to the process count with

excellent safety system is convenient

activate bypass system until flow is

stabilize

1.5.2

LIC 4003 fails

closing the valve

LV 4003 due to

malfunctions

Bypass system LWCS01

with two manual

valves before and

after GBCF01;

Desviation system

SP0230 contected with

bypass system

Same as 1.5.2 1 4 4-L Same as 1.5.1

1.5.3

LI 4001 fails

sending a wrong

signal

Manual valves located

in the exit of the tank

GWCS01

Trawl

hydrocarbon to

system effluent

treatment.

1 1 1-L

Consider an automation of the oily

water drainage system to avoid a

overpressure and presence of

pollutants

1.5.4

Valve LWCS 01 that

located in the exit

of the oly water

fails complently

open due to

human errors

Same as 1.5.3 Same as 1.5.4 1 1 1-L

Constantly check of the manual valve

LWCS 01 and LI 4001 is recommendable

apply behavior based safety to ensure

a good comunication between

employees

1.5.5

Tamponade in the

inlet pipes due to

prescence of

impurities in the

stream and

incorrect

maintenance

XV 4125 with relief

system and SIS UC29

Rupture due to

overpressure in

the inlet pipe

causing possible

potential fire.

4 2 10-M

Is recommendable close the XV 4125

to checnk the state of the pipeline and

avoid possibles ruptures

Same as 1.3.2.

Install a Pressure Indicator in the inlet

pipeline to avoid ruptures or leaks due

to a possible a overpressure

1.5.6

XV 4125 fails

completely closed

due to

malfunctions

Vent System and SIS

UC29

Same 1.5.9 and

1.5.2 4 1 4-L

Due to the process has a security

sistem wich is bypass system is

recommendable if this consequences

occur activate it

LEVEL 1FEED SURGE DRUM

D-201LESS





98


1.6.1

Tamponade in the

olefins exit piping

due to prescence of

impurities

LIC 4003; LI 4001; Safety

valve PSV 4005 with a bypass

system LWSC01 and two

manual valves before and

after safety valve (GWCY01

and GACF04)

Rupture due to

overpressure in the outlet

pipe causing possible

potential fire. The NPSH is

less than requested and

cause cavitation in the

pump P 201A/B.

4 2 8-M

Activate a PSV valve to stabilize the flow and

considere install a flow indicator before the

pumps P 201A/B to avoid possibles

cavitations due to a increase or decrease of

the flow Periodic

maintenance to the pipeline and reporting

the real state

1.6.2

LIC 4003 fails

opening the valve LV

4003 due to

malfunctions

Bypass system LWCS01 with

two manual valves before

and after GBCF01;

Desviation system SP0230

contected with bypass

system

Entrainment of fraction

liquid into the TEA

system.

Overpressure in the tank

causing possible

explosion.

5 2 10-M

Activate a PSV valve to stabilize the flow and

considere install a flow indicator before the

pumps P 201A/B to avoid possibles

cavitations due to a increase or decrease of

the flow. Considere install a Flow Indicator

Alarm before XV 4125 to control the flow that

enter and avoid a overpressure and increase

of the temperature

1.6.3

Tamponade in the

oily water drain line

due to prescence of

impurities

LIC 4003; LI 4001; Safety

valve PSV 4005 with a bypass

system LWSC01 and two


after safety valve (GWCY01

and GACF04)

Same as 1.6.2.

Entrainment of oily water

in the process stream.

3 3 9-M

Install a Flow indicator in the oily water drain

line to ensure the correct separation and

avoid of presence of possible contaminants

1.6.4

FIC 4013 fails

opening the valve FV

4013 due to

malfunctions

Bypass LWCS 01 with two

manial valves before and

after control valve (GDCF01)

Same as 1.6.2. 5 1 5-M

Due to the process count with excellent

safety system is convenient activate bypass

system until flow is stabilize

1.6.5

Increase in the

olefins and diolefins

flow that enter to

tank

XV 4125; LIC 4003; FIC 4013Same as 1.6.2.

Economic losses5 2 10-M

Install a flow indicator control which works

with valve XV 4125 to ensure the correct

separation and avoid of presence of possible

contaminants

1.6.6

LI 4001 fails due to

malfunctions

sending a wrong

signal

LIC 4003; Manual valves

located in the exit of the

tank GWCS01

Same as 1.6.3 3 1 3-M Same as 1.5.4

1.6.7

XV 4126 fails

completely closed

due to malfunctions

No safeguard Same as 1.6.1 5 2 10-M

Install a flow indicator before the pumps P

201A/B which works in a loop with valve XV

4126.

1.6.8

XV 4125 fails

completely open

due to malfunctions

Vent System and SIS UC29 Same as 1.6.2 5 2 10-M

Due to the process has a security sistem wich

is bypass system is recommendable if this

consequences occur activate it

FEED SURGE DRUM

D-2011 LEVEL HIGH





99


1 1.7.1FEED SURGE DRUM

D-201LEVEL NO Same as Less Same as less Same as less Same as less

2.1.1XV 4026 fails closed

due to malfunctionsVent System and SIS UC28

∆T in the Heat Exchanger

decrease Break in the

pipe before the valve for

overpressure.

Drawg of steam to the head

condensate

1 3 3-L



consequences occur activate it considere

install a Flow Indicator Alarm after valve XV

4026 to prevent that the flow increase or

decrease due to a fail

2.1.2

Tamponade in the

pipes of the heat

exchanger

PP; LIC 4108

Decrease of the surface

area

Break or leak in the pipes

for overpressure

1 2 2-L

Implement a differential pressure gauge to

work with the input and output currents for

the steam side

2.1.3TI 4148 fails sending

wrong signal

TW 4147; XV4026 with a Vent

System and SIS UC28

No important

consequences 1 1 1-L

Periodic inspection and immediately report

about the real state of the heat exchangers

for avoid possible damages and deviations of

the process due to external events

Install a flow alarm indicator that works with

the temperture indicator TU 4148

2.1.4

TI 4144 fails sending

a wrong signal due to

malfunctions

TW 4150 and manual valves

GWCY01Same as 2.1.5 1 1 1-L Same as 2.15

2.1.5

The olefins

temperature is lower

than normal

TI 4144; TW 4150 Same as 2.1.2 1 3 3-L

Maintenance of the loops control between TI

4144 and valve XV 4026 for control the vapor

flow to prevent possibles fails

2.1.6

Decrease in the inlet

stream flow of the

olefins

XV4026 with a Vent System

and SIS UC28

Increase the temperature

of the out the stream

∆T in the Heat Exchanger

decrease

1 2 2-L

Implement a flow indicator which worked

with the valve XV 4026 to ensure the correct

control of the flow in this part of the section

2.1.7

FIC 4020 fails closing

the valve FV 4020

due to malfunctions

Bypass system LWSS01 with

two manual valves before

and after contol valve

(GWSS01)


stream flow

Same as 2.1.8

1 2 2-L




TEMPERATURE 2HEAT EXCHANGER

E-201 LESS





100


2.2.1XV 4026 fails opened

due to malfunctionsVent System and SIS UC28

∆T in Heat Exchanger

increase causing a higher

temperature in the

olefins stream.

Economic losses due to

unnecesary use of steam

rate.

Increase in the pressure.

Increase in the condenser

level.

2 2 4-L Same as 2.1.1

2.2.2

The steam

temperature is

higher than

operating

temperature (>307

°F)

Same as 2.1.2

∆T in Heat Exchanger

increase causing a higher

temperature in the

olefins stream.

Increase in the pressure.

1 2 2-L Same as 2.1.2

2.2.3

The olefins

temperature is

higher than normal

Same as 2.1.7∆T in Heat Exchanger

increase1 3 3-L Same as 2.1.5

2.2.4

Increase in the inlet

stream flow of the

olefins

XV4026 with a Vent System

and SIS UC28

Same as 2.2.3

Decrease the temperature

in the out stream.

1 2 2-L Same as 2.1.6

2.2.5

FIC 4020 fails

opening the valve

FV4020 due to

malfunctions

Same as 2.1.7Increase in the inlet

stream flow. Same as 2.2.41 2 2-L Same as 2.1.7

TEMPERATURE




HIGHHEAT EXCHANGER

E-201 2


101

NODE DESCRIPTION NODE PROCESS PARAMETERS DEVIATION POSSIBLE CAUSEEXISTING SAFEGUARDS CONSEQUENCES S F R RECOMMENDATION

3.1.1

The temperature

of inlet stream is

lower than

operating

temperature.

Same as 2.1.7

Lower production of

steam in the

condenser.

More production of

liquid phase in the

drum (Increase in the

out flow rate).

1 4 4-L

Periodic maintenance to the Heat

Exchanger E-201 to ensure the correct

temperature to prevent possible fails

that can change the operational

profile

3.1.2

Increase of the ∆T

due to decrease in

the inlet

temperature of

diolefins and

olefins in the heat

exchanger E-201

TI 4148; TI 4133; TI

4145Same as 3.1.1 1 4 4-L Same as 3.1.1

3.1.3

XV 4026 fails

closed decreasing

the steam flow

rate.

GWCS 01; Vent

System and SIS

UC28

Same as 3.1.1 1 4 4-L

Maintenance to the valve XV 4026 to

prevent ruptures, leaks or hold for

corrosion or external events and

contamination of the other streams of

the process

3.2.1

The temperature

of inlet stream is

higher than

operating

temperature.

PSV 4105; GWCS

01

Increase in the

pressure causing more

production of steam.

Increase in the flow

rate of vapour in the

inlet of the heat

exchanger E-201.

1 3 3-L Same as 3.1.1

3.2.2

Decrease of the ∆T

due to increase in

the inlet

temperature of

diolefins and

olefins in the heat

exchanger E-201

TI 4148; TI 4133; TI

4145

Same as 3.2.1.

More production of

steam in the

condenser and lower

production of liquid

phase.

1 5 5-M Same as 3.1.1

3.2.3

XV 4026 fails

opened due to

malfunctions

GWCS 01; Vent

System and SIS

UC28


unnecesary use of

steam.

2 4 8-M Same as 3.1.3

3CONDENSER

D-204





LESS

HIGH

TEMPERATURE

102

NODE DESCRIPTION NODE PROCESS PARAMETERS DEVIATION POSSIBLE CAUSEEXISTING SAFEGUARDS CONSEQUENCES S F R RECOMMENDATION

3.3.1

Decrease or NO

steam flow due to

error in the heat

exchanger

PI 4104; LIC 4108;

FIC 4027; PSV

4105

No exist condesation 1 2 2-L

Install a flow indicator in the inlet

steam stream due to the process

required more control in this part

3.3.2Decrease in the

inlet stream flow

PI 4104; LIC 4108;

FIC 4027; PSV

4105

No important

consequences

1 4 4-L Same as 3.1.1

3.3.3

Decrease in the

inlet stream

temperature

Same as 3.3.2Decrease in the steam

production 1 3 3-L Same as 3.1.1

3.3.4

PSV 4105 fails

opened due to

malfunctions

Manual valve

GWCS 01 located

before PSV Same as 3.3.4

2 4 8-M

Maintance to the valve security valve

PSV 4105 to prevent possibles fails if a

desviation can occur

3.3.5

LIC 4108 fails

opening FV 4027

due to

malfunctions

Bypass system

LWCS01; manual

valves before and

after conrol valve

(GWCS01)

Decrease the level in

the condenser 1 3 3-L

Due to the process has a important

safety system is recomendable

activate closing bypass system and

the valve that before control valve to

stabilize the process

3.3.6

Tamponade in the

inlet piping due to

prescence of

impurities in the

stream

LIC 4108; FIC 4027;

FV4027

Same as 3.3.7

Overpressure in the

inlet pipe and the heat

exchanger tubes.

2 3 6-M

Constant maintenance the pipeline to




the process Install

a flow indicator in the inlet stream

due to the process required more

control

PRESSURE 3CONDENSER

D-204





LESS

103


3.4.1

XV 4026 fails

opened due to

malfunctions

Manual valves GBCF01

GWCS 01; Vent

System PSV 4105; PI

4104

Explosion in the

condenser due to

overpressure inside

the vessel.

3 2 6-M

Close the manual valve that located

before the control valve until process

is stabilize

3.4.2

LIC 4108 fails

closing FV 4027

due to

malfunctions

Bypass system

LWCS01; manual

valves before and

after conrol valve

(GWCS01)

Increase in the level

causing dawg of

condensate to the

steam line.

1 2 2-L



activate closing bypass system and



3.4.3

Increase in the

inlet flow stream

due to external

events

LIC 4108 Same as 3.4.2 1 4 4-L


steam stream due to the process


3.4.4PSV 4105 fails

closed.

Manual valve located

before the safety

valve GWCS 01

Same as 3.4.1 3 2 6-M Same as 3.3.6

3.4.5

Increase in the

inlet stream

temperature due

to malfunctions in

the heat

exchanger

PI 4104

More production of

steam in the

condenser.

1 4 4-L

Periodic maintenance to the Heat

Exchanger E-201 to ensure the correct

temperature to prevent possible fails

that can change the operational

profile

3.4.6

Tamponade in the

exit piping due to

prescence of

impurities in the

stream

FIC 4027; LIC 4108; PI

4104 Same as 3.4.2 2 3 6-M

Constant maintenance the pipeline to




the process

PRESSURE 3CONDENSER

D-204





HIGH

104


3.5.1

LIC 4108 fails

opening FV 4027

due to

malfunctions

Bypass system LWCS01;


and after conrol valve

(GWCS01)

Parcial condenser,

disminution of the

temperature of olefin

outside of E-201

1 4 4-L


before the control valve until process

is stabilize

3.5.2

FIC 4027 fails

opening FV 4027

due to

malfunctions


with two manual valves

GWCS01 ; FE 4027Same as 3.5.1

1 2 2-L



recommendable closing if this


3.5.3

XV 4026 fails

closed due to

malfunctions


GWCS 01; Vent System

PSV 4105; PI 4104

Disminution of the

temperature of olefin

oustide of E-201

1 4 4-L Same as 3.5.2

3.5.4

The olefins

temperature is

high normal / The

inlet stream of the

D-204 is liquid-

vapour phase

TI 4144; LIC 4108; FIC

4027 Parcial condenser 1 3 3-L

Install a valve than worked with the TI

4144 if is necessary increase or

decrease the flow and control the

variables like temperature, presure

and flow

3.6.1

Increase in the

inlet stream to D-

204 due to

malfunctions in

the heat

exchanger

LIC 4108; FIC 4027;

FV4027

Decreased heat

transfer.

Overpressure in the D-

204 and E-201.

Liquid draw to the

steam inlet.

Acumulation of the

water condensate in

the E-201

3 1 3-L

Install a Flow Control in the inlet of

the D-204 to check the correct flow

into the tank

3.6.2

LIC 4108 fails

closing the valve

FV 4027

Bypass system LWCS01;


and after conrol valve

(GWCS01)

Same as 3.6.1 3 1 3-L



activate opening bypass system and



3.6.3

XV 4026 fails

opened due to

malfunctions


GWCS 01; Vent System

PSV 4105; PI 4104

Overpressure in the D-204 and E-2013 1 3-L Same as 3.6.2

3.6.4

FIC 4027 fails

closing the valve

FV 4027



GWCS01 ; FE 4027Same as 3.6.1

3 1 3-L



recommendable opening if this


3.7.1 NO Same as Less

LEVEL




CONDENSER

D-2043

HIGH

LESS


105


4.1.1

Decrease in the

temperature in the

inlet stream of the

reactors 201/202

(< 175⁰F)

TIC 4022; TIC 4023; TI

4044

Wrong operation in

the reactor due to

differents process

conditions.

Promote the

undesirable reactions

decreasing the

lifetime of the

2 3 6-M

Constant monitoring to the operation

conditions and equipments to




the process

4.1.2

Decrease in the

hydrogenation

reactions

TI 4043 A.B.C; TI 4044;

TAHH 4043

A.B.C/4042/4044; TI

4053A.B.C; TI 4054; TAHH

4053 A.B.C/4054/4052.

Promote the

undesirable reactions

decreasing the

lifetime of the

catalyst. Economic

losses due to decrease

in the desirable

(olefins).

3 2 6-M Same as 4.1.1

4.1.3

Increase in the non-

exhotermic

undesirable

reaction

Same as 4.1.2.

PI 4038; PI 4048.

Decrease in the

lifetime of the

catalyst.

Production of

undesirable

compounds

2 2 4-L Same as 4.1.1

4.1.4

No reactions due

to damages in the

catalyst

Same as 4.1.3


decrease in the

desirable (olefins).

3 2 6-M Same as 4.1.1

4.1.5

PSV 4037 or PSV

4047 fail opened

decreasing the

pressure in the

reactor

PI 4038; PI 4048; GACF

04; GBCF 03; GBCF 01

Same as 4.1.1.

Air pollution 3 2 6-M

Same as 4.1.1 .

Periodic maintenance to the safety

valve PSV 4037/4047 to prevent fails

if a deviation can occur

4.1.6

The inlet stream

has different

composition

FY 4014A/B.

Same as 4.1.2

3 2 6-M

Install a FY in the inlet stream to

prevent precence of contaminants

that can affect the process

4.1.7

The ratio

Hydrogen/diolefin

s is less than

normal

Same as 4.1.6

Decrease the all

reaction causing

decrease in the heat

produced.

2 2 4-L

Periodic monitoring to the results of

FY 4014A/B to prevent prescence of

contaminants that can affect the

process

4.1.8 Decrease in the

catalyst activity

Same as 4.1.2.

PDI 4041 /4051

Decrease in the

hydrogenation

reaction.

3 2 6-M

Periodic reactivation of catalyst to

ensure the correct convertion and the

reaction time

4.1.9

Increase in the

fresh charge to the

reactor

GBCF01 with bypass

system LWCS01Decrease the

residence time

1 2 2-L

Install a flow indicator control in the

inlet stream which work with a

control valve

4.1.10 Increase in the

inlet flow Same as 4.1.9

Increase in the heat

absortion causing a

decrease in the

average temperature

in the catalyst bed.

1 2 2-L Same as 4.1.9

4.1.11Increase in the

recirculation flow

FIC 4059: FV 4059:

LBCF01: GBCF01 Same as 4.1.10 1 2 2-L Same as 4.1.9

TEMPERATURE REACTORS

R-201/2024 LESS





106


4.2.1

Increase in the

inlet temperature

(>220⁰F)

Same as 4.1.1

Promote all reaction

due to increase in the

average temperature

in the catalyst bed.

Increase in the

polymerization of

diolefins.

Increase the

desactivation rate of

catalyst causing

decrease in the

lifetime of it.

3 2 6-M

Implement a cooling system to the

reactor for control the temperature

runway.


diolefins flows

GBCF01 with bypass

system LWCS01

Promote the

hydrogenation

reaction (exhotermic

reaction) causing

increase in the average

temperature in the

catalyst bed.

Higher consume of the

hydrogen flow

2 3 6-M Same as 4.1.6

4.2.3

Increase in the

composition of

diolefins and

olefins


4.2.4

Decrease in the

fresh charge to the

reactor

Same as 4.1.9.

Increase the residence

time.

Decrease in the heat

absortion.

2 1 2-L Same as 4.1.9

4.2.5

The ratio

Hydrogen/diolefin

s is higher than

normal

Same as 4.1.6

Same as 4.2.1

3 2 6-M Same as 4.1.7

4.2.6 Increase in the catalyst activity Same as 4.1.8 Same as 4.2.2 2 2 4-L Same as 4.1.8

4.2.7

Decrease in the

charge flow to the

reactor

Same as 4.2.4

Same as 4.2.4

2 1 2-L Same as 4.1.9

4.2.8 Decrease in the

recirculation flow Same as 4.1.11

Same as 4.2.4 2 2 4-L Same as 4.1.9

4.2.9

Increase in the

hydrogen flow in

the inlet of the R-

201 or R-202

FIC 4020/4046

Increase in the

hydrogenation

severity causing an

increase in the

temperature in the

reactors and potential

catalyst damage.


unnecessary use of the

hydrogen

3 3 9-M

Periodic monitoring of the flow

indicator controls to prevent

ruptures, leaks or hold for corrosion

or external events and contamination

of the other streams of the process

4.2.10

PSV 4037 or PSV

4047 fails closed

due to

malfunctions

Same as 4.1.5

Same as 4.1.1.

Overpressure in the R-

201 with possible

explosion.

5 3 15-S Same as 4.1.5

TEMPERATURE REACTORS

R-201/2024





HIGH

107


4.3.1

Decrease in the

hydrogen flow in

the inlet of the R-

201/202

FIC 4014; FIC 4020; FV

4020; FIC 4046; FV 4046Same as 4.1.1 3 2 6-M Same as 4.2.9

4.3.2

PI 4041A or PIC

4051A fails sending

wrong signal

PID 4041; PI 4041B; PDI

4051; PIC 4051B - NO

SAFEGUARD

Error in the control of

pressure in the

reactor.

Same as 4.1.1

3 2 6-M

Install other PI or PIC in the inlet

stream in case that fails PI 4041A or

PIC 4051A

4.3.3

PI 4041B or PIC

4051B fails sending

wrong signal

PID 4041; PI 4041A; PDI

4051; PIC 4051ASame as 4.3.2 3 3 9-M

Install other PI or PIC in the inlet

stream in case that fails PI 4041B or

PIC 4051B

4.3.4

The valve PSV 4037

or PSV 4047 fails

open



before and after safety

valve (GBCF03)

Release of hydrogen to

the atmosphere

causing air pollution. 4 3 12-S

Periodic monitoring of the safety

valves PSV 4037 or PSV 4047 to

prevent desviation and possibles risks

4.3.5

Decrease in the

inlet stream of

olefins and

diolefins.

Delta PDI 4041 and 4051 Same as 4.1.1 1 5 5-M

Install a Flow Indicator in the inlet of

the reactor for prevent possible leak,

rupture, hold or release to control

this fail

4.4.1

Increase in the

hydrogen flow in

the inlet of the R-

201 or R-202

Same as 4.3.1Same as 4.1.1

Economic losses.3 3 9-M Same as 4.3.1

4.4.2

PSV 4037 or PSV

4047 fails closed

due to

malfunctions

Same as 4.3.5

Increase of the vapor

inside the reactor

impacting the reaction.

Overpressure.

Same as 4.2.1

4 2 8-M Same as 4.3.5

4.4.3Obstruction in the

catalyst bed

PI 4041A-B; PDI 4041; PIC

4051A-B; PDI 4051

Increase in the

polymeritation. Coke

accumulation in the

bed. Same as 4.1.9

1 4 4-L

Constant maintenance to prevent

ruptures, leaks or hold for corrosion

or external events and contamination

of the other streams of the process

4.4.4

PI 4041A or PIC

4051A fails sending

wrong signal


4.4.5

PI 4041B or PIC

4051B fails sending

wrong signal


4.4.6

Increase in the

inlet stream of

olefins and

diolefins.

Same 4.3.5 Same as 4.1.1 2 4 8-M Same as 4.3.7

REACTORS

R-201/2024

LESS

PRESSURE

HIGH





108


4.5.1

LI 4040 or 4050 fails

sendind wrong

signal

PI 4038 - 4048; TI4043/

4053 A-B-CIncrease in the reaction temperature 2 2 4-L

Implement a process indicator control

PIC worked with LI 4040/4050 to

ensure the real level and avoid

overpressure and ensure the correct

separation

4.5.2

Tamponade in the

inlet stream due to

prescence of

impurities in the

stream and bad

maintenance

LI 4040 - 4050; manual

valves LWCS01 and SP

0176

Same as 4.5.1

Overpressure in the

inlet line.

1 2 2-L


pipe line of the reactors to ensure

the correct flow in the reactors to

prevent problems in the reactor

4.5.3

FY 4014 a fails

closed FIC 4020 -

4026 due to

malfunctions

Bypass system LWSS01


before and after contol

valve (GWSS01)

Same as 4.5.1 2 2 4-L

Due to the process has a excellent

safety system is recommendable

opening to stabilize the process

4.5.4 HIGH

PCV 4149 fails

opened increased

the nitrogen flow

Relief valve (Fuel gas

purges to the refinery

flare system)

More nitrogen to the

flare header.

Potencial impact to the

flare (loss of the flare).

Possible risk to

employees

Enviromental

contaminant

5 3 15- S

Constant monitoring and

maintenance of the valves and

constant check of the correct

procedures

4.6.1

FY 4014 A/B fails

partially closing FV

4020/4046

Bypass with valve

LWSS01 with Manual

valve located before

control valve GWSS01 ;

FT 4020/4046

No occurs the desired

reaction

(hydrogenation

reaction).

Same as 4.1.4

3 2 6-M

Periodic maintance to the FY 4014 A/B

to prevent the increase or the

contaminants in the flows

4.6.2

Decrease in the

purity of Hydrogen

stream

FIL 201A/B; PDI 4030

Potential damaged to

the catalyst due to

catalyst poison.

Promote the

undesirable reactions.

Increase in the

residence time in the

reactor

3 2 6-M

Maintenance to the hydrogen filters

to ensure the correct convert and

reaction time

4.6.3

XV4024A/B fails

partially closed

due to

malfunctions

FIC 4020; FT 4020; FE

4020 Same as 4.6.1 3 1 3-L

Due to the process have a security



occur activate it

4.6.4

Decrease in the

quality of filter

material.

PDI 4030

Decrease the efficient

filtration causing

increase in the

suspended solids in

the stream.

Potential damaged to

the catalyst due to

catalyst poison.

3 2 6-M Same as 4.6.2

4.6.5

Decrease in the

Hydrogen charge

flow.

FIC 4020/4046 ; FT

4020/4046

Decrease the efficient

filtration. Reduce the

quality of sovent

circulated.

2 1 2-L

install a flow indicator control in the

inlet stream due to the process


HYDROGEN

CONCENTRATION

LEVEL

LESS

LESS




REACTORS

R-201/2024


109


4.7.1

FY 4014 A/B fails

opening FV

4020/4046

Bypass with valve

LWSS01 with Manual

valve located before

control valve GWSS01

Promote the desirable

reaction and decrease

the diolefins

polimerization.

Increase the life time

of the catalyst.

2 2 4-L Same as 4.6.1

4.7.2 High purity of

Hydrogen No safeguard Same as 4.7.1 2 2 4-L Any important recommendation

4.7.3XV4024A/B fails

opened

FIC 4020/4046 ; FT

4020/4046; FV

4020/4046; FE 4020; PI

4028

Increase the hydrogen

flow and cause

overpressure in the

line with possible

rupture of the pipe.

4 2 8-M The system has enough safeguards

4.7.4High quality of

filter material PDI 4030

Increase the hydrogen

purity and promotes

the hydrogenation

reaction.

1 2 2-L Any important recommendation

4.7.5

Increase in the

hydrogen charge

flow


4.8.1

FY 4014 A/B fails

completely closing

FV 4020/4046


4.8.2

XV4024A/B fails

completely closed

due to

malfunctions


4REACTORS

R-201/202

NO

HIGH




HYDROGEN

CONCENTRATION


110


4.9.1

The feed stream of

the process comes

with less diolefins

and olefins

concentrations

TI 4043/ 4053A-B-C; PI

4041A-B; PDI 4041/ 4051;

PIC 4051A-B

Decrease in the

hydrogenation

reaction. Decrease in

the heat produced.

Decrease in the bed

temperature.Formatio

n of undesired

reactions.

Decrease in the

product quality.

Increase of the

hydrogen

1 5 5-M

Install a Concentration Indicator in

the inlet of the process to prevent

changes and desviations due to

contaminants

4.9.2

The manual valve

GBCF01 located in

the enter of the

reactors fails

closed due to

malfunctions

Bypass systrem LWCS01 Same as 4.8.1 1 3 3-L

Opened bypass system until flow is

stabilize. Periodic inspection in the

manual valve valve GBCF01 to prevent

possibles human errors. It is

recommendable have a good

communication between employees

4.9.3

The feed stream of

the process comes

with less diolefins

and olefins

concentration and

more contaminant

such as sulfur,

heavy metals,

water and caustic

soda.

Same as 4.9.1

Same as 4.8.1.

Increase the polymer

formation. Decrease in

the lifetime of the

catalyst. Formation of

H2S due at the reaction

sulfur and hydrogen.

Inhibition of the

catalyst. Catalyst

poisoning due to the

presence of heavy

metals.

2 4 8-M Same as 4.9.1

4.10.1

The feed stream of

the process comes

with higher

diolefins and

olefins

concentrations

Same as 4.9.1

Increase in the

hydrogenation

reaction. Increase in

the heat produced.

Increase in the bed

temperature.

Increased hydrogen

consumption.

Decrease in the H2

concentration.

Insufficiency of

hydrogen in the

reactor. Increase of

diolefins in the out

stream. Tamponade in

the reactor. Decrease

in the lifetime of the

catalyst.

1 4 4-L Same as 4.9.1

4.10.2

The valve manual

GBCF01 located in

the enter of the

reactors fails

opened due to

malfunctions

Bypass systrem LWCS01 Same as 4.9.1 1 5 5-M

Closed bypass system until flow is

stabilize, is recommendable install a

loops control that worked with

manual valve. Periodic inspection in

the manual valve valve GBCF01 to

prevent possibles human errors

Is recommendable have a good

communication between employees

HIGH

LESS

DIOLEFINS AND

OLEFINS

CONCENTRATION




REACTORS

R-201/2024


111


4.11.1

FIC 4014 fails

closed FV 4014 -

4020 - 4046 due to

malfunctions

Bypass system LDCF01 -


Canalization in the

catalytic bed, catalyser

desactivation,

nonuniform

distribution in the

catalyser and decrease

un the quality of the

products

3 3 9-M

Same as 4.10.1 and constant

monitoring to the TE 4043 A-B-C to

ensure the correct temperature

4.11.2

XV 4024 a/b valve

fails closed due to

malfunctions

Same as 4.11.1 Same as 4.11.1 3 3 9-M

Due to process has a excellent safety

system is recommedable active

bypass system until process system is

stabilize

4.11.3FIC 4059 fails

closed FV 4059Same as 4.11.1 Same as 4.11.1 3 3 9-M Same as 4.11.2

4.11.4

FY 4014 A-B fails

closed FV 4020 -

4046


4.11.5

Decrease in the

charge flow in the

olefin charge drum

D-201

Same as 4.11.1

Same as 4.11.1 and

cavitation in the P-201

A/B pumps

3 4 12-M

Same as 4.11.2 and install a flow

indicator in the intlet stream due to

the process required more control in

this part

4.11.6

Tamponade in the

inlet pipe line due

to prescence of

impurities in the

stream

Same as 4.5.2

Same as 4.11.2,

overpressure in the

line, posible explosion

fire

3 2 6-M Same as 4.5.2

4.12.1

FIC 4014 fails

opened FV 4014 -

4020 - 4046 due to

malfunctions

Bypass system LDCF01 -


The space velocity

LHSV is high than

normal, catalyser

desactivation,

decrease in the quality

of the products,

decrease in the

resident time.

2 4 8-M




stabilize and constant monitoring to

the TE 4043 A-B-C to ensure the

correct temperature

4.12.2

XV 4024 A/B valve

fails opened due

to malfunctions

XY 4024 A/B; bypass

system and SIS UC30Same as 4.12.1 2 2 4-L

Constant monitoring and Periodic

maintenance to pipeline to ensure

proper operation of the process

Installation a pressure indicator that

worked with some pressure

indicators valves to ensure that the

pressure profile don't change

4.12.3

FIC 4059 fails

opened FV 4059

due to

malfunctions

Bypass system LBCF01

with two manual valves Same as 4.12.1 2 3 6-M




stabilize

4.12.4

FY 4014 A-B fails

opened FV 4020 -

4046 due to

malfunctions



before and after contol

valve (GWSS01)

Same as 4.12.1 2 2 4-L Same as 4.11.3

4.12.5

FIC 4014 fails

opened FV 4014

due to

malfunctions

Same as 4.12.4 Same as 4.12.1 2 2 4-l

Monitoring the vent system to

prevent possibles fails and ensure the

correct performance

4.12.6

Increase in the

charge flow in the

olefin charge drum

D-201

XV 4125 with vent

system; FV 4013; bypass

system

Same as 4.12.1 2 2 4-L

Constant monitoring to the charge

flow to ensure proper operation of

the process

REACTORS

R-201/2024

HIGH

FLOW

LESS





112


5.1.1

Drecrease in the

temperature in the

inlet of stripper

due to an increase

in the ∆T heat

exchanger E 202

because the D-203

presented

changes.

TIC 4017; TI 4139; 4063

The stripper would

need more heat

sumistred for reboiler

E203.

Condensing of the

vapor to ascend inside

the stripper.

More procuct of lungs

in the bottom.

1 5 5-M

Constant monitoring of the operated

system. Increase the recirculation

flow from reboiler E-203. Increase the

flow to reboiler E-203 and condenser

drum D-203.

5.1.2

PV 4051 fails

opened due to

malfunctions

TI 4135; bypass system

LBCF01 with two manual

valves GBCF01

Same as 5.1.1

Flooding in the column

Economic losses

1 5 5-M


before GBCF01 until process is

stabilize

Decrease of recirculation flow in the

top and in the bottom.

5.1.3

The bypass system

fails due to TV

4017B fails opened

due to

malfunctions

ZSO 4017B; VENT SYSTEM

XY 4017BSame as 5.1.2 1 5 5-M Same as 5.1.2

5.1.4

TIC 4017 fails

opened the valves

TV 4017 A/B due to

malfunctions

ZSC 4017A; ZSO 4017B;

XY 4017 A/BSame as 5.1.2 1 5 5-M Same as 5.1.2

5.1.5

Decrease in the

steam on the line

of the condensates

drum D-203

LIC 4128; FIC 4127; FV

4127

Partial condensation of

the steam

hydrocarburs in the

inlet of the column.

Condensed of the


the stripper.

More product of lungs

in the bottom.

Increase of level in the

bottom.

1 4 4-LConstant monitoring of the operating

systems than work with D-203

5.1.6

Decrease in the

recirculation flow

in the bottom

PI 4116; TI4117

Condensing of the


the stripper.


in the bottom.

Flooding in the column

Economic losses

2 4 8-M

Decrease of the flow in the inlet of

stripper to stablish the temperature

operability profile

5.1.7

Increase in the

recirculation flow

in the top

LIC 4083; FIC 4073; PDI

4064

Potencial flooding.

Increase in the charge

o heat exchanger.


in th bottom.

Economic losses.

2 4 8-M

Decrease of the flow in the bottom


system

LESS5STRIPPER

T-201




TEMPERATURE


113


5.1.8

Presence of water in

the olefins stream

outside of the D-202

LIC 4078; LIC 4083; FIC

4073

Decrease in the propane

concentration. Presence of

lungs in the bottom. Cavitation

in the P -203 A/B pumps.

1 5 5-M

Increase of the steam flow in the bottom

from reboiler E-203.

Decrease of the flow in the inlet

stripper.

5.1.9

Tamponade in the

outside stream of the

reboiler E-203

TI 4115; PDI 4164

Same as 5.1.6. Overpressure in

the line pipe. Flooded in the

exchanger generating a high

level in the condensed drum D-

203 with partial condensation of

the vapor. Possible fire

explosion due a overpressure

generating a risk to the

employees, enviroment and

equipment.

5 2 10-M

Install a alarm indicator worked with TI

4115 due to the process required more

control in this part

Constat monitoring to ensure proper

operation of the process

5.1.10

Rupture in the outside

stream of the reboiler E-

203

TI 4115; PDI 4164

Sane as 5.1.6

Flooded in the exchanger

generating a high level in the

condensed drum D-203 with

partial condensation of the

vapor. Possible fire explosion

due a overpressure generating a

risk to the employees,

enviroment and equipment.

Air pollution

5 2 10-M Same as 5.1.9

5.1.11

Decrease in the olefins

inlet stream of the heat

exchanger E-203

PV 4051: TI 4063

Same as 5.1.6

Presence of vapor in the heat

exchanger otside to condensate

drum.

1 2 2-L Same 5.1.7

5.2.1

Increase in the

temperature in the

inlet of stripper due to

an decrease in the ∆T of

the heat exchanger E

202 because the D-203

presented changes.

TIC 4017; TI 4139; 4063

The stripper would need less

heat from reboiler E-203

Presence of hydrocarbon

vaporised in the top of the

issostroppier. Hydrogen

contamination. Decrease in the

propane concentration.

Economic losses

1 5 5-L


system.

Decrease the recirculation flow from

reboiler E-203.

Decrease the flow to reboiler E-203 and

condenser drum D-203.

5.2.2TIC 4017 fails closed the

valves TV 4017 A/B

ZSC 4017A; ZSO 4017B;

XY 4017 A/B

Same as 5.2.1

Overpressure in the pipe line.

Flooded in the exchanger E-202.

Possible fire explosion

generating a risk to the

employees, enviroment and

equipment.

5 2 10-M


system.


reboiler E-203.

Increase in the flow of the top.

5.2.3

PV 4051 fails closed

interrupting the olefins

flow

Bypass System (LBCF01)


before and after at

pressure valve

The stripper would need less

heat from reboiler E-203.




contamination. Decrease in the

propane concentration.

Economic losses. Overpressure

in the line pipe. Possible

rupture of the pipe line due the

overpressure causing a posible

fire explosion generating risk

for the employees, enviroment

and equipment.

5 3 15-S


system.


reboiler E-203.

Increase in the flow of the top.

HIGH

5STRIPPER

T-201




LESS

TEMPERATURE


114


5.2.4

The bypass system fails

due to TV 4017B fails

closed

ZSO 4017B; VENT SYSTEM

XY 4017B

Same as 5.2.1

Overpressure in the line.

Interruptiom of flow after the

valve.

2 1 2-L

Inccrease the flow in the line of heat

exchanger E-202.

Increase the olefins steam in the

bottoms of stroppier.

5.2.5

Increase in the

temperature of olefins

inlent steam in the

bottoms.

TI 4115; PDY 4064; LIC

4069; TI 4070



issostroppier.

Economic losses

2 2 4-L

Decrease of the flow in the inlet of

stroppier.

Increase the recirculation flow in the

top.

5.2.6

Decrease in the

recirculation flow in the

top.

FIC 4073

Increase of vapor in the top.

Decrease in the quality

separation and charge of

olefins.

3 4 12-S

Decrease in the recirulation flow in the

bottoms.

