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Rethinking Platos Conception of Knowledge: The Non-philosopher and the Forms JOEL A. MARTINEZ Lewis & Clark College 0615 S. W. Palatine Hill Rd. Portland, OR 97219 [email protected] Abstract In this paper, I argue against the claim that in Platos Republic the most important distinguishing feature between the philosopher and non-philosopher is that the phi- losopher has knowledge while the non-philosopher has, at best, true opinion. This claim is, in fact, inconsistent with statements Plato makes in later books of the Re- public. I submit that the important distinction Plato makes concerns the type of knowledge possessed by the philosopher-ruler. As a result, we need to amend widely held scholarly interpretations of important passages in the Republic; most notably the passages containing the Sun, Line, and Cave. I consider the views of a number of important scholars and suggest a proposal that avoids this inconsistency with the text. An important consequence of my argument is that Philosophers are indeed not the only ones with knowledge in the Kallipolis. Keywords: Republic, knowledge, techne, philosopher-rulers, Sun, Line, Cave It is commonly claimed that in Platos Republic one has knowledge if, and only if, one is a philosopher. 1 I submit that this claim, call it A, is false. In this paper, I argue that A is inconsistent with other statements Plato makes in the Republic and with passages from other relevant dialogues. I first look at the problematic passages in order to determine precisely what generates the tension. Next, I examine different interpretations of the pro- blematic texts and discuss why the standard scholarly analyses do not re- solve the conflict. Finally, I present an interpretation of the allegories of the Sun, Line, and Cave under which philosopher-rulers are distinguished from non-philosophers not by having privileged access to knowledge of apeiron, vol. 44, pp. 326 334 © Walter de Gruyter 2011 DOI 10.1515/apeiron.2011.019 1 Brickhouse 1981; Cross and Woozley 1966; Ferguson 1922; Hall 1974; Kraut 1973; Malcolm 1962, 1981; Prichard 1966; Smith 1996; Stokes 1992; Vlastos 1981. Brought to you by | Fordham University Library Authenticated | 150.108.161.71 Download Date | 5/2/13 2:00 PM

Apeiron Volume 44 Issue 4 2011 [Doi 10.1515%2Fapeiron.2011.019] Martinez, Joel a. -- Rethinking Plato's Conception of Knowledge- The Non-philosopher and the Forms

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Apeiron Volume 44 Issue 4 2011 [Doi 10.1515%2Fapeiron.2011.019] Martinez, Joel a. -- Rethinking Plato's Conception of Knowledge- The Non-philosopher and the Forms

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  • Rethinking Platos Conception of Knowledge:The Non-philosopher and the Forms

    JOEL A. MARTINEZLewis & Clark College

    0615 S. W. Palatine Hill Rd.Portland, OR 97219

    [email protected]

    Abstract

    In this paper, I argue against the claim that in Platos Republic the most importantdistinguishing feature between the philosopher and non-philosopher is that the phi-losopher has knowledge while the non-philosopher has, at best, true opinion. Thisclaim is, in fact, inconsistent with statements Plato makes in later books of the Re-public. I submit that the important distinction Plato makes concerns the type ofknowledge possessed by the philosopher-ruler. As a result, we need to amend widelyheld scholarly interpretations of important passages in the Republic; most notablythe passages containing the Sun, Line, and Cave. I consider the views of a numberof important scholars and suggest a proposal that avoids this inconsistency with thetext. An important consequence of my argument is that Philosophers are indeed notthe only ones with knowledge in the Kallipolis.

    Keywords: Republic, knowledge, techne, philosopher-rulers, Sun, Line, Cave

    It is commonly claimed that in Platos Republic one has knowledge if, andonly if, one is a philosopher.1 I submit that this claim, call it A, is false. Inthis paper, I argue that A is inconsistent with other statements Platomakes in the Republic and with passages from other relevant dialogues. Ifirst look at the problematic passages in order to determine precisely whatgenerates the tension. Next, I examine different interpretations of the pro-blematic texts and discuss why the standard scholarly analyses do not re-solve the conflict. Finally, I present an interpretation of the allegories ofthe Sun, Line, and Cave under which philosopher-rulers are distinguishedfrom non-philosophers not by having privileged access to knowledge of

    apeiron, vol. 44, pp. 326334Walter de Gruyter 2011 DOI 10.1515/apeiron.2011.019

    1 Brickhouse 1981; Cross and Woozley 1966; Ferguson 1922; Hall 1974; Kraut 1973;Malcolm 1962, 1981; Prichard 1966; Smith 1996; Stokes 1992; Vlastos 1981.

