App 3 EU Veterinary Expert Team Mission 17 to 21 Jan 2011 ...Appendix 3 81 st Session of the Executive Committee for EuFMD – 2nd February 2011, Rome 12 EU Veterinary Expert Team

Appendix 3

81st

Session of the Executive Committee for EuFMD – 2nd

February 2011, Rome

12

EU Veterinary Expert Team Mission (January 17-21st

2011)

FMD in Bulgaria

Team members: Keith Sumption (Team leader), Klaus Depner (EU Expert), Silvia Bellini (SANCO).

Part I. Preliminary mission report and recommendations

Part II. Terms of Reference, Mission Schedule and Findings

Part I

Preliminary report –as presented 21st January, 1000 hrs to National Veterinary Service Bulgaria

Situation as of 1600 hrs, 20th January:

No new FMD cases suspected or confirmed on 20th

, number of outbreaks officially reported as

two (Kosti village and Resovo, Tsarevo Municipality)

1. Killing almost complete in Kosti village (1 cow remaining) and Resovo (12 buffalo

remaining).

2. Daily surveillance (clinical inspections) in all villages within the SZ, all animals should be

housed. 2nd

round of small ruminant serosurveillance planned 14 days after first.

Location of villages in South-East Bulgaria where surveillance for FMD had been conducted

at time of the mission. (Source: NVS)

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Findings – source and spread

1. Given the relative separation of animal groups in Kosti, and their infection histories,

there should be considered three infected domestic animal groups (here called IPs),

these being IP1 (free-range pigs and cattle), IP2 (village) and IP3 (Hereford herd), all

under Kosti village, and the outbreak in Resovo which may be considered as IP4.

2. No convincing evidence was found that buffalo moving between Turkish territory and

Bulgaria (inside the 2 km fence) at Resovo were the source for any of the IP investigated.

However their appearance on 4th

January is circa 6 days before the date of first lesion

(10th

Jan) estimated at IP4 (Resovo), so they must be considered1. Vaccination data was

obtained from Turkey for the first 8 buffalo shot, which indicated they had been

vaccinated in autumn 2010. We cannot conclude that the buffalo were the source for

IP4 given other contacts. IP4 is also linked to IP3 through the visit of the surveillance

team on 8th

January.

3. In addition to the virus positive wildboar, shot 30th

December, a report was received that

a sick wild boar (limping) was observed south of Kosti, 2-4 km from the index case,

around December 20.

4. Based on reported information, a timeline was developed (Annex 1) leading to the

working hypothesis that FMD occurred in wildlife before infection of domestic pigs in

Kosti (IP1). IP1 is close to the location of the shot wild boar; healing foot lesions were

reported to have been seen on one animal, and several (5) pigs were Ab+ve, which

places the date of infection between 13-27th

December, although the 1st

date could be

earlier. The owner of the sero-positive pigs was reported as feeding both domestic pigs

and wildboar. Thereafter spread in this village seems to have occurred through access of

village flocks (which were mostly led out in groups assembled in the mornings from

different owners) to shared grazing, and the antibody positive village animals were

therefore considered IP2. The means of local spread to the Hereford herd were not

clarified. No disease was seen on surveillance visit to IP3 on 7th

January and 93 bovine

animals NSP-ve; however these developed severe disease by the inspection on 14th

,

estimated as 3-4 days. The Kosti team is understood to visit Resovo (IP4) for blood

sampling on 8th

and lesions up to (at most) 10 days age were seen on the 18th

. As no

other links were found, so Resovo may have become been infected from IP3.

5. Primary infection in Bulgaria is more of a mystery; this could have been through infected

wild boar entering Bulgarian territory or by infection of domestic pigs or wild boar

through access to food waste contaminated with FMDV. The team could not conclude

which is more likely at this point.

6. Control in the domestic livestock population is favored by the very low and isolated

animal populations in the affected area, and ease of restricting access to infected places.

The team were however concerned that heavy FMDV infection at IP3 and IP 4 (Resovo),

and the difficulty of maintaining biosecurity of veterinary and disposal teams lead to risk

of spread particularly by those handling animals.

1 Following the mission we were informed that acute FMD lesions were observed in at least one buffalo

post-mortem. Full details/confirmation from NVS have been requested. Acute lesions in vaccinated

animals suggests exposure to a very high challenge of virus , for example from the cattle at Resovo.

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7. The team were concerned with lack of personal biosecurity protection, or clear entry

and exit biosecurity (clean and dirty system) for veterinarians and operators handling

animals at infected sites. Personal clothing, watches, sampling equipment, etc could

easily become contaminated and be carried onto other animal sites.