Increase in the flow of charge to

stroppier.

5.2.7Decrease in the olefins

charge of stripperPV 4051 Same as 5.2.1 2 4 8-M

Decrease in the recirculation flow in the

bottoms.

Increase in the recirculation flow in the

top.

5.2.8

Increase in the steam

on the line of the

condensates drum D-

203

LIC 4128; FIC 4127; FV

4127


vaporised on the top of the

stroppier.

Economic losses.

2 2 4

Increase of the flow of charge to

stroppier.

Decresse in the recirculation flow of the

top.

5.3.1Increase in the charge

flow PV 4051; TI 4063

Flooding in the column.

Presence of lungs in the bottom.

Decreasse in the quality of

olefins. Hydrogen

contamination. Economic losses

2 3 6-M

Increase the outside flow to reboiler.

Increase de steam flow in the condenser.

Decrease the recriculation flow in the

top.

5.3.2

Decrease in the


bottoms

TI 4115; TI 4070; LIC 4069 Same as 5.3.1 3 4 12-SDecrease the charge flow until flow is

stabilize

5.3.3

The tea system fails

opened due to

malfunctions

PI 4064; PI 4065; PSV

4066

Losses of hydrogen.

Air pollution 3 2 6-M

Decrease the charge flow.

Decrease the recirculation flow in the

botoms.

Open the security valves.

5.3.4

Increase in the


top

LIC 4083; FIC 4073; PDI

4064

Potencial flooding.

Increase in the charge o heat

exchanger. More product

of lungs in th bottom.

Economic losses.

2 3 6-MIncrease in the recirculation flow in the

bottoms

5.3.5

Presence of water in

the hydrocarbon reflux

stream in the top

LI 4078; LIC 4083; FIC

4073; PDI 4064

Same as 5.3.1

The stripper would need more

heat from reboiler E-203

2 2 4-L Same as 5.3.4

PRESSURE

TEMPERATURE

STRIPPER

T-2015

HIGH

LESS





115


5.4.1Decrease in the charge

flowPV 4051: TI 4063

Presence of hydrocarbon in the

top of the column.

Hydrogen contamination.

Decrease in the olefins quality.

Economic losses

2 3 6-M

Decrease of the recirculation flow in the

bottoms.

Increase of the recirculation flow in the

top.

5.4.2

Increase in the


bottoms

PI 4064; PI 4065; PSV

4066Same as 3.4.1 2 3 6-M

Decrease of the recirculation flow in the

top.

Decrease the charge flow

5.4.3

Decrease in the


top

LIC 4083; FIC 4073; PDI

4064

Same as 3.4.1

Increase of steam in the top2 3 6-M Same as 5.3.4

5.4.4The tea system fails

clossed

PI 4064; PI 4065; PSV

4066

Possible floofing into the

stripper.

Overpressure.

Losses of olefins.

4 2 8-MOpen the safe valve GBCF01 and GACF04

to stabilize the pressure in the tower

5.4.5

Tamponade in the

outside stream in the

bottoms

LIC 4069; TI 4079

Increase the olefinsin the

bottoms.

Overpressure into stripper.

Potencial flooding.

Hydrogen contamination.

Economic losses.

5 1 5-M

Decrease the charge flow.

Decrease the recirculation flow in the

top.

Decrease the steam flow in the

condenser D 203

5.5.1

Tamponade in the

charge line of the

stripper

PV 5051; TI 4063; LBCF01;

LIC 4069

Same as 5.5.1

Overpressure in the pipe line

Possible fire explosion with

possible risk to employees,

enviroment and equipment

5 2 10-M

Same as 5.4.1

Constant monitoring to the system

controls

5.5.2 PV 4051 fails closed LBCF01; TI 4063; LIC 4069 Same as 5.5.3 5 1 5-M Same as 5.5.3

5.5.3Rupture in the outside

line in the bottom

TI 4070; GWC01 - PP; LIC

4069

Same as 5.5.2

Economic losses

Escape of lighs

5 2 10-M Same as 5.4.5

5.5.4

Tamponade in the

recirculation line of the

top

FIC 4073; PDI 4064Same as 5.5.3

Same as 5.5.65 1 5-M

Same as 5.2.6

Monitoring constant to the control

systems

LEVEL

PRESSURE HIGH

LESS




STRIPPER

T-2015


116


5.6.1 PV 4051 fails opened LBCF01; TI 4063; LIC 4069Same as 5.4.1

Flooding in the column 4 1 4-L

Open the safe valve LBCF01 to stabilize

the operability profile

5.6.2TV 4017 A/B fails

openedTI 4139; TI 4063; PV 4051 Same as 5.6.1 4 1 4-L Same as 5.3.1

5.6.3 FIC 4073 fails closed LWCS01; SP 0182

Overpressure in the D-201

Posible rupture of the pipe line

due to overpressute

4 1 4-LOpen the safe valve LWCS01 to stabilize


5.6.4

Tamponade in the

outside line in the

bottom

TI 4070; TW4179Same as 5.4.5

Decreasse in the olefins quality5 2 10-M Same as 5.4.3

5.6.5LIC 4069 fails closed fv

4061Same as 5.6.1

Same as 5.6.1

Same as 5.6.4

Increase the charge for the

reboiler E 203

5 1 5-MOpen the safe valve LBCF01 to stabilize


5.7.1

The feed stream of the

process comes with

some diolefins

PDY 4064; LIC 4069; TI

4115

Decrease in the temperature

profile.

Decrease in the molecular

weight on the plates along of

towel.

Decrease in the olefins quality

2 2 4-L Same as 4.9.1

5.7.2

The feed stream of the

process comes with less

diolefins and olefins

concentration and more

contaminant such as

sulfur, heavy metals,

water and caustic soda.

Same as 5.7.1

Same as 5.7.1

Contamination of the finale

product

2 3 6-M


maintenance to pipeline and

equipments to ensure proper operation

of the process

5.8.1 HIGH

Increase in the

molecular weight of the

charge

Same as 5.7.1

Decresse in the sensible heat.

Decrease in the molecular wight

in the products of top and

bottom

3 2 6-M

Constant monitoring to the variables like

pressure, flow and temeprature to

prevent chances in the composition

LEVEL

STRIPPER

T-2015

HIGH

LESS

CHARGE

COMPOSITION





117

Annex 2 Application of HAZOP methodology to Charge and Drying section

NODE DESCRIPTION NODE PROCESS PARAMETERS DEVIATION POSSIBLE CAUSE EXISTING SAFEGUARDS CONSEQUENCES S L R RECOMMENDATION

1.1.1

Temperature of inlet is

cooler than normal

(<110°F)

TI 4062; TI/TE 1001, TI 2495

Increase in the separation

time between hydrocarbon

and water.

1 1 1-L

Install an Temperature Indicator in the

inlet line to surge drum D-02 to

monitoring this operational variable in

the control room

1.1.2Decrease in the pressure

tank (<75 psig)PI 1364 Same as 1.1.1 1 3 3-L

Realize constant operator procedures,

monitoring and training. Do a schedule

to realice the activities in this section.

1.2.1

Temperature of inlet is

higher than normal

(>110°F)

Same as 1.1.1

Decrease in the separation

time between hydrocarbon

and water

1 4 4-L Same as 1.1.1

1.2.2

Increase in the pressure

tank due to generation

vapor (>75psig)

Same as 1.1.2; PSV 1002

Same as 1.2.1

Increase in the NPSH

causing mechanical

damage in the pump P-

01A/B. Overpressure in the

drum D-02

2 2 4-L Same as 1.1.2

1.3.1Manual valve GWCS03 is

opened PDI 1003; PI 1364/1021

Hydrocarbon spill to

atmosphere causing air

pollution and potential

fire. Risk to the employees

and the equipments.

Economic losses.

5 2 10-M

Realize periodic maintenance and

monitoring to the surge drum and

manual valves inmediatly report about

the real state of the tank. Do a schedule

to realice that action.

1.3.2 The PSV 1002 fails opened GACF04, PDI 1003, PI1364



pollution and potential

fire. Risk to the employees

and the equipments.

Economic losses. Decrease

in the NPSH causing

cavitation in the pump P-

01A/B

4 2 8-M

Realize a periodic maintance to the

valve PSV 1002 to avoid this kind of

causes in the unit and is convenient do a

schedule to realice this type of actions

1.3.3 Manual Valve GBCF18 is

opened PI 2450, PDI 1003 Same as 1.3.2 4 2 8-M Same as 1.3.1

1.4.1

Increase in the

temperature inside the D-

02

Same as 1.1.1. PSV 1002; PI

1364, TEA system

The outlet stream is

contaminated with vapor

of water. Potential fire and

explosion in the drum

2 2 4-L

The surge drum count with the

necessary safeguards, realize constant

monitoring of pressures and

temperature indicator.

1.4.2The PSV 1002 fails closed or

malfunctions

Bypass system around PSV

1002; PI 1364,

Overpressure in the drum

D-02. Potential explosion

of the drum

3 2 6-M Same as 1.3.2

SURGE DRUM D-021


Process: The objective is to remove humidity of the charge currents the unit Study Section: Charge and Drying



TEMPERATURE

LESS

HIGH

PRESSURE

HIGH

LESS

118


1.5.1FV 1000 fails closed or

malfunctions

LI 1005 with low level and

low-low alarm; Bypass

around FV 1000 valve with

manual valve LWCS03

If this valve fails more than

30 minutes is potential to

shutdown the Alkylation

unit or go on isubutane

circulation. Economic

losses due to loss of

production.

3 3 9-M

Consider adding a low flow alarm on FIC

1000 and realice operator procedures,

trainig and response

1.5.2

The FIC 4061 and/or LIC

4069 fails closing the valve

FV 4061

Same as 1.5.1.

Same as 1.5.1. Increase the

level in the bottom of

stripper T-201 causing

overpressure and potential

explosion of the vessel.

4 2 8-M

Intall a Flow Indicator in the inlet line of

the Surge Drum to monitoring the inlet

flow to the drum. Periodic maintenance

to the existing safeguards and valves.

Realize operator procedures and

training

1.5.3XV 2453 fails closed or

malfunctions


low-low alarm; Position

indication (ZIC 2453) on XV

2453

Same as 1.5.1 3 2 6-M

Realize monitoring and constant

maintenance to the valve XV 2453 and

operator procedures, training and

response.

1.5.4 FV 1006 fails closed or

malfunctions

Same as 1.5.1; FE 1006,

FT/FIC 1006 Same as 1.5.1 3 3 9-M Same as 1.5.2

1.5.5LV 1004 fails opened or

malfunctions

PI 1364, LIC/LT 1004, LG

1009 for operator to verify

level in boot, LI 1005 with

low level and low-low

alarm, Bypass around LV

1004

Same as 1.5.1

Potential to send

isobutane/olefin feed to

the neutralizer drum D-19.

Potential loss of feed.

Economic losses

3 3 9-M

Intall a Flow Indicator in the drain line of

oily water. Do periodic monitoring to

the state of the plant.

1.5.6Rupture or leak in the

principle inlet line to D-02

Manuals valves CBCF01/

LWCS03/ LBCF06 to close

the inlet flow for each

streams; XV 2453; FV1006

Potential fire and

explosion.Hydrocarbon

spill to atmosphere causing

air pollution. Risk to the

employees and the

equipments. Economic

losses. Decrease in the

NPSH causing cavitation in

the pump P-01A/B.

Decrease in the pressure

tank

4 3 12-S

Install a Flow Indicator in the inlet line

of surge drum and flow indicator with

lower and higher Alarm in the drum.

Constantly check of the pipe and realize

maintenance to the pipes and vessels

and training to the operator if this cause

occurs.

1.5.7XV 1516 fails opened or

malfunctions

Position valve indication

on XV 1516; FIC

1059C/1903C with low flow

alarm on E-28/E28A reactor

feed lines; PSV 1002 on D-

02 set at 170 psig, design

pressure of vessel is higher

than maximum expected,

LI 1005 with high level and

low - low alarm

Same as 1.5.1 2 3 6-M

Periodic maintenance to the XV 1516

and realice operator procedures,

training and response. Consider install a

PT/PI with high pressure alarm on surge

drum D-02

1.5.8Rupture in the outlet lines

of the drum D-02


low-low alarm, Manual

valve GWCS03, XV 1516

Same as 1.5.6 4 3 12-S

Install a Flow Indicator in the outlet line

of the surge drum. Realize operator

procedures and training

1.5.9Rupture or break in the oily

water drain line Same as 1.5.8

Same as 1.5.6

Hydrocarbon load loss 5 2 10-M Same as1.5.5

1.5.10Tamponade in the inlet

pipes


low-low alarm

Rupture in the inlet line

due to overpressure in it

causing possible potential

fire. Decrease in the NPSH

causing cavitation in the

pump P-01A/B


tank

5 2 10-M Same as 1.5.6

1.5.11

Loss of inlet flow from

stripper bottoms trim

cooler, butamer unit, D-01,

D-12, P-07A/B, P-06A/B, E-

06A/B


low-low alarm

Potential to shutdown

alkylation unit or go on

isobutane circulation.


loss of production

3 3 9-M

Consider adding a low flow alarm on FIC

1000 and realice operator procedures,

training and response

1 SURGE DRUM D-02 LEVEL





LESS

119


1.6.1FV 1000 fails opened or

malfunctions


low-low alarm and high

level and high - high

alarm, XV2453; PI 1364

Higher consumption of

Acid in the reaction

section. Drag of acid to the

Isostripper section.


causing possible explosion.

Drag of hydrocarbon to the

TEA system Decrease in

the separation time

between hydrocarbon and

water

5 2 10-M Same as 1.5.1

1.6.2

The FIC 4061 and/or LIC

4069 fails opening the

valve FV 4061


1.6.3The valve XV 2453 fails

opened or malfunctions Same as 1.5.3 Same as 1.6.1 5 2 10-M Same as 1.5.3


malfunctions

Same as 1.5.1; FE 1006,

FT/FIC 1006 Same as 1.6.1 5 2 10-M Same as 1.5.2

1.6.5

LV 1004 fails closed for

example bad transmitter or

loss of instrument air

Bypass system around

valve LV 1004 with manual

valve LWCS03; LI 1005 with

low level and low-low

alarm and high level and

high - high alarm

Drag the acid to the

Isostripper section




TEA system. Drag of water

to the dryers D-03A/B.

Increase in the corrosion

of equipments. Loss of acid

due to the increase of

water. Potential for water

buildup and water

carryover to the dryer

leading to potential

corrosion in downstream

system. Overtime, possible

leaks of acid in

downstream equipments

with possible exposure to

employees. Economic

losses

4 3 12-S

Periodic maintenance to the bypass line,

pipes an surge drum. Consider adding an

HF/Water acid analyzer on the E-28/E-

28A reactor acid circulation loop

1.6.6Tamponade in the outlet

pipes



level and high - high alarm

Rupture due to



potential fire. The NPSH is

less than requested and

cause cavitation in the

pump P-01A/B Drag of

hydrocarbon to the TEA

system

4 2 8-M Same as 1.5.8

HIGH LEVELSURGE DRUM D-021





120


1.6.7Tamponade in the oily

water drain line




alarm, bypass system

aroun valve LWCS03

Rupture due to

overpressure in the oily

water drain pipe causing

possible potential fire.


TEA system

Drag of water to the dryers

D-03A/B. Increase in the

corrosion of equipments.

Loss of acid due to the

increase of water.

Economic losses

4 2 8-M Same as 1.5.5

1.6.8 Increase in the inlet flow




alarm, Manuals valves

CBCF01/ LWCS03/ LBCF06

to close the inlet flow for

each stream

Same as 1.6.1 5 2 10-M Same as 1.5.2

1.6.9

The valve XV 1516 fail

closed on suction of P-

01A/B feed pumps

Position valve indication

on XV 1516; FIC

1059C/1903C with low flow

alarm on E-28/E28A reactor

feed lines; PSV 1002 on D-

02 set at 170 psig, design

pressure of vessel is higher

than maximum expected,

LI 1005 with high level and

low - low alarm

The NPSH is less than

requested and cause

cavitation in the pump P-

01A/B Drag of hydrocarbon

to the TEA system



Potential for loss of flow to

reactor E-28 and EE-28A

leading to loss of

production. Possible

economic impact.

5 2 10-M

Periodic maintenance to the XV 1516

and realice operator procedures,

training and response. Consider install a

PT/PI with high pressure alarm on surge

drum D-02

Damage in P-01A/B

Pump run status indication;

FIC 1006 with low flow

alarm; FIC 1059C/1903C

with low flow alarm, PSV

1002, Design pressure of

vessel, LI 1005 with high

and high high level alarm.

Potential for loss of

pressure on reactor feed

header and loss of flow to

reactors E-28/E-28A leading

of production. Potential

overpressure in the D-02

with loss of containment,

potential fire and

employees injuries

5 2 10-MConsider install a PT/PI with high

pressure alarm on surge drum D-02

1.7.1 NO Same as Less Same as Less Same as Less Same as less

SURGE DRUM D-021 LEVELHIGH





121


2.1.1 LESS

Inlet temperature is lower

than operating

temperature (<102°F)

TI 1025/1026 No significant consequences 1 1 1-L

The inlet line has enough safeguards but

is necessary realize periodic

maintenance to the indicators.

2.2.1

Inlet temperature is higher

than operating

temperature (>102°F)

Same as 2.1.1

Decrease in the efficiency

of removal water from

olefins.

Increase in the moisture

into dryers causing

saturation in the molecular

sieves and decrease the

drying cycle operation

2 2 4-L Same as 2.1.1

2.2.2Increase the friction in the

inlet pipe Same as 2.1.1 Same as 2.2.1 2 2 4-L

Realice periodic maintenance to the

pipes and operator procedures and

training.

2.2.3 Increase in the pressure PSV 1027/1028 Same as 2.2.1 2 1 2-LSame as 2.2.2. Intall a pressure indicator

in each dryer.

2.3.1

XV 1350/1351 fails closed

or malfunctions decreasing

the inlet flowto olefins

feed driers D-03A/B

XV 1352, XV 1353

Increase in the lifetime of

molecular sieves due to

decrease in the moisture

into dryers but decrease

the charge to the reaction

step.

Possible fire explosion and

leak of hydrocarbon due to

overpressure in the inlet

pipe.

Economic losses

3 3 9-MSame as 2.2.2. Install a flow indicator

after valve 1350/1351

2.3.2PSV 1027/1028 fails opened

or malfunctions

GACF 04, Bypass system

around valves PSV

1027/1028

Air pollution due to

hydrocaron escape. Injures

to employees and

equipment. Economic

losses.

2 3 6-M Same as 2.2.2

2.3.3

XV 1352/1353 fails opened

depending of what dryer is

using

Drain line with manual

valve GWCS03

Decrease in the level due

to reverse flow of olefins

which are sending to the

coalescer

1 2 2-L Same as 2.3.3

2.4.1Increase in the charge to

the dryer XV 1350/1351 Same as 2.2.1 2 2 4-L

Install a flow indicator control (FIC)

which works with a control valve in the

inlet stream to monitoring the flow in

the dryer.


pipe. PI 2548




pipe.

Decrease in the charge to

the reaction step.

5 2 10-M Same as 2.2.2

2.4.3 PSV 1027/1028 fails closed Bypass with valve LBCF06

Posible explosion due to

overpressure into the tank

.

4 2 8-M Same as 2.3.3

2.4.4


temperature to olefins

feed driers

TT/T1025, TT/TI1026 Same as 2.2.1 2 2 4-L Install a PDI in each olefins feed driers

PRESSURE

2OLEFIN FEED DRIERS

IN USE D-03A/B

TEMPERATURE

HIGH

LESS

HIGH





122


2.5.1 LESS Good separation in the

charge drum D-02 No safeguards


molecular sieves due to

decrease in the moisture

into dryer.

Increase in the drying cycle

operation.

2 3 6-M

Install a analyzer in the inlet pipe and

realice sampling procedures in the

stream.Periodic operator procedures

and training.

2.6.1

LIC 1004 fails closing the

valve LV 1004 causing

water drag in the olefins

stream.


2.6.2

Bad separation in the

charge drum D-02 due to

high temperature


2.7.1Molecular sieves recently

regenerated AI 1030

No hydrate formation in

the reaction 2 1 2-L No important comments to do

2.7.2Decrease in the moisture

of the inlet stream Same as 2.7.1


molecular sieves.

Same as 2.7.1

1 1 1-L

Install a analyzer in the inlet pipe and

realice sampling procedures in the

stream.Periodic operator procedures

and training.

2.7.3Decrease in the sieves

operation time No safeguards Same as 2.7.2 1 2 2-L No important comments to do

2.8.1Increase in the sieves

operation time No safeguards 2 1 2-L No important comments to do

2.8.2Saturation of molecular

sieves Same as 2.7.1 2 2 4-L

Schedule the regeneration of the

molecular sieves.

2.8.3 Increase in the inlet flow Same as 2.4.1 2 1 2-L Same as 2.4.1

2.8.4Increase in the moisture in

the inlet stream No safeguards (drum) 2 3 6-M

Realize sampling procedures in the inlet

stream and periodic maintenance to the

pipes and drum

2.9.1 XV 1350/1351 fails closed No safeguards Same as 2.3.1 2 3 6-M Install a bypass system around the

valves XV 1350/1351

2.9.2Leak or rupture in the inlet

pipe No safeguards Same as 2.3.2 3 3 9-M

Install a flow indicator in the inlet pipe.

Periodic pipe maintenance


pipe.


valve GWCS03




pipe.

4 2 8-MSame as 2.2.2. Install a pressure

indicator in the inlet pipe.

2.9.4

XV 1352/1353 fails opened

depending of what dryer is

using

No safeguards Same as 2.3.4 1 2 2-L

Install a manual valve after valves XV

1352/1353 and do periodic maintenance

to the valves, equipments and drum.

2.10.1 HIGH XV 1350/1351 fails opened No safeguards

Increase the moisture into

the dryers. Decrease the

lifetime of molecular

sieves.

2 2 4-L No important comments to do

2OLEFIN FEED DRIERS

IN USE D-03A/B

Decrease in the lifetime of

molecular sieves.

Increase in the operational

cost due to constant dryer

regeneration.

Hydrate formation in the

reaction step. Acid

losses.

WATER CONCENTRATION IN

THE INLET STREAM

HIGH

INLET FLOW

LESS

WATER CONCENTRATION IN

THE OUTLET STREAM

LESS

HIGH





123


3.1.1

FV 1023 fails opened

increasing the inlet flow

olefins in the E-01

FT 1023, GWCS03

Decrease in the

regeneration efficiency to

the D-03A/B.

1 2 2-L

Realice periodic maintenance to the

valve FV 1023. Consider if it is possible

install a FI in the inlet line in the E-01 to

control of the inlet flow in the control

room

3.1.2TIC 1022 fails closing the

valve FV 1024

TI 1540, FIC 1024, Bypass

system with manual valve

LWCS 02

Same as 3.1.1 1 1 1-L

The line has enough safeguards but

realize constant monitoring to the

controllers, pipes and valves

3.1.3

FIC 1024 fails closing the

valve FV 1024 decreasing

the inlet flow of steam

TIC 1022; Bypass system

with manual valve LWCS 02Same as 3.1.1 1 2 2-L Same as 3.1.2

3.1.4Level in the condenser

increaseLIC 2455

Decrease the heat transfer

in the E-01.

Overpressure in the E-01.

Same as 3.1.1

2 2 4-L

Constant monitoring to the LIC 2455 and

valve LV 2455 and do an operator

procedures.

3.2.1

FV 1023 fails closed

decreasing the inlet flow

of olefins in the E-01

FT 1023; Bypass system

with manual valve LWCS02

Inefficient use of steam.

Possible increase in the

pressure of D-02 and D-

03A/B.

Increase in the

regeneration time due to

cooling time required for

it.

2 2 4-L Same as 3.1.1

3.2.2TIC 1022 fails opening the

valve FV 1024 TI 1540, FIC 1024,GDCF04.


Difficulty in separating the

water from the olefins due

to increase the coalescer

temperature.

1 2 2-L Same as 3.1.2

3.2.3

FIC 1024 fails opening the

valve FV 1024 decreasing

the inlet flow of steam

TIC 1022; GDCF04 Same as 3.2.2 1 2 2-L Same as 3.1.2

3.3.1

XV 1346/1347 fails closed No safeguards Same as 3.1.1 1 4 4-L

Periodic maintenance to the valve XV

1346/1347. Install a flow indicator after

valves 1346/1347 to monitoring the flow

in the inlet stream. Install a bypass

system around valves 1346/1347.

3.3.2FV 1023/1024 fails closed or

malfunctions

Bypass in the inlet lines of

olefin regenerant heater E-

01 around valves FV

1023/1024 with manual

valve LWCS 03

Same as 3.1.1 1 1 1-L Same as 3.1.1


pipe of olefin driers


valve GBCF18Same as 3.1.1 1 4 4-L

Periodic maintenance to the pipes and

consider install a pressure indicator or

flow indicator in the inlet stream.

3.4.1

FV 1023 fails opened and

the regeneration steam go

out to the E-01 to the

operational temperature.

GWCS 03

Increases the rate of

removal of moisture

resulting in improved

regeneration cycle.

Increase regeneration

cycle time

1 4 4-L Same as 3.1.1

3.4.2XV 1346/1347 fails opened

or malfunctions No safeguards Same as 3.4.1 1 4 4-L Same as 3.3.1

OLEFIN FEED DRIERS

IN REGENERATION D-

03A/B

TEMPERATURE IN THE INLET

STEAM

LESS

HIGH





FLOW IN THE INLET STREAM

LESS

HIGH

3

124


4.1.1

The temperature of inlet

stream is lower than

operating temperature.

Preheating in E-01, TI1549

with low temperature

alarm

Lower production of steam

in the condenser

More production of liquid

phase in the drum

(Increase in the out flow

rate) Decrease in the

pressure inside the

condenser

2 2 4-L

Install a temperature indicator to

monitoring this property in the control

room. Realize operator procedures

4.1.2

Increase of the ∆T due to

decrease in the inlet

temperature of olefins in

the heat exchanger E-01

TI1549 with low

temperature alarm Same as 4.1.1 2 2 4-L Same as 4.1.1

4.1.3

FV 1024 fails closed or

malfunctions on steam to E-

21

TI 1540 with low

temperature alarm,

Bypass around FV 1024

Loss of heat input to E-01.

Delay the regeneration

process.

1 1 1-L

Periodic maintenance and monitoring to

the valve FV 1024 and the control of it to

avoid that this control send a wrong

signal to the control room.

4.2.1


stream is higher than

operating temperature.

TI1549 with low

temperature alarm


causing more production of

steam

More production of steam

in the condenser and lower

production of liquid phase

1 2 2-L Same as 4.1.1

4.2.2

Decrease of the ∆T due to

increase in the inlet

temperature of diolefins

and olefins in the heat

exchanger E-01

TI1549 with low

temperature alarmSame as 4.2.1 2 2 4-L Same as 4.1.2


malfunctions

TI 1540 with low

temperature alarm,

Bypass around FV 1024,

manual valve GDCF04


unnecesary use of steam.

Same as 4.2.1

1 2 2-L Same as 4.1.3

4.3.1 Decrease or NO steam flow PI 1357 No exist condesation 1 1 1-L

Install a flow indicator in the inlet steam

line and realize monitoring in the line

and the pressure indicator.

4.3.2Decrease in the inlet

stream flowNo safeguards

Drag of steam to head

condensate. Economic

losses

1 2 2-LInstall a Flow Indicator in the inlet of

the D-24


stream temperature

Preheating in E-01, TI1549

with low temperature

alarm

Same as 4.1.1 2 3 6-M Same as 4.1.1

4.3.4 Break in the steam pipe No safeguards Risk to the employees and

the atmosphere 4 2 8-M

Same as 4.3.1. Do periodic maintenance

to the pipes and operator procedures in

the unit

4.3.6 PSV 2496 fails opened

Manual valve GWCS02

located before valve PSV

2496

Same as 4.3.4 2 3 6-MRealize monitoring and constant

maintenance to the valve PSV 2496.


malfunctions

Manual valve GWCS02

located after valve LV 2455

Decrease the level in the

condenser Same as 4.3.23 3 9-M Same as 3.1.4


pipeNo safeguard

Rupture due to



injuries to employees

4 2 8-M

Same as 4.3.2. Periodic maintenance to

the pipes and consider install a pressure

indicator

PRESSURE

CONDENSER D-244

TEMPERATURE

LESS

HIGH

LESS





125


4.4.1LV 2455 fails closed or

malfunctions


valve LV 2455; PI 1357; PSV

2496, LIC 2455, LG 2454


causing dawg of

condensate to the steam

line.

1 2 2-L Same as 3.1.4

4.4.2Increase in the inlet flow

stream No safeguard Same as 4.4.1 1 4 4-L Same as 4.3.2

4.4.3 PSV 2496 fails closed.

Drain line in the top of the

condenser, Design

procedures

Explosion in the condenser

due to overpressure inside

the vessel.

3 3 9-M Same as 4.3.6

4.4.4Increase in the inlet stream

temperaturePI 4104 ; PSV 2496

More production of steam

in the condenser and lower

production of liquid phase

1 3 3-L Same as 4.1.1. Same as 4.1.2


pipeLIC 2455; PI 1357, LG 2454

Same as 4.4.1

Rupture due to



injuries to employees

3 3 9-M Periodic maintenance to the pipes and

operator procedures and training


malfunctions

Manual valve GWCS02

located after valve LV 2455Same as 4.3.2 2 2 4-L Same as 3.1.4

4.5.2

FV 1024 fails closed or

malfunctions on steam to E-

21

TI 1540 with low

temperature alarm,

Bypass around FV 1024, PI

1357

Same as 4.3.1

Same as 4.1.31 2 2-L

Monitoring of the control FIC 1024 and

valve FV 1024 and periodic maintenance

to the existing safeguards.


stream to the D-24No safeguards Same as 4.3.2 1 2 2-L Same as 4.3.2

4.6.1Increase in the inlet stream

to the D-24LIC 2455, LG 2454

Decreased heat transfer.


and E-01.

Acumulation of the water

condensate in the E-01

Same as 4.3.2

2 1 2-L Same as 4.3.2


malfunctions


valve LV 2455; PI 1357; PSV

2496, LIC 2455, LG 2454

Same as 4.6.1 2 1 2-L Same as 3.1.4


malfunctions

TI 1540 with low

temperature alarm,

Bypass around FV 1024,

manual valve GDCF04

Same as 4.6.1

Increase of the condensate

causing liquid drag to the

steam line

Inefficient use of steam

Economic losses

2 2 4-L Same as 4.5.2

4.7.1 NO Same as Less Same as Less Same as Less Same as Less

PRESSURE

4 CONDENSER D-24

HIGH

HIGH

LEVEL

LESS





126


5.1.1

Increase in the secondary

cooling water flow to E-

03/E-03A

PP in each inlet line and

outler to trim condenser,

TW 1529/2502 in each inlet

line to trim condenser, TW

1524/2500 in each outlet

line to trim condenser, TI

1013 with high

temperature alarm

Decrease in the time of

separation between the

water and olefins.

Presence of olefins in the

oil water. Economic losses.

1 2 2-L


inlet stream of each trim condenser.

Operator monitoring to these flow

indicators.

5.1.2

Damage in the E-03/E-03A

decreasing the heat

transfer


5.1.3


stream temperature from E-

03/E-03A

TI 1013 with high

temperature alarmSame as 5.1.1 1 2 2-L

Constant operator procedures and

monitoring to the existing safeguard

5.2.1

Decrease in the secondary

cooling water flow to E-

03/E-03A

Same as 5.1.1

Increase in the time of

separation between the

water and olefins.

Economic losses.

1 2 2-L Same as 5.1.1

5.2.2

Increase in the inlet stream

temperature from E-03/E-

03A

Same as 5.1.3

Same as 5.2.1

Increase in the use of

secondary cooling water

2 2 4-L Same as 5.1.3

5.3.1PV 1018 fails opened or

malfunctions

PDI 1014; PI 1017;Manual

Valve LWCS03/GWCS03

Possible vaporization of

light hydrocarbons.

Inefficiency in the removal

of water

1 2 2-LPeriodic operator procedures, training

and response.

5.3.2Decrease in the level of

the condenser

PDI 1014; PI 1017, LIC 1015

with low and high level

alarm, LG 1019

Same as 5.3.1 2 2 4-L Same as 5.3.1

5.3.3PSV 1016 fails opened or

malfunctions Manual valve GACF04 Same as 5.3.1 2 2 4-L Same as 5.3.1

5.3.4Manual valve GWCS03

opened No safeguards Same as 5.3.1 2 2 4-L Same as 5.3.1

5.4.1PV 1018 fails closed or

malfunctions Same as 5.3.1


and E-03 A/B3 2 6-M Same as 5.3.1

5.4.2

Increase the level in the

condenser due to increase

in the inlet flow rate

Same as 5.3.2

Same as 5.4.1

Drag to Hydrocarbons to

the flare header

2 3 6-M Same as 5.3.1

5.4.3

Increase in the

temperature inside the D-

01


5.4.4

Manual valve GWCY03

opened allowing the inlet

of Nitrogen in the vessel


COALESCER D-015

TEMPERATURE

HIGH

LESS

HIGH

PRESSURE

LESS





127



malfunctions

Manual valve GWCS03,


valve LV 1015, LG 1019, LIC

1015 with high an low leval

alarm

Presence of hydrocarbons

in the effluent treatment

section.

Increase of pollutants in

the effluent water.

Economic losses

2 2 4-L Same as 5.3.1

5.5.2Decrease in the inlet flow

rate to condenser D-01 Same as 5.3.2

Same as 5.3.1

Same as 5.5.12 2 4-L

Install a flow indicator in the inlet line of

olefin regenerant coalescer. Realize

operator procedures.

5.5.3XV 1353 fails closed or

malfunctions

PP in the inlet line to

olefin regenerant

condenser E-02

Overpressure in the outlet

line to olefin feed driers.

Increase in the level of the

driers. Same as 5.5.2

2 3 6-MConstant operator procedures and

monitoring to the existing safeguard

5.5.4Manual valve GWCS03

opened

LIC 1015 with low and high

level alarm, LG 1019

Release of hydrocarbon.

Potential explosion and

fire. Potential risk to

employees and plant.

Economic losses

3 2 6-M Same as 5.5.3


malfunctions Same as 5.5.1

Presence of water in D-02.

Decrease in the lifetime of

the olefin feed driers D-03

A/B due an increase in the

water present in the

stream .

Economic losses.

2 2 4-L Open the manual valve LWCS03

5.6.2XV 1353 fails opened or

malfunctions

PP in the inlet line to

olefin regenerant

condenser E-02

Overpressure in the pipe

line. Same as

5.6.1

3 2 6-M Same as 5.5.3

LEVEL

HIGH

LESS





128

Annex 3 Application of HAZOP methodology to Reaction section

NODE DESCRIPTION

NODEPROCESS PARAMETERS DEVIATION POSSIBLE CAUSE EXISTING SAFEGUARDS CONSEQUENCES S F R RECOMMENDATION

1.1.1

Increase in the inlet flow

from of the Charge and Drying

section due to problem

operational

FIC1059C/1903C

Economically inefficient operation.

Possible acid drag to isostripper section

due to speedup in reactors. Decrease in

the alkylate octanaje. Increase in the

polymer production and pollutans.

2 1 2-L


line when the streams are mixed to

verify that the flow is right

1.1.2

The inlet stream of HF more

cooler than normal due to

operational problems in the

ALKAD section or Acid settler

D-04

TI1055/1907 Economically inefficient operation. 3 1 3-L

Periodic inspection and maintenance

of temperature indicators to avoid

operational problems in the reactors

1.1.3

The inlet stream of

Isobutane/Olefins more

cooler than normal due to


Charge and Drying section or

Isostripper section

PI 1053/1905

Increase the production of organics

fluorides.

Loss of acid

3 1 3-L Same as 1.1.2

1.1.4Increase in the primary

cooling water inlet flow rate FI1328, TI1330, PI1332, TI 1548, PI1546

Much cooling causing reactor cool.

Possible rupture in the pipes due to

overpressure. Economically inefficient

operation

4 1 4-L

Installation of a cooling water flow

indicator and low flow alarm to

provide an immediate indication of

cooling loss. Periodic inspections

and maintenance of the cooling

system to insure its integrity.

1.1.5Increase in the isobutene

recirculation flow rate TI1054/1906; FIC1047/1900

Economically inefficient operation.

Possible acid drag to isostripper section

due to speedup in reactors.

3 1 3-L Same as 1.1.2

1.2.1Decreasing in the isobutene

stream of recirculation FIC1047/1900

Generation of polymer and pollutants

causing a decreasing the octanaje of

alkylate.Secondary reaction in downstream

equipment.

4 2 8-M


of the controllers to prevent that

send bad signal to the control room

or valve

1.2.2Increasing of the temperature

of the inlet stream of HFSame as 1.1.2 Same as 1.2.1 4 2 8-M Same as 1.1.2

1.2.3

Increasing of the temperature

of the inlet stream of the

isobutane and olefins


REACTOR

E28/28A1

HAZOP WORKSHEET - ANNEX 3 Project Title: Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid Date: Febrary to June Page 1 of 1

Process: Explains the reaction between the olefins and isobutane in the presence of hydrofluoric acid to obtain the alkylate Study Section: Reaction


LESS

HIGH

TEMPERATURE

129

NODE DESCRIPTION


1.2.4 TEMPERATURE HIGH

The cooling flow is

interrupted due to the FBCF01

fails closed

TI 1548, PI1546

Runaway reaction with subsequent

increase in the vessel pressure possibly

leading to a rupture or explosion of the

vessel

4 3 12-S

Installation of a cooling water flow

indicator and low flow alarm to

provide an immediate indication of

cooling loss. Periodic inspections

and maintenance of the cooling

system to insure its integrity.

Installation of a high temperature

alarm to alert the operator in the

event of cooling function loss.

Installation of a high temperature

shutdown system, that would

automatically shutdown the process

in the event of a high reactor

temperature. The shutdown

temperature would be higher than

the alarm temperature to provide

the operator with the opportunity to

restore cooling before the reactor is

shutdown. Evaluation of the cooling

water source to consider any

possible interruption and

contamination of the supply.

