APPENDIX I Major Hazard Installation Risk Assessment

APPENDIX I

Major Hazard Installation Risk Assessment

PROPOSED MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION LANELE OIL TERMINAL 1 (LOT 1) DURBAN

REPORT:

MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION RISK ASSESSMENT

PROPOSED INSTALLATION

LANELE OIL TERMINAL 1 (LOT 1)

ISLAND VIEW – DURBAN

FINAL REPORT

ASSIGNMENT NO: J2462R Rev2

ASSESSED BY:

Telephone:

Email:

Daniel Rademeyer

011 997 7947

[email protected]

CLIENT - Organisation:

Address:

Golder Associates Africa (Pty) Ltd

P.O. Box 6001

Halfway House,

1685

South Africa

Project Representative:

Telephone:

e-mail :

Natalie Kohler

+27 (11) 254 4800

[email protected]

DATE ISSUED: 2 October 2019

ISHECON, H6 Pinelands Office Park, Maxwell Drive, Modderfontein, 1645 Registration No.: CK 99/29022/23

ISHECON CHEMICAL PROCESS SAFETY ENGINEERS

______________________________________________________________________________________________ J2462R Golder MHI RA Lenele Final Page 2 of 68

Assessment Rev. No. Date Description

Original 0 20 November2018 Site visit

Original 0 23 December 2018 Issue draft report for comment

Original 1 24 January 2019 Make clarifications, add health risks

Original 2 15 February 2019 Address bund overfill and add standards

Original 2 2 October 2019 Issue final report to Golder Associates

REPORT ADMINSTRATIVE RECORD

VALIDITY OF THE RISK ASSESSMENT CONTRIBUTORS AND ACKNOWLEGEMENTS The validity, results and conclusions of this assessment are based on the expertise, skills and information, provided by the following contributing team members, who are responsible for the design, operation and maintenance of the plant and equipment as well as for assistance with the site visits:

NAME ORGANISATION DISCIPLINE AND EXPERTISE

Natalie Kohler Golder Associates Environmental & Waste Management Consultant / Power Lead for Africa

Sean Syndercombe Thyssen Krupp Principal Control Systems Engineer Process Plant Engineering

DISTRIBUTION

NAME ORGANISATION

D J E RADEMEYER ISHECON

Natalie Kohler Golder Associates

NOTIFICATIONS By client

NAME ORGANISATION



NAME ORGANISATION

EThekwini Municipal Fire and Rescue Services Regional Commander Local Authority: Sandile Dladla [email protected]

18 Cnr ML Sultan Rd & Steve Biko St The Market Durban 4000 Fire Safety P O Box 625 Durban 4000 Tel: 031-903 9000 or 073 389 1632

Department of Labour Head Office Chief Inspector: Rachel Aphane – Deputy Director Major Hazard Installations

Chief Inspector Department of Labour Private Bag X117 Pretoria 0001

Department of Labour KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Office Provincial Chief Director Edward Kambula Deputy Director IES A Rasepae

267 Anton Lembede (Smith Street) Royal Building Durban 4000 PO Box 940, Durban, 4000 Tel: 031 309 5063 Tel 031 366 2117/2016

DISCLAIMER Note that although every effort has been made to obtain the correct information and to carry out an appropriate, independent, impartial and competent study, ISHECON cannot be held liable for any incident which directly, or indirectly, relates to the work in this document and which may have an effect on the client or on any other third party. CONFIDENTIALITY The content of this report will be kept confidential. Copies of the report will not be distributed to other parties except with the expressed permission of the client. The exception to this confidentiality being the requirement from the Department of Labour for Approved Inspection Authorities to inform them of the Major Hazard Installation Risk Assessments conducted every month and the outcome of the Major Hazard Installation classification. PROOF READING:

Report spelling and grammar verified by K J Henning 20 December 2018



SUMMARY

Lanele Oil Terminal intends to establish a bulk storage installation at Ambrose Park adjacent to the Durban harbour area to import, store and distribute fuel inland by pipeline and road tankers. The inventory of fuels on-site could be in the order of 182 000 tonnes. As part of the basic assessment of the environmental impacts, a Major Hazard Risk Assessment was carried out, which is a requirement for approval by the authorities, to implement the project. This assessment also covers the environmental effects from major hazard accidents as well as the health and hygiene risks during construction, operation and close down. 1. Methodology A quantitative risk assessment, which included identification of the major hazards, a cause analysis, consequence analysis and an estimation of the individual risks1 and societal risk2, were carried out. This was followed by comparing the risks with international criteria3 for acceptability, reviewing suitability of emergency measures and organisational aspects. Finally, measures were proposed to reduce or eliminate the risk, where not acceptable. 2. Findings The hazards that were identified as potentially serious were the release of flammable materials from the bursting of pipes, tanks, loading arms and overfilling of tanks and road tankers. Ignition will result in fires and explosions, with serious effects extending some distance across the site boundary. If any of the events had to occur, one could possibly expect, as a minimum, some serious effects as far away as 359 m for an explosion due to a leak on the petrol supply pipe to the multi-purpose pipeline followed by ignition. Thus, since these hazards could seriously affect neighbouring sites and members of the public, the Lanele Oil Terminal qualifies as a Major Hazard Installation, as per the regulations under the Occupational Health and safety Act. It was found that overall, the risk (individual risk) of being exposed to a serious hazard would at most be a 3,2 * 10-5 chance of a fatality per person per year at the boundary fence of the site, and would reduce to less than 1 * 10-6 further away. The maximum risk to which employees on-site will be exposed is a 3 * 10-4 chance of a fatality per person per year. All the individual risks (employee and public) are tolerable. Societal risks are not totally acceptable due to the large numbers of people (order of 29 000) on the site’s surrounding areas which could be affected and can therefore only be regarded as tolerable. Risks that are tolerable should be reduced where practical and cost effective; otherwise it may be accepted as low as reasonably practicable. Contributions to individual risk at the centre of the facility, are approximately 45% from large leaks in petrol tank, petrol tank burst 27%, overfilling of petrol tanks 24%, overfilling of a petrol road tanker 1,8%, small leak on a petrol tank 0,12% and others, less than 0,1 %. Risks to the environment were found to be small as suitable containment, recovery and tests systems will be in place.

1 The frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realisation of specified hazards.

2 This is the relationship between the frequency and the number of people suffering from a specified level of harm in a given population from the realisation of specified hazards.. 3 A standard or a norm



Similarly health and hygiene risk will also be low due to personnel wearing of protective equipment, open air for dispersion of fumes and containment of fuels in a closed system.

3 . Recommendations

The primary recommendations are: (i) Submit this risk assessment to the local authority together with Safety Data Sheets of the

substances handled on the installation {4.4.2}. (ii) Submit letters, together with a copy of the risk assessment to the Chief Inspector and a summary

to the Provincial Director notifying them of the Major Hazard Installation {4.4.2}. (iii) Review the risk assessment again in 2024 or earlier if modifications or additions are done for

which this assessment will not be valid {4.4.2}. (iv) Keep a register of all near miss incidents related to the operation of the storage installations

{4.4.3}. (v) Notify the local emergency services and Provincial Director of any incidents, which activated the

emergency procedures {4.4.3}. (vi) Implement a Health and Hygiene Management system {6.5}. (vii) Draw up and implement an Emergency Plan for the site {7.2}. (viii) Implement a Process Safety Management system which will include monitoring piping, tank and

loading arm integrity, e.g. scheduled inspection and testing. {8}. (ix) Provide emergency isolation on atmospheric tank discharge piping {10.3.2}. (x) Implement automatic overfill protection on all flammable tanks {10.3.2}. (xi) Implement the site layout option with tanks located at the northern part of the site {10.3.3}. This risk assessment is issued by: Signed: Daniël J E Rademeyer – Risk Assessment Technical Signatory ISHECON - Approved Inspection Authority as per Appendix 12. Date: 2 October 2019.



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION 9

2. MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION REGULATION SCOPE APPLICATION 9

2.1 CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION AS A MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION 9 2.2 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY 9

3. DESCRIPTIONS 9

3.1 ORGANISATION, SITE LOCATION AND SURROUNDING AREAS 9 3.1.1 ORGANISATION 9 3.1.2 PHYSICAL ADDRESS 10 3.1.3 LOCATION 10 3.1.4 TOPOGRAPHY AND METEOROLOGY 12

3.2 PLANT PROCESS AND OPERATIONS 13 3.2.1 ORIGIN, MANUFACTURE, INSTALLATION, ERECTION AND DATE 13 3.2.2 PLANT 13 3.2.3 PROCESS AND OPERATIONS 14 3.2.4 INVENTORIES OF MATERIALS ON-SITE 15

4. RISK ASSESSMENT 15

4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS 15 4.1.1 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS IN THE PROCESS 15 4.1.2 ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS 16 4.1.3 HAZARDOUS MATERIAL INTERACTIONS 16

4.2 PAST MAJOR ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE 16 4.2.1 SITE 16 4.2.2 LOCAL AND WORLDWIDE 16

4.3 HAZARD ANALYSIS 17 4.3.1 HAZARDOUS EVENT IDENTIFICATION 18 4.3.2 CONSEQUENCE SEVERITY 19 4.3.3 HAZARD EFFECT ZONES 21

4.4 QUALIFICATION AS A MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION 23 4.4.1 CLASSIFICATION 23 4.4.2 NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION 24 4.4.3 REPORTING OF EMERGENCY OCCURRENCES 24 4.4.4 HAZARD ESCALATION DOMINO EFFECTS 24 4.4.5 EFFECT ON ADJACENT MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATIONS 24

4.5 LIKELIHOOD OF MAJOR HAZARDS 24 4.6 RISK RESULTS 24

4.6.1 INDIVIDUAL RISK CONTOURS 24 4.6.2 RISK PROFILES 25 4.6.3 SOCIETAL RISK 26

4.7 ACCEPTABILITY 27 4.7.1 EMPLOYEE INDIVIDUAL RISK 27 4.7.2 PUBLIC INDIVIDUAL RISK 28 4.7.3 SOCIETAL RISK 28



5. ENVIRONMENTAL 28

6. HEALTH AND HYGIENE 29

6.1 IDENTIFICATION OF WORK HEALTH ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS 29 6.2 ANALYSIS OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPOSURES 29 6.3 RISK ESTIMATION 31

6.3.1 PROBABILITY 31 6.3.2 EXPOSURE 32 6.3.3 SEVERITY 32 6.3.4 RISK CLASSIFICATION 32

6.4 HEALTH AND HYGIENE ASSESSMENT 32 6.5 HEALTH AND HYGIENE MANAGEMENT 34

7. EMERGENCY PLAN 35

7.1 INSTALLATION EMERGENCIES 35 7.2 ON-SITE EMERGENCIES 35 7.3 OFF-SITE EMERGENCIES 35

8. ORGANISATIONAL AND PROCESS SAFETY MEASURES 35

9. LAND USE 35

10. CONCLUSIONS 36

10.1 INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION 36 10.2 SEVERITY AND RISKS 36

10.2.1 SEVERITY 36 10.2.2 INDIVIDUAL RISKS 36 10.2.3 SOCIETAL RISKS 36 10.2.4 ENVIRONMENTAL 37 10.2.5 HEALTH AND HYGIENE 37

10.3 RISK REDUCTION 37 10.3.1 INTEGRITY ASSURANCE 37 10.3.2 OVERFILL AND EMERGENCY ISOLATION 37 10.3.3 SITE LAYOUT 37

11. RECOMMENDATIONS 37

11.1 ADMINISTRATIVE 37 11.2 RISK REDUCTION 38

12. REFERENCES 38

APPENDIXES APPENDIX 1 GENERAL RISK ASSESSMENT .......................................................................................................... 39



APPENDIX 2 INSTALLATION DESIGN INFORMATION ......................................................................................... 41 APPENDIX 3 WIND WEATHER DATA ................................................................................................................... 42 APPENDIX 4 MATERIAL DATA ............................................................................................................................. 43 APPENDIX 5 CAUSE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS THEORY .................................................................................... 45 APPENDIX 6 CONSEQUENCE SEVERITY ............................................................................................................... 48 APPENDIX 7 CONSEQUENCE METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................... 49 APPENDIX 8 MODELLING INPUT DATA .............................................................................................................. 52 APPENDIX 9 LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................... 58 APPENDIX 10 RISKS ............................................................................................................................................... 62 APPENDIX 11 ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK ................................................................................................................. 63 APPENDIX 12 REFERENCES ................................................................................................................................... 65 APPENDIX 13 COMPETENCES OF RISK ASSESSORS .............................................................................................. 66 APPENDIX 14 MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION ADVERTISEMENT ....................................................................... 67 APPENDIX 15 EMERGENCY PLAN.......................................................................................................................... 68



1. INTRODUCTION

Lanele Group proposes to develop and operate a liquid fuel blending and storage terminal at Ambrose Park, in Bayhead, Durban. The portion of land has been leased from Transnet Properties for 20 years with an option to renew for an additional 10 years. The facility is intended for the receipt, storage, blending and issuing of refined products. It will import petrol, diesel and blending components via the port of Durban. The distribution of product will take place via the multi products pipeline (MPP), previously known as the new MPP, to Gauteng and via road and/or rail, by Lanele and storage tenants at the facility. Lanele Group also has the intention of importing low sulphur fuel oil and supplying it to the port via the facility. The proposed project triggers Activity 42 [The expansion of facilities for the storage, or storage and handling, of dangerous goods, where the capacity of such a storage facility will be expanded by 80 cubic metres or more] listed under Listing Notice 1 of NEMA (R544 of 2010; and requires a Basic Assessment (BA). As part of the BA process, a Major Hazard Risk Assessment is needed, which is also a requirement for approval of the facility by the authorities as per the Major Hazard Installation Regulations.

2. MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION REGULATION SCOPE APPLICATION

This risk assessment is conducted to comply with the Major Hazard Installation Regulations under the Occupational Health and Safety Act. Refer to Appendix 1 for further details of the regulation requirements.

2.1 CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION AS A MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION

Briefly, a major hazard installation is an installation where a hazardous substance, which is listed in the General Machinery Regulations of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, is processed, handled or stored, and the content of the hazardous substance exceeds the quantity stipulated. Alternatively, if it is not listed, it may be an installation that has the potential to cause a major incident that will affect members of the public. Refer to Appendix 1 for details.

