Apollo by the Numbers a Statistical Reference

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About the cover image (ASlO-27-3873):The Apollo 10 Command and Service Modules (CSM) are photographed from the Lunar Module (LMafter CSM-LM separation in lunar orbit. The CSM was about 175 statute miles east of Smyths Sea awas above the rough terrain which is typical of the lunar farside. Numerous bright craters and theabsence of shadows show that the sun was almost directly overhead when the photograph was taken


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APOLLO BY THE NUMBERS:A Statistical Reference

byRichard W. Orloff

NASA History DivisionOffice of Policy and PlansNASA HeadquartersWashington, DC 20546

NASA SP-2000-4029

2000~or sale by the Superintenden tof Documents, U S . Governm ent Printing OfficeInternet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: (202) 512-1800 Fax: 202) 512-2250Mail: StopSSOP,Washington, DC 20402-0001

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication DataOrloff, Richard W., 1948-Apollo by t he Numb ers: A Statistical Reference / by Richard W. Orloff.p. cm-(NASA Hi sto ry Series)NASA SP-2000-4029.

Includes bibliographical references.1.Project Apollo (U.S.) 2. Project Apollo (U.S.)-Statistics. 3. Space flight to the Moon. 4. Moon-Exploration. I. Title.11. Series.

TL789.8.U6 A564 20006 2 9 . 4 5 4 0 0 9 7 3 4 ~ 2 1 00-061677


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ForewordIn a spring 1999 poll of opinion leaders sponsored by leading news organizations in the United States, the 100 most significantevents of the 20th century were ranked. The M oon land ing was a very close second to the sp litting of the atom and its usedu ring World War 11. It was agon izing, CN N anch or an d s enior co rresp ond ent Judy Wo odruff said of th e selection process.Probably historian Arthur M. Sddesinger, Jr., best summ arized the position of a large numb er of individuals polled. The onething for which this century will be remembered 500 years from now was: T his was the centu ry when we began the explo-ration of space. He noted that Project Apollo gave many a sense of infinite potential. People always say: f we could land onthe Mo on, we can d o any thmg, said M aria Elena Salinas, co-anchor at M iami-based Spanish-language cable netw ork Univisionwho also made it her first choice.Perhaps because of his long life, Schlesinger has looked toward a positive &m e , and th at prom pted him to rank the lunarlanding first. I put DNA and penicillin and the computer and the microchip in the first 10 because theyve transformed civi-lization. Wars vanish, Schlesinger said, and many people today cannot even recall when the Civil War took place. Pearl Harborwill be as remote as the War of the Roses, he said, referring to the Engllsh civil wzy of the 15th century. And theres no needto get hung up o n the ranking, he said. T he o rde r is essentially very artificial and fictitious, he said. Its very hard to decidethe atomic bom b is more important than getting on the Moon.There have been many detailed historical studies of Project Apollo completed in the more than thirty years since the first lunarlanding in 1969. The m ajor con tours of the Am erican sprint to the Moon durin g the 1960s have been told and retold m anytimes, notably in several books in the NASA History Series, and by William Burroughs, Andrew Ch aikin, and C harles Murrayand Catherine Bly Cox. AU provide he end of the decade through the first lunar landing o n July 20, 1969, on to the last of sixsuccessful Moon landings with Apollo 17 in December 1972, NASA carried out Project Apollo with enthusiasm and aplomb.With the passage of time, the demise of the Soviet Union, the end of the C old War, and the su bsequent opening of archives onbot h sides of the space race, however, there are opp ort uni ties no t presen t before to recon sider Project Apollo anew.While there have been many studies recounting the history of Apollo, ths new b ook in the NASA H istory Series seeks to d rawout the statistical information about each of the flights that have been long buried in numerous technical memoranda and his-torical studies. It seeks to recount the missions, measuring results against the expectations for them.This work appears in the NASA History Series as a Special Publication (SP) in the Reference Works section, SP-4000, of theseries. Works in this sectio n provide info rma tion, usually in diction ary, encyclop edic, or chrono logical form , for use by NASApersonnel, scholars, and the public. This new p ublication captures for the use of all detailed inform ation about Apollo and itsunfolding durin g the 1960s and early 1970s.

Roger D. LauniusChief HistorianNational Aeronautics and Space AdministrationOctober 2, 2000

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IntroductionThe purpo se of this work is to provide researchers, students, and space enthusiasts with a comprehensive reference for factsabout Project Apollo, Americas effort to put humans on the Moon.Research for this work started in 1988, when the author discovered that, despite the number of excellent books that focused onthe drama of events that highlighted Apollo, there were none that focused on the drama of the numbers.It may be impossible to produce the perfect Apollo fact book. For a program of the m agnitu de of Apollo, many NASA Centersand contractors ma intained d ata files for each mission. As a result, the same measurements from different sources vary, some-times significantly. In addition, there are notable errors an d conflicts even within official NASA an d con tractor docu ments. Inorder to minimize conflicts, the author sought original documents to create ths work. Som e docu men ts were previously unavail-able to the public, an d were released only following the authors petitions thr oug h the Freedom of Info rmatio n Act.This book is separated into two parts. The first part contains narratives for the Apollo 1 fire and the 11 flown Apollo missions.Included after each narrative is a series of d ata tables, followed by a co mprehen sive timeline of events from just before liftoff tojust after crew and spacecraft recovery. The second part contains more than 50 tables. These tables organize much of th e da tafrom the narratives in one place so they can be compared among all missions. The tables offer additional d ata as well. The read-er can select a specific mission narrative or specific data table by consulting the Table of Contents.Event times in this work are expressed mostly as GMT (Greenwich Mean T ime) and GET (Gro und Elapsed T ime). Local U.S.Eastern time, in which all missions were launched, is included only for significant events. In regular usage, GMT does no t use acolon between the hours and minutes; however for the convenience of readers of this work, most of whom are in the UnitedStates, where time is expressed as 0000: the colon is included.The term GET (Grou nd Elapsed T ime), used for m anned U.S. spaceflights prior to the Space Shuttle, was referenced to RangeZero, the last integral second before liboff. With the fm t laun ch of the S huttle, NASA began using th e term MET (MissionElapsed Tim e), which begins at the m om ent of solid rocket booster ignition. The for ma t for GET used h ere is hhlxmm:ss.sss(e.g., h0urs:minutes:seconds). Example: 208:23:45.343,with GET excluded and assumed in order to avoid confusion with GMT.Some other abbreviations used frequently in this work include:B.S.: Bachelor of Science degreeC M Command ModuleCME Command Module PilotCS M Comm and and Service Module(s) (combined structure)GH,: G aseous HydrogenLH,: Liquid HydrogenLM Lunar ModuleLM P Lunar Module PilotLOX Liquid OxygenLRV Lunar Rover Vehicle (used on Apollos 15, 16, and 17)

M.S.: Master of Science degreeMET Modular E quipment Transport (used only on Apollo 14)NASA: National Aeronautics and Space AdministrationPh.D.: Doctor of Philosophy degreeSc.D.: Doctor of Science degreeS-IB Saturn IB launch vehicleS-TVB: Satu rn IV-B lau nch vehicleSM Service Mod uleSPS Service Propulsion System

Trivia buffs wiU have a field day with the data published here, and its a sure bet that a few readers will disagree with some ofit. However, it is a start. Enjoy

Com ments an d documen ted potential corrections are welcomed. Mail inquiries should be sent to Richard Orloff, Apollo by th eNumbers, d o NASA History Division, NASA Headquarters, Mail Code ZH, W ashington, DC 20546, U.S.A.Richard W. OrloffOctober 2000

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AcknowledgmentsThe information contained in the mission narratives in this work was derived primarily from uncopy righted NASA a nd con-tractor m ission reports, and, in some cases, is quoted verbatim from the original text without attributio n. Readers interested inspecific source s will find them listed in the bibliography which appears at the e nd of ths work. In a few cases, it was necessaryto include inform ation from copyrighted works, an d th e au thor acknowledges those cases as follows:The source for some of the astronaut biographical data is Whos Who In Space: The International Space Year Edition, byMichael Cassutt, although m ost in form ation was derived from NASA b iographies.The primary source for descriptions of the mission emblems is the official NASA text that accompanied each emblem.However, additional inform ation has been used from Space Patches From Mercury to the Space Shuttle, written by Jud ith Kaplanan d R obert Muniz. Another sou rce is Dick Lattimers unpub lished draft of Astronaut Mission Patches and Spacecraft Callsigns,available at the time of this writin g at Rice Universitys F ond ren Library.The source for the COSPAR designations for the various Apollo spacecraft and launch vehicle stages once o n orbit is theRAE. Table of Earth Satellites 1957-1986.The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of the following people for helping to locate original NASA documents,images and other information, and for checking the transcript for errors.Becky Fryday, forme rly Media Services, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center; Bunda L. Dean, form erly Lyndon B. John son SpaceCenter; Dale Johnson, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center; Daryl L. Bahls, The Boeing Company; David Ransom, Jr.,Rancho Palos Verdes, CA; J.L. Pickering, Norm al, IL; Ricky Lanclos, Nederland, TX; Dr. Eric M. Jones, editor of the ApolloLunar Surface Journal Internet Web site; Dr. John B. Charles, Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center; Florastela Luna, Lyndon B.Johnson Space Center; Gary Evans, TRW, Gordon Davie, Edinburgh, Scotland; Janet Kovacevich, Lyndon B. Johnson SpaceCenter; Joan Ferry and Lois Morris, Woodsen Research Center, Rice University; Joey Pellarin Kuhlman, formerly Lyndon B.Johnson Space Center; Kenneth Nail, form erly John F. Kennedy Space Cen ter; Kipp Teague, Lynchburg, VA; Lee Saegesser, for-merly NASA Hea dqu arters ; Lisa Vazquez, form erly Lyndon B. John son Sp ace Center; Mike Gentry, Lyndon B. Johnson SpaceCenter; Margaret Persinger, Kennedy Space Center; Oma Lou White, formerly George C. Marshall Space Flight Center; Paul0DAngelo, Rome, Italy; Philip N. French and Jona than Gran t, NASA Cen ter for A erospace Information; Robert Sutton,Chantilly, VA; Robert W. Fricke, Jr., Lockheed M artin; R uud Kuik, Amsterdam , The Netherlan ds; Dr. David R. WiUiams,National Space Data Center, GSFC; Hayes M. Harper, Downers Grove, IL Lt. Col. George H. Orloff USA-RET, Oakh urst, NJ;Hara ld Kucharek, Karlsruh e, Germany; Kay Grin ter, Kennedy Space Center; and Louise Alstork, Stanley Artis, Steve Garber,Hope Kang, Roger Launius, Warren Owens, and Michael Walker, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC.