1.3.1 LESSPI 1905 or PI 1053 fails send a

bad signal PI 1052; PI 1904

Decrease in the operation conditions

causing inefficiency in the reactor2 2 4-L

Constantly monitoring of the

controllers to avoid undesirable

reactions and maintain the

production of alkylate

1.4.1


in the reactors due the inlet

stream is more higher than

normal or the cooling streams

is less than normal

TI 1054/1548/1055, PI 1053/1052/1546

Overpressure in the reactors

Increase of the production polymer and

contaminants

Increased loss of acid

Economic losses

4 1 4-L

Same as 1.3.1

Monitoring of the cooling system to

maintain the operation temperature

in the range of operating

1.4.2

PSV 1048/1915 fails closed

causing an overpressure in

the cooling pipe

PI 1547/1916, TI 1049/1917

Rupture in the cooling pipe causing water

spill and problems in the operation

condition. Problems in

the operation condition of the reactors

3 2 6-M

Monitoring of the cooling pipe and

PSV valve to avoid an incident and

maintain the good operation in the

reactors

Install a PIC in the exit of the cooling

pipe to control the pressure from the

control room

REACTOR

E28/28A1




HIGH

PRESSURE

130

NODE DESCRIPTION


1.5.1FIC 1059C/1903C fails closed

the FV 1059/1903 valve

Bypass system LBCF06 located in each

reactor around of the FV 1059/1903

valve

Decrease of octane alkylate product

Increase in the end point of alkylate

Increase in the polymer material

Increase of acid lost

5 2 10-M

Activate bypass system to control of

the flow in case that fails

Constant monitoring of the pipeline

to avoid tamponade due to the

contaminants

1.5.2

Isobutane flow FIC 1047/1900

fails closed the FV 1047/1900

valve

Bypass system LBCF09 located in each

reactor around of the FV 1047/ 1900

valve

Same as 1.5.1

Increase in the temperature

Could occur secundary reactions in the acid

settler and in the top of the isostripper

5 2 10-M Same as 1.5.1

1.5.3

Acid and aditive HC 1056 and

1908 fails closed the HV

1056/1908 valves

FE 1057/1909; FIC 1059C/1903C; TI

1056/1907Point increase in volatility acid 3 3 9-M

Decreasing of the flow of olefins and

butane to maintain the operation

Maintenance the pipe to avoid

tamponade or leak

Install an alarm flow indicator and a

bypass sistem in case that the valve

fails closed and maintain the flow in

the reactors

1.5.4

Rupture or hole in the pipe of

the Isubutane stream due to

the corrosion or overpressure

FIC 1047/1900 - PI 1053/1905

Same as 1.5.2

Posible fire explosion

Air pollution Personal

Injures

Economic losses

5 1 5-M

Constant monitoring to the pipe line

to avoid rupture and prevent an

incident

Decrease of the flow of olefins and

isobutane to prevent an incident

Close the valves FV 1047/1900 to cut

the flow input

1.5.5


the olefins stream due to the

corrosion or overpressure

FIC 1059C/1905 - PI 1053/ 1905

Same as 1.5.1 Posible fire

explosion Air

pollution Personal

Injures

Economic losses

5 1 5-M


to avoid rupture and prevent an

incident

Decrease of the flow of olefins to

prevent an incident

Close the valves FV 1059/1903 to cut

the flow input

1.5.6


the HF and aditive stream due

to corrosion or overpressure

HC 1056/1908

Same as 1.5.3 Catastrophic

events like, personal injuries event with

fatalities

5 2 10-M


to maintain the operation and avoid

a rupture

Install a bypass system and alarm

flow indicator in case that the valve

fails closed and show the inlet flow

1.5.7

Tamponade in the pipe of the

streams of HF and Additive

due to the accumulation of

the contaminants

HC 1056/1908

Same as 1.5.6 Overpresure

in the line Posible fire

explision

5 1 5-M


to maintain the operation and avoid

a tamponade

1.5.8

Both pumps P-02A/C stop

from loss of power (Normally

operate two

pumps).

FI 1057/1909; Pump run status in PCS

Total loss of acid flow to

both reactors leading to

uncontrolled ratio of HC/acid. With

continued HC feed flow,

this can result in the potential

for polymer formation and

eventually acid runaway.

Potential for increased

corrosive environment which

could result in leaks in process, with

possible

personnel exposure to HF

4 2 8-M

Maintenance of the pumps to avoid

stop of operation and maintain the

feed of the acid to the reactors

REACTOR

E28/28A1




LESSLEVEL

131

NODE DESCRIPTION


1.6.1

The controllers of the Olefins

stream which are FIC 1059

C/1903 C fails, opening the FV

1059/1903 valves

Bypas system, GBCF16 Manual valve

located after of the FV1059 valve;

GBCF 16 Manual valve located after of

the FV 1903 valve; TI 1051/1911; PI

1053/1905

Decrease in the flow rate of isobutane/

olefins flow

Decrease of octane final product

Increase in the alkylate final point

Increase in the polimeric material

Increase acid losess

3 1 3-L

Install FI after the FV 1903/1059 valve

to show the flow inlet in the reactors

and maintain the relation

isobutane/olefins and HF/HC

Constantly monitoring to the

controllers to avoid fails in the

operation

1.6.2

The controllers of the

Isobutane stream which are

FIC 1047/1900 fails opening

the FV 104771900 valves

GBCF22 Manual valve located after of

the FV 1047 valve; GBCF 22 Manual

valve located after of the FV 1900

valve

Increase of octane of the alkylate product

decrease in the polimeric material

Economic operation inefficient

Acid escape to the destilation separation

column

4 1 4-L Same as 1.6.1

1.6.3

The controllers of the Acid

and aditive stream which are

HC 1056/1908 fails opening

the HV 1056/1908 valves

Same as 1.5.3 Catalyst deactivation 3 3 9-M

Install FIC after the HV 1908/1056 and

loops work which work with those

valves

1.7.1

Rupture or hole in the charge

and drying pipe line due to

the overpressure or corrosion

GBCF 22 Manual valve located in each

reactor before of the PI 1052/1904; XV

1060 / 1902; PI 1052 / 1904; PI 1053 /

1905

Posible fire explosion Air pollution

Decrease in the alkylate product

Decrease in the generation of polynmeric

materials Decrease in the

alkylate product Increase in

the temperature of the E-28/28A

Economic losses

5 2 10-M

Constant maintenance of the pipe

line to prevent rupture or fails in the

process

Activate bypass system and interrupt

the inlet flow

1.7.2

Tamponade in the inlet pipe


contaminants in the pipe

PI 1052/ 1904; PI 1053/1905Overpressure in the pipe line

Same as 1.7.15 2 10-M

Constant maintenance of the pipe

line to prevent rupture or fails in the

process

1.7.3FIC 1047/1900 fails closed the

FV 1047/1900 valve

Bypass system LBCF 09; GBCF22

Desviation valve; FE 1047/1900


Increased loss of acid

Presence of secondary reactions in the

equipment D-04, D-05 and top of the tower

V-02 Same as

1.7.2

4 1 4-L

Maintenance of the Bypass system to

maintain the flow and prevent

operational problems in the reactors

1.7.4

The line from of Charge and

Drying of the controllers FIC

1059C/1903C fails, closed the

FV 1059/1903 valve

Bypass system LBCF06; FE 1059/1903 Increase of octane alkylate product

Same as 1.7.25 1 5-M Same as 1.7.3

1.7.5

Fails in the relacionador of

Isobutane to Olefins XI

2508/2512 closing the

FV1059C / 1903C or FV

1047/1900 valves

Bypass system LBCF 06/09, TI

1051/1911; PI 1053/1905

Decrease in the octane of product alkylate

Increasse in the final point of alkylate

Generation of polymer material

Increase in the acid lost

3 2 6-M

Constant monitoring of loops control

to avoid fails in the process and

prevent that the valves fails closed

1.7.6

The XV 1060/1902 valve of

the pipe from of the Charge

and Drying section fails closed

FE 1059/1903 Same as 1.7.4 3 2 6-M

Maintenance of the XV 1060/1902

valve to avoid a decreasing of the

relation of the olefins and isobutane

and maintain the alkylate quality

LEVEL

RELATION ISOBUTANE -

OLEFINSLESS




HIGH

REACTOR

E28/28A1

132

NODE DESCRIPTION


1.8.1FIC 1047/1900 fails opened

the FV 1047/1900 valve

GBCF 22 Manual valve located after of

the FV 1047/1900 valve; TI 1051/1911;

PI 1053/1905

Increase of octane alkylate product

Decrease in the end point

Decrease in the generation of polymeric

material

Economically inefficient operation

Acid leakage to issostropier due increasse

in the reactors velocity

4 1 4-LDecreasing the acid flow and

recycling the unreacted product

1.8.2

Fails in the relacionador of

Isobutane to Olefins XI

2508/2512 opening the

FV1059C / 1903C or FV

1047/1900 valves

TI 1051/1911; PI 1053/1905Same as 1.7.5 Economic

operation inefficient2 3 6-M Same as 1.7.5

1.8.3

The line from of Charge and

Drying of the controllers FIC

1059C/1903C fails, opened the

FV 1059/1903 valve

The GBCF16 manual valve located

after the FV 1059/1903

Decrease in the relation isubotane flow

between olefins flow


Increase in the end point

Increase in the generation of polymeric

materials

4 2 8-M Same as 1.8.1

2.1.1

The exit stream from the

reactor comes is colder than

normal (<100°F)

TI 1051/1911

Increases acid viscosity causing decrease in

the sedimentation time of the acid

Trawl of the acid to the isostripper section

The hydrocarbon stream contaminated

Increase the consumption of acid

Increase the corrosion of the equipment

due the acid Economic losses

4 1 4-L

Install Temperature Indicator Alarm

Control in the inlet stream of the D-

04 to avoid decrease the

sedimentation time of the acid in the

D-04

Check of the operatin variable

Monitoring of the operating

variables to maintain a good process

of separation in the D-04

2.1.2


Isostripper comes is colder

than normal (<100°F)

TI 2359; PI 2537 same as 2.1.1 4 2 8-M Same as 2.1.1

2.2.1


reactor comes is hotter than

normal (>100°F)

Same as 2.1.1

Increase the sedimentation time causing

possibel trawl of acid to the isostripper

section

2 1 2-L

Install a Temperature Indicator (TI) in

the streams from the isostripper to

maintain the temperature of

operation in the D-04

Monitoring of the operating

variables to maintain a good process

of separation in the D-04

2.2.2


isostripper comes is hotter

than normal (>100°F)


2.3.1

Decreasing of the inlet flow

due to problems operational

in the reaction section

causing a decreasing of the

level

TI 1051/1911; DI 1071; LI 1072

Hydrocarbon drags to acid circulation

system increasing the formation of

polymers and pollutants.

Hydrocarbon spill to atmosphere. Potential

fire. Risk to the

employees and the equipments.

Economic losses.

4 2 8-M

Install a low level alarm to alert the

operator in the event of leak or hole

in the tank.


to controllers to avoid fails and

prevent that send bad signal

2.3.2

Rupture or leak in the outlet

stream of the acid due to the

corrosion

XV 1066/1067/1918 located before of

the pump P-02 A-C

Possible fire explosion Air

pollution Risk to

the employees and the equipments.

Economic losses.

5 2 10-M

Constant maintenance of the acid

pipe to avoid a catastrophic incident

in the plant

REACTOR

E28/28A

RELATION ISOBUTANE -

OLEFINS1

PRESSURE

ACID SETTLER

D-04 2

HIGH

LESS

LESS

HIGH

TEMPERATURE




133

NODE DESCRIPTION


2.4.1

Tamponade in the outlet pipe

(draining HF pipe) causing

increase in the acid level

LI 1072; PI 1069

Hydrofluoric acid drags to isostripper

section Overpressure in the

D-04

4 2 8-M

Maintenance of the acid pipe to

avoid accumulation of contaminant

in the pipe and prevent operational

problems in the reaction section

2.4.2

Tamponade in the outlet pipe

(draining alkylate and

isobutane pipe)

PI 1069

Higher content of polymer in the stream.

Low density making efficient separation of

emulsion Overpressure in the D-04

3 2 6-M

Maintenance of the alkylate and

isobutane pipe to avoid

accumulation of contaminant in the

pipe and prevent operational

problems in the next section

2.4.3

The XV 2461 valve located in

the isobutane and alkylate

pipe fails closed

Same as 2.4.2

Increase the level in the vessel causing

trawl of isobutane and alkylate to the

reaction section


2 3 6-M

Monitoring of the XV 2461 valve to

avoid fails closed and maintain the

operation in the next section

2.4.4 PSV 1990 fails closed LBCF09 deviates the flow to the HF

Acid Blowdown

Overpressure in the D-04. Increasing of the

temperature inside of the D-04 3 2 6-M

Maintenance of the PSV 1990 to

prevent that fails closed and avoid a

explosion due to the overpressure

2.5.1

Rupture in the inlet pipe of

the D-04 due to the

overpressure in the pipe

TI 1051/1911

Posible fire explotion

Air pollution due an acid escape

Equipment damage Risk to

the employees

Economic losses

5 2 10-M

Constant monitoring in the pipeline

to avoid problems in the process

Install a pressure indicator in the line

to show the pressure and maintain

the operation

2.5.2

XV 1066 valve located before

of the pump P-02A fails

opened

Same as 2.4.1

Damages mechanic in the pumps

Operational problems in the reactors E-

28/28A

Cavitation in the pumps

5 2 10-M


avoid fails closed and maintain the

operation in the reactors to obtain a

good alkylate

2.5.3

Decreasing of the inlet stream

compound with acid,

isobutane and alkylate is less

due to operational problems

in the reactors

Same as 2.1.1

Bad separation of the acid in the D-04

Inefficiency in the separation in the

isostripper section

Trawl of hydrocarbon to the reaction

section

5 2 10-M

Monitoring of the proces in the

reactors E-28/28A to maintain the

production of alkylate and reduce

fails in the D-04

2.5.4

Rupture or leak in the outlet

stream of the acid due to the

corrosion


2.5.6


of the D-04 due to the

increase of contaminants in

the pipe

Same as 2.5.1

Operational problems in the reactors E-

28/28A Decreasing of the

quality of the alkylate

Overpressure in the pipeline

3 2 6-M

Install a pressure indicator in the

inlet pipe to show that the pipe no is

obstructed

2.6.1

Increasing of the inlet stream

compound with acid,

isobutane and alkylate is less

due to operational problems

in the reactors

Same as 2.1.1

Trawl of acid to the Isostripper scetion

Bad separation in the D-04

Contamination of the stream that enter to

the reaction section

4 1 4-L Same as 2.5.3

2.6.2 XV 1066 valve fails closed Same as 2.4.1

Trawl of acid to the isostripper section

Contamination of the alkylate and

isobutane stream

Economic losses

3 3 9-M


avoid fails opened and maintain the

operation in the reactors to obtain a

good alkylate

2.6.3 XV 2461 valve fails closed PI 1069; LI 1072; PSV 1990; DI 1071

Trawl of alkylate and isobutane to the

reaction section

Operational problems in the isostripper

section

3 2 6-M

Constant monitoring of the XV 2460

valve to avoid that fails closed and

prevent bad control in the reactors E-

28/28A

PRESSURE

ACID SETTLER

D-04 2

HIGH

LEVEL

LESS

HIGH




134

Annex 4 Application of HAZOP methodology to Acid Storage section


1.1.1PV 1033 fails closed or

malfunctions

PIC 1033, PI 1034, Bypass

system around valve PV

1033, PI 1035 with high and

lower pressure alarm, XI

1037 reference of level

Inefficient displacement

of HF causing increase in

the level in the truck

1 4 4-L

The line has enough safeguards.

Periodic maintenance to the

controls and valves. Also, operator

procedures, inspections and

training.

1.1.2PSV 1032 fails opened or

malfunctionsManual valve GWCS03

Nitrogen to ATM at safe

location. Same as 1.1.1 1 3 3-L

Consider if it is possible install a

bypass system around safety valve

PSV 1032

1.2.1PV 1033 fails opened or

malfunctions

PIC 1033, XV 1039, interlock

UC03, emergency shutdown

Overpressure in the

system. Shutdown safety

valve to D-30, increase in

the losses of acid. HF can

escape by breaking the

flexible lines, HF leak in

the truck for the block

valves.

2 2 4-L

Same as 1.1.1. Confirm that the HF

Acid vendor container has

overpressure protection.

Note: UOP recommends using the

minimum design pressure of the

vendor container 125 psig assuming

a 95 psig Nitrogen design pressure.

1.2.2

Tamponade in the outlet

pipe causing level

increase in the truck

PI 1035 with high and lower

pressure alarm, PI 1036

Increase in the truck level

causing overpressure in

the system. Possible

explosion due to

overpressure and release

of HF with potential risk o

employees and

sourronding areas.

Economic losses

3 2 6-M

Periodic maintenance to the pipe

and eliminate the presence of

pollutants in the tank to avoid

sedimentation in the pipe. Periodic

operator procedures, inspections

and training.

1.3.1 LESS Considered but nothing

significant identified

1.4.1Rupture in the N2 line or

NO flow of nitrogen

PIC 1033, PI 1034, Bypass

system around valve PV

1033

Same as 1.1.1 1 4 4-L Same as 1.1.1

1.4.2 Tamponade in the outlet

pipe


pressure alarm, PI 1036 Same as 1.2.2 3 2 6-M Same as 1.2.2

1.4.3XV 1040 malfunctions

closed


pressure alarm, PSV 1032

Expose the container to

the full nitrogen supply

pressure resulting in

potential overpressure

leading to possible leaks

of HF. Personnel safety

issues

3 2 6-M

Confirm that the HF Acid vendor

container has overpressure

protection.







Process: Describe the storage system, recirculation and drainage of hydrofluoric acid Study Section: Acid Storage

PRESSURE

HIGH

LESS

LEVEL

HIGH

HF ACID CONTAINER

(TRUCK) 1

135


2.1.1

Manual valve GBCF22 in

the top of the acid

storage drum opened

Operator procedures,


Air pollution. Potential

fire or injuries to

employees and

sourronding areas

2 2 4-LSchedule the monitoring of this

valve for operators

2.1.2 PSV 1041 fails opened or

malfunctions

Manual valves

GACF16/GBCF 22, Drain line

with manual valve GBCF22

No important

consequences occurs if

this possible cause come

about

1 2 2-L

Periodic maintenance of valves.

Periodic operator procedures,

inspections and training.

2.2.1

Damage in the pump P-

14A allowinfg the

increase the acid level in

the drum D-30

P-14B Same as 1.2.2 2 2 4-L

Periodic maintenance and

monitoring to pump P-14 A to avoid

mechanical damages in it.

2.2.2

Presence to

hydrocarbons in the

drum D-30

DI 1037, System display and

remmote command nit

Possible explosion and

potential fire 4 2 8-M

Constant monitoring to DI 1037.

Periodic operator procedures,

inspections and training. Do

sampling procedures.

2.2.3Increase in the flow

from the process


pressure alarm, Check valve

between storage drum and

vendor container, PSV 1032

set at 95 psig, Operator

activated interlock U03

closes XV 1039/1040

Unable to get the HF

transferred into the

storage drum delaying

unloading. Potential to

get storage tank contents

into the vendor container

resulting overpressure


of HF. Potential risk to the

employees

3 2 6-M

Confirm that the HF Acid vendor

container has overpressure

protection.





2.3.1 XV 1040 malfunctions

closed


pressure alarm, PSV 1032

Expose the truck container

to the full nitrogen supply

pressure resulting in

potential overpressure


of HF. Personnel safety

issues

3 2 6-M Install a low level alarm in the acid

storage drum D-30

2.3.2 Tamponade in the inlet

stream PI 1035

Increase in the level of

the truck and

overpressure in it with

potential explosion and

HF release to atmosphere.

4 2 8-M

Constant monitoring and inspection

to indicator and pipes.

Eliminate the presence of water in

the tank to avoid corrosion in the

pipe.

2.3.3 XV 1045 fails closed or

malfunctions No safeguards

Same as 2.3.2.Possible

mechanical damage to

pump 14A.

Reverse flow to D-30

4 2 8-M

Install a bypass system in this line

and consider installing a flow

indicator in the inlet line after valve

XV 1045 to monitoring the flow in

this line. Periodic maintenance to

the valve and operator procedures.

2.4.1 The extraction nozzles

are tamponade

Injection of Nitrogen , LAH

1038, PSV 1041 set at 300

psig

No important

consequences 1 1 1-L

Periodic maintenance and

inspection to the controls, valves

and alarms


stream

Recirculation streams, LAH

1038

Possible mechanical

damage to pump P-14A

because is not working in

operational range.

Economic losses

3 2 6-M

Same as 2.4.1. Same as 2.2.1

Install a flow indicator in the outlet

pipe to monitoring it constantly in

the control room.




2

HIGH

LESS

ACID STORAGE DRUM

D-30

HIGH

PRESSURE

LESS

LEVEL

136


3.1.1 PSV 1079 fails opened Manual valve GBCF22

The acid is send to

blowdown causing

economic losses.

1 2 2-L

Periodic monitoring to the pressure

control to avoid the open of PSV

1079 and do maintenance to the

safety valve. Reestablish the

set point

3.1.2 Decrease in the inlet N2

stream flow rate PI 1080, PI 1081

Inefficient displacement

of HF causing increase the

level

1 4 4-L

Install o replace the PI 1081 for a PIC

which works in a loop control with

valve XV1077 to avoid human error

3.1.3 XV 1077 fails opened Manual Valve GBCF22, FI

2516


acid dump header1 1 1-L Same as 3.1.2

3.2.1 Increase in the inlet N2

stream flow rate PSV 1079. PI 1080, PI 1081

Displacement of HF to the

acid dump header.

Possible explosion in the

drum causing HF release

and possible injuries to

the employees. Air

pollution. Economic

losses.

2 2 4-L Install a shutdown system to cut the

inlet flow of N2. Same as 3.1.2

3.2.2


inside the drum or dump

is full

LAH 1083 and LAHH 1078

radioactive high level

alarm, LI 1082 with high

level

alarm on D-23, PI-1081 with

high pressure alarm PI 1061

, PI 1080

HF drag to HF

blowdown.Possible

explosion in the drum

causing HF release.

Unable to remove the acid

from the system during an

emergency dump. If there

is a leak, there is greater

potential for personnel

injury. Air pollution.

Economic losses

4 2 8-M

Install a high level alarm in the tank.

Also, install a pressure indicator in

the top of the tank to monitoring

this property. Verify the dump drum

capacity

3.2.3

Inadvertently have block

valves closed(these

valves must be open

when the unit is running

but can be closed during

startup for example

during a dryout

operation).

Valves are designed to

be locked open (LO), the

refinery has a safety

isolation system

Unable to remove the acid

from the system during an

emergency dump. If there

is a leak, there is greater

potential

for personnel injury.

4 2 8-M

Consider install a bypass system

around blck valves and realize

periodic operator procedures

3.3.1Insufficient time for

dumping a system.

The time is preset based

on design inventory

calculations.

Can't get all the acid out. If

there is a leak, there is

greater


injury.

3 3 9-M

Once the piping design has been

completed, isometrics are to be

sent to UOP to address timing for

dumping acid from equipment. UOP

to verify and approve the unit dump

timing based on inventory and

piping layout. Flow test the acid

dump/pumpout system to verify the

timing of the dump sequence.

3.3.2 Tamponade in the inlet

stream FI 2516

Overpressure in the line

causing vibration in it with

possible explosion and

potential release of acid.

Potential risk to

employees and

sourronding areas. Air

pollution. Economic losses

2 3 6-M


inlet stream and a PSV to send the

acid to another vessel (header).

3.4.1 HIGH Increase in the inlet

flow rate

XV 1077, FI 2516, LAHH 1078

radioactive high level

alarm

Same as 3.2.2 4 2 8-M Same as 3.2.2




3 ACID DUMP DRUM

LESS

HIGH

PRESSURE

LEVEL

LESS

137

Annex 5 Application of HAZOP methodology to Cooling Water Tower – TAE- section




1.2.1 HIGHBad functioning of cooling

tower fans

Pressure safety valves, run

status indicators for fan

motors, TI 1374, TI 1330, , TI

1379, TI 1335, Shutdown.

Higher cooling water

temperature. Potential

overpressure of the

alkylation unit leading to

flange leaks, loss of

containment causing

potential fire and

personnel injury.

5 2 10-M

Constant check of the process to

ensure the adequate functioning of

the unit. Check all the procedures

with the same goal include the

cooling water system failures.

1.3.1 LESS Decrease in the inlet flow

PI-2036 with low pressure

alarm on the cooling water

header, Pressure Safety

Valves, Pressure Safety

Valves, Electrical power is

provided by two separate

busses, Two of the electric

motor driven pumps are

connected to the

emergency power supply,

Selection and sizing of the

pump allows adequate

cooling, even while three

pumps are running

although with less pressure

cooling water system and

return temperatures higher

(normal operation is four

pumps in service), Two

steam turbines P-400A/E.

Potential for lower cooling

water supply pressure

resulting in lower flow

rates to the Alkylation

Unit. Potential to

overpressure leading to


containment with

potential for

fire and employees injury.

5 2 10-M Install a low pressure alarm on PI 1382

in the high pressure steam supply

1.4.1 HIGH

Cooling water supply

blocked in exchangers with

heat still on exchangers

PSVs in each heat

exchanger provided in the

cooling water side.

Potential overpressure

due to increase in the

temperature of the

cooling water side of the

heat exchanger causing

damage in it (leak).

2 2 4-L

Check the pressure in each cooling

water exchanger to guarantee the

correct operation of this and avoid

damage in the exchangers.

COOLING TOWER CT-

401


Process: Discusses the cooling system of the cooling water of unit Study Section: Cooling Water Tower TAE


TEMPERATURE

PRESSURE

1

138


1.5.1

LV 2004 fails closed

decreasing the flow of

filtered water

PI 2036 with low pressure

alarm in the header, LI 2010

with low level alarm,

Bypass system, FI 2005,

PSVs.

Loss of cooling due to

decrease in the cooling

water basin level. Possible

overpressure and

explosions or leaks

causing loss of

containment with

potential fire and injuries

to the employees and

equipments. Decrease in

the flow rate due to

decrease in the pressure

causing damage in other

sections in the unit.

5 2 10-M

Constant check of this parameter and

revision of the existing safeguards.

Training to the operators to avoid

human errors.

1.5.2

Decrease in the flow rate of

chlorinated cooling water

makeup

Sampling, other treatment

procedures.

Grow up of biomass

afecting the operability in

the unit. Increase in the

fouling factor.

2 2 4-L

Periodic sampling procedures in the

treatment procedures. Training to the

operator to do this procedures safely.

1.5.3 AV 2026 fails closed

Bypass system, Sampling

procedures of the cooling

water. Other treatment

procedures.

Potential grow uo of

contaminants in the

cooling water. Increase in

the fouling factor.

2 2 4-L Same as 1.5.2

1.5.4 XV 2014 fails closed

Sampling procedures of the

cooling water. Other

treatment procedures.

Same as 1.5.3 2 2 4-L Same as 1.5.2

1.5.5 XV 2013 fails closed Same as 1.5.4 Same as 1.5.3 2 2 4-L Same as 1.5.2

1.5.6 XV 2012 fails closed Same as 1.5.4 Same as 1.5.3 2 2 4-L Same as 1.5.2

1.6.1 HIGH LV 2004 fails open

LI 2010, high level alarm,

Bypass system with a block

valve, FI 2005

Increase in the flow of

filtered water causing

potencial spill of this

water in the cooling tower

basin. Risk to the

employees and

environmental damage.

2 2 4-L


safeguards and check the parameters

to avoid the spill of water.

1.7.1 Content of acid in the

cooling water system Sampling procedures.

Increase in the pH causing

toxic environment in the

cooling water. Possible

corrosion in the

equipment. Risk to the

employees.

3 2 6-M

Periodic realization of sampling

procedures and constantly measure

of ph.

1.7.2 Leak of hydrocarbon

AI 2003, interlock UC 31, AIC

2026, AI 2027, Additive to

maintain equipment

integrity, sampling

procedures.


in the cooling water

system. Possible fire and

employees injury.

4 3 12-SInstall a measuring element level low

(LEL) in the cooling system

1.7.3 Leak in the reactor AI 1050, AI 1912, AI 2028,, AI

2003


and acid in the cooling

water system causing

corrosion. Potential fire in

the section and

employees injuries.

3 2 6-M Maintenance to the reactor and

monitoring of the fluoride analyzer.

1.8.1 HIGH Considered but nothing


1COOLING TOWER CT-

401

LESS

COMPOSITION (WATER

PURITY)

LESS




LEVEL

139

Annex 6 Application of HAZOP methodology to Isostripper section


1.1.1 LESS

Temperature of inlet

streams from of the

reaction system is cooler


TI 1927; PI 1069Possible fails in the V-02

causing bad separtion 1 4 4-L

Install a Temperature Indicator (TI) in

each inlet streams to check and

maintain the operation temperature

1.2.1 HIGH


streams from of the

reaction system is hotter


Same as 1.1.1

The exit the heavy hydrocarbon

for the top of the D-05

Pump cavitation

1 4 4-L Same as 1.1.1

1.3.1PIC 1921 fails closed the PV

1921 valve

PI 1922; Bypass System

LBCF09

Trawl the acid to isostripper

section

Vaporization of light

hydrocarbons causing

instability in the reaction

section

Low suction pressure at the

pumps P-03A/B

Pumping instability

Decreasing the inlet flow of

lateral isobutane from of the

isostripper tower

3 3 9-M

Maintenance of the D-05 to avoid

equipment damage

Install a Pressure Indicator in the tank

to control better the pressure of the

D-05 Monitoring

of the pressure controller to avoid

fails in the operation

1.3.2

PSV 1923 fails opened

located in the top of the D-

05

GBCF22 Manual valve

located before of the

PSV 1923; GFCS05

Manual valve

Same as 1.3.1 3 3 9-M


equipment damage



D-05

Monitoring and maintenance of the

PSV 1923 valve to prevent that failed

open

1.4.1

PSV 1923 fails closed

located in the top of the D-

05

GFCS05 Manual valve;

LFCS05 Manual valve

Overpressure in the reactors

E28/28A and Drum D-04

The flow of hydrocarbon could

return to the reaction section

2 3 6-M


equipment damage



D-05


PSV 1923 valve to prevent that failed

closed

1.4.2

Increase of temperature in

the tank due to that stream

come more hotter than

normal

Same as 1.1.1 Same as 1.4.1 2 4 8-M


equipment damage



D-05

1.4.3PIC 1921 fails opened the

PV 1921 valveSame as 1.3.1

Same as 1.4.1 Increasing

the inlet flow of lateral

isobutane from of the

isostripper tower

2 3 6-M Same as 1.3.1

ISOSTRIPPER SURGE

DRUM D-051



Process: The objective is the separation of the various fractions generated in the reaction section Study Section: Isostripper

TEMPERATURE

LESS

HIGH

PRESSURE

140


1.5.1PIC 1921 fails closed the PV

1921 valve

Bypass LBCF09 located

in the inlet pipe of the

top of the D-05; PI 1922

increasing the inlet flow of

lateral isobutane from of the

isostripper tower

2 2 4-LMonitoring constantly of the PIC 1921

controller to prevent fails operating

1.5.2LIC 1924 or FIC 1933 fails

opened the FV 1933 valve

GBCF22 Manual valve

located before of the

FV 1933

Operation problems in the

isostripper section causing bad

separation

1 3 3-L

Install a Flow Indicator (FI) in the

inlet of the isostripper to show

correct flow for a good operation

1.5.3FIC 1932 fails closed the FV

1932 valve

Bypass LBCF09 located

in the reflux pipe of

the D-05

Same as 1.5.2 1 2 2-LMonitoring constantly of the FIC 1932

controller to prevent fails operating

1.5.4 XV 2461 fails closed PI 1069Same as 1.5.2

Same as 1.5.13 2 6-M

Maintenance of the valve to avoid a

decreasing in the level of the D-05

Install a Bypass system to maintain

the flow to the D-05

1.5.5

Tamponade of the inlet

pipe in the top due to

accumulation of the

contaminants

PIC 1921; PI1922Same as 1.5.1

Overpressure in the tank 3 3 9-M

Maintenance of the pipe to avoid

rupture of the pipe due to the

overpressure and an incident

1.5.6

Tamponade of the inlet

pipe in the bottom of the D-

05

TI 1927 Same as 1.5.5 3 2 6-M Same as 1.5.6

1.5.7Rupture in the inlet pipe of

the bottom of the D-05PI 1069


Air pollution

Injuries to the employees

Equipment damage

Economic losses

5 3 15-S Same as 1.5.6

1.6.1PIC 1921 fails opened the

PV 1921 valve Same as 1.3.1

Instability in the control of the

pressure in the reaction section

Trawl of liquid hydrocarbon to

the Blowdown system

Pump gavitation

Operation problems in the

isostripper section

3 3 9-M Same as 1.5.1

1.6.2LIC 1924 or FIC 1933 fails

closed the FV 1933 valve

Bypass system LBCF09

located after of the FE

1933

Same as 1.6.1 2 3 6-M Same as 1.5.2

1.6.3FIC 1932 fails opened the FV

1932 valve

GBCF 22 Manual valve

located after of the FV

1932 valve

Same as 1.6.1 3 3 9-M Same as 1.5.3

1.6.4 XV 2461 fails opened Same as 1.5.7 Same as 1.6.1 3 2 6-M Same as 1.5.4

1.6.5 XV 1928/1930 fails closed

TI 1927; GBCF 22

Manual valve located

before of the TI 1927

Same as 1.6.1

Damage to the pump3 1 3-L

Maintenance of the valve to avoid a

increasing in the level of the D-05

1.6.6Tamponade in the exit pipe

of the D-05TI 1927 Same as 1.6.5 3 2 6-M Same as 1.5.5


1ISOSTRIPPER SURGE

DRUM D-05


LESS

HIGH



LEVEL

141


2.1.1


stream is cooler than

normal (<160° F)

TI 1562; TI 1563

Light leakage at the bottom

Alkylate pollution with HF

Increase the reflux flow in the

bottom

Greater energy supplied to the

column

Economic losses

3 3 9-M

Increase the flow in the E-11/11 A ,

the reboiler E-12 and the furnace H-

01

Decrease the reflux in the top

2.1.2 Increase of reflux in the topFIC 2319; XV 2317; LIC

1094

Presence of hydrocarburs and

alkylate in the top of the

column

Contamination of HF stream

2 3 6-M

Increase the reflux in the bottoms

and decrease the flow in the inlet of

the column

2.1.3Decrease of reflux in the

bottom

FIC 1499A; FIC 1500A;

FIC1501A; FIC 1502A;

PDIC 1107; XV2519

Same as 2.1.2 2 2 4-L


Decrease the flow in the inlet stream

Increase the fuel in the furnace and

reboiler

2.1.4

Decrease in the

temperature stream from

reboiler

TI 1565/ 1571

Vaporization and inefficient

separation

Increasse in the mount of

isobutene, propene and acid in

the bottom stream

Increase of the corrosion in

other section of the plant

3 2 6-MIncrease the reflux in the furnace


2.1.5

Decrease in the

temperature stream from

furnace

TI1106A-D; FIC1666;

PIC1662 A/B; PDIC1107Same as 2.1.4 3 1 3-L

Increase the temperature in the

reboiler Decrease the

reflux in the botoms

2.1.6Decrease in the inlet flow at

column FIC 1933; FIC1932

Operational problems at V-02

(Isostripper)

Prescence of HF in the botom

Corrosion in other section of

the plant

2 3 6-MDecrease the reflux in the top and

botoms

2.1.7XV 2519 Fails closed due to

malfunctions Vent System SIS UC14



Increase the flow through

furneace

Possible flood on the plates of

the column

3 3 9-MActivate vent system to open the

valve

2.1.8

FIC 2100 fails opened due to

malfunctions

FI 2100 with bypass

system LWCS01 with


and after GBCSF01

Escape alkylate

Reduced flow within the

column

3 2 6-M

Install a manual valve before that FIC

to control and prevent possibles

overpressures and desviations

2.1.9TIC 1091 fails sending less

vapor

TI 1099; PSV 1361 with



GBCF13

Same as 2.1.4 2 4 8-M

Install a temperature alarm indicator

to avoid desviations and operational

inestabilities

ISOSTRIPPER TOWER V-02 TEMPERATURE 2




LESS

142


2.2.1


stream is hot than normal

(>160°F)

TI 1562; TI 1563

Increase in the amount of

normal butane and alkylate

exiting the tower side draw

Low purity recycle isobutane

Possible activation of the

cutting system for high

temperature furnace

2 2 4-LDecrease the flow in the E-11/11A , In

the top and the bottoms

2.2.2Decrease of reflux in the

topFIC 2319; XV 2317

Presence of acid in the bottoms

Posible pollution in the outside

streams at bottoms

Possible corrosion in other

section of the plan

3 2 6-M

Decrease the reflux in the bottoms

Decrease the flow in the inlet of the

column

2.2.3Increase of reflux in the

bottom

FIC 1499A; FIC 1500A;


PDIC 1107; XV2519

Presence of butane and

alkylate in the top of the

column. Low

purity recycle isobutane

More energy from furnace,

economic losses

1 4 4-LIncrease the reflux in the top and

increase the flow at inlet stream

2.2.4Increase in the temperature

sream from reboiler TI 1565/ 1571

Same as 2.2.2

Economic losses for fuel and

contamination of the alkylate

3 3 9-MIncrease the reflux in the top and

decrease the reflux in the furnace

2.2.5Increase in the temperature

stream from furnace

TI1106A-D; FIC1666;

PIC1662 A/B; PDIC1107Same as 2.2.4 3 2 6-M

Decrease the steam flow from

reboiler and increase the flow in the

top

2.2.6Increase in the inlet flow at

column FIC 1933; FIC1932

Possible increase in the level

of D-05

Operational problems in the V-

02 for low flow

Presence of HF in the bottom

Possible corrosion in other

section of the plant

4 2 8-M

Increase the flow in the furnace and

more steam from reboiler is

requaried

2.2.7Isobutane leaking on the

top sideDrum sidestream D-07

Presence of HF in the bottom

Economic losses1 1 1-L Decrease the reflux from furnace

2.2.8 FIC 2100 fails closed FI 2100



Increase in the reflux flow

Air pollution Risk

injures to employees

Economic losses

3 2 6-MInstall a bypass system

Decrease the inlet flow to column

2.2.9 Rupture in the inlet stream TI 1563; FIC 1933; FIC

1932

Air pollution


Instability in the distillation

process

5 2 10-MInstall an flow indicator alarm in the

inlet

2.2.10Leak in the inlet stream

pipeline Same as 2.2.9 Same as 2.2.9 5 2 10-M Same as 2.2.9

TEMPERATURE ISOSTRIPPER TOWER V-022




HIGH

143


2.3.1Decrease in the steam from

reboilerTI 1565/ 1571

Decrease in the temperature inside the

column. Tower overpressure

isostripper V-02. Decreased

vaporization column, leading to lighter

composition in the tower. A decrease

in the removal of HF acid and propane

by increasing the concentration of

pollutants in the alkylate of funds

3 3 9-MIncrease the reflux in the furnace and

maintance the reflux in the top

2.3.2Decrease the reflux in the

bottoms

FIC 1499A; FIC 1500A;


PDIC 1107; XV2519

Same as 2.3.1. HF pollution in the

bottoms. Posible corrosion in other

section of the plant. Tower flooding

3 2 6-M

Increase the steam flow from

reboiler

Decrease the flow in the column

2.3.3

PDI 1092 fails generating

that more flow enter in the

column

PI 1336; TI 1097; LIC

1094

Same as 2.2.7 Tower

flooding 1 3 3-L

Constant monitoring to the lopp

control to avoid possibles errors or

desviations

2.3.4TIC 1091 fails sending less

steam

PI 1336; TI 1097; LIC

1094Same as 2.3.2 3 3 9-M

Install an pressure alarm indicator in

the steam line

2.3.5FIC 2319 fails closed due to

malfunctionsFI 2100


Presence of alkylate and isobutane in

the top of the column. Air pollution.