2.2 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

Risk is made up of two components:

- The probability of a certain magnitude of hazardous event occurring. - The severity of the consequences of the hazardous event. A risk assessment is, therefore, typically comprised of the following aspects:

- Identification of the likely hazards expected to be associated with the operation of the installation; - Quantification of the hazards in terms of their likely frequency and magnitude; - Determination of the consequences of the hazards and their severity, should these occur; - Estimating the risk and comparing this with certain acceptability criteria. Refer to Appendix 1 for details of risk assessment standards and procedures.

3. DESCRIPTIONS

3.1 ORGANISATION, SITE LOCATION AND SURROUNDING AREAS

3.1.1 Organisation

Lanele Group (Pty) Ltd is a privately owned South African company with a track record in the downstream oil, gas and energy sector. Lanele Group forms part of the Lanele Group of entities, which



was founded in 2005 to focus on the energy and commodities sector.

3.1.2 Physical address

Ambrose Park, Bayhead, Durban

3.1.3 Location

The Lanele Oil Terminal 1 (Lot 1) project is located in Ambrose Park, Bayhead, Durban. The parcel of land is approximately 7 ha, at a portion of the Kings Royal Flats No. 16576 and the remainder of ERF 10019. The proposed facility is immediately north and adjacent to the NOOA tank farm development project in Bayhead, Durban. It is approximately 4 km southeast of the Durban Central Business District in the KwaZulu-Natal Province. Figure 3-1 below shows the location of the Island View harbour complex in Durban in the KwaZulu-Natal province on a map of South Africa.

Figure 3-1 Map of South Africa showing location of the Lanele site in Durban

Figure 3-2 below shows the harbour complex and the location of the Lanele Terminal bay sites, with residential areas surrounding it in more detail.

CAPE TOWNEAST LONDON

PORT ELIZABETH

MUSINA

GABORONE

Northern Cape

Eastern Cape

LESOTHO

Newcastle

NAMIBIA

Western Cape

POLOKWANE

DURBAN

JOHANNESBURG

PRETORIA

Sasolburg

KIMBERLEY

BLOEMFONTEIN

NELSPRUIT

RICHARDS BAYNatal

Free State

North West

Limpopo

EstcourtKroonstadWelkom

SWAZILAND

Lanele site



Figure 3-2 Location of the proposed Lanele near the harbour area The layout of the Lanele Terminal with the storage tanks, road tanker filling bays and main pipelines are shown in Figure 3-3 below.

LaneleSite



Figure 3-3 Layout of the Lanele Terminal Principle areas of activity surrounding the site are:

Other industrial companies (e.g. Shell, Engen, Zenex).

Proposed NOOA fuel terminal immediately south of this site

Rail staging and shunting yard adjacent southwest

Harbour and bay area adjacent on the northeast side.

Formal residential areas Umbilo 1,5 km northwest

Durban Central Business district about 3,7 km away.

The Indian Ocean and beach 1 km away.

3.1.4 Topography and Meteorology

The area around the Island View Durban harbour sites is essentially flat and surrounded by tall structures and tanks, with seawater in the bay. There is no vegetation in the harbour area, except grass and small shrubs outside the harbour area towards the north. Meteorological conditions are typically coastal with high humidity and morning and evening sea winds from the north and northeast. Winter nights are cool with some temperature inversions. Generally days

Road tanker loading bays

Pipe racksPump

stations

Petrol ULP95

Blend stock ULP95

Marine Gas Oil

Jet Fuel

Diesel blend

Ultra low sulphur diesel

Spill basin

Slop tank system

Fire water system



are clear, windy and sunny. The dominant wind directions are from the north-northeast (21,5 % of time) and the southwest (20,9 % of time), with occasional winds from other directions. Therefore, the wind blows across the area, parallel to the coastline most of the time. See wind rose in Figure 3-4 below (old Durban Airport) and refer to Appendix 3 for details of wind and weather tendencies.

Figure 3-4 Annual wind direction rose for Island View Durban

3.2 PLANT PROCESS AND OPERATIONS

3.2.1 Origin, manufacture, installation, erection and date

Lanele Group commissioned engineering company, Thyssenkrupp Industrial Solutions South Africa (Pty) Ltd (Thyssenkrupp) to complete the pre-feasibility study (PFS) and bankable feasibility study (BFS).

3.2.2 Plant

This is essentially a fuel storage terminal. See Figure 3-5 below. The facility will comprise the following plant items:

Three separate 16” carbon steel fuel pipelines from the common user infrastructure, feeding from Berths 2, 6 and 9 to the storage tanks, approximately 400 -470 m long.

Two ULP95 petrol tanks and a blend tank, three diesel tanks and a blend tank, three marine gas oil tanks and a jet fuel tank. Petrol tanks provided with internal floating roofs (blankets). All tanks are fitted with conservation vents.

Pump stations for petrol, jet fuel, diesel transfer to road loading stations.

Pump stations petrol, jet fuel, diesel supply to multi-purpose pipeline.

Pump stations for diesel blending and export of marine gas oil.

Three separate 16” carbon steel fuel pipelines from pump stations at storage tanks to multi-purpose pipeline, approximately 400 -430 m long.

Three separate 10” carbon steel fuel pipelines from pump stations at storage tanks to road tanker loading gantry, approximately 400 - 430 m long.

0.0

5.0

10.0

15.0

20.0

25.0

N

NNE

NE

ENE

E

ESE

SE

SSE

S

SSW

SW

WSW

W

WNW

NW

NNW

WIND DIRECTION DISTRIBUTION (ISLAND VIEW)



Road loading gantry comprising 4 loading bays, for tanker bottom fill, with a batch metering control system via 100 mm rigid steel loading arms. A system for vapour recovery when loading of petrol tankers will be provided.

Oily water and slop system, consisting of oily water pit, oil water separator and water treatment unit for treating all oily water collected on-site before discharge into the storm water system.

Fire water supply consisting of a pressurising jockey pump and a main electric pump, which will feed the tank cooling sprays and foam systems.

Figure 3-5 Illustration of the Lanele terminal activities

3.2.3 Process and operations

The basic process is: diesel, petrol and jet fuels, imported by ship, are received from the common user interface linked to Berths 2, 6 and 9 within the Cutler Complex of the Durban Harbour. The products are received from dedicated product lines and stored in tanks. The majority of the fuels are then issued to the Multi-Product Pipeline (MPP) with the remainder being sent to the special blend tank or road loading. Fuels may also be received from the road pump back if there is a problem with the tanker that was filled while it is still on-site, or if the product is rejected and returned to the facility or there is a problem with receipt of product from the Cutler complex. Marine Gas Oil is also received from berths, stored and supplied to the Bunkering facilities located close to Berth 10. Low octane unleaded petrol can be blended with high octane blend stock (e.g. Reformate) to produce a petrol blend. A diesel blend can be produced by blending diesel from the storage tanks and a special diesel blend stock. The special diesel can only be issued via road loading. The typical process around an atmospheric liquid storage tank is shown in Figure 3-6 below.

Figure 3-6 Typical atmospheric liquid storage tank arrangement

LANELE TERMINAL

MULTI-

PURPOSE

PIPELINE

FUEL OUTFUEL IN

EARTH

BUND

VACUUM BREAK /

PRESSURE RELIEF

HIGH LEVEL

SHUT OFF

WATER SPRAYS

FEED FROM

SHIPS OR

OTHER

FOAM POURERTO LOADING OF

TANKERS,

BLENDING OR

MPP SUPPLY

LI LAHL

BUND

LSHH

M

I

INTERNAL

FLOATING ROOF

M



3.2.4 Inventories of materials on-site

Several different fuels will be handled as listed below:

Petrol

Diesel

Marine Gas Oil

Jet A1 fuel Average maximum inventories of hazardous materials on-site at any time are given in Table 3-1 below.

Table 3-1 – Inventories of hazardous materials

Material Volume containment (tanks) Specific gravity

Mass (tonnes)

Proposed

Petrol 2 tanks T1101/2 @ 15 000 m3 = 30 000 m3 0.79 23 700

Diesel 3 tanks T2301/23 @ 25 000 m3 = 75 000 m3 0.85 63 750

Jet A1 1 tank T4001 @ 15 000 m3 = 15 000 m3 0.82 12 300

Marine Gas Oil 3 tanks T5001/2/3 @ 20 000 m3 = 60 000 m3 0.89 53 400

Blend diesel 1 tank T2304 @ 25 000 m3 = 25 000 m3 0.85 21 250

Blend petrol 1 tank T1103 @ 10 000 m3 = 10 000 m3 0.79 7 900

Total average maximum capacity 182 300

4. RISK ASSESSMENT

4.1 IDENTIFICATION OF HAZARDS

4.1.1 Hazardous Materials in the Process

The materials of concern here are large inventories that are hazardous and which have the potential to create major hazards, if released. These were categorised according to SANS 10228 and SANS 10234 classes of dangerous substances, as detailed below in Table 4-1. An evaluation was made to determine whether these materials have the potential to contribute to a major hazard risk, requiring further quantification. Detailed material safety data from the Safety Data Sheets are given in Appendix 4.

Table 4-1 Hazardous material classification

Materials SANS10228 SANS10234 Potential Major Hazard

None Class 1 Explosives Not relevant

None Class 2.1 Flammable gasses Flammable gas 1 Not relevant

None Class 2.2 Non-flammable gasses

Not relevant

None Class 2.3 Toxic gasses Flammable gas 2, Acute toxic 3 (inhalation) Skin corrosion 1B,Acute aquatic 1

Not relevant

Petrol, diesel, marine gas oil, Jet A1 fuel

Class 3 Flammable liquids Major Hazard installation, large

inventories

None Class 4 Flammable solids Not relevant

Oxygen Class 5.1 Oxidisers Not relevant

None Class 5.2 Peroxides Not relevant



Table 4-1 Hazardous material classification

Materials SANS10228 SANS10234 Potential Major Hazard

None Class 6.1 Toxic gasses Flam gas 1, Acute toxic 2 (inhalation), Acute aquatic 1, Chronic aquatic 1

Not relevant

None Class 6.2 Infectious Not relevant

None Class 7 Radioactive Not relevant

None

Class 8 Corrosives Skin corrosion 1B, Eye damage 1

Not relevant

None Class 9 Miscellaneous Not relevant

4.1.2 Environmental Hazards

Environmental effects (biophysical) are not relevant to the Major Hazard Installation Regulations with the exception of elements mentioned in the Environmental Conservation Act of 1973 (replaced by the National Environmental Management Act 1998). Although the effects from a major hazard on the environment may be identified in this assessment, no environmental risk assessment will be carried out as part of the Major Hazard Installation Risk Assessment.

4.1.3 Hazardous Material Interactions

Some hazardous chemicals, when combined, may have flammable, explosive or toxic effects. This is unlikely to happen as all the fuels are compatible.

4.2 PAST MAJOR ACCIDENT EXPERIENCE

In order to illustrate the credibility of a potentially major hazard on this installation, some typical incidents that have previously occurred are cited below.

4.2.1 Site

None, site not existing yet, still has to be established.

4.2.2 Local and worldwide

A search in the literature and accident databases, IChemE 1999, shows that over the last 50 years worldwide, various accidents involving the handling and storage of hazardous substances (fuels) similar to those handled on this site have occurred. As an illustration, there are over 500 reports of accidents involving highly flammable petrol. One involving a storage site and another two related to road tankers are described below. During December 2005, a large fuel storage site at Buncefield in the UK, suffered explosions and fires resulting in extensive damage due to the overflowing of a petrol tank, followed by ignition. No injuries or fatalities were reported (Powell 2006). In the UK, a blowtorch was used on top of a petrol tanker to solder the sensor wires and caused the tanker to explode, killing the mechanic. Another explosion occurred when welding was done to the bottom of a tanker during maintenance (Kletz 2003). In 1993, gasoline was spilt from a tanker during offloading at a gasoline station in South Africa. It ignited and the fire destroyed the station and resulted in two fatalities (OSE 1993).

4.2.2.1 Petrol

There is a total of 5753 incidents recorded involving petrol; most were related to transport and refineries. Some significant incidents are listed below:



December 1999, THAILAND, deaths 8, injuries 13. A fire occurred on a tank farm at a refinery, killing eight people and injuring thirteen others. The incident occurred when a gasoline tank overflowed, releasing vapours, which entered several nearby buildings. Two operators went to investigate and it is thought that the vehicle they were driving ignited the vapours causing a number of explosions, starting a fire on a tank containing 1.5 million litres gasoline which quickly spread to four other larger tanks. A large quantity of foam was used in extinguishing the fire.

June 10, 1999, Washington, USA, deaths 3, injuries 0. A leak occurred on a pipeline, releasing vapours over a nearby creek. The vapours ignited causing a fireball which killed three people. Approximately 1,100 m3 of gasoline was spilt into the creek.

March 30, 1998, Sandy Springs, Georgia, USA, deaths 0, and injuries 0. A pipeline rupture caused approximately 30,000 gallons of gasoline to be released, of which 17,000 gallons were recovered. The incident occurred on a 40-inch diameter steel pipeline, which ran through a landfill site. An employee at the site detected the odour of gasoline flowing up through the ground in the vicinity of the site and immediately reported the leak to the pipeline owner. The pipeline was subsequently shut down. An investigation into the leak found that the pipeline had buckled and cracked. It is thought that the stress damage was due to soil settlement underneath the pipe.

November 11, 1996, MEXICO, deaths 19, injuries 4. An explosion, attributed to a faulty valve, occurred in a gasoline storage tank. About 100,000 bbl. of leaded and unleaded gasoline burnt out of control for more than 36 hours, destroying 2 of 6 storage tanks. More than 5,000 people were evacuated from the adjacent residential area.

November 1, 1995, Baytown, Texas, USA, deaths 0, injuries 0. The fire started as a result of a lightning strike on a 50,000 bbl. gasoline tank, which was almost full. The fire was extinguished after 2 hours.

