Apeiron Volume 33 Issue 2 2000 [Doi 10.1515%2FAPEIRON.2000.33.2.87] Wrenn, Chase B. -- Being and Knowledge- A Connoisseur's Guide to Republic v.476e Ff

Being and Knowledge:A Connoisseur's Guide toRepublic VA76eff.Chase B. Wrenn

1 Introduction

At the end of Republic V, Plato's Socrates argues that lovers of sights andsounds have no legitimate claims to knowledge; they have mere opinionat best. Only philosophers — those who believe in the beautiful itselfover and above the many beautiful things (for example) — can haveknowledge. Famously, the argument turns on the claims that the domainof knowledge is 'what is/ while ignorance is set over 'what is not' andopinion is set over 'what is and is not' (476e-7a, 478c-e) Socrates appliesthose claims in showing that knowledge and opinion are different pow-ers (477c-8d) and that what lovers of sights and sounds concern them-selves with (the many beautiful things, for example) both 'are' and 'arenot' (478e-9e). Lovers of sights and sounds, then, can have opinions, butthey cannot have knowledge (479e-80).

'To be' is carrying a lot of weight in these passages. Its interpretationmakes a difference both to the evaluation of the argument, and to theassessment of Plato's view of knowledge in the Republic.1 In this paper,

For example, R.E. Allen reads 'what is' as 'what exists', and claims that thisargument 'contains one of the first statements in European philosophy of thedoctrine of degrees of being and reality' (Allen 1961:325). Gail Fine reads 'what is'as 'what is true' and denies that Plato is committed to such a doctrine (Fine 1990).Julia Annas agrees with Allen that Plato is committed to a doctrine of degrees of

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88 Chase B. Wrenn

I argue for a 'veridical' interpretation of 'to be' in Republic 476e ff. Onsuch an interpretation, 'to be' is glossed, roughly, as 'to be so'. Thus,when Socrates claims that knowledge is set over what is, we are tointerpret him as claiming that knowledge is set over what is so. A merelyveridical reading of 'to be' runs into difficulties, however, because itinvolves only the distinction between truth and falsehood. I offer anamendment to the veridical reading according to which Socrates isconcerned not only with distinguishing truth from falsehood, but alsowith distinguishing reality from appearances. That is, Socrates is alsoconcerned with distinguishing what is (or is not) so independently ofhow things seem from what is (or is not) so depending on how thingsseem.

Another difficulty in 476e ff. comes from Plato's use of the ambiguousGreek preposition, 'epi', which I gloss here as 'set over'. It is unclear whatit means for knowledge or opinion to be 'set over' something. Somecommentators believe that Plato analyzes knowledge in terms of itscontents (Fine 1990, Reeve 1988). If they are right, then 'set over' isprobably best rendered as 'about'. Other commentators believe that theanalysis proceeds in terms of the objects of knowledge (Allen 1961,Benitez 1996). If they are right, then it is probably best to construe being'set over' a kind of thing as being a process that takes things of that kindas inputs. In Sections 3 and 4,1 apply the veridical interpretation of 'tobe' in a way that clarifies somewhat the notion of being 'set over'something, but I persist in using the vague English expression for threereasons. First, 'epi' is ambiguous in Greek, and it cannot be properlydisambigue ted without using the Stoic concept of a proposition. Thatconcept is unavailable to Plato, and it is necessary for the purpose ofdistinguishing what a cognitive process is about from what its operandsare.2 Second, my aim is to develop a reading of 'to be' that is neutral with

reality, but she does so on the basis of a reading different from his (Annas 1981). Areading similar to Armas's leads C.D.C. Reeve to attribute a reliabilitist epistemol-ogy reminiscent of Alvin Goldman (1979) to Plato (Reeve 1988).

2 With the appeal to propositions, the distinction works in this way. The contents ofknowledge or opinion are their meanings, i.e. propositional contents, and theybelong to the realm of Fregean sense. The objects of knowledge or opinion are theentities or states of affairs that impress themselves on the mind and generate thestates of knowing or opining. They belong to the realm of reference. Construed inthis way, the contents/objects controversy is a dispute over whether Plato offers anBrought to you by | York University Libraries

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Being and Knowledge 89

regard to the content/objects controversy, and so it does not requiredisambiguation of 'epi'. 'What is', in my view, means 'what is so', andwhat is so could be either facts (objects) or propositions (contents). Third,presupposing an interpretation of 'epi' might beg the question for oragainst some particular interpretation of 'to be', and I do not wish to begthe question. I am confident that the arguments below do not turn onany equivocation.