8. The team was also concerned with the lack of an accurate census data and animal

identification, including pigs being seen where the census data from surveillance visits

indicated none. In Resovo, a significant proportion of cattle (around 40% ) did not have

ear tags and could not therefore their origin could not be checked. Attention should be

given to ear-tagging during inspection visits.

9. The team also observed animals wandering along roads or being herded in the open, in

breach of official orders. Maintaining restrictions to enclosed areas may need significant

public communication, attention and assistance, if it is to be maintained for a prolonged

period while the risk of wildlife infection persists.

10. The extent of infection in the wild boar population is unknown, as is the duration of the

sylvatic epidemic, and the involvement of other susceptible wild species in this area

(three deer species and moufflon). Should the entry mechanism be an undetected

epidemic in wild boar in Turkish Thrace, then introductions may occur at other points

along the border, or spread silently in the wild population in this region of Bulgaria.

11. International attention and concern will remain as long as there is a plausible risk, or

perception, of continuous FMD in wild populations spanning the woodland ecosystem

on both sides of the border.

12. Proof of absence of circulation in wild boar will be difficult, and may require to wait until

evidence that animals born since the last detected viral positive (in domestic or wild

species) are antibody negative, in other words may rely on sampling and testing piglets >

3 months of age (to rule out +ves from maternal antibody).

13. The wildboar programme, on both sides of the border, will be required for at least 3

months, and possibly a year to acquire evidence that circulation has ceased, and

surveillance in other species may also be needed to satisfy scientific opinion that

circulation has not occurred or has ceased.

14. The risk of re-introduction to domestic animals (pigs) could occur through meat /tissues

from wild boar shot in autumn 2010 in the high risk areas.

15. Given the above risk of persistent infection in the cross-border area, vaccination may

have advantages and the issues relating to vaccination to live, in accordance with the EC

Directive, need to be urgently considered and options identified. Given the nature of

livestock keeping in this region, local economic consequences should be very limited.

On surveillance in domestic population

Given point 5, and that IP1 in Kosti seems implausible as the primary site for entry into Bulgarian

animals via catering waste into the backyard system, sero-surveillance attention should be given

to high risk backyard pig holdings/forest access situations in the adjacent bordering districts. To

some extent the first round of sero-surveillance addressed this with negative results, but the

team were not satisfied that all sero-surveillance data had been provided (data should be

provided to the EU-RL for samples which test positive on the screening test (NSP) but negative

on the confirmatory test (Prionics type O ELISA)).

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Recommendation

In addition to requirements of the Directive, extend the surveillance programme to focus upon

high risk backyard pig holdings in the adjacent bordering municipalities.

Prepare to review and revise sero-surveillance plans after results of the wildlife surveillance,

since high risk zones may change.

Conclusions – on FMD in wild boar

From the information available it cannot be concluded if wild boar has been the source of the

infection or secondarily infected (victim of the infection). Furthermore, other wild species which

maybe infected are present in the forests, in total number exceeding the wild boar [deer, red,

roe, and fallow moufflon], and may be infected from wild or domestic animals in the current

epidemic.

Conclusion and recommendations

As long as the role of wild boar is not clear, it has to be assumed that the wild boar population

[and other species] might be infected, representing a source of infection for farm animals.

All the samples collected from wild boar in 2010 in the affected area should be tested for

retrospective assessment of FMD.

A surveillance plan for wild boar/wildlife, which addresses the issue of other susceptible wildlife

species in the area, should be implemented as soon as possible.

High priority must be given to WB trapping/hunting to achieve information on the “status” of

infection of wild boar.

Tissue testing for virus can be used to detect infection in the past month, and antibody for

infections > 1month previously. Medium term objectives can be set after initial results in one

month, and long term objectives are probably to provide evidence for freedom.

Experimental studies in wild boar with the present virus strain would assist to define duration of

infection and optimize diagnostic procedures. Such study could be conducted at the FLI.

Findings – epidemiological inquiry

Due to the backyard farming systems, epidemiological tracing is extremely difficult. Data on

animal census and animal identification are not accurate and do not provide a solid base for

control and eradication activities.


Greater effort should be given to epidemiological enquiry and the construction of time-lines for

all FMD test positive animal groups, indicating the dates of probable entry of infection and high

risk periods when infected groups will act as source for others, to prioritise biosecurity and

surveillance actions.

Registration and identification of holdings, and of animals, has to be improved as soon as

possible. Surveillance teams might assist in this task.

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Sero-surveillance will be essential to identify the extent of undetected infection. It is advised

send an aliquot of each serum from Kosti, Resovo and villages with >1 NSP positive to the EU-RL

for further testing, and to identify why a significant number of sera are NSP positive and type O

antibody negative.

Sanitary control measures

The principles of all control and eradication measures laid down in the EC Directives were

followed, but it is undoubtedly difficult to apply all measures under the backyard system, with

free grazing in forests and limited use of housing.