Risk injures to empoyees

3 3 9-MInstall a bypass system to avoid that

ruptures due to overpressure

2.3.6Inecrease the flow in the

inlet at column FIC 1933; FIC1932

Possible increase in the level of D-05

Operational problems in the V-02 for

low flow. Presence of HF in the bottom

Possible corrosion in other section of

the plant

3 3 9-M

Increase the reflux in the top and the

bottoms

More extraction in the isobutane

stream

2.4.1Increase of the steam from

reboilerTI 1565/ 1571

Increase in the vaporization

Presence of more hydrocarburs in the

column. Presence of butane in the top

of the column. Decrease in the quality

of recirculation isobutane

2 3 6-M

Decrease the reflux from furnace to

stabilize the temperature and

pressure in the stripper

Increase the reflux in the top

2.4.2Increase the reflux in the

bottoms

FIC 1499A; FIC 1500A;


PDIC 1107; XV2519

Same as 2.4.1 2 1 2-L

Increase the reflux in the top to

stabilize the worked profile

Decrease the flow in the column to

stabilize the flow

2.4.3

PDI 1092 fails generating

that less flow enter in the

column

PI 1336; TI 1097; LIC

1094Same as 2.4.1. Alkylate pollution 2 3 6-M Same as 2.3.3

2.4.4TIC 1091 fails sending more

vapor

PI 1336; TI 1097; LIC

1094Same as 2.4.1. Tower flooding 3 3 9-M

Constant monitoring to the lopp

control to avoid possibles errors or

desviations

2.4.5 FIC 2319 fails opened FI 2319 Same as 2.4.1. Economic losses 2 3 6-MInstall a flow alarm indicator to

control the flow in the stream

ISOSTRIPPER TOWER V-022




LESS

HIGH

PRESSURE

144


2.5.1FIC 1933 or LIC 1924 fails

closed the FV 1933 valve

Bypass System LBCF09;

LIC 1094

Operation problems in the isostripper

causing a separation poor of the light

hydrocarbon and heavy hydrocarbon

Increasing of the Temperature in the

tower. Accumulation of the acid in the

bottom of the tower. Decreasing of the

quality of the end product

3 2 6-M Same as 1.5.2

2.5.2Rupture in the pipe of the

Heat Exchanger E-04A/B

PI 1578/1579; TI

1588/1591

Same as 2.5.1

Contamination of heating streams

causing problems in the next

equipments

4 2 8-M

Maintenance of the heat exchanger

to prevent rupture of some pipes

and contamination of the other

streams of the process

2.5.3The XV 2317 valve fails

closed due to malfunctionsVent System SIS UC14

Same as 2.5.1. Increase of level in the D-

12. Pump gavitation and mechanics

damage

3 4 12-S

Maintenance of the valve to maintain

the flow in the isostripper and no

have operation problems

2.5.4

FIC 2319 fails closed the FV

2319 valve due to

malfunctions

Bypass System LBCF09;

FE 2319; LIC 1094Same as 2.5.3 3 2 6-M

Install a Flow Indicator Alarm in the

reflux inlet in case of have a

problems before the FV 2319 valve

2.5.5

LIC 1094 fails opened the FV

2100 valve due to

malfunctions

XV 2519; FIC 2100

Operation problems in the isostripper

causing a separation poor of the light

hydrocarbon and heavy hydrocarbon

Increasing of the Temperature in the

tower. Trawl of heavy hydrocarbon to

the top of the tower

3 2 6-M Same as 2.5.3

2.6.1FIC 1933 or LIC 1924 fails

opened the FV 1933 valve

LIC 1094; XV 2519; Vent

System SIS UC14; PSV

1361 with manual

valves before and after

relief systemGBCF13

Possible inundation in the tower

Decreasing in the temperature of the

tower causing operation problems

Trawl light hydrocarbon in the bottom

of the tower. Decreasing of the quality

of the end product. Decreasing of the

efficiency in the distillation

3 2 6-M Same as 1.5.2

2.6.2

FIC 2319 fails opened the FV

2319 valve due to

malfunctions

FE 2319; LIC 1094 Same as 2.6.1 3 2 6-M Same as 2.5.4

2.6.3

LIC 1094 fails closed the FV

2100 valve due to

malfunctions

XV 2519; FIC 2100

Same as 2.6.1

Problems in the reboiler and the

Debutanizacion and Alkylate treat

sections

3 2 6-M

Maintenance and monitoring of the

valve to maintain the flow in the

isostripper and no have operation

problems in the process

2.6.4

Problems in the reboiler

causing decreasing the

temperature in the tower

TI1571/1565/1106A-

D/1099; TIC 1091

Possible inundation in the tower

Trawl light hydrocarbon in the bottom

of the tower. Decreasing of the quality

of the end product. Decreasing of the

efficiency in the distillation

3 2 6-M

Monitoring of the reboiler to

maintain the temperature in the

tower

2.7.1 NO Same as Less Same as Less Same as Less Same as less

ISOSTRIPPER TOWER V-022




LESS

LEVEL

HIGH

145


3.1.1


streams is cooler than

normal (<100°F) due a

problems operational in the

heat exchangers E-18 A/B

TI2316; PI 2307; PI 2305Problems of decantation causing trawl

of acid to the isostripper. Bad

separation hydrocarbon/acid

2 2 4-L

Install a Temperature indicator (TI) in

the inlet of the D-12 to control the

temperature Monitoring

of the heat exchanger to verify the

right temperature

3.1.2


tank due to the decreasing

of the inlet flow to the D-12

PI 2307; LIC 2311; TI

2316Same as 3.1.1 2 1 2-L



D-12

3.2.1


streams is hotter than

normal (<100°F) due a

problems operational in the

heat exchangers E-18 A/B

Same as 3.1.1

Pump cavitation. Evaporation of the

hydrocarbon causing decreasing flow

of the reflux inlet in the V-02

2 2 4-L Same as 3.1.1

3.2.2


tank due to the generation

vapor


3.3.1 LESS

The GBCF22 Manual valve

fails opened for the factor

human

PI 2307; LBCF09 Manual

valve located after the

GBCF22 Manual valve

Decrease in the NPSH causing

cavitation in the pump P-07A/B 3 3 9-M

Feedback to employees on good

operating practices

Application of the Behaviour Based

Safety (BBS)

3.4.1

The GBCF22 Manual valve

fails closed for the factor

human

PI 2307

Overpressure in the tank. Possible

incident could causing injuries to the

employees and damage to the

equipments

3 3 9-M Same as 3.3.1


rate of the D-12

TI 1096; PI 1092B;

Controller of the exit

pipe in the top of the V-

03 TI 1625; PI2530

Trawl hydrocarbon to HF Acid

BlowDown. Trawl acid to isostripper 2 1 2-L

Periodic inspection to the inlet pipe

to maintain all the parameters in the

operational range.

3.4.3Tamponade in the

BlowDown pipe Same as 3.1.2 Same as 3.4.1 3 1 3-L

Monitoring the pipe to prevent an

incident and maintain the operation

process

3.5.1

Rupture in any heat

exchanger E-18A-F causing

release of the hydrocarbon

stream

Same as 3.1.2 Same as 3.4.1 2 3 6-MMaintenance of all heat exchangers

to keep a good operation

3.5.2LIC 2311 fails opened the LV

2311 valveFI 2315; FE 2315

Trawl of the hydrocarbon to reaction

section causing problems of operation

in this section. Increase the polymer

formation and contaminants in the

reaction section

4 2 8-M

Monitoring constantly of this

controller to avoid problems in the

reaction section and prevent the

formation of undesirables products

DEPROPANIZER FEED

SETTLER D-123




LESSLEVEL

LESS

TEMPERATURE

HIGH

PRESSURE

HIGH

146


3.5.3 P-07A pump fails

FIC-2319 Isostripper

reflux flow indication;

LI 2314; Pump status P-

07B.

Potential for HF to accumulate in the

top over time and eventually for HF

acid in the Alkylate and downstream.

Loss of Isostripper reflux with potential

for higher temperatures and higher

pressure in the Isostripper overhead.

Reduce the level in D-12 Settler from

reduced condensation of overhead

vapors. Potential for over pressure of

the Isostripper leading to flange leaks

and loss of vessel containment leading

to possible fire and possible personnel

injury.

5 1 5-M

Install a low flow alarm to

FIC-2319 (Isostripper

Reflux)

3.5.4XV-2317 malfunctions

closed

If emergency isolation

valves close the pumps

will

stop; Operator

procedures,


Stopped flow to the P-07A/B pumps

with the potential to cavitate the

pumps or isolate the suction of the

pumps with

potential damage to the seals and a

leak of Hydrocarbons containing HF.

Potential fire and personnel injury.

4 2 8-M Same as 2.5.3

3.5.5 FV-2319 control valve fails

FV-2319 Isostripper

reflux control valve

bypass; Operator

training and

response

Lose flow of Isostripper reflux.

Potential for HF to accumulate in the

top over time and eventually for HF

acid in the Alkylate and downstream.

Potential for increased corrosive

environment overtime which could

result in leaks in process with possible

personnel exposure to HF.

4 2 8-M Same as 2.5.4

3.6.1LIC 2311 fails closed the LV

2311 valve3.5.2

Increasing the acid level in the D-12

Trawl acid to isostripper causing

accumulation the acid in the bottom of

the tower. Increasing of the

equipments corrosion. Trawl

hydrocarbon and acid to BowDown

system. Pump gavitation

4 2 8-M

Same as 3.5.2

Install a Bypass system, if this fails

valve closed

3.6.2XV 2317 fails closed to

factor human

FIC 2319; TI 2316;

Operator procedures,


Same as 3.6.1 4 2 8-M Same as 3.3.1

3.6.3

Tamponade the exit pipe of

the Hydrocarbon of the D-

12

TI 2316; LIC 2311; LI

2314; If emergency

isolation

valves close the pumps

will

stop

Same as 3.6.1

Overpressure in the tank 3 2 6-M

Same as 3.4.3

Install a Pressure Indicator in the exit

pipe of the hydrocarbon to avoid

operational problems

3.6.4Tamponade the exit pipe of

the acid before the valve

FI 2315; LIC 2311; LI

2314

Operational problems in the reaction

section due a decreasing in the flow

Trawl of acid to other sections causing

poor control. Trawl hydrocarbon and

acid to BowDown system

3 3 9-M

Install a Pressure Indicator in the exit

pipe of the acid to avoid tamponade

and maintain the operation process


3




LESS

LEVEL

HIGH

DEPROPANIZER FEED

SETTLER D-12

147

Annex 7 Application of HAZOP methodology to Depropanizer and HF Stripper section


1.1.8Operational problems in the

condenser D-32Same as 1.1.3

Same as 1.1.5

Overpressure in the D-32 and E-

22

4 2 8-M

Monitoring of the D-32 to avoid

problems and maintain the level

adequate to operate the reboiler

1.1.9Decreased heat transfer of the

reboiler E-22Same as 1.1.3

Trawl the light hydrocarbon and

acid to the bottom of the

tower. Contamination the

bottom streams with acid and

propane. Operational problems

in the tower. Flooding in the

tower

4 2 8-M Same as 1.1.8

1.2.1

Temperature of inlet stream of the

V-04 is hotter than normal (>170° F)

due a operational problems in the

heat exchangers E-19 A/C

Same as 1.1.1

Trawl the heavy hydrocarbon to

the top pf the tower. Increasing

the temperature in the tower.

Decreasing of the separation in

each plate. Increasing of the

pressure in the tower

3 2 6-M Same as 1.1.1

1.2.2

FIC 2332 or TIC 2323 fails closed the

FV 2332 valve causing decreasing of

reflux in the top

FE 2332; TI 2321/2320/2333

Same as 1.2.1

Operational problems in the D-

13

Increasing of the consumer in

the steam

4 2 8-M

Install a Temperature Indicator

Alarm in case the temperature is

high and do the right procedures

Increasing the inlet flow of the

tower to maintain the right

temperature in the V-04

1.2.3Increasing of the steam in the


Trawl the vapor to the top of

the tower

Same as 1.2.1


concentration

Isobutane loss

4 2 8-M Same as 1.1.3

1.2.4

Decreasing in the inlet flow in the

tower due to problems operational

in the isostripper tower

Same as 1.1.5 Same as 1.2.1 3 2 6-M

Increasing of the reflux flow to

conserve the level of the tower

and maintain the temperature in

the column

Monitoring of the control of flow

to verify the flow is adequate for

operate the tower

1.2.5FIC 2336 fails opened the FV 2336

valve

FE 2336;TI 2321/2320/2333; GBCF

13 Manual valve located after of

the FV 2336 valve

Low concentration of isobutane

Operational problems in the HF

regeration

Trawl of contaminent in the

stream that inlet for the top of

the HF regeneration

Inenfficiency in the acid

regenerations

4 2 8-M

Monitoring of the FIC 2336 for no

open the valve and to avoid

problems in the inlet flow in the

HF Regeneration Maintenance of

the FV 2336 to maintain the set

point

TEMPERATUREDEPROPANIZER

V-041

LESS

HIGH

HAZOP WORKSHEET - ANNEX 7Project Title: Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid Date: Febrary to June Page 1 of 1

Process: Explains the removal of propane of the Isobutane of recirculation and dispossession the traces of acid present in the light hydrocarbon fractions Study Section: Depropanizer and HF Stripper


148


1.2.6 XV 2492 fails opened Same as 1.1.7

Decreasin the level in te tower

Same as 1.2.1

Operational problems in the

reaction and ALKAD sections

4 2 8-M

Maintenance of the valve to avoid

decreasing the level in the tower

and prevent the operational

problems. Install a Flow Indicator

after the XV 2492 to verify the flow

of inlet of the next sections

1.2.7Increased heat transfer of the

reboiler E-22Same as 1.1.3 Same as 1.2.3 4 2 8-M

Monitoring and maintenance of

the reboiler and verify the inlet

stream of the steam is right

1.2.8

Rupture in the inlet pipe of the

tower due to the corrosion or

overpressure

PI 2365


Air pollution


Equipment damage

Economic losses

Stop in the unit

5 2 10-M


an incident and maintain the

operation of the unit

Install a control loop that work

with a Pressure Indicator which

closes a valve in case of the

rupture of the pipe

1.2.9

Rupture in the reflux pipe of the V-

04 due to the corrosion or

overpressure

FIC 2332; TI 2321/2320/2333 Same as 1.2.8 5 2 10-M Same as 1.2.8

1.2.10

Rupture in the exit pipe of the

tower due to the overpressure or

corrosion

TI 2334; PI 2490; XV 2492 Same as 1.2.8 5 2 10-M Same as 1.2.8


GBCF 14 Manual valve located

before of the PSV 2327; LO

Manual valve located after of

the PSV 2327


Tea system due to increased of

the inlet flow

Increasing of the vaporization

causing trawl the heavy

hydrocarbon to the top of the

tower

3 2 6-M

Monitoring of the PSV 2327 to

avoid less pressure in the tower

and prevent the decreasing of the

isobutane

1.3.2Decreasing of the inlet flow of the

tower Same as 1.1.5 Same as 1.2.1 3 2 6-M

Monitoring of the Flow Indicator

Control to verify the flow is the

right for the operation of the tower

1.3.3 Break in the inlet pipe of the tower Same as 1.2.8


Air pollution


Equipment damage

Economic losses

Stop of the unit

5 2 10-M Same as 1.2.8

1.3.4 Break in the exit pipe of the tower TI2334; FIC 2337; LIC 2334Same as 1.3.3

Stop of the unit 5 2 10-M Same as 1.2.8

DEPROPANIZER

V-041

HIGHTEMPERATURE

PRESSURE




LESS

149


1.4.1 PSV 2327 fails closed


before of the PSV 2327; LBCF 05

Manula valve located after of

the GBCF 13 Manual valve

Overpressure in the tower

Decreasing of the vaporization

causing higher concentration of

the light hydrocarbon in the

tower

3 2 6-M


avoid high pressure in the tower

and prevent the trawl of the

propane and acid in the isobutane

stream

1.4.2Increasing of the inlet flow of the

tower Same as 1.1.5

Flooding in the tower

Same as 1.4.1

Decrease in the removal of

propane Increasing

of concentration of the

contaminant in the isobutane

stripping stream

4 2 8-M Same as 1.1.5

1.4.3

Tamponade in the inlet pipe of the

tower due to the accumulation of

the contaminants

Same as 1.2.8

Same as 1.4.1


isostripper due to that comes

back the flow to the V-02

4 2 8-M Same as 1.2.8

1.4.4

Tamponade in the exit pipe of the


the contaminants

Same as 1.3.4

Same as 1.4.1



4 2 8-M Same as 1.2.8

1.4.5

Tamponade of the lateral pipe of

the tower due to the accumulation

of the contaminants

FIC 2336; FE 2326; LIC 2324; TI

2321

Same as 1.4.1


regeneration due to the less

flow

4 1 4-L Same as 1.2.8

1.5.1Increasing the condensate flow of

the D-32LIC 2488; FIC 2328

Increasing heat transfer in the E-

22 causing a high vaporization

Trawl of isobutane to the top of

the tower

Possible increased of the

pressure in the V-04

Unnecessary use of steam

3 1 3-L


pipe of condensate in case of high

flow the operator apply the good

practices to control the flow

Monitoring of the FIC 2328 for that

no fails the signal to the valve

1.5.2 Decreasing of the level in the D-32 LIC 2488




trawl of steam to the head

condensate

2 2 4-L

Install an Alarm in case the level is

less or high to avoid operational

problems in the D-32, E-22 and in

the tower

1.5.3 XV 2492 fails opened Same as 1.1.7

Bad separation in the

depropanizer tower

Same as 1.2.1



3 2 6-M Same as 1.2.6

PRESSURE

LESSLEVEL

DEPROPANIZER

V-041




HIGH

150


1.5.4



corrosion

Same as 1.3.4


tower Possible fire explosion

Air pollution


Equipment damage

Economic losses

Stop in the unit

5 2 10-M Same as 1.2.8

1.5.5FIC 2318 fails closed the FV 2318

valveTI 2340


tower

Inefficiency in the separation

of propane and acid in the

isobutane stream


isostripper

2 3 6-M

Maintenance of the FIC 2318 to

maintain the good operation in the

depropanizer

Install a Flow Indicator in the inlet

pipe of the V-04 to verify the inlet

flow is adequate for the operation


valveBypass system LBCF09; FE 2332

Same as 1.2.2

Inundation in the D-13

Gavitation pump

3 1 3-L

Increasing the inlet flow of the



Monitoring of the controller to

avoid the operational problems in

the tower and D-13

1.5.7

Rupture in the inlet pipe of the

tower due to the corrosion or

overpressure

PI 2365 Same as 1.5.4 5 2 10-M Same as 1.2.8



Trawl the isobutane in the top

of the tower causing

contamination in the inlet

stream of the D-13


tower

Inefficiency in the separation

of propane and acid in the

isobutane stream

3 2 6-M

Same as 1.1.8

Install a Flow Indicator in the

steam pipe to show the flow to

heat the hydrocarbon

1.6.1Decreasing the condensate flow of

the D-32Same as 1.5.1

Decreasing heat transfer in the

E-22 causing a less vaporization

Decreasing of the efficiency to

remove the propane and HF in

the isobutane stream

2 1 2-L Same as 1.5.1

1.6.2 Increasin the level of the D-32 Same as 1.5.2




22

3 2 6-M Same as 1.5.2

1.6.3 XV 2492 fails closed LIC 2324 Same as 1.1.7 2 2 4-L Same as 1.1.7

LEVEL

LESS

HIGH

DEPROPANIZER

V-041




151



valveSame as 1.5.5

Decreasing the temperature in

the tower causing bad

separation


isostripper sections

Flooding in the tower

3 3 9-M Same as 1.5.5


valve


after of the FV 2332 valve; LIC

2324; TI 2320/2333/2321


stripper and D-13

Possible presence of acid in the

Flushing system

Increasing the concentration of

propane and acid of the bottom

in the tower

3 2 6-M

Decreasing the inlet flow of the




avoid the operational problems in

the tower, D-13 and reaction

section

1.6.6

Tamponade in the exit pipe of the


the contaminants



reboiler E-22Same as 1.1.3 Same as 1.1.9 4 2 8-M Same as 1.1.8

1.6.8

Tamponade of the lateral pipe of

the tower due to the accumulation

of the contaminants

Same 1.4.5 Same as 1.4.5 4 1 4-L Same as 1.2.8


2.1.1Increasing of the cooling water in

the E-21 A/BTI 2353

Decrease of the separation

time between of propane and

acid

Contamination of the stream

that come to the reaction

section causing problems

operational

3 3 9-M

Constantly monitoring to the

cooling water to avoid problems in

the E-21A/B

2.1.2

Rupture in the inlet line of the

cooling water due to the

overpressure

PI 2359; TI 2353


Equipment damage

Economic losses

Stop in the unit

3 2 6-M

Maintenance of the line to avoid

an incident in the unit or stop or

the unit. Install a Flow Indicator in

the inlet pipe to show the flow is

the necessary to condensate the

inlet stream

2.1.3

Tamponade in the pipes of the

heat exchanger E-21A/B due to the

poor maintenance

TI 2353; TI 2359

Decrease of the surface area

Break or leak in the pipes for

overpressure causing

contamination of the stream


13, V-04 and V-05 causing less

efficiency in the process

4 2 8-M

Implement a differential pressure

gauge to work with the input and

output currents for the steam side

Constantly maintenance of the

heat exchanger to maintain

adequate operations in the process

2.1.4Decreasing the flow in the inlet of

the heat exchanger E-21 A/BFIC 2318; TI 2362; TI 2340

Decreasing the temperature of

the inlet stream of the D-13

Same as 2.1.1

3 3 9-M

Install a Flow Indicator Control to

work in loop with an Flow Indicator

in the cooling pipe to maintain the

temperature the inlet stream of

the D-13

LEVELDEPROPANIZER

V-041

TEMPERATUREDEPROPANIZER

RECEIVER D-132

HIGH

LESS




152


2.2.1Decreasing of the cooling water in

the E-21 A/BSame as 2.1.1

Bad separation of the propane

and acid in the D-13

Increasing the vapor in the D-13

causing high pressure


next section due to the high

temperature of the stream

3 3 9-M Same as 2.1.1

2.2.2Tamponade in the inlet line of the

cooling water Same as 2.1.2

Decreasing of the heat transfer

in the heat exchanger due that

the cooling pipe is blocked

Increasing the vapor in the D-

13, sending the vapor to the

depropanizer and the reaction

section causing operational

problems decreasing the

efficiency the process

3 2 6-M

Same as 2.1.2

Install a Pressure Indicator in the

inlet pipe of the cooling water to

avoid problems in the process

2.2.3Increasing the flow in the inlet of

the heat exchanger E-21 A/BSame as 2.1.4

Same as 2.2.1

Bad condensation of the vapor

stream

3 3 9-M Same as 2.1.4

2.3.1PIC 2350 fails opened the PV 2350

valve PI 2547/2357

Decrease in the NPSH causing

cavitation in the pump P-08A/B


13

2 1 2-L

Maintenance of the controller and

valve to avoid the propane steam

come back to the V-04

2.3.2

Decreasing the inlet flow in the D-1

due to the operationla problems in

the V-04 or V-05

PI 2351; PIC 2350; PI 2547; TI 2359 Same as 2.3.1 2 2 4-L

Install a Flow Indicator in each inlet

pipe of the D-13 to control the

operations in this tank

2.4.1PIC 2350 fails closed the PV 2350

valve

PI 2547/2357; Bypass system

LBCF09


Decreasing the liquid in the

tank causing trawl of vapor in

the next sections

Mechanic damage in the pump

P-08A/B

3 2 6-M

Monitoring of the controller and

valve to avoid operational

problems in the tank

2.4.2

Tamponade in the BlowDown pipe


contaminants

PI2537


causing possible explosion


due to the mixed of the acid in

the propane stream

4 2 8-M

Maintenance of the pipe to

prevent an incident in case of an

overpressure in the pipe causing a

rupture

2.4.3

Increasing the inlet flow in the D-

13 due to the operationla

problems in the V-04 or V-05

Same as 2.3.2


causing possible explosion

Mechanic damage in the pump

P-08A/B

3 2 6-M Same as 2.3.2

TEMPERATURE

DEPROPANIZER

RECEIVER D-132

HIGH

LESS

HIGH




PRESSURE

153


2.5.1PIC 2350 fail closed the PV 2350

valveBypass system, PI 2547

Mechanic damage of the pump

and cavitation


04 and V-05 towers

Trawl of propane to the

reaction section

2 1 2-L

Review constantly of the controller

to avoid bad signal to the control

room and valve

2.5.2Decreasing of the temperature in

the V-04 tower causing less vapor TI 2320/ 2321 / 2333


P-08A/B and cavitation

Decreasing of the reflux

causing high temperature in


Inefficiency of the separation

in the depropanizer

Flooding in the V-04 tower


05 tower

Unnecessary use of cooling

water

3 1 3-L

Control of the process in the

depropanizer to avoid a decreasing

in the temperature and prevents

possible damage in the next

equipments

2.5.3Rupture in the inlet pipe of the D-

13 due to the overpressure PI 2547; TI 2359


Air pollution


Equipment damage

Economic losses

Stop of the unit

5 2 10-M Same as 1.2.8

2.5.4Decreasing the cooling water

causing less condensation TI 2353 / 2359


Increasing of hydrocarbon

vapor inside the tank, causing

trawl of the vapor to the

depropanizer, HF stripper and

reaction section


P-08A/B and cavitation

3 2 6-M

Monitoring of the cooling system

to prevent problem in the

operational process

Install a Flow indicator to work in a

loop with the Temperature

indicator in the inlet of the first

heat exchanger to maintain the

temperature in the D-13

2.5.5LIC 2355 fails opened the LV 2335

valve LIC 2358

Trawl of the hydrocarbon to the

reaction section causing

operational problems and less

production of alkylate

4 2 8-M Same as 2.5.1

2.5.6

LIC 2358 fail send a bad signal to

the control room and produce

opening the FV 1145 valveLIC 2355

Trawl of hydrocarbon to the HF

stripper causing bad separation

and high formation of the

polymer and contaminant

4 2 8-M Same as 2.5.1

2.5.7Rupture in the acid pipe due to the

corrosion LIC 2355; LIC 2358

High air pollution


Equipment damage

Economic losses

Stop of the unit

5 2 10-M

Maintenance constantly of the

pipe to avoid an catastrophic

incident in the plant and prevent

injuries to the nearest town of the

plant

2.5.8Rupture in the propane pipe due to

the overpressure or corrosion XV 2335; FIC 2332 Same as 2.5.3 5 2 10-M Same as 1.2.8

LEVEL DEPROPANIZER

RECEIVER D-132 LESS




154


2.6.1PIC 2350 fail opened the PV 2350

valvePI 2547

Possible overpressure in the D-

13 and V-04

Trawl of the liquid to the HF

acid BlowDown

Possible trawl of acid to the

depropanizer and HF srtipper

Increasing of the corrosion in

the line and equipments

4 2 8-M Same as 2.5.1

2.6.2Increasing of the temperature in

the V-04 causing high vapor Same as 2.5.2 Same as 2.6.1 4 1 4-L

Control of the temperature of the

process in the depropanizer to

avoid possible damage in the next

equipments and operational

problems

2.6.3LIC 2355 fails closed the LV 2335

valve same as 2.5.5

Same as 2.6.1


reaction section

4 2 8-M Same as 2.5.1

2.6.4Increasing the cooling water

causing high condensation same as 2.5.4

Increasing in the presence of

propane and HF in the bottom

of the isobutane stream

Possible presence of the acid in

the flushing system

Increasing of the reflux causing

decreasing in the temperature

in the tower


3 2 6-M Same as 2.5.4

2.6.5

LIC 2358 fail send a bad signal to

the control room and produce

closing the FV 1145 valve

Same as 2.5.6


stripper

Same as 2.6.4

Cavitation in the pumps P-

08A/B

4 2 8-M Same as 2.5.1

2.6.7Increasing of the stream from to

the top of HF stripperFI 1148; TI 1149 Same as 2.6.1 4 2 8-M

Control of the process in the HF

stripper to avoid operational

problems in the V-04 and D-13


3.1.1 TEMPERATUREConsidered but nothing significant

identified

3.2.1 LESSDecreasing of the suspended solids

in the filter PDI 2345

It does not represent any

damage1 1 1-L

Constantly monitoring of the filter

to maintain the operation

3.3.1 HIGHIncreasing of the suspended solids

in the filter Same as 3.2.1


flushing system

Increasing of contaminant in

the isobutane stream

2 1 2-L


process in the V-04 tower to avoid

that the isobutane stream come

with contaminant

3.4.1 LEVELConsidered but nothing significant

identified

LEVEL DEPROPANIZER

RECEIVER D-132

HIGH




3ISOBUTANE FLUSH

FILTER S-04A/BPRESSURE

155


4.1.1Temperature of inlet stream of the

V-05 is cooler than normal TI 1582

Decreasing of the efficiency of

the separation


propane stream

Corrosion of the next

equipments

4 2 8-M

Monitoring of the process in the

depropanizer to maintain the good

operation in the V-05

Install a Temperature Indicator in

the inlet of the tower to show the

right temperature of the inlet

stream

4.1.2FIC 1145 or LIC 2358 fails opened

the FV 2332 valve FE 1145

Trawl of acid in the porpane

stream. Flooding in the tower

Corrosion of the next

equipments

3 2 6-M

Increasing of the steam in the

reboiler to maintain of the

operating temperature in the

tower

Same as 2.5.1

4.1.3Fail or rupture in the E-22 causing

less temperature in the towerFIC 1520; TI 1582


inside the tower

Stop of the unit

contamination in the vapor

stream

3 1 3-LMaintenance of the reboiler to

prevent rupture of the pipes

4.1.4Decreasing of the steam in the

reboiler E-23TI 2526; PI 2525

Increasing the level in the V-05

tower. Flooding in the tower

Same as 4.1.1

4 2 8-M Same as 1.1.3

4.1.5Operational problems in the

condenser D-32LIC 1522; PI 2529

Decreasing of the separation

Inefficiency in the process of

the tower

Operational problem in the

reboiler

2 1 2-L

Maintenance constant to the

condenser to avoid problem in the

reboiler E-23


reboiler E-23PI 2525; TI 2526


Bad separation of the HF acid

Contamination of the propane

stream with acid

3 1 3-L

Monitoring of the D-33 to avoid

problems and maintain the level

adequate to operate the reboiler E-

23

4.2.1Temperature of inlet stream of the

V-05 is hotter than normal Same as 4.1.1

Unncessary use of the steam

Trawl of propane to the top of

the tower causing operational


Contamination of the vapor

stream

3 2 6-M Same as 4.1.1

4.2.2FIC 1145 or LIC 2358 fails closed the

FV 2332 valve

Bypass system LBCF09 located in

the inlet pipe of the V-05; FE

1145


04 and D-13 due to increasing of

the flow

Decreasing of the propane

stream to the exit of the V-05

tower Trawl of

propane to the top of the tower

3 1 3-L Same as 2.5.1

TEMPERATUREHF STRIPPER V-054

HIGH




LESS

156


4.2.3Increasing of the steam in the

reboiler E-23TI 1582; TI 2526; PI 2525


the tower causing operational


Economic losses

3 1 3-L Same as 1.1.3




the tower

Decreasing of the separation in

each plate

Increasing of the pressure in

the tower


concentration

Propane loss

4 1 4-L

Maintenance of the reboiler to

avoid high temperature inside the

tower and prevent loss of propane

4.2.5Rupture in the inlet pipe of the

tower due to the corrosion FIC 1145; FE 1145


High air pollution


Equipment damage

Economic losses

Stop in the unit

5 2 10-M

Maintenance and monitoring of

the pipe to avoid a relief of acid

and prevent a catastrophic incident

4.2.6



corrosion

TI 2371; LIC 1152; TI 1582 Same as 4.2.5 5 1 5-M Same as 4.2.5



before of the PSV 1155; GACF 16

Manual valve located after of

the PSV 1155

Increasing of the vaporization

in the tower

Trawl excessive of propane to


3 1 3-L


avoid less pressure in the tower

and prevent the decreasing of the

propane

4.3.2PIC 1150 fails opened the PV 1150

valveFI 1148; TI 1149

Same as 4.3.1


13 due to increasing the flow

3 1 3-L

Monitoring constant of the

controller to avoid problems in the

process of the V-05

4.3.3 Break in the inlet pipe of the tower FIC 1145 Same as 4.2.5 5 2 10-M Same as 1.2.8

4.3.4 Break in the exit pipe of the tower Same as 4.2.6 Same as 4.2.5 5 1 5-M Same as 1.2.8

4.4.1 PSV 1155 fails closed

GFCS04 Manual valve located

before of the PSV 1155; LFCS 04

located after of the GFCS04

Manual valve

Overpressure in the V-05 tower


in the tower

Decreasing in the efficiency in

the removal of acid

3 1 3-L


avoid high pressure in the tower

and prevent contamination of the

propane stream


valve

Bypass system LBCF09; FI 1148;

TI 1149

Same as 4.4.1


13 and V-04 due to decreasing

of the flow

3 1 3-L Same as 4.3.2

4.4.3Tamponade in the top pipe of the

tower FI 1148; TI 1149; PSV 1155

Same as 4.4.2

Rupture of the pipe due to high

pressure

4 1 4-L

Maintenance of the pipe to

prevent an incident and maintain

of the operation in the process

4.4.4Tamponade of the pipe of the HF

acid BlowDown TI 1582; PIC 1150

Same as 4.4.3

High air pollution and injuries

to the employees in case of

rupture of the pipe

5 2 10-M Same as 4.4.4

TEMPERATURE

HF STRIPPER V-054

HIGH




LESS

HIGH

PRESSURE

157


4.5.1

Increased heat transfer of the

reboiler due to increasing the

steam flow

PI 2525; TI 2526

Increasing of the pressure in

the tower


Increasing the vapor inside in

the tower causing a decreasing

of the level

3 1 3-L Same as 4.2.4


valve LIC 1152; Baypass system LBCF09


tower Bad operation

in the reboiler


and overpressure in the V-05

3 1 3-LReview constantly the controller to

prevent falls in the process

4.5.3Increasing the condensate flow of

the D-33LIC 1522; FIC 1520




the tower

Decreasing the propane stream

Possible increased of the

pressure in the V-05


3 2 6-M


pipe of condensate in case of high


practices to control the flow

Monitoring of the LIC 1522 and FIC

1520 for that no fails the signal to

the valve

4.5.4 Decreasing of the level in the D-33 LIC 1522




trawl of steam to the head

condensate

3 2 6-M

Install an Alarm in case the level is

less or high to avoid operational

problems in the D-33, E-23 and in

the v-05 tower

4.5.5Rupture in the exit pipe of the V-05

towerSame as 4.2.6


High air pollution


Equipment damage

Economic losses

Stop in the unit

5 1 5-M

Maintenance constant to the pipe

to avoid rupture due to the

corrosion or overpressure in the

pipe

4.5.6Rupture in the inlet pipe of the V-

05 tower Same as 4.3.3 Same as 4.5.5 5 2 10-M Same as 4.5.5

4.6.1

Decreasing heat transfer of the

reboiler due to decreasing the

steam flow

Same as 4.5.1


causing bad separation of the

acid Flooding

in the V-05 tower


propane stream

3 1 3-L

Install a Flow Indicator in the

steam pipe to show the flow for

the good operation


valve FE 1145 Same as 4.6.1 3 2 6-M Same as 4.5.2

LEVELHF STRIPPER V-054

HIGH




LESS

158


4.6.3Decreasing the condensate flow of

the D-33Same as 4.5.3





propane stream

3 2 6-M


pipe of condensate in case of less


practices to control the operation

4.6.4 Increasing of the level in the D-33 Same as 4.5.4




23

2 2 4-L Same as 4.5.4

4.6.5Tamponade in the exit pipe of the

V-05 towerTI 2371


treatment of propane and

reaction section


the tower

3 3 9-M


problems in the V-05 and the next

section


valveSame as 4.4.2

Overpressure in the V-05 tower

Trawl of the vapor to the inlet

pipe causing operational

problems in the depropanizer

and D-13

3 1 3-L Same as 4.3.2

LIC 1152 fails closed the LV 1152

valveBypass system LWCS07


treatment propane

Increasing the flow to the

propane flush filters

2 1 2-L

Maintenance of the controller to

prevent operational problems in

the process Install a

Flow Indicator in the propane pipe

to show the inlet flow of the

treatment of propane


5.1.1 TEMPERATUREConsidered but nothing significant

identified

5.2.1 LESSDecreasing of the suspended solids

in the filter PDI 2384 Same as 3.2.1 1 1 1-L Same as 3.2.1

5.3.1 HIGHIncreasing of the suspended solids

in the filter Same as 5.2.1


flushing system

Increasing of contaminant in

the propane stream

2 1 2-L


process in the V-05 tower to avoid

that the propane stream come with

contaminant

5.4.1 LEVELConsidered but nothing significant

identified

LEVELHF STRIPPER V-054HIGH




5PROPANE FLUSH

FILTER S-06A/BPRESSURE

159

Annex 8 Application of HAZOP methodology to Propane Treatment section


1.1.1

The inlet stream of the E-25

is more cooler than normal

due to operational

problems in the heat

exchanger E-26

TI 2441 / 2443 / 2439; PI 2440 /

2442 / 2438

More use of steam


propane alumina treaters

3 1 3-L

Review constant of the operation

in the HF stripper to avoid

problems in the remove of the

organic fluorides

1.1.2

Decreasing of the steam

flow in the Heat Exchanger

E-25

FIC 2393; TI 2433; PI 2432

Inefficiency in the remove of

the organic fluorides



3 1 3-L

Monitoring of the steam system to

maintain the steam in good

condition for to operation

1.1.3Increasing the level in the

Condensate D-29LIC 2394; PI 2396

Decreasing the transfer heat

in the E-25

Overpressure in the

condensate D-29 and Heat

exchanger E-25

2 2 4-L

Review of the steam flow to

maintain the transfer heat in the E-

25

Monitoring of the LIC 2394 to avoid


1.1.4FIC 2393 fails closed the FV

2393 valve

Bypass system LWCS02; TI

2433; PI 2432

Trawl the propane liquid to

the propane alumina treaters

causing operational problems

in those equipments

Decreasing of the level in the

condensate D-29

4 1 4-L


steam pipe in case the valve fails

closed to avoid problems in the



prevent fails in the process

1.1.5

TE 2400 send a bad signal to

the TT 2400 closing the FV

2393 valve


1.1.6LIC 2394 fails closed the LV

2394 valve

Bypass system LWCS02 located

in the exit pipe of the D-29Same as 1.1.3 2 1 2-L

Monitoring of the LIC 2394 to avoid


and LV 2394 valve

1.1.7More inlet flow in the heat

exchanger E-26

PI 2436; TW 2437; PI 2442; TI

2443; PI 2440; TI 2441

Possible trawl the propane

liquid to the propane

alumina treaters causing

operational problems in

those equipments

Inefficiency in the remove of

the organic fluorides

3 1 3-L

Install a Pressure Indicator Control

in the inlet pipe of the heat

exchanger E-26 to maintain the

good operation in the treatment of

propane

1.1.8 Rupture in the steam pipe PI 2432; TI 2433Damage to the equipments

Injury to the employees 4 2 8-M


problems in the process of

treatment of propane



Process: Explain the process of conditioning and removal of contaminant of the product propane Study Section: Propane treatment