My case for the veridical interpretation has three stages. In the firststage (Section 2, below) I argue that Socrates must use premises in 476eff. that the lovers of sights and sounds would accept. Not to do so wouldundermine the plausibility of the Republic's main thesis: that it is betterto be just than to be unjust. The second stage involves showing that onlythe veridical interpretation of 'to be' is compatible with this requirement.I survey the possible interpretations in Section 3, and I find that all otherinterpretations involve attributing premises to Socrates that the loversand sights and sounds would reject. The final phase, in Section 4, is theapplication of the veridical interpretation of 'to be' to the rest of Socrates'argument at the end of Book V. I argue that my version of the veridicalinterpretation is at least as good as any other in handling the difficult'powers argument' of 477c-478d and the 'argument from opposites' at478e-479e.

2 The Rhetorical Setting of 476e ff. andthe Dialectical Requirement

Following Fine (1990), I call the requirement that Socrates argue ongrounds acceptable to the lovers of sights and sounds the 'dialecticalrequirement'. The context of Book V's final argument provides reasonswhy the requirement is in place at 476e ff. Socrates has been trying to putoff answering objections to the practical possibility of the ideal citybecause he sees such objections as 'the greatest wave of criticism' againsthis proposal (472a, 473c) and because his answer to them is 'paradoxical'(472a, 473e). His paradoxical answer is that the ideal city is possible, at

mtensional or an extensional analysis of knowledge. Without recourse to proposi-tions, Plato does not have the means to distinguish intensional from extensionalanalyses. Brought to you by | York University Libraries


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least approximately, provided that it could actually be brought aboutthat 'political power and philosophy entirely coincide' (473c-d). Hedistinguishes philosophers from lovers of sights and sounds (whom Icall 'connoisseurs') and argues (474c-6d) that only philosophers can haveknowledge. Connoisseurs must settle for mere opinion because, unlikephilosophers, they do not believe (for example) in the beautiful itself assomething over and above the many beautiful things.

After drawing that conclusion at 476d, however, Socrates immedi-ately sees a difficulty that must be overcome. He points out the difficultyat 476d-e, in the transition to the final argument of Book V:

[S]3 What if the person who has opinion but not knowledge [that is, theconnoisseur] is angry with us and disputes the truth of what we aresaying? Is there some way to console him and persuade him gently,while hiding from him that he isn't in his right mind?[G] There must be.[S] Consider, then, what we'll say to him. Won't we question him likethis? First, we'll tell him that nobody begrudges him any knowledgehe may have and that we'd be delighted to discover that he knowssomething.

It is no idle question to wonder what to do if the connoisseurs becomeangry and dispute the truth of what Socrates is saying. We should keepin mind that the philosophers' claim to exclusive political power in theapproximately ideal city is based on their exclusive claim to knowledge,including knowledge of how best to rule. The non-philosophers, how-ever, outnumber the philosophers (494a), and Glaucon warns Socratesearly on that 'a great many people ... will cast off their cloaks and,stripped for action, make a determined rush at [him], ready to do terriblethings' (473e-4a) upon hearing his claim that philosophers should holdthe monopoly on political power. At issue is whether the approximatelyideal city is really possible, and not just an abstraction that could neverbe implemented. If approximating the ideal city is to be possible on earth,then the philosophers must be able to overcome the non-philosophers'

Where necessary, I distinguish the speakers in a passage by using '[S]' for Socratesand '[G]' for Glaucon. All English translations are taken from the Grube and Reeveversion in Cooper (1997). Brought to you by | York University Libraries



challenge. They must be able to persuade and console those who thinkthat they have knowledge when they really have mere opinion. Other-wise, the non-philosophers will not allow the philosophers to rule.Arguments that only philosophers would accept, such as that of 474c-6d,are not up to the task.4 The philosophers need a way of responding tothe connoisseurs in their own terms. If Socrates cannot provide such away, then the philosophers will have no way of turning back the con-noisseurs' angry rush. The philosophers would thus be overpoweredand unable to make philosophy and ruling entirely coincide. Conse-quently, they would not be able to approximate the ideal city on earth.

