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Case No. A-00-0277

IN THE NEBRASKA COURT OF APPEALS FILED___________________---""J:..=UN'--'----""'2 1 2000IN THE INTEREST OF SABRIENIA BRUCE

Child Under Eighteen Years ofAge

APPEAL FROM THE SEPARATE JUVENILE COURTFOR DOUGLAS COUNTY, NEBRASKA

Honorable Douglas F. JohnsonJuvenile Court Judge

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

Prepared and Submitted by:JAMES S. JANSENDouglas CountyAttorney

KAREN KASSEBAUM NELSON #20523DeputyDouglas County Attorney601 Hall of Justice17th and Farnam StreetsOmaha, Nebraska 68183(402) 444-7051Attorney for Appellee

CLERKNEBRASKA SUPREME COUCOURT OF .A.PPEAlS


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N c l 2 . ~ . StU. 43-279 (Reissue 1998) 20Neb. Rev. Still. 43-279.01 (Reissue 1998) 3,17Ncl2. B&Y. Stat. 43-292 2,5,18,20,32

~ . Rev. StU. 43-291 (1) (Reissue 1998) 1,33,34~ . Rev. Stat. 43-292 (2) (Reissue 1998) .1,33,34Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-292 (6) (Reissue 1998) .1,17,32,33,34Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-1501 32

N s i l i . ~ . Stat. 43-1505 (4) (Reissue 1998) .4,18N e b . ~ . Stat. 43-1505 (6) (Reissue 1998) .4,18,22Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-2,106.01 (Reissue 1998) : 2

OTHER AUTHORITIES

Nebraska Supreme CQurtRule 9(D)(1)(d) 5,33


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independentof the findings ofthe trial court. In re InterestL.H, et.a!., 241 Neb. 232, 487N.W.2d 279 (1992). When evidenceis in conflict, an appellate court considers and maygiveweight to the fact that the trial court observedthe witnesses and acceptedoneversion of facts rather than another" Id.Jurisdictional Statement:

This appeal is pursuant toNeb. Rev. Stat. 43-2,106,OI (Reissue1998)whichstates that, "Any final order orjudgment enteredby a juvenile courtmay be appealed tothe CourtofAppeals."

PROPOSITIONS OF LAWI.

In an appeal terminating parental rights, an appellatecourt tries factual questionsde novoon the record which requires an appellatecourt to reach a conclusion independent of thefindings of the trial court. In re InterestL.H, et.a!., 241 Neb.232,487N,W.2d279(1992).

II.When evidence is in conflict, an appellatecourt considers andmay giveweight to the factthat the trial court observed the witnesses and acceptedoneversion of facts rather thananother. In re Interest L.H. et.a!., 241Neb. 232, 487 N.W.2d279 (1992).

III,To terminate parental rights, theremust be clear and convincing evidenceto show afactual basis, as contemplatedby one ormore ofthe subsections in 43-292, exists and

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also that the children's best interests are served by terminating parental rights. InreInterest C.P., 235 Neb. 276, 455 N.W.2d 138 (1990).

IV.

The hallmarks ofprocedural due process are reasonable notice concerning the subject tobe litigated; a reasonable opportunity to be heard, to present evidence, and to confrontand cross-examine adverse witnesses; representation by counsel when required by statuteor Constitutional provisions; and a hearing before an impartial decision-maker. In reInterest ofKelley D. and Heather D., 256 Neb. 465, 590 N.W.2d 392 (1999), Babcock v.St. Francix Medical Center, 4 Neb.App.362, 543 N.W.2d 749 (1996) and State ex.rel.Grape v. Zach, 247 Neb. 29, 524 N.W.2d 788 (1994). See also Neb. Rev. Stat. 43279.01 (Reissue 1998).

v.

In construing the guarantees ofprocedural due process under the Fourteenth Amendmentto the United States Constitution, the Nebraska Supreme Court has held that therequirements of due process are satisfied if the individual has reasonable notice and areasonable opportunity to be heard as long as such opportunities are appropriate to thenature of the proceedings as well as the character of rights which may be affected. Boll v.Nebraska Department ofRevenue, 247 Neb. 473, 528 N.W.2d 300 (1995).

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VI.

Under the Nebraska Indian Child .Welfare Act [ICWA],Ncl2, B&Y. Stat. 43-1505 (4) and(6) , the State must show that, "active efforts," wereused to provide, "remedial servicesand rehabilitativeprograms designedto preventthe breakup of the Indian family," andthat, "continuedcustodyof the child by the parentor Indiancustodian is likely to result inserious emotionalor physical damage."

VII.UnderNcl2, ~ . Stat. 25-833 (Reissue 1995), a partymay fileamotion tomakemoredefinite and certain,"when the allegations of a pleadingareso indefiniteanduncertainthat the precise nature ofthe charge or defense is not apparent."

VIII.The State is requiredto showvia experttestimony that, "continuedcustodyof the childby the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in seriousemotional or physicaldamage." SeeNeb.Rev. Stat. 43-1505 (6) (Reissue 1998).

IX.Whethera witness is qualified to testify as an expertpursuantto Neb.Rev.Stat. 27-702(Reissue1995), is a preliminaryquestionof admissibility andthat sucha determinationwill be upheld on appealunless that finding is clearlyerroneous. SeeIn re InterestofC.W. et.al., 239 Neb. 817,479 N.W.2d 105 (1992).

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x.The Indian Child Welfare Act, "does not change the cardinal rule that the best interests ofthe child are paramount, although it may alter its focus." See In re Interest ofC.W. et.a!.,239 Neb. 817,479 N.W.2d 105 (1992).

XI.Under the Rules of the Supreme Court promulgated by the Nebraska Supreme Court, anappellants are required to separately number and paragraph in their appellate briefs eachassignment of error which she contends the juvenile court made. See Nebraska Supreme .Court Rule 9(D){l)(d).

XII.

Appellate review is limited to errs assigned and argued, and errors not assigned in anappellate brief are deemed waived. See Keithley y. Black, 239 Neb. 685,477 N.W.2d806 (1991); Morton v. Farmer's Business Cooperative ofShelby, 1 Neb.App.552, 510N.W.2d 326 (1993).