March 7, 1995, Carteret, New Jersey, USA, deaths 0, injuries 0. A 2 hour fire raged at this gasoline storage terminal after a pipe connected to a 2 million gallon gasoline tank had failed. Some nearby toll operators were taken to hospital after inhaling toxic fumes.

November 2 1994, Drunk Asyut, EGYPT, deaths 390, injuries 0. During a thunderstorm lightning struck a complex of 8 fuel storage tanks, causing the explosion of the tank. Burning gasoline flowed on flood waters into a village causing many deaths. Rail tracks subsided and 2 rail tankers overturned and spilt fuel.

January 1993, location unknown, deaths 1, injuries 2. A major fire in a tank farm. A floating roof tank was overfilled with gasoline to the point where spilled gasoline was both inside and outside the bund. A tremendous explosion occurred, and a fireball was sent hundreds of feet into the air. The basic cause of this incident was inadequate monitoring of tank filling.

4.2.2.2 Diesel

There is only record of 6 incidents involving diesel fuel. Most of these are associated with the transportation of diesel. The following incidents, not related to transport, are noteworthy:

In the USA on 24 September 1977, lightning struck a 190 foot diameter cone roof tank containing diesel fuel. Roof fragments were hurled 240 feet away and struck a 100 foot diameter covered floating roof gasoline tank. A 180 foot floating gasoline tank at 80 feet distance was also struck by debris. The entire surface of the cone and internal floating roof tanks ignited immediately. The rim fire on the floating roof resulted in the roof sinking after about four hours. The two largest tanks were full. The smallest about half full. The two larger tanks and their content were destroyed. The fire in the internal floating roof tank was extinguished after about two hours.

Date and location unknown, two workers welding a 150 gallon diesel fuel tank were fatally injured when the tank exploded. After the explosion it was found that diesel fuel in the tank was contaminated with gasoline.

4.3 HAZARD ANALYSIS



4.3.1 Hazardous event identification

The site was broken down into discrete sections in order to facilitate the analysis of possible hazards. These sections are:

Berth pipelines

Flammable storage in vertical tanks

Piping to road tanker loading and Transnet multipurpose pipeline

Road tanker loading The possibility of the following hazards in each of the above areas was considered:

Fires (jet pool and flash)

Explosions (confined) Hazards were analysed as shown in Table 4-2 below. Refer to Appendix 8 for all scenarios considered for modelling, with associated key process input data.

Table 4-2 Hazard Analysis

Plant Section Failures and Causes

Preventative Measures

HAZARDOUS EVENT

Protective Measures

Final Consequences

Berth pipes, feed pipes to tanker loading, supply pipes to multi-purpose pipeline

Pipe rupture

Leaks due to soil movement, bleed valve left open, loose gasket

Ignition from static charges, electrical faults, hot work or smoking

Integrity assurance, maintenance

Electrical classified area, hot work procedures, smoking prohibited and earthing

Pool fire

Jet fire

Flash fire

Explosion

Emergency isolation

Fire water and foam application

Harbour fire brigade

Potential for overheat damage of nearby tankers

Radiation injuries to employees, possible outside public

Tank farm bulk storage

Overfilling of tanks and roof seam shear

Rupture of tank, e.g. integrity loss

Tank pipeline rupture or leak due to damage, e.g. corrosion, vehicle damage

Sabotage

Ignition sources, e.g. hot work, electrical sparks, static, smoking

Level indication and high alarms

Integrity assurance, maintenance

Electrical area classification

Earthing

Security and fenced in

Pool fire

Jet fire

Flash fire

Explosion

Emergency isolation, water sprinkler system on tanks

Foam application

Containment in bunding


Potential for overheat damage of nearby tanks

Blast or radiation injuries to employees, possible outside public



Table 4-2 Hazard Analysis

Plant Section Failures and Causes

Preventative Measures

HAZARDOUS EVENT

Protective Measures

Final Consequences

Air ingress into the tank

Ignition from static (unlikely)

Internal floating roof in petrol tanks

Earthing

Internal explosion

Emergency procedures

Damage of the tank

Potential injuries or fatalities

Road tanker loading

Tanker burst

Loading hose or arm rupture due to loss of integrity e.g. corrosion, or tanker pulled away with hose

Pump gland leak

Overfilling

Ignition sources present, e.g. hot work, electrical sparks, static, smoking

Integrity assurance, e.g. inspection, maintenance, testing

Batch filling meter

Electrical classified area, hot work procedures, smoking prohibited and earthing

Pool fire

Jet fire

Flash fire

Explosion

Emergency procedures, e.g. isolation

Fire extinguishing


Potential for overheat damage of nearby tankers

Radiation injuries to employees, possible outside public

4.3.2 Consequence Severity

Use was made of the computer programme DNV-GL PHAST and SAFETI 8.11 to model each release in terms of the flow rate, pool formation, evaporation, dispersion and resultant radiation for fires or overpressures from explosions. This was done for three weather conditions: Inversion, with a wind speed of 1.5 m/s, neutral with a wind speed of 5 m/s and unstable with a wind speed of 3 m/s. These represent both low and high wind speed conditions, as well as day and night conditions. The input data to these calculations, which are based on the cause analysis, is given in A-Table 16 to 27 in Appendix 8.

4.3.2.1 Effect distances

In order to interpret the physiological effects on persons exposed to the hazards, three severity categories were adopted for explosion and fires, as defined and shown in Table 4-3 below.

Table 4-3 Effect categories

Category 1 2 3

Least severe Moderately severe Most severe

Fire radiation kW/m2 4 12,5 37,5

Effects from a pool or jet fire or a fire ball for 10 s

0 % fatal, pain, blistering

~ 0 - 1% fatal, 2nd degree burns

100% fatal

Flash fire radius m Radius from the release to ½ the Lower Flammable Limit (LEL)

Effects from a flash fire 100 % fatal



Table 4-3 Effect categories

Category 1 2 3

Explosion overpressure kPa

2 13,8 20,7

Explosion effect on people in open

0 % fatal

0,1% ear drum rupture

0 % fatal

1% ear drum rupture

0 % fatal

10% ear drum rupture 0 % fatal

Explosion effect on people inside masonry building

0 % fatal 1 % fatal 20 % fatal

Explosion effects on masonry buildings

No masonry damage, safe building. 10-20 % windows broken.

Minor structural damage to houses. Missile limit

Masonry damage. 100 % windows broken.

Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses.

Steel building damage. 100 % windows broken.

Steel frame buildings distorted and pulled away from foundation. Frameless, self- framing steel building demolished, rupture of storage tanks

Toxic concentration ERPG 1 ERPG 2 ERPG 3

Toxic effects on people Suffer only mild transient health effects and objectionable odour

Not suffer irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair ability to take protective action

Will not suffer life threatening health effects

Severity effect distances for the 3 effect categories, were determined by the consequence modelling. Events, which have a serious effect the longest distance away from the source (hazard end points), are summarised in Table 4-4 below, for each severity category.

Table 4-4 – Events with maximum effect distances

Category 1 2 3 Event Effect Maximum effect distance m

Radiation: Pool fires 299(22) 290 (22) 279 (22) 22. Jet fuel feed pipe to multipurpose pipeline leak

Jet fire 580 (27) 467 (27) 359 (27) 27. Petrol tank small leak Flash fire 1948(26) 26. Petrol tank large leak

Explosion 2072(26) 156626) - 26. Petrol tank large leak Toxic release - - - Not applicable

Note, no 13,8 kPa overpressures developed by explosions , so only the 7 kPa effect distance is shown. Table 4-4 above shows that, if any of the events had to occur, one could possibly expect, as a minimum, some serious effects as far away as 1948 m for a flash fire due to a large leak on a petrol tank followed by ignition. These results do not include any escape or shielding factors, i.e. it is for a person in the open, stationary at that distance. Neither do these results include the likelihood (frequency) of the events happening. Account is only taken of the probability of the effects on a person.



4.3.3 Hazard Effect Zones

Severity is further illustrated below by graphical outputs of effects on plot plans of the site and surrounding areas.

4.3.3.1 Fire Radiation

Fire radiation radii for various ignited releases are shown on maps in the figures below.

Figure 4-1 Jet fire 12,5 kW/m2 radiation radii: for various ignited releases

Figure 4-2 Late pool fire 12,5 kW/m2 radiation radii for various ignited flammable releases



Figure 4-3 Flash fire radiation radii for worst ignited flammable release

4.3.3.2 Explosion overpressures

There are no 13,5 kPa overpressure circles, so 7 kPa overpressure circles for petrol unconfined vapour explosion are displayed on the map in the Figure 4-4 below as an illustration.

Figure 4-4 Explosion 13,8 kPa overpressure circles for various ignited flammable releases

4.3.3.3 Toxic effects

There are no toxic effects to display.

NOOA



4.3.3.4 Lethality

Fatal zone limits for a 1% fatal probability are shown on maps of the site in the figures below, for significant fire and toxic effects from various releases.

Figure 4-5 Fatal 1% zones for jet fires from various ignited releases

Figure 4-6 Fatal 1% zones for pool fires from various ignited releases

4.4 QUALIFICATION AS A MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION

4.4.1 Classification



No materials contained in a single container on the site are listed in Schedule A of the General Machinery Regulations. Therefore the Lanele Oil Terminal is not a compulsory Major Hazard Installation. However, it can be seen from the results in the previous Section 4.3.3 that the set criteria in Appendix 1 of 12,5 kW/ m2 radiation and 13,7 kPa overpressure effects, extend across the site boundary. Therefore the Lanele Oil Terminal is classified as a Major Hazard Installation under the current regulations.

4.4.2 Notification of Major Hazard Installation

As this facility is a Major Hazard Installation, notifications to the authorities are required. The installations must be re-assessed after five years, i.e. 2023, or earlier, if the installation is modified, capacities are increased or more hazardous materials are stored. Refer to regulation 5, for the circumstances under which the risk assessment should be reviewed before the end of the 5-year period.

4.4.3 Reporting of Emergency Occurrences

Since the facility is a major hazard installation all incidents, which require the emergency procedures to be activated on the installation, must be reported to the local emergency services as well as to the Provincial Director. Such incidents must be recorded and the register must be available for inspection.

4.4.4 Hazard escalation domino effects

Overpressures in excess of 7 kPa (ICI 1986) will have to be attained before tanks and piping will be damaged. Referring to the consequence maps, this may be possible, which will lead to a release of fuel and initiate further fires, escalating the hazard. In terms of radiation from fires, intensities of 25 kW/m2 (ICI 1986) need to be attained before thermal stress will lead to tank failure and further escalation of fires. From the consequence maps it can be seen that radiation levels in excess of this can extend to adjacent tanks and lead to overheating and eventual release of fuel. However all tanks are provided with facilities to cool down exposed surfaces with firewater, which will reduce the likelihood of escalating the hazard.

4.4.5 Effect on adjacent Major Hazard Installations

There are other major hazard installations close by in the area. In particular there is the proposed NOOA fuel terminal south of the Lanele site. An explosion will not damage tanks, buildings and piping at NOOA. See the Figure 4-4 in Section 4.3.3.2 above where 7 kPa overpressure circles are shown which do not cross the NOOA site. Fires at Lanele will not cause weakening of tanks and infrastructure to the extent that these may fail or if ignited result tank fires at NOOA and neighbouring facilities.

4.5 LIKELIHOOD OF MAJOR HAZARDS

Generic failure data from the data bases in the Purple Book, Bevi document, ICI and HSE etc. (see references) collected and compiled by ISHECON, as well as data available from the site or similar sites was used to determine the likelihood of hazardous events. Refer to likelihood data for the events assessed as per table in Appendix 10. The failure data was adjusted according to the evaluation of the process safety management and organizational measures practiced on the site. This may be well managed, not well managed or neutral and the failure frequency was adjusted accordingly, as per Appendix 10.

4.6 RISK RESULTS

Two types of risks were evaluated in this risk assessment, individual risk for employees and public and societal risks. Use was made of the computer model DNV-GL SAFETI 8.11 to obtain the risk results.

4.6.1 Individual risk contours



Individual risk is the chance that a particular individual at a particular location will be harmed in the course of a year. The risk is typically expressed as the chance (e.g. 10-3 , 10-4, 10-5 …..10-8) of a fatality per person per year. Contours have been plotted on a map of the site, as shown in Figure 4-7 below

Figure 4-7 – Individual risk contours

4.6.2 Risk Profiles

On the map of the risk contours in Figure 4-7 above, a horizontal (west to east direction) ‘transects’ A – B was drawn, which produced the risk profile as shown on the graph in Figure 4-8 below. The highest risk on the Lanele site is approximately an 3 * 10-4 chance of a fatality per person per year.

Figure 4-8 Risk profile along transect A – B Similarly, the risk profile anticlockwise from the northwest corner along the site boundary was obtained as shown on the graph in Figure 4-9 below. This shows that the maximum risk from the Lanele Terminal installations at the public interface is a 3,2 * 10--5 chance of a fatality per person per year.

A

B



Figure 4-9– Risk profile along the Island View site boundary

4.6.3 Societal Risk

Societal risk depends on the population distribution normally surrounding the site, as well as on whether persons are indoors or outdoors, i.e. their ability to escape from the hazard area. Societal risk is a way to estimate the chances of numbers of people being harmed from an incident. The likelihood of the primary event (an accident at a major hazard plant) is still a factor, but the consequences are assessed in terms of level of harm and numbers affected, to provide an idea of the scale of an accident in terms of numbers killed or harmed. Evaluation of societal risk is useful for town planning as it gives an indication of how many of the population may be harmed. Population areas on a map were demarcated as shown in Figure 4-10 below.

Figure 4-10 Island View Durban site, and surrounding population areas An estimate of the number of people in a populated area was done and the population density was calculated based on the surface area. A probability that people would be indoors, was assigned to each population area, based on the guidelines, Green Book 1992. See Table 4-5 below.