The impossibility of such a city renders implausible the Republic'smain thesis: that it is better for a person to be just than to be unjust.Suppose that it is impossible for an actual person to be appreciably just.We know that injustice is within the scope of ordinary human capacities.Because it is not better to do what is impossible than to do what ispossible, it would follow that it is not better to be just than to be unjust.If the impossibility of the approximately ideal city suggests the impos-sibility of personal justice, then, it also suggests the falsity of the Repub-lic's most central claim.

The impossibility of approximating the ideal city does suggest theimpossibility of personal justice, and that is why Socrates sees objectionsto the possibility of the ideal city as the 'greatest wave' of criticism (472a,473c). From 368e on, the analogy of the soul to a city informs theRepublic's structure. In the ideal city, each class knows and acquiesces inits place, does its own work, and is ruled by the philosophical class(428a-34d). In the just soul, each part knows and acquiesces in its place,does its own work, and is ruled by the rational part (441c-4e). To claimthat the ideal city cannot be approximated is to claim that the philosophi-cal class will be unable to acquire significant political power with theapproval of the city's other classes. There are four main ways in whichtha t might happen (see Books VIII and IX), and four corresponding kindsof souls not ruled by their rational parts. If the philosophical class cannotgain political power, then the analogy suggests that the rational part ofthe soul cannot gain psychic power. Because personal justice requires

The argument of 474c-6d presupposes the existence of the beautiful itself over andabove the many beautiful things, but the connoisseurs (by definition) do not believein the beautiful itself. Brought to you by | York University Libraries


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rulership by the rational part of the soul, the earthly impossibility ofphilosophical rulership in the city indicates the earthly impossibility ofpersonal justice. That would mean that it is not better to be just than tobe unjust.

Apart from the city/soul analogy, Socrates' characterization of hisresponse as 'paradoxical' seems to connect the possibility of the approxi-mately ideal city to the possibility of the approximately just person. Theparadox that Socrates has in mind could be a chicken-or-egg or boot-strapping problem.5 Personal justice requires philosophy because itrequires that the soul be ruled by its rational part and philosophers arethose whose souls are so ruled. The extent to which a person can actua-lize his philosophical nature, however, depends on the existence of theright kind of social order, with the most complete actualization takingplace in the ideal city (496a-7b). Anticipating this result of Book VI,Socrates sees that there is a bootstrapping problem in the claim thatapproximating the just city requires philosopher-rulers. The best phi-losophers must be raised in the best cities, but the best cities requirephilosophers in order to be best. The lesson here is the same as that of496a-7b: Justice requires philosophy, and philosophy requires the city.If approximating the ideal city is impossible, then it is very unlikely thatpeople will be able to approximate the ideal of personal justice.6 ForSocrates to argue successfully that personal justice is better than personalinjustice, he must show that the approximately ideal city is itself possible.To do that, however, he must be able to turn back the angry rush ofconnoisseurs who will oppose rule by the philosophical class.

This is not the only possible interpretation here. Eugenio Benitez (1996) contendsthat the paradox comes from the fact that philosophers must be compelled to rule.Furthermore, the Greek word Socrates uses ('paradoxen') applies to what is genu-inely paradoxical, 'unbelievable' in the sense of an unbelievably talented athlete, orjust unpopular. It is thus plausible that the claim is 'paradoxical' on many dimen-sions, and that that helps to explain Socrates' reluctance to answer this wave ofcriticism.

It is unlikely, but not entirely impossible. Socrates escapes the bootstrappingproblem by allowing for the existence of persons with philosophical natures outsidethe approximately ideal city (496a ff.) Although these people will be more philo-sophical than others (and therefore more just), the (approximately) full realizationof their philosophical nature requires the nurture of the approximately ideal city.Brought to you by | York University Libraries



To overcome the connoisseurs' opposition, Socrates must argue frompremises that they already accept. Turning them back by force is not anoption because the connoisseurs vastly outnumber the philosophers(494a). Without resort to force, the only alternative is genuinely persua-sive argumentation, and genuinely persuasive argumentation will notresort to tactics of tricking or shaming the audience into assent.7 Theargument at 476e ff. is a sample of legitimate, persuasive argumentationmeant to defuse the connoisseurs' opposition to philosophical rule. It isnot meant to persuade us, the enlightened readers of the Republic, thatthe connoisseurs have opinion but not knowledge. That argument is at474c-6d. This argument is an example of how the connoisseurs could bepersuaded that they do not know what they think they know.8

Even a legitimately persuasive argument starting from what theconnoisseurs accept is not enough. Socrates must start from true beliefsof the connoisseurs as well. If he exploits their false beliefs, then theymight cease to be persuaded when their errors are corrected. That couldlead to another angry rush of connoisseurs who are now better informed— and perhaps harder to persuade — than the first wave. A betterstrategy would be to use premises that the philosophers and the connois-seurs can agree on and not to risk the stability of the approximately idealcity.