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Table of ContentsForewordIntroductionAcknowledgmentsDedication

Apollo I

Apollo 7Apollo 8

Apollo 9Apollo 10

Apsllo I IApollo 12Apollo 13Apollo 14Apollo 15Apollo I6Apollo 17

Stat is t ica l Tables

The FireThe First Mission: Testing the CSM in Earth Orbi t

The Second Mission:Testing the CSM in Lunar Orbit

The Third Mission:Testing the LM in Earth Orbit

The Fourth Mission:Testing the LM in Lunar Orbit

The Fifth Mission:The First Lunar Landing

The Sixth Mission: The Second Lunar Landing

The Seventh Mission: The Third Lunar Landing Attempt

The Eighth Mission: The Third Lunar Landing

The Ninth Mission: The Fourth Lunar Landing

The Tenth Mission: The Fifth Lunar Landing

The Eleventh Mission: The Sixth Lunar Landing

General BackgroundCrew Information-Earth Orbi t and Lunar Orbi t MissionsCrew Information-Lunar Landing MissionsApportionment of Training According t o Mission TypeApollo Training ExercisesCapsule Communicators (CAPCOMS)Support CrewsFlight DirectorsApollo Space Vehicle ConfigurationDesignations

iiiivVvi

i13

31

517189

135

159

183

21 I23926626726826926927027272273274

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Launch Vehicle/Spacecraft Key FactsLaunch Vehicle/Spacecraft Key FactsLaunch Vehicle/Spacecraft Key FactsLaunch WindowsLaunch WeatherLaunch WeatherApollo Program Budget AppropriationsCall SignsMission InsigniasGround Ignition WeightsAscent DataEarth Orbit DataSaturn Stage Earth ImpactLaunch Vehicle Propellant UsageLaunch Vehicle Propellant UsageLaunch Vehicle Propellant UsageTranslunar InjectionS-IVB Solar TrajectoryS-IVB Lunar ImpactLM Lunar LandingLM Descent Stage Propellant StatusLM Ascent Stage Propellant StatusLM Ascent and Ascent Stage Lunar ImpactExtravehicular ActivityLunar Surface Experiments Package Arrays and StatusLunar Surface ExperimentsLunar Surface ExperimentsLunar Orbit ExperimentsGeology and Soil Mechanics Tools and EquipmentLunar SubsatellitesEntry, Splashdown, and RecoveryEntry, Splashdown, and RecoverySelected Mission Weights (Ibs)Command Module Cabin Temperature HistoryAccumulated Time in Space During Apollo MissionsApollo Medical KitsApollo Medical KitsCrew Weight Historylnflight Medical Problems in Apollo CrewsPostflight Medical Problems in Apollo CrewsNASA Photo Numbers for Crew Portraits and Mission Emblems

BibliographyPhoto CreditsThe NASA History SeriesIndex

2752762772782792802828228328428528628728828929029 I2922932942952962972982993003030230330430530630730830931031 I312313314315317323325329

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The Fire


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Apollo I Fire Summary(27 January 1967)

The Apollo 1 crew (1. to r.): Ed White, Gus Grissom,Roger Chaffee (NASA Sa-30236).Authors Note: None of the crew mem ber photos in this chap-ter were taken on the day of the fire. These photos u re usedstrictly to provide examples of training activities.

BackgroundThe first piloted Apollo mission was scheduled for launchon 21 February 1967 at Cape Kennedy Launch Complex34. However, the death of the prime crew in a commandmod ule fire during a practice session o n 27 January 1967put Americas lunar landing program on hold.The crew consisted of Lt. Colonel Virgil Ivan GusGrissom (USAF), com ma nd pilot; Lt. Colonel EdwardHiggins White, I1 (USAF), senior pilot; and Lt.Com man der Roger Bruce Chaffee (USN ), pilot.Selected in the astro naut grou p of 1959, Grissom had beenpilot of MR-4, Americas second a nd last subo rbital flight,and com man d pilot of the first two-person flight, Gemini3. Born on 3 April 1926 in Mitchell, Indiana, Grissom was40 years old on the day of the Apollo 1 fire. Grissomreceived a B.S. in mechanical engineering from PurdueUniversity in 1950. His backup for the mission wasCaptain Walter Marty Wally Schirra (USN).White had been pilot for the Gemini 4 mission, duringwhich he became the first American to walk in space. Hewas born 14 November 1930 in San Antonio, Texas, andwas 36 years old on the day of the Apollo 1 fire. He

received a B.S. fro m the US. MiLitary Academy at WestPoint in 1952, an M.S. in aeronautical engineering fromthe University of Michigan in 1959, and was selected as anastron aut in 1962. His backup was Major Donn FultonEisele (USAF).Chaffee was training for his first spaceflight. He was born15 February 1935 in Gran d Rapids, Michigan, and was 31years old o n the day of the Apollo 1 lire. He received aB.S. in aeronautical engineering from Purdue University in1957, and was selected as an astronaut in 1963. His backupwas Ronnie Walter Walt Cunningham.

The AccidentThe accident occurred during the Plugs Out IntegratedTest. The purpose of this test was to dem onstrate all spacevehicle systems and operational procedures in as near aflight configuration as practical and to verify systems capa-bility in a simulated launch.

Grissombeing checked out in Apollo 1 pressure su i t(NASA 566-58023).The test was initiated at 12:55 GMT on 27 Janu ary 1967.After initial system tests were completed, the flight crewentered the command module at 18:OO GMT. The com-mand pilot noted an odor in the spacecraft environmentalcontrol system suit oxygen loop and the co unt was held at18 20 GM T while a sam ple of the oxygen in th is systemwas taken. The count was resumed at 19:42 GMT with

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hatch installation and subsequen t cabin purge with oxygenbeginning at 19 45 GMT. (Th e odor was later determinednot to be related to the fire.)Com mun ication difficulties were en countered and thecount was held at approximately 2240 GMT to trou-bleshoot the problem. The problem consisted of a continu-ously live microphone that could not be turned off by thecrew. Various final countdown functions were still per-formed during the hold as communications permitted.

The biomedical data indicated that just prior to the firerepor t the senior pilot was perform ing essentially n o activi-:21 GMT, when a slight increase inry rate was no ted . At 23:30:30 GMT, theelectrocardiogram indicated som e muscular activity forseveral seconds. Similar indications were n oted at 23:3039GMT. The data show increased activity but are not indica-tive of an alarm type of response. By 23:30:45 GMT, all ofthe bi om ed id parameters had reverted to the baseline

rest level.By 23:20 GMT, all final countdown functions up to thetransfer to simulated fuel cell power were completed andthe c ount was held at T-10 m inutes pending res olution ofthe communications problems.

Apollo 1 commander Grissom (1.) inspects the CM dur-ing a visit to North American Aviation in 1966 (NASAS66-40760).

Grissom, Chaffee, and White during Apollo 1 training(NASA S66-49 18 1).

From the start of the T-10 minute hold at 2320 GMTuntil abo ut 23:30 GMT, there were no events that app earto be related to the fire. The major activity during thisperiod was routine troubleshooting of the communicationsproblem; all other systems were operating normally. Therewere no voice transm issions from the spacecraft from2330:14 GMT until the transm ission reporting the fire,wh ich began a t 23:31:04.7 GMT.During the period beginning about 30 seconds before therepor t, there were indications of crew movement. Theseindications were provided by the data from the biom edicalsensors, the com man d pilots live microp hone, the guidanceand navigation system, and the environmental control sys-tem. There was no evidence as to w hat this m ovement wasor that it was related to the fire.

Beginning at abo ut 2 33 0 GM T, the com man d pilots livemicrophone transmitted brushing and tapping noiseswhich were indicative of movement. The noises were simi-lar to tho se transmitted earlier in th e test by the livemicrophone when the command pilot was known to havebeen m oving. These sounds ended at 23:3058.6 GMT.Any significant crew movement would result in minormotion of the comm and module as detected by the guid-ance an d navigation system; however, the type of movementcould n ot be determined. Data from this system indicated aslight movement at 23:3024 GMT, with more intense adivi-ty beginning at 23:3039 GMT and ending at 23:3044 GMT.More m ovem ent began at 23:31:00 GMT a nd con tinueduntil loss of data transmission du ring the fire.Increases of oxygen flow rate to the crew suits also indicat-ed movement. All suits had some small leakage, and thisleakage rate varied with the position of each crew memberin the spacecraft. Earlier in the Plugs Out Integrated Test,the crew reported that a particular movement, the natureof which was unspecified, provided increased flow rate.