STATEMENT OF FACTSOn or about March 5, 1999, the State filed a motion seeking to terminate Roseann

Hogner's parental rights to Sabrienia Bruce under 43-292. In March 1999, Ms. Hognerfiled a motion to dismiss the State's motion to terminate parental rights, and when the. motion to dismiss was overruled, Ms. Hogner appealed that decision to the NebraskaCourt ofAppeals. The Nebraska Court ofAppeals granted the State's motion forsummary affirmance, and the matter on the motion to terminate parental rights wasadjudicated on January 31, February 1, February 7, and February 23,2000. The Separate

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Juvenile Court for Douglas County took judicial notice of a September 8, 1998 orderfinding that the Nebraska Indian Child Welfare Act [ICWA] applied to this case, and theState stipulated that ICWA applied. (7:2-9) At the hearing, the State called Dr. LeslieJoseph, Ph.D., Trisa High, Stephanie Hoesing, Sharon Frillman, Judy Enders, DonnaSkala, and Brenda Shepherd.

Leslie Joseph, Ph.D., testified that he is employed as a licensed psychologist atAlegent Health. (8:8-22) Dr. Joseph testified that he completed an intake evaluation aswell as some psychological testing on Roseann Hogner on April 16, 1999 andMay 6,1999. (9:13-17;11 :10-14) Dr. Joseph's report, exhibit 5, was received into evidence.(12: 11-18) When asked whether she hears voices, Hogner initially indicated she heard a"squeaky voice" but when asked again, she paused and then answered that she did nothear voices. (17:19-18:2) Dr. Joseph concluded, "This patient meets the criteria to beclassified as an adult with severe and persistent mental illness," and that,

[Ms. Hegner] can be expected to encounter significant difficulties in herattempts to cope with stress and manage herself, her relationships and lifesituations adaptively. Roseann was encouraged to seek a psychiatricevaluation in that possible antidepressant and anti-anxiety medicationscould be quite beneficial for her. Unfortunately, she seems quite reluctantto seek such help at this time. (E5p4-5;See alsoI9:13-20)

In exhibit 5, Dr. Joseph diagnosed Hogner with major depression-recurrent withpsychotic features--and indicated Hognermay be manifesting Paranoid and SchizotypalPersonality Traits. (E5p5) Dr. Joseph testified that, without medication, court-orderingMs. Hogner to undergo individual therapy or attend parenting classes would serve nouseful purpose due to Hogner's level of depression, stress, and mental confusion. (22:12-

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23:5) Dr. Joseph felt that Hogner's prognosis without a psychiatric evaluation andmedication was poor. (45:22-46:1)

The State next called Trisa High, a therapist at Maplewood CounselingAssociates. (50:25-51 :9) High explained that she began providing therapy to SabrieniaBruce and Judy Enders, Sabrienia's great-aunt and foster care placement, on June 10,1999. (53:3-14) At the time of the hearing, High was still working with Sabrienia at herfoster placement once a week on communication issues, relationship skills, and behaviormanagement. (53:21-54:6) .

StephanieHoesing testified that she was previously employed at Nebraska Healthand Human Services [HHS] as a case manager from October 1997 to October 1998.(90:9-7) Hoesing was the case manager for Roseann Hogner and her daughter Sabrienia.(91:13-19) Hoesing explained that she was aware that Roseann Hogner was courtordered to complete a psychiatric evaluation. (91:25-92:4) Hoesing scheduled apsychiatric evaluation for Hogner on February 24, 1998, with Dr. Copaz and madearrangement to transport Hogner to that appointment. (92:8-6) Hogner did not completethe February 24, 1998, psychiatric evaluation. (93:14-16) Subsequently on February 25,Hoesing rescheduled the psychiatric evaluation for March 17, 1998, personally notifiedHogner ofthe appointment, and explained that she was personally transportingHogner tothe March 17, 1998, appointment. (94:1-18) On February 25, 1998; Hoesing stressed toHogner how important it was to keep the March 17, 1998 appointment as the psychiatricevaluation was court-ordered. (94:7-18) Hogner told Hoesing on February 25, 1998, thatshe missed the appointment on the 24th because she was looking for a place to live.

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(98:22-24) Hoesing reminded Hagner on March 13th of the March 17th appointment.(99:11-19) When Hoesing showed up to transport Hagner to theMarch 17thappointment, Hagner was not there. (94:19-23) After the June 1998 court hearing,Hoesing again scheduled another psychiatric evaluation with Dr. Copaz on August 18,1998, had a letter informing Hagnerof the appointment, hand-delivered through thefamily support worker, and again made transportation arrangements for Hagner. (95:311) Again on August 18, 1998, Hoesing attempted to personally take Hagner to thepsychiatric evaluation, bu tHagner did not keep that appointment. (108:11-16)

Hoesing spoke with Hagner on February 4, 1998, atwhich time Hagner informedher that she was at the SienafFrancis House, needed bus tickets to attend visits, and onFebruary 5, Hoesing dropped-off those bus tickets for Hagner at the Siena/Francis House.(96:22-97:1) Hoesing next saw Hagner on February 10, 1998, during a scheduled visitand at that time, Hagner informed Hoesing that she would be leaving the Siena/FrancisHouse to go live with a friend somewhere offof21st and Howard Streets (no specificaddress or telephone number given). (97:4-18) When Hoesing saw Hagner on February20, 1998, Hogner again indicated to Hoesing that she wanted to move but did not knowwhere. (98: 1-7) On February 25th, Hogner informed Hoesing that she had stayed theprevious night at a Travel Lodge, that she was looking for a place to live because she andher boyfriend had broken-up, and that she was applying to the Salvation Army forhousing. (98: 19-99:10) OnMarch 13th, Hagner explained to Hoesing that she had beenat the Lydia House, but she left the Lydia House because she was again staying with herboyfriend, that they were staying the night at the Travel Lodge, and beyond that she did

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not know where they would be staying. (99:11-100:5) On the day of the adjudication onMarch 23, 1998,Hoesing spoke with Hogner who told her that she was staying withfriends somewhere near 26th and Howard Streets and could not give out the phonenumber at the friends' request. (100:6-23) On May 6, 1998, Hoesing again spoke withHogner because her boyfriend had pushed her, she left, and was again looking forhousing. (103:24-104:5) Hoesing explained that Hogner was not allowed into most ofthe shelters in the Omaha area, and that Hogner was able to borrow thirty dollars from herbrother and get bus tickets from Hoesing to spend the night at the YMCA. (104:5-15)Hoesing next spoke with Hogner on June 4, 1998 at which time Hogner was again at theSiena/Francis House. (104:24-105:5) Hoesing explained that during the ten (10) monthsshe was the case manager, Hogner resided at numerous shelters or other locations, andHogner was not cooperative in keeping Hoesing appraised of her whereabouts. (107: 10-21)

On April 27, 1998, Hoesing attended a supervised visit at the Salvation Army atwhich time she had the opportunity to discuss the sporadic visits and to explain theconfirmation plan whichwas going to be implemented. (100:24-101:19) Exhibit 14,which was received into evidence, is a copy of the visitation planwhich outlines thedates, time, and confirmation numbers of visits; Roseann Hogner signed the visitationplan. (101:13-103:17) At the termination hearing, the State stipulated that Hogner keptall ofher February 1998 visits. (116:1-8) In March 1998, however, Hogner only keptfour visits, failed to show for five visits, and there was one canceled visit due to theweather. (125:12-25) In April 1998, Hogner missed six visits and kept two visits.