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  • everything, but rather by having privileged access to moral knowledge, orknowledge of moral terms.2

    I. The Conflict

    Gail Fine states: [T]he Republic aims to persuade us that philosophersshould rule, since only they have knowledge, and knowledge is necessary forgood ruling.3 According to this interpretation, it is because of this knowl-edge that the philosopher-rulers have a unique role in the Kallipolis. Theepistemic allegories appear to provide good reason to believe that Plato isindeed making an important distinction between philosopher-rulers andall other citizens of the Kallipolis. Most scholars have thought that Platois clear about the fact that in order to have knowledge, the individualmust first have knowledge of the Good. He states:

    The Form of the Good is the most important thing to learn about and that its bytheir relation to it that just things and the others become useful and beneficial ...And you also knew that, if we dont know it, even the fullest possible knowledge ofother things is of no benefit to us, any more than if we acquire any possessionwithout the good of it. (505a)4

    This passage, and others like it in conjunction with the allegory of thecave, have typically been interpreted to mean that only the philosopherhas knowledge. At the conclusion of the allegory of the cave, Socratesstates:

    This whole image, Glaucon, must be fitted together with what we said before ...And if you interpret the upward journey and the study of the things above as theupward journey of the soul to the intelligible realm, youll grasp what I hope toconvey, since that is what you wanted to hear about [why the philosopher shouldrule] In the knowable realm, the form of the Good is the last thing to be seen,and it is reached only with difficulty. (517b)

    Plato seems to be indicating here and throughout the epistemic allegoriesthat access to the Forms is how one develops knowledge. And since thephilosopher-rulers are the only ones who ascend out of the cave and intothe light, it seems that they are the only ones with knowledge and that iswhy they should rule.

    2 By this, I mean, knowledge of the Good and those things that are knowable and arederived from the Good. The most obvious example of an object of knowledge wouldbe knowledge of the Form of Justice. Alternatively, we could say that philosopher-rulers have knowledge of the Forms to which moral terms refer.

    3 Fine 1990, 86. Italics are mine.4 All translations of the Republic are from Grube (revised by Reeve) 1992.

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  • The above interpretation, however, relies on a further assumption,namely, that in the passages containing the epistemic allegories when So-crates speaks of knowledge, he is speaking of knowledge in general. If thiswere the case, then two claims would follow: 1) There is no object ofknowledge that the philosopher cannot know. (Or the philosopher canhave knowledge of all knowable things); and, 2) There is nothing whichcan be known by the non-philosopher. (Or, if one is not a philosopher,then one cannot have knowledge of anything.)

    Certainly, we should not accept Platos third wave of paradox(473cd), his claim that only philosophers should rule, without good rea-sons for doing so. And what better reason could there be for choosingphilosophers as rulers than the fact that they are the sole possessors ofknowledge? I submit, however, that the above interpretation overlooks im-portant statements Plato makes concerning the relationship betweenknowledge and craftsmanship in the Republic.

    The beginning of Book X sheds light on the important question, whohas knowledge and about what do they have knowledge? In order to ban-ish all artists from the Kallipolis, Socrates sets out to establish that in noway does the poet have knowledge of that which he claims. In fact, thepoet is merely a magician or imitator who produces imitation threesteps away from truth.5 It follows from the fact that the poet (or painter)makes an image of the product of the craftsman that the product of thecraftsman is itself an image of a Form. But, how does the craftsman makehis product? Socrates explains this in somewhat ambiguous terms, Anddont we customarily say that their makers look to the appropriate formin making the bed or tables? (596b)

    It is not clear whether Plato intends the craftsman to look to a Pla-tonic Form or whether the craftsman simply has a wide range of experi-ence with a class of physical objects, say tables, and understands some gen-eralities about them and how they are made. Even if Plato intended forthe craftsman to have access to the Platonic Forms, this passage alonewould not be enough to establish that claim. For this passage merely statesthat the maker looks towards the appropriate form, but this does not pre-clude the idea that the maker only considers generalities about the thingsshe makes.