To apply the dialectical requirement to 476e ff., we must determinewho the 'lovers of sights and sounds,' i.e. the connoisseurs, are and whatthey believe. Both philosophers and connoisseurs are 'lovers of learning/but connoisseurs learn by attending festivals, seeing sights, and listening

Socrates sometimes uses such tactics in the dialogues, as in Protagoras 333a-6b or inCorgias. In this case, however, such a strategy would not turn back the rush ofconnoisseurs once and for all, and thus it would render the approximately ideal cityunstable. Rhetorical tricks and shame do not garner lasting agreement. Addition-ally, one could argue that the ideal city must be moderate, and that moderationrequires a level of genuine agreement which rhetorical tricks are unable to produce.See Protagoras 333b-e for evidence of emptiness of ashamed assent.

I thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on whether it is more important forthe argument to persuade us or to persuade the connoisseurs. Of course, the Republicas a whole is meant to persuade us that it is better to be just than to be unjust. To doso, however, it must also persuade us that it is possible to be just. Unless we can bepersuaded that there is a way to win over the connoisseurs, however, we cannot bepersuaded that personal justice is possible. To win them over requires that both weand the connoisseurs be persuaded that only philosophers can have knowledge.Brought to you by | York University Libraries


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to choruses (475c-d).9 Unlike philosophers, connoisseurs 'would neverwillingly attend a serious discussion' (475d).10 They study T^autina!sounds, colors, shapes, and everything fashioned out of them, but theirthought is unable to see and embrace the beautiful itself (476b). Con-noisseurs cannot attend to the beautiful itself because they do not believein it. Instead, they believe only in sensible beautiful things (476c).

There are two ways in which someone might believe only in sensiblebeautiful things, and this ambiguity might affect the interpretation of the'argument from opposites' at 478e-9c (see below, Section 4). On oneinterpretation, the connoisseurs are strict nominalists who hold thatthere are particular, sensible beautiful objects but not a single, intelligibleForm in which all and only those objects participate.11 On the other hand,the connoisseurs might not be strict nominalists, but instead believe thatthere are many different sensible ways or modes of being beautiful. Theirbelief in the many beautiful things is the belief that many differentsensible properties can be beautiful, a nice shape or a harmonious tone,for example.12

There is a third possible interpretation, however. Perhaps some con-noisseurs are nominalists and others are not. It is not important what the

9 This passage supports Gosling's (1960) characterization of the connoisseurs as thesort of person whose 'learning is culled, for instance, from attendance at festivals ...;but they do not attend merely to fill in time, like the Saturday cinema queues; theywould more likely be found at the Cannes Festival, studying the art.' I prefer theword 'connoisseur' to the more standard 'sight-lover' or 'lover of sights and sounds'(see Allen [1961], Annas [1981], Benitez [1996], Fine [1990], Gosling [1960], Reeve[1988], and just about any other writer on this passage); 'connoisseur' seems betterto convey that these are people who have a prima facie claim to know something,rather than people who just like to be entertained. Plato's own words, however, aremore literally rendered in the standard way.

10 It is not clear what Glaucon has in mind here as 'a serious discussion'. I assume thatconnoisseurs might enjoy a merely intellectual discussion (see Protagoras and Repub-lic I), but they would become bored once the discussion became philosophical.Cephalus, for example, seems to have plenty to say in Republic I until the discussionmoves to the topic of justice in itself (331b-c). He then makes a lame excuse andleaves at the first opportunity (331d).

11 Both R.E. Allen (1961) and Eugenio Benitez (1996) take this line. The coincidence ofa nominalistic reading of Tjeautiful things' and a reading of 'to be' as 'to exist' in476e-7a is accidental for neither Allen nor Benitez.