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This was also confirmed from the flow rate data records.The flow rate showed a gradual rise at 2 3:3024 GM Twhich reached the limit of the sensor at 23:30:59 GMT.At 233054.8 GMT, a signiScant voltage transient wasrecorded. The records showed a surg e in the AC Bus 2voltage. Several other parameters being measured alsoshowed anomalous behavior at this time.Begin ning at 23:31:04.7 GMT, the crew gave the first verbalindication of a n em ergency when they reported a fire inthe comm and module.Emergency procedures called for the senior pilot, occupy-ing the center couch, to unlatch and remove the hatchwhile retaining his harness buckled. A num ber of witnesseswho observed the television picture of the command mod-ule hatch w indow discerned motion that suggested that thesenior pilot was reaching for the in ner hatch h andle. Thesenior pilots harness buckle was found unopened after thefire, indicating th at he initiated the sta ndard hatch-op eningprocedure. Data from the Guidance and Navigation Systemindicated considerable activity within the command mod-ule after the fire was discovered. This activity was consis-tent with movement of the crew prompted by proximity ofthe fire or with the undertaking of standard emergencyegress procedures.

Apollo 1 crew training (NASA 57-HC-21).Personnel located on adjustable level 8 adjacent to thecommand module responded to the report of the fire. Thepad leader ordered crew egress procedures to be startedand technicians started toward the White Room which sur-rounded the hatch and into which the crew would stepupo n egress. Then, at 23:31:19 GMT, the com ma nd mo d-ule ruptured.

All transmission of voice and data from the spacecraft ter-min ated by 23:31:22.4 GMT, three seconds after rupture .Witnesses m onito ring the television showing the hatchwindow report that flames spread from the left to the rightside of the co mm and mod ule and shortly thereafter cov-ered the entire visible area.Flames and gases flowed rapidly out of the ruptured area,spreading flames into the space between the com man dmodule pressure vessel and heat shield through accesshatches and into levels A-8 and A-7 of the service struc-ture. These flames ignited combustibles, endangered padpersonnel, and im peded rescue efforts. The burs t of fire,together with the sounds of ru pture, caused several padpersonnel to believe that the command module hadexploded or was abo ut to explode.The immediate reaction of all personnel on level A-8 wasto evacuate the level. This reaction was promptly followedby a return to effect rescue. Upon running out on theswing arm from the umbilical tower, several personnelobtained fire extinguishers and returne d along the swingarm to the White Room to begin rescue efforts. Othersobtained fire extinguishers from various areas of the serv-ice structure and rendered assistance in fighting the fires.Three hatches were installed on the com man d module. Theoutermost hatch, called the boost protective cover (BPC)hatch, was pa rt of the cover which shielded the co mm andmodule durin g launch an d was jettisoned p rior to o rbitaloperation. The m iddle hatch was termed the ablative hatchand became the ou ter hatch when the BPC was jettisonedafter lau nch. The inne r hatc h closed the pressure vessel wallof the command module and was the first hatch to beopened by the crew in an unaided crew egress.The day of the fire, the o uter or BPC hatch was in placebut not fully latched because of distortion in the BPCcaused by wire bundles temporarily installed for the test.The middle hatch and inner hatch were in place andlakhed after crew ingress.Although the BPC hatch was not fully latched, it was nec-essary to insert a specially-designed tool into the hatch inorder to provide a hand-ho ld for lifting it from the com-mand module. At ths time the White Room was fillingwith dense, dark smoke from the co mm and m odule interi-or and from secondary fires thro ugh out level A-8. Whilesome person nel were able to locate and do n o perable gasmasks, others were n ot. Som e proceeded without masks

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while others attem pted witho ut success to ren der m asksoperable. Even operable masks were unable to cope withthe dense smoke present because they were designed foruse in toxic rather than dense smoke atmospheres.Visibility in the White Room was virtually nonexistent. Itwas necessary to work essentially by to uch since visualobs ervatio n was limited to a few inches at best. A hatchremoval tool was in the White Room. Once the small firenear the BPC hatch had been extinguished and the toollocated, the pad leader an d a n assistant removed the BPChatch. Although the hatch was not latched, removal wasdifficult.The personnel who removed the BPC hatch could notremain in the White Ro om because of the sm oke. They leftthe White Room and passed the tool required to openeach hatch to other individuals. A total of five individualstook part in opening the three hatches and each made sev-eral trips into the White Room and out for breathable air.The middle hatch was removed with less effort than wasrequired for the BPC hatch.The inner hatch was unlatched and an attempt was madeto raise it from its support and to lower it to the com-mand module floor. The hatch could not be lowered theful distance to the floor and was instead pushed to on eside. When the inner h atch was op ened intense heat and aconsiderable am ount of smok e issued from the interior ofthe command module.

Apollo 1 crew members inspect equipment before fire(NASA S66-40472).When the pad leader ascertained that all hatches wereopen, he left the White Room, proceeded a few feet alongthe swing arm, donned his headset and reported this fact.From a voice tape it has been determined that this repo rt

came approximately 5 minutes 27 seconds after the firstreport of the fire. The pad leader estimates that his reportwas made no more than 30 seconds after the inner h atchwas opened. Therefore, it was concluded that all hatcheswere opened and the two outer hatches removed approxi-mately five minutes after the repo rt of fire or at a bou t23:36 GMT.Medical o pinion, based on autopsy reports, concluded thatchances of resuscitation decreased rapidly onc e conscious-ness was lost (about 15 to 30 seconds after the first suitfailed) an d th at resuscitation was impossible by 2336 GMT.Cerebral hypoxia due to cardiac arrest resulting from myo-cardial hypoxia caused a loss of consciousness. Factors oftemperature, pressure, and environm ental concentrations ofcarbon m onoxide, carbon dioxide, oxygen, and pulm onaryirritants were ch anging extremely rapidly. It was impossibleto integrate these variables on the basis of available infor-mation with the dynamic physiological and metabolic con -ditions they produced in order to arrive at a precise timewhen consciousness was lost and death supervened. Thecomb ined effect of these env iron men tal factors dramaticallyincreased the lethal effect of any factor by itself.Visibility within the command module was extremely poor.Although the lights remained on, they could be perceivedonly dimly. No fire was observed. Initially, the crew was notseen. The personnel who had been involved in removingthe hatches attempted to locate the crew withou t success.Throughout this period, othe r pad personnel were fightingseco ndar y fires on level A-8. There was considerable fearthat the launch escape tower, mounted above the com-ma nd mod ule, would be ignited by the fires below anddestroy much of the launch complex.Shortly after the report of the fire, a call was made to thefire dep artme nt. From log records, it appeared that the fireapparatus and personnel were dispatched at about 23:32GMT. After hearing the repo rt of the fire, the d octor m on-itoring the test from the b lockhouse near the pad proceed-ed to the base of the umbilical tower.Th e exact tim e at w hich firefighters reached Level A-8 isnot known. Personnel who opened the hatches unani-mously stated that all hatches were open before anyfirefighters were seen on the level or in the White Room.The first firefighters who re ached Level A-8 stated th at allhatches were open, but th at the inner hatch was inside thecom man d modu le when they arrived. This placed arrivalof th e firefighters after 2336 GMT. It was estimated on thebasis of tests that seven to eight minutes were required to

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travel from the fire station to the launch complex and toride the elevator from the ground to Level A-8. Thus, theestimated time the firefighters arrived at level A-8 wasshortly before 2340 GMT.When the firefighters arrived, the positions of th e crewcouches and crew could be perceived through the smoke butonly with great diflidty. An unsuccessful attempt was ma deto remove the senior pilot h m he command module.Initial observations an d subsequen t inspection revealed thefollowing facts. Th e c om ma nd pilots couch (the leftcouch) was in the 170 degree position, in which it wasessentially horizontal throu gho ut its length. Th e footrestraints and harness were released and the inlet and out-let oxygen hoses were connected to the suit. The electricaladapter cable was disconnected fro m the comm unicationscable. The com man d pilot was lying supine on th e aftbdkhead or floor of the commandmet visor closed and locked andpilots head rest and his feet on his o m ouch. A fragmentof his suit material was found outside the command mod-ule pressure vessel five feet from the point of rupture. Thisindicated that his suit had failed prior to the time of rup-ture (23:31:19.4 GMT), allowing convection cur rents tocarry the suit fragment through the rupture.The senior pilots couch (the center couch) was in the96 degree position in which the back po rtion was ho ri-zontal and the lower portion was raised. The buckle releas-ing the shoulder straps and lap belts was not opened. Thestraps and belts were burn ed through. Th e suit oxygenoutlet hose was connected but the inlet hose was discon-nected. The helmet visor was closed and locked and allelectrical connections were intact. The senior pilot waslying transversely across the com man d m odule just belowthe level of the hatchway.The pilots couch (the couch on the right) was in the264 degree position in which the back po rtion was h ori-zontal and the lower portion dropped toward the floor. Allrestraints were disco nnec ted, all hoses a nd electrical con-nections were intact and the helmet visor was closed andlacked. The pilot was supine on his couch.From the foregoing, it was determined th at in all probabili-ty the command pilot left his couch to avoid the initialfire, the senior pilot rem ained in his couch as planned foremergency egress, attempting to open the hatch until hisrestraints burned through. The pilot remained in his couch

to maintain communications until the hatch could beopened by the senior pilot as planned. With a slightlyhigher pressure inside the command module than outside,opening the inner hatch was impossible because of theresulting force on the hatch. Thus the inability of the pres-sure relief system to cope with the pressure increase due tothe fire made opening the inner hatch impossible untilafter cabin ru pture. After ru pture, the intense and wide-spread fire, together with rapidly increasing carbon monox-ide concentrations, further prevented egress.Whether the inner hatch handle was moved by the crewcannot be determined because the opening of the innerhatch from the White Room also moves the handle withinthe com mand module to the unlatched position.Immediately afier the firefighters arrived, the pad leader onduty was relieved to allow treatm ent for smoke inhalation.He had first reported over the headset that he could notdescribe the situation in the command module. In thismann er he attempted to convey the fact that th e crew wasdead to the Test Conductor without informing the manypeople monitoring the communication channels. Uponreaching the ground the pad leader told the doctors thatthe crew was dead. The three doctors proceeded to theWhite Room and arrived there shortly after the arrival ofthe firefighters. The doctors estimate their arrival to havebeen at 23:45 GMT. The second pad leader reported thatmedical support was available at approximately 23:43GMT. The three doctors entered the White Room anddetermined that the crew had not survived the heat,smoke, and thermal burns. The doctors were not equippedwith breathing apparatus, and the comm and m odule stillcontained fumes and smoke. It was determined that noth-ing could be gained by immediate removal of the crew.The firefighters were directed to stop removal efforts.When the command module had been adequately ventilated,the doctors returned to the White Room w ith eq uipmen tfor crew removal. It became ap paren t that extensive fusionof suit material to melted nylon from the spacecraft wouldmake removal very difficult. For ths reason it was decidedto discontinue removal efforts in the interest of accidentinvestigation and to p hotograph the command module withthe crew in place before evidence was disarranged.Photograp hs were taken an d th e removal efforts resumedat appr oxima tely 00:30 GMT, 28 January. Removal of th ecrew took approximately 90 minutes and was completedabout seven and one-half hours after the accident.