TEMPERATURE1PROPANE EXCHANGER

E-25 LESS

160


1.2.1

The inlet stream of the E-25

is more hotter than normal

due to operational

problems in the heat

exchanger E-26

Same as 1.1.1


Damage in the propane

alumina treaters

4 1 4-L Same as 1.1.1

1.2.2

Increasing of the steam

flow in the Heat Exchanger

E-25

Same as 1.1.2


alumina treaters

Economic losses due to the

unnecessary use of the steam

3 1 3-L

Same as 1.1.2

Monitoring of the FIC 2393 to avoid

that this controller send bad signal

to the control room

1.2.3FIC 2393 fails opened the FV

2393 valve

TI 2433; PI 2432; GWCS 02

Manual valve located after the

PV 2993 valve

Same as 1.2.2 3 2 6-M


steam pipe in case increased of

steam flow to avoid problems in


Monitoring of the FIC 2393 to

prevent that send bad signal to the

FV 2393 valve

1.2.4

TE 2400 send a bad signal to

the TT 2400 opened the FV

2393 valve

Same as 1.2.3 Same as 1.2.3 3 2 6-M


prevent that send bad signal to the

FV 2393 valve and avoid that the

valve opened

1.2.5LIC 2394 fails opened the LV

2394 valve

GWCS 02 Manual valve located

after the LV 2394 valve

Trawl of the steam to the

condensate header

Unnecessary use of the

steam

2 2 4-L Same as 1.1.6

1.2.6Less inlet flow in the heat

exchanger E-26Same as 1.1.7 Same as 1.2.3 3 2 6-M Same as 1.1.7

1.2.7Increasing of transfer heat

in the heat exchanger E-26TI 2439; PI 2438


unnecessary use of steam



3 1 3-L


heat exchanger E-26 to prevent

problems in the next equipments

1.3.1Rupture in the pipe of the

heat exchanger E-25TI 2401; TIC 2400

Contamination of the

propane stream



3 2 6-M


E-25 to prevent a rupture of the

pipes and avoid contamination of

the stream

1.3.2

Decreasing of the heat

transfer in the E-26 causing

a less pressure in the E-25

Same as 1.2.7



trawl of the liquid propane to


3 1 3-LReview of the heat exchanger E-26

to prevent fails in the E-25

1.4.1Tamponade of the pipes of

the heat exchanger E-25Same as 1.2.7

Rupture to the pipes causing

contamination of the

propane stream

4 1 4-L Same as 1.3.1



a less pressure in the E-25

Same as 1.2.7

Increasing of the heat


damage in the treaters of

propane

3 1 3-L Same as 1.3.2

1.5.1 LEVELConsidered but nothing





PRESSURE

TEMPERATURE

PROPANE EXCHANGER

E-25 1

HIGH

LESS

HIGH

161


2.1.1Decreasing of the heat

transfer in the E-25TI 2401; TIC 2400

Decreasing in the efficiency

in the remove of the

fluorides in the D-14 A/B

3 2 6-M

Review of the operation in the E-25

to maintain the removing of the

fluorides in the treaters


pipe of the D-14 A/BSame as 2.1.1


causing posible rupture

Air pollution


Risk to employees

Economic losses

4 2 8-M

Maintenance constant to the inlet

pipe to prevent an incident in the

unit


inlet pipe to the D-14 A/B to show

the flow of the propane

2.1.3

TE 2400 fails sending wrong

signal to the TIC 2400

opening the FV 2393 valve

Same as 2.1.1 Same as 2.1.1 3 2 6-M

Monitoring to the controller to

avoid fails in the signal to maintain

the operation in the D-14 A/B

2.1.4Inefficiency in the treaters

with alumina TI 2404 / 2403; TI 2406 / 2405 Same as 2.1.1 3 1 3-L


treaters D-14 A/B to prevent

problems in the propane KOH

treater

2.1.5Decreasing of the inlet flow

of the treaters PI 2436 / 2438; TW 2437; TI 2439 Same as 2.1.1 3 2 6-M


pipe of the treaters to verify that

the flow is right

2.2.1Increasing of the heat

transfer in the E-25Same as 2.1.1


alumina treaters

Unnecessary use of the

steam causing economic

losses

4 2 8-M Same as 2.1.1

2.2.2Increasing of the inlet flow

of the treaters

Same as 2.1.5; XV 2396 located

in the inlet pipe of the E-26


alumina treaters

Inefficiency in the removal of

the fluoride


propane stream

4 2 8-M Same as 2.1.5

2.2.3

TE 2400 fails sending wrong

signal to the TIC 2400

closing the FV 2393 valve

Same as 2.1.3

Same as 2.2.1

Possible overpressure in the

alumina treater

4 2 8-M Same as 2.1.3

2.2.4Inefficiency in the treaters

with alumina Same as 2.1.4 Same as 2.2.2 4 1 4-L Same as 2.1.4

2.2.5Tamponade of the exit pipe

of the treaters TI 2404; TI 2406


pipe causing a rupture in the

exit pipe


propane KOH treater

4 2 8-M

Maintenance constant to the exit

pipe to prevent an incident in the

unit and maintain the operation




TEMPERATUREPROPANE ALUMINA

TREATERS D- 14 A/B2

LESS

HIGH

162


2.3.1PSV 2407 or PSV 2408 fails

opened PI 2444; PI 2445

Decreasing in the efficiency

in the remove of the

fluorides in the D-14 A/B due

to the less temperature in

those treaters

Damage of the treaters with

alumina

4 1 4-L

Monitoring and review of this valve

to avoid fails in the treaters and

maintain the operation

2.3.2 Decrease the propane flow PI 2436; TW 2437; TI 2401Same as 2.3.1

Economic losses 4 2 8-M Same as 2.1.5

2.3.3 Eyector S-07 fails opened PI 2409; GBCF 24 Manual valve

located after of the S-07Same as 2.3.2 4 2 8-M

Maintenance of the eyector to

prevent decreasing of the pressure

inside of the treaters

2.4.1PSV 2407 or PSV 2408 fails

closed Same as 2.3.1


alumina


treaters

4 1 4-L Same as 2.3.1

2.4.2 Increase the propane flow Same as 2.3.2; XV 2396


alumina

Decreasing of the efficiency

in the removal of the fluoride

3 2 6-M Same as 2.1.5

2.4.3 Eyector S-07 fails closed Same as 2.3.3


causing rupture to the relief

pipe

Wrong operation of the

treaters

4 2 8-M

Maintenance of the eyector to

prevent overpressure in the

treaters and avoid an incident


of the treaters Same as 2.2.5 Same as 2.2.5 4 2 8-M Same as 2.2.5

2.5.1 LEVELConsidered but nothing


3.1.1

Operational problems in


A/B due to decreasing the

cooling water

TI 2411; TI 2410 A

Inefficiency in remove the

traces of acid of the propane

stream

Contamination in the next

sections

3 1 3-L

Monitoring constant of the cooling

system to verify that the

temperature is right and prevent

damage in the D-15

3.1.2

Rupture of the pipe of the

heat exchanger E- 27A/B

causing contamination and

problem in the

temperature in the propane

stream

Same as 3.1.1

Same as 3.1.1

Damage in the propane KOH

treater D-15


treater D-15

4 1 4-L


E-27A/B to prevent rupture to the

pipes due to the corrosion or

overpressure




PRESSURE

2PROPANE ALUMINA

TREATERS D- 14 A/B

LESS

HIGH

LESS3 TEMPERATUREPROPANE KOH

TREATERS D-15

163


3.2.1



A/B due to increasing the

cooling water

Same as 3.1.1

Damage of the bed of KOH



stream

Trawl of propane to the tea

system

3 1 3-L Same as 3.1.1

3.2.2Increasing of the traces of

acid in the propane stream TI 2410A/B; TDI 2410

Damage of the bed of KOH



stream

3 1 3-L

Monitoring of the process in the HF

stripper to verify that the propane

stream come with little content of

acid

3.3.1Increasing the inlet flow of

the teatrer D-15TI 2406; TI 2404

Possible vaporization of the

hydrocarbon


traces of acid

Potential cavitation of the

pumps P-17 A/B

4 2 8-M


pipe of the D-15 to verify that the

flow is right and avoid problems in

the process of the tank


PI 2428; GBCF 13 Manual valve

located before of the PSV

2414

Trawl of thydrocarbon to the

tea system


traces of acid

3 2 6-M


avoid that fails opened and

maintain the operation in the

treater with KOH

3.3.3Tamponade of the pipe of

drainPI 2446; PI 2416; TI 2429

Increasing of the level in the

D-15 causing inefficiency in

the remove of the acid of the

propane stream

Increasing of the aqueous

phase in the inside of the

tank

3 1 3-L


tamponade due to the aqueous

phase and prevent rupture of the

pipe and an incident

3.4.1Decreasing the inlet flow of

the teatrer D-15PSV 2414; Same as 3.3.1


Increasing of the

temperature in the tank

3 3 9-M Same as 3.3.1

3.4.2 PSV 2414 fails closed Same as 3.3.2; LFCS04

Same as 3.4.1

Possible explosion of the

tank causing a great incident

in the unit

4 2 8-M


avoid that fails closed and maintain

the operation in the treater with

KOH and prevent an incident in the

plant

3.4.3Rupture to the exit pipe of

the D-15

PIC 2417; GBCF 13 Manual

valve located before of the PT

2417


Air pollution

Risk to employees

Economic losses

Damage in the equipments

5 1 5-M


pipe to prevent rupture and avoid

an incident

3.4.4 Rupture of the pipe of drain GWCS 07 Manual valve Same as 3.4.3 5 2 10-MSame as 3.3.3

3




PRESSURE

LESS

HIGH

HIGHTEMPERATURE

PROPANE KOH

TREATERS D-15

164


3.5.1Rupture of the exit pipe of

the D-15PI 2416; TI 2429 Same as 3.4.3 5 1 5-L Same as 3.4.3

3.5.2


the HF stripper casuing less

flow

TI 2411; TI 2410A


pumps P-17 A/B causing

cavitation and mechanical

damage in the pumps

Decreasing of the

concentration of propane in

the charge of olefins

4 2 8-M

Monitoring to the process in the HF

stripper to verify that the inlet flow

is right and maintain the operation

of the tank

3.5.3 Same as 3.4.4 Same as 3.4.4 Same as 3.4.3 5 2 10-MSame as 3.3.3

3.5.4Rupture in the inlet pipe of

the D-15

TI 2411; GBCF 13 Manual valve

located after of the TI 2411Same as 3.4.3 5 2 10-MSame as 3.4.3

3.5.5

GWCS07 Manual valve

located in the drain pipe

fails opened

PI 2446; LWCS 07 Manual valve

located under of the drain pot

Same as 3.5.2

Trawl of propane to the drain

pot causing an increase in the

exit propane

4 2 8-M

Install a Flow Indicator in the pipe

of drain to avoid problems in the

drain pot

3.5.6 PV-2417 malfunctions open

FIC-2415 with low flow

alarm; Operator procedures

and

training; GBCF 16 Manual valve

located after of the PV 2417

Potential vapors and

cavitation of the pump P-17

resulting in seals leaking

leading to loss of

containment

with potential for fire and

personnel injur

4 3 12-S

Consider adding a Low Flow Alarm

to FI-2423A and FI-2423B. (Propane

product flow to storage)


of the D-15Same as 3.5.1


tank causing contamination

of the propano and damage

in the equipment

3 1 3-L


tamponade due to the aqueous

phase and prevent rupture of the

pipe and an incident

3.6.2


the HF stripper casuing high

flow

Same as 3.5.2 No consequences of deviation 1 1 1-L

It is not necessary to establish

recommendations because it does

not represent any consequences

3.6.3

GWCS07 Manual valve

located in the drain pipe

fails closed

PI 2446; PI 2416; TI 2429


propane stream with the

aqueous phase


next section due to the

contamination of the stream

3 3 9-M Same as 3.5.5

3

HIGH

LEVEL




LESS

PROPANE KOH

TREATERS D-15

165


3.6.4

Rupture of the pipes of the

heat exchanger E-27 A/B

causing contamination of

the propane stream and

increasing of the inlet flow

Same as 3.5.2

Damage of the equipment


propane stream causing


next section

3 2 6-M Same as 3.1.2

3.6.5 P-17A/B pump stopsSpare pump, Pump run status,

FIC-2415 low flow alarm

Loss flow of product to

storage.

Stop flow from the HF

stripper

3 2 6-M

It is necessary to apply a

maintenance to the pumps to avoid


process and maintain the inlet flow

in the other sections

3.6.6PV-2417 malfunctions

closed

Bypass around PV-2417; FIC-

2415 minimum flow

controller with low flow

alarm; PSV-2414 on the KOH

treater; PSV-2407/2408 on the

Alumina treater

Loss of flow of product to

storage.

Potential to dead head the

pumps resulting in seal leaks

and loss of containment with

potential for fire and

personnel

injury

Potential for overpressure in

the KOH and the Alumina

treaters. Potential for flange

leaks and loss of containment

with potential for fire and

personnel injury

4 3 12-S

Install a High Pressure Alarm in the

D-15 in case that the pressure

increases inside of the tank


LEVELPROPANE KOH

TREATERS D-153




HIGH

166

Annex 9 Application of HAZOP methodology to Debutanization and Alkylate Treatment section


1.1.1TIC 2013 fails opened FV 2112

due to malfunctions

Bypass system (LWC307) and

safe valves GWCS07

Vaporization and inefficient separation.

Increase the N-Butane amount in the

alkylate product

2 2 4-L

Increase steam flow generated from reboiler

due to decrease the temperature in the tower

Decreased inlet flow using safe valves which

are manual

1.1.2Temperature of inlet stream

is cooler than normal (<160° F)TI 2101; TI 2102; TI 2104; TI 2106

Decrease in the acid vaporization

Decrease between water and acid in the

HF generate

Decrease in the severity

Acid losses

3 3 9-M

Increase the steam flow generated from

reboiler for secure the correct operation and

avoid instabilities in the tower

1.1.3Decrease in the vapor

generated from reboiler E-09FIC 2117

Same as 1.1.2 Presence

of acid in the bottoms

Contamination of alkylate product

Economic losses

2 3 6-M

Decrease reflux in the top because if we keep

the steady flow temperature will continue to

fall and is important decrease the inlet flow

until the temperature stabilizes

1.1.4

Increase the reflux in the top

due to desviations in the

process

FIC 2112 and TIC 2103; FIC 2112;


manual valves GBCF13;

Desviation system GWCS07

and SP 0156; PDI 2110; LIC 2107

Same as 1.1.1 2 2 4-L Same as 1.1.1

The temperature of the reflux

flow in the top is less than

normal

TI 2101; TI 2102; TI 2104; TI 2106 Same as 1.11 2 2 4-L

Due to reboiler is the principal equipment in

the hot generation is recommendable increase

the steam flow for maintain the correct

temperature

1.2.1The temperature of inlet

stream is higher than normalTI 2101; TI 2102; TI 2104; TI 2106

Increase the pressure in the column

Presence of alkylate in the top

Alkylate losses

3 2 6-M

Decrease steam flow generated from reboiler

until the temperature stabilizes

Considere increase reflux flow for decrease the

temperature and evit a instabilities

1.2.2TIC 2013 fails closed FV 2112

due to malfunctions

Bypass system (LWC307) with

two manual valves before and

after control valve (GWCS07)

Overpressure Possible

rupture Pumps

cavitation

2 2 4-L

Decrease inlet flow and because the higher

temperature is in the bottoms is recomendabe

reduce the flow out

Decrease flow coming out on top due to if the

flow remains constant instabilities might occur

in tower

1.2.3

Tamponade the inlet

pipeline due to prescence of

impurities in the stream

TI 2101; FIC 2100; Bypass

system LBCF05 with manual

valves GBCF13; Desviation

system GWCS07 and SP 0155;

PDI 2110; LIC 2107

Same as 1.2.1

Overpressure Possible

fire explosion

3 2 6-M

Decrease flow coming out on top and bottoms

and considere decrwase the steam flow

generated from reboiler due to the main heat

source is in reboiler

1.2.4

Tamponade the inlet reflux

top pipeline due to bad

maintenance


1.2.5Increase the vapor generated

from reboiler E-09FIC 2117 Same as 1.2.1 3 2 6-M Same as 1.2.1


Process: Explains the removal of butane of the product alkylate, also the conditioning and removal of contaminants from the stream of butane Study Section: Debutanization and Alkylate treatment


TEMPERATURE

LESS

HIGH

1DEBUTANIZER TOWER

V-01

167


1.3.1The temperature of inlet

stream is less than normalTI 2101; TI 2102; TI 2104; TI 2106

Vaporization at column

Presence of light in the bottoms

Presence of alkylate in the top

Economic losses

3 2 6-M

Increase the steam flow generated from

reboiler for secure the correct operation and

avoid instabilities in the tower

1.3.2Decrease in the vapor

generated from reboiler E-09

FIC 2100; Bypass system

LBCF05 with manual valves

GBCF13; Desviation system

GWCS07 and SP 0155; PDI 2110;

LIC 2107

Same as 1.3.1 3 2 6-M

Due to in the top is the cooler part of the towel

considere decrease flow coming out on top for

increase the temperature and maintain the

profile

1.3.3Increased flow that enter in

the tower





LIC 2107

Same as 1.3.1 3 2 6-M

Decrease flow coming out on top and the reflux

for increase the temperature

Increase flow coming out in bottoms for

maintain the temperature profile in the tower

until to stabilize

1.3.4

Decreased the reflux flow

that enter in the top of the

tower

FIC 2112 and TIC 2103; FIC 2112;




and SP 0156; PDI 2110; LIC 2107

Same as 1.3.1 3 3 9-M

Increase flow that enter in the column and

considere increase the flow that coming out in

bottoms until the temperature to stabilize

1.3.5Increased the flow that exit at

tower in the top

PDI 2110; FIC 2112; Bypass

system LWCS07 with two

manual vaves before and after

control valve (GBCF13);

desviation system before

bypass system with two

manual valves GWCS07 SP

0156

Same as 1.3.1 3 2 6-M

Due to the process has an excellent safety

system is recommendable activate bypass

system closing manual valve until flow is

stabilize

1.3.6PDI 2110 fails generated that

more flow enter at column TI 2101; TI 2102; TI 2104; TI 2106 Same as 1.3.1 3 3 9-M

Due to a increase in the inlet flow considere

increase the flow coming out on top and

bottoms for stabilize the profile and avoid

flooding and economic losses

1.4.1Increased steam flow from

reboiler E-09





LIC 2107

Overpressure at column V-01

Decreased column vaporization

Presence of lighs at bottoms

Presence of contaminants in the bottoms

2 2 4-L

Increase reflux flow in the top due to is the

cooler part of the tower and considere increase

the inlet flow for suply the flow necessary for

maintain the pressure in the tower

1.4.2Decreased flow in the reflux

that enter in the top

PI 2110B; PDI 2110; TI 2105; PIC

2124


of hydrocarbur vapor in the pipeline4 2 8-M

Due to a decrease in the cooler part of the top

is necessary decrease steam flow generated

from reboiler for avoid a increase of

temperature and pressure. Increase inlet flow

for avoid flooding

1.4.3

More flow at column due to

fails in valves or leak in the

piping

Bypass system LBCF05 with


after GBCF13; deviation

system with manual valves

GWCS07 SP 0155

Same as 1.4.1

Flooding in the tower2 3 6-M

Activate bypass system closing manual valve

until flow is stabilize Increase

the steam generated from reboiler for

increase the temperature and avoid

contaminants

HIGH

PRESSUREDEBUTANIZER TOWER

V-011




LESS

168


1.4.4

Temperature of inlet stream

is higher than normal (<160°

F)

TI 2101; TI 2102; TI 2104; TI 2106 Same as 1.4.3 2 3 6-M

Considere increase the reflux flow in the top to

lowering the temperature and avoid a increase

in the pressure

1.4.5PDI 2110 fails generated that

more flow enter at column



before and after GBCF13;

deviation system with manual

valves GWCS07 SP 0155

Same as 1.4.3 3 3 9-M Same as 1.4.3

1.4.6

Decreased flow in the

bottoms due to fails in

manual valves or leaks in the

pipes

TI 2106; TI 2104; TI 2101


of alkylate in the top

Economic losses

4 2 8-L Same as 1.4.2

1.5.2LIC 2107 fails closed FIC 1238

due to malfunctions



after the control valve GBCF 03

Same as 1.5.1 Overpressure

in the pipeline Flooding in the

column

3 3 9-M

Install a bypass system due to is the most

effective system for control tamponade or fails

in the valves and taking into account that if the

valve is important and the flow is dangerous if

this is in contant with the environment

1.5.3FV 2112 fails closed fue to

malfunctionsP-06A/B; FIC 2112; PI 2148

Same as 1.5.1

Air pollution


Risk and injuries to employees

Economic losses

5 2 10-M

Install a flow indicator alarm for ensure a

correct control and avoid possibles risk and

activate the shutdown for the valve for

interrupt the flow

1.5.4Loss of cooling water supply

or inadvertently blocked in

PI 2148; PIC2124; PSV 2111; LIC

2130; PDI 2110; Start up

procedure including line up of

the cooling water system


in the pipeline Possible fire

explosion

3 3 9-M

Install a flow indicator alarm. Considere

decrease the flow coming out on top and

bottoms for avoid flooding in the tower

1.6.1FV 2100 fails opened due to

malfunctions

Bypass system (LBCF05) and

safe valves GBCF13

Unestable operation in the tower

Economic losses2 1 2-L

Increase the flow that coming out on bottoms

to decrease the temperature and the level of

the top for avoid contaminants in the top and in

the tower

1.6.2

Tamponade the bottoms

pipeline due to prescence of

impurities

TI 2106; Bypass system LBCF05

with manual valves before and

after GBCF13; Desviation

system SP 0155

Same as 1.6.1

Overpressure in the pipeline3 2 6-M

Install a flow indicator alarm for ensure a

correct control

1.6.3Problems the reboiler causing

less steam flow

LIC 2107; LIC 2115; FIC 2117

with manual valves GDCF04;

PSV 2111

Same as 1.6.1 Decrease

in the alkylate quality2 3 6-M

Decrease the flow that enter the tower due to

could occur a increase the level producing a

possible flooding


malfunctions

Bypass system LBCF05 with



and SP 0155


in the pipeline Posible

rupture in the pipeline with possible fire

explosion Risk and injuries

to employees Air

pollution Economic

losses

3 3 9-M

Install a bypass system due to is the most

effective system for control tamponade or fails

in the valves and taking into account that if the

valve is important and the flow is dangerous if


PRESSURE HIGH




HIGH

LEVEL

LESS

1DEBUTANIZER TOWER

V-01

169


2.1.1

Increased the secondary

cooling water flow into E-

08A/B generating a decreased

the outside temperature

TI 1053; Start up procedure

including line up of the

cooling water system; PI 2036;

5 pumps in cooling water

system

More time in the separation time into the

drum Presence of water in the

butane flow

2 2 4-LIncrease the flow that coming out the column

for maintain the correct level

2.1.2The temperature of the inlet

is cooler than normal <177°FTI 2125; 2105 Same as 2.1.1 2 2 4-L

Decrease the flow into 08 A/B Exchanger for

increase the temperature of vapors and liquid

in the tower

2.2.1

Decreased the secundary

cooling water flow into E-08

A/B generating a increased

the outside temperature

TI 1053; Start up procedure

including line up of the

cooling water system; PI 2036;

5 pumps in cooling water

system

Presence of contaminant in the butane

flow Increase the

pressure inside the tank

2 2 4-L

Decrease the flow outside the column in the

bottoms part for decrease the temperature and

stabilize the profile

2.2.2The temperature of the inlet

is hot than tomal >177°FTI 2105; 2125 Same as 2.2.1 2 2 4-L

Increase the flow into heat exchangers 08 A/B

for decrease the temperature and avoid

possible complications

2.3.1TEA system fails opened due

to malfunctions

PI 2132; Manual valve

(GWCS03) located after PSV

2133

Butane drain system TEA

Economic losses Decrease the

butane reflux

3 2 6-MDecrease the flow coming in on tank for avoid

overflow and possible contaminations

2.3.2

Decrease in the temperature

inside the tank due to

desviations in the process

TIC 2103; 2102; LIC 2130; PI

2132; PI 2149

Possible presence of water in the butane

flow Increase the

separation time

2 3 6-MDecrease the temperature of secondary cooling

water flow into heat exchanger 08 A/B

2.3.3PV 1218 fails opened due to

malfunctions

Block vakves and bypass

system PV 1218

Lower operating pressures on the Butane

treater trains. Potential to vaporize

Butane. Since vapor, there is potential for

loss of efficiency on the KOH and additive

treaters with potential for HF acid and

Alkad into the Butamer Unit which can

kill the catalyst. Product upset

3 2 6-M

Consider adding a low pressure alarm to PIC-

1218, on outlet of the Butane Additive Treaters

Continue maintenance to the tank and constant

report about the status of the equipment for

have a control of the efficiency

2.4.1PIC 2124 fails closed PV 2124

due to malfunctions

Bypass system (LFCS04) with


after control valve GACF 16


Increased the temperature inside the

tank Possible

rupture in the pipeline


4 2 8-MInstall a flow indicator system for proper

control of the flow through the pipe

2.4.2TEA system fails closed due to

malfunctions



2133

Overpressure inside the tank

Leak of butane

Increase the temperature inside the tank

Decrease the reflux flow in the top

3 2 6-MDecrease the flow inside the tank and outside

for maintain the correct flow

2.4.3


inside the tank due to

desviations in the process

TIC 2103; 2102; LIC 2130; PI

2132; PI 2149


Leak of butane 2 2 4-L

Increase the flow in the secondary cooling

water in the heat exchangerS 08 A/B for

deacrease the temperature of the stream that

enter in the equipment

Tamponade in the outside

pipeline de to prescence of


Pumps P-06C/D


Cavitation pumps Possible

rupture or break the tank

2 2 4-LConstant maintenance to the pipeline to

ensure the proper functioning

REFLUX DRUM

D-082

TEMPERATURE

LESS

HIGH

PRESSURE

LESS

HIGH




170


2.5.1LIC 2130 fails opened FIC 2120

and 2121 due to malfunctions

Bypass system (LWCS07) with


after control valve (GBCF13);

the valve coun with SIS UC07

and vent system XV 2121

Possible cavitation and pumps damage in

the top of the column

Reflux losses

Increased temperature in the top of the

column

3 2 6-MActivate bypass system closing manual valve

until flow is stabilize

2.5.2

Overpressure in the inlet

pipeline causing possible

rupture

PIC 2124 ; LIC 2130; PI 2148 Air pollution. Possible fire explosion.

Risk to employees. Economic losses3 2 6-M

Periodic maintenance to pipes to ensure the

proper functioning and avoid possibles

accidents

2.5.4Decreasses the inlet flow due

to desviations in the processPIC 2124; PI 2148; LIC 2130 Same as 2.5.1 3 2 6-M

Decrease the flow coming out on tank for

maintain the level and correct separation

2.5.5


line due to prescence of


Same as 2.5.4

Same as 2.5.1

Overpressure with possible rupture the

pipeline. Air pollution. Risk to employees

Economic losses

4 2 8-M Same as 2.5.2


due to malfunctions




Same as 2.5.5 4 2 8-M

Due to the process has a security sistem wich is

bypass system is recommendable if this cause

occur activate bypass system

2.5.7 TEA system fails opened



2133

Same as 2.5.1 Leak

to butane. Increase the air pollution3 2 6-M

Same as 2.5.6 Decrease

the flow that enter in the tank for avoid a

incomplete separation

2.6.1LIC 2113 fails closed FIC 2120

and 2121



after control valve (GBCF13);

the valve coun with SIS UC06

and vent system XV 2120

Overpressure in the D-08 and V-01

Presence of liquid in TEA system



4 1 4-LDecrease the flow coming out on tank for

maintain the level and correct separation

2.6.2TEA system fails closed due to

malfunctions



2133

Same as 2.6.1

Increase the contaminants substance

Economic losses due to leak of butane

4 2 8-M Same as 2.5.6

2.6.3PIC 2124 fails opened PV 2124

due to malfunctions




Same as 2.6.1 4 2 8-MInstall a flow indicator alarm for proper control

of the flow through the pipe

2.6.4

Increase the flow from

column due to desviations in

the process

PIC 2124; PI 2148; LIC 2130 Same as 2.6.1 4 2 8-M

Increase the flow coming out on tank for avoid

a flooding in the tank and contaminations of

the sustances

2.6.5Tamponade the butane

pipeline coming outLIC 2107; Pumps P-06 C/D

Overpressure the pipeline and tank


Possible rupture in the tank

Air pollution

3 2 6-M

Decrease the flow that enter the tank for avoid

a possible flooding

Periodic maintenance of pipeline for proper

control of state of the equipment

REFLUX DRUM

D-082 LEVEL

LESS

HIGH




171


3.1.1Decrease the inlet flow due to failure in

the pump P-04BP-04A - Turbine; FV1227B

Inefficiency the refrigeration circuit flush

Operational problems in the flushing system

due to decrease in the pressure

Hydrocarbon leak to pumps due to mechanical

failures

2 2 4-L

Open de steam valve FV-1227B of pump P-04B

Periodic maintenance of pump because a inopportune

damage of this can generate large sobreprecionamientos

in pipes and equipment

3.1.2Decrease the inlet flow due to failure in

the pump P-04AP-04B; PI 2534 Same as 3.1.1 2 3 6-M

Activate pump P-04B. Periodic maintenance of pump

because a inopportune damage of this can generate large

overpressures in pipes and equipment

3.1.3Overpressure in the pipeline causing

possible rupturePDI 1234; PI 2514; FIC 1227

Same as 3.1.1 Air

pollution due to possible rupture of pipeline.

Possible fire explosion. Risk employees.

Economic losses

3 2 6-MInstall a pressure indicator alarm due to a this sudden

pressure change is immediately identified

3.1.4Tamponade in the inlet pipeline due to

prescence of impurities in the stream PDI 1234; PI 2514; FIC 1227

Same as 3.1.1 Failures due

to overload. Rupture in the pipeline due to

overpressure

2 2 4-M Same as 3.1.3

3.1.5 FIC 1227 fails stopping both pumps XI P004A- Turbine Same as 3.1.1 2 2 4-MInstall a pressure indicator alarm that worked with a

steam valve of turbine and pump P-04A

3.2.1FIC 1227 fails activate both pumps P-04

A/B

Bypass system LWCS07 with two

manual valves before and after

control valve (GBVF13); two

desviation with two manual valves

LBCF05 and CBCF21

Don't exist significant consequences 1 1 1-L Activate manual valves in case that this desviation occur

3.2.2 FIC 1227 fails opened FV 1221 A/B





LBCF05 and CBCF21

Same as 3.2.1 1 1 1-L Same as 3.2.1

3.2.3FIC 1238 fails closed generating flow

accumulation





LBCF05 and CBCF21

Overpressure in the pipeline. Possible

rupture in the pipeline. Possible fire

explosion due to a possible rupture. Air

pollution. Economic losses

4 2 8-M

Due to the process have a security sistem wich is bypass

system is recommendable if this consequences occur

activate bypass system

3.3.1

Loss of turbine pump P- 04A from either

mechanical damage or loss of steam if

using turbine as primary pump

Pumps status in the PCS; FI 2538;

separe pump with separate power

sources

Loss of the Alkylate flush flow resulting in

insufficient pressure on the header. Potential

to negate the dual pressurization system to

the pump seals which is considered a

mechanical integrity system.

3 4 12-S

Ensure the turbine pump P-04A (alkylate flush pump) has

ready start capability that allows slow rolling

Consider connecting the electric pump P-04B (alkylate

flush pump) to an emergency power source, such as a

diesel generator

3.3.2Blocked the Alkylate flush to a single

stopped pump.

Low flow alarm; design of the pump

seal system still have Isobutame

flush and the seals are designed to

contain any leak

Loss of the Alkylate flush flow to a single user

resulting in potential for trash to get into the

seals and damage to the individual pump

seals. Potential to negate the dual

pressurization system on that specific pump

seal which is considered a mechanical

integrity system.

3 2 6-MConstant maintenance to equipments to garantice a goof

performance

3.3.3Blocked the Alkylate flush to a single

running pump

Low flow alarm; design of the pump

seal system still have Isobutame

flush and the seals are designed to

contain any leak

Loss of the Alkylate flush flow to a single user

resulting in insufficient pressure on the

header. Potential to negate the dual

pressurization system on that specific pump

seal which is considered a mechanical

integrity system.

3 2 6-M Same as 3.3.2

3.4.1 HIGHIncorrect flow setting or higher pressure

on the Alkylate flush header

High flow alarm for the infividual

pumps

More flow to the individual pump seals. Over

time it will effect seal life. Operability issue.1 1 1-F Any important recommendation

3

LESS

ALKYLATE FILTER S-

05A/B

PRESSURE

LESS

HIGH

LEVEL




172


4.1.1 LESSTemperature of inlet is cooler than

normalNo safeguards Don't exist significant consequences 1 1 1-L Any recomendation

4.2.1 HIGHTemperature of inlet is higher than

normalNo safeguards Don't exist significant consequences 1 1 1-L Any recomendation

4.3.1Tamponade in the inlet pipeline due to

prescence of impurities in the stream

Bypass system (GACF16); Relief valve

GWCS07

Overpressure in the pipeline causing posible

rupture of the pipeline. Possible flooding in

the destillation colum V01. Less heat

exchangert in E-11 A/B and E-12 resulting in a

decrease of the temperature profile in the

destilation column V02. Presence of HF in the

alkylatE. Decrease in the alkylate production

4 2 8-MSame as 3.2.3 Periodic

maintance to pipeline to ensure proper operation

4.3.2Overpressure causing possible rupture

in the inlet pipelineSame as 4.3.1; FIC 1238

Same as 4.3.1 Air

pollution due to a possible rupture of the

pipeline. Possible fire explosion. Risk to

employees. Economic losses

3 2 6-M Same as 4.3.1

4.3.3FIC 1238 fails closed the valve 1238 due

to malfunctionsBypass system (LACF06) Same as 4.3.1 4 2 8-M

Due to the process has a security sistem wich is bypass

system is recommendable if this consequences occur

activate bypass system

4.3.4 Decrease the flow that entering to drum FIC 1238

Possible flooding in the destillation colum

V01. Less heat exchanger in E-11 A/B and E-12

resulting in a decrease of the temperature

profile in the destilation column V02.