    5 Socrates establishes this position of the poet by referring back to the position of thephilosopher and the craftsman. Since the craftsman is two steps away from knowl-edge and the poet imitates the product of the craftsman, which is itself an imitation,the poet is three steps away from knowledge. At 597de, Socrates states: Wouldntyou call someone whose product is third from the truth an imitator? This passagealso leaves open the question of how many steps away from knowledge the philoso-pher is. As will be mentioned later, there is strong evidence that the philosopher, likethe craftsman, is two steps away.

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  • In fact, in Book X there is evidence against the claim that the crafts-man has knowledge.

    Or is it the case that even the cobbler and metal-worker who make them do notknow this (how the reins and mouth bit have to be), but only someone who knowshow to use them, namely, a horseman? (601e)

    Whether or not the other craftsmen (the cobbler and the metal-worker)have knowledge, it is clear that Plato allows the horseman to have knowl-edge. At 601d, Socrates establishes, That for each thing there are thesethree crafts, one that uses it, one that makes it, and one that imitates it.The artist (whether poet, painter, etc.) is the imitator, the craftsman is themaker, and the user of crafts is simply the one who uses that which thecraftsman makes. At 601d-e, Socrates makes explicit the relationship be-tween craftsman and knower:

    It is wholly necessary, therefore, that the user of each thing has most experience ofit and that he tell a maker which of his products performs well or badly in actualuse. A flute-player, for example, tells a flute-maker about the flutes that respondwell in actual playing and prescribes what kind of flutes he is to make, while themaker follows his instruction.

    601de is consistent with the claim that the craftsman does not haveknowledge. However, in it Plato explicitly tells us that the users of craftdo have knowledge.

    The standard approach to overcoming this problem, for those scholarswho notice the problem at all, is to maintain that A is Platos true view ofthe development of knowledge. For example, C. D. C. Reeve attempts toreconcile Book X in the following way.

    The craftsman is a maker, someone who exercises folk-wisdom. He has true beliefabout what kind of beds he should make, not autonomously like someone whoexercises scientific-thought, but only because he is compelled to listen to the userwho has knowledge about them (601e7602a1). And the user who has knowledgeabout beds, or about any of the other kinds of things to which we apply the samename is, of course, the philosopher-king.6

    Reeve states in a footnote to this passage that any attempt at interpretingthe craftsman as having direct access to the Forms would go directlyagainst the entire thrust of the Republic.7 Reeve interprets the proble-matic passages above to be consistent with A even though it forces him toadopt a very unnatural view of the philosopher-ruler. In order for the Kal-lipolis to function, according to Reeve, the philosopher must be the userof the products of crafts!

    But nowhere does Plato state that philosophers are the only users ofproducts of crafts. In fact, the argument in Book III (394e395d) con-

    6 Reeve 1988, 86.7 Ibid. 294295, note 37.

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  • cerning the role that imitation should play in ruling is an explicit state-ment that the rulers will only be concerned with statecraft. It would, ac-cording to Plato, be harmful for the guardians to be involved in othercrafts. According to Plato, the flute-player must not be a philosopher. So,it seems that non-philosophers, such as flute players, must have knowledge.This conclusion is in direct opposition to A.

    A second problem arises from the fact that it is highly counter-intui-tive to claim that the craftsman and the user of craft products are invari-ably two different individuals. Certainly the cobbler uses her own tools.So, at the very least, the cobbler has knowledge of her tools. But, if westand by A we must hold that the philosopher, in some instances, is theuser and the maker of the cobblers tools.