12 Gosling (1960) and Reeve (1988) take this line. Brought to you by | York University LibrariesAuthenticated | 130.63.180.147



connoisseurs take the sensible to be; all that matters is that their mindsdo not move beyond the sensible to the intelligible. Treating the connois-seurs as strict nominalists provides a natural reading, but there is textualevidence that at least some connoisseurs pay close attention to thefeatures in virtue of which particular objects are beautiful. For example,at 474d-5a Socrates gives a litany of 'terms and excuses' that a connois-seur of young boys will use to explain the beauty of a particular boy.Although the connoisseur does not account for a boy's beauty by appealthe beautiful itself, each boy is beautiful for a reason; he has somesensible property that makes him beautiful. This suggests that nominal-istic connoisseurs are not Socrates' only target. My interpretation of the'argument from opposites' at 478e ff. will work whether or not anyconnoisseurs actually are nominalists.

The connoisseurs are genuine lovers of learning, not just pleasure-seeking epicures out for a good time. They might appear to be expertsin their fields, for they are able to tell good plays from bad, for example,and to say something about what makes the good ones good or the badones bad. As Gosling (1960:120) puts it, they seem to 'know what theyare about.' This might make them appear to have the knowledge requiredto run a city well, even though they neither believe in nor have access tothe beautiful (or the just) itself, over and above the many beautiful (orjust) things. To overturn their claim to political power, and to turn backtheir angry rush, Socrates must argue from premises that such peoplealready accept.

3 The Early Premises: 'What is'

Socrates begins his case against the connoisseurs with the followingshort argument (476e-7a):

(1) He who knows knows something rather than nothing.

(2) What he who knows knows is something that is rather thansomething that is not}3

(3) Therefore, what is completely is completely knowable and whatis in no way is in every way unknowable.

13 Like A. Bloom (1991), I here italicize the relevant instances of 'to be' and 'not to be'.Brought to you by | York University LibrariesAuthenticated | 130.63.180.147


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There are two related puzzles in this passage. The first is how best tointerpret 'to be' in such claims as 'he who knows knows something thatis', and the solution of this puzzle guides the interpretation of the rest ofRepublic V. The second puzzle pertains to the inference from (1) and (2)to (3). On the face of it (pending an interpretation of 'to be'), the argumentdoes not follow. In keeping with the dialectical requirement, then, wemust interpret this passage in such a way that the connoisseurs are likelyto accept the premises and in such a way that the inference plausiblyfollows.14

There are several senses of 'to be' that might apply here. One is theexistential sense, which involves glossing 'to be' as 'to exist'.15 Such aninterpretation, however, also involves violating the dialectical require-ment. The connoisseurs would not accept the premises on an existentialreading of 'to be'. As Annas (1981:196-7) points out, they would probablyreject (2), interpreted existentially, and claim to know some things thatin fact do not exist. Despite her death many years in the past, the con-noisseurs might claim to know that Helen was beautiful. They might alsoclaim to know at least one thing about the beautiful itself—namely, thatit does not exist. The existential reading requires, however, that theconnoisseurs give up such knowledge claims in accepting (2).

Also, for the inference from (1) and (2) to follow — or even for (3) tomake sense — it apparently must be assumed that there are degrees ofbeing. Some things are completely, and others are in no way. Socrates hasno trouble getting agreement that opinion is set over what is intermedi-ate between being and not being (478d). On an existential reading of 'tobe', these claims involve the notion of degrees of existence. There is nogood reason, however, to suppose that the connoisseurs would agreethat there are degrees of existence. Nominalistic and non-nominalisticconnoisseurs alike would be far more likely to believe that some thingsexist and others do not than to admit of an ontologically suspiciousmiddle ground. If we read 'to be' existentially, the connoisseurs musteither posit such a middle ground or deny that there is such a thing as

14 The text of 476e-7a is unclear as to whether Socrates infers (3) from (1) and (2) orinstead infers Glaucon's acceptance of (3) from his acceptance of (1) and (2). Thisdetail makes little difference, however, because the best grounds for inferringGlaucon's agreement come from endorsing the inference of (3) from (1) and (2).

15 Allen (1961) and Benitez (1996) favor this reading.Brought to you by | York University LibrariesAuthenticated | 130.63.180.147



opinion when they agree that opinion is set over what is 'intermediate'(478c-d). It is implausible that the connoisseurs would do either, so weshould give up the existential reading.