Presence of HF in the alkylate. Decrease in the

alkylate production

4 2 8-MInstall a flow indicator alarm due to a this sudden flow

change is immediately identified

4.4.1FIC 1238 fails opened FV 1238 due to

malfunctionsBypass system (LACF06)

Possible decrease of leven in the distillation

column V-01 Flow

losses to flush system

3 2 6-M Same as 4.3.3

4.4.2 Increase the flow that entering to drum FIC 1238 Same as 4.4.1 3 2 6-M Same as 4.3.4

4.4.3 Increase the Potassium Hydroxide mass No safeguards Decrease alkylate product

Economic losses2 3 6-M

Periodic check to the equipments a pipeline where we

can get the correct status of them

4ALKYLATE TREATMENT

DRUM D-06

TEMPERATURE

PRESSURE

LESS

HIGH




173

Annex 10 Application of HAZOP methodology to N-Butane Treatment section


1.1.1

FIC 1312 and 1982 fails

closed FV 1312 and 1982

due to malfunctions



after control valve (GDCF06);

Vent System XY 1312 and SIS

UC06

Decrease the efficiency of

removing fluorides in the

treatments with alumina D-

09 A/B

1 1 1-L




occur activate it

1.1.2Decrease the N-Butane

flow due to external events

LIC 2478/2482; PSV 2481; FIC

1312/1982

Decreased steam flow

Vapor leak to condensates

drum

1 1 1-L

Decrease the cooling water that enter

in the heat exchanger for decrease the

temperature of the flow that coming

out

1.1.3

LIC 2478 and 2482 fails


due to malfunctions




Same as 1.1.1

Overpressure in the


rupture

Economic losses

2 1 2-L Same as 1.1.1

1.1.4

Overpressure causing

possible rupture in the

enter pipeline

PI 1972; PI 1728

Same as 1.1.1

Air pollution

Risk to employees

Economic losses

2 3 6-M Same as 1.1.1

1.1.5

Tamponade in the inlet

pipeline due to prescence

of impurities in the stream

PI 1972; PI 1728

Same as 1.1.1

Possible rupture due to

overpressure

Air pollution

Economic losses

3 2 6-M Same as 1.1.1

1.2.1


opened FV 1312 and 1982

due to malfunctinons





UC06

Inefficient steam usage

Decreased the heat

exchanger in the E-14/14A


27/27A and in the E-14/14A

3 2 6-M Same as 1.1.1

1.2.2Increase the N-Butane flow

due to external events

LIC 2478/2482; FIC 1312/1982;




Same as 1.2.1 3 2 6-M Same as 1.1.4

1.2.3

The temperature of the

vapor steam is cooler than

normal due to desviations

in the process

LIC 2478/2482; TI 1731/1964 Same as 1.2.1 3 2 6-M Same as 1.2.1

1.3.1



due to malfunctions





UC06

Condensate leak

Inefficient steam usage

Overpressure in the


rupture

3 1 3-L Same as 1.1.1

1.3.2



due to malfunctions




Same as 1.3.1 3 1 3-L Same as 1.1.1

1.3.3

Overpressure causing

possible rupture in the

pipeline

PI 1972; PI 1728

Same as 1.3.1


possible rupture

Economic losses

3 2 6-L Same as 1.1.4

1.3.4




PI 1972; PI 1728 Same as 1.3.1 3 2 6-L Same as 1.1.4

TEMPERATURE

LESS

HIGH

LESSLEVEL

HEAT EXCHANGERS E-

14/14A AND CONDENSER

D-27/D27A

1



Process: Explain the process of conditioning and removal of contaminant of the product N-Butane Study Section: N-Butane treatment

174


1.4.1



due to malfunctinons





UC06

Decrease the heat

exchanger inn the E-

14/14A


27/27A and in the E-14/14A

2 1 2-L Same as 1.1.1

1.4.2



due to malfunctions




Same as 1.4.1 2 1 2-L Same as 1.1.1

2.1.1

TIC 1309/ 1974 fails closed

FV 1312/1962 due to

malfunctions





UC06


of removal of fluoride in

the alumina treater

1 1 1-L Same as 1.1.1

2.1.2




PI 1972; PSV 1304/1340 with

bypass system (LWCS07) and

manual valves GACF04 located

before and after bypass system

Same as 2.1.1

Overpressure in the

pipeline causing posible

rupture Air

pollution


Risk to employees

Economic losses

3 2 6-M

Constant maintenance to the pipeline

to ensure the proper functioning

Install a flow indicator alarm

2.1.3



rupture in the pipeline

PI 1972; PSV 1304/1340 with

bypass system (LWCS07) and



Same as 2.1.1

Air pollution


Risk to employees

Economic losses

3 2 6-M Same as 2.1.2

2.1.4

LIC 2478/2482 fails closed

the valve LV 2482/2478 due

to malfunctions




Same as 2.1.1

Overpressure in the

pipeline causing posible

rupture Air

pollution


Risk to employees

4 2 8-M




occur activate it

2.1.5Tea system fails opened

due to malfunctions

Bypass system (LFCS04) and



Same as 2.1.1


increase in the

components

Economic losses

4 2 8-M Same as 2.1.5

2.2.1

TIC 1309/ 1974 fails opened

FV 1312/1962 due to

malfunctions





UC06

Increase in the design

temperature of alumina

treater D-09 A-D

1 1 1-L Same as 2.1.5

2.2.2

LIC 2478/2482 fails opened

the valve LV 2482/2478 due

to malfunctions




Same as 2.2.1 1 1 1-L Same as 2.1.5

HIGH

HEAT EXCHANGERS E-

14/14A AND CONDENSER

D-27/D27A

1 LEVEL

LESS

HIGH

TEMPERATURETREATERS WITH ALUMINA

D-09A-D2




175


2.2.3

Due to external events

temperature of the stream

is higher than normal

(450°F)

TIC 1309/ 1974; TI 1306/1976

with SUS UC06/07Same as 2.2.1 1 1 1-L

Decrease the flow that enter to

alumina treater and increase the steam

flow in the heat exchanger E-14/14A

2.2.4Tea system fails closed due

to malfunctions




Same as 2.2.1

Overpressure in the

alumina treater

Possible leak or rupture

Air pollution

Economic losses

3 2 6-M Same as 2.1.5

2.2.5




TIC 1309/ 1974; TI 1306/1976

with SUS UC06/07Same as 2.2.4 3 3 9-M

Install a flow indicator alarm for proper

control of the flow through the pipe.



2.2.6

Manual valve GBCF13 it will

closed due to human

factors

No safeguards

Same as 2.2.4

Overpressure in the


rupture


due to a possible rupture

Air pollution

Risk to employees

Economic losses

4 3 12-S

Install a control valve with a loop that

worked together to avoid possibles

damages. Ensure good communication

between employees


to malfunctions




Damage in the alumina

treaters 2 1 2-L




occur activate it

2.3.2

Decrease the N-Butane

flow due to desviations in

the process

LIC 2478/2482; S-07

Same as 2.3.1

Decrease the pollutants

remotion efficiency

Economic losses

3 2 6-M




occur activate it

2.3.3Eyector S-07 fails opened

(LWCS07)Bypass system

Same as 2.3.1

Economic losses2 2 4-L Same as 2.3.2


due to malfunctions





treaters

Scape of N-Butane to tea

system

Economic losses

2 2 4-L Same as 2.3.2

2.4.2

Eyector S-07 fails closed

(LWCS07) due to

malfunctions

Bypass system


treaters

Overpressure in the

treaters

Possible rupture or leak in

the treaters

3 2 6-M Same as 2.3.2

2.4.3Increase the N-Butane flow

due to external eventsLIC 2478/2482


remotion efficiency

Damage to alumina

treaters

Economic losses

3 2 6-M

Install a flow indicator system in the

inlet stream which is for control the

flow that enter in the equipment

additional to this is required a constant

monitoring for prevent possible

malfunctions and risk to process and

employees

TREATERS WITH ALUMINA

D-09A-D2

PRESSURE

LESS

HIGH

TEMPERATURE HIGH




176


2.5.1



the process

LIC 2478/2482


treaters Decrease

the pollutants remotion

efficiency

Economic losses

3 2 6-M

Is required install a flow indicator

system in the inlet stream for control

the flow and level in the tank because

this depends on the separation of

substances and prevents possible

contaminants

2.5.2P-06A/B pump fails due to

malfunctionsP-06 A/B; E-14/14A

Total loss of flow to both

treater sections. Loss of

flow to the individual train

vaporizers E-14/E-14A

heaters and D- 09A/B/C/D

Alumina treaters.

Potential damage to the

heaters resulting in

potential release of hot

steam. Potential

personnel safety concern.

3 2 6-M Same as 2.5.2

2.5.3FV 2121 fails closed due to

malfunctionsTI 1976/11977; TIC 1974; FV 2121

More flow through the

train leading to potentially

cooler temperatures for

the Alumina treaters. Loss

of absorption of the

organic fluorides on the

Alumina resulting in

increased organic fluorides

in the Butane product and

potential to kill the

catalyst in the Butamer

4 2 8-MConstant maintenance to valves and

report the real state of them

2.6.1 HIGH

Increase the N-Butane flow

due to desviation in the

process

LIC 2478/2482

Decrease the pressure in

the alumina treaters


remotion efficiency

Damage to alumina traters

Economic losses

3 2 6-M Same as 2.5.2

3.1.1

Decrease the N-butane

flow trater in the heat

exchangers E-15/E-15A

TW 1643/1645 - TW 1940/1938Decrease the water

remotion eficence1 1 1-L

Due to heat exchangers has the

responsibility of control the

temperature that enter in the

coalescer is necessary decrease the

cool secondary water in the heat

exchangers E-16/16A for maintain the

temperature

3.1.2

The temperature of N-

Butane is cooler than

normal

TI 1648/1943Any important

consequence1 1 1-L Any importat recomendation

3.1.3

Increase the secundary

water in the heat

exchangers E-16/16A

TI 1217A/1945A - TI 1648/1943Any important

consequence 1 1 1-L Any importat recomendation

TREATERS WITH ALUMINA

D-09A-D2

TEMPERATUREN-BUTANE COALESCERS

D10/10A3 LESS

LEVEL

LESS




177


3.2.1

Increase the N-butane flow

trater in the heat

exchangers E-15/E-15A

TW 1643/1645 - TW 1940/1938

Possible generation of

vapor of N-Butane

Decrease the efficiency in

the water remoting into D-

10/10A

Possible traces of HF in the

D-11/11A

3 2 6-M

Due to heat exchangers has the

responsibility of control the

temperature that enter in the

coalescer is necessary increase the

cool secondary water in the heat

exchangers E-16/16A for maintenance

the temperature

3.2.2

Increase the secundary

water in the heat

exchangers E-16/16A

TI 1217A/1945A - TI 1648/1943 Same as 3.2.1 3 1 3-L

Due to main flow control the

temperature is required that decrease

the flow that enter in the N-Butane

Coalescer D-10/10A for stabilize the

temperature profile


to malfunctions




Same as 3.2.1

Overpressure in the

coalescers D-10/10A

3 2 6-M




occur activate it

3.2.4

The temperature of the N-

Butane flow is higher than

normal (>110°F)

TI 1648/1943; TT1217A/1945A

with SIS UC06/07Same as 3.2.1 3 3 9-M

Decrease the N-butane flow that

enteter in the coalescers

3.2.5The N-Butane flow contain

more water that normal

TI 1648/1943; TW 1643/1940; TW

1645/1938; TW 1647/1944Same as 3.2.1 3 2 6-M Same as 3.2.4

3.3.1



the process

LIC 2478/2482; LIC 1214/1959


treaters Decrease


efficiency

Economic losses

3 3 9-M


inlet stream because the N-Butane

flow is responsible for an instability

occurs and that may cause damage to

coalescer


due to malfunctions




Same as 3.3.1 3 2 6-M




occur activate it

3.3.3

Manual valve LFCS04 to

drain water fails opened for

bad maintance

LI 1959/ 1214

Decrease the separation

time

Butane leak drainage

system

Economic losses

3 3 9-M

Install a bypass system due to is the

most effective system for control

tamponed or fails in the valves and

taking into account that if the valve is

important and the flow is dangerous if

this is in contact with the environment

Periodic maintenance to pipes to

ensure the proper functioning and

avoid possibles accidents

3.3.4




PDI 1958; TDI 1945/1945; TI

1648/1943



rupture


Air pollution

Risk to employees

Economic losses

2 2 4-L


inlet stream

Periodic maintenance to pipes to

ensure the proper functioning and

avoid possibles accidents

3.3.5

Overpresure in the inlet


rupture

TI 1217A/1945A - TI 1648/1943 Same as 3.3.4 4 2 8-M Same as 3.3.4

N-BUTANE COALESCERS

D10/10A3

TEMPERATURE

PRESSURE

HIGH

LESS




178


3.4.1



process

LIC 2478/2482; LIC 1214/1959




remotion efficiency

Damage to alumina

treaters

Economic losses

2 3 6-M

The tea system is one of the best

safety system and in this case is

required open the tea system if this

consequences could occur


to malfunctions




Same as 3.4.2

Overpressure inside the

alumina coalescer

generating possible

rupture

3 2 6-M




occur activate it

3.4.3


drain water fails closed for

bad maintance

LI 1959/ 1214

Overpressure in the

pipeline and coalescer

Loss of butane

Risk to employees

3 2 6-M

Same as 3.3.4 Constant

maintenance to valve due to this does

not have any security system is

required to be manually consistently

report the status

3.4.4


pipeline which drain the

water

LI 1959/ 1214

Overpressure in the

outside pipeline causing

possible rupture

Air pollution

Economic losses

3 2 6-M

Have in count install a bypass system

for prevent possibles injures or

tamponades or leaks due to a mal

function of the valve Constant

maintenance to valve due to this does

not have any security system is

required to be manually consistently

report the status

3.4.5


pipeline wich the N-Butane

exit

PI 1219/1984

Overpressure in the


possible rupture


due to a rupture of the

pipeline Air

pollution Risk

to employees

Economic losses

4 3 12-S


inlet stream for control the flow that

enter in the coalescer



3.5.1Decrease the N-Butane

flow due to malfunctionsLIC 2478/2482; LIC 1214/1959


treaters Decrease


efficiency

Economic losses

3 2 6-M




3.5.2


drain water fails opened for

bad maintance

LI 1959/ 1214

Decrease the separation

time

Butane leak drainage

system

Economic losses

2 1 2-L

Install a bypass system due to is the

most effective system for control

tamponed or fails in the valves and

taking into account that if the valve is

important and the flow is dangerous if


Constant monitoring to the manual

valve


pipeline

PDI 1958; TDI 1945/1945; TI

1648/1943



rupture


Air pollution

Risk to employees

Economic losses

4 2 8-M






3.5.4

Overpresure in the inlet


rupture

TI 1217A/1945A - TI 1648/1943 Same as 3.5.3 4 2 8-M Same as 3.5.3

PRESSURE

LEVEL

N-BUTANE COALESCERS

D10/10A3

HIGH

LESS




179


3.6.1



process

LIC 2478/2482; LIC 1214/1959




remotion efficiency

Damage to alumina traters

Economic losses

4 2 8-M

The tea system is one of the best

safety system and in this case is

required open the tea system if this

consequences could occur

3.6.2


drain water fails closed for

bad maintance

LI 1959/ 1214

Overpressure in the

pipeline and coalescer

Loss of butane

Risk to employees

3 2 6-M




Constant maintenance to valve due to

this does not have any security system

is required to be manually consistently

report the status

3.6.3


pipeline which drain the

water

LI 1959/ 1214

Overpressure in the


possible rupture

Air pollution

Economic losses

3 2 6-M Same as 3.5.2

3.6.4


pipeline wich the N-Butane

exit

PI 1219/1984

Overpressure in the


possible rupture


due to a rupture of the

pipeline

Air pollution

Risk to employees

Economic losses

4 2 8-M Same as 3.5.3

4.1.1Increase of cooling water

on E-16TDI 1217/1945

Decrease in the efficency

of pollutants remove

Decrease the pollutans

adsorption

2 2 4-L

Considere install a temperature alarm

indicator inside the treatments drums

worked with TDI 1217/1945 to control

the required flow in the drums

4.1.2The N-Butane temperature

is cooler than normal (>110)Same as 4.1.1 Same as 4.1.1 2 2 4-L Same as 4.1.1

4.1.3The N-Butane contain more

water than normal No safeguards Same as 4.1.1 2 3 6-M

Due to N-Butane contain more water

than normal is necessary decrease the

inlet flow at treatments drum for avoid

possible damages



enter in the KOH treatments

4.2.1Decrease of cooling water

on E-16TI 1013; PI 2036;

Increase the flourures

remotion 1 2 2-L Any importat recomendation

4.2.2The N-Butane temperature

is higher than normal (>110)TDI 1217/1945 Same as 4.2.1 1 2 2-L Any importat recomendation

LEVEL3N-BUTANE COALESCERS

D10/10A

4

HIGH

TEMPERATURE

LESS

HIGH

KOH TREATMENTS DRUMS

D 11/11A




180


4.3.1


flow that enter to

treatments drums

PI 1219/1984




adsorption

2 2 4-L



enter in the KOH treatments drums



4.3.2

Overpressure in the


rupture

PI 1219/1984

Same as 4.3.1


possible leak


Risk to employees

Economic losses

3 3 9-MConstant maintenance to the pipeline



pipelineSame as 4.3.2

Same as 4.3.2

Overpressure in the


rupture

3 2 6-M Same as 4.3.2


due to malfunctions




Same as 4.3.1


increase in the

contaminants flow

Economic losses

3 2 6-M



recommendable if this desviation

occur activate it

4.3.5Draigane system fails

opened

LG 1216 Manual

valves GWCS07

Same as 4.3.2

Increase the

contaminations

3 1 3-L

The process has a manual valves which

are can activate if the principal valve

fails in this case is recommendable

activate manual valves

4.4.1


that enter to treatments

drums

PI 1219/1984

Increase in the

temperature which

promueve the fluorides

remove

2 2 4-L




4.4.2Tea system falis closed due

to malfunctions




Overpressure inside the

tank generating possible

leak

2 2 4-L Same as 4.3.5

4.4.3




PI 1219/1984

Overpressure in the


rupture


possible rupture


Risk to employees

Economic losses

4 2 8-M


maintance to pipeline to ensure



closed due to human errors

LG 1216 Manual

valves GWCS07


causing possible leak


possible rupture

Economic losses

3 3 9-M

The proces has a manual valves wich



activate manual valves


desviation systemManial valve GFCS04 Same as 4.4.3 4 2 8-M




close manual valves


D 11/11A4 PRESSURE

LESS

HIGH




181


4.5.1


flow that enter to

treatments drums

PI 1219/1984




adsorption

2 2 4-L

Install a flow indicator alarm for avoid

possible increase or decrease of flow

at treatments drums





pipelinePI 1219/1984

Same as 4.5.2

Overpressure in the


rupture

3 2 6-M Same as 4.5.2


due to malfunctions




Same as 4.5.1


increase in the

contaminants flow

Economic losses

3 2 6-M




occur activate it


opened

Bypass system LG 1216 with two

manual valves GWCS07 before

and after

Same as 4.5.2

Increase the

contaminations

3 1 3-L




close manual valves

4.6.1



drums

PI 1219/1984

Increase in the

temperature which

promueve the fluorides

remove

2 2 4-L




4.6.2Tamponade in the outside

pipelinePI 1219/1984

Overpressure in the


rupture


possible rupture


Risk to employees

Economic losses

4 2 8-M





desviation systemManual valve GWCS04 Same as 4.4.3 3 2 6-M

The proces has a manual valves which



open manual valves

LEVEL

LESS

HIGH


D 11/11A4




182


5.1.1

The temperature of stream

is cooler than normal

(<110°f)

TDI 1217/1945; TI 1234/2141; TI

2142/2143

Decrease the efficiency of

additive ALKAD remove

possible contamination of

the catalyst

2 2 4-L

Considere install a flow indicator alarm

for check the flow and avoid a level

increase at aditive treatments

5.1.2The butane contain more

pollutans than normalSame as 5.1.1 Same as 5.1.1 2 2 4-L

Decrease the flow and increase the

temperature in the coalescer for

remove complete the pollutants

5.2.1

The temperature of stream

is higher than normal

(<110°f)

Same as 5.1.1

Possible vaporization into

the treatments drums

Increase the remotion

time Possible

leak of pollutants in the N-

Butane flow

Economic losses

4 2 8-M Same as 5.1.1

5.2.2

Due to a overpressure in

the pipeline the

temperature of the flow

increased

Same as 5.1.1

Same as 5.2.1

Possible rupture of the

pipeline due to a

overpressure

Air pollution due to a

overpressure in the

pipeline

Economic losses

4 2 8-M



at aditive treatments


maintenance to pipeline to ensure


5.3.1


flow that enter to

treatments drums

PIC 1218 with bypass system

LWCS03 and two manual valves

GWCS03 before and after

control valve; other bypass

system with a sample in manual

valve and SP 0088

Inefficient in the removal

of additive ALKAD

Possible contamination of

the ctalizer

3 3 9-MActivate bypass system opening to

stabilize until flow is stabilize

5.3.2

Overpressure in the


rupture

Same as 5.3.1

Same as 5.3.1

Air pollution due to a

possible rupture of the

pipeline


Risk to employees

Economic losses

3 2 6-MActivate bypass system opening to

stabilize until flow is stabilize


pipeline

Same as 5.3.1 Relief

valve PSV 2141/2146Same as 5.3.2 3 2 6-M Same as 5.3.2

5.3.5 Tea system fails opened Bypass system (LBCF06)

Increase the air pollution

due to a increase the

contaminants flow

2 2 4-L


sistem which is bypass system is


occur activate it

5.3.6Eyector system fails

openedDesviation system

Economic losses due to a

leak of the butane product2 1 2-L


eyector and activate the deviation

system

ADITIVE TREATMENTS D-31

A/B5

TEMPERATURE

LESS

HIGH

LESSPRESSURE




183


5.4.1



drums

PIC 1218 with bypass system

LWCS03 and two manual valves

GWCS03 before and after

control valve; other bypass

system with a sample in manual

valve and SP 0088


causing possible

vaporization of the N-

Butane

2 2 4-L




5.4.2Tea system falis closed due

to malfunctions

Bypass system (LBCF06) with

two manual valves GACF04 and

GBCF16 before and afeter safety

valve

Same as 5.4.1


causing possible hole

3 1 3-L Same as 5.3.5

5.4.3




Same as 5.4.1

Same as 5.4.1

Overpressure in the


rupture Air

pollution due to a possible

rupture Fire

explosion

Risk to employees

Economic losses

3 3 9-MPeriodic maintance to pipeline to

ensure proper operation

5.4.4PIC 1218 Fails closed PV

1218 due to malfunctions

Bypass system (LWCS03);

Desviation system with a

manual valve

Overpressure in the

pipeline generating

damage in the catalicer of

the U-106

Possible vaporization of

the hydrocarbon

Decreased the emotion in

the acid, water and aditive

3 2 6-M Same as 5.3.5

5.5.1


flow that enter to

treatments drums

No safeguards


of remove of the additive

ALKAD

Possible contamination of

the catalizer

2 3 6-M




5.5.2




Same as 5.5.2

Same as 5.5.2

Overpressure in the


rupture

3 2 6-M Same as 5.5.2


due to malfunctionsBypass system (LBCF06)

Increase the pollution due

to escape to contaminants 2 1 2-L Same as 5.3.5

5.5.4PIC 1218 Fails opened PV

1218



manual valve

Same as 5.5.1

Damage due to

overpressure in the D-01

and D-03 A/B


in the alumina treatments

D-09 A/B

3 2 5-M Same as 5.3.5

5.6.1



drums




valve

Possible vaporization into

the treatments drums

Increase the remotion

time

Damage in the catalicer

3 3 9-MInstall a flow indicator system in the

inlet of the treaters

5.6.2







valve

Same as 5.6.1

Overpressure in the

pipeline

Possible rupture in the

pipeline with possible fire

explosion

3 3 9-m Same as 5.6.1

5.6.3PIC 1218 Fails closed PV

1219



manual valve

Possible overpressure in

the pipeline causing a

ruptured

Overpressure in the

treaters

Damage in the catalizer

3 1 3-L Same as 5.3.5

HIGH

LEVEL

LESS

HIGH

PRESSURE

ADITIVE TREATMENTS D-31

A/B5




184

Annex 11 Application of HAZOP methodology to ALKAD Regeneration section


1.1.1 LESS

Considering but any possible

cause wasn't significant

identified

No safeguards Any important consequence 1 1 1-L Any recommendation

1.2.1 HIGH



identified


1.3.1 LESSPCV 3049 fails opened due to

malfunctionsPCV 3048 nitrogen supply

Decreasse the pressure in the

drum

Possible ingrese of air or

moisture

Possible contamination of the

aditive

Economic losses

4 2 8-M

Constant checking of the valve

functioning and report the state

of the valve for prevent fails

1.4.1PCV 3048 fails closed due to

malfunctions

Relief valve PSV 3050;

PCV 3049; Manual valve

(PCV 3048)

Increase the nitrogen flow and

in the design pressure of the

drum D-103

Possible leak of the additive

Risk to employees

Economic losses

3 2 6-M

Due to the process count with a

relief system which is one of

the most important safety

systems is requirid opened if

this cause could occur

Considering install a bypass

system for avoid problems if

the principal valve fails

1.4.2Inadvertent blocking of the

discharge P-104A (pumps)Relief valve PSV 3050

Overpressuure in the discharge

piping and possible damage the

pump

Leak of aditive

Air pollution

Risk to employees

Economic losses

4 2 8-M

Periodic maintenance of pump

because a inopportune damage

of this can generate large

overpressures in pipes and

equipment

1.5.1 LESS



identified


1.6.1 HIGH



identified


PRESSURE

HIGH

LEVEL

1

FRESH ADDITIVE

CHARGE - ADDITIVE

STORAGE DRUM D-103

TEMPERATURE

HAZOP Team: Figueroa Stefanny, Lombana Stefany and Ruiz Ingry


Process: Explain the process of addition and regeneration of the additive to the reaction section Study Section: ALKAD Regenaration

Meeting days: All days of Febrary to June

185


2.1.1

Decrease the steam flow in

the E-104A-D due to external

events

XV 3111; FT 3069; FV 3065

Increase the HF in the bottomos

of the T-101

Decrease in the polymeric

contaminants

Loss in the acid quality

Increase of the production of

organic fluorics

Presence of polymer in the

reaction section

4 2 8-M

Decrease the acid stream that

passes through the heat

exchangers E-104A-D

Install a flow indicator alarma

that worked with LV3100

2.1.2

Decrease the steam flow in

the E-101A-B due to external

events

FV 3001; TI 3066 Same as 2.1.1 4 2 8-M Same as 2.1.1

2.1.3FIC 3001 Fails closed due to

malfunctions


Manual valves (GDCF04)

Same as 2.1.1 Possible

overpressure with possible

rupture in the piping

Risk to employees

Air pollution

Equipment damage

Economic losses

4 2 8-M

Activate the bypass system for

mitigate or prevent injuries or

risk Constant

monitoring and check to

control loops for avoid probles

with the valves

2.1.4LV 3100 fails opened due to

malfunctions

Bypass system (LWCY01);


and after that level valve

(GDCF06)

Decreasse the temperature of

the stream Same

as 2.1.1

Economic losses due to use

inefficient of vapor

3 2 6-M

Close the manual valve that be

before the control valve until

the flow is regulated

2.1.5LV 3090 fails closed due to

malfunctions




(GBCF01)

Same as 2.1.4 3 2 6-M Same as 2.1.4

2.1.6FIC 3000 fails closed FV 3000

due to malfunctions

Bypass system (LBCF09);


and after that flow valve

(GBCF22); Vent system

for supply air if is

neccesary

Decreasse the temperature of

the stream Same

as 2.1.1


generating possible air

pollution Risk to

employees due to acid leak

Economic losses

4 2 8-M

Activate vent system for supply

the requested air

Activate bypass system

2.1.7FIC 3065 fails opened FV 3065

due to malfunctions




(GBCF13)

Same as 2.1.6 4 2 8-M


Install a flow indicator alarm

worked with the flow indicator

control


due to malfunctions




(GBCF22)

Same as 2.1.1

Possible damage in the pumps 3 2 6-M

Decrease the flow that exit in

the bottoms for maintance the

temperature in the towel

Close the manual valve is

before the control valce until


2.1.9TIC 3012 fails closed TV 3012

due to malfunctions

Bypass system (LBNF01);


and after that

temperature valve

(GBNF01); Vent system


neccesary

No consequences for the

temperature in the column


causing possible rupture


Risk to employees

Economic lossses

3 2 6-M


the requested air

Due to the process has a

security sistem which is bypass

system is recommendable if

this consequences occur

activate it

LESS





TEMPERATUREADDITIVE STRIPPER T-

1012

186


2.2.1Increase the steam flow in

the E-104A-DXV 3111; FT 3069; FV 3065 Ineficient use of the steam 2 3 6-M

Install a flow indicator in the

piping for controling the flow

Constant monitoring of the

piping for maintain the correct

functioning and avoid problems

2.2.2Increase the steam flow in

the E-101A-BFV 3001; TI 3066

Same as 2.2.1 Escape

of contaminant to the top

stream

Ineficient in the acid

regeneration

Increase in the pressure of the

tower

4 3 12-S Same as 2.2.1

2.2.3FIC 3001 Fails opened due to

malfunctions



and after the flow valve

(GDCF04)

Same as 2.2.2

Increase the steam level

Possible overpresure in the D-

105

4 2 8-M

Close the manual valve that be




malfunctions

Bypass system (LWCY01);



(GDCF06)

Same as 2.2.1

Overpressure in the piping

Possible rupture in the piping

causing equipment damage

3 2 6-M


Constant monitoring to the

control loops


malfunctions




(GBCF01)

Same as 2.2.4 3 2 6-M Same as 2.2.4


due to malfunctions






neccesary

Increase the acid concentration

in the bottoms

Possible flooding in the column

2 2 4-L


the requested air

Due to the process have a

security sistem wich is bypass



activate it


due to malfunctions




(GBCF13)

Possible damage in the heat

exchanger equipments


causing possible rupture Same

as 2.2.2

3 2 6-M Same as 2.2.4


due to malfunctions




(GBCF22)

Increased the steam in the top 1 1 1-L

Due to the process count with a

manual valves for help the

principal valve is necessary

close the manual valve that be




due to malfunctions



and after that

temperature valve



neccesary

Increase the polymer solubility

in the acid solution

Decrease the efficence of the

separation between acid and

polymer

2 1 1-L





activate it

HIGH





TEMPERATUREADDITIVE STRIPPER T-

1012

187


2.3.1LIC 3006 fails opened LV 3006

due to malfunctions

Bypass system (3NM2B);

Manual valve before and

after the level valve

(GBNF01)

Obstruction in the ingrese de

vapor isobutano1 2 2-L

Same as 2.2.9

Constant monitoring and check

to control loops

2.3.2

TIC 3002 fails sending a wrong

signal to FIC 3001 generating

less steam




(GDCF04)

Decreased the efficence in the

acid regeneration

Loss of acid in the tower

2 1 2-L Same as 2.3.1


malfunctions




(GDCF04)

Same as 2.1.1 Decrease the


aditive Increase HF

in the bottoms

Decrease pollutans remotion

Loss of acid quality

Polimerization in the reaction

section Possible

overpressure with possible


Risk to employees

Air pollution

Equipment damage

Economic losses

5 210-

M

Same as 2.2.9 Install a

flow indicator alarm that work

with flow indicator control for

garantize tha the necessary

flow enter to the column


due to malfunctions






neccesary

Increase the acid concentration

in the bottoms

Possible flooding in the column

2 2 4-L


the requested air


2.3.5

The temperature of the HF

inlet stream is less than

normal

TI 3003 Any important consequence 1 1 1-L Any importan recommendation

2.4.1LIC 3006 fails closed LV 3006

due to malfunctions




(GBNF01)

Inestability in the pressure due

to a obstruction of enter of

isobutane steam


generating possible rupture

Air pollution Risk

to employees

4 2 8-MActivate bypass system for

controling the flow

2.4.2

TIC 3002 fails sending a wrong

signal to FIC 3001 generating

more steam




(GDCF04)

Presence of contaminants in

the destillation column

Increase the contaminants in

the pollutans products


2 2 2-L


piping for controling the flow

and avoid that the pressure

profile change

Periodic check to the

equipments and pipeline

where we can get the correct

status of them

2.4.3FIC 3001 fails opened due to

malfunctions




(GDCF04)



the stea top

Loss of acid purity

Increase the organics fluorides


zone

3 2 6-M

Closed the manual valve than is

before the flow valve until

control the flow for avoid

overpressure and possible

rupture of the pipeling

2

LESS





HIGH

PRESSUREADDITIVE STRIPPER T-

101

188



due to malfunctions






neccesary

Loss of acid purity

Increase the production of

organic fluorides


zone

2 2 4-L

Activate the vent system for

generate the suficient air for

opened the valve


2.4.6

The temperature of the HF

inlet stream is higher than

normal

TI 3003


the destillation column

Increase the contaminants in

the pollutans products


2 1 1-L

Change the temperature

indicator for a temperature

alarm indicator

2.5.1LIC 3006 fails opened LV 3006

due to malfunctions




(GBNF01)

Obstrucción in the ingrese de

vapor isobutano1 1 1-L

Activate the bypass system

Constant monitoring and check

to control loops


due to malfunctions



and after that

temperature valve



neccesary

Presence of acid in the bottoms


causing possible rupture


Risk to employees

Economic lossses

3 1 3-L


the requested air



due to malfunctions




(GBCF13)





as 2.2.2

3 2 6-M



control loops


due to malfunctions




(GBCF22)

Increased the steam in the top 1 1 1-L

Closed the manual valve that be



2.6.1LIC 3006 fails closed LV 3006

due to malfunctions




(GBNF01)

Inestability in the pressure due

to a obstruction of enter of

isobutane steam



Air pollution Risk

to employees

3 1 3-L





activate it for control the flow

2.6.2TIC 3012 fails opened TV 3012

due to malfunctions



and after that

temperature valve



neccesary

Increase the polymer solubility

in the acid solution

Decrease the efficence of the


polymer

3 2 6-M Same as 2.6.1


due to malfunctions




(GBCF13)





as 2.2.2

2 2 4-L

Same as 2.6.1


control loops


due to malfunctions




(GBCF22)

Potential flooding in the tower 1 1 1-L

Open the manual valve that be



PRESSURE HIGH

LEVEL

LESS

HIGH





ADDITIVE STRIPPER T-

1012

189


3.1.1 LESS

Cooling water is more cooler

than normal due to

enviromental effects

TI 3084 Any important consequence 1 1 1-L Any recommendation

3.2.1 HIGH

Decrease the cooling water

flow due to fails in manual

valves or decrease in the flow

TI 3084

Possible vaporization of HF in

the tank Increasse

the time of separation

2 2 4-L

Considere install a flow

indicator alarm in the cooling

water piping for chek the

correct temperature in this

stream


due to malfunctions



and after the pressure

valve; PIC 3026; LIC 3032;

PI 3112; Bypass system

All flow is forced through the

condensers

Over time potential to have

high level in the receivers

creating back pressure

Potential to overpressure the

Additive Stripper Risk to

employees

Economic losses

4 2 8-M

Same as 2.6.1


equipment and pipeline where

we can get the correct status of

them


due to malfunctions




valve (GBCF22)

Same as 3.3.1



4 2 8-M Same as 3.3.1

3.4.1 HIGHPIC 3026 fails opened PV 3026

due to malfunctions




valve; PIC 3026; LIC 3032;

PI 3112; Bypass system

Loss of flow through

condensers

Potential to overpressure the

Additive Stripper

Risk to employees

3 2 6-M Same as 3.3.1


malfunctions

LIC 3006; Bypass system

(LBCF09) Potential flooding in the tower 1 1 1-L

Open the manual valve that be




malfunctionsBypass system (LBCF09)

Possible lost of nivel of the

interfase acid/isobutane in the

D-102 Cavitation

of the P-102 A/B

2 1 2-L Same as 3.3.1


malfunctions

A manual valve after the

flow valve (GBCF22)

Decrease the removal of the

contaminants of the acid

Losses of acid purity

Increase the production of

organics fluorides

3 2 6.M

Closed the manual valve

Install a flow indicator that

worked with flow indicator

control


malfunctionsBypass system (LBCF09)

Cavitation in the pumps P-103

A/B2 2 4-L

Due to the process have a






malfunctions

P 103A-B; FIC 3035; A

manual valve after the

flow valve (GBCF22)

Increase the acid loss in the

bottoms of V-03

Possible flooding in the V-03

2 2 4-L

Activate the valve that is after

the flow valve to control the

flow


malfunctions

FIC 3039; P-102A/B;

Bypass system (LBCF09)

Increase the level in the D-103

More time of separation

between acid and isobutane

Overpressure with possible


3 2 6-M Same as 3.5.4

3ADDITIVE STRIPPER

RECEIVER D-102

TEMPERATURE

PRESSURE

LESS

LEVEL

LESS

HIGH





190


4.1.1 LESS



identified

Any safeguards Any important consequence 1 1 1-L Any recommendation

4.2.1 HIGH

Loss of cooling water the E-

102A-G due to fails in manual

valves or in the stream

TI 3015

Stop the slip stream flow

through the E-102 Potential

hotter temperatures in the

Bottom Separator leading to

hotter Polymer to the Polymer

Surge Drum and Neutralizing

Drum Potential for higher

corrosion rates leading to

vessel replacement and

reduced capacity to neutralize

4 3 12-S


Cooling Water system to ensure

the temperature profile in the

column

4.3.1 LESS



identified


4.4.1 HIGH



identified


4.5.1 LESS



identified



malfunctions




(GBNF01)

Lower interface level in the

separator and potential to send

Polymer with the Complex to

the Alky Unit Over time loss of

acid purity. Resulting in acid

runaway Potential for

corrosion, leaks, and personnel

injury

4 2 8-M

Same as 3.5.4


equipments and pipeline

where we can get the correct

status of them


malfunctions

Bypass system (LDNF01);



(GDNF01)

Higher Polymer flow to the

Polymer Surge Drum Higher

interface level in the bottom

separator Potential for some of

the Complex to get into the

Polymer Surge Drum

3 2 6-M Same as 4.5.2

4.5.4TV 3012 fails opened due to

malfunctions



and after that

temperature valve



neccesary

Potential to cool the bottoms of

the separator to approximately

100 degrees Potential to cool

the Polymer below its pour

point and plugging/fouling in

the bottom circuit Worst case is

having to shutdown Alkad to

clean the bottoms circuit

4 2 8-M

Same as 4.5.2

Activate vent system for close

the valve to operational values

4

FLOW

HIGH

TEMPERATURE

PRESSURE





ADDITIVE STRIPPER

BOTTOMS SEPARATOR

D-101

191


4.6.1P-101 pumps stop due to

malfunctions

LIC 3021; PIC 3026; LAH

3023

Stop flow of Complex to the

Alky Unit Potential for higher

interface level in the Bottoms

Separator, D-101 The loss of

flow out of the Bottoms

Separator can result in higher

levels in the Additive Stripper,

T-101 Worse case is the

potential for overpressure of

the Additive Stripper overhead

system resulting in potential for

loss of containment

4 2 8-M

Periodic maintenance of pump

because a inopportune damage

of this can generate large

overpressures in pipes and

equipment

Considered install a turbine for

generate more energy in the

pumps and ensure their

function


malfunctions




(GBNF01)

The loss of flow out of the

Bottoms Separator resulting in

higher levels in the Additive

Stripper. Worse case is the

potential for overpressure of

the Additive Stripper overhead

system resulting in potential for

loss of containment. Potential

for fire and personnel injury.