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(126:7-11) In May 1998, there were six missed visits and only one visit which was kept.(126:12-14) In June 1998, there were two missed visits and five visits which were kept.(126:15-17) In July 1998, there were six missed visits and again only two visits kept.(126:18-20) Hoesing explained that the above-referenced sporadic visitation wasconsistent withHogner's visitation pattern while Hoesing was case manager. (126:24-127:9)

Hoesing explained that she understood this to be an lCWA case and initiated thechange of placement for Sabrienia to Judy Enders, as a Native American relativewho wasa licensed foster care provider, in an effort to complywithK'WA. (111:3-19)

Judy Enders, Sabrienia's great-aunt, testified that Sabrieniawas placed in herhome on August 3, 1998. ( 1 ~ 3 : 1 3 - 1 6 4 : 1 4 ) Enders explained that she enrolled Sabrieniainto the Cherokee Nation Tribe because she felt it was Sabrienia's right. (165:7-166:6)Enders is enrolled in the Rosebud Sioux Tribe and has taken efforts to make sure that

Sabrienia is exposed to the Native AmericanlIndian culture, and those efforts includegoing to powwows, having fry bread, listening to Native AmericanlIndian music,teaching Sabrienia some of the language, sayingNative American prayers, and havingNative AmericanlIndian artifacts in her home. (166:13-167:12)

Enders explained that Hognerarrived at her home on September 30, 1998 andwanted to take the children trick or treating. (171:15-172:13) .After taking Hogner to thestore and explaining that Halloween was a month away, Enders allowed Hogner into herresidence and let her visit with Sabrienia. (172:8-173 :2) On October 24, 1998, Hogneragain showed up at the Enders residence thinking it was Halloween, bu t Enders asked

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Hogner to leave at that time. (177:7-25) Between October 1998 and May 1999, Endersis aware ofHogner having approximately one visit with Sabrienia. (170:23-171:7;173:17-20)

Donna Skala testified that she was previously employed at Visinet as a familysupport worker. (234:14-235:2) As a family support worker, Skala supervised visits,transported children to visits, andwould help parents look forjobs and housing. (235:37) Skala supervised visits between Hogner and Sabrienia between April/May 1998 andNovember 1998. (236:2-19) Skala testified that on November 2, 1998, there was a visitat whichHogner arrived late and then started yelling and screaming. (240:20-242:22) Atone point, Hogner grabbed Sabrienia and security had to be called in order for Hogner toput Sabrienia down. (243:7) Skala testified that while there were visits on October 2,1998, and November 2, 1998, there were no visits from October 5, 1998, through October30, 1998, because Roseann failed to confirm those visits. (238:1-2;240:19;244:23-24)Skala also explained that there were no visits between September 5, 1998, and September28, 1998; Skala did explain that she was il l and had to cancel a visit but Hogner failed toreschedule that visit. (244:25-246:17) The last visit Skala was to supervise was onNovember 14, 1998, but that had to be canceled because Sabrienia had pink eye.(246:18-23) Skala testified that Hognerwas very inconsistent in keeping her visitationwith Sabrienia; that is, Hogner could have visits up to twice per week but that rarelyhappened becauseHognerwould either fail to confirm a visit or would call and cancel thevisit. (247:2-25)

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, )

Skala also attempted to assist Hogner in obtaining housing, through Section 8, infinding shelter care, and in locating ajob. (248:8-16) While Skala was the familysupport worker, Hognermade no progress on the housing and employment goals.(248:20-21) Skala explained that Hogner would say she would do something but thenfailed to follow-through and was not interested in attempting to locate a two-bedroomresidence. (248:23-8)

Sharon Frillman, a family support worker and visitation specialist with Visinet,testified that she was assigned to supervise visits between Roseann Hogner and Sabrienia 'Bruce. (133:10-135:3) Frillman explained that she was assigned the case in the secondweek ofNovember 1998 andstated that the last visit she attempted occurred onDecember 31, 1998. (135:4-11) During that seven week time period, Frillman testifiedthat she never sawRoseann and never supervised any visits during that time period.(135:22-136:8) Frillman testified that on November 26, December 5, December 15,December 17, December 22, December 24, December 29, and December 31, 1998,Hogner called to confirm that she would be at the visit but then failed to appear for thevisit causing Sabrienia to be unnecessarily transported to the visit. (136:9138:23;147:11-25;150:8-15) During the short time that Frillman was the family supportworker and visitation specialist, Hogner changed the visitation times on November 30,1998, only to change the visitation time back on December 10,1998. (158:2-161:1)However, by the very next week onDecember 14, 1998, Hogner became confused onwhen the visitation times were. (161:2-9) Frillman explained that frequent changing of

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visitation time was difficult for her and was confusing to her, however, she allowed thechanges so that Hogner would have visitation with Sabrienia. (161:10-162:1)

Brenda Shepherd testified that she is an employee ofHHS and is a protectiveservice worker and was assigned to the HognerlBruce case in approximately November1998. (272:6-11;273:13-21) As a protective service worker, Shepherd works withfamilies that are in need of assistance in stabilizing an unsafe family home as determinedby juvenile court. (272:25-273:2)

When Shepherd was assigned the case, Shepherd understood the status ofHogner's case to be that Hogner was to be completing evaluations and that Hogner hadwas having sporadic contact with Sabrienia and HHS. (274:13-21) While Hogner's HHScase file indicated she was living with her parents, Shepherd had a difficult timeascertaining her whereabouts. (275:14-276:2) Shepherd contacted the family supportworkers, the foster parent, and even correspondedwith a shelter in an effort to locateHogner. (276:6-15) When Shepherd finally spoke with Hogner on January 27, 1999,Shepherd asked Hogner where she was living, Hogner told Shepherd it was none ofherbusiness. (279:23-280:3) Shepherd asked Hogner where she had been, and Hognerexplained that she had the flu and had hurt her ankle and could not contact anyone.(280:4-11) In February 1999, Shepherd learned through Hogner's aunt, Judy Enders, thatHogner was residing at the SienalFrancis House. (281:14-282:12) Shepherd testified thatHogner was not keeping her appraised ofher whereabouts, and that since the inception ofthe case, Hogner has resided in ten to eleven different residences. (297:17-21;298:18299:3)