    Plato is very clear, at the end of Book V, that all knowledge is knowl-edge of Forms. It seems, therefore, that we must accept that the user ofproducts of crafts, since she has knowledge, must have cognitive access tothe Forms. It follows, however, that the philosopher-ruler is not the onlyone to have knowledge, or cognitive access to the Forms.

    Furthermore, it is not only in Book X that Plato states that someknowledge is held by the non-philosopher. In Book I, Socrates states that:

    Its when his knowledge fails him that he makes an error, and in regard to thaterror he is no craftsman. No craftsman, expert, or ruler makes an error at the mo-ment when he is ruling, even though everyone will say that a physician or a rulermakes errors. (340e)

    The craftsman, like the philosopher, cannot err qua craftsman. This sug-gests that the cognitive power used by the craftsman as a craftsman is asreliable as that used by the philosopher as a philosopher. In Book IV, Platoalso states: Is it because of knowledge possessed by its carpenters, then,that the city is to be called wise and sound in judgment? (428b) Theanswer, of course is no. However, this passage suggests that the carpen-ters in a city do possess some form of knowledge, though not the kind toproduce a city wise and sound in judgment.8

    II. The Commentators Premises

    Three key elements are common to the views of commentators who arecommitted to A.9 First, those who accept A agree that in the Republic

    8 Only a few lines later (at 428d), Plato makes a distinction between a kind of knowl-edge that helps determine the maintenance of the city and knowledge possessed bysome individuals that is not concerned with the ruling of the city. I will look closerat this passage in section III.

    9 The number of commentators who, like Fine, are committed to A is so vast that Icannot hope to acknowledge all of the appropriate commitment to it here. The fol-

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  • Plato is referring to knowledge of all types in his explanation of how thephilosopher develops knowledge. Second, they suppose that only the philo-sopher can have knowledge indeed it is in virtue of having knowledge atall that the philosopher holds a unique position in society. Finally, on thisview, the three epistemic allegories are descriptions of the only way onegoes about attaining knowledge of anything (that is, following the firstfeature above, any kind of knowledge).

    C.D.C. Reeve, for example, explicitly accepts the premise that only thephilosopher-rulers have knowledge.10 He states: No one can know a formunless he knows the good itself. And no one can know the good itselfunless he has mastered the mathematical sciences and dialectic and hasfifteen years experience in practical politics.11 Reeve further states:

    It is an easy inference from the account of the relation of forms to the good itselfthat the philosopher-king alone knows, not only how to make the best kind of polis,but also how to make every good thing that can be made.12

    According to Reeve, knowledge is only to be had from the type of educa-tion Plato describes in the Republic, that is, the education of the philoso-pher-ruler. Those who do not have the opportunity and the ability to en-gage in dialectic can never have knowledge. Likewise, the only way onecan gain knowledge of anything, according to Reeve, is as a derivative ofknowledge of the Good itself. Finally, Plato is not just explaining theknowledge of the form of the Good in the Republic. The philosopher-ruleris the only individual who can have knowledge of any Form. From theknowledge of the Good itself, the philosopher has knowledge of all Formsand, hence, everything.

    III. Moral Knowledge and Knowledge in General

    In section I, I pointed to several places outside Book X where Plato statesthat non-philosophers have knowledge. The users of craft and the crafts-men themselves both have knowledge of some things. But these passagesseem to directly contradict the claim that, in the Republic, only the philo-sopher has knowledge. However, if we abandon A, then the tension nolonger exists. Of course, it is not that simple. The consequences of thisapproach would involve reinterpreting important passages in the Republic.

    lowing provide examples of the relevant commitment: Brickhouse 1981; Cross &Woozley 1966; Ferguson 1922; Hall 1974; Kraut 1973; Malcolm 1962, 1981; Pri-chard 1966; Smith 1996; Stokes 1992; Vlastos 1981.

    10 Reeve 1988.11 Ibid., 108.12 Ibid., 85. Italics are mine.

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  • There are a number of problems which must be dealt with before explor-ing other proposals.