A promising alternative is the predicative reading of 'to be'. Such areading treats 'to be' as a copula, and thus treats sentences like 'Knowl-edge is set over what is' as elliptical. They can be completed by addingsome predicate, F, so that 'Knowledge is set over what is' glosses as'Knowledge is set over what is-F'.16 There are two different versions ofthe predicative reading, but there are some difficulties that both versionshave in common. It is not clear what the relevant predicates are withwhich we should complete the elliptical sentences. There may be someparticular predicates that Socrates has in mind (perhaps Tjeautiful'), orit could be that we should understand 'is-F' schematically, with 'F'replaceable by any of a number of predicates that satisfy some further(perhaps null) set of conditions. We might gain some clarity here bylooking forward to the argument from opposites (478e ff.), but thatargument comes too late. By 478, the connoisseurs have already agreedto the key premises involving 'to be', and it is not reasonable to expectthem to agree to those premises before the meaning of 'to be' in them hasbeen clarified.17

The simplest version of the predicative reading is what I call straightpredication. On this interpretation, the 'F' in 'is-F' is replaceable by suchpredicates as l>eautifur, 'double', or 'just' (see 479a ff.). This readingruns into difficulties of its own. It is unrealistic to suppose that theconnoisseurs do not think that they have 'negative knowledge' of somesort. But if we read 'what is' as 'what is beautiful' (for example) and 'whatis not' as 'what is not beautiful', we have to read 'What is in no way is inevery way unknowable' as 'What is beautiful in no way is in every wayunknowable'. Charity dictates that we restrict the ways of knowing inthe range of 'every' so that the most plausible interpretation is that onecannot know anything about the beauty of something that is in no way

16 Reeve (1988) and Armas (1981) adopt this approach. Kahn (1981) adopts a compli-cated account combining elements of the predicative reading with elements of theveridical reading.

17 One might attempt to use 476b-d to evade this problem, but there is only onepredicate, ΐεΒυαπιΙ', used in that passage. One can construct any theory from asingle data point, and the discussion there does not rule a predicative interpretationin or out. Brought to you by | York University Libraries


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beautiful. As long as we assume that the connoisseurs believe themselvesto have negative knowledge, however, they would disagree. They mightclaim to know of some especially ugly thing that it is in no way beautiful.They would thus know something of this ugly thing's beauty. For theconnoisseurs to agree to (2) would involve their giving up any claims tonegative knowledge, which it is not reasonable to suppose they woulddo so early in the argument.18

The second form of the predicative reading, definitional predication,might appear more promising. On this reading, 'what is' is treated notso much as 'what is-F as 'what F is' or 'what it is to be F'. Such a readingmight seem to gain support from 476b-d and from the Socratic obsessionwith questions of the form 'What is F?'. Nevertheless, it does not work.Like the existential reading, the definitional predication reading of 'to be'is binary. While it might make sense to talk about what beauty is, and itmight make sense to talk about what beauty is not, there is no way tomake sense of the notion of something intermediate between what beautyis and what it is not. Particular beautiful things, or ways of beingbeautiful, are not intermediate between what beauty is and what beautyis not. Rather, they simply are not what beauty is.19 They fall readily intothe category of 'what is in no way' on the definitional predicationreading. But Socrates and the connoisseurs agree (eventually) that theconnoisseurs' views of the many beautifuls are opinions, not ignorance,and opinion is set over what is intermediate, not over what is in no way.Even if it were not nonsense to talk about 'degrees' of being whatsomething is (perhaps by pointing to better and worse definitions), thefact that Socrates and the connoisseurs agree that the many beautifuls

18 One might respond to this objection by saying that the connoisseurs would agreethat something that is in no way F is also in no way knowable as F. The problemwith this reply is that to know something as F is just to know that it is F. The objection,then, does not allow for a distinction between knowing something as F (a predicativereading) and knowing that its being F is so (a veridical reading). If the objectionworks, then, it works by backing off from what makes the predicative reading apredicative reading, and so fails to give that reading much support.

19 Recall Socrates' assessment of Euthyphro's claim (Euthyphro 5d-6e) that piety isprosecuting wrongdoers, whoever they may be. He does not say that prosecutingwrongdoers is and is not what piety is, or that it is intermediate between what pietyis and what piety is not. Rather, he points out that prosecuting wrongdoers isaltogether the wrong sort of thing to be what piety is.Brought to you by | York University Libraries



are intermediate is enough to make it unlikely that 'to be' is to be readdefinitionally here.