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After weeks ofmissed visits and not confirming her visits, Shepherd put the visitsbetweenHogner and Sabrienia on hold in December 1998, which is typically done whena parent has missed weeks ofvisits. (277:16-278:13) Hogner finally contacted Shepherdon January 27, 1999, whenHogner wanted to know why there were no visits. (279:1122) Hogner was very agitated on the phone, so Shepherd scheduled an appointment tomeet with Hogner on February 1, 1999, but Hogner canceled. (180:15-25) Thatappointment was eventually rescheduled for April I, 1999. (281:1-13) Shepherd testifiedthat after December 1998, Hogner's first visit with Sabrienia occurred onMay 13, 1998.(297:4-11) SinceMay 13, 1998, Shepherd testified that Hogner was having fairlyconsistent visitation with Sabrienia. (297:12-16)

When asked what efforts she made to assist Hogner in completing a psychiatricevaluation, Hogner explained that she made referrals, set-up appointments, and madetransportation arrangements for the psychiatric evaluation on more than one occasion.(283: 18-24) Shepherd scheduled psychiatric evaluations for Hogner on March 2, 1999,April 1, 1999, April 16, 1999, and November 3, 1999. Concerning the March 2, 1999,appointment, Shepherd sent a letter to Hogner informing her of theMarch 2, 1999,appointment and indicated that Hogner should contact her if she needed assistance withtransportation. (283:25-284:3;285:6-9) Hogner did not keep the March 2, 1999,appointment, and when Shepherd asked Hogner why, Hogner said she did not havetransportation, became agitated, refused to allow Shepherd to reschedule the appointment,and refused to accept assistance with transportation on future appointments. (284:20-

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285:15) Hogner also did not keep the April 1, 1999, appointment for a psychiatricevaluation, (284:23-24)

Subsequently, Shepherd called Alegant and requested an appointment for apsychiatric evaluationwhich was scheduled for April 16, 1999; Shepherd also sent areferral authorizing payment to Alegant for the psychiatric evaluation. (285:18-287:3)Shepherd personally transported Hogner to the Apn116, 1999, appointment and believedthat a psychiatric evaluation was being completed; however, Alegant completed apsychological evaluation instead of a psychiatric evaluation. (288:12-17) Shepherdexplained that Alegant's psychological evaluation recommended a psychiatric evaluation,which was what HHS was attempting to obtain, (289:4-9)

When Shepherd explained to Hogner that a psychiatric evaluation still needed tobe completed, Hogner became distressed. (289:4-9) Even after April 1999, Shepherdcontinued to try to contact Hogner via telephone, personal contact at visitations, andwritten correspondence to explain to Hogner that a psychiatric evaluation still needed tobe completed. (289:16-20) Shepherd even scheduled another psychiatric evaluation forHogner on November 3, 1999. (291:22-292:5) Prior to that appointment, on October 15,1999, Shepherd personally informed Hogner ofthe appointment, Hogner not only refusedthe appointment but raised her voice, started yelling profanities at Shepherd, movedtowards Shepherd, and threatened to kick Shepherd's "ass." (292:18-9;302:20-303:2)Shepherd asked Hogner to calm down, to stop using profanity, and to back away fromher, and whenHogner did not do so, securitywas called. (294:1-9) When Shepherd

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arrived to transport Hogner to the November 1999psychiatric evaluation, Hegner was notthere. (291:22-292:14)

Shepherd testified that there were no other efforts she could make to assist Hognerin completing the psychiatric evaluation and that the primary obstacle to Hogner'scompleting the evaluation was Hogner's unwillingness to do so. (294:10-19) Shepherdexplained that Hogner's failure to complete the psychiatric evaluation was an impedimentto the goal of reunification as, "The psychiatric evaluation would have given us a basis onwhat services to give Roseann to initiate her in getting her daughter back. Her failure tocomplywith that basic first step stopped the whole process." (300:5-17)

After hearing all the evidence, the Separate Juvenile Court for Douglas Countyfound the following: the allegations in Counts II, IV, and VI to be true by beyond a

.reasonable doubt; found that Nebraska Health and Human Services [HHS] used activeefforts to provide remedial service and rehabilitative programs designed to prevent thebreakup of the Indian family and that these efforts were unsuccessful; that the evidence,including the testimony of a qualified expert witness, showed beyond a reasonable doubtthat continued custody of Sabrienia Bruce in the custody ofRoseann Hogner would likelyresult in serious emotional and physical damage to said child; found that SabrieniaBruce's best interests required termination ofRoseann Hogner's parental rights; andthereby terminated Roseann Hogner's parental rights. The juvenile court cited In reInterest ofP.D., 231 Neb. 608,437 N.W.2d 156 and made a specific findings that, "Thechild has unfortunately and inappropriately languished in foster care due to the mother'ssporadic visitation, failure to obtain a stable residence to provide for herselfand her child,

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whereabouts constantly unknown, and failing to obtain a mental evaluation for possibleservices."

ARGUMENT

I.THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING A CAUSE OF ACTIONWAS

STATED PURSUANT TO 43-292 (6) ANDDID NOT VIOLATE HOGNER'SPROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS RIGHTS ASA RESULT 'THEREOF.

Hogner apparently argues "reasonable efforts" language utilized in Count IV ofthe motion to terminate parental rights were not specifically detailed enough, that she hadno procedural mechanism to challenge the State's failure to define "reasonable efforts" inthe motion to terminate parental rights, and that Separate Juvenile Court for DouglasCounty erred in not sustaining her demurrer. See Appellant's Brief at 8 to 13.