Table 4-5 Population data

Time

Population area Lanele Harbour Umbilo

Day People 22 29 000 1600

Population density (persons / m2

0,00026 0,004 0,001

Fraction indoors 0,93 0,93 0,93

Night People 8 15 000 3200

Population density (persons / m2

0,00012 0,002 0,0025

Fraction indoors 0,99 0,99 0,99

Societal risks were determined by using the individual risks to calculate the number of fatalities in a specific population area, taking account of the population density, the probability that people will be indoors, the wind direction distribution and ignition probabilities associated with the population and other activities. Societal risk is then expressed in frequency – fatality (F-N) curves as shown on the graph in Figure 5-11 below. The blue curve denoted ‘Combination 1‘, is the combination of day and night societal risk curves. In this evaluation the population on-site was included. Incidents, which will incur a large number of fatalities, are less likely to occur. There is a lower limit line (green), below which the risks are totally acceptable and an upper limit line (red) above which risks are totally unacceptable. The risk region between these two limit lines is regarded as ‘tolerable’.

Figure 4-11 Societal risk F-N cure (frequency / year versus number of fatalities)

4.7 ACCEPTABILITY

4.7.1 Employee individual risk

The maximum risks from explosions, jet fires, pool and flash inside the terminal where employees are exposed (see risk profiles) are at most an 1,8 * 10-4 chance of a fatality per person per year. This does not exceed 1 * 10-3, but exceed 1 * 10-5 chance of a fatality per person per year stated in Appendix 12. Thus, the risks from the Lanele installations are tolerable for employees; Risks should be reduced where practical and cost effective, otherwise it may be accepted that they are as low as reasonably practicable ((ALARP4).

4 As low as reasonably practical.



4.7.2 Public individual risk

Refer to the risk contours in Figure 4-7 of Section 4.6, as well as the boundary risk profile in Figure 4-9 which shows the maximum risk on the site boundary is a 9,5 * 10-5 chance of a fatality per person per year. Risks thus do not exceed the target stated in Appendix 12 of a 1 * 10 -4 chance of a fatality per person per year at the boundary, and outside, and further away, but exceed 1 * 10-6 which would be totally acceptable. Therefore, public individual risks may be regarded as tolerable; Risks should be reduced where practical and cost effective, otherwise it may be accepted that they are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

4.7.3 Societal risk

The F-N curve in Figure 4-15 of Section 4.6.3 indicates that societal risks are tolerable; Risks should be reduced where practical and cost effective, otherwise it may be accepted that they are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).

5. ENVIRONMENTAL

Loss of containment of some materials will result in vapours, which may lead to complaints of discomfort and smell, from neighbours in the area or from the public. The heat generated in the fire will assist in initially dispersing the fumes and these are likely to descend some distance away with little effect on the environment. There may also be temporary visual impact from the smoke. In terms of mitigation, to minimise the chance of releases from the long berth pipelines and piping around the tanks and pumps due to corrosion from sea atmospheric conditions, all the pipelines will be carbon steel material A106_GrB, ASTM A106 grade B Seamless Pressure Pipe (ASME SA106) with a suitable specified protective outside layer of epoxy paint to prevent external corrosion. Pipes will be rated for pressures meeting Class 300 ASA rating, which will withstand pressure far in excess of operating pressures and used in power plants, boilers, petrochemical plants, oil and gas refineries, and ships where the piping must transport fluids and gases that exhibit high pressures and temperatures. In addition, where piping goes underground, it is wrapped with Denso Tape (cloth impregnated with a petroleum grease) to further minimise stress corrosion cracking from the chlorides in the soil. Scheduled inspections (pressure testing) of pipelines are done even if they are underground; therefore the chance of a leak from the berth pipelines will be extremely small. Scheduled inspection of piping is done as per API 570; Piping Inspection Code, Fourth Edition, published by the American Petroleum Institute (API). A fire on the installations, with the resultant use of large quantities of firewater, could pose an environmental problem if not suitably contained and directed to the catchment pits, disaster drains or a controlled storm water system.

The tanks are bunded, so that if there is a fire, foam will be poured into the bund to extinguish the fire, this will be a relative small quantity. Initially the fire water for cooling the tank will fill the bund and be contained. Fire water sprays on adjacent tanks for cooling will remain clean and could be discharged with no pollution, Should the tank bund that is on fire eventually fill up with water, operators may attempt to open the bund drain if safe from fire radiation, thus draining the clean water out as the fuels will float on top of the water.

Leaks of fuels will be contained in bunds, trenches and directed to an oily water separator where fuels will be separated out. Water will be tested, before any discharge into the storm water drain.

Tank bunds have been sized to contain the contents of the largest tank with additional 10% capacity to ensure any tank burst is contained. Above this a 200mm freeboard bund height has been incorporated in

https://inspectioneering.com/tag/api



the design to prevent any overflow spillage. The high integrity civil design will also ensure that bunds will not fail when filled.

Major leaks or ruptures during tanker loading may spill fuels into the storm water drains. There is, however, a separation sump from which spilled liquids can be recovered before discharging water into the storm water drain, once tests have been done to confirm that the liquid is not harmful to the environment. In addition, spillage can also be pumped to other empty bunds for temporary containment. The expected frequencies of releases and fires are such that any environmental incident would be extremely infrequent.

6. HEALTH AND HYGIENE

6.1 IDENTIFICATION OF WORK HEALTH ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

Physical: Radiation, microwaves, laser, ultra violet, X-rays, noise, vibration, extreme temperatures Chemical: Toxic, carcinogens, mutagens or tetragens, systemic poisons, anaesthetic or narcotic materials. Hazard data summarised in table 1 at the end. Biological: Insects e.g. wasps, flies, mosquitoes, rodents e.g. rats and mice, bacteria e.g. from unhygienic practices, plants, mites, fungi, moulds, viruses. Ergonomic: Tool & work station, workplace design, material handling, body position, work capacity, fatigue, shift work, monotony, relationships, work rest cycle, physio-psychological factors, biomechanics Psychological: emergencies, personal problems, threats, and violence

6.2 ANALYSIS OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPOSURES

Refer to Table The activities that are carried out together with the persons involved was listed and analysed in terms of the exposure route or mechanism, the time or duration, the form or nature of the exposure and the effects or consequences. In addition control measures were identified.

Table 6-1 Activities and Exposures

Activities Personnel involved

Form or nature of exposure

Time mins/

hrs

Exposure mechanism or

route

Effects Control measures

Construction

Transport, offloading of materials and equipment

Drivers

Labourers

Crane drivers

Ambient temperature

Humidity

Diesel fumes

8 hrs/ day

Body absorption

Inhalation

Heat stress

Throat and lung Irritation

Water drinking

Open air ventilation

Civil construction, excavations, foundations

Labourers

Earth working machine drivers

Ambient temperature

Humidity

Diesel fumes

Cement

Dust

8 hrs/ day

Body contact

Inhalation

Heat stress


Skin irritation

Water drinking


Wearing protective equipment e.g. gloves

Welding and cutting

Welders

Labourers

Fumes from welding and cutting

UV radiation

8 hrs/ day

Inhalation

Skin and eye absorption


Skin burn

Vision


Fume extraction

Wearing






Time mins/

hrs


route


impairment

protective equipment e.g. gloves

Erection of tanks, piping and equipment

Fitters

Crane drivers

Welders

Labourers

Fumes from welding and cutting

UV radiation

8 hrs/ day

Body absorption

Inhalation

Heat stress


Water drinking



Operation

Taking fuel samples and testing

Operators 1 off

Petrol, diesel and oil fumes

Liquid fuels

3 hrs/ day

Inhalation

Skin absorption

Chronic effects from volatiles e.g. benzene

Der-matitis

Ventilation

Wearing protective equipment

Medical surveilance

Shift work 3 Operators

Routine activities

Emergency situations

8 hrs/ day

Sitting

Visual PC screen

Day night changes

Dis-orientation

Stress

Aherence to work regualtions

Time off

Three shift work with 2 off weekends

Fitness program

Preparation for maintenance

2 Operator Petrol, diesel and oil fumes

8 hrs/ day

Inhalation

Skin absorption


Der-matitis

Ventilation


Medical surveilance

Welding cutting, fitting

1 Welder

3 fitters

Fumes, smoke and dust

8 hrs/ day

Inhalation

Skin and eye absorption


Skin burn

Vision impairment


Fume extraction







Time mins/

hrs


route


Road tanker loading

4 Operators

Petrol, diesel and oil fumes

8 hrs/ day

Inhalation

Skin absorption


Der-matitis

Ventilation


Medical surveilance

Closure and Rehabilitation

Transport, loading of materials and scrap

Drivers

Labourers

Crane drivers

Ambient temperature

Humidity

Diesel fumes

8 hrs/ day

Body absorption

Inhalation

Heat stress


Water drinking


Civil demolition

Labourers

Earth working machine drivers

Ambient temperature

Humidity

Diesel fumes

Cement

Dust

8 hrs/ day

Body contact

Inhalation

Heat stress


Skin irritation

Water drinking



Cutting Labourers Fumes from cutting

8 hrs/ day

Inhalation




Demolition of tanks, piping and equipment

Fitters

Crane drivers

Labourers

Fumes from cutting

8 hrs/ day

Inhalation Heat stress


Water drinking



6.3 RISK ESTIMATION

Health risk comprises the product of: Probability of exposure, Extend or duration of exposure, and the Severity of the consequences i.e. R = P * E * C The values of the terms can be determined based on the work of (Fine 1971 & Schoeman 1998) as follows:

6.3.1 Probability

This is a measure of how far the safe limits will be exceeded e.g. P = 0 @ OEL, or P = 1 @ LC50 or LD50.

EXCEEDING THE OEL QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTION VALUE



Exceed OEL - C or OEL more than 4 fold Might well be expected 10 Exceed OEL - STEL /TWA more than 3 fold Quite possible 6 Exceed OEL - TWA Unusual, but possible 3 Exceed Action limit (50 % TWA) Remotely possible, has happened 1 Exceed 25 % of TWA Conceivable, has not happened yet 0,5 Exceed 10 % of TWA One in a million chance 0,2 Exceed 1 % of TWA Virtually impossible .1

6.3.2 Exposure

This is a measure of how long a person will be exposed i.e. duration of the hazard experience.

DURATION QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTION VALUE Continuous for 8 hour shift Continuous 10 Continuous for 2 to 4 hours Frequent, daily 6 Continuous for 1 to 2 hours Often, weekly 3 Short periods, a few times a day Unusual, monthly 2 Few times a week Very unusual 1 Few times a month Yearly 0,5 Few times a year Exceptional 0,1

6.3.3 Severity

This is a measure of the severity of the consequence.

LOSSES QUALITATIVE DESCRIPTION VALUE Many mortalities -> R10m Catastrophic 100 Few mortalities > R5m Disaster 40 One mortality > R1m Very serious 15 Many permanent illnesses > R0,5m Highly serious 7 Few permanent illnesses > R0,1m Moderately Serious 6 One permanent illness > R20 000 Serious 5 Many temporary illnesses > R10 000 Highly important 4 Few temporary illness > R5 000 Moderately important 3 One temporary illnesses > R2000 Important 2 Many minor illnesses > R1000 Of serious concern 1 Few minor illness > R5 00 Of medium concern 0,5 One minor illnesses > R200 Of concern 0,1

6.3.4 Risk Classification

Risk was classified in terms of acceptability according to (Schoeman 1999) as follows:

Risk value Classification Acceptability 400 & above Eliminate Consider discontinuation 250 - 399 Very high Immediate correction required 150 - 249 High Correction needed 70 - 149 Medium Attention necessary 20 - 69 Low Little attention required Under 20 Tolerable Only meet legislative requirements

6.4 HEALTH AND HYGIENE ASSESSMENT



Table 6-2 Assessment Record

No

Activity Exceed safe limits

P Exposure E Severity C R Risk Class

Notes

Construction

1 Transport, offloading of materials and equipment

Remotely possible, has happened, high ambient temperature, diesel fumes

1 Often weekly, 1 to 2 hours at a time

3 One minor illness possible

0,1 0,1 Tolerable None

2 Civil construction,excavations, foundations

Conceivable, not known to have happened

0,2 Whole day 8 hrs

10 One temporary illness possible


3 Welding and cutting

Remotely possible, has happened, fumes and UV

Wearing PPE

1 Whole day 8 hrs


PPE

2 20 Tolerable None wearing PPE

4 Erection of tanks, piping and equipment


Wearing PPE

1 Whole day 8 hrs



Operation

5 Taking fuel samples and testing

Remotely possible, has happened

1 Few times a day

2 One temporary illness

2 4 Tolerable None wearing PPE, open air outside, fume cupboard in lab

6 Shift work Unusual but possible

3 Whole day 8 hrs

10 One minor illness

0,1 3 Tolerable None

7 Preparation for maintenance


1 Few times a day

2 One temporary illness

2 4 Tolerable None wearing PPE, open air outside

8 Welding cutting, fitting


Wearing PPE

1 Few times a day





Table 6-2 Assessment Record

No

Activity Exceed safe limits

P Exposure E Severity C R Risk Class

Notes

9 Road tanker loading


1 Whole day 8 hrs


2 20 Tolerable None wearing PPE, open air outside, Closed filling system

Closure and Rehabilitation

10 Transport, loading of materials and scrap

Remotely possible, has happened, high ambient temperature, diesel fumes

1 Two to 4 hours a day

6 One minor illness possible


11 Civil demolition

Conceivable, not known to have happened

0,2 Whole day 8 hrs


PPE

2 4 Tolerable None

12 Cutting Remotely possible, has happened, fumes and UV

Wearing PPE

1 Whole day 8 hrs


PPE


13 Demolition of tanks, piping and equipment


Wearing PPE

1 Whole day 8 hrs



6.5 HEALTH AND HYGIENE MANAGEMENT

A Health and Hygiene Management system should be implemented, which should include the following elements:

Medical Surveilance: Lung X –ray, sampling and testing, pre-placement medical examination

Work Environment Monitoring: Base line of exposure concentrations, volatile organic compounds, sampling

Health Hazard Information: Material Safety Data Sheets, training sessions. Material Hazards Quality management System, updated on a regular basis

Procedures and Codes of Practice: Safe operating procedures of all operations available as part of a Quality Management System, codes of handling for hazardous materials e.g., lead, personal protective clothing, rehabilitation of an employee as a result of affected health



Health Policy: Health policy statement included under the company Safety, Health and Environmental Policy

7. EMERGENCY PLAN

There are usually three levels of emergency response to be considered:

- Installation emergencies - Site emergencies - Emergencies that involve the outside public and local authorities.