Having dispensed with the existential and predicative readings of 'tobe', then, the only remaining option is a veridical reading.20 On thisreading, we gloss 'what is' as, roughly, 'what is so', and 'what is not' as'what is not so'. As Annas (1981: 197) points out, this reading doesseriously risk falling to the same sort of objection that felled the existen-tial and definitional predicative interpretations. It makes no sense tospeak of degrees of truth, and it would appear that the veridical readingwould involve us (and the connoisseurs!) in just such talk.

This is a serious warning. However we work out the veridical reading,we should do it in a way that does not involve saying that some thingsare truer or falser than others.21 There is a veridical interpretation of 'tobe' that does not run afoul of this problem, however. Kahn (1981) dis-cusses, in addition to the veridical sense of the verb 'to be' in Greek, averidical nuance or value that the verb sometimes carries:

Even where syntax is unambiguous, a copula use of the verb may beara veridical value, that is to say, it may serve to call attention to the truthclaim that is implicit in each declarative sentence. This function of theverb ... is not so clearly defined a notion as the veridical construction.It is unmistakable in those cases where a use of ["to be"] is naturallytranslated as "is true", "is so", or "is the case"; but these are typicallynot copula constructions. In the copula use a veridical nuance emergeswhenever there is any contrast between being so and seeming so,between being really such-and-such and being only called such-and-such or believed to be such-and-such. (1981:105-6)

Taking the veridical nuance into account, Kahn develops a version of thepredicative reading such that 'to be' means 'really (and not just appar-ently) to be F'. There is much to recommend such a reading, but it suffers

20 To the extent that the 'identity interpretation' (treating 'is' as 'is identical to') is aserious option, it is a species of the predicative interpretation.

21 Fine (1991) attempts to get around the 'degrees of truth' problem by reconstructingthe argument in terms of sets of propositions. Doing so, however, is anachronistic,and anachronism is not allowed if we take the dialectical requirement as a seriousinterpretive constraint. The connoisseurs cannot agree to something that has not yetbeen conceived. Brought to you by | York University Libraries


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the characteristic weakness of any predicative reading of 'to be' in 476eff.: there is no good way to determine which predicates are eligible to bereplacements for the schematic 'F. Despite the problems facing Kahn'spredicative account, it is suggestive of a possibly fruitful veridical account.If we combine the veridical interpretation of 'to be' with an appreciationfor the veridical nuance, then we can piece together a two-dimensionalveridical interpretation that succeeds, I think, in making sense of Socra-tes' argument at 476e ff.

The veridical nuance allows an ordinary truth claim to be made moreemphatically. Merely to say that something is with the veridical senseleaves it open whether or not it is so independently of how things seem.To say that it is with both the veridical sense and the veridical nuancehowever, is to say that it is so independently of how things seem. Thereare thus two distinctions at play. The first is the ordinary distinctionbetween what is so and what is not so. The second is the distinctionbetween what is (or is not) so independently o/how things seem and whatis (or is not) so depending on how things seem. I propose to use both thesedistinctions in working out the veridical interpretation of 'to be'. Socratesdistinguishes not only what is from what is not, but he also makes themore emphatic distinction between what is completely and what is in noway. The language of 477a indicates that these four categories areintensionally distinct from one another. In the general category of whatis, there is a subcategory consisting of what is completely. What is in noway constitutes a subcategory of what is not. One can thus take what iscompletely to be what is so independently of how things seem. It is whatis with 'is' carrying both the veridical sense and the veridical nuance.'What is not completely' is thus ambiguous. On the one hand, it indicateswhat completely is not, i.e. what is in no way. This is what, independentlyof how things seem, is not so. On the other hand, something might notbe completely because the matter of whether it is or is not depends insome way on how things seem. The categories of what is and is not thusbreak down as follows:

1. What isl.a. What is so independently of how things seem, 'what is

completely'

l.b. What is so at least partly in virtue of how things seem

2. What is not2.a. What is not so independently of how things seem, 'what

is in no way' Brought to you by | York University LibrariesAuthenticated | 130.63.180.147



2.b. What is not so at least partly in virtue of how things seem

Knowledge in general is set over what is. Complete or unqualifiedknowledge, however, is set over only category l.a. Similarly, ignoranceis set over what is not, but absolute ignorance is set over only category 2.a.Socrates and Glaucon agree (477a) that if anything both is and is not (thatis, if anything falls into both category 1 and category 2), then it isintermediate between what 'purely is' (l.a.) and what 'in no way is' (2.a.).Whatever is intermediate, then, must fall both into category 1 .b. and intocategory 2.b. It will have to seem to be so and also seem not to be so,depending how you look at it.