The hallmarks ofprocedural due process are reasonable notice concerning thesubject to be litigated; a reasonable opportunity to be heard, to present evidence, and toconfront and cross-examine adverse witnesses; representation by counsel when requiredby statute or Constitutional provisions; and a hearing before an impartial decision-maker.In re Interest ofKelley D. and Heather D., 256 Neb. 465, 590 N.W.2d 392 (1999),Babcock v. St. Francix Medical Center, 4 Neb.App.362, 543 N.W.2d 749 (199q) andState ex.rel. Grape v. Zach, 247 Neb. 29, 524 N.W.2d 788 (1994). ~ aImNcl2, Rev..stu. 43-279.01 (Reissue 1998). In construing the guarantees ofprocedural due process

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under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the NebraskaSupreme Court has held that the requirements ofdue process are satisfied if the individual

has reasonable notice and a reasonable opportunity to be heard as long as suchopportunities are appropriate to the nature of the proceedings aswell as the character ofrights which may be affected. Boll v. Nebraska Department ofRevenue, 247 Neb. 473,528 N.W.2d 300 (1995). Under Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-292, the Separate Juvenile Courtmay terminate parental rights if a factual basis is shown and there is clear and convincingevidence that to terminate parental rights would be in the child's best interests. See In reInterest C.P., 235 Neb. 276,455 N.W.2d 138 (1990). Under the Nebraska Indian ChildWelfare Act [ICWA], Neb. ReY. S1a1. 43-1505 (4) and (6) , the State must show that,"active efforts," were used to provide, "remedial services and rehabilitative programsdesigned to prevent the breakup of the Indian family," and that, "continued custody of thechild by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in serious emotional or physicaldamage."

In the instant case, Hogner does not contest that she received a copy of the motionto terminate parental rights or was served with such a motion with a notice ofhearing.Receiving such a notice informed her of the nature and subject matter of the proceedingas well as the fact that the State was seeking to terminate her parental rights. Likewise,

she was appraised of her rights at the detention hearing, the adjudication hearing, andwhen she arrived at the termination ofparental rights hearing. The termination hearingwas held before an impartial decision-maker-the Separate Juvenile Court for DouglasCounty-and there is no assignment of error alleging otherwise. Hogner was served with

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notice ofthe hearing and appeared in person for most ofthe proceedings and wasrepresented by competent legal counsel, who cross-examined all witnesses called.

Hogner had the opportunity to be heard and to present evidence on her behalf.Hogner argues that, "when the State elects to file for a termination ofparental

rights by motion, there is no means of challenging deficient or defective allegations. .contained there." .See Appellant's Brief at 10.While Hogner refers to a demurrer as anappropriate filing whenapleading'fails to state a cause of action, nowhere in Argument Idoes Hogner argue that the State failed to state a cause of action. ~ Appellant's Briefat9-10. A careful reading ofHogner's brief, however, shows that her major complaint isthat the State's pleadingwasnotmore definite and certain--specifically she cites Iowaand Colorado statutes and argues that the terminology, "reasonable efforts," needed to bedefined. See Appellant's Briefat 12-13.

The State simply responds in several ways. First, while Iowa and Coloradostatutes may specifically require a delineation ofwhat, "reasonable efforts," were used,nothing in Nebraska statutes so require such a delineation. Second, there are proceduresin Nebraska Revised Statutes by whichHogner could have challenged "deficient"pleadings. The State refers this Court to Ncl2. Rev. Stat. 25-833 (Reissue 1995) whichallows parties to file motions to make more definite and certain, ''when the allegations ofa pleading are so indefinite and uncertain that the precise nature of the charge or defenseis not apparent." Clearly, ifHogner or her legal counsel had questions on what"reasonable efforts" meant in this case or how ICWA affected this case, clearly Hognercould have appropriately filed a motion to make more definite and certain.

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In her brief, Hogner argues,As a basis for overruling Appellant's Demurrer, the trial court's orderstated that Appellant had been advised at the detention hearing 'o f herrights, including the nature of the proceedings and the possibleconsequences or dispositions, one of the possible dispositions being aproceeding regarding termination ofparental rights.' Further the sameadvisory was given at the adjudication hearing. (T21-22) The trial courtappears to hold that a general advisory that termination ofparental rightsis a potential outcome in the proceedings is sufficient to satisfy dueprocess requirements. See Appellant'sBrief at 11.

The State submits that, in the instant case, there is no evidence that the juvenile courtfailed to comply with Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-279 (Reissue 1998) and failed to advise orwarn Hogner that her parental rights could be terminated. Section 43-274 (1) involves"criminal complaints" filed pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-247--not 43-292. While. Hogner cites and relies on Neb. Rev. Stat. 43-274 (1) to support her proposition that

State should be required to file an affidavit which sets forth with specificity the basis ofthe prayer for termination, the State is unaware of any statute or case law which requiresthe State to file a detailed affidavit as a basis to support the prayer for termination underNeb. Rev. Stll, 43-292.

II.THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN OVERRULINGHOGNER'S

DEMURRER OR VIOLATE HOGNER'S PROCEDURALDUE PROCESSRIGHTS AS THE STATE'S PLEADINGS STATEDA CAUSE OF ACTION.

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In her brief, while it is not entirely clear, Hogner appears to argue that the Stateshould have included allegations in the Motion to Terminate Parental Rights that active

efforts had been used in this case and that Hogner's continued custody ofSabrienia wouldcause Sabrienia serious emotional or physical damage. See Appellant's Brief at 13-15.In her argument, however, Hogner cites no statute or case law which would support thespecific proposition that Hogner proposes.

While the State concedes that pleadings are meant to frame the issues, and that ademurrer is usually one means to challenge a pleading, certainly Hogner cites no case orstatute which supports her proposition that such allegations need to be specifically

--delineated. Further, without conceding that the State must contain the allegations Hognerproposes, there were allegations in Count N concerning "reasonable efforts" whicharguably encompass "active efforts" as well as allegations in Count VII concerning "bestinterests" which arguably encompass the emotional or physical damage issue. Thoseallegations in Counts N and VII placed Hogner on notice that the State would beproducing evidence concerning Sabrienia's best interests, which include emotional orphysical suffering, as well as what efforts HHS was using to assist her. IfHogner wasconcerned or confused that the State's allegations were too indefinite or uncertain for herto understand the Motion to Terminate Parental Rights or to adequately prepare a defense,Hogner could have filed a motion to make more definite and certain under Nsili. Rev. S1ill;.25-833 (Reissue 1995) as discussed in Argument 1. Thus, given the States allegations inCounts IV and VII and the procedural mechanisms Hogner failed to utilize (whicharguably constitutes waiver of those issues), the State suggests that the pleading in the

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instant case (i.e., the Motion to Terminate Parental Rights) was sufficient to place Hogneron notice that State would be procuring evidence concerning both Sabrienia Bruce's best

interests which could have included emotional and physical suffering as well as effortsHHS were using.

III.THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING A TERMINATION

WAS IN SABRIENIA'S BEST INTERESTS.

In her brief, Hogner argues both that the State failed to prove neither thattermination ofparental rights was in Sabrienia Bruce's best interests nor that SabrieniaBruce would suffer emotional and/or physical harm if removed from her parent or Indiancustodian. See Appellant's Briefat 15 to 22.