7.1 INSTALLATION EMERGENCIES

These are normally of a small nature, e.g. leaks, small fires and can in almost all cases be dealt with by the operator. It is included as part of the operating procedures, which are simple and straightforward. Therefore, these were not considered any further.

7.2 ON-SITE EMERGENCIES

These are emergencies that result from a fire or explosion which usually only has an effect on the installation itself and on any other surrounding installations within the boundaries of the site. An emergency response plan must be drawn up for the Lanele Oil Terminal as per SANS 1514:2018.

7.3 OFF-SITE EMERGENCIES

An off-site emergency plan or procedure is the responsibility of the local emergency services and needs to be prepared, reviewed and updated with the assistance of the Lanele Oil Terminal personnel. For the harbour as a whole there is an emergency plan “Cutler Emergency Plan.

8. ORGANISATIONAL AND PROCESS SAFETY MEASURES

A Process Safety Management system covering process safety measures, as part of the organisational risk management, must be compiled and implemented.

9. LAND USE

In the event that further development is planned near or adjacent to a major hazard installation, approval will be granted based on the risk posed by the installation. A safety or exclusion zone around the installation is defined normally based on the risks from toxic gas releases. If there are no toxic releases, as is the case here, guidance for exclusion zones for fires and explosions are adopted from the toxic gas release method. Based on the type of development, the authorities can allow the development to be implemented. When applied to flammable risks, the approval guideline in Table 9-1 below can be used, as per the United Kingdom’s Health and Safety Executive first published document HSE (1989) and a later discussion document HSE (2001).

Table 9-1 Development approval guideline

Risk (frequency) < 1 * 10 –5 / y < 1 * 10 –6 / y < 1 * 10 –7 / y

Sensitivity level

Normal working population Allow Allow Allow

General public at home or involved in normal activities Disallow Allow Allow

Vulnerable members of the public (children, those with mobility difficulties or those unable to recognise physical danger)

Disallow Disallow Allow



Refer to the risk contours in Figure 4-7 above and the risk profile along the Lanele site boundary in Figure 4-9 above where the risk outside the site boundary is at most a 3*10-5 chance of fatality per person per year. Then, comparing this with the guideline in Table 9-1 above, there would be no restriction (‘disallow’) on any type of industrial development, e.g. normal working population, which includes the NOALA terminal. Public at home and vulnerable members of the public should not be allowed inside the 10-7 contour.

10. CONCLUSIONS

From the above analyses, risk assessment and emergency plan discussions, the following conclusions can be drawn:

10.1 INCIDENT IDENTIFICATION

In terms of material hazards associated with the process or operations there are:

Volatile flammable liquids with flash point -25 C.

Combustible liquids with flash point > 55 C. In terms of the plant and equipment used on the installations, hazard causative factors are:

Potential bursting and leaks of large diameter piping

Potential bursting and leaks of storage tanks with large inventories

Bursting and leaks of loading arms

Overfilling of storage tanks and road tankers

Ignition of pool and jet fires following releases

Initiation of flash fires and explosions.

10.2 SEVERITY AND RISKS

10.2.1 Severity

Hazardous events that stood out as major hazards are fires and explosions. Serious Injuries may occur outside the site boundary where members of the public may be exposed and thus the Lanele Oil Terminal is classified as a Major Hazard Installation.

10.2.2 Individual risks

The maximum individual risk on the site, where employees are exposed, is approximately a 3 * 10-4 chance of a fatality per person, which is tolerable. Risks at the site boundary where members of the public may be exposed are at most a 3,2 * 10-5 chance of a fatality per person per year, which is tolerable. As an illustration, main contributions of risk from the Lanele fuel storage at the proposed NOALA site are the following events: Leaks on petrol tanks, followed by ignition, resulting in fires and explosions 84% Catastrophic rupture of a petrol tank, followed by ignition, resulting in fires and explosions 16%

10.2.3 Societal risks

Societal risks are tolerable, due to large numbers of people at Island View and adjacent industrial and residential areas. It was found that the top events contributing to societal risk are as follows: Petrol tanks large leaks 45% Petrol tanks ruptures 27% Overfilling of petrol tanks 24% Overfilling a petrol road tanker 1,8%



Small leak on a petrol tank 0,12% Petrol loading arm burst 0,077% MGO tank rupture, petrol arm leak 0,05% Other less than 0,05 %.

10.2.4 Environmental

In the event of release of fuels, these will be contained in bunding for recovery back into the system. Where there is rain water contaminated with fuels, it will be passes through a separation pond and any water will only be discharged into the storm water once tested and cleared safe. Therefore risk to the environment is regarded very small.

10.2.5 Health and Hygiene

The fuels handled on this installation have low toxicity i.e. petrol threshold value (TLV) of 300 ppm, diesel 100 mg/m3 mist. In addition diesel, kerosene and marine gas oils are of low volatility, so that the concentrations that can be attained in air are very low. Operating personnel will wear protective equipment when handling fuels in the open and open air will further ensure good dispersion of any fumes. The fuels are also contained in a closed system i.e. piping and tanks, so only exposure will be from accidental releases or during maintenance when equipment has to be opened. Nevertheless, before maintenance equipment will be drained and cleaned.

10.3 RISK REDUCTION

10.3.1 Integrity assurance

While it is fine for an installation to have been designed and constructed according to high standards, it is also necessary to ensure that the integrity of the infrastructure is maintained and any deterioration is detected and plant and equipment are restored to the original condition. This requires continual monitoring of the condition of plant and equipment by means of scheduled inspections (API Standard 653). Similarly, the condition of piping road tanker loading arms should be regularly inspected to ensure that deterioration is detected early, thus preventing their unexpected rupture and leaks.

10.3.2 Overfill and emergency isolation

Emergency isolation of any leaks will be the most effective method of reducing the consequential effects of fires from a burst of loading hoses, pipelines as well as from overfilling of tanks. Therefore, automatic overfill protection on all flammable tanks should be implemented. Remote or automatic emergency isolation on the bottom outlet of tanks low flash point fuels should be installed.

10.3.3 Site layout

The option for tanks at the northern part of the site should be implemented, which will shift the hazard effects further away from the proposed NOOA terminal. Petrol tanks should also occupy the northern section of the site with diesel further south.

11. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations were made (Numbers in { } brackets refer to the report sections):

11.1 ADMINISTRATIVE

(i) Submit this risk assessment to the local authority together with Safety Data Sheets of the substances handled on the installation {4.4.2}.

(ii) Submit letters, together with a copy of the risk assessment to the Chief Inspector and a summary to the Provincial Director notifying them of the Major Hazard Installation {4.4.2}.



(iii) Review the risk assessment again in 2024 or earlier if modifications or additions are done for which this assessment will not be valid {4.4.2}.

(iv) Keep a register of all near miss incidents related to the operation of the storage installations {4.4.3}.

(v) Notify the local emergency services and Provincial Director of any incidents, which activated the emergency procedures {4.4.3}.

11.2 RISK REDUCTION

(vi) Implement a Health and Hygiene Management system {6.5}. (vii) Draw up and implement an Emergency Plan for the site {7.2}. (viii) Implement a Process Safety Management system which will include monitoring piping, tank and

loading arm integrity, e.g. scheduled inspection and testing. {8}. (ix) Provide emergency isolation on atmospheric tank discharge piping {10.3.2}. (x) Implement automatic overfill protection on all flammable tanks {10.3.2}. (xi) Implement the site layout option with tanks located at the northern part of the site {10.3.3}.

12. REFERENCES

See Appendix 13. END of report.........................................................................................................



APPENDIX 1 GENERAL RISK ASSESSMENT 1 DEFINITION OF TERMINOLOGY AS USED IN THIS REPORT

Terms used frequently in this report and the interpretation / meaning attached to each of these terms can be found in the Major Hazard Installation regulations. Definitions of some other terms are listed below.

Hazard A situation that has the potential to harm people, the environment or physical property, through a fire, explosion or toxic release, e.g. the use, storage or manufacture of a flammable or toxic material;

Incident An occurrence due to use of plant or machinery or from activities in the workplace, that leads to an exposure of persons to hazards, e.g. the rupture of a vessel and loss of containment of flammable or toxic material (also referred to as a hazardous event);

Causative events Occurrences that give rise to a hazardous incident, e.g. failure of a temperature indicator or pressure relief, etc.;

Consequences The physical effects of hazardous incidents and the damage caused by these effects;

Severity The seriousness of the consequences, e.g. death or injury or distress;

Risk The overall probability of a particular type of consequence of a particular type of incident affecting a particular type of person;

Acceptability The evaluation of the risk in comparison to certain known levels of risk in other areas;

Odour threshold The concentration a person will smell the material.

(TLV) Threshold Limit Value The time weighted average concentration a person may be exposed for 8 hours per day for a 40-hour week, is really only applicable to workers inside the factory. Outside the site boundary the criteria of the TLV divided by 50 (fifty) is often used as an acceptable ground level concentration, unless there is an Ambient Air Pollution criteria, which is then considered binding.

STEL Short term exposure limit The concentration a person may be exposed to for more than the time weighted average (TWA) limit, but with a maximum of 4 excursions to this limit per day for a maximum duration of 15 minutes each with at least 60 minutes between exposures, again applicable to employees in a factory.

IDLHV Immediately dangerous to life and health value Concentration represents a maximum level from which a person could escape within 30 minutes without any escape-impairing symptoms or irreversible health effects.

ERPG Emergency Response Planning Guidelines Categories adopted from the American Industrial Hygiene Association for 60 minutes exposure are defined as follows

ERPG 1 Suffer only mild transient health effects and objectionable odour.

ERPG 2 Not suffer irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could impair abilities to take protective action.

ERPG 3 Will not suffer life threatening health effects

2 THRESHOLD CRITERIA FOR CLASSIFICATION OF A MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION Definitions in the regulations state that a Major Hazard Installation is an installation where a substance is stored that is listed in Schedule A of the General Machinery regulations of the Occupational Health and Safety Act and the quantity exceeds those stipulated.



The materials handled are hazardous substances listed in SABS 0228 under both the specific and generic type names. It is an installation where a substance is produced, processed, used, handled or stored in such a form and quantity that it has the potential to cause a major incident. A Major Incident is an event or occurrence of catastrophic proportions resulting from the use of plant and machinery, or from activities at a workplace. This may be interpreted in technical terms as follows:

Catastrophic relates to the effects on the general public i.e. persons outside the boundary of the premises of the installation.

People entering the premises through gates, although members of the public will be regarded as employees for the duration they remain on the premises.

A fatality to one or more members of the public may be regarded as catastrophic.

Exposing a member of the public to hazard effects which exceeds the following thresholds:

Thermal radiation: 12 kW / m2 for 1 minute.

Blast overpressure: 14 kPa.

Toxic gas dose: Equivalent Emergency Planning Response Guideline ERPG 3 for 1 hour and chance of fatality > 1 %.

Toxic liquid drench: More than 50 % body coverage [severe injuries or fatalities].

3 APPROACH USED IN THIS RISK ASSESSMENT The focus of this assessment is on those hazards leading to injuries or fatalities that can affect the outside public or neighbouring installations. It is therefore not a detailed audit of all the possible risks to plant equipment and operating personnel etc. The expertise and knowledge of the operating personnel were initially used to determine which events are most likely to be significant and furthermore which of these significant events is likely to affect the outside population and installations. Thereafter all the categories of hazards in each area were evaluated qualitatively and quantitatively to confirm which hazards are major hazards. Therefore general hazards from the storage of large quantities of hazardous materials, such as burns and possible death of personnel, were deemed to be localised and not able to affect the outside public or neighbouring installations, and are hence not considered in detail in this report. Similarly, issues such as ecological, environmental and financial risks within the organisation were not considered. The methodology followed can therefore be summarised as follows:

Description of the plant, the location, and the meteorological conditions;

Identification of all the possible categories of hazards, by listing all the materials used in the process with their hazardous properties, and by dividing the plant into sections with consideration of the possible equipment related hazards in each section;

Selecting in a qualitative manner, the worst incidents within all these categories and then quantifying these;

Evaluating the consequences of the incidents in order to determine which events were likely to affect only the local plant and which could possibly effect the outside public (potential major hazards);

Quantification of consequences in detail in terms of toxic cloud movements, explosion damage circles etc.;

Major hazards with potential consequences which may affect the local plant were not considered further, while the severity of the remaining major hazards was determined and a frequency of



occurrence estimated;

Estimating the risk and comparison with certain acceptability criteria;

Reviewing emergency procedures in the light of the possible major incidents;

Drawing of conclusions and proposing recommendations.

APPENDIX 2 INSTALLATION DESIGN INFORMATION Design information for the assessment was obtained from the engineering company, Thyssenkrupp Industrial Solutions South Africa (Pty) Ltd. This included Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams, Process Design Basis, Process Description and a scoping document. 1 DESIGN STANDARDS AND CODES

SANS342: Automotive fuels — Requirements and test methods for diesel

SANS1590: Supply chain specifications for white petroleum products — Pipeline specification

SANS1598: Automotive fuels — Requirements and test methods for petrol

SANS10089-1 – The petroleum industry – Part 1: Storage and distribution of petroleum products in above-ground bulk installations.

SANS10089-2 – The petroleum industry – Part 2: Electrical and other installations in the distribution and marketing sector.