Communication campaigns, and other measures, to increase compliance with orders to ensure

animals are kept enclosed.

Maintain morale and reinforce efforts and support to the veterinary teams and operators to

ensure high awareness of risk of spread.

Irrespective of the available disposal capacity, culling of infected groups must take place within

48 hours to prevent rapid amplification in the group, and greater effort must be given to

achieving this. The slaughter of all animals in Kosti village had not been achieved by the 20th

January (6 days after clinical disease observed and probably 10 days after first lesions)

Since the role of the wild boar remains unclear, potential for re-infection from the contaminated

environment and infected wild animals remains, vaccination strategies should be considered.

Decision points should be agreed in advance, for example based on the rate or location of new

cases and evidence of spread in wildlife.

Vaccination plans should be prepared, with all major issues resolved in advance concerning

application, post-vaccination surveillance, and with stakeholder acceptance.

Biosecurity, Cleansing and Disinfection and Repopulation

The isolation of the currently affected villages, and the limited traffic of vehicles connecting

livestock units, favour containment of these infected foci. However, the extreme infectiousness

of FMDV requires a very high level of application of biosecurity. Critical biosecurity points must

be identified and special attention given. In the current situation, with delayed killing,

biosecurity procedures for staff working with animals or carcasses, and associated heavy

equipment and vehicles must be given more attention than currently observed.

Given the infection in places where cleansing cannot occur, infected premises should not be

repopulated until after sufficient time to allow for virus inactivation in the environment (see

Annex V to Directive 2003/85/EC). Repopulation before the wildlife population is shown to be

free has some risk, and special surveillance and movement restriction measures will be required.

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Co-operation with the Government of Turkey on FMD management

The Tripartite Mechanism (Tripartite consisting of Bulgaria, Greece and Turkey and OIE, FAO and

EuFMD) should be followed, with a daily report provided to General Directorate of Protection

and Control (GDPC) in Ankara and to the veterinary services in Greece.

A weekly report giving a summary of surveillance operations in domestic livestock and wild boar

is encouraged, as agreed in principle with the GDPC.

Joint meetings with the Turkish authorities to discuss results are encouraged, following the first

round of surveillance to the end of the Turkish hunting program (15th

February).

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Part II. Terms of Reference, Mission Schedule and Findings

1. Terms of Reference

2. Mission schedule

Date Schedule

17th

Arrival (Varna) and transfer to Tsarevo. First Meeting with NVS (Drs Kamenov and Boykovski),

2000hrs.

18th

0830.Meeting – NVS team, at Tsarevo (Municipality offices).

1030. Transfer to Resovo village, visit border fence, local disease control centre Resovo, inspect

disease control operations. 1600 Meeting with Minister and regional Governor for Bourgas.

19th

0900. Transfer to Kosti village. Meetings at Disease control centre.

Interviews with (ex-) livestock owners. 1200. Visit to Gramatikovo and Slivarovo villages (bordering

Turkey) in Malkho Tornovo municipality. 1600 return to Tsarevo. 2000 Meetings over Dinner (Dr

Meyer-Gibaulet, and Dep CVO Iliev).

20th

Meeting at Malkho Tornovo BIP with Turkish delegation (GDPC, Ankara and Kirklareli, plus EUFMD

Consultants Honhold and Khomenko) at 0900. 1400. Return to Tsarevo. 1630 Transfer to Bourgas.

Report writing.

21st

Transfer to Sofia (0720 am). Final Meeting/Debriefing NVS at 1000-1230.

3. Mission Findings

3. 1 General situation

The two reported outbreaks (Kosti, and Resovo) are located in a thickly forested area with a very

low density of livestock population – of only 5000 susceptible domestic animals in the

Municipality of Tsarevo, which is circa 530 km2, grazing areas are mainly in valley bottoms, and

reports on land use indicate a great excess of available land to current animal numbers held.

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Of note is that Kosti village lies in a bowl of hills (see Figures below) , inland and inside the

“barrier fence” built 1-2 km inland from the actual border of Turkey/Bulgaria. The Hereford

shown is from IP3, Kosti village ( both pictures from NVS).

Resovo in contrast is on the Turkish side of the fence, and on the coast, and has no tarmac road

connection to Kosti.

Kosti had one of the higher animal populations, and since this had the most intensive effort to

identify all the animals for surveillance/culling effort, leads to question if there is

underestimation in other villages. Inland villages are separated by several kilometers of thick

forest and pastureland is limited to river valleys and is rarely visible. Enclosed pastures were

rare, most grazing is on common lands, and in the forest. In addition to village systems (animals

led out, graze together and return at night) , in Kosti village was a herd of Hereford cattle (IP3).