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Chronology of the FireIt was most likely that t he fire began in the lower forwardportion of the left equipment bay, to the left of the com-mand pilot, and considerably below the level of his couch.

wall, essentially opposite the point of origin of the fire.About three seconds before rup ture, at 23:31:16.8GMT, thefinal crew comm unication began. This comm unication endedshort ly a f kr pp tu re a t 2331:21.8 GMT, followed by loss oftelemetry at 23:31:22.4 GMT.Once initiated, the fire bu rned in three stages. The firststage, with its associated rapid tem peratu re rise andincrease in cabin pressure, terminated 15 seconds after th everbal report of fire. At this time, 23:31:19 GMT, the com-man d module cabin ruptured. During this first stage,flames moved rapidly from the point of ignition, travelingalong debris traps installed in the command module toprevent items from dropping into equipment areas duringtests or flight. At the same time, Velcro strips positionednear the ignition point also burned.The fire was not intense until about 23:31:12 GMT. Theslow rate of buildup of th e fire during th e early portio n ofthe first stage was consistent with the opinion that ignitionoccurred in a zone containing little combu stible material.The slow rise of pressure could also have resulted fromabsorption of most of the heat by the alum inum structureof the command module.The original flames rose vertically and then spread o utacross the cabin ceiling. The debris traps provided not onlycombustible material and a path for the sp read of th eflames, but also firebrands of b urnin g molten nylon. Thescattering of these firebrands contrib uted to the spread ofthe flames.By 23:31:12 GMT, the fire had broken fiom its point oforigin. A wall of flames extended along the left wall of themod ule, preventing the com man d pilot, occupying the leftcouch, from reaching the valve that would vent the com-mand module to the outside atmosphere.Although o peration of this was the first step in establishedemergency egress procedures, such action would have beento no avail because the venting capacity was insufficient toprevent the rapid buildup of pressure due to the fire. Itwas estimated that opening the valve would have delayedcommand module rupture by less than one second.The command module was designed to withstand an inter-nal pressure of approximately 13 pound s per square inchabove external pressure witho ut rup turing. Data recordeddur ing the fire showed that ths design criterion was exceed-ed late in the first stage of the fire and that ru ptu re occurredat about 2331:19 GMT. The point of rupture was where thefloor or aft bulkhead of the command module joined the

Apollo 1 CM after the fire (NASA S90-35348).Rupture of the command module marked the beginning ofthe brief second stage of the fire. This stage was character-ized by the period of greatest conflagration due to theforced convection that resulted from the outrush of gasesthrough the rupture in the pressure vessel. The swirlingflow scattered firebrands throughout the crew compart-men t, spreading fire. This stage of the fire ended atapproximately 2331:25 GMT. Evidence that the fire spreadfrom the left side of the command module toward therupture area was found on subsequent examination of themodule and crew suits. Evidence of the intensity of the fireincludes burst and burned aluminum tubes in the oxygenand coolant systems at floor level.This third stage was characterized by rapid pr odu ction ofhigh concentrations of carbon m onoxide. Following theloss of pressure in the command module and with firenow through out the crew com partment, the remainingatmosph ere quickly became deficient in oxygen so that itcould not support continued combustion. Unlike the earli-er stages where the flame was relatively smokeless, heavysmoke now form ed and large amoun ts of soot weredeposited on most spacecraft interior surfaces as they

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plastic containers, and transported under the requiredsecurity to bonded storage.On 17 February 1967, the Board decided that removal andwiring tests had progressed to a point which allowed mov-ing the comm and module without d isturbing evidence.The command module was moved to the ~ o t e c h n i c sInstallation Building at KSC, where better working condi-tions were available.With imp roved working conditions, it was foun d that awork schedule of two eight-hour shifts per day for six daysa week was sufficient to keep pace with the analysis anddisassembly planning. The only exception t o thi s was athree-day period of three eight-hou r shifts per day used toremove the aft heat shield, move the command module toa more convenient workstation and remove the crew com -partm ent heat shield. The disassembly of the com man dmodule was completed on 27 March 1967.

Cause of the Apollo I FireAlthough the Board was not able to determine conclusivelythe specific initiator of the Apollo 204 fire, it identified theconditions that led to the disaster. These conditions were:1. A sealed cabin, pressur ized with an oxygen atmosphere.2. An extensive distribution of combustible materials in the cabin.3. Vulnerable wiring carrying spacecraft power.4. Vulnerable plumbing carrying a combustible and corrosivecoolant.5. Inadequate provisions for the crew to escape.6. Inadequate provisions for rescue or medical assistance.Having identified these conditions, the Board addressed thequestion of how these conditions came to exist. Carefulconsideration of this question led the Board to the conclu-sion that in its devotion to the many difficult problems ofspace travel, the Apollo team failed to give adequate atten-tion to certain mu nda ne but equally vital questions ofcrew safety. The Board's investigation revealed manydeficiencies in design an d engineering, manu facture, andquality control.

As a result of the investigation, major modifications in, nd p rocedures were implem ented. Thewas replaced by a single quick-operating,outward opening crew hatch made of aluminum and fiber-glass. The new hatch could be opened from inside in sevenseconds and by a p ad safety crew in 10 seconds. Ease ofopen ing was enh anced by a gas-powered counterbalanc emechanism. The second m ajor mo dification was thechange in the laun ch pad spacecraft cabin atmosph ere forpre-lau nch'testin g fiom 100 percent oxygen to a mixtureof 6 percent oxygen and 40 percent nitrogen to reducesupport of any combustion. The crew suit loops still car-ried 100 percent oxygen. After launc h, the 60140 mix wasgradually replaced wth pure oxygen until cabin atmos-phere reached 100 percent oxygen at 5 pounds per squareinch. This "enriched air mix was selected after extensiveflammability tests in various percentages of oxygen at vary-ing pressures.Othe r changes inc lude d subs tituting stainless steel for alu-min um in high-pressu re oxygen tubing, armo r platedwater-glycol liquid line solder joints, pro tective covers overwiring bundles, stowage boxes built of aluminum, replace-ment of materials to minimize flammability, installation offireproof storage containers for flammable materials,mechanical fasteners substituted for gripper cloth patches,flameproof coating o n w ire conn ections, replacement ofplastic switches with metal ones, installation of an em er-gency oxygen system to isolate the crew from toxic fumes,and th e inclusion of a portable fire extinguisher andfire-isolating panels in the cabin.Safety changes were also made at Launch Complex 34.These included structural changes to the White Room forthe new quick-open ing spacecraft hatch, improvedfirefighting equipment, emergency egress routes, emergencyaccess to the spacecraft, purging of all electrical equipmentin the White Room with nitrogen, installation of ahand-held water hose an d a large exhaust fan in the WhiteRoom to draw sm oke and fumes o ut, fire-resistant paint,relocation of certain s tru ctur al mem bers to prov ide easieraccess to the spacecraft and faster egress, addition of awater spray system to cool the launch escape system (thesolid propellants could be ignited by extreme heat), andthe installation of additional water spray systems along theegress route from the spacecraft to ground level.

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Apollo I Spacecraft;HistoryEVENT DATEFabrication of spacecraft 012 at North American Aviation, Downey, CA.Basic structure completed.Installation and final assembly of subsystems completed. Critical design reviewscompleted. Checkout of all subsystems initiated, followed by integrated testingof all spacecraft subsystems.Customer acceptance readiness review completed. NASA issued certificate offightw orthiiess and authorized spacecraft to be shipped to KSC.Command module received at KSC.CM-012 mated with service module in altitude chamber. Alignment,First combined systems tests completed.Design certification document issued which certified design as flightworthy,First piloted test at sea level pressure to verify total spacecraft system operationUnpiloted test at altitude pressures using oxygen to verify spacecraft systemPiloted test with flight crew completed.Second piloted altitude test with backup crew initiated, but discontinued

subsystems and system certification tests and functional checks performed.

pending satisfactory resolution of open items.completed.operation.

when failure occurred in oxygen system regulator in spacecraft environmentalcontrol system. Regulator removed and found to have design deficiency.Apollo program directo r conducted recertification review which closed outmajority of open items remaining from previous reviews.Sea level and unpiloted altitude tests completed.Piloted altitude test with backup fight crew completed.Command module removed from altitude chamber.Spacecraft mated to launch vehicle at Cape Kennedy Launch Complex 34. Various testsand equipment installations and replacements performed.