SANS 15589-1 – Petroleum and natural gas industries — Cathodic protection of pipeline transportation systems Part 1: On-land pipelines

API 520 (Part I 8th Edition 2008 &Part II 5th Edition 2003) - Sizing, Selection, and Installation of Pressure-relieving Devices in Refineries

API 521 (6th Edition 2014) - Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems

API 620 (12th Edition 2013) - Design and Construction of Large, Welded, Low-pressure Storage Tanks

API 650 (12th Edition 2013) - Welded Tanks for Oil Storage

API 2000 (7th Edition March 2014) - Venting Atmospheric and Low-pressure Storage Tanks

API 2001(8th Edition 2005) - Fire Protection in Refineries

API 2021 (4th Edition June 2006) - Management of Atmospheric Storage Tank Fires

API 2030 (3rd Edition 2005) - Application of Fixed Water Spray Systems For Fire Protection In The Petroleum and Petrochemical Industries

API 2350 (4th Edition 2012) - Overfill Protection for Storage Tanks in Petroleum Facilities

NFPA 10 - Standard for Portable Fire Extinguishers

NFPA 11 - NFPA 11 Standard for Low-, Medium-, and High-Expansion Foam

NFPA 15 - NFPA 15 Standard for Water Spray Fixed Systems for Fire Protection

NFPA 16 - Standard for the Installation of Foam-Water Sprinkler and Foam-Water Spray Systems

NFPA 20 - Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection

NFPA 22 - Standard for Water Tanks for Private Fire Protection

NFPA 24 - Standard for the Installation of Private Fire Service Mains and Their Appurtenances

NFPA 30 - NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code

NFPA 72 - National Fire Alarm and Signalling Code

NFPA 2001 - Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems 2 INTEGRITY ASSURANCE Pipes are pressure tested before ships are offloaded. Schedule pipe inspection and pressure testing is done on all berth lines twice a year. Tanks are inspected after every storage campaign (could last for 3 - 4 years). 3 PROTECTIVE SYSTEMS



The following protective features are incorporated in the design of the installation to minimise Major Hazard Incidents:

All vertical tanks are bunded with concrete walls and impermeable floors.

Water spray are installed on all the tanks, primarily for radiation heat protection.

Foam fire extinguishing in the form of foam pourers (3 %) is provided in the bund areas (Cutler Fire Injection system).

All tanks are provided with manual level dip tapes for loading and dispatch purposes as well as for monitoring inventory.

Level sensors with displays in control rooms and high alarm on tanks.

All tanks, piping and equipment are earthed.

Emergency shutdown facilities are provided on all pumps.

Automatic overflow protection of all tanks.

Remote isolation of battery limit piping 5 RATINGS Tanks: Atmospheric. Piping: 350 kPa for berth pipes, export to MPP 1986 kPa, feed to road loading 350 - 756 kPa, export to port 3312 kPa

APPENDIX 3 WIND WEATHER DATA 1 GENERAL WEATHER INFORMATION: DURBAN Atmospheric Pressure - 100 kPa Abs Day temperature - 26 o C Night temperature - 16 Relative Humidity Day - 65 % Relative Humidity Night - 80% 2 WIND SPEEDS, DIRECTIONS AND THERMAL STABILITIES The following information sources were used:

Weather Bureau data from Durban Airport weather office from 2011 to 2016.

Tyson P D, Diab R D & Preston-Whyte R A, Stability Wind Roses for Southern Africa, Environmental Studies Occasional Paper No 21, Dept. Of Geography & Environmental Studies, Univ. Wits, Jhb. RSA.

Three Pasquill stability conditions are normally applicable namely:

Unstable: Sunny hot day (A, B, C).

Neutral: Overcast day or night (D).

Stable: Clear, cold night (E, F). The above choice was based on climate data for the east coast area (Tyson, Diab, Preston 1979) with the following distribution over a year (information for mornings were not available): Condition Night Day Total (01:30) (13:30) Unstable 2 58 30 Stable 54 39 47 Inversion 44 3 23



100% 100% 100% The time during a year that the wind blows in given directions were scaled to a 100 % and given in the table below.

APPENDIX 4 MATERIAL DATA The tables in the following sections summarize the properties, safety, health and environmental information extracted from Material Hazard Data sheets and from the available literature (Weiss 1986 & Genium 1998). 4.1 Physical and flammable properties Physical properties shown in the table below provide an indication of the capability of the material to cause a hazard.

A-Table 1 - Physical properties

MATERIAL Petrol Diesel Jet Fuel A1 Marine Gas Oil

Boiling point at 1 atm. [°C.] 43 193 160 150 -390

Vapour pressure @ 20 °C. [bar]

0,52 @38 C 0,0003 0.03 0,4 kPa

Melting point C -60 -34 -29 < 0

Liquid density at 20C [g / cm3]

0,75 0,85 0.79 0,84

Gas density air = 1 3,5 2 4 4

Flammable and reactive properties in Table 4-2 provide an indication of the conditions necessary to initiate a fire or explosion hazard

DAYTIME Wnd Direction N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE

Unstable B3 = 58 4.5 6.9 4.0 4.0 1.7 1.0 1.3

Stable D5 = 39 3.1 4.7 2.7 2.7 1.1 0.7 0.9

Inversion F1.5 = 3 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1

NIGHTTIME Wnd Direction N NNE NE ENE E ESE SE

Unstable B3 = 2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0

Stable D5 = 54 4.2 6.5 3.7 3.7 1.6 1.0 1.2

Inversion F1.5 = 44 3.5 5.3 3.0 3.0 1.3 0.8 1.0

Totals Island View 1 15.7 24.0 13.7 13.7 5.9 3.6 4.6

SSE S SSW SW WSW W WNN NW NNW

2.5 4.3 5.5 6.1 3.4 2.3 2.1 3.9 4.2 58.00

1.7 2.9 3.7 4.1 2.3 1.6 1.4 2.6 2.8 39.00

0.1 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 3.00

SSE S SSW SW WSW W WNN NW NNW

0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 2.00

2.4 4.0 5.1 5.6 3.2 2.2 2.0 3.6 3.9 54.00

1.9 3.3 4.2 4.6 2.6 1.8 1.6 3.0 3.2 44.00

8.7 14.8 19.1 20.9 11.8 8.1 7.4 13.5 14.6 200.00



A-Table 2 - Flammable and reactive properties

Material Petrol Diesel Jet Fuel Marine Gas Oil

Flash point (C) -34 >55 45 >55

Auto ignition temperature

(C)

220 229 257 225

Explosive limits in air % v 1,4 – 7,6 1,3 - 6 0,6 – 7,5 1 - 6

Reactivity Stable, reacts with strong oxidiser

Stable, reacts with strong oxidiser



4.2 Toxic Hazards Acute (immediate) toxic hazards directly affect people and are applicable in terms of major hazards for which the properties are given in Tables 4-3. Thus, chronic and ingestion effects are not considered.

A-Table 3 - - Acute Health effects

Material Petrol Diesel Jet Fuel Marine Gas Oil

Inhalation Irritation of respiratory tract, cough, mild depression, cardiac arrhythmias

Irritation of respiratory tract, cough, mild depression, cardiac arrhythmias



Skin contact Mild irritation of the skin

Mild irritation of the skin



4.3 Material toxic data Exposure limit values for the materials on the installation are listed in Table 4-4 below. These are concentrations in parts per million (ppm) for odour, exposure threshold limit values (TLV), short term exposure limits (STEL), immediately dangerous to life and health exposure values (IDLHV) as well as Emergency Response Guideline values, all defined in Appendix 1.

A-Table 4 - Toxic data

Material Odour (ppm)

TLV (ppm)

STEL (ppm)

IDLHV (ppm)

ERPG 15 ERPG 25 ERPG 35

Petrol 0,25 300 500 (30 min)

NA NA NA NA

Diesel 0,7 100mg/m3

NA NA NA NA NA

Jet Fuel 0,08 - 1 200 2500 (1hr)

NP NA NA NA

Marine Gas Oil 2 mg/m3 mist

NP NA NA NA

5 Defined in Appendix 1



4.4 Hazardous Breakdown Products Should any of the materials be exposed to fire, it is possible that the combustion products could pose a significant hazard and hence the need to identify any such compounds.

A-Table 5 - - Combustion Breakdown Products

Material Combustion Breakdown Products

Petrol Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and soot

Diesel Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and soot

Jet Fuel Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and soot

Marine Gas Oil Carbon monoxide, carbon dioxide and soot, sulphur oxides

4.6 Material modelling data Material modelling properties were derived as described below. 4.6.1 Petrol The vapour pressure of gasoline was obtained from Barnett et al 1969 & Petrochemical 1969, and the Antoine vapour pressure curve equation was fitted to the data as: Pp = e (A+B/T+ClognT+DTÊ) = e (20.31 - 2894/T). Heptane was used as the modelling material, but with the Antoine vapour pressure equation values for gasoline. The vapour pressure equation was adjusted to give a Reid vapour pressure of 600 hPa in the Phast software 4.6.2 Diesel The vapour pressure of diesel was obtained from Barnett et al 1969 & Petrochemical 1969, and the Antoine vapour pressure curve equation was fitted to the data as: Pp = e (A+B/T+ClognT+DTÊ) = e (21.78 - 5335/T).n- Penta-decane was used as the modelling material, but with the Antoine vapour pressure equation values for diesel. The vapour pressure equation was adjusted to give a Reid vapour pressure of 1 hPa in the Phast software. 4.6.3 Jet fuel A1 (modelled as kerosene) The vapour pressure of kerosene was obtained from Barnett et al 1969 & Petrochemical 1969, and the Antonie vapour pressure curve equation was fitted to the data as: Pp = e (A+B/T+ClognT+DTÊ) = e (21.42 - 4978/T). APPENDIX 5 CAUSE CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS THEORY 1 CAUSE ANALYSIS In order to quantify a hazard it is necessary to analyse the causes leading to the hazardous event in more detail. 1.1 Primary causes There are many tanks, receiving material from ships or road and rail tankers, or loading from tanks to ships and rail or road tankers. All tanks basically have a bottom suction pipe to a pump, with delivery routed to a ship or road or rail tanker loading station. As the hazards being assessed will originate mostly from loss of containment, i.e. a release, the following generic primary causes were identified: Berth piping: For ship loading and unloading, pipes run above and underground over a distance of 1000 - 2500 m between the terminal and the ship docks. The following may cause a release:



Rupture of the 150 and 200 mm liquid pipe lines, as a result of a crack that developed in the piping material due to fatigue from vibration, stress corrosion cracking or an inherent fabrication defect not detected during X-ray inspection. Such a rupture could then be initiated by, e.g. a pressure surge, or external damage from actions of others.

Tank piping:

Rupture of 150 mm suction liquid pipeline from bottom of the tank to the pump, or the delivery pipe to the loading stations. This may be as a result of a crack that developed in the piping material due to fatigue from vibration, stress corrosion cracking or an inherent fabrication defect not detected during X-ray inspection. Such a rupture could then be initiated by, e.g. a pressure surge or hydraulic hammer.

External damage of piping and equipment, e.g. impact from a collision, rollover of a road tanker, driving off while a tanker hose is still coupled.

Tanks:

Rupture of a tank due to stress corrosion cracking, a fabrication defect in the material of construction, restricted vent, rapid filling or an explosion inside.

Overfilling of the tank due to operator error.

Failure of the protective systems, e.g. level instrument, hardware and human error. Loading station releases: There are several tanker loading and unloading stations for flammable and toxic materials. Releases could originate from:

Creation of an open end, e.g. opening of valves, uncoupling a hose due to human error or failure of equipment.

Rupture of loading arm due to construction material failure, e.g. stress corrosion cracking, kinking or impact damage.

Ripping off of loading arm due to the tankers being pulled away while still coupled. 1.2 Secondary causes Possible causes for ignition (fire & explosions) of cold room insulation materials are:

Hot work

Static spark discharges and lightning

Electrical faults

Smoking

Hot surfaces, friction and impact. Possible causes for toxic exposure or gassing of people from released materials are:

Not wearing personal protective equipment

Lack of awareness

Failure to evacuate. 1.3 Minor and rare causes Since the assessment mainly deals with the major hazards of explosion, fire and toxic releases, the following causes were excluded:

Small general leaks, which may include valve spindle seal leaks, leaks due to normal wear, or improper maintenance.

Natural events (earthquakes, storms, floods, etc.)



External or internal sabotage as a result of personnel grievances

Aviation accidents. The causes are also analysed in detail in the section Likelihood Analysis, in Appendix 10. 2 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 2.1. Fires and explosions If a release of flammable liquid is ignited, a jet flame will result immediately, otherwise the liquid will form a pool on the ground. Early ignition will cause a fire to burn on the pool (pool fire), or if the liquid is volatile, evaporation will take place from the pool to form a vapour cloud, which will drift away assisted by the wind. Later ignition of the vapour cloud will result in an unconfined vapour cloud explosion, which will be weak, and may rather be regarded as a flash fire, that could flash back and ignite the pool fire. The overpressure generated by a flash fire is negligible and can be discounted, but the radiation effects are severe. However, if the flammable vapour cloud enters a congested region and ignition occurs then this may result in a confined vapour cloud explosion, which will have blast effects, i.e. overpressures.

Illustration of the progression of a flammable release However, if the flammable vapour cloud enters a congested region and ignition occurs, then this may result in a confined vapour cloud explosion. Referring to the earlier site lay-out in Figure 4-3, it can be seen that there are only tanks with large open spaces between them, which do not present any confinement. In order to have significant confinement, an array of pipes and beams must be present forming narrow channels or tunnels. Therefore, no areas of congestion or confinement are present at the Quarry 2 site and thus ignition of a vapour cloud will not produce any significant blast pressures. In general, pool fires will only affect persons in the immediate vicinity of the fire. Jet fires are more likely to affect areas outside the installation since the fire is much more energy intensive than pool fires. Persons exposed to the radiation from fires, may suffer severe burn injuries. The major consequence of an explosion is the shock wave effect, which can shatter glass, damage plant and equipment, or result in injuries and fatalities, directly through rupture of bodily organs, or from

FLAMMABLE

LIQUID

RELEASE

POOL

EVAPORATION

NO IGNITION

VAPOUR

CLOUD

CLOUD DRIFTS

EARLY IGNITION

RAIN OUT

POOL FIREFLASH BACK FIRE

IMMEDIATE IGNITION

WINDJET FLAME

LATE IGNITION

CONGESTION

VAPOUR

CLOUD

EXPLOSION

FLASH FIRE

LATER IGNITION

CLOUD IN

OPEN, NO

CONGESTION

BLAST

PRESSURE



structures collapsing onto people. If a vessel or a tank is engulfed in a fire, the material of construction may be weakened by the heat and may fail, resulting in a BLEVE6 with similar explosive effects. In summary then the severity of the following flammable consequences was evaluated for each of the releases identified in the cause analysis:

Pool fire in a bund or on the flat ground

Jet fire from liquid emerging from a ruptured pipe

Flash fire

Unconfined vapour cloud explosion. 2.2 Toxic releases The release of toxic vapours is generally the hazard that is of most significance to the public outside the boundaries of any installation (Lees 1990 and ICI 1986). During a toxic liquid release from containment, vapour will flash off to form a cloud while some liquid will rain out to form a pool on the ground. Evaporation from the pool will add to the vapour in the cloud, which will drift away assisted by the wind. Dispersion will take place and concentrations will decrease as the cloud moves further away from the source. Dispersion of gas clouds is governed by the prevalent weather conditions, i.e. wind speed, direction and stability of the atmosphere (essentially vertical mixing). On cold windless nights, cold air is trapped close to the surface of the ground and dispersion will be poor, whereas on a hot summers day there is a lot of turbulence in the air due to heating of the earth’s surface and dispersion will be good. Releases of hydrocarbons, which include volatile and non-volatile substances, have generally low toxicities related to long-term exposures and were not further considered in this assessment. APPENDIX 6 CONSEQUENCE SEVERITY 1 RADIATION Probability of fatality due to fires was based on the radiation intensity at a location where a person may

be present via the probit equation Pr = A + B logn I n t where I Radiation kW/m2, t time in minutes. The constants A, B and n were obtained from available databases, e.g. the Purple Book 199. 2 EXPLOSION Probability of fatality due to explosions was based on the peak overpressure at a location where a person may be present as follows: Peak overpressure bar: Probability of fatality % < 0,1 0 outdoors and indoors > 0,1 0 outdoors, 2,5 indoors > 0,3 100 outdoors and indoors 3 TOXIC

Probability of fatality was determined via the probit equation Pr = A + B logn cn t where c ppm and t time in minutes. The constants A, B and n were obtained from available databases, or alternatively it were derived from

6 Boling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion



the LC50, based on the method in the Purple Book 1999. Where these constants are not available or could not be calculated, the toxicity was based on dangerous dose.