Cattle allowed to free range in the forest in Kosti (IP1) were described as almost wild, beig rarely

handled. In Tsarevo “colonies” of sheep, pigs

and goats were observed on the village periphery; these were described as belonging to owners

living in the town, allowed to have enclosures close to grazing lands. The systems are therefore a

mix of very isolated animal populations associated with villages, but relatively close contact

within villages (mixing as groups are led out to pasture, or kept in colonies of several hundred

animals) , and some almost purely forest “holdings”. IP1, the first postulated outbreak, was an

example of the latter, where domestic pigs and wild pigs could contact at feeding points.

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3.2 On the entry and spread of FMD

The location of the index case (wildboar shot on 30th

December), inside the fence, 2 km from

the border, and the “Turkish” FMDV lineage (in sequence with almost identical EU-RL Report

with only one nucleotide change to an FMDV from July in eastern Black Sea coast of Turkey)

suggest the origin of infection is from Turkey. However, it does not follow that there is domestic

animal infection in Turkish Thrace; possibly infection entered wildlife from access to infected

animal products on either side of the border.

Given that domestic pigs are kept on a free range system in Bulgaria but not Turkey, serious

consideration has to be given to surveillance in backyard/free range domestic pigs in border

districts. At time of report, serosurveillance had been conducted in 3 municipalities but the

numbers of sampled pigs was low.

It cannot be ruled out that entry occurred through backyard systems.

On the Turkish Thrace side, several possibilities exist but of these, all rather speculative. The

kurban bayram festival occurred 15-19th

November 2010; this high risk period increases the risk

of illegal practices but also potential increased disposal of meat/offal to which there which may

be access of wild pigs.

[The EuFMD epidemiology team, working with the GPDC 17-20th

January and visiting all villages

along the Turkish side of the border close to Kosti heard no rumours to suggest unreported FMD

cases, supporting the position of the GDPC that no outbreaks had been reported or suspected in

Thrace region in December].

Sero-surveillance on the Turkish Thrace side may not resolve this since animals have been at risk

from the confirmed presence in wildboar in the region. Full genome sequencing of sufficient

Turkish and BG isolates from 2010 (at Pirbright) might assist particularly if it suggested a strain

which was not circulating in recent months (e.g the sausage hypothesis).

Open questions.

Did infection begin in domestic or wild animals in region of Kosti village?

The NVS epidemiology team (as reported to us by Dr Boykovski) observed lesions on feet of a

pig on 7th January, location SW of Kosti town. Five of the examined/bled pigs were NSP +ve. The

healing lesions, and NSP +ve, suggest >10 days infection, therefore 27th

December for first lesion

or before. Pictures were not provided. It was reported that the owner fed his free range pigs,

and wildboar also came for the same feeding sites. The precise locations were not provided, so

the team relied on the pictures provided in the Initial Report to ScoFCAH. The team requested

to vist the location but as culling (with free bullets/marksmen) operations were occurring the

NVS did not advise this. The team did interview two animal owners in Kosti village, and from

their description it seems very likely transmission took place at a common grazing point. Since

no clinical signs were reported in the village group, we cannot be certain which occurred first.

However, since 5 pigs were positive in the first group, this seems likely to be very significant as

pigs require closer contact/higher infective dose from infected sources than ruminants, which

supports the idea that the first location was infected from wildlife. For the above reasons the

team considers IP1 (infected premise 1) to be the free range pigs/cattle SW of Kosti village, IP2

the village animals which were mainly sheep and goats.

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The locations are shown in Figure 1.

We were not told what the IP1 owner fed pigs with, but the site is so remote and unpopulated

that it seems very implausible that “Turkish” meat products could possibly be available. The

population in Kosti /Tsarevo was described as non-moslem.

However,

• We cannot rule out infection began in this location (or elsewhere) in domestic pigs.

• Retrospective analysis of samples from wild boar harvested in the autumn shooting

season (some 103 animals in Kosti hunting area alone) would assist to determine if

earlier exposure had occurred. The team asked for records of all samples collected and

still available (serum, tissues) but this was not provided by end of mission.(Follow-up

needed)

• The exact circumstances of the initial shooting/reporting of the wild boar case, and entry

mechanisms into Kosti village could not be clarified. The details of the hunter (where

from, which hunting concession/association) were not provided, or information on what

happended to the carcasses. Forestry Agency representative provided details of the

hunting concessions, and the location originally indicated was under provate

concession (Bourgas) and hunters “proably came from the city”. The team had earlier

been told that Kosti residents often hunt boar, and one person skilled in butchering

usually receives the carcasses, offal being left in forest; and this person had relatives

(including in IP1). Difficulties also arise from the location (GPS) co-ordinates provided by

Dr Kamenov to the team, which did not match the mapped position in their reports; the

GPS location had been recorded by NVS who visited the site of the shooting. Mapping of

the GPS shows the location (Figure 2) to be several km to the south-west, in a different

hunting concession (in Malkho Tornovo Municipality). The NVS reported to us that

hunters had a wild boar limping (blood on snow) but not shot, within an area close to

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the mapped site (Figure 1). Exact location and dates unclear; between border police

posts 7-8-9 and circa 20th December.