Aug 1964Sept 1965

Mar 1966Aug 196626 Aug 1966Sept 19661 Oct 1966

7 Oct 196613 Oct 196615 Oct 196619 Oct 1966

21 Oct 196621 Dec 196621 Dec 196630 Dec 19663 Jan 1967

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Apollo I Fire TimelineEvent GMT GMT

Date TimePlugs Out Integrated Test initiated when power applied to spacecraft.Following completion of initialverification tests of system operation, commandCount held when command pilot noted odor in spacecraft environmentalCount resumed after hatch installed.Cabin purged with oxygen.Open microphone first noted by test crew.Count held while communication difficulties checked. Various final countdownFrom this time until about 23:53 GMT, flight crew interchanged equipment

pilot entered spacecraft, followed by pilot and senior pilot.control system suit oxygen. Sample taken.

functions performed during hold as communications permitted.related to communications systems in effort to isolate communications problem.During troubleshooting period, problems developed with ability of various groundstations to communicate with one another and with crew.Final countdown functions up to transfer to simulated fuel cell power completedand count held at T-10 minutes pending resolution of communications problems.For next 10 minutes, no events related to fire. Major activity was routinetroubleshooting of communications problem.All other systems operatednormally during this period.First indication by either cabin pressure or battery compartment sensors ofa pressure increase.Command pilot live microphone transmitted brushing and tapping noises,indicative of movement. Noises similar to those transm itted earlier in testby live microphone when command pilot was known to be moving.No voice transmissions from spacecraft from this time until transmissionreporting fire.Slight increase in pulse and respiratory rate noted from senior pilot.Data from guidance and navigation system indicated undetermined type ofcrew movement. Gradual rise in oxygen flow rate to crew suits began,indicating movement. Earlier in Plugs Out Integrated Test, crew reported that anunspecified movement caused increased flow rate.Senior pilot's electrocardiogram indicated muscular activity for several seconds.Additional electrocardiogram indications from senior pilot. Data show increasedactivity but were not indicative of alarm type of response. More intense crewactivity sensed by guidance and navigation system.Crew movement ended.All of senior pilot's biomedical parameters reverted to "rest" level.Variation in signal output from gas chromatograph.First voice transmission ended.Fire broke from its point of origin. Evidence suggests a wall of flames extendedalong left wall of module, preventing command pilot, occupying left couch, fromreaching valve which would vent command module to outside atmosphere.Original flames rose vertically and spread ou t across cabin ceiling. Scatteringof firebrands of molten burning nylon contributed to spread of flames. It wasestimated that opening valve would have delayed command module ruptureby less than one second.Cabin pressure exceeded range of transducers, 17 pounds per square inch absolute(psia) for cabin and 21 psia for ba ttery compartment transducers. Rupture andresulting jet of hot gases caused extensive damage to exterior.

27 Jan 1967 125518:OO18:20194219:4522:252240

22:45

232023:21:11

23:3023:30:1423:30:21

2330:2423:30:30

23:30:3923:30:4423:304523:30:502331:lO

23:31: 12

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Apollo I Fire TimelineEvent GMT GMTDate TimeBeginning of final voice transmission from crew. Entire transmission garbled.Sounded likeTheyre fighting a bad fire-lets get out. Open er up? Or, Wevegot a bad fire-lets get out. Were burning up? Or, Im reporting a bad h e .Im getting out? Transmission ended with cry of pain, perhaps from pilot.Command module ruptured, start of second stage of fire. First stage markedby rapid temperature rise and increase in cabin pressure. Flames had movedrapidly from point of ignition, traveling along net debris traps installed toprevent items from dropping into equipment areas. At same time, Velcrostrips positioned near ignition point also burned.End of final voice transmission.All spacecraft transmissions ended. Television monitors showed flames spreadingfrom left to right side of command module and shortly covered entire visible area.Telemetry loss made determination of precise times of subsequent occurrencesimpossible.Third stage of fire characterized by greatest conflagration due to forced convectionfrom outrush of gases through rupture in pressure vessel. Swirling flow scatteredfirebrands, spreading fire. Pressure in command module dropped to atmospheric

pressure five or six seconds after rupture.Command module atmosphere reached lethal stage, characterized by rapid productionof high concentrations of carbon monoxide. Following loss of pressure, and withfire throughout crew compartment, remaining atmosphere quickly became deficientin oxygen and could not support continued combustion. Heavy smoke formed andlarge amounts of soot deposited on most spacecraft interior surfaces. Although oxygenleak extinguished most of fire, failed oxygen and waterlglycol lines supplied oxygen andfuel to support localized fire that melted aft bulkhead and burned adjacent portions ofinner surface of command module heat shield.Fire apparatus and firefighting personnel dispatched.Attempts to remove hatches.Pad leader reported that attempts had started to remove hatches.Hatches opened, outer hatches removed. Resuscitation of crew impossible.Pad leader ascertained all hatches open, left White Room, proceeded a fewFirefighters arrived at Level A-8. Positions of crew couches and crew could befeet along swing arm, donned headset and reported this fact.perceived through smoke but only with great difficulty. Unsuccessful attem ptto remove senior pilot from command module.Doctors arrived.Photographs taken, and removal efforts started.Removal of crew completed, about seven and one-half hours after accident.Command module 014 shipped to KSC to develop disassembly techniques forselected components prior to their removal from command module 012.Disassembly plan fully operational.Command module moved to pyrotechnics installation building at KSC, whereDisassembly of command module completed.better working conditions available.

27 Jan 1967 23:31:16.8

23:3 1: 1923:3 1:21.8

23:31:22.4

2331:25

23:31:3023:3223:320423:32:34233623363123:40

23:4328 Jan 1967 003002001 Feb 1967

7 Feb 196717 Feb 196727 Mar 1967

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P O L O 7I

The First Mission:Testing the CSM in Earth Orbit


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Apollo 7 SummaryI I October-22 October 1968)

The Apollo 7 crew (1. to. r.): Donn Eisele, Wally Schirra,Walt C u n n i n g h a (NASA S68-33744).Background

Twenty-one months after the Apollo 1 fire, the U nitedStates was ready to begin the piloted phase of the Apolloprogram. The primary objectives of the first mission were:to demonstrate CSM and crew performance;

- to demonstrate crew, space vehicle, and mission support facilitiesperformance; andto demonstrate CSM rendezvous capability.

The crew members were Captain Walter M arty W dy Schirra, Jr. [shi-RAH] (U SN), comm ander; Major DonnFulton Eisele [EYES-lee] (USAF ), com mand mod ule pilot;and Ronnie Walter Walt Cunningham, lunar module pilot.Selected in the original astronaut gro up in 1959, Schirrahad been pilot of the fifth (third orbita l) Mercury mission(MA-8) and command pilot of Gemini 6-A. WithApollo 7, Schirra would become the first person to makethree trips into space. Born 12 March 1923 in Hackensack,New Jersey, Schirra was 45 years old at the time of theApollo 7 mission . Schirra received a B.S. degree from theU.S. Naval Academy in 1945. His backup for the missionwas Colonel Thomas Patten Stafford (USAF).Eisele and Cunningham were each making their first space-flight. Born 23 June 1930 in Columbus, Ohio, Eisele was

38 years old at the tim e of the Apollo 7 mission. Hereceived a B.S. in as tro nau tics in 1952 from the U.S. NavalAcademy, and an M.S. in astron autics in 1960 fro m theU.S. Air Force Institute of Technology, and was selected asan astronaut in 1963.1 His backup was Com mand er JohnWatts Young (USN).Born 16 March 1932 in Creston, Iowa, Cunningham was36 years old at the time of the Apollo 7 m ission. Hereceived a B.A. in physics in 1960 and an M.A. in physicsin 1961 from the University of California at Los Angeles.He was selected as an astronaut in 1963. His backup wasCom mand er E ugene Andrew Gene Cernan (USN).The capsule communicators (CAPCOMs) for the missionwere Stafford, Lt. Commander Ronald Ellwin Evans (USN),Major W illiam Reid Pogue (USAF)2, Joh n Leo nard JackSwigert, Jr. [SW Y-girt],Young, and Cernan. The supportcrew were Swigert, Evans, and Pogue. The flight directorswere Glynn S. Lunney (first shi ft), Eugene E Kran z (secondshift), and Gerald D. Griffm (third shift).The Apollo 7 launch vehicle was a Saturn IB, an upratedSaturn, designated SA-205. The mission also carried thedesignation Eastern Test Range #66. The CSM com binationwas designated CSM-101 and form ed th e first block I1configuration spacecraft flown, that is, with the capabilityto accom modate the LM a nd other systems advancements.

Launch PreparationsThe countdown began at 19:OO GMT on 6 October 1968,There were three plann ed holds. The first two, at T-72hours for six hours and at T-33 hours for three hours,allowed sufficient time to fix any spacecraft problems. T hefinal hold, at T-6 hou rs, provided a rest period for th elaun ch crew. Six hou rs later, the clock resumed at09:OO GMT, 11 October 1968.The final countdown proceeded smoothly until T-10 min-utes when thrust chamber jacket chilldown was initiatedfor the launch vehicle S-IVB stage. The procedure too klonger than necessary and would have required a recyclingof the clock to T-15 minutes if the proper temperaturewere not reached in time for initiation of the automaticcountdow n sequence. As a result, a hold was called at T-6minutes 15 seconds, and lasted for 2 minutes 45 seconds.Postlaunch analysis determ ined th at chilldown wo uld haveoccurred without the hold, bu t the h old was advisable inreal-time to meet revised temperature requirements. At1456:30 GMT, the countdown resumed and continued toliftoff withou t furthe r problems.

Eisele died of a heart a ttack 1 December 1987 in Tokyo, Japan (Houston Chronicle,3 Dec 1987, p. 8).Pogue replaced Major Edward Galen G ivens, Jr.(USAF), ho died in an automobile accident in Pearland, TX, on 6 June 1967. Givens had b een selected in the astronaut class of1966 (Houston Chronicle, 8 Jm 1967).