APPENDIX 7 CONSEQUENCE METHODOLOGY 1 HAZARD MAGNITUDE Magnitude depends on the amount or rate of release of the hazardous material following loss of containment, as a liquid. It was determined by normal fluid flow calculations in terms of the size of the hole and the pressure drop, head loss or in some cases from equipment specifications (pumps). The duration of a release affect the magnitude of the hazard e.g. a large release for a very short time may be as hazardous as a small release for a long time. Although injuries may be inflicted on a person when exposed directly to a release, the principal hazard stems from the effect when experiencing the fire radiation or blast wave or inhaling the gas. Therefore, in addition to the magnitude of release, the gas emission rate is also needed for determining the risk to people. The duration of a release affect the magnitude of the hazard e.g. a large release for a very short time may be as hazardous as a small release for a long time. Salient aspects pertaining to some of the calculations are described below: HOLE SIZE

Four possible cases were considered:

Case 1 - Guillotine cut open end damage of a fixed pipe, or sheared off valve i.e. full diameter as below:

Case 2 – A leak of liquid following fracture split or cracks on piping or a tank. Size of opening governs the release.

Case 3 - Totally open flow path e.g. when there is an instantaneous release following a burst of a tank.

Case 4 – Tank overflow



3 RELEASE RATE It was assumed that when a release occurs as a result of a pipe rupture, liquid or gas will flow from the vessel through a valve, pipe reduction, some length of straight pipe, three elbows, and an enlargement at the opening where the break occurred as depicted below, before emerging into the atmosphere.

The upstream pressure and temperature were taken as that prevailing inside the vessels or containers and the maximum flow rate was calculated using a computer program capable of handling two phase and gas flow. In the case of complete rupture of a vessel or tank, it was taken that the entire content is instantaneously released as a liquid.

4 DURATION OF RELEASE

It was assumed that a release will continue until some action had been taken by the operating staff to isolate the leak e.g. closing a valve, or if isolation is not possible, until the entire contents had been lost. Knowing the rate of release and the content of the materials enables calculation of the duration. It should be noted that in respect of the duration of the incidents, the UK Health & Safety Executive standards (Lees 1980) were used:

Symbol Time Description

MD 5 seconds Automatic isolation by mechanical in plant devices e.g. excess flow valve, non- return valve, recycle relief

AEI 1 min 60 s

Detection via a sensor followed by automatic isolation with an actuated shut off valve. Action by an operator is not necessary

OEI 2 mins 120 s

Operator with procedures and trained in attendance and has access or close to an emergency activating device (e.g. button) to stop the hazardous event. Example is tanker loading operations, filling, draining.

REI 5 mins 300 s

Remote manual isolation, e.g. operator responds to panel alarm and can isolate it either on the panel or at strategically located external isolation valves. After validation of the signal the operator closes the blocking valves by actuating a switch in the control room.

MEI 10 mins 600 s

Detection of the leak takes place automatically and leads to an alarm signal in a continuously staffed control room. The operator does not have the facilities to shut off the blocking valves by actuating a switch in the control room, but should take action outside the control room.

MI 20 mins 1200 s

Operator is required to isolate it manually directly at, or very close, to the source of the release, e.g. required to don breathing apparatus set, and move through the vapour cloud to close a valve.



UL 60 mins 3600 s

No immediate isolation takes place and the release is allowed to continue. The mitigation by prompt isolation is lost and the release becomes continuous. This is the limit set on the modelling.

5 EMISSION

When a liquid above its normal boiling point emerges from a rupture, instantaneous adiabatic flashing occurs, the temperature falls, and the vapour is dispersed immediately. The remaining cooled liquid descends onto the ground forming a pool from which evaporation takes place over an extended period, which will add to the flash evaporation to give the total atmospheric emission. 6 POOL FORMATION A pool formed outside in the open will spread radially outwards or follow the land contours, or enter a drain or water way. This will tend to spread the emission of vapour, which will then be dispersed by the wind. If the area is bunded, the containment walls would fix the pool dimensions, and the evaporation would be constant. The average depth of a liquid pool will be of the order of about 10 mm with the diameter depending on the amount of liquid released. 7 DISPERSION Dispersion of vapour or gas releases is handled by dispersion modelling. 8 EXPLOSION Explosions were modelled using the TNO multi energy method, based on the un- and confined strength, and the confined fraction of the gas cloud. If no significant confinement was identified on the site, no explosion results were produced. .



APPENDIX 8 MODELLING INPUT DATA Bund areas Total area = 29 000 m2 Tank area = 10 500 m2 Effective spill contain area = 18 500m2

A-Table 6 – Tank piping

MD Mech device5, AEI SensorAuto60, OEI Operator120, REI ≡ AlarmRemoteManual300, MEI AlarmManualField600, MI Manual Field 1200, UL No isolation3600

No Equipment Hazard failure event

Hole size mm

Container inventory kgs

Material (composition wt%)

Release duration (s)

Temp

C

Pressure bar

(m H head)

Release rate kg/s

Notes Bund area m2

Release height m Direction

1 2

Petrol load pipe

Rupture Leak

300 30

11 850 000 tank contents

Petrol 300 REI 20 0+20 mH + 55m pump H

66 12

470 m long pipe

A = 100

h = 0,1

4 horizontal

5 6

Jet fuel load pipe

Rupture Leak

300 30


Jet fuel 300 REI 20 0+20 mH + 54m pump H

66 12

470 m long pipe

A = 100

h = 0,1

4 horizontal

7 8

Diesel load pipe

Rupture Leak

300 30


Diesel 300 REI 20 0+20 mH + 48m pump H

66 12

470 m long pipe

A = 100

h = 0,1

4 horizontal

9 10

Petrol berth pipe

Rupture Leak

300 30

~40 000 000 parcel offloaded from ship

Petrol 60 MEI 300 REI stop ship pump

20 0+20 mH + 270 m pump H

410 25

430 m long pipe

A = 100

h = 0,1

4 horizontal

11 12

MGO berth pipe

Rupture Leak

300 30


MGO 60 MEI 300 REI stop ship pump

20 0+20 mH + 322m pump H

410 27

430 m long pipe

A = 100

h = 0,1

4 horizontal



A-Table 6 – Tank piping



Hole size mm




Temp

C

Pressure bar

(m H head)

Release rate kg/s

Notes Bund area m2


13 14

Jet fuel berth pipe

Rupture Leak

300 30


Jet fuel 60 MEI 300 REI stop ship pump

20 0+20 mH + 282m pump H

410 25

430 m long pipe

A = 100

h = 0,1

4 horizontal

15 16

Diesel berth pipe

Rupture Leak

300 30


Diesel 60 MEI 300 REI stop ship pump

20 0+20 mH + 302 m pump H

410 26

430 m long pipe

A = 100

h = 0,1

4 horizontal

17

18

Petrol MPP pipe

Rupture Leak

300 30


Petrol 300 REI operator action

20 0+20 mH + 144 m pump H

280 18

470 m long pipe

A = 100

h = 0,1

4 horizontal

21 22

Jet fuel MPP pipe

Rupture Leak

300 30


Jet fuel 300 REI operator action

20 0+20 mH + 152 m pump H

280 19

470 m long pipe

A = 100

h = 0,1

4 horizontal

23 24

Diesel MPP pipe

Rupture Leak

300 30


Diesel 300 REI operator action

20 0+20 mH + 159 m pump H

280 19

470 m long pipe

A = 100

h = 0,1

4 horizontal

A-Table 7 – Storage tanks



Hole size mm




Temp

C

Pressure bar

(m H head)

Release rate kg/s

Notes Bund area m2


25 Petrol tank Rupture - 11 850 000 tank

contents Petrol 1 20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal






Hole size mm




Temp

C

Pressure bar

(m H head)

Release rate kg/s

Notes Bund area m2


26 Large leak -


Petrol 600

20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal

27 Small leak 10 11 850 000 tank

contents Petrol 3600 20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal

28 Overfill - ~40 000 000

parcel offloaded from ship

Petrol 1200 20 0+20 mH + 270 m pump H

410 A = 18 500

h = 1,5

20 down impinge

29 MGO tank Rupture - 17 800 000 tank

contents MGO 1 20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal

30 Large leak -


MGO 600

20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal


contents MGO 3600 20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal

32 Overfill - ~40 000 000


MGO 1200 20 0+20 mH + 322m pump H

410 A = 18 500

h = 1,5

20 down impinge

33 Jet fuel tank Rupture - 12 300 000 tank

contents Kerosene 1 20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal

34 Large leak -


Kerosene 600

20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal






Hole size mm




Temp

C

Pressure bar

(m H head)

Release rate kg/s

Notes Bund area m2



contents Kerosene 3600 20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal

36 Overfill - ~40 000 000


Kerosene 1200 20 0+20 mH + 282m pump H

410 A = 18 500

h = 1,5

20 down impinge

37 Diesel tank Rupture - 21 250 000 tank

contents Diesel 1 20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal

38 Large leak -


Diesel 600

20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal


contents Diesel 3600 20 0+20 mH A = 18 500

h = 1,5

1 horizontal

40 Overfill - ~40 000 000


Diesel 1200 20 0+20 mH + 302m pump H

410 A = 18 500

h = 1,5

20 down impinge

A-Table 8 – Tanker loading



Hole size mm




Temp

C

Pressure bar

(m H head)

Release rate kg/s

Notes Bund area m2


41 Petrol tanker Burst

-

30 000 Petrol - 20 0 + 2 mH A = 100 h = 0,1

1 impinge down






Hole size mm




Temp

C

Pressure bar

(m H head)

Release rate kg/s

Notes Bund area m2


42 Large leak - 30 000 Petrol 600 20 0 + 2 mH A = 100

h = 0,1 1 impinge down

43 Small leak 10 30 000 Petrol 3600 20 0 + 2 mH A = 100


44 Petrol hose Burst

100

13 000 000 Petrol 60 EIV 20 0+20 mH + 55m pump H

30 A = 100 h = 0,1

1 horizontal

45 Leak 10 13 000 000 Petrol 60 EIV 20 0+20 mH +

55m pump H 0,8 A = 100

h = 0,1 1 horizontal

46 Petrol tanker Overfilled 80 13 000 000 Petrol 60 EIV 20 0+20 mH +

55m pump H 30 A = 100


53 Jet fuel tanker

Burst

-

30 000 Jet fuel - 20 0 + 2 mH A = 100 h = 0,1

1 impinge down

54 Large leak - 30 000 Jet fuel 600 20 0 + 2 mH A = 100


55 Small leak 10 30 000 Jet fuel 3600 20 0 + 2 mH A = 100


56 Jet fuel hose Burst

100

13 000 000 Jet fuel 60 EIV 20 0+20 mH + 54m pump H

30 A = 100 h = 0,1

1 horizontal

57 Leak 10 13 000 000 Jet fuel 60 EIV 20 0+20 mH +

54m pump H 0,8 A = 100


58 Jet fuel tanker

Overfilled 80 13 000 000 Jet fuel 60 EIV 20 0+20 mH + 54m pump H

30 A = 100 h = 0,1

3 impinge down

59 Diesel tanker Burst

-

30 000 Diesel - 20 0 + 2 mH A = 100 h = 0,1

1 impinge down

60 Large leak - 30 000 Diesel 600 20 0 + 2 mH A = 100







Hole size mm




Temp

C

Pressure bar

(m H head)

Release rate kg/s

Notes Bund area m2


61 Small leak 10 30 000 Diesel 3600 20 0 + 2 mH A = 100


62 Diesel hose Burst

100

13 000 000 Diesel 60 EIV 20 0+20 mH + 48m pump H

30 A = 100 h = 0,1

1 horizontal

63 Leak 10 13 000 000 Diesel 60 EIV 20 0+20 mH +

48m pump H 0,8 A = 100


64 Diesel tanker Overfilled 80 13 000 000 Diesel 60 EIV 20 0+20 mH +

48m pump H 30 A = 100




APPENDIX 9 LIKELIHOOD ANALYSIS

1 Failure data used in this assessment Likelihood of events was accessed from the ISHECON compiled failure data. Were appropriate data was not available, the likelihood was determined from drawing and quantifying of fault trees. 2 System Factors The standard of inspection and maintenance, integrity assurance and general safety management systems in place on a site can have a significant effect on the failure rates used. According to Pitblado (Ref. 19 pg 115) the generic failure data was adjusted depending on the effectiveness of the maintenance and safety systems evaluated during the site visit. For WSSA site the rating was 7 and from table below the adjustment factor used was 1.