The issue before this Court regarding the best interests and the expert testimonyconcerning harm to an Indian/Native American child has been previously addressed in Inre Interest ofC.W. et.a!., 239 Neb. 817, 479 N.W.2d 105 (1992). In that instance, onappeal, the mother unsuccessfully argued that State's expert witnesses was not an expert.Under 43-1505 (6), the State is required to show via expert testimony that, "continuedcustody of the child by the parent or Indian custodian is likely to result in seriousemotional or physical damage." The c.;:}L court noted that whether a witness is qualifiedto testify as an expert pursuant to Neb. Rev. Stil. 27-702 (Reissue 1995), is apreliminary question of admissibility and that such a determination will be upheld onappeal unless that finding is clearly erroneous. Id. In that case, the Nebraska SupremeCourt found that the State's expert possessed substantial education and experience and

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that the expert's lack of experience with Native American culture in no way underminedhis testimony. The Supreme Court went on to note that ICWA, "does not change the

cardinal rule that the best interests of the child are paramount, although it may alter itsfocus." Id. The c.:5l:L. court then went on to find that there was evidence of emotionalharm as well as best interests testimony and added that the mother had not found the"incentive to mature" so the Court would not expect the child to wait and see whether themother would grow up.

The State submits that in the instant situation, there was sufficient testimony from'Trisa High for the Court to find that emotional damage would result from Sabrienia beingremoved from Judy Enders and that Sabrieniawould suffer emotional and/or physicaltrauma if Sabrienia were placed with Bruce. High testified in detail that Sabrienia Bruceis in need of a safe, stable, permanent home, that Judy Enders is providing that toSabrienia, that Sabrienia is bonded with her great-aunt, Judy Enders. (66:24-70:1) Highrelated that during therapy session Sabrienia talked about times in which her motherfailed to show-up for visits, that Sabrienia acted-out more after the missed visits, and thatSabrienia is negatively impacted, confused, and upset as a result of the missed visits.(56:12-57:9)

High explained thatshe had a therapy session with Sabrienia on January 18,2000.

(61:12-15) During that visit, Sabrienia drew three pictures which were marked asexhibits 11, 12, and 13 at the hearing and were received into evidence. (66:11-20)

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Sabrienia drew Exhibit 11 when High asked her to draw a picture of how RoseannHogner appears in Sabrienia's dreams. (61:18-62:12) Exhibit 11was significant to Highbecause the picture,

was all one color and she did it in a matter ofjust very quickly and there isone color. There is a smile on there, but it's like everything is distorted,and there's a little bit of orange down here and there's just nothingconcrete about it. It's just all over the place. (63:3-11)

Sabrienia drew Exhibit 12when High asked her to draw how Roseann Hogner appears inreal life. (63:12-15) In exhibit 12, there are three colors and High explains, "there's asmile on the face, and the legs are-just there's nothing. There's no hands, there's no feet,there's no arms. It's just-It's more detailed, a little more colorful, but it's still notexactly detailed like a person." (63:14-23) Sabrienia drew Exhibit 13when High askedher to draw how Judy Enders appears in real life. (63:24-64:3) High stated that Sabrieniatook more time d r a ~ i n g this picture; used five different colors; depicted arms, legs, feet,no hands, and a smile; and wrote MOM above the picture. (64:4-10) When asked whatMOM spelled, Sabrienia answered, "mom." (64:10-15) High concluded that Sabrienia ismore emotionally invested in Judy Enders. (64:16-24)

High opined that it was important to Sabrienia to have a safe, stable, permanent,structured home environment. (67:1-9) High also explained that Sabrienia appears to bebonded with Judy Enders, that she is aware that Judy Enders is an extended familymember, and that if Judy Enders were exposing Sabrienia to the Native AmericanlIndianculture then High's therapeutic concerns would be satisfied. (69:12-71:2) Brenda,Shepherd opined that termination ofHogner's parental rights to Sabrienia was in

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Sabrienia's best interests. (299:4-24) Shepherd explained that Sabrienia was in need of asafe, loving home and that Hogner demonstrated she was not capable ofproviding this.(300:1-4) Given such testimony and using the precedent elucidated in c..:1L., .sJJlID}, theSeparate Juvenile Court for Douglas County had sufficient testimony to find, "That theevidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt, including testimony of qualified expertwitnesses, that the continued custody of the child by the parent is likely to result inserious emotional and physical damage to the child."

Concerning High's credentials, the State submits that clearly High qualifies as anexpert. Trisa High has a masters degree in communities counseling and is a provisionallicensed mental health practitioner, which means she has completed 6000 hours ofcounseling to graduate, has 1500 direct contact hours and 1500 indirect contact hours.(51:10-52:20) High has been employed at Maplewood Counseling since October 1996and has worked with many children and families. (52:21-53:2) Given High's educationand her experience, the State submits that the Separate Juvenile Court for DouglasCounty did not err in finding there was qualified expert testimony concerning theemotional/physical harm Sabrienia would suffer if she were to remain in Hogner's care.Under C.W., supra, there is no evidence that the Separate Juvenile Court for DouglasCounty erroneously determined that High was a qualified expert.

On appeal, Hogner's specific argument appears to be twofold. First, Hogner citesIn re Interest ofTeela H., 4 Neb.App.608, 547 N.W.2d 512 (1996) and In re I n t e ~ e s t ofL.J., 220 Neb. 102,368 N.W.2d 474 (1985) asserts that, "The State's position is

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apparently that Sabrienia would benefit from continuity of care from an individual whichwhom she was 'bonded.'" ~ Appellant's Brief at 16. Second, Hogner argues that theopinion testimony concerning best interest and emotional/physical damage was basedupon a faulty premise--namely that Hogner was inconsistent regarding her visitation withSabrienia. See Appellant's Briefat 17.

Clearly, Hogner does not understand the State's position. While the testimony isunrefuted that Sabrienia is bondedwith Judy Enders, this is not the sole basis of the

prayer for termination ofHogner's rights. The State asserts that this case is similar to thefacts in c.:iL., supra. In that the case, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted that mother'saddiction to alcohol and/or controlled substances, her denial of such addictions, andfound,

The evidence supports a causal relationship between the mother's behavior.and likely damage to the children, and we will not ask the children to waitand see whether their mother grows up in the future. She has not foundthe incentive to mature and change her lifestyle over the years this casehas been progressing through the juvenile court, when that was the onlyobstruction to having her children returned to her.