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A large high pressure system centered over Nova Scotiacaused high easterly surface winds at launch time. Theupper winds, above 30,000 feet, were light from the west.Surface wind speeds were the highest observed for anySaturn vehicle to date. A few scattered clouds were in thearea. Cumulon imbus clouds covered 30 percent of th e skywith a base at 2,100 feet, visibility 10 statute miles, temper-ature 82.9" F, relative humidity 65 percent, dew point 70.0"F, baro metr ic pressure 14.765 lb/in2, and w inds 19.8 knotsat 90" from true north measured by the anemometer onthe light pole 59.4 feet above ground at the launch site.

Ascent PhaseApollo 7 was launched from Launch Complex 34 at CapeKennedy, Florida (USAF Eastern Test Range). Liftoffoccurred at Range Zero time of 15:02:45 GMT (11:02:45a.m. EDT) o n 11 October 1968, well wth n the plannedlaunch window of 15:OOOO to 19:OO:OO GMT.The ascent phase was nominal. Moments after liftoff, thevehicle rolled from a launch p ad az imu th of 100" to a flightazimuth of 72" east of north. The first stage provided co n-tinuous thrust u n a center engine cutoff at 0000220.65.The outbo ard engine shut down 3.67 seconds later at anEarth-fixed velocity of 6,479.1 fllsec. Cutoff conditions werevery close to prediction.The S-IB was separated from the upper stage at OOk02:25.59,followed by S-IVB engine ignition at 0000226.97. Cutoffoccurred at 0 0 10:16.76, with deviations from the p lannedtrajectory of only 2.3 filsec in velocity and 0.054 n mi inaltitude. The S-IVB burn time of 469.79 seconds was wth none second of prediction, and all structural load limts werewell wth n design tolerances during ascent.The m aximum wind conditions encountered during ascentwere 81 knots at 172,000 feet. Wind shear in the highdynamic pressure region reached 0.0113 sec-1 in the pitchplane at 48,100 feet. The m axim um wind speed in thehigh dynam ic pressure region was 30.3 knots from 309" at44,500 feet.The probable impact of the spent S-IB was d eterminedfrom a theoretical, tum bling , free flight trajectory.Assumingthe booster remained intact during entry, the impactoccurred in the Atlantic Ocean at latitude 29.76" north andlongitude 75.72" west, 265.01 n mi from the launch site.At 000:10:26.76, the spacecraft entered Earth orbit, definedas S-IVB cutoff plus 10 seconds to account for engine tai-loff and other transient effects. At insertion, conditions

were: apogee and perigee 153.7 by 123.3 n mi, inclination31.5 83 per iod 89.70 minute s, an d velocity 25,538.6 Wsec.

Apollo 7 s Saturn IB lifts off from Cape Canaveral Pad34 (NASA S68-48778).The internatio nal designation for the spacecraft uponachieving orbit was 1968-089A and the S-IVB was desig-nated 1968-089B.3

Inflight ActivitiesThe crew adapted quickly and completely to the weightlessenvironm ent. There were n o d isorientation problems asso-ciated with movement inside the CM nor looking out thewindows at Earth. In faa , an attempt by the lunar modulepilot to induce vertigo or motion sickness by m ovement ofthe head in all directions at rapid rates met with negativeresults. Early in th e m ission, however, the crew reported somesoreness of their back muscles in the kidney area. The sore-ness was relimed by exercise and hyperextension of t he back.Prior to separation from the S-IVB, a 2-minute 56-secondmanual takeover of attitude control from the launch vehiclestage was performed at 0023048. The crew exercised the

RAE Table of Earth Satellites 1957-1986,pps. vii, and viii. The international Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) has given all satellites a designation based on the year oflaunch (first four digits) and number of successful launches during that year (next three digits). In COSPAR terminology, he letter A usually refers to the instrume nted spacecraft,B to the rocket, and C,D, , etc. to fragments.

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manual S-IbIIU orbital attitud e control capability This con-sisted of a test of the closed loop spacecrafthunch vehiclecontrol system by performing manual pitch, roll, and yawmaneuvers. The con trol system responded properly. M e rcompletion of the test, the crew switched attitude controlback to the auto matic launch vehicle system which resumedthe n orma l attitude timeline. By the time the CSMIS-IVBseparated at 002 550 2, venting of S-IVB propellants hadraised the orbit to 167.0 by 125.3 n mi.One objective of Apollo 7 was to perform a safing of theS-IVB stage by lowering pressure in the propellant tanks andhigh-pressure bottIes to a level that would permit safe ren-dezvous and simulated docking maneuvers. The safing wasscheduled to take place in several stages. First, he LH, tanksafing was to be performed by three pre-programmed vent-ings; however, four additional ventings were required becausethe pre-p rogram med ones did no t adequately safe the tankunder the orbital conditions experienced. The first ventingoccurred at 0001017, and the final one ended at 00511:15.The seven ventings totaled 3,274.1 seconds. Second, a liquidoxygen dump was initiated at 001:3428 and lasted 721.00 sec-onds. Third, a cold helium du m p was performed at 001:4228and again at 0043016, lasting 2,868.00 and 1,199.99 seconds,respectively. Finally, a stage control sphere helium dumpoccurred at 003:17:33, but was terminated by ground com-mand after 2,967 seconds to save the remaining helium forcontrol of the LH, tank vent-and-relief valve. Safing, however,was adequately accomplished.During the second revolution the crew observed that one ofthe spacecraft/LM adapter panels o n the S-IVB was deployedonly 25 instead of the normal 45. It had opened fully, but aretention cable designed to prevent the panel from closinghad become stuck an d th e panel had partially closed. Thiswas not a problem because the panels would be jettisoned onfuture missions. By the 19th revolution, the panel had movedto the f u l l open position.In order to establish conditions required for rendezvous withthe S-IVB, a 16.3-second phasing maneuver was performed at003:2009 using the service module reaction control system.This resulted in an orbit of 165.2 by 124.8 n mi.The ph asing burn was intended to place the spacecraft76.5 n mi ahead of the S-IVB. However, the S-IVB orbitdecayed m ore rapidly than anticipated durin g the six sub-sequent revolutions. An additional phasing maneuver of17.6 seconds was perfo rmed a t 015:5200 to obtain thedesired conditions. The resulting orbit was 164.7 by120.8 n mi.

Rendezvous operations with the S-IVB stage (NASAASO7-03-1541).

At 01446, it was reported that the commander had devel-oped a bad head cold, which had begun abo ut one hourafter liftoff, nd that he had taken two aspirins. The nextday, the other two crew mem bers also experienced head coldsymptoms. This condition, which continued through out themission, caused extreme discom fort because it was verydifficult to clear the ears, nose, and sinuses in zero g con-ditions. Medication was taken, but th e sym ptom s persisted.At 023:33, the spacecraft commander canceled the first tele-vision transmission, scheduled to begin in 20 minutes.Annoyed that mission control had added two burns and aurin e du m p to the crews workload while they were testing anew vehicle, and still suffering from a cold, Schirra reportedthat, . .TV wiU be delayed without further discussion...Two service propulsion system firings were required forrendezvous with th e S - M 3 . The first firing, a 9.26-secondcorrective combination maneuver at 026:2455, was neces-sary to achieve the desired 1.32 phase and 8.0 nauticalmile altitude offset so that the second firing would producean or bit coelliptic with that of the S - M 3 . The result wasan orbit of 194.1 by 123.0 n mi. During this period, thesextant was used to track the S - M 3 which was visible inreflected sunlight. The 7.76-second firing at 028:00:56occurred w hen the spacecraft was 80 n mi behind and7.8 n mi below the S-IVB, and created a more circularizedorbit of 153.6 by 113.9 n mi.The two firings achieved the desired conditions for the46-second rendezvous terminal phase initiation, which



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occurred at 029 163 3, about four and one half minutesearlier than planned because of a minor variation in theorbit. A small midcourse correction was made at 02 932 48,followed by a 708-second br aking man euver a t 029:43:55,and final closure to wthn 70 feet of the tumbling S-IVB.Stationkeeping was p erformed for 25 minu tes starting at029:55:43 in an orbit of 161.0 by 122.1 n mi, after which a5.4-second service mod ule reaction con trol system posi-grade maneuver removed the CSM from the vicinity of theS - M 3 stage. The crew maneuvered the CSM around theS - M 3 in order to inspect and photograph it.The rendezvous maneuver was impo rtant because itdemo nstrated the ability of the spacecraft to rendezvouswith th e LM (represented by th e S-IVB) if the ascent stagebecame disabled after leaving the lunar surface. However,the crew reported that the manually-controlled brakingmaneuver was frustrating because no reliable backup rang-ing information was available, as would be the case duringan actual rendezvous with the LM.The next 24-hour period was devoted to a sextant calibra-tion test at 041:00, two attitude contro l tests at 0 490 0 a nd050:40, and two primary evaporator tests at 049:50 and050:40. In addition, the crew performed a rendezvous navi-gation test, using the sextant to track th e s-IVB visually toa distance of 160 n mi at OM40 and to 320 n mi at053:20. The crew later repo rted s ightin g the S-IVB at arange of nearly 1,000 n mi.To ensure maximum return from Apollo 7, it was plannedto complete as many prim ary a nd secondary objectives aspossible early in the flight, and, by th e end of the secondday, more than 90 percent had been accomplished.Three tests of the rendezvous radar transp ond er were per-formed. This system would be essential for docking theLM ascent stage to the CM after liftoff from the lunar sur-face. Th e first two tests occu rre d at 061:OO an d 071:40. Th ethird was performed during revolution 48 at 07627, whenthe grou nd rad ar at Wh ite Sands Missile Range, NewMexico, acquired and locked on to th e spacecraft transpon -der at a range of 390 n mi and tracked it to 415 n m iAt 071:43, the first of seven television trans miss ions beganand lasted for seven minutes. It was the first live televisiontransmission from a piloted Am erican spacecraft. The crewopened th e telecast with a sign that read From the lovelyApollo room high a top everything. They then aimed thecamera out the window as the spacecraft passed over NewOrleans and then over the Florida peninsula. The orbitalmotion of the spacecraft was evident.