• From the above we cannot be certain that infection first occurred in wild boar, and the

small possibility that infection first occurred in domestic pigs somewhere in the area

and spread to wild boar must be investigated, through sufficient targeted sampling of

high risk pig holdings/villages.

• Surveillance in wild boar on the Turkish side of the border will be important to define

extent of spread in wild boar, but this may not allow for a conclusion of whether

infection first occurred in wild boar in Turkey rather than Bulgaria.

• Figures below: Figure 2a - location where wildboar was shot (GPS location from NS); 2b)

locations and findings from Kosti village reported by NVS to SCOFCAH.

Fig 2a Fig 3

How long has infection been present?

For the above reasons it is impossible to have confidence, where being few observed (NVS or EU

team ) events. Figure 3 gives the time line built from information available to the team.

The earliest “possible FMD event” reported to us (at the meeting in Kosti) was that a 2nd

wildboar had been seen by hunters in the Slivarovo hunting area (Malkho Tornovo Municip.)

with suspicious signs (limping, blood on snow) but had not been shot; the location was on the

Turkish side of the fence, between index (shot boar) and the border, and in the period about

20th

December. Taking this date, assuming 4-6 day lesions, places earlier start for infection (1-

12th

December).

We take this report seriously despite lack of confirmation, and therefore assume infection entry

into wild boar occurred in early December. Assuming this is a new event, then it fits with

possible scenarios associated with the kurban bayram festival, but we cannot conclude on which

side of the border the first infection occurred, or even for the reasons mentioned above, that

prior infection in domestic animals had occurred (but the latter is not supported by 1st

round

sero-surveillance results).

The role of the Turkish buffalo

The group of 21 Turkish buffalo were reported to have crossed into Bulgarian territory on 4th

January. The exact locations and proximity to domestic species is uncertain but are assumed to

have used same grazing as the unconfined local village cattle. The date of 4th

January is within

the “source” window for infection of IP4, therefore as a source for Resovo they cannot be ruled

out.

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However, using the ear-tag data from 8 of these, vaccinations had been carried in Turkey in the

autumn campaign, and therefore assumed to be at worst a low source of infection if they had

been challenged (while in Turkey) and thus a minimal risk of infection. Further this date of

crossing was after the earlier infection in the wildboar, so we assume these buffalo

furthermore, are not important to the bigger story and through being vaccinated, were probably

less risk than the uninfected animals in Resovo (at time of our visit).

Mechanisms of spread in the domestic population

The team concluded that there were 4 infected premises/animal groups, and that spread

between IP1 and IP2 occurred t common grazing, before the FMD case in wild boar was

observed. Mechanism of spread to IP3 (enclosed herd of 93 Herefords) and IP4 could not be

identified but probably occurred after the wild boar case was confirmed. IP4 (Resovo) has no

direct road connection to IP3 and two possibilities were considered, human/veterinary and the

Turkish buffalo – see above. The numbers of pigs involved in IP1 were probably insufficient for

much aerosol production but possibly sufficient for local spread to cattle at this site. The

numbers of Herefords at IP3 and cattle at IP4 with simultaneous, acute lesions (assumed 50

animals at each) provides a potent source of infection for sread through

human/vehicle/fomites. Even with 100 simultaneously infected cattle, local aerosol spread may

be limited to 200 metres (not therefore threatening to Turkish territory or local spread in

Bulgaria); based on table of Donaldson and Alexandersen, 2001.

3.3 On the observed control measures

The control measures of greatest significance in this situation are considered to be:

1. Quarantine/biosecurity measures to prevent spread within and outside of the Protection

Zone;

2. Culling/disposal of animals in infected groups/premises;

3. Surveillance to achieve early detection of new cases in domestic (and wildlife).

Quarantine/biosecurity and culling/disposal

Factors favouring quarantine/biosecurity as a control measure to isolate infection are

- the distance between villages;

- The lack of human population between villages, limiting traffic;

- Single tarmac road access to Kosti and Resovo;

- No dairy tankers, feed lorries etc to the husbandry systems.

In principle this leads to highly favourable situation for isolation of the infection.