    First, if philosophers are not the only ones with knowledge then whyshould they rule? Second, if non-philosophers can have knowledge then itseems they can also have access to the Forms. If so, then why does Platostress that non-philosophers are like prisoners chained in the cave? Tradi-tionally, it is held that it is only the philosopher who leaves the cave. It isthe ability to travel out of the cave that allows the philosopher to gainaccess to the Forms and, hence, knowledge. If we abandon assumption Aand accept that non-philosophers have access to the Forms, and so haveknowledge, then what do the epistemic allegories tell us? If the epistemicallegories are to be interpreted as the only process for attaining knowledgeof anything, then it would seem that both philosophers and non-philoso-phers can ascend out of the cave.

    At this point we can see more precisely where the tension arises and,in doing, so see exactly where we must amend our interpretation of theRepublic. The traditional understanding of the epistemic allegories assumesthat they are concerned with knowledge in general. If we abandon thisview, we avoid the contradiction. For example, if there were more thanone type of knowledge, say moral knowledge and knowledge of a particu-lar practical sphere (e.g. flute playing), and these types of knowledge wereattained in different ways, then we could hold there to be an importantepistemic distinction between the philosopher and non-philosopher.13However, the distinction is not straightforwardly between knower andopiner, rather it is between one with moral knowledge and one withoutmoral knowledge. The philosopher has moral knowledge, i.e. knowledge ofjustice, while the flute-player has practical knowledge, i.e. knowledge offlutes. Because the higher education system is not aimed at the attainmentof knowledge in general, but instead primarily at the attainment of moralknowledge, the philosopher could still occupy a unique position in theKallipolis. The philosophers have knowledge of moral Forms. It is in virtueof this knowledge that they occupy the position they do in the Kallipolis.It is not just knowledge that distinguishes philosophers from non-philoso-phers, but knowledge of, for example, justice. Likewise, the epistemic alle-gories do not tell us how knowledge in general is developed, but insteadtell us how knowledge of morality (and, hence, ruling) is developed. Thepeople who ascend out of the cave are still the philosophers, but ascendingout of the cave does not symbolize the general pursuit of knowledge. Only

    13 This interpretation is consistent with the view that, according to Plato, moral knowl-edge is a kind of practical knowledge. Moral knowledge could simply be a more im-portant and, possibly, wide-ranging type of practical knowledge.

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  • those who will gain moral knowledge are depicted in this allegory, and itis only their education that is prescribed in Book VII.

    The text seems to support this reading of Plato. In section I, I men-tioned this passage between Glaucon and Socrates:

    Then, is there some knowledge possessed by some of the citizens in the city we justfounded that doesnt judge about any particular matter but the city as a whole andthe maintenance of good relations, both internally and with other cities?

    There is indeed.

    What is this knowledge, and who has it?

    It is guardianship, and it is possessed by those rulers we just now called completeguardians. (428d)

    In this passage Plato appears to acknowledge that there is a distinctionbetween types of knowledge knowledge that judges particular mattersbut not the city as a whole. Different citizens know different things, butthe knowledge that is important for the functioning and ruling of the cityis that knowledge held by the guardians. It is the possession of this knowl-edge that is most significant for determining who should rule in the Kalli-polis. Accordingly, in the context of the Republic we should not assumethat Plato is primarily concerned with knowledge in general, as opposed toknowledge of the Good and those things that are knowable and derivedfrom the Good. The most obvious example of such knowledge is knowl-edge of Justice.

    My view requires a reinterpretation of important passages of the Re-public. This statement is not, however, as radical as it may sound. I amnot proposing that, according to Plato, non-philosophers are knowledge-able in the way that philosopher-rulers are. My proposal can best be sum-marized by reformulating a new epistemic principle developed in the Re-public which I hold to be consistent with the rest of the Republic, andpreferable to A, call it A*. A* states: one has moral knowledge if, and onlyif, one is a philosopher. In the epistemic allegories, Plato is concerned withmoral knowledge, not knowledge in general. Only the philosopher hasmoral knowledge, and it is this moral knowledge that gives the philoso-pher her distinct place as the rightful ruler of the Kallipolis.

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