Message to the world from the Apollo 7 crew during&st live television transmission (NASA S68-50713).

The service propu lsion system was fired six additional t imesdurin g the mission. The third firing, at 075:4800 (advanced16 ho urs f rom the original plan) , was a 9.10-secondmaneuver controlled by the stabilization and control system.The maneuver was performed early to increase the backupdeorbit capability of the service module reaction controlsystem by lowering the perigee to 90 n mi and placing it inthe northern hemisphere. The resulting orbit was 159.7 by89.5 n mi.After the third firing, a three-hour cold soak of the servicepropulsion therm al control system was performed. Thecold soak stabilized the spacecraft and exposed one sideaway from the Sun for a period of time to lower the tem-perature and mo nitor the effects of the cold space environ-ment. The thermal characteristics of the system were betterthan anticipated for ran dom , drifting flight, because thetemperature decrease was less than predicted.A test to determine whether the environmental control sys-tem rad iator surface coating had degraded was conductedbetween 092:37 and 09200. Results indicated that the solarabso rptiv ity of the ra diato r panel tested was within pre-dicted limits, nd validated the system for lunar flight.The second television transmission started at 095:25 andlasted abo ut 11 minutes. The program included a tour ofthe CM including various controls, a demo nstration of theexercise device, and an attemp t to sho w water cond ensationinside th e spacecraft.Condensation was a major problem associated with thecabin and suit circuits. This problem was anticipated in thecabin because the cold coo lant lines from the radiator to

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the environment control unit and from the environmentcontrol unit to the inertial measurement unit were n otinsulated. Each time excessive cond ensa tion was note d o nthe coolant lines or in a puddle on the aft bulkhead afterservice propulsion system maneuvers, the crew vacuumedthe water overboard. Experiment SO05 (Synoptic TerrainPhotography) began at 098:40, using a hand-held modified70 mm Hasselblad 500C camera. Th e pho tographs wereused to study the origin of the Carolina bays in the UnitedStates, wind erosion in desert regions, coastal morphology,and the origin of the African rift valley. Near-vertical, high-sun-angle photographs of Baja California, other parts ofMexico, and parts of the Middle East were useful for geo-logic studies. Photographs of New O rleans and Houstonwere generally better for geographic urban studies thanthose available from previous programs.

Mission commander Wally Schirra (NASA ASO7-04-1582).Areas of oceano graphic interest, particularly islands in thePacific Ocean, were photographed for the first time. Inaddition, the mission obtained the first extensive photo-graphic coverage of northern Chile, Australia, and otherareas. Of the 500 photographs taken of land and oceanareas, approximately 200 were usable, and , in general, thecolor and exposure were excellent. The need to change thefilmmagazines, filters, and exposu re settings hurr iedly wh ena target came into view, and to hold the camera steady,accounted for the improp er exposure of many frames.The purpo se of Exper iment SO06 (Synoptic WeatherPhotography) was to photograp h as many as possible of 27basic categories of weather phenomena, and began at099:lO. The cam era was the sa me used for Expe riment S005.Of the 500 photog raphs taken, approximately 300 showedclouds or other items of meteorological interest, and approx-imately 80 contained features of interest in oceanography.Categories considered worthy of ad ditional interest included

weather systems, winds an d th eir effects o n clouds, oceansurfaces, underwater zones of Australian reefs, the Pacificatolls, the Bahamas an d Cuba, landfiorm effects, chn act iczones, and hydrology. Oce anograp hic surface features wererevealed more clearly than in any of the preceding pilotedflights. The p hotographs of H urricane Gladys and T yphoonGloria, taken on 17 October and 20 Octo ber 1968, respec-tively, were the best-to-date views of tropical storms. Imagesharpness of photographs for this experiment ranged fromfair to excellent, again affected by the difficulty in holdingthe camera steady. Regardless, ocean swells could be resolvedfrom altitudes near 100 n mi.

Example of Synoptic Terrain Photography: India, Nepal,Tibet, and H malayasfrom 126 n m i altitude (NASAASO7-11-1980).

The th ird television transmission began at 119:08 and last-ed about ten minutes. It featured a d emo nstration of howto prepare food in space, in particular a package of driedfruit juice reconstituted with water. The telecast alsoshowed the process of vacuuming water that had accumu-lated on the cold glycol lines. Various controls at the com-manders wo rkstatio n were also viewed.The fourth service propulsion system firing, at 120:43:00.44,was p erformed to evaluate the m inimum -impulse capabilityof the service propulsion engine. It lasted only 0.48 secondsand produced an orbit of 156.7 by 89.1 n mi.A tour of the CM, the fourth television transmission,began at 141:ll. The crew trained their camera on depositson window 1 and on optical site markings used to meas-ure pitch angle on window 2. Fanning around the space-craft, the camera gave viewers a look at sleep stations,stowage areas, helmet bags and pressure suit hoses. Thecomm ander also demon strated weightlessness by blowingon a floating pen to control its motion. By 141:27, thecrew had signed off an d th e transm ission signal had faded.



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Example of Synoptic Weather Photography: a view ofHurricane Gladys over the Padtic Ocean at an altitudeof 99 n m i (NASA AS07-07-1877).

During this time, the S-TVB stage continued to orbit theEarth. It impacted the Indian Ocean at 09:30 GMT on18 October. The estimated impact point was latitude 8.9south an d lon gitude 81.6 east.sion system firing was performed tofor an op timum deorbit maneuverat the end of the plann ed orb ital phase by allowing at leasttwo minutes of tracking by th e Hawaii ground station ifanother orbit were required. This occurred at 165:0000.42.To ensure verification of the propellant gauging system, thefiring duration was increased from the original plan.

CMP Walt Cunningham peers out the spacecraft win-dow (NASA ASO7-04-1584).

The 66.95-second mane uver produ ced th e largest velocitysion, 1,691.3 Wsec, and incorporated actor-control takeover halfway th roug h th eulting orbit was 244.2 by 89.1 n mi.and transearth flight on future missions,it would b e necessary to p ut the spacecraft into a slowbarbecue roll to maintain an even external temperature.This m aneuver, called passive ther mal c ontro l, was tested

twice on Apollo 7, first at 16200 and next at 212:OO.The fifth television tran smission , starting at 189:04, featuredanother spacecraft tour. The program began with a view ofthe in strum ent panel including attitude thruster switchesand the display keyboard, and cryogenic controls, andended w ith the crew performing a military close orderdrill.An attempt to show scenes of Earth was unsuccessful.The sixth SPS firing was perform ed dur ing the eighth day,at 21007:59, and was the second minimum-impulsemaneuver. At the time, the apogee was 234.6 n mi and theperigee was 88.4 n mi. This firing lasted 0.50 seconds andwas d irected out-of-plane because no change in orbit wasdesired.For the sixth television transmission, starting at 2 13:10, thecrew aimed the camera out the window and gave groundcontrollers a view of the Florida peninsula. They thenturned the cam era inside the spacecraft to show off thebeards they had grown during the mission.At 231:08, the Solar Particle Alert Network facility atCarnarvon, Australia, detected a Class 1B solar flare.Analysis of data confirmed the flare would have no effecton the spacecraft or crew. However, this exercise proved tobe an excellent checkout of the systems and proceduresthat would be used in the event of a solar flare during alunar mission. This event was followed by the seventhservice propulsion system firing, a 7.70-second maneuver at239:06 11, which placed the spacecraft perigee at the prop-er longitude for en try and recovery, and lowered the orb itto 229.8 by 88.5 n mi.For the final television transmission, starting at 2 3618 andlasting for about 11minutes, the crew showed off theirbeards again, and reported seeing several jet contrails farbelow them over the Gulf Coast. They also described thebands of color created by the day a r glow above the Earth.

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decided 48 h ours prior to entry, and at the crew's insis-tence, that helmets and gloves would not be w orn.The service mod ule was jettisoned at 259 43:33, and th eCM entry followed both automatic and m a n d y guidedprofiles. The co mm and m odule reentered the Earth'satmo sph ere (400,000 feet altitu de) at 259:53:26 at a veloci-ty of 25,846 Wsec. Trajectory reconstruction indicated thatthe service m odule impacted th e Atlantic Ocean at26003:OO at a point estimated to be latitude 29" north andlong itude 72" west. Dur ing entry, three objects-the CM ,the service module, and a 12-foot insulation disk betweenthe two-were tracked simultaneo usly and were also sight-ed visually.

LMPDonn M e oses for a photo (NASA MO7-04-1583).The midcourse navigation program, using the Earth hori-zon an d a star, could no t be accomplished because theEarth horizon was indistinct and variable. The air glowwas about three degrees wide and had no distinct bound-aries or lines when viewed th roug h the sextant. This prob-lem seemed to be associated with the spacecraft being in alow Earth orbit. Using this same program on lunar land-marks and a star, however, the task was very easy to per-form. Lunar landm arks showed up nearly as well as Earthlandmarks. Stars could be seen at 10" and 15", and greater,from the M oon.Sextadstar counts and star checks and starhorizon sightingswere made throu ghout the m ission; lunar landmark htarsightings were attempted at 14200.

The parachu te system effected a soft splashdown of th e CMin the Atlantic Ocean southeast of Bermuda at 11:11:48GMT (0211:48 a.m. EDT) on 22 October 1968. Missiondur ation was 26009:03. T he impa ct point was 1.9 n mifrom the target point an d 7 n mi from the recovery shipU.S.S. Essex. The splashdown site was estimated to be lati-tude 27.63" nor th a nd longitud e 64.15" west. M e r splash-down, the CM assumed an apex-down flotation attitude, butwas successfuIly retur ned to the n orm al flotation positionwithin 13 minutes by the inflatable bag uprighting system.During this period, the recovery beacon was n ot visible andvoice comm unication with the crew was interrupted.The crew was retrieved by helicopter and was aboard therecovery ship 56 miriutes after splashdown. The CM wasrecovered 55 minutes later. The estimated CM weight atsplashdown was 11,409 pounds, an d the estimated distancetraveled for the mission was 3,953,842 n mi.