Id. at 831, 479 N.W.2d at 115. Likewise, in the instant case, the record is replete withevidence that Bogner failed to maintain a residence, failed to consistently visit Sabrienia,failed to obtain a psychiatric evaluation, and failed to cooperate with HHS officials.While Hogner argues that on isolated incidents there were visits which were canceled dueto Sabrienia having pink eye or due to the visitationworker being ill, but it is also clearthat there were many more instances that Hogner failed to reschedule those missed visits

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when given the opportunity to do so. Further, there was ample evidence that Hogner, forwhatever reasons, on her own accord failed to visit Sabrieniawhen given the opportunity.The evidence was overwhelming that termination was in Sabrienia's best interests andfailing to do so would cause her emotional/physical harms given that Hogner's lifestylewas unstable which included multiple residences, that Hogner was nowhere near the pointthat she could reunify with Sabrienia, and that Sabrienia was bonded with Judy Enders.Given such evidence, the juvenile court appropriate found,

The child has unfortunately and inappropriately languished in foster caredue tot he mother's sporadic visitation, failure to obtain a stable residenceto provide for herself and her child, whereabouts constantly unknown, and

..failing to obtain a mental evaluation for possible services. "Childrencannot, and should not, be suspended in foster care, nor be made to awaituncertain parental maturity."

To argue that best interests and emotional/physical harm testimony was premised on lackof consistent visitation or Sabrienia's bond with Enders, ignores the whole picture andunfairly summarizes the evidence.

IV.THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING HHS USED "ACTIVE

EFFORTS" AND THEREBY DID NOT ERR IN TERMINATING HOGNER'S

PARENTALRIGHTS.

In her brief, Hogner recognizes that "active efforts" has no precise meaning but. argues that Nebraska Health and Ruman Services, specifically Stephanie Hoesing andBrenda Shepherd, failed to use "active efforts" to reunify Hogner with Sabrienia Bruce.~ Appellant's Briefat 22 to 25. While Hogner cites no statute or case law, either

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federal or state, which would support her arguments, she complains that the followingefforts ofHHS were insufficient to be deemed active efforts: the February 11, 1999 letterthat Brenda Shepherd allegedly sent to the wrong address; that transportationarrangements which were made for Hogner to various psychiatric appointments weresomehow not suitable; that Alegant performed a psychological evaluation in April 1999instead of the requested psychiatric evaluation; and that Hoesing did not take sufficientefforts to personally notify Hogner ofthe February 24, 1998 psychiatric evaluation. ~Appellant's Briefat 23-24.

The State suggests that the evidence was unrefuted that both Hoesing andShepherd used, at a minimum, "active efforts." Hoesing detailed that her active effortsincluded making a number ofpersonal contacts with Hogner, providing her with bustickets, providing a family support worker to assist her with parenting, housing,employment, and income issues, scheduling psychiatric and chemical dependency

. evaluations, and providing visitation schedules and monthly calendars. (109:9-110:4)Hogner, however, was not cooperative with Hoesing in accessing services which wasdemonstrated by Hogner failing to keep anyone of the three scheduled psychiatricevaluations, only working with the family support worker twice on housing and incomeissues, failing to follow-through with other scheduled appointments, and Hogner's failure

to let Hoesing know her whereabouts. (110:9-22) In fact, Hoesing had to, "track downand talked to other people to find out where she [Hogner] was at." (110:20-22) Hoesingwas unaware of anything else which could have been offered to Hogner to assist inreunifying her with Sabrienia. (110:23-111 :2) Hoesing testified that she felt Hogner

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made no significant progress in reunifying with Sabrienia during the time that she was thecase manager. (111:20-112:11)

Shepherd testified that she used "active efforts" in this case. (294:20-295:7)Shepherd explained that she used "active efforts" due to

the numerous times that I had to set up the evaluation in itself. It's notpractice to -- to set up evaluations for parents, usually. That's somethingthat they initiate on their own. Transportation, although we may assist init, me picking up a client and transporting them to an evaluation is prettyrare, especially on this many occasions. (295: 10-17)

In short, both case managers testified that they used "active efforts."Without addressing Hegner's specific complaint that Hoesing did not personally

inform her of the February 1998 psychiatric appointment, the State submits that Hoesingdid everything short ofphysically forcing Hogner to go the to the two psychiatricappointments Hoesing subsequently scheduled. Hoesing rescheduled the missed

February 1998 psychiatric evaluation for March 17, 1998, personally notified Hogner ofthe appointment at which time Hoesing stressed how important the psychiatric evaluationwas, reminded Hogner of the appointment on March 13th, made arrangements topersonally transport Hogner, and when Hoesing showed up to transport Hogner to theMarch 17th appointment, Hogner was not there. (94:1-23;99:11-19) Hoesing againscheduled another psychiatric evaluation on August 18, 1998, had a letter informingHogner of the appointment, hand-delivered throughthe family support worker, and againmade transportation arrangements for Hogner. (95:3-11) Again on August 18, 1998,Hoesing attempted to personally take Hogner to the psychiatric evaluation, but Hogner

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did not keep that appointment. (108:11-16) Certainly such actions on Hoesing's part(both the transportation arrangements and the scheduling procedures) qualify "activeefforts" regardless ofwhether or not Hoesing personally informed Hogner of theFebruary 1998 appointment.

Regarding the actions Shepherd made to schedule psychiatric evaluations forHogner, it is unrefuted that Shepherd scheduled psychiatric evaluations for Hogner onMarch 2, 1999, April 1, 1999, April 16, 1999, and November 3, 1999. Withoutaddressing Hogner's complaints concerning theMarch 2, 1999, and April 1, 1999,scheduled psychiatric appointments, certainly Hogner cannot contest that Shepherd usedactive efforts relating to the April 16, 1999 andNovember 3, 1999, appointments.Shepherd personally transported Hogner to the April 16, 1999, appointment andbelievedthat a psychiatric evaluation was being completed; however, Alegant completed apsychological evaluation instead ofa psychiatric evaluation. (288:12-17) While Hognercomplains about this, certainly Shepherd did everything in her power to schedule thepsychiatric evaluation which included sending a referral authorizing payment to Alegantfor the psychiatric evaluation. (285:18-287:3) Further, Shepherd scheduled anotherpsychiatric evaluation for Hogner on November 3, 1999. (291:22-292:5) Prior to thatappointment, on October 15, 1999, Shepherd personally informed Hogner of the

appointment, Hogner not only refused the appointment but raised her voice, startedyelling profanities at Shepherd, moved towards Shepherd, and threatened Shepherd.(292:18-9;302:20-303:2)