AVERAGE DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM FACTORS RATING FACTOR

Nothing in place 0 10

1 9

Something in place 2 8

3 7

4 6

Bare minimum in place 5 5

6 3

Typical average system 7 1

8 0,9

9 0,75

The very best – fully accredited PSM 10 0,5

The factor used in this assessment was 0,5 i.e. well managed process safety system. 3 Severe wear condition In some environments equipment are subjected to severe wear conditions, will wear faster, or equipment are old and this is allowed for by increasing the failure frequency as follows:

DESCRIPTION FACTOR

No severe wear conditions, inland, new installation < 10 years 1

Underground, moisture, no wrapping, no cathodic protection 1,5

Moist air e.g. at the coast, equipment aged > 20 years 2

Acidic air conditions e.g. handling of acids or corrosive materials, acid plants,

high temperatures > 200 C

2,5

The factor used in this assessment was 1 i.e. dry climate, away from acidic air conditions, plants not aged. 4 Fault tree generation Fault trees were used to calculate the likelihood of some of the events. A fault tree is essentially a logic diagram, which represents the development of events from the root causes with failure data in terms of their frequency or probability of occurrence to the final 'top' event or hazard as illustrated below.



5 Final event frequencies In order to obtain the real risk, account was taken of other similar events that can contribute to the hazard, e.g. several tanks or pipes can burst. Therefore, the frequency of each event was multiplied by the number of items involved in the hazard, the process safety and wear factors to obtain the total event frequency, which is shown in the A-Table 21 below.

A-Table 9 Likelihood or frequency of hazard events

No Equipment Event Frequency source

Frequency per year

Allowance for items (F)

Incidents per year

Incidents = Frequency x F 1 2

Petrol load pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6

Allowed for 10 m, but 470 m, i.e. F = 47

9,4 * 10-5

2,8 * 10-4 3 4

MGO load pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6


9,4 * 10-5

2,8 * 10-4 5 6

Jet fuel load pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6


9,4 * 10-5

2,8 * 10-4 7 8

Diesel load pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6


9,4 * 10-5

2,8 * 10-4 9 10

Petrol berth pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6


8,6 * 10-5

2,6 * 10-4 11 12

MGO berth pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6


8,6 * 10-5

2,6 * 10-4 13 14

Jet fuel berth pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6


8,6 * 10-5

2,6 * 10-4 15 16

Diesel berth pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6


8,6 * 10-5

2,6 * 10-4 17 18

Petrol MPP pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6


9,4 * 10-5

2,8 * 10-4 19 20

MGO MPP pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6


9,4 * 10-5

2,8 * 10-4 21 22

Jet fuel MPP pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6


9,4 * 10-5

2,8 * 10-4 23 24

Diesel MPP pipe Rupture Leak

Diagram 1 2 * 10-6

6 * 10-6


9,4 * 10-5

2,8 * 10-4 25 Petrol tank Rupture Diagram 1 5 * 10-6 Allowed for 1 tank,

but 3, i.e. F = 3 1,5 * 10-5

26 Large leak Diagram 1 5 * 10-6 Allowed for 1 tank,

but 3, i.e. F = 3 1,5 * 10-5

27 Small leak Diagram 1 1 * 10-4 Allowed for 1 tank,

but 3, i.e. F = 3 3 * 10-4

COMPONENT 1 FAILS

COMPONENT 2 FAILS

COMPONENT n FAILS

PROTECTION SYSTEM 1 FAILED

OR

AND HAZARD

SUB CAUSES

PROTECTION SYSTEM n FAILED

PROTECTION SYSTEM 2 FAILED





Frequency per year


Incidents per year

Incidents = Frequency x F

28 Overfill Diagram 1 2,7 * 10-4 Allowed for 1 tank,

filled daily, but 1 ship/month, 3 tanks i.e. F = 3*12/365 = 0,1

2,7 * 10-5

29 MGO tank Rupture Diagram 1 5 * 10-6 Allowed for 1 tank,

but 3, i.e. F = 3 1,5 * 10-5


but 3, i.e. F = 3 1,5 * 10-5


but 3, i.e. F = 3 3 * 10-4


filled daily, but 2 ship/month, 3 tanks i.e. F = 3*24/365 = 0,2

5,3 * 10-5

33 Jet fuel tank Rupture Diagram 1 5 * 10-6 Allowed for 1 tank,

but 1, i.e. F = 1 5 * 10-6


but 1, i.e. F = 1 5 * 10-6


but 1, i.e. F = 1 1 * 10-4


filled daily, but 1 ship/2 month, 1 tank i.e. F = 1*6/365 = 0,02

4,4 * 10-6

37 Diesel tank Rupture Diagram 1 5 * 10-6 Allowed for 1 tank,

but 3, i.e. F = 3 1,5 * 10-5


but 3, i.e. F = 3 1,5 * 10-5


but 3, i.e. F = 3 3 * 10-4


filled daily, but 1 ship/week, 3 tanks i.e. F = 3*52/365 = 0,4

1,2 * 10-4

41 Petrol tanker Burst

Diagram 1 5 * 10-6 Allowed for 1 tanker,

full time on site, but 65/month for 2 hrs, i.e. F = 65*12*2/365/24 = 0,18

8,9 * 10-7





Frequency per year


Incidents per year


42 Large leak Diagram 1 5 * 10-6 Allowed for 1 tanker,


8,9 * 10-7

43 Small leak Diagram 2 1 * 10-4 Allowed for 1 tanker,


1,8 * 10-5

44 Petrol arm Burst

Diagram 2 4,7 * 10-5 Allowed for 1 tanker

filled daily for 2 hrs, but 65/month i.e. F = 65*12/365 = 2,1

9,9 * 10-5

45 Leak Diagram 2 1,5 * 10-4 Allowed for 1 tanker

filled daily for 2 hrs, but 65/month i.e. F = 65*12/365 = 2,1

3 * 10-4

46 Petrol tanker Overfilled Diagram 2 2,9 * 10-3 Allowed for 1 tanker

filled daily, but 65/month i.e. F = 65*12/365 = 2,1

6,2 * 10-3

53 Jet fuel tanker Burst



4,2 * 10-7



4,2 * 10-7



8,5 * 10-6

56 Jet fuel hose Burst


filled daily for 2 hrs with 1 hose, but 31/month i.e. F = 31*12/365 = 1

1,5 * 10-3





Frequency per year


Incidents per year




1,5 * 10-2

58 Jet fuel tanker Overfilled Diagram 2 2,9 * 10-3 Allowed for 1 tanker


2,9 * 10-3

59 Diesel tanker Burst



3,5 * 10-6



3,5 * 10-6



7 * 10-5

62 Diesel hose Burst


filled daily for 2 hrs with 1 hose, but 257/month i.e. F = 257*12/365 = 8,4

1,3 * 10-2


filled daily for 2 hrs with 1 hose, but 257/month i.e. F = 257*12/365 = 8,4

1,3 * 10-1

64 Diesel tanker Overfilled Diagram 2 2,9 * 10-3 Allowed for 1 tanker

filled daily, but 257/month i.e. F = 257*12/365 = 8,4

2,5 * 10-2

APPENDIX 10 RISKS 1. RISKS ESTIMATION Risk is the product of the likelihood of the event (F) and the severity (S) of the consequences i.e. R = F x S.



F was determined earlier by an estimate of the frequency of the events as incidents per year. Severity is the consequence effect (C) at a specific distance from the hazard source and the probability P) of the injury effect i.e. death at that distance. S = C x P Thus R = F x C x P as a function of distance from the source. The total risk at a point = Sum of all the risk contributions (Explosion, fire, toxic releases).

2. CONTOURS Next it was necessary to take into account that the wind blows in several directions and the proportion of the time that it blows in each direction differs. This has the effect of increasing the toxic risk in certain areas while decreasing it in others. Percentages of the time during a year that the wind blows in given directions are tabulated in Appendix 3. The risks determined earlier for a uniformly distributed wind, were proportioned to each of the 16 directions according to the wind direction distribution, by multiplying with an appropriate factor:

F=1/100 * (Number of wind directions e.g. 16) * (% of time wind blows in direction) This adjustment gives the variation of the fatal risk with distance from a toxic release in any specific direction. In order to elucidate the effect, use was made of a map of the area surrounding the installations. Sectors, according to the 16 wind directions were marked out from each installation as centre and crude risk contours were drawn as explained by the illustration below.

A risk contours are shown for 10-6 injuries (fatalities) per person per year (/p/y) for the installation. This may also be interpreted as risk contour for 1 fatality / person per million (106) years.

4 PROFILES By drawing a centre line from left to right across the contours and plotting the risks against distance allows a risk profile to be drawn. This gives an indication of the risk with distance from the installation.

APPENDIX 11 ACCEPTABILITY OF RISK In deciding what acceptability criteria to use, there are two factors to keep in mind. Firstly, if incidents happen too often, the reaction of the public would be such as to cause the facility to be closed. Secondly, if too stringent targets were set, the penalties on operation or the cost of preventing the incidents would be intolerable burdens on the business.

N

SSE

NNE

ENE

NE

E

S

SESW

SSW

WSW

WNW

W

NNW

NW

RELEASE SOURCE

SITE BOUNDARY

ESE

RISK CONTOURS



1 INDIVIDUAL RISK CRITERIA Public A criterion used for deciding the acceptability or tolerability of a chemical installation to the public in general, is based on everyday life involuntary risks. This roughly requires that a hazardous installation should not pose an individual risk to the public greater than 10 times that of being killed by a lightning strike, i.e.10-6 deaths per person per year. The Health and Safety Executive in the UK have adopted this limit (see HSE 2001). A risk > 1 * 10-4 would be totally unacceptable, and will not be granted approval for either construction or continued operation. For existing installations, if the risk is > 1 * 10-6 but < 1 * 10-4, then serious consideration needs to be given to reducing the risk. Employees People inside the facility site are looked upon as being employees who are different from the public as far as safety is concerned. They have been trained in handling all the potential hazards on the site, i.e. emergency procedures, availability of suitable protective equipment (PPE). Criteria by the Health & Safety Executive in the UK (HSE 2001) a target risk of 10-3 for employees is regarded as the absolute tolerable maximum. A risk of less than 10-5 would be totally acceptable. 2 SOCIETAL RISK CRITERIA This was adopted from the UK Health and Safety Executive, HSE 2010, which specifies upper and lower societal limits as follows:

Intolerable if fatalities of 50 or more people in a single event can happen with a frequency of more than 1 in 5000 per year (2 * 10-4).

Acceptable if fatalities of 50 or more people will not occur with a frequency more than two orders of magnitude less that that regarded above as intolerable i.e. 1 in 50 000 per year or 2 * 10-5 per year.

When used on an F-N curve, the slope of the limit lines shall pass through the above point with a slope of –1 and be parallel to each other as shown below.

The straight lines on the F – N curve indicate these limits. The upper line represents the tolerable limit and the lower line the risk acceptance. The region between the upper and the lower line is denoted the ALARP area (As Low As Reasonable Practical). For scenarios with risk levels (that lie) between these two lines the risk should be reduced if practical, typically subject to cost benefit analysis. For scenarios with risk levels above the upper line, measures must be implemented to reduce the risk. Below the lower line

1.E-08

1.E-06

1.E-04

1.E-02

1 10 100 1000

FR

EQ

UE

NC

Y / y

FATALITIES (N)

F - N CURVE

Tolerable



risk is acceptable and no measures need to be implemented. APPENDIX 12 REFERENCES 1. Lex Patria Publishers, Occupational Health & Safety Act 85 of 1993. 2. Fire Protection Guide on Hazardous Materials 7th ed. - National Fire Protection Association 1978. 3. Weiss G 1986, Hazardous Chemical Data Book 2nd ed. - Noyes Data Corporation. 4. Genium (1998), Material Safety Data sheet Collection, Genium publishing, New York, Mach. 5. Pirhonen P, Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 1992, Vol 5 Number 5 pg. 292 6. Lees, F P, Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol 1, Butterworths, London, 1980 7. ICI, Process Safety Guide No 10, 1986- Risk Assessment Methodology. 8. ICI Reliability Data (1992) - Process Safety Guide No 14, D W Heckle, ICI Engineering, September

1992. 9. Powell T (2006), The Buncefield Investigation – Second Report, UK, May 2006. 10. Purple Book (1990), Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, CPR 18E, Committee for the

Prevention of Disasters, ISNB 90 12 08796 1,1999. 11. OSE (1993), Occupational Safety & Environmental publication, Oudtshoorn SA, 13 September 1993. 12. South African National Standard 089 Part 1, Storage and Distribution of Petroleum Products in an

aboveground bulk Installations, 1999. 13. HSE, Reducing Risks, Protecting People, HSE Books, Section 132, 2001. 14. HSE Guidance Document, HID’s approach to ‘As low As Reasonably Practical’ ALARP, decisions,

(SPC/Permissioning/09), 2010. 15. Transnet, Instructions governing the lease of sites for the reception, storage, handling and

distribution of Petroleum Products, Revised 1991, Annexure F, ref. no BP1/004/TL 16. Purple Book, Guidelines for Quantitative Risk Assessment, CPR 18E, 1999.



APPENDIX 13 COMPETENCES OF RISK ASSESSORS APPROVED INSPECTION AUTHORITY CERTIFICATE



APPENDIX 14 MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION ADVERTISEMENT EXAMPLE OF A NOTIFICATION FOR A MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION IN A LOCAL NEWS PAPER

NOTICE

In terms of section 3 of the Major Hazard Installation Regulations of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Act 85 of 1993 as amended), the EThekwini Metropolitan Unicity Municipality Emergency Services and the Provincial Director Department of Labour have been notified that the installation of Lanele Terminal in Island View, Durban, falls within the scope of the provisions of the Major Hazard Installation Regulations. The risk assessment, and any other relevant information required by these regulations, is available for inspection at the Durban Central Fire Station, Emergency Planning Officer, EThekwini Municipality, Fire Safety address at 18 ML Sultan Road, Durban.

LANELE TERMINAL (PTY) LIMITED



APPENDIX 15 EMERGENCY PLAN To be drawn up only when project approved before submission to authorities.

SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

AND

PROCEDURES

Documents

APPENDIX I Major Hazard Installation Risk Assessment