RecoveryThe h a l day of the mission was devoted primarily topreparations for the deorbit maneuver. This was accom-plished by the eighth SPS firing, an 11.79-second eighthservice maneuver at 25939:16 over Hawaii, during the 163rdorbit. During th e final orbit, the apogee was 225.3 n mi, theperigee was 88.2 n mi, the period was 90.39 minutes, andthe inclination 29.88".Because of their cold symptoms, there was a considerableamo unt of discussion abou t whether the crew should wearhelmets and gloves durin g entry. With helmets on, it m ightbe impossible to properly clear the .throat and ears asincreasing gravity drew mucus down from the head area, After splashdown, Wally Schirra exits the commandmodule with the aid of a Navy support team memberwhere it remained during zero gravity conditions. It was (NASA S68-49529).



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Apollo 7 crew safely aboard recovery ship U.S.S. Essexfollowingsuccessfulmission (NASA S68-49744).

At CM retrieval, the weather recorded onboard the Essashowed light rain showers, 600-foot ceiling; visibility 2 n mi;wind speed 16 knots from 260" true north, air temperature74 F;water temperature 81" F; with waves to 3 feet from260" true north.The CM was offloaded from the Essex on 24 October atthe Norfolk Naval Air Station, Norfolk, Virginia, and theLanding Safing Team began the evaluation and deactiva-tion procedures at 1400 GMT. Deactivation was completedat 01:30 G MT o n 27 October 1968. Th e CM was thenflown to Long Beach, California and trucked to the NorthAmerican Rockwell Space Division facility at Downey,California for postflight analysis.

ConclusionsThe A pollo 7 mission was successful in every respect. AUspacecraft systems ope rated satisfactorily, and all but one ofthe detailed test objectives were met. As an engineering testflight, Apollo 7 demo nstrated the performance of theorbital safing experimen t, the adequacy of attitude con trolin both the manual and automatic modes, and that thevehicle systems could perform for extended periods inorbit. For the first time, a mixed cabin atmo sphere consist-ing of 65 percent oxygen and 35 percent nitrogen was usedaboard an American piloted spacecraft. All previous flightshad used 100 percent oxygen, a procedure changed as aresult of recommendations made by the Apollo 1 fireinvestigation board. Ano ther "first" was the availability ofhot an d cold drinking water for the crew as a by-productof the service module fuel cells, an important element forpiloted lunar excursions. Consumables usage was ma in-tained at safe levels, and permitted the introduction ofadditional flight activities toward the end of the mission.

The most significant aerodynamic effect encou ntered wasenon noted as perigee tost noticeable when the perigee wasat 90 n mi.

The following conclusions were made fiom an analysis ofpost-mission data:1. The results of the Apollo 7 mission, when combined with results of

previous missionsand ground tests, demonstrated that the CSMwas qualified for operation in the Earth orbital environment andwas ready for tests in the cislunar and lunar orbital environments.2. The concepts and operational functioning of the crewhpacecraftinterfaces, including procedures, provisioning, accommodations,and displays and controls, were acceptable.3. The overall therm al balance of the spacecraft, for both activeand passive elements, was more favorable than predicted for thenear-Earth environment.4. The endurance required for systems operation on a lunar mis-

sion was demonstrated.5. The capability of performing rendezvous using the CSM, withonly optical and onboard data, was demonstrated; however, itwas determined that ranging information would be extremelydesirable for the terminal phase.6. Navigation techniques in general were demonstrated to be ade-quate for lunar missions. Specifically:

a. Onboard navigation using the landmark tracking techniqueproved feasible in Earth orbit.b. The Earth horizon was not usable for optics measurements inlow Earth orbit with the available optics design and techniques.c. Although a debris cloud of frozen liquid particles followingventing obscured star visibility with the scanning telescope, itcould be expected to dissipate rapidly in Earth orbit withoutsignificantly contaminating the optical surfaces.d. Star visibility data with the scanning telescope indicated thatin cislunar space, with no venting and with proper spacecraftorientation to shield the optics from the Sun and Earth orMoon light, constellation recognition would be adequate for

platform inertial orientation.e. Sextant star visibility was adequate for platform realignmentsin daylight using Apollo navigation stars as close as 30" fromthe Sun line-of-sight.

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7. The rendezvous radar acquisition and tracking test demonstrat-ed the capability of performance at ranges required for ren-dezvous between the CSM and the LM.8. Mission support facilities, including the Piloted Space FlightNetwork and the recovery forces were satisfactory for an Earthorbital mission.

Apollo 7 Objectives4Launch Vehicle PrimaryDetailed Objectives1. To demonstrate the adequacy of the launch vehicle attitude con-trol system for orbital operation.Achieved.2. To demonstrateS-IVB orbita l safing capability.Achieved.3. To evaluate S-IVB J-2 engine augmented spark igniter linemodifications. Achieved.Launch Vehicle Secondary Detailed Test Objectives1. To evaluate the S-IVBIinstrument unit orbital coast lifetimecapability.Achieved.2. To demonstrate command and service module piloted launchvehicle orbital attitude control.Achieved.Spacecraft Primary Objectives1. To demonstrate command and service module and crew per-formance.Achieved.2. To demonstrate crew, space vehicle, and mission support facili-

ties performance.Achieved.3. To demonstrate command and service module rendezvous capa-bility. Achieved.Spacecraft Primary Detailed Test Objectives1. P1.6 To perform inertial measurement unit alignm ents usingthe sextant.Achieved.2. P1.7: To perform an internal measurement unit orientation deter-mination and a star pattern daylight visibfity check. Achieved.3. P1.8: To perform onboard navigation using the technique of thescanning telescope landmark tracking.Achieved.4. P1.10 To perform optical tracking of a target vehicle using thesextant. Achkved, during rendezvous.

5. P1.12: To demonstrate guidance navigation control system atito-matic and manual attitude controlled reaction control systemmaneuvers. Partia lk achieved, by the automatic mode prior to theservice propulsion ystem burns and the manual mode. Althoughall required modes were demonstrated, all rates were not checked.6. P1.13: To perform guidance navigation control system controlledservice propulsion system and reaction control system velocitymaneuvers. Achieved, at various times during the mission. '7. P1.14 To evaluate the ability of the guidance navigation controlsystem to guide the entry from Earth orbit. Achieied, during e n v .8. P1.15: To perform star and Earth horizon Sihtings to establishan Earth horizon model. Not achieved. On the two occasionsattempted, the Earth horizon was indistinct and variable, with nodefined boundaries or lines, thus precluding obtaining the neces-sary data.9. P1.16 To obtain inertial measurement unit performance data inthe flight environment. Achieved, in conjunction with the inertial

measurement unit alignment checks. Two pulse integrating pendu-lous accelerometer bias tests were also performed.10.

11.

12.

13.14.

15.

16.

P2.3: To monitor the entry monitoring system during servicepropulsion velocity changes and entry.Achieved, during the firstservice propulsion service burn and enttyP2.4: To demonstrate the stabilization control system automaticand manual attitude controlled reaction control system maneu-vers. Achieved, exceptfor testing the high and auto rate modes.P2.5: To demonstrate the command and service module stabi-lization control system velocity control capability.Achieved.P2.6 To perform a manual thrust vector control takeover.AchievedP2.7: To obtain data on the stabilization control systems capabil-ity to provide a suitable inertia l reference in a flight environ-ment. Achieved, during the zero-g phase o the mission prior tothe ourth service propulsion system burn and prior to the S-ZVBseparation. Desired data during the boost phase was not obtained.P2.10: To accomplish the backup mode of the gyro displaycoupler-flight director attitude indicator dignment using thescanning telescope in preparation for an increment velocitymaneuver.Achieved, although there was a problem with theflight director attitude indicator in the latter part o the mission.P3.14 To demonstrate the service propulsion system m i n i u mimpulse burns in a space environment.Achieved, during thefourth and sixth service propulsion burns.

Apollo objectives and their level of achievement for al flights are derived from mission re ports and from Boeing's hal &ght evaluation re ports for Apollo 7,8,9,nd 10

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17. P3.15: To perform a service propulsion system performanceburn in the space environment.Achieved, during theJifh serv-ice propulsion burn.18. P3.16: To monitor the primary and auxiliary gauging system.Achieved, during the Jifh service propulsion burn.19. P3.20 To verify the adequacy of the propellant feed line ther-

mal control system.Achieved, by the demonstration o f normaloperation and the cold soak test.20. P4.4 To verify the life support functions of the environmentalcontrol system.Achieved.21. P4.6: To obtain data on operation of the waste managementsystem in the flight environment.Achieved.22. P4.8 To operate the secondary coolant loop.Achieved, andincluded daily redundant component tests.23. P4.9: To demonstrate the water management subsystems opera-

tion in the flight environment.Achieved, throughout the mission,despite a problem with the chlorination procedure and somehardware problems.24. P4.10: To demonstrate the postlanding ventilation circuit opera-tion. Achieved.25. P5.8 To obtain data on thermal stratification with and withoutthe cryogenic fans of the cryogenic gas storage system.Achieved. Although only two of the three stratification tests weresuccessfil and part of the third test was accomplished (the restwas deleted), sufficient data were obtained.26. P5.9: To verify automatic pressure control of the cryogenic tanksystems in a zero-g environment.Achieved.27. P5.10: To demonstrate fuel cell water operations in a zero-genvironment. Achieved.28. P6.7: To demonstrate S-band data uplink cap ab~ty .chieved.29. P6.8 To demonstrate a simulate