Against this (Negative factors) are :

- Lack of precise numbers of animals owned/alive at each site, making it impossible to

guarantee all animals have been killed/enclosed;

- Free range husbandry system, lack of feed for animals if enclosed, therefore orders to

enclose create difficulties;

- Lack of animal holding facilities, making surveillance, and culling operations extremely

difficult;

- Culling at animals in woodland settings, leading to contamination;

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- Difficulty to maintain operational biosecurity of veterinary culling teams through wild

nature of animals, lack of handling facilities, and operations in open/woodland locations;

- Lack of familiarity of teams with the practices to manage the exceptional infectiousness

of FMDV.

Observations

Roadblocks were observed at the single entry points with disinfection mats/sprayers,

handwashes, and Police attendance. The insides of vehicles did not seem to be inspected.

(shown below; at road junction leading to Kosti village; and at the entry point through the

Border Fence, to Resovo). This border fence is located 1-2 km inside the actual border.

In Resovo village, biosecurity standards applied in control operations were insufficient. No

clean/dirty system for entry exit of personnel was observed. Vets/operators were seen wearing

PPE within vehicles, and veterinary and other vehicles carrying contaminated carcasses used the

same roads.

Cattle at Resovo were killed by shooting in two barns. Burial trenches had been prepared on this

site. Disposal on site probably reduces risk.

Given the extent of acute infection (IP3, and IP4 –Resovo) the greatest risk must be from the

control operations, and in particular, the slow speed of culling operations, resulting in > 50% of

animals observed having early lesions. The slaughter of all animals in Kosti village had not been

achieved by the 20th

January (6 days after clinical disease observed and probably 10 days after

first lesions).

In this situation, culling > 24 hours after first signs confirmed (and >7 days after earliest lesion),

and especially if animals are enclosed for several days before killing, creates conditions for

explosive intra-herd virus amplification and risk of inter-herd spread.

Control operations where >50% animals have early lesions is extremely hazardous: - every

animal is a potent source of virus for spread. Culling and disposal teams biosecurity was a major

concern; the NVS described that it was very difficult to get persons for this unpleasant/difficult

work, and as these persons will have greatest exposure, should be a concern, as they live off site.

Further, two additional risks arise:

- contamination of ground by animals before and after culling;

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- wild boar/wildlife access, (or domestic animals which were missed from culling) to

carcasses or contaminated ground, if delay between culling and burial.

The first and second result in risk of infectious FMDV remaining on the sites of the control

operations.

Therefore, given the difficulty of cleansing and disifection, and risks of infection in the wild

population, repopulation carries risks - and particular repopulation conditions are needed that

will include tagging of all animals and surveillance in these until it is clear wild population and

environment contamination risk is negligible.

Surveillance

The Protection Zones (PZ) around Kosti and Resovo contain a small number of

settlements/animals and the NVS have organized daily vet surveillance of these, and a rotation

of clean teams to conduct these. All animals should be enclosed, and it seems the order is

complied with (one exception only seen).

Given the limited numbers of animals/settlements, spread within the PZ should be detected.

The holdings within the 10 km SZ are also inspected daily. As small ruminants exceed other

stock, sero-surveillance will be crucial.

The NVS plan for sero-surveillance was not clear. They indicated they plan to rebleed all animals

within the PZ, and either all animals in the SZ or at least sufficient within each epidemiological

unit to detect a 5% prevalence. The second bleed at 21 days is due 28th

January.

The above scheme has some risks that clinical signs would not be seen (small ruminanats) and

given the probably remaining source in wild animals, multiple rounds of NSP serosurveillance

will be needed.

Spread from IP4, for example, might take 14 days to result in clinical signs and another 10 days

to lead to a seropositive, therefore 24 days after last animal killed (20th

January) is 13th

February.

Surveillance beyond the PZ/SZ

Given the risk that domestic pigs, or wild pigs, may be infected at other sites but undetected to

date, the Team recommended extending sero-surveillance to high risk holdings, with attention

to:

- pigs kept in villages/holdings in the Provinces bordering Turkey;

- free-range pigs /East Balkan pigs should be included;

- as pigs do show clinical signs, sampling programme could be based on 10% prevalence in

groups.

The value of the above is also to build confidence in the overall surveillance in place to detect

risks of entry that include movements of infection from the known sites (hunters, carcasses,

other cross border movements and entry mechanisms ) as well as presumed entry mechanisms.

Surveillance in wild boar/wildlife

The NVS needs to develop a plan within 90 days but in fact should be made without delay.

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The data on wildlife counts (Annex 2) indicates that the number of deer and moufflon exceeds

the counts of wild boar. The likelihood of a prolonged epidemic in wild ruminants/wild boar

seems remote, but low densities can lead to low transmission rates which may allow infection to

linger longer, and if young animals are present, acute deaths could occur and carcasses remain a

source of infection. These species must be considered in a surveillance programme for proof of

freedom.