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I I

While Hogner complains about Hoesing and Shepherd, she overlooks twoimportant points. First, Hogner has not-and cannot--complain about most ofwhatHoesing and Shepherd did to assist her because they both went above and beyond the callof duty which included seeking Hogner out and personally transporting her toappointments. Secondly, and maybe more importantly, Hogner overlooks anyresponsibility she had to make efforts on her own behalf to place herselfin a position toparent Sabrienia Bruce. In In re Interest of John T., 4 Neb.App.79, 538 N.W.2d 761(1995), the Nebraska Court ofAppeals recognized the discretionary power of the juvenile'court to order a reasonable plan for parental rehabilitation to correct the conditions whichbrought the child under the jurisdiction of juvenile court. Moreover, when a parent failsto make reasonable efforts to comply with a court-ordered rehabilitation plan, such afailure on the part ofthe parent provides a separate and independent basis to terminateparental rights. In re Interest ofJ.H., 242 Neb. 906,496 N.W.2d 346 (1993) (emphasisadded).

Based upon the evidence presented at the January and February 2000 terminationhearing, there was ample evidence to show that the major barrier in this case was

. Hogner's unwillingness to comply with the plan. Both Hoesing and Shepherd madenumerous psychiatric appointments, which Hogner had personal notice of, and even with

door-to-door transportation services offered by the case managers, Hogner did not keepthose appointments. Shepherd explained that Hogner's unwillingness to cooperatewith HHS was th e primary obstacle in getting the psychiatric evaluation completed.Further evidence ofHogner's uncooperative attitude was her failure to keep HHS

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, ( ,

informed ofher whereabouts. Hoesing testified that Hogner would frequently not reporta change of address or a current address, so Hoesing resorted to making efforts on he rown to locate Hogner. Shepherd, too, also testified she had initial difficulty locatingHogner. Given such testimony, there can be little doubt that Hogner failed to takeadvantage ofthe "active efforts" in which various individuals were making to assist her.The State submits that even ifHHS had made Herculean efforts (as were arguably made),such efforts would have fallen short given the uncooperative attitude Hogner displayed inbeing receptive to such efforts.

V.THEREWAS AMPLE EVIDENCE FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO

TERMINATEHOGNER'S PARENTALRIGHTS TO SABRIENIA BRUCE BYBEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT UNDER 43-292 (6).

Under 43-292, the Separate Juvenile Court may terminate parental rights if afactual basis is shown and there is clear and convincing evidence that to terminateparental rights would be in the children's best interest. See In re Interest ofe.p., 235Neb. 276, 455 N.W.2d 138 (1990). See also In re Interest ofIB. and A.P., 235 Neb. 74,453 N.W.2d 477 (1990). When seeking to terminate parental rights in a case whereICWA is applicable, the State must prove, by beyond a reasonable doubt, that a factual

basis exists under 43-292 aswell as prove, by beyond a reasonable doubt, thattermination is in the child's best interest. ~ In re Interest ofC.W. et.al., 239 Neb. 817,479 N.W.2d 105 (1992) andNeb. Rev. Stat. 43-1501 et. seq.

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In her brief, Hogner only assigns as error and only argues that the SeparateJuvenile Court for Douglas County erred in terminating Hogner's parental rights under43-292 (1) and (2) as there was insufficient evidence to show that Hogner intended toabandon Bruce. See Appellant's Briefat 25 to 27.

While the Separate Juvenile Court for Douglas County terminated Hegner'sparental rights under 4 3 - 2 ~ 2 (1) and (2), the juvenile court also terminated Hogner'sparental rights pursuant to 43-292 (6). In her brief, Hogner never assigns as error thatwere was insufficient evidence for the Separate Juvenile Court's to terminate her parental'rights under 43-292 (6) by beyond a reasonable doubt. Under the Rules of the SupremeCourt promulgated by the Nebraska Supreme Court, Hogner is required to separatelynumber and paragraph in her appellate brief each assignment of error which she contendsthe juvenile court made. See Nebraska Supreme Court Rule 9(D)(1)(d). Under that rule,appellate review is limited to errors assigned and argued, and errors not assigned in anappellate brief are deemedwaived. Id. See also Keithley v. Black, 239 Neb. 685, 477N.W.2d 806 (1991); Morton v. Farmer's Business Cooperative of Shelby, 1Neb.App.552, 510 N.W.2d 326 (1993). Since Hogner has not assigned as error thejuvenile court's finding that there was sufficient basis to terminate Hogner's parentalrights under 43-292 (6), she cannot now complain that such a finding was error. So

assuming, in arguendo, that the juvenile court somehow erred in terminatingHogner'sparental right under 43-292 (1) and (2), there is an adequate and independent basis toaffirm the Separate Juvenile Court for Douglas County's order terminating Hogner'sparental rights under 43-292 (6).

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CONCLUSION

The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the findings of the SeparateJuvenile Court for Douglas County and terminate Hogner's parental rights to Brucepursuant to 43-292 (1), (2), and (6).

Respectfully submitted,STATE OFNEBRASKA ~n Kassebaum Nelson #20523DeputyDouglas County Attorney601 Hall of Justice17th and Farnam StreetsOmaha, Nebraska 68183(402) 444-7051Attorney for Appellee

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, , r

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FORTHE STATE OF NEBRASKASTATE OF NEBRASKA

Appelleevs.

BRUCE, SABRIENIAChild Under Eighteen Years ofAgeSTATE OF NEBRASKA)Countyof Douglas ,) ss.

))))))

Case No. A-00-0277PROOF OF SERVICE OFBRIEF OFAPPELLEE

I, Karen KassebaumNelson, being first duly sworn, depose and state that true andcorrect copies of the foregoing BriefofAppellee have been mailed to the Nebraska CourtofAppeals, State Capitol 2413, P.O. Box 98910, Lincoln, Nebraska 68509; Vicki L.Boone-Lawson, 1823 Hamey Street, Suite 1016, Omaha, Nebraska 68102; CatherineShugrue-Schaffuer, P.O. Box 390714, Omaha, Nebraska 68139 and PaulaFritz, P.O. Box6385, Omaha, Nebraska 68106 on June 26, 2000.~ ~ ~

Deputy Douglas CountyAttorney601 Hall of Justice17th and Farnam StreetsOmaha, Nebraska 68183(402) 444-7051ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

SUBSCRIBED and sworn before me and in my presence this 26th day of June,2000.

J;ENERALNOTARYSlale 01 Nebraska. III TAMARA L.DUBAY

. My Comm, Exp. March 31. 2001

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