4 2 8-M






Stop flow of Complex to the

Alky Unit

Potential for higher interface

level in the Bottoms Separator.


malfunctions

Bypass system (LDNF01);



(GDNF01)

Lower interface level in the

separator and potential to send

Polymer with the Complex to

the Alky Unit Over time loss of

acid purity Resulting in acid

runaway Potential for

corrosion, leaks, and personnel

injury

4 2 8-M

Stop Polymer flow to the

Polymer Surge Drum

Activate vent system for try to

open the valve Due

to the process have a security


recommendable if this


for control the flow

4.6.4TV 3012 fails closed due to

malfunctions



and after that

temperature valve



neccesary

Potential hotter temperatures

in the Bottom Separator leading

to hotter Polymer to the

Polymer Surge Drum and

Neutralizing Drum Potential for

higher corrosion rates leading

to vessel replacement and

reduced capacity to neutralize

4 2 8-M

Activate vent system for try to

open the valve


Stop the slip stream flow

through the E-102

4.7.1 LESS



identified


4.7.2 HIGH



identified


FLOW

ADDITIVE STRIPPER

BOTTOMS SEPARATOR

D-101

4

NO

LEVEL





192

Annex 12 Application of HAZOP methodology to HF Regeneration section


1.1.1

FV 1180 fails closed

decreasing the inlet

steam flow rate in the

isobutane superheater E-

17

TI 1628, TI 1178 with a high

and low temperature alarm,

PI 1622, TW 1629, LIC 2470

with a high level alarm, TI

1072/TI 1073 with a high

temperature alarm, TI 1176

with a low temperature

alarm, TIC 1178 with a lower

temperature alarm, LI-1075

with high level alarm on

regenerator, Bypass around

FV 1180

The steam flow is not

enough to heat the

isobutane stream which

enters in the superheater

causing decrease in the HF

regeneration efficiency.

Increase in the HF losses in

the bottom of the stripper or

regenerator V-03. Decrease

in the Condensate level D-28

and flooding in the bottom

of the column. Corrosion in

the column V-03. Economic

losses.

2 2 4-L

Realice periodic sampling

procedures to measures the real

temperature in this stream.

Constant maintenance to the

superheater and valves to ensure

the correct operation of this

equipments. Constant monitoring of

controllers. Periodic operator

procedures.

1.1.2

Decrease in the

Isobutane inlet flow in

the superheater E-17

TIC 1178, TI 1179, TW 1630

Decrease in the HF

regeneration efficiency due

to decrease in the bottom

temperature and possible

flooding. Increase in the HF

losses in the bottom of the

stripper or regenerator V-03

to the polymer surge drum.

Corrosion in the column V-

03. Increase in the

superheating temperature

causing possible

overpressure in it with

possible rupture or leak in a

tube.

2 2 4-L

Install a FIC in the inlet stream

which works with FIC 1180 to

regulate the steam flow rate to

ensure the correct inlet

temperature.

1.1.3

The isobutane from the

superheater inlet

temperature is lower

than normal


1.1.4

LV 2470 fails closed

increasing the

condensate level causing

decrease in the steam

flow rate in the

superheater E-17

Same as 1.1.1.

LIC-2470 with a high level

alarm, LI-1075 with high

level alarm, Bypass system

around LV 2470.

Same as 1.1.1 2 2 4-L

The condensate pot has enough

safeguards but it is important realice

constant monitoring to the existing

safeguards and equipments. Also,

operator procedures and training.

1.1.5


stream (regenerating

isobutane and HF from

the reaction section) is

cooler than normal

TI 1072, TI 1073

Decrease in the top

temperature in the V-03 .

Decrease in the HF


Drag of isobutane and HF

with polymer stream in the

bottom. Flooding in the

bottom. Economic losses

2 2 4-L

Install a TIC in each line

(Regeneration isobutane from the

depropanizer and HF stripper and Hf

from the Reaction section) to

monitoring the inlet temperature

and do a loop control with a valve

which control the inlet flow rate to

hot isobutane in the bottom of the

column V-03.


LESS TEMPERATURE

Acid Regenerator V-03,

IsoButane Superheater

E-17, Iso Butane

Superheater

Condensate Pot D-28

1


Process: Explain the process of removal of polymer and humidity of the hydrofluoric acid Study Section: HF Regeneration

193


1.1.6 TV 1168 fails opened

TI 1176 with low

temperature alarm, LI 1075

with high level alarm on

regenerator, TI 1072 and TI-

1073 with high temperature

alarm, TIC 1178 with low

temperature alarm, Hand

wheel on TV 1168.


rate to the V-03 causing

flooding in the one plate.

More reflux leading to

column flooding. Potential

for colder operation in the

bottom of the regenerator

and flooding. Potential for

corrosion in the column and

loss of acid to the polymer

surge drum.

2 2 4-L

Change the ubication of the existing

FI in the line after valve TV1168.

Periodic monitoring of this indicator

for part of operator.

1.1.7 FV 1171 fails opened Same as 1.1.6


rate to the V-03 causing

flooding in the five plate.

Potential for colder

operation in the bottom of

the regenerator and

flooding. Potential for

corrosion in the column and

loss of acid to the polymer

surge drum.

2 2 4-L

Install a manual valve and FI in the

line from ALKAD regeneration

section and close the intermittent

flow. Periodic maintenance to valve

FV 1171 and the existing safeguards.

1.1.8

Wrong operation of

superheater E-17

decreasing the heat

transfer

LIC2470, PI1622, TI1628,

TIC1178Same as 1.1.2 2 2 4-L Same as 1.1.1

1.1.9 Operational problems in

the condenser D-28 Same as 1.1.4 Same as 1.1.1 2 2 4-L Same as 1.1.4

1.2.1 HIGH

FV 1180 fails opened

increasing the inlet


isobutane superheater E-

17

Same as 1.1.1


Higher corrosion in the

column V-03. Drag of

pollutants to isostripper

section. Increase in the

pollutants in the product

stream. Increase the level in

the condensate pot causing


explosion. Economic losses.

3 2 6-M

This line counts with the enough

loop controls, controllers and

indicators but it is important relice

constant monitoring to the

operating variables and

maintenance to the equipments and

existing safeguards. Also, operator


LESS


TEMPERATURE



E-17, Iso Butane

Superheater

Condensate Pot D-28

1



194


1.2.2 FV 1171 fails closed

Intermittent flow from

ALKAD section, Lab

sampling, hand wheel on FV

1171, TIC 1168 which will

add reflux to maintain the

overhead temperature of

the regenerator.

Decrease in the HF inlet flow

rate decreasing the

remotion of soluble

pollutants in the acid. For a

short period of time, there

are no significant

consequences. For a longer

period of time, potential for

hotter overhead

temperature in the

regenerator. Loss of acid

purity resulting in acid

runaway. Potential for

corrosion, leaks, and

personnel injury. Losses in

the acid purity. Increase in

the production of organics

fluorides and polimerization

4 3 12-S

Install a FIC in the inlet line of the

regenerator V-03 (after valve FV

1171) which works with a flow valve

in the intermittent flow line to

increase the flow rate in case of this

valve or FIC 1171 which regulate the

valve fails and mantein the

operational range (626 BDP). Verify

sampling schedule and frequency

for isobutane and Olefin Feed.

Consider adding an HF / Water acid

analyzer on the E-28/E28A reactor

acid circulation loop. Create a

calculation in PCS for the V-03 acid

regenerator Isobutane and acid

ratio.

1.2.3

The isobutane from the

superheater inlet

temperature is higher

than normal


1.2.4 TV 1168 malfunctions

closed

FI-1170 flow indication.

TI-1625 temperature

indication.

Hand wheel on TV-1168.

Decrease in the isobutane

from the depropanizer and

HF stripper section. Higher

corrosion in the column V-

03. Drag of pollutants to

isostripper section.Loss of

Regenerator reflux resulting

in higher overhead

temperatures. Potential for

higher corrosion in the acid

regenerator. Over a longer

period of time, potential for

increased impurities in the

acid. Over time, potential for

acid runaway.

4 3 12-S

Install a higher temperature alarm in

the line. Constant monitoring to the

temperature in the control room.


controllers (adjust the set point) and

valves to avoid this kind of problems

in the plant.

1.2.5


stream (regenerating

isobutane and Hf from

the reaction section) is

higher than normal

Same as 1.1.5

Increase in the top

temperature in the V-03.

Higher corrosion in the

column V-03. Drag of




stream.

2 2 4-L Same as 1.1.5

HIGH TEMPERATURE



E-17, Iso Butane

Superheater

Condensate Pot D-28

1




195


1.3.1

Rupture in some (inlet or

outlet) pipes to the

regenerator V-03

FIC 1171, FI 1170, PI 1622

Possible fire explosion for

hydrocarbon spill. Air

pollution


for acid spill (possible died

of employees if one of them

are exposure to high

concentration). Equipment

damage Economic

losses. Stop and complete

evacuation of the unit.

4 2 8-M

Periodic maintenance to the pipes.

Install a FI in the outlet pipe in the

bottom of the regenerator. If it is

possible install a FI in the inlet pipe

(in the bottom of the tower).

1.3.2


the top of the

regenerator is open

No safeguards Same as 1.3.1 4 3 12-S

Change this valve for a security

valve (PSV) in the top of the column

with a bypass system and send the

stream to flare header and reduce

the risk for the employees to

contaminate with HF.

1.3.3

Decrease in the tower

temperature due to

cause above analyzed

TI 1073/TI 1072 with a high

temperature alarm, TI 1176

with a low temperature

alarm, TIC 1168

Decrease in the HF


Increase in the HF losses in

the bottom of the stripper or

regenerator V-03. decrease

in the Condensate level D-28

and flooding in the bottom

of the column. Corrosion in

the column V-03. Economic

losses.

2 2 4-L

Periodic monitoring to the

temperature and analyze all the

recommendation that the team

analyze in the less temperature.

1.3.4

PSV 1988 fails open

decreasing the inlet flow

of hot isobutane in the

bottom

Manual valves GBCF13,

GACF04. Same as 1.1.1 Same as 1.1.1 2 2 4-L Same as 1.1.1

1.3.5

Decrease in the partial

pressure of each

compounds

No safeguards

Increase in the pollutants

vaporization. Decrease of

acid losses but decrease the

remotion of pollutants.

2 4 8-M

Install a pressure indicator in the top

of the column and do constant

monitoring to this parameter.

1.3.6

Increase in the

isobutane/HF acid ratio

causing a decrease in the

partial pressure of other

compounds

No safeguards Same as 1.3.5 2 4 8-M

Install a pressure indicator in the top

of the column and do constant

monitoring to this parameter.



E-17, Iso Butane

Superheater

Condensate Pot D-28

1 PRESSURE




LESS

196


1.4.1

Decrease in the

isobutane/HF acid ratio

causing a increase in

partial pressure of other

compounds

No safeguards

Decrease in the pollutants

vaporization. Drag of acid in

the outlet bottom stream.

Increase in the remotion of

pollutants in the bottom of

the tower. Economic losses

2 4 8-M


regenerator to control and

monitoring this parameter.

1.4.2

Increase in partial

pressure of each

compounds

No safeguards Same as 1.4.1 2 4 8-M Same as 1.4.1


regenerator temperature Same as 1.1.1

The increase in the tower

temperature can has a lot of

consequences but those

depends of what is the cause

of this deviation in the

process, due to this

parameter and deviation

were analayze before see

the possible consequences

which stay above.

2 2 4-LSee the recomendations for the

HIGH TEMPERATURE

1.4.4

Tamponade in the exit

line of the superheater

(hot isobutane stripping

stream)

PSV 1988

Potential overpressure in

the superheater causing

possible rupture or leak in

the tube, contamination of

condensate and presence of

hydrocarbon in the

condensate pot, Damage in

equipment due to corrosion

due to potential for leak of

steam into the process.

2 2 4-L

Periodic operator procedures and

training. Periodic maintenance to

security valve and monitoring of the

set point. In the same way

monitoring and maintenance to

condensate pot.

1.4.5 Decrease in the inlet flow

rate to the regenerator

TV 1168, FV 1171, Reflux

stream

Increase in the temperature

in the tower causing higher

corrosion in the V-03. Drag of




stream. Increase the level in

the condensate pot causing


explosion. Economic losses.

3 3 9-M See the recomendations for the

HIGH TEMPERATURE

1.4.6 Flooding in the bottom of

the tower

LI 1075 with high and lower

level alarm

Drag of pollutants to

isostripper section. Increase

in the pollutants in the

product stream. HF losses in

the bottom. Wrong

operation of the tower,

superheater E-17 and

condensate pot.

3 2 6-M

Periodic monitoring of the level

indicator and the equipments

including the indicators and vessels.



E-17, Iso Butane

Superheater

Condensate Pot D-28

1 PRESSURE




HIGH

197


1.5.1

LI 1075 fails sending a

wrong signal to the

control room

TI 1176 with a low

temperature alarm, TI

1072/1073 with high

temperature alarm, LT 1075

which is not exposure to

the fluid.

Draining the column than

needed leading to potential

mechanical damage in the

equipment. Shutdown the

unit to repair the damage.

Economic losses

3 2 6-M Maintenance to the LI 1075, operator

training to avoid human error.

1.5.2

Decrease the inlet flow

rate to the regenerator

decreasing the level in

the regenerator bottom

FIC 1171, FI 1170, PI 1622, LI

1075 with high and lower

level alarm

Same as 1.4.5 3 2 6-MSee the recomendations for the

HIGH TEMPERATURE

1.5.3 Manual valve LBNF01 is

closed


level alarmSame as 1.4.5 3 3 9-M

Periodic operator procedures and

training. Periodic maintenance to

manual valve.

1.5.4

Increase in the heat

transfer in the

superheater E-17

increasing the isobutane

stripping temperature

which inlet in the column


1.5.5 TV 1168 fails closed Same as 1.5.3 Same 1.4.5 3 3 9-M

Maintenance to the loop controls

and valves with the objective to

avoid this kind of errors in the unit


line


level alarm

Flooding in the bottom.


stream from the superheater

causing overpressure in the

line with possible rupture or

leak in it. Bad compounds

separation for the wrong

tower operation.

2 3 6-M

Maintenance to the indicators LI

1075 and realize periodic operator


1.6.2 TV 1168 fails opened Same as 1.1.6 Same as 1.1.6 1 2 2-L Same as 1.1.6

1.6.3


temperature from the

superheater due to a bad

heat transfer



to the regenerator

GBCF22, TI1072, TI1073, LI

1075 with high and lower

level alarm

The stream of hot isobutane

is not enough to separate

the compounds causing HF

losses in the bottom and

drag of pollutant to

isostripper section. Wrong

operation of the tower,

superheater E-17 and

condensate pot.

3 2 6-M Same as 1.3.1

LEVEL

HIGH



E-17, Iso Butane

Superheater

Condensate Pot D-28

1




LESS

198


1.6.5 HIGH

LI 1075 fails sending a

wrong signal to the

control room

Heat tracing on the bottom

of the piping, Procedures to

flush the bottom line after

every

dump, TI 1072 and TI 1073

with high temperature

alarm, Design of the LT is

nuclear and external to the

vessel (no fluid exposure).

Operator does not dump

when needed due to bad LI

reading. Higher level with

potential to flood. Potential

to shutdown the regenerator

and the Alky unit, if plug is

not removed in short time.

3 3 9-M Same as 1.5.1

1.7.1 NO Same as less Same as less Same as less Same as less

2.1.1 Decrease in the steam

inlet temperature

TI 1184/1185/1186/1187 is

located in the liquid level

Potential polymer set up in

the vessel. Delay in transfer

the polymer neutralizer

drum D-17.

2 2 4-L

Consider install a temperature

indicator in the inlet pipe (steam

line and polymer from V-03 line) to

monitoring this variable, If it is

possible install a temperature valve

in the steam line which works with a

TIC located in the polymer from V-03

line to regulate the steam flow.

2.1.2

Manual valve LWCS01 is

closed decreasing the

steam inlet flow rate

Same as 2.1.1 Same as 2.1.1 2 2 4-L

Replace the manual valve LWCS01

for a temperature valve controlled

by TIC to avoid human errors

2.1.3

The polymer stream from

V-03 is cooler than

normal

Same as 2.1.1. Clamp-on

steam jacket Same as 2.1.1 2 2 4-L Same as 2.1.1


rate from V-03

TI 1184/1185/1186/1187,

PSV 1183


drum causing potential fire

for overpressure and injuries

to employees and

sourronding areas

4 2 8-M Same as 2.1.1

2.2.1 Increase the low pressure

steam inlet temperature Same as 2.1.1

The residence time in the

drum is more than normal

due the increase in solubility

of the azeotrope. Inefficient

use of steam

3 2 6-M Same as 2.1.1

2.2.2 Manual valve LWCS01

fails opened Same as 2.1.4 Same as 2.2.1. 3 2 6-M Same as 2.1.2


rate to the regeneratorSame as 2.1.4

Drag to acid and traces of

polymer to flare header

causing air pollutions and

potential injuries to

employees and citizens.

4 2 8-M Same as 2.1.1

LEVEL



E-17, Iso Butane

Superheater

Condensate Pot D-28

1

2POLYMER SURGE DRUM

D-16




HIGH

TEMPERATURE

LESS

199


2.3.1 PSV 1183 fails opened GBCF 22, bypass system

around PSV 1183

Air pollution. Risk to

employees and equipment. 3 3 9-M


Realize periodic maintenance to the

safety and manual valves. Operator

procedures and training.

2.3.2 Decrease in the nitrogen

flow rate

GWCS01, GFCS05, Line to

flare header

Inefficient displacement of

polymer and drag of water to

the neutralizer drum

2 2 4-L

Install a flow indicator in the N2 line

to monitoring this operational

variable.

2.3.3 Decrease in the level in

the drum LAL 1188A/B Drag of water to the neutralizer drum 2 2 4-L

Maintenance to the LAL. Periodic


2.3.4


the top of the

regenerator is open



safety and manual valves. Consider

install a pressure indicator in the

surge drum and consider eliminate

this valve to the polymer surge

drum. Operator procedures and

training.

2.4.1 Increase in the nitrogen

flow rate Same as 2.3.2

Overpressure in the system.

Polymer can escape by

breaking the flexible lines.

3 2 6-M

Same as 2.3.2. Install a pressure

indicator in the top of the drum with

the objective of monitoring this

operational variable

2.4.2 Increase in the inside

temperature Same as 2.1.4

Overpressure in the system

causing potential fire and

injury to the employees.



4 2 8-M


temperature indicators and install a

pressure indicator. Periodic

operator training and procedures.

2.4.3 PSV 1183 fails closed Bypass system Same as 2.4.2 4 2 8-M Same as 2.3.4. Same as 2.4.2

2.4.4 Increase in the level

inside the drum LAHH 1181/1182

Drag of polymer to the top

line spill to atmosphere.

Potential fire. Risk to the

employees and the

equipments. Economic

losses

4 2 8-M

Periodic maintenance to LAHH and

monitoring of LAHH in the control

room. Periodic operator training and

procedures.


lineLAHH 1181/1182, LAL 1188 A/B

Increase in the level inside

the drum causing drag of

polymer in the top line.

Same as 2.4.4.

4 2 8-M Constant maintenance to the pipe.

2.5.1


rate to the polymer surge

drum D-16

Same as 2.3.3

Drag of polymer to

neutralization drum require

frequent KOH regeneration

spending KOH faster in the

HF relief system. Economic

losses

3 3 9-M

Constant monitoring to the AI in the

control room and the indicators in

the drum D-16 and D-17.

2.5.2

AE 1193 fails sending a

wrong signal to AI 1193

draining the acid water

LAL 1188A/B, TI 2540, LI 1279 Same as 2.5.1 3 2 6-M Same as 2.5.1

POLYMER SURGE DRUM

D-16

LEVEL

2




PRESSURE

LESS

HIGH

LESS

200


2.6.1


rate from the regenerator

V-03

GBCF 22

Drag of polymer to the

nitrogen and PSV inlet

piping. Polymer spill with

potential fire and personnel

injury. Possible explosion.

4 2 8-M


line from regenerator V-03 to

monitoring this operational

variable.

2.6.2 Tamponade in the

draining lines Same as 2.4.5

Decrease the level polymer

neutralizer D-17. Same as

2.6.1

4 2 8-M

Periodic maintenance to the pipe

and do a schedule to realize this

action. Periodic operator training

and procedures

2.6.3 Increase the flow rate

from D-101 GDNF01

Drag of polymer to the

nitrogen and PSV inlet

piping. Polymer spill with

potential fire and personnel

injury.

3 3 9-M


line from D-101 with a flow valve to

control the inlet flow from the alkad

section D-101


3.1.1

Decrease in the low

pressure steam inlet

temperature

TI 1196


the vessel. Delay in transfer

to the polymer neutralizer

drum or the regenerator V-

03

2 2 4-L


indicator in the inlet pipe to


variable, If it is possible install a

temperature valve in the steam line

which works with a TIC to regulate

the steam flow.


fails closed Same as 3.1.1 Same as 3.1.1 2 2 4-L

Install a temperature valve

controled by TIC to avoid human

errors

3.1.3

The polymer stream from

D-16 is cooler than

normal


steam jacket Same as 3.1.1 2 2 4-L Same as 3.1.1


rate LG 1195/1197, TI 1196




to employees

4 2 8-M Same as 3.1.1

3.1.5 Decrease in the steam

inlet flow rateTI 1196 Same as 3.1.1 2 3 6-M Same as 3.1.1

3.2.1 HIGHPresence of acid water in

the drum

TI 1196, Drain the water

from polymer surge drum

after the acid regenerator

dump

The KOH reacts with the acid

water approaching to the

design temperature.


drum with potential fire and

spill of polymer and traces of

HF and KOH to atmosphere.

Potential personnel injury

into the plant and

sourronding areas .

3 2 6-M

Control and constant monitoring to

the draining system. Maintenance to

the temperature indicator to

prevent the wrong signal to the

control room. Personnel training

and constant procedures.

TEMPERATURE POLYMER NEUTRALIZER

D-17 3

LEVEL POLYMER SURGE DRUM

D-16 2




HIGH

LESS

201


3.2.2Increase the low pressure


The residence time in the

drum is more than normal

due the increase in solubility

of the azeotrope. Inefficient

use of steam

2 2 4-L Same as 3.1.1

3.2.3 Manual valve LWCS01 is

opened TI 1196


drum with potential fire and

spill of polymer and traces of

HF and KOH to atmosphere.

Potential personnel injury

into the plant and

sourronding areas.

2 3 6-M Same as 3.1.2

3.2.4


flow rate to the camp on

jacket


3.2.5

Decrease in the inlet flow

rate to the neutralizer D-

17 from D-16

Reflux stream, stream from

S-05. Same as 3.2.3

Inefficient use of steam and

KOH. Same as 3.2.3 4 2 8-M Same as 3.1.1

3.3.1 PSV 1194 fails opened GACF04Air pollution. Risk to

employees and equipment. 3 2 6-M






flow rate

GWCS04, GFCS05, LFCS04,

Line to flare header

Inefficient displacement of

polymer to closed drain

drum

2 2 4-L

Install a flow indicator in nitrogen

line to monitoring this operational

variable.

3.3.3 Decrease in the level in

the polymer neutralizer LG 1195/1197

No displacemento to the the

closed drain drum. Potential

corrosion

2 2 4-LMaintenance to the LG. Periodic


3.3.4

Manual valve GWCS07 in

the top of the vessel is

open




procedures and training. Consider if

it is necessary this manual valve in

the vessel.

3.4.1 Increase in the nitrogen


Overpressure in the system.



3 2 6-M

Same as 3.3.2. Install a pressure

indicator in the top of the drum with

the objective of monitoring this

operational variable


temperature TI 1196






4 2 8-M


temperature indicator and install a

pressure indicator. Periodic


3.4.3 PSV 1183 fails closed Bypass system around valve

PSV 1183, GWCS07Same as 3.4.2 4 1 4-L Same as 3.3.4. Same as 3.4.2

POLYMER NEUTRALIZER

D-17 3

PRESSURE

HIGHTEMPERATURE




HIGH

LESS

202


3.4.4Increase in the level

inside the drum Same as 3.3.3

Drag of polymer and KOH to

the top line spill to

atmosphere. Potential fire.

Risk to the employees and

the equipments. Increase in

the level to closed drain

drum. Economic losses

4 2 8-M

Periodic maintenance to LG and

monitoring the signal that those

send in the control room. Periodic



line

Line to P-12A/B, Drain line

in the middle to the vessel

with a manual valve,

injection of N2, Reflux

stream. Same as 3.3.3

Same as 3.4.4. 4 2 8-M

Maintenance to the pipes and

manual valves. Periodic monitoring

to the LG signal in the control room.


training.

3.5.1


rate to the polymer

neutralizer D-17 from D-

16

Same as 3.3.3

Require frequent KOH

regeneration spending KOH

faster in the HF relief

system. Economic losses

2 2 4-L

Constant monitoring to the LG in the

control room and the indicators in

the drum D-16 and D-17. Install a

flow indicator in the inlet line to the

polymer neutralizer D-17 from D-16.

3.5.2 Pump out the KOH No safeguards

Potential to get polymer into

the neutralization system

relief gas scrubber.

2 2 4-L

Monitoring to the pumps and

periodic operator procedures and

training


from the alkyl flush Same as 3.3.3 Same as 3.5.1 2 2 4-L Same as 3.5.1

3.6.1 LG 1195 is tamponade

LI 2702 in the closed drain

drum, stream of alkylate

flush

Potential to overfill the

neutralizer and send KOH to

the Cracked slop tank that is

eventually routed to the

Delayed Coker Unit.

Resulting in a loss of KOH.

Economic losses.

3 2 6-M Same as 3.4.4


from the alkyl flush Same as 3.3.3 Same as 3.6.1 3 2 6-M Same as 3.4.4

3.6.3


rate to the polymer

neutralizer D-17 from D-

16

Same as 3.3.3

KOH is not enough to

neutralize the polymer and

traces of acid present in that.

Drag to acid and acid water

to the closed drain drum

causing possible corrosion in

the vessel.

3 2 6-M Same as 3.5.1

3.6.4 Increase in the pumping

of KOHNo safeguards Economic losses 2 3 6-M Same as 3.5.2


PRESSURE




HIGH

LEVEL

LESS

HIGH

POLYMER NEUTRALIZER

D-17 3

203


4.1.1

Decrease in the low

pressure steam inlet

temperature

TI 2704 with low

temperature alarm


the vessel. Potential

mechanical damage in the

pump P-09A/B. Economic

losses

3 2 6-M

Change the TI 2704 for a TIC and

install a temperature valve in the

inlet steam pipe which works with

this controller. Consider install a TI

in the vessel


fails closed Same as 4.1.1 Same as 4.1.1 3 2 6-M

Same as 4.1.1. Install a bypass

system in the line

4.1.3 The inlet stream is cooler

than normal


steam jacket Same as 4.1.1 3 2 6-M Same as 4.1.1


rate

LI 2702 with higher and

lower level alarm, LG 2702.

Same as 4.1.1.




to employees

4 1 4-L Same as 4.1.1

4.1.5Decrease in the steam

inlet flow rateSame as 4.1.1 Same as 4.1.1 3 2 6-M Same as 4.1.1

4.2.1Increase the low pressure



Increase the pressure inside


personnel injury. Economic

losses

2 2 4-L Same as 4.1.1


fails opened Same as 4.1.1 Same as 4.2.1 2 2 4-L Same as 4.1.2


rate Same as 4.1.4 Same as 4.2.1 2 2 4-L Same as 4.1.1

4.2.4


flow rate to the camp on

jacket


4.3.1 Manual valve GACF04 is

open PI 2709

Polymer spill to atmosphere.

Potential fire.


the equipments.

Economic losses.

3 2 6-M

Realize periodic maintenance to

manual valves. Operator procedures

and training.


flow rate

Bypass system, PI 2714, PI

2709

No important consequences

identified. 1 1 1-L

Install a flow indicator in the line to


variable.

4.3.3Decrease in the level in

the drum


level alarm, LG2703

NPSH to pump P-09A/B is not

enough. Mechanical damage

to pump.

2 1 2-LMaintenance to the LI. Periodic


4.3.4

Manual valve GWCS03 in

the top of the vessel is

open


Realize periodic maintenance to

manual valve. Operator procedures

and training. Consider if it is

necessary this manual valve in the

vessel. Analyze if this valve can

change for a safety valve.




PRESSURE

CLOSED DRAIN DRUM D-

404 4

TEMPERATURE

LESS

HIGH

LESS

204


4.4.1

Bypass system of PCV

2700 is opened increasing

the nitrogen flow rate

PI 2714, RO2716

Full Nitrogen pressure on

the drum and vent header.

Worst case would be during

vessel de-commissioning

with the vent line blocked

in. Potential overpressure of

the drum D-404 leading to


containment, and personnel

injury.

5 4 20-H

Consider moving the PI-2714 and

restrictive orifice (RO) in the

nitrogen line to D-404 vent

downstream of the bypass PCV-

2700. Install a pressure indicator in

the top of the drum with the

objective of monitoring this

operational variable. revising the

design pressure of the D-404 Closed

Drain Drum because the maximum

nitrogen pressure on the purge to

the drum and vent piping is

approximately 95 psig and the

current design pressure of the drum

is 50 psig.


temperature

TI 2704 with low

temperature alarm






3 3 9-M


temperature indicator. Consider

change the location of TI 2704 or

install another temperature

indicator in the vessel and higher

temperature alarm. Periodic


4.4.3

LWCS03 fails open

allowing the passage of

the stream of flushing oil

from distribution

No safeguards reverse flow to the flare

header. Same as 4.4.2 3 3 9-M Same as 3.3.4. Same as 3.4.2

4.4.4 Increase in the level

inside the drum Same as 4.1.4 Same as 4.4.2 4 1 4-L


existing safeguards and monitoring

the signal that those send in the

control room. Periodic operator

training and procedures.


lineSuction of pump P-09A/B Same as 4.4.2 4 2 8-M

Maintenance to the pipes, valves

and pump. Periodic monitoring to

the LI signal in the control room.


training.

4.4.6

PCV 2700 fails opened

increasing the N2 inlet

flow

Same as 4.4.1 Same as 4.4.1 5 4 20-H Same as 4.4.1

4.5.1 Continue pumping when

not supposed to


temperature alarm, PCS UC-

32 pump shutoff at low low

level, LG 2703

Running the drum dry and

damaging the pump. 3 2 6-M

Monitoring to level indicator in the

control room. Periodic operator


4.5.2 Decrease the inlet flow

rate Same as 4.3.3 Same as 4.3.3 2 1 2-L Same as 4.3.3

PRESSURE


404 4




LEVEL

HIGH

LESS

205


4.6.1 PCV 2700 fails closed Bypass system, PI 2709

Lose Nitrogen pressure in the

sweep to the drum and to the

flare header. Potential for

reverse flow from the low

pressure flare header to the

drain drum

3 1 3-L



valves and pipes. Operator



from polymer neutralizer

PIC 1662 with a low

pressure alarm, LG 1687,

PALL 1661 low pressure

alarm.

Unable to transfer from the

Polymer Neutralizer and unable

to neutralize the polymer

resulting in a high level in the

polymer surge drum and

eventually shutting down the

acid regenerator. Liquid

entrainment in the fuel gas to

the burners. this could result in

pluggage of the burner tips. Loss

of efficiency of the heaters. Loss

of fuel gas flow to the heater

due to high liquid level or

pluggage of the burner tips

which results in the potential to

cut back on the firing to the

heater resulting in lower

temperatures to the

Isostrippers. Potential to get HF

acid in the Alkylate and

downstream. Potential for

increased corrosive

environment overtime which

could result in leaks in process,

with possible personnel

exposure to HF.

5 2 10-M


line from polymer neutralizer to


variable.

4.6.3 Tamponade in the

draining pipe

LI 2702 with a high level

alarm, TI 2704 with a low

temperature alarm, LG 2703,

Clamp-on steam jacket.

Same as 4.6.2 5 2 10-M

Constant monitoring to the existing

safeguards in the control room.

Periodic maintenance to the pipes.

Operator procedures and training

4.6.4 Pump P-09A/B stop Same as 4.6.2 Same as 4.6.2 5 2 10-M

Monitoring to the pumps and


training



404 4




LEVEL HIGH

206

Annex 13 Application of HAZOP methodology to Effluent Treatment section










1.5.1 LESS

1.6.1 Increase in the inlet HF

acid blowdown flow rate

LI 1272 with low and high level

alarm, LE 1269

Excessive acid drag to the relief

gas scrubber V-06. Increase in

the corrosion of lines and

equipments. Potential

employees injury.

5 2 10-M

Install a manual or control valve in

the inlet line and change the LI 1272

for a LIC and this controller works

with the level valve.

1.6.2 Increase in the reflux

stream

Manual valve GBCF22 , LG

1271B, LI 1272 with low and

high level alarm.

Same as 1.6.1 5 2 10-M

Change the LI 1272 for a LIC and install

a level valve which works with this

controller

1.6.3 Wrong operation of

eductor S-02 Same as 1.6.1

Bad transfer the liquid from D-

18. Potential for corrosion and

leaks of HF and employees

injury.

5 2 10-M

Periodic maintenance to eductor S-02

and operator procedures in the plant

and training.

1.7.1 NO

2.1.1 LESS Not applicable

2.2.1 Steam coil on neutralizing

drum left in serviceTI 1277, RO 1273

Potential for higher

operating temperatures in the

Neutralizing Drum.

Higher temperatures could

result in caustic embrittlement

and over time replacement of

the vessel.

2 2 4-L

Install a flow indicator in this line

with the purpose to monitoring in the

control room the steam inlet flow

2.2.2 Presence of HF from acid

blowdown system TI 2540, TI 1276, TI 1277 Same as 2.2.1 2 2 4-L

Install an acid analyzer in the inlet

line to control the presence of acid in

this section

2.3.1 LV 1281 fails openLIC 1281 with high and lower

level alarm, LG 1280

More KOH is sending to the

relief gas scrubber. Potential for

lower KOH level in the

neutralizer and hydrocarbons

getting into the KOH circulation

loop requiring skimming at the

scrubber.

2 3 6-M


safeguards and periodic maintenance

to the safeguards and LV 1281. Also,


training.

2.3.2 P-12 A/B is shut down FI-1294

Loss of KOH circulation.

Unable to transfer the liquid

from the knockout drum.

Potential for corrosion and leaks

of HF and personnel injury.

5 2 10-M

Periodic maintenance to pumps P-

12A/B to prevent this situation and

care the equipments. periodic

operator procedures and training.

NEUTRALIZING DRUM D-

192

Not applicable because this knockout drum works in a operational range to 0 through 10%.

HIGH

Not applicable because this knockout drum works in a operational rang to 0 through 10%.


Process: Explain the process of treatment and disposition of effluents generated by the unit Study Section: Effluent Treatment


1LIQUID KNOCKOUT DRUM

D-18

TEMPERATURE

PRESSURE

LEVEL

TEMPERATURE HIGH

LESSLEVEL

207


2.3.3 P-12 A/B is shut down LI 1279, Intermitent stream

from P-10A, TI 2540

Unable to transfer the acid

water from the polymer surge

drum decreasing the useful life

of the equipment.

2 2 4-L Same as 2.3.2

2.3.4

P-10A pump shuts down or

will not start when needed

(pumping out

Hydrocarbons is a manual

operation).

LI 1279, Intermitent stream

from P-10A

No transfer of hydrocarbon from

neutralizing drum which can

prevent transfer from polymer

surge drum or the liquid from

Knockout drum. Same as 2.3.2

and 2.3.3

2 2 4-L Same as 2.3.2

2.4.1

LV-1281 malfunctions

closed when circulating

KOH solution to the relief

gas scrubber.

LIC 1281 with low and high

level alarm, LG 1280, Bypass

system

Stop the return of KOH to the

relief gas scrubber resulting in

higher level of caustic in the

neutralizer. Potential to get KOH

into the Hydrocarbon section of

the drum. Potential to send KOH

to the waste water treatment

resulting in potential

environmental impact.

2 2 4-L Same as 2.3.1

2.4.2 PI 1275, FI 1294

Increase in the KOH circulation

flow to the eductor. Potential to

build pressure at the eductor

resulting in KOH potentially

going to the polymer surge drum

or the liquid knockout drum and

temporary stopping the transfer

from the surge drum or the

liquid knockout drum.

3 2 6-M

Constant monitoring to check valve in

the rundown line from the surge

drum and liquid knockout drum.

2.4.3 TI 2540, TI 1276

Increase in the KOH circulation

flow with potential for higher

temperatures in the neutralizing

drum.

3 2 6-M Install a high temperature alarm in TI

2540.

2.4.4

Improper setting of the

circulation rate for the KOH

from the P-12 pump (rates

are adjusted by a manual

block/globe valve)

Same as 2.4.1

Potential for higher KOH

levels in the drum with

spillover in the Hydrocarbon

section. Potential to get KOH

into the Hydrocarbon section of

the drum. Potential to send KOH

to the waste water treatment

resulting in potential

environmental

impact

2 2 4-L


safeguards and periodic maintenance

to the safeguards and pump P-12.

Also, periodic operator procedures

and training.





LESS

LEVEL NEUTRALIZING DRUM D-

192

HIGH

Improper setting of the

circulation rate for the KOH

from the P-12 pump (rates

are adjusted by a manual

block/globe valve)

208


3.1.1



bottom of the scrubber

TI 1287 with high and low

temperature alarm, RO 1284

Traces of acid go out in the top

of the scrubber. 1 1 1-L


indicator control in the vessel which

works with a temperature valve

localized in the inlet steam line to

control the temperature inside.