The NVS indicated they would focus on wild boar, through a trapping programme for wild boar,

building 3-4 traps in the border areas between Kosti, Resovo and Slivarovo. They estimated 5-10

animals may be trapped in each operation, perhaps 20 per trap per month, which could be a

high sampling rate (proportion of the population).

This will be extremely important, but the question remains of how wide a programme is needed

to define limits of the exposed population and how long the programme is needed to prove

circulation has ceased.

Proving the latter may need to wait until no seropositives are found in the crop of animals born

after the epidemic; this may take possibly a year (assuming young born middle of year).

Biosecurity aspects:

- the trapping teams must assume animals/carcasses are infected. The Report of the

EuFMD Team to Turkish Thrace provides biosecurity guidance.

On the use of Vaccination

Brief discussions were held with NVS on the issue of vaccination; the NVS made clear this was

not their preferred option at the present . The isolation of the animal populations does favour

control by stamping out.

The team made it clear that the NVS should consider and define conditions when they might opt

for vaccination, considering :

- the spread of infection in wild population might be shown to be wider and vet resources

for surveillance insufficient to cover all populations at risk;

- cases outside of the current PZ/SZ might threaten to overwhelm vet resources;

- that vaccination may reduce the need for daily surveillance and that the options for

vaccination to die and vaccination to live are allowed under the EC Directive;

- that the domestic populations are mainly kept for personal consumption, there being a

small sector only that would be economically affected (by processing requirements).

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February 2011, Rome

On co-operation with the Turkish authorities in FMD surveillance and control

The NVS (at the level of Deputy CVO, senior NBVS staff (Drs Kamenov, Boykovski, Alexandrov)

and the General Directorate of Protection and Control , Turkey (GDPC), was held at the Border

Inspection Post (BIP) at Malkho Tornovo. EU Expert Team, and the EuFMD/FAO team (advising

the GDPC) were in attendance.

After a clear presentation by the NVS on the situation in Bulgaria, Dr Askaroglu, for the GDPC

summarized the control measures in place, and additional surveillance being conducted in

domestic populations (sero-survey in all of Thrace region to detect infection) with more

intensive surveillance in villages close to the border with Bourgas Province.

The main points agreed were:

1. That the NVS, BG should copy their daily updates to the GDPC, when they are sent to

SANCO/EU;

2. That weekly summary of surveillance operations/control measures should be sent by

both sides;

3. Joint meetings to discuss results of the surveillance in wild life should take place

following the first round of surveillance to the end of the Turkish hunting program (15th

February);

4. The Bulgarian offer to demonstrate their trap construction and operation were

gratefully accepted;

5. The NVS Bulgarian indicated they agreed with the GDPC plan to organise licensed

shooting of wild boar for surveillance purposes in the period up to 15th

February.

Some concern was voiced that the surveillance on the BG side in wild animals might occur

too slowly since traps take time to build and operate. The NVS indicated they would begin to

build them the week after the operation and expected them to be in operation in the first

week of February. The NVS-BG expressed concern that hunting with dogs should not occur,

but agreed with the proposal that hunting be for surveillance only , and under licensed

operations.

Concern was also raised that full epidemiological information and data from surveillance

from the BG side be released in order that the Turkish side could assess the risk of spread to

their territory/population.

To this extent it could be helpful to ensure future meetings have such information in

advance (e.g next meeting following the first wild boar surveillance).

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28

Information provided – Domestic Livestock and Wild life populations in Tsarevo,Municipality.

Table 1. Domestic Livestock, January 2011 (from NVS, surveillance)

Munic. Settlement Owner

Cattl

e

Shee

p

Goat

s

Pig

s

No.

Owner

s No.

Owner

s No.

Owner

s No.

Owner

s

Tsarev

o Ahtopol 28 134 18 861 15 99 12

15

2 7

Tsarevo 53 60 12 600 32 120 25 0 0

Brodilovo 56 5 3 114 25 151 50 33 1

Bulgari 7 0 0 41 5 12 6 0 0

Varvara 15 25 5 175 8 62 5 0 0

Velika 5 57 2 28 2 57 4 0 0

Izgrev 2 0 0 3 1 0 0 4 1

Kondolovo 3 0 0 43 3 40 1 0 0

Kosti 52 147 4 113 20 154 43

10

4 6

Lozenets 15 0 0 302 9 181 6 3 2

Rezovo 9 92 6 68 2 9 2 28 1

Sineromore

ts 12 15 4 219 5 77 10 9 5

Fazanovo 7 174 5 320 1 3 1 38 2

Total 264 709 59 2887 128 965 165

37

1 25

Table 2. Spring 2010 counts of susceptible wild large animals in the 13 Forestry administrative

units of Tsarevo.