Periodic monitoring in the control

room and operator procedures and

training.

3.1.2


stream from liquid

knockout drum D-18 is

lower than operational

range

Same as 3.1.1

Same as 3.1.1. Increase in the

use of steam in the process.

Economic losses

1 2 2-L Same as 3.1.1

3.1.3


stream from pumps P-11A

is lower than operational

range


3.1.4


stream from neutralizing

drum D-19 is lower than

operational range


3.2.1

Increase in the inlet steam

flow rate in the bottom of

the scrubber

Same as 3.1.1.

Potential for higher operating

temperatures in the Relief Gas

Scrubber. Higher temperatures

(typically greater than 150

degrees F) could result in caustic

embrittlement and over time

replacement of the vessel.

2 2 4-L Same as 3.1.1

3.2.2


stream from liquid

knockout drum D-18 is

higher than operational

range


3.2.3


stream from pumps P-11A

is higher than operational

range


3.2.4


stream from neutralizing

drum D-19 is higher than

operational range


3.3.1 PRESSURE LESS Manual valve GACF06 is

open No safeguards


equipments. Air pollution.

Economic losses.

4 3 12-S


equipments and constant monitoring

of these for operators in the plant.

Operator training and procedures.

Change the GACF06 for a safety valve

to avoid human error




3RELIEF GAS SCRUBBER V-

06

TEMPERATURE

LESS

HIGH

209


3.4.1

Increase in the

temperature inside the

vessel

GACF06. Same as 3.1.1 Same as 3.2.1 2 2 4-L





3.4.2


(acid gas) from liquid

knockout drum D-18

Sampling procedures, GACF06

The steam is not enough to

separate the HF which enters in

the vessel and traces of acid go

to the TEA system

1 3 3-L

Change the GACF06 for a safety valve

to avoid human error and

overpressure in the vessel with

potential fire, spill of substance in

the unit and risk to employees

3.5.1

P-11A/B pumps shut down

from either mechanical

damage or loss of power.

FIC 1290 with low flow alarm

The pumps shut down with a

flaring scenario resulting in not

neutralizing the acid flare

material before entering the

plant flare system. Potential for

acid in an area of the plant not

designed to see HF acid.

Potential for corrosion in the

flare relief system. Over time,

potential for loss of

containment and exposure of

personnel to HF.

5 3 15-S





3.5.2 HV 1265 is closed Same as 3.5.1.

Loss of flow to the top

distributor of the scrubber

resulting in not neutralizing the

acid flare material before

entering the plant flare system.

Potential for acid in an area of

the plant not designed to see HF

acid. Potential for corrosion in

the flare relief system. Over

time, potential for loss of

containment and exposure of

personnel to HF

5 2 10-M





3.5.3 FI 1290 fails sending a

wrong signal HV 1265, FI 1288

Reduce the neutralizing capacity

due to less flow in the vessel. 3 2 6-M Same as 3.3.1

3.6.1 HV 1265 is open Same as 3.5.1 Flooding in the bootom of the

scrubber1 2 2-L Same as 3.3.1

3.6.2 FV 1290 fails open Same as 3.5.3. FI 1290

Same as 3.6.1 . Potential

mechanical damage to pump P-

11B due to cavitation.

1 2 2-L Same as 3.3.1

RELIEF GAS SCRUBBER V-

06 3




PRESSURE HIGH

LESS

LEVEL

HIGH

210


4.1.1 Decrease in the inlet

steam flow rateTI 1300, RO 1301

Increase in the residence time

or setting times. 2 2 4-L

Consider install a flow indicator in the

inlet line to control the flow rate

which enters in the reboiler. Periodic

operator procedures, training and

response.

4.1.2


stream from P-12A/B

temperature

TI 1300 Same as 4.1.1. 2 2 4-LPeriodic operator procedures,

training and response.

4.2.1 Increase in the inlet steam


Potential for higher operating

temperatures in the KOH

Regeneration Tank. Higher

temperatures (typically greater

than 150 degrees F) could result

in caustic embrittlement and

over time replacement of the

vessel.

2 2 4-L Same as 4.1.1

4.2.2 Increase in the inlet lime

flow rate No safeguards

Localized heating at the eductor

S-03 2 2 4-L

Install a shutdown system in the

eductor S-03 which works with a

temperature indicator to control the

temperature inside the tank

4.2.3


stream from P-12A/B

temperature






4.5.1 Decrease in the inlet

stream flow from P-12A/B

Reflux stream, Stream from

eductor S-03

Increase in the regeneration

time of KOH due to increase in

the batches

1 2 2-L

Install a flow indicator in this line.

Periodic monitoring and maintenance

to pump P-12A/B.

4.5.2

Decrease in the addition of

lime and KOH from eductor

S-03

Stream of KOH from P-12A/B,

Sampling procedures, operator

calculations.

Same as 4.5.1 1 2 2-L

Consider install a flow indicator in the

inlet pipe. Operator procedures and

training. Realize a schedule for

sampling procedures and monitoring

it.

4.5.3 Rupture in the outlet line

to TK-001A/B Line to fire hose connection

Potential risk to the employees

and the equipments. Increase in

the level of TK-001A/B

4 2 8-MSame as 4.5.2. Periodic maintenance

to the pipe.

4.5.4 Free draining lines are

openManual valve GACF04

Increase in the level in the tank

TK-001A/B 1 2 2-L

Operator procedures and periodic

training.

4.5.5 Manual valve GACF04 fails

open No safeguards Same as 4.5.4 1 3 3-L

Constant monitoring to equipments

and periodic operator procedures.

4.5.6 Presence of solids from

the regeneration tank No safeguards

Losing more regenerated

KOH than intended to the

neutralization basin

2 3 6-M

Ensure there is a gap between the

Regeneration Tank drain line and the

Neutralization Basin to see if there is

plugging in the drain line and to

minimize KOH losses

KOH REGENERATION

TANK D-20

LEVEL

4




TEMPERATURE

LESS

HIGH

PRESSURE

LESS

211


4.6.1 Increase in the inlet

stream flow from P-12A/B

LAH 1298, Draining lines, LI

1299

Increase the level in neutralizing

basin TK-001A/B2 2 4-L Same as 4.5.4

4.6.2

Increase in the addition of

lime and KOH from eductor

S-03

LAH 1298, Draining lines

Potential for KOH to spill

over on the slab. Potential for

personnel exposure to KOH.

2 2 4-L Same as 4.5.2


line Same as 4.6.2

Overpressure in the line causing

potential explosion and spill of

chemical in the plant. Same as

4.5.7

4 2 8-M

Periodic maintenance to the pipe and

constant operator procedures and

training.

4.6.4 Manual valve GACF04 fails

closed Same as 4.6.2

Same as 4.6.3. Potential

explosion of the vessel. 4 2 8-M Same as 4.5.5


4.8.1 Decrease in the addition of

lime

Sampling procedures, operator

calculationsNo important issue identified 1 1 1-L Same as 4.5.2

4.8.2 Rupture in the inlet line Same as 4.8.1 Same as 4.5.7 1 1 1-L Same as 4.5.3

4.9.1 HIGH Increase in the addition of

lime than neededSame as 4.8.1

additional maintenance during

turnaround.1 2 2-L Same as 4.5.2

4.10.1 LESS

4.11.1 HIGH Increase in the addition of

KOH solution (>14 wt%)Same as 4.8.1

Thicker KOH solution which will

inhibit proper settling resulting

in an increase of solids to the

Relief Gas Scrubber V-06. This

will require additional

maintenance during turnaround.

1 2 2-LInstall a hydrometer on the unit to

confirm the KOH solution density

5.1.1 LESS

5.2.1 HIGH

5.3.1 LESS

5.4.1 HIGH

5.5.1 LIC 1725 fail starting the

pump P-13A/B

HS, Pump status with local

start/stop, LT 1725 Ultrasonic

The P-13A/B pump could

continue to run. Potentially

damage the pump from loss of

level.

2 2 4-L

Realize constant operator procedures

to check the NPSH with the objective

to avoid mechanical damage in the

pump. Delegate the function to check

the status of the pump.

5.5.2

Accumulations of solids in

the Neutralizing Basin

from the neutralizing

process and from dumping

the KOH regeneration

tank.

Sluice gate in the bottom of

the basin

Decrease the effective volume

of the basin which reduces the

neutralizing capacity of the

basin

2 4 8-M

Determine the means to clean and

how to handle solids that might

accumulate in the Neutralizing Basin

5.5.3 Tamponade in inlet line. No safeguards

Potential for less flow than

desired and potential for backup

of the sewer system.

Possibility of acid on the ground.

Environmental issue and

potential for exposure to

personnel.

3 2 6-M Same as 4.5.5

Considered but nothing significant identified


Not applicable because this tank is open to atmosphere

LESS

HIGH

LIME CONCENTRATION

LESS

4

KOH CONCENTRATION





KOH REGENERATION

TANK D-20

TEMPERATURE

PRESSURE

LEVEL

NEUTRALIZING BASIN TK-

001A/B 5

LEVEL

212


5.6.1 LIC 1725 fails stopping the

pump P-13A/B Same as 5.5.1

Unable to lower the level in the

pumpout section of the basin.

Unable to transfer from the

neutralizing section of the basin

to the pumpout section and can

reach the maximum liquid level

in the neutralizing basin. Unable

to receive any additional

rundown from the HFS or AWS

system since this is gravity fed.




personnel

4 4 16-S

Provide a line to divert the AWS

water from the Neutralizing Basin to

the potentially contaminated

stormwater sump

5.6.2 Incidental maintenance.

LIC 1725 with automatically

starts/stops the pump P-13A/B

and high level alarm. Parallel

basins.

Potential for higher level in the

Neutralizing Basin resulting in

over filling. Unable to receive

any additional rundown from

the HFS or AWS system since

this is gravity fed. Possibility of

acid on the ground.



personnel.

4 2 8-MOperator procedures and periodic

training.

5.6.3

Flooding in the unit and

the neutralizing basin area

due to heavy rain

No safeguards

Potential for the surface

water from the flooding to enter

the Neutralizing Basin. Potential

to reach the maximum liquid

level in the neutralizing basin.

Unable to receive any additional

rundown from the HFS or AWS

system since this is gravity fed.




personnel.

4 4 16-S

Provide a line to divert the AWS

water from the Neutralizing Basin to

the potentially contaminated

stormwater sump

5.6.4 Pumps P-13A/B shut down Same as 5.5.1 Same as 5.6.1 4 4 16-S Same as 5.6.3

LEVEL NEUTRALIZING BASIN TK-

001A/B 5




HIGH

213

Annex 14 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Selective Hydrogenation section

NODE DESCRIPTIO

N NODE

PROCESS

PARAMETERS DEVIATION

POSSIBLE

CAUSEEXISTING SAFEGUARDS CONSEQUENCES F

INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENCY

RECOMMENDATION PROCESS

DESING PROCEDURES

RELIEF

DEVICE

EMERGENCY

RESPONSE

OVERALL

CONSEQUENCE

FREQUENCY

SILs for

SIFsSIL RECOMMENDATION

1FEED SURGE

DRUM D-201 PRESSURE LESS

PIC 4007 fails

opened PV

4007A due to

malfunctions

* Pressure of Nitrogen is 95

psig and pressure of the drum

is 180 psig using for decreasse

the pressure inside the tank

*Relief valve (Fuel gas purges

to the refinery flare system)

*Bypass system (LWCS01)

* Manual valves before and

after PV 4007A (GWCS01)

*Operator procedures,


Higher flow rate of

Nitrogen to the flare to the

plant flare header.

Potential impact to the

flare (loss of the flare).

Releasing to the

atmosphere unburnt

Hydrocarbons, potential

ground fires.



injury.

3 1,00E-03

Constant check if the

Nitrogen purge flow

worked in the permits

limits

1,00E-05 1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-13

The hazard from this

equipment generates

with this deviation

was mitigated with

the safeguards that

the process has

PRESSURE HIGH

The valve PSV

4037 or PSV

4047 fails

open due to

malfunctions

*Manual valve GBCF03



Release of hydrogen to the


pollution. 3 1,00E-03

Periodic monitoring of

the safety valves PSV

4037 or PSV 4047 to

prevent desviation

and possibles risks

1,00E-05 1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-13


equipment generates

with this deviation

was mitigated with

the safeguards that

the process has

LEVEL HIGH

Due to

malfunctions

the PCV 4149

fails opened

increased the

nitrogen flow

* Relief valve (Fuel gas

purges to the refinery flare

system)



More nitrogen to the flare

header. Potencial impact to

the flare (loss of the flare).

Possible risk to employees.

Enviromental contaminant

3 1,00E-03

Constant monitoring

and maintenance of

the valves and

constant check of the

correct procedures

1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-08


equipment generates

with this deviation

was mitigated with

the safeguards that

the process has

5STRIPPER T-

201TEMPERATURE HIGH

Due to

malfunctions

the PV 4051

fails closed

interrupting

the olefins

flow

*Bypass System (LBCF01)

*Manual valves GBCF01

before and after at pressure

valve



The stripper would need

less heat from reboiler E-

203. Presence of

hydrocarbon vaporised in

the top of the


contamination. Decrease in

the propane concentration.

Economic losses.

Overpressure in the line

pipe. Possible rupture of

the pipe line due the

overpressure causing a

posible fire explosion

generating risk for the

employees, enviroment

and equipment.

3 1,00E-03

Constant monitoring

of the operated

system.

Decrease the

recirculation flow

from reboiler E-203.

Increase in the flow of

the top.

1,00E-05 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-12


equipment generates

with this deviation

was mitigated with

the safeguards that

the process has

HAZOP WITH LOPA/SIL WORKSHEET - ANNEX 14

Project Title: Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid Date: Febrary to June Page 1 of 1 1,00E-08

Process: The objective is the removal of diolefins and light fractions of the olefins stream Study Section: Selective Hydrogenation

HAZOP Team: Figueroa Stefanny, Lombana Stefany and Ruiz Ingry INDEPENDENT PROTECTION LAYERS

4REACTORS

R-201/202

ACCEPTABLE RISK CRITERIA


214

Annex 15 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Charge and Drying section

NODE DESCRIPTION

NODE

PROCESS

PARAMETER

S

DEVIATION POSSIBLE

CAUSE

EXISTING

SAFEGUARDSCONSEQUENCES F

INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENCY


DESING BPCS ALARM PROCEDURES SIS

EMERGENCY

RESPONSE

OVERALL

CONSEQUENC

E FREQUENCY

SILs

for

SIFs

SIL RECOMMENDATION

1.5.6

Rupture or

leak in the

principle

inlet line to

D-02

* Manuals valves

CBCF01/

LWCS03/ LBCF06

to close the inlet

flow for each

streams IPL 1

* XV 2453 IPL2

*FV1006 IPL2

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

*Emergency

response IPL3

Potential fire and

explosion.


atmosphere causing

air pollution. Risk to

the employees and

the equipments.

Economic losses.

Decrease in the

NPSH causing

cavitation in the

pump P-01A/B.

Decrease in the

pressure tank

3 1,00E-03

Install a Flow

Indicator in the inlet

line of surge drum

and flow indicator

with lower and higher

Alarm in the drum.

Constantly check of

the pipe and realize

maintenance to the

pipes and vessels and

training to the

operator if this cause

occurs.

1,00E-05 1,00E-02 1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-15


equipment generates

with this deviation

was mitigated with

the safeguards that

the process has

1.5.8

Rupture in

the outlet

lines of the

drum D-02

*LI 1005 with low

level and low-

low alarm IPL1

*Manual valve

GWCS03 IPL2

*XV 1516

*Operator

Same as 1.5.6 3 1,00E-03

Install a Flow

Indicator in the outlet

line of the surge

drum. Realize

operator procedures

and training

1,00E-05 1,00E-02 1,00E-01 1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-16


equipment generates

with this deviation

was mitigated with

the safeguards that

the process has

1.6.5 HIGH

LV 1004

fails closed

for

example

bad

transmitter

or loss of

instrument

air

*Bypass system

around valve LV

1004 with

manual valve

LWCS03

*LI 1005 with low

level and low-

low alarm and

high level and

high - high

alarm

Drag the acid to the

Isostripper section

Overpressure in the

tank causing

possible explosion.

Drag of hydrocarbon

to the TEA system.

Drag of water to the

dryers D-03A/B.

Increase in the

corrosion of

equipments. Loss of

acid due to the

increase of water.

Potential for water

buildup and water

carryover to the

dryer leading to

potential corrosion

in downstream

system. Overtime,

possible leaks of

acid in downstream

equipments with

possible exposure

to employees.

Economic losses

3 1,00E-03

Periodic maintenance

to the bypass line,

pipes and surge drum.

Consider adding an

HF/Water acid

analyzer on the E-28/E-

28A reactor acid

circulation loop

1,00E-05 1,00E-01 1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-12


equipment generates

with this deviation

was mitigated with

the safeguards that

the process has






Surge Drum D-

02LEVEL

LESS


1

215

Annex 16 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Reaction section

NODE DESCRIPTION

NODE

PROCESS

PARAMETER

S

DEVIATION POSSIBLE

CAUSE

EXISTING

SAFEGUARD

S

CONSEQUENCES F

INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENCY


DESING PROCEDURES

RELIEF

DEVICE

EMERGENCY

RESPONSE

OVERALL

CONSEQUENCE

FREQUENCY

SILs

for

SIFs

SIL RECOMMENDATION

NEW

OVERAL

L

1REACTOR

E28/28ATEMPERATURE HIGH

The cooling

flow is

interrupted

due to the

FBCF01 fails

closed for

human

error

* TI 1548

*PI1546

*PSV

1048/1915

*Operator

procedure

training and

response

Runaway

reaction with

subsequent

increase in the

vessel pressure

possibly leading

to a rupture or

explosion of the

vessel

3 1,00E-03

Installation of a

cooling water flow

indicator and low

flow alarm to provide

an immediate

indication of cooling

loss. Periodic

inspections and

maintenance of the

cooling system , PSV

and Manual valve to

insure its integrity.

Change the manual

valve to an automatic

valve. Installation of

a high temperature

alarm to alert the

operator in the event

of cooling function

loss. Evaluation of

the cooling water

source to consider

any possible

interruption and

contamination of the

supply.

1,00E-01 1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-09

Install a Flow

Indicator Control

with Low Flow Alarm

which is located in

the inlet pipe of the

cooling water to

maintain the process

flow in the reactors*

1,00E-11



INDEPENDENT PROTECTION LAYERS

Project Title: Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with

hydrofluoric acid


1,00E-08

Study Section: ReactionProcess: Explains the reaction between the olefins and isobutane in the presence of

hydrofluoric acid to obtain the alkylate


*We considerate install this recommendation to mitigate completely this scenery

216

Annex 17 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Propane Treatment section

NODE DESCRIPTIO

N NODE

PROCESS


POSSIBLE

CAUSE

EXISTING

SAFEGUARD

S

CONSEQUENCES F

INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENCY

RECOMMENDATION

PROCES

S

DESING

BPCS ALARM PROCEDURESRELIEF

DEVICE

EMERGENCY

RESPONSE

OVERALL

CONSEQUENC

E FREQUENCY

SILs

for

SIFs

SIL RECOMMENDATION

LESS

PV-2417 fails

open due to

malfunctions

*FIC-2415

with low flow

alarm

*Operator

procedures

and

training

*GBCF 16

Manual valve

located after

of the PV 2417

Potential vapors

and cavitation of

the pump P-17

resulting in seals

leaking leading

to loss of

containment

with potential

for fire and

personnel injury

3 1,00E-03

Consider adding a

Low Flow Alarm to FI-

2423A and FI-2423B.

(Propane product

flow to storage)

1,00E-05 1,00E-01 1,00E-01 1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-13


equipment generates

with this deviation was

mitigated with the

safeguards that the

process has

HIGH

PV-2417 fails

closed due to

malfunctions

*Bypass

around PV-

2417

*FIC-2415

minimum

flow

controller

with low flow

alarm

*PSV-2414 on

the KOH

treater

*PSV-

2407/2408 on

the Alumina

treater

*Operator

procedures

and training

Loss of flow of

product to

storage.

Potential to dead

head the pumps

resulting in seal

leaks and loss of

containment

with

potential for fire

and personnel

injury. Potential

for overpressure

in the KOH and

the Alumina

treaters.Potentia

l for flange leaks

and loss of

containment

with potential

for fire and

personnel injury

3 1,00E-03

Install a High

Pressure Alarm in

the D-15 in case that

the pressure

increases inside of

the tank

1,00E-05 1,00E-01 1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-16


equipment generates

with this deviation was

mitigated with the

safeguards that the

process has


3

PROPANE

KOH

TREATERS D-

15

LEVEL


HAZOP WITH LOPA/SIL WORKSHEET - ANNEX 17 Project Title: Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with

hydrofluoric acid Date: Febrary to June Page 1 of 1 1,00E-08

Process: Explain the process of conditioning and removal of contaminant of

the product propane Study Section: Propane treatment


217

Annex 18 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Debutanization and Alkylate Treatment section

NODE DESCRIPTION

NODE

PROCESS


POSSIBLE

CAUSE

EXISTING


INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENC

Y


DESING BPCS

EMERGENCY

RESPONSE

OVERALL

CONSEQUENC

E FREQUENCY

SILs

for

SIFs

SIL RECOMMENDATION

1

ALKYLATE

FILTER S-

05A/B

LEVEL LESS

Loss of

turbine pump

P- 04A from

either

mechanical

damage or

loss of steam

if using

turbine as

primary pump

*Pumps status in

the PCS conected

to loops control

*FI 2538

*Separate pump

with separate

power sources

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Loss of the Alkylate

flush flow resulting in

insufficient pressure

on the header.

Potential to negate

the dual

pressurization system

to the pump seals

which is considered a

mechanical integrity

system.

4 1,00E-02

Ensure the turbine

pump P-04A (alkylate

flush pump) has

ready start capability

that allows slow

rolling

Consider connecting

the electric pump P-

04B (alkylate flush

pump) to an

emergency power

source, such as a

diesel generator

1,00E-05 1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-10


equipment generates

with this deviation

was mitigated with

the safeguards that

the process has



HAZOP WITH LOPA/SIL WORKSHEET


Process: Explains the removal of butane of the product alkylate, also the conditioning and removal of contaminants from

the stream of butane


Study Section: Debutanization and Alkylate Treatment

218

Annex 19 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to N-Butane Treatment section

DESCRIPTION

NODE

PROCESS

PARAMETER

S

DEVIATION POSSIBLE

CAUSE

EXISTING


INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENCY

RECOMMENDATION BPCSRELIEF

DEVICE

EMERGENCY

RESPONSE

OVERALL

CONSEQUENC

E FREQUENCY

SILs for


NEW

OVERALL

TREATERS

WITH ALUMINA

D-09A-D

PRESSURE HIGH

Manual valve

GBCF13 it will

closed due to

human factors

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response


of removal of fluoride in

the alumina treater

Overpressure in the


rupture

Possible fire explosion due

to a possible rupture

Air pollution

Risk to employees

Economic losses

3 1,00E-03

Install a control valve

with a loop that worked

together to avoid

possibles damages

Ensure good

communication between

employees

1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-07 1,00E-01 SIL 2

Is necessary install a

safeguard SIL 1 with a

loop control BPCS

and SIL 4 with a

bypass system

between control

valve

1,00E-13

N-BUTANE

COALESCERS

D10/10A

PRESSURE HIGH

Tamponad in

the outside

pipeline of the

N-Butane exit

*PIC 1219/1984

worked with a

control valve

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Overpressure in the


possible rupture

Possible fire explosion due

to a rupture of the pipeline

Air pollution

Risk to employees

Economic losses

3 1,00E-03

Install a flow indicator

system in the inlet

stream for control the

flow that enter in the

coalescer

Constant maintenance to

the pipeline to ensure

the proper functioning

1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-08 1,00E+00 SIL 1

Is required a SIL 4


that worked between

pressure indicator

control

1,00E-13


INDEPENDENT PROTECTION

LAYERS





Study Section: N-Butane TreatmentProcess: Explain the process of conditioning and removal of contaminant of the product N-Butane

SAFEGUARDS PROCESS DESING BPCSOVERALL CONSEQUENCE

FREQUENCY

*Loop control that

worked with a flow

valve

*Bypass system to

avoid problems

1,00E-05 1,00E-01 1,00E-13

*Bypass System

between Pressure

indicator control

1,00E-05 1,00E-13

219

Annex 20 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Cooling Water Tower -TAE- section

NODE DESCRIPTION

NODE

PROCESS


POSSIBLE

CAUSE

EXISTING


INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENCY

RECOMMENDATION BPCS PROCEDURESEMERGENCY

RESPONSE

OVERALL

CONSEQUENC

E FREQUENCY

SILs

for

SIFs

SILRECOMMENDATIO

N

1 1.7.2 COOLING TOWER

CT-401

COMPOSITION

(WATER PURITY)LESS

Leak of

hydrocarbon

*AI 2003

*Interlock UC 31

*AIC 2026

*AI 2027

*Additive to

maintain

equipment

integrity

*Sampling

procedures

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Presence of

hydrocarbon in the

cooling water

system. Possible

fire and

employees injury.

3 1,00E-03

Install a measuring

element level low

(LEL) in the cooling

system

1,00E-02 1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-08


equipment generates

with this deviation

was mitigated with

the safeguards that

the process has







220

Annex 21 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to HF Regeneration section

NODE DESCRIPTION

NODE

PROCESS

PARAMETER

S

DEVIATION POSSIBLE

CAUSE

EXISTING


INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENCY


DESING BPCS PROCEDURES

OVERALL

CONSEQUENCE

FREQUENCY

SILs for


1.2.2FV 1171 fails

closed

*Intermittent

flow from ALKAD

section IPL 1

*Lab sampling

IPL 2

*hand wheel on

FV 1171 IPL 3

*TIC 1168 which

will add reflux to

maintain the

overhead

temperature of

the regenerator

IPL 4 *Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Decrease in the HF

inlet flow rate

decreasing the

remotion of soluble

pollutants in the

acid. For a short

period of time,

there are no

significant

consequences. For a

longer period of

time, potential for

hotter overhead

temperature in the

regenerator. Loss of

acid purity resulting

in acid runaway.

Potential for

corrosion, leaks, and

personnel injury.

Losses in the acid

purity. Increase in

the production of

organics fluorides

and polimerization

in the reaction

section.

3 1,00E-03

Install a FIC in the

inlet line of the

regenerator V-03

(after valve FV 1171)

which works with a

flow valve in the

intermittent flow line

to increase the flow

rate in case of this

valve or FIC 1171

which regulate the

valve fails and

mantein the

operational range (626

BDP). Verify sampling

schedule and

frequency for

isobutane and Olefin

Feed. Consider adding

an HF / Water acid

analyzer on the E-

28/E28A reactor acid

circulation loop.

Create a calculation in

PCS for the V-03 acid

regenerator Isobutane

and acid ratio.

1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-09 1,00E+01


equipment generates

with this deviation

was mitigated with

the safeguards that

the process has

1.2.4

TV 1168

malfunctions

closed

*FI-1170 flow

indication.

*TI-1625

temperature

indication IPL 1

*Hand wheel on

TV-1168.

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Decrease in the

isobutane from the

depropanizer and HF

stripper section.

Higher corrosion in

the column V-03.

Drag of pollutants

to isostripper

section.Loss of

Regenerator reflux

resulting in higher

overhead

temperatures.

Potential for higher

corrosion in the acid

regenerator. Over a

longer period of

time, potential for

increased impurities

in the acid. Over

time, potential for

acid runaway.

3 1,00E-03

Install a higher

temperature alarm in

the line. Constant

monitoring to the

temperature in the

control room. Periodic

maintenance to the

controllers (adjust the

set point) and valves

to avoid this kind of

problems in the plant.

1,00E-04 1,00E-01 1,00E-08 1,00E+00


equipment generates

with this deviation

was mitigated with

the safeguards that

the process has



Process: Explain the process of removal of polymer and humidity of the hydrofluoric acidStudy Section: HF Regeneration


INDEPENDENT PROTECTION

LAYERS

TEMPERATURE HIGH

Meeting days: All days of Febrary to

June

1

Acid

Regenerator V-

03, IsoButane

Superheater

E-17, Iso

Butane

Superheater

Condensate

Pot D-28

221

NODE DESCRIPTION

NODE

PROCESS

PARAMETER

S

DEVIATION POSSIBLE

CAUSE

EXISTING


INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENCY

RECOMMENDATION PROCEDURESEMERGENCY

RESPONSE

OVERALL

CONSEQUENCE

FREQUENCY

SILs for


PFD OF THE

RECOMMENDATION

S

OVERALL

CONSEQUENC

E FREQUENCY

1 1.3.2

Acid

Regenerator V-

03, IsoButane

Superheater

E-17, Iso

Butane

Superheater

Condensate

Pot D-28

PRESSURE LESS

Manual valve

GBCF22 in

the top of

the

regenerator

is open

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Possible fire

explosion for

hydrocarbon spill.

Air pollution

Injuries to the

employees for acid

spill (possible died

of employees if one

of them are

exposure to high

concentration).

Equipment damage

Economic losses.

Stop and complete

evacuation of the

unit.

3 1,00E-03

Change this valve for a

security valve (PSV) in

the top of the column


and send the stream

to flare header and

reduce the risk for the

employees to

contaminate with HF.

1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-07 1,00E-01 SIL 1

Change the manual

valve located in the

top of the vessel for a

relief valve to prevent

air pollution and

system from

exceeding specified

verpressure. The

effectveness of this

device is sensitive to

service and

experience.

1,00E-04 1,00E-11

Project Title: Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid Date: Febrary to June Page 1 of 1

Process: Explain the process of removal of polymer and humidity of the hydrofluoric acidStudy Section: HF Regeneration



1,00E-08

INDEPENDENT

PROTECTION LAYERSHAZOP Team: Figueroa Stefanny, Lombana Stefany and Ruiz Ingry Meeting days: All days of Febrary to June

222

DESCRIPTION

NODE

PROCESS

PARAMETER

S

DEVIATION POSSIBLE

CAUSE

EXISTING


INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENCY


DESING PROCEDURES

EMERGENCY

RESPONSE

OVERALL

CONSEQUENC

E FREQUENCY

SILs for


PFD OF THE

RECOMMEN

DATIONS

OVERALL

CONSEQUENC

E FREQUENCY

4.4.1

Bypass

system of

PCV 2700 is

opened

increasing

the nitrogen

flow rate

*PI 2714 IPL 1

*RO2716 IPL 1

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Full Nitrogen

pressure on the

drum and vent

header. Worst case

would be during

vessel de-

commissioning with

the vent line

blocked in. Potential

overpressure of the

drum D-404 leading

to flange leaks, loss

of containment, and

personnel injury.

4 1,00E-02

Consider moving the

PI-2714 and restrictive

orifice (RO) in the

nitrogen line to D-404

vent downstream of

the bypass PCV-2700.

Install a pressure

indicator in the top of

the drum with the

objective of

monitoring this


revising the design

pressure of the D-404

Closed Drain Drum

because the maximum

nitrogen pressure on

the purge to the drum

and vent piping is

approximately 95 psig

and the current design

pressure of the drum

is 50 psig.

1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-07 1,00E-01 SIL 1

Install a high pressure

alarm with the

existing pressure

indicator

1,00E-01 1,00E-08

4.4.6

PCV 2700

fails opened

increasing

the N2 inlet

flow

*PI 2714 IPL 1

*RO2716 IPL 1

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Full Nitrogen

pressure on the

drum and vent

header. Worst case

would be during

vessel de-

commissioning with

the vent line

blocked in. Potential

overpressure of the

drum D-404 leading

to flange leaks, loss

of containment, and

personnel injury.

4 1,00E-02

Consider moving the

PI-2714 and restrictive

orifice (RO) in the

nitrogen line to D-404

vent downstream of

the bypass PCV-2700.

Install a pressure

indicator in the top of

the drum with the

objective of

monitoring this


revising the design

pressure of the D-404

Closed Drain Drum

because the maximum

nitrogen pressure on

the purge to the drum

and vent piping is

approximately 95 psig

and the current design

pressure of the drum

is 50 psig.

1,00E-01 1,00E-02 1,00E-02 1,00E-07 1,00E-01 SIL 1

Install a high pressure

alarm with the

existing pressure

indicator

1,00E-01 1,00E-08

NODE

Project Title: Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acidDate: Febrary to June Page 1 of 1

Process: Explain the process of removal of polymer and humidity of the

hydrofluoric acidStudy Section: HF Regeneration



1,00E-08

4CLOSED DRAIN

DRUM D-404 PRESSURE HIGH

INDEPENDENT PROTECTION LAYERSHAZOP Team: Figueroa Stefanny, Lombana Stefany and Ruiz Ingry Meeting days: All days of Febrary to June

223

Annex 22 Application of LOPA and SIL methodology to Effluent Treatment section

DESCRIPTION

NODE

PROCESS


POSSIBLE

CAUSE

EXISTING


INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENCY

RECOMMENDATION BPCS ALARM PROCEDURES

OVERALL

CONSEQUENCE

FREQUENCY

SILs for


PFD OF THE

RECOMME

NDATIONS

OVERALL

CONSEQUENCE

FREQUENCY

3.3.1 PRESSURE LESS

Manual

valve

GACF06 is

open

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Risk to the

employees and

equipments. Air

pollution.

Economic losses.

3 1,00E-03


to the equipments

and constant

monitoring of these

for operators in the

plant. Operator

training and

procedures. Change

the GACF06 for a

safety valve to avoid

human error

1,00E-02 1,00E-05 1,00E-03 SIL 2

Change the manual

valve located in the

top of the vessel for a

relief valve to prevent

air pollution and

system from

exceeding specified

overpressure. The

effectiveness of this

device is sensitive to

service and

experience.

1,00E-04 1,00E-09

3.5.1 LEVEL LESS

P-11A/B

pumps shut

down from

either

mechanical

damage or

loss of

power.

*FIC 1290 with

low flow alarm

IPL 1

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

The pumps shut

down with a

flaring scenario

resulting in not

neutralizing the

acid flare material

before entering

the plant flare

system. Potential

for acid in an area

of the plant not

designed to see HF

acid. Potential for

corrosion in the

flare relief system.

Over time,

potential for loss

of containment

and exposure of

personnel to HF.

3 1,00E-03


to the equipments

and constant

monitoring of these

for operators in the

plant. Operator

training and

procedures.

1,00E-01 1,00E-01 1,00E-01 1,00E-06 1,00E-02 SIL 1

Due to is a damage in

the pump recommend

to install a active IPL

as Human action with

no more than 20 min

of response time to

simple well-

documented action

with clear and reliable

indications that the

action is required

1,00E-02 1,00E-08

NODE

Project Title: Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid

Process: Explain the process of treatment and disposition of effluents generated by the unit


ACCEPTABLE RISK CRITERIADate: Febrary to June Page 1 of 1

Meeting days: All days of Febrary to June HAZOP Team: Figueroa Stefanny, Lombana Stefany and Ruiz Ingry

1,00E-08

Study Section: Effluent Treatment


3RELIEF GAS

SCRUBBER V-06

224

DESCRIPTION

NODE

PROCESS


POSSIBLE

CAUSE

EXISTING


INITIATING

EVENT

FREQUENCY


DESING PROCEDURES

OVERALL

CONSEQUENCE

FREQUENCY

SILs for


PFD OF THE

RECOMME

NDATIONS

OVERALL

CONSEQUENCE

FREQUENCY

5.6.1

LIC 1725

fails

stopping

the pump

P-13A/B

*HS

*Pump status

with local

start/stop IPL 1

*LT 1725

Ultrasonic IPL

2

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Unable to lower the level in

the pumpout section of the

basin. Unable to transfer

from the neutralizing section

of the basin to the pumpout

section and can reach the

maximum liquid level in the

neutralizing basin. Unable to

receive any additional

rundown from the HFS or

AWS system since this is

gravity fed. Possibility of acid

on the ground.



personnel

4 1,00E-02

Provide a line to

divert the AWS water

from the Neutralizing

Basin to the

potentially

contaminated

stormwater sump

1,00E-02 1,00E-01 1,00E-05 1,00E-03 SIL 2

Consider to install a

passive IPL like a dike

or underground

drainage system to

reduces the frequency

of large consequences

(widespread spill) of a

tank overfill.

1,00E-03 1,00E-08



or underground

drainage system to




tank overfill.

1,00E-03 1,00E-06

Install a level

indicator with a high

alarm in the

neutralizing basin

tank

1,00E-02 1,00E-08

5.6.4

Pumps P-

13A/B shut

down

*HS

*Pump status

with local

start/stop

*LT 1725

Ultrasonic

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Unable to lower the level in

the pumpout section of the

basin. Unable to transfer

from the neutralizing section

of the basin to the pumpout

section and can reach the







on the ground.



personnel

4 1,00E-02

Provide a line to



Basin to the

potentially

contaminated storm

water sump

1,00E-02 1,00E-01 1,00E-05 1,00E-03



or underground

drainage system to




tank overfill.

1,00E-03 1,00E-08

1,00E-05

1,00E-08

Study Section: Effluent Treatment

5.6.3 4 1,00E-02

Provide a line to



Basin to the

potentially

contaminated storm

water sump

1,00E-01 1,00E-03HIGH

NODE

Project Title: Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit catalyzed with hydrofluoric acid

Process: Explain the process of treatment and disposition of effluents generated by the unit


ACCEPTABLE RISK CRITERIADate: Febrary to June Page 1 of 1

Meeting days: All days of Febrary to June HAZOP Team: Figueroa Stefanny, Lombana Stefany and Ruiz Ingry

Potential for the surface

water from the flooding to

enter the Neutralizing Basin.

Potential to reach the







on the ground.



personnel.

*Operator

procedures,

training and

response

Flooding in

the unit

and the

neutralizin

g basin

area due

to heavy

rain

SIL 4

INDEPENDENT

PROTECTION LAYERS

5

NEUTRALIZING

BASIN TK-

001A/B

LEVEL

Documents

Application of HAZOP, LOPA and SIL to the alkylation unit ... · Ecopetrol´s Cartagena Colombia refining has an alkylation plant catalyzed with HF which represents a potential hazards