Total of area: 177,587 Ha (=1775.87 km2)

Species Male Female Fenced area Totals Density

Red deer 422 746 163 1331 0.75

Fallow deer 104 182 120 406 0.23

Moufflon 103 155 258 516 0.29

Roe deer 653 931 1584 0.89

Wild boar 1340 1507 388 3235 1.82

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February 2011, Rome

Table 3 Resovo, FMD investigation –observations at the EU team visit. FMD Lesion aging on 14

cattle and 1 sheep , inspected soon after killing. Oldest lesion age was between 7 and 10 days.

Lesions observed in almost all Animals (13 of 15) and majority < 4 days, possibly because of

collection into an enclosure for inspection in the previous week (5 days before - 13-14th

) at which

time initial lesions were observed by the surveillance team.

Column1 Tag? Animal Age Lesion Age (days)

1 Y adult 4

2 N calf 3

3 Y adult 1

4 N cow Neg

5 N calf 7 to 10

6 N cow 1

7 N cow 4

8 Y cow neg

9 Y cow 4

10 N cow 1

11 N calf 5

12 N cow 4

13 N cow 5

14 N cow 2

15 N sheep- adult 1

FMD lesion observed at Resovo; calf #5, lesion provisionally aged 7 -10 days, the oldest lesion

observed. .

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30

Information needed

Some questions we could not get answers for:

1. Who were the hunters of the boar killed 30th

December, where did they come from,

what was their connection to Kosti and what happened to the carcass?

2. The name /function of those who first examined the wildboar and submitted samples to

the National Reference Laboratory for testing for FMD;

3. The number of animals at IP1 (pigs, cattle) and where animals grazed, how many owners

or animal groups at this site and their approximate locations;

4. The name/function of those who first examined the wildboar and submitted samples,

the age of the 3 wild boar shot;

5. The locations (villages, numbers) of East Balkan pigs within Bourgas province and

Malkho Tornovo in particular;

6. The order of movements of veterinary teams which had visited Kosti village, in period

before clinical signs first observed;

7. The number of wild boar shot in the Provinces neighboring Turkey, the number of

samples received from the lab from these, and number remaining for FMD

serology/PCR;

8. A description of the sero-surveillance design , which villages were 100% sampled and

which had a statistical sampling (and design of this);

9. Full serology data, indicating the results positive on screening test (NSP) and which were

not confirmed on the second confirmatory test. For this subset, full data is needed.

Were these borderline positives? Test data needed for both test results and any repeat

tests since these may indicate groups for re-sampling (e.g rising Ab);

10. The results of the clinical examination at death in the Turkish buffalo at Resovo : did any

show disease? All ear tag data (in order to get their vaccination records).

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February 2011, Rome

Annex 1.

ENTRY TO IP3 1ST LESIONS-IP3

SPREAD WITHIN KOSTI VILLAGE (=IP 2).LEADS TO 27 +VE AT SAMPLING ON 7TH

IP1 infectious - spread

28 N 30thN 2 De 4 De 6 De 8 De 10 De 12 De 14 De 26De 28De 30De 2Ja 4Ja 6Ja 8Ja 10Ja 12Ja 14Ja 18Ja 20Ja 22Ja

MINIMUM PERIOD OF INFECTIOUS WILD BOAR (SUSPECTED AND CONFIRMED CASES ONLY)

22De 24De26-Nov 16De 18De 20De

1st day

estimated

lesions for

Wild Boar B

3 Wildboar shot, 1

lame.FMD confirmed

4th Jan

Wild boar (B)observed

lame (Slivarovo Hunting

area).

Entry of infection to IP1 (Kosti) in period 13-

27th based on lesion (assumed 10 days) seen

in domestic pig on 7th Jan

FMD Timeline - Kosti and Resovo, Bulgaria. Green boxes are Observed Events (Surveillance findings)

1st Day est CS

in wildboar

case (A).

7th Jan: Kosti

Healing Lesion seen in domestic pig

(=IP1). 5 +ve pigs and 1 +ve cow in

group (FMD-NSP antibody).

Blood sampling Kosti Hereford herd (IP3):

NSP-ve. Incubating?

EU team visit Resovo. Oldest

lesion observed 7-10 days

age.

Earliest infection date (14 day incub.)

for Wild boar B

Kosti - Surveillance finds FMD signs 4 days age

in Hereford herd (=IP3)

27th December: infection in IP1 must

have occurred on or before this date to

give rise to clinical signs/NSP+ves at

sampling on 7th Jan.

1st lesions estimated to occur Resovo 8-

10th

4th : Turkish buffalo reported in Resovo

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32

Documents

App 3 EU Veterinary Expert Team Mission 17 to 21 Jan 2011 ...Appendix 3 81 st Session of the Executive Committee for EuFMD – 2nd February 2011, Rome 12 EU Veterinary Expert Team