This approach avoids the degrees of truth problem. Neither Socratesnor the connoisseurs are committed to the absurd doctrine that truthcomes in degrees. Beyond the distinction between truth and falsehood,they are committed only to a distinction between what is so inde-pendently of how things seem and what is so at least partly in virtue ofhow things seem. The connoisseurs have no reason to disagree with sucha distinction between reality and appearances.

This, then, is how I read 476e-7a. Speaking on behalf of the connois-seurs, Glaucon first agrees with Socrates that whenever someone knows,he knows something rather than nothing. The thing that the personknows is something that is so (category 1). The inference from (1) and (2)to (3) occurs when Socrates and Glaucon note that whatever is soindependently of how things seem (l.a.) is knowable without qualifica-tion.22 Furthermore, whatever is not so independently of how thingsseem (2.a.), is not knowable at all. The inference is valid because, al-though knowledge is set over what is, only what is so independently ofhow things seem (category l.a.) cannot also fall into category 2. Interme-diate between what is really so and what is really not so (l.a. and 2.a.),

22 Although Socrates and Glaucon agree that whatever is is completely knowable(apparently on the basis of [1] and [2]), they should agree only that whatever iscompletely is completely knowable if knowable at all, i.e. that whatever is com-pletely knowable is completely. This is a problem for Socrates and Glaucon on anyinterpretation, and so I do not attempt to correct the error here. As things stand,Plato is apparently committed to the view that knowability is criterial for truth orreality, and that human knowers have cognitive access, in principle, to all the facts.From this point, it is easy to make the move to an anti-realist verificationism(certainly an un-Platonic position!) according to which truth itself amounts toknowability, and the limits of human reason set the limits of what there is.Brought to you by | York University Libraries


102 Chase B. Wrenn

we find things that fall into both category 1 and category 2. Becausesomething in category l.a. cannot be in category 2, and something incategory 2.a. cannot be in category 1, anything intermediate betweenwhat purely is and what is in no way would have to fall into bothcategory l.b. and category 2.b. These are things that seem one way andalso seem another way; they are so if viewed from one perspective andthey are not so if viewed from another.

If this version of the veridical interpretation is to work, however, itmust also hold up in two other important parts of Socrates' argumentagainst the connoisseurs. The first is the 'powers argument' at 477c ff.,in which Socrates attempts to show that opinion is intermediate betweenknowledge and ignorance. The second is the 'argument from opposites'at 478a ff., in which he argues that the many beautifuls (for example) areintermediate between being and not being, and thus objects of opinion butnot knowledge. I rum to these arguments in the following section.

4 The Powers Argument and the Argumentfrom Opposites

The structure of the powers argument (477c-8d) is as follows. First,Socrates proposes a criterion for individuating powers and establishesthat knowledge and opinion are both powers (477c-e). Applying thatcriterion of individuation (and assuming that knowledge, opinion, andignorance are different powers), he argues that opinion is set oversomething different from what knowledge and ignorance are respec-tively set over. Because opinion is 'darker than knowledge but clearerthan ignorance' (478d), the conclusion is that opinion is intermediatebetween ignorance and knowledge and is set over what is intermediatebetween what is completely and what is in no way.

The most troublesome part of Socrates' argument is his criterion ofindividuation for powers:

A power has neither color nor shape nor any other feature of the sortthat many other things have and that I use to distinguish those thingsfrom one another. In the case of a power, I use only what it is set overand what it does, and by reference to these I call each the power it is:What is set over the same things and does the same I call the samepower; what is set over something different and does something dif-ferent I call a different one. (477c-d)




With Glaucon's agreement that knowledge and opinion are differentpowers (477b), Socrates applies this criterion to establish that opinion isset over something different and does something different from knowl-edge.

Socrates' criterion, however, is insufficient to support the inference. Itis logically possible for powers to be set over different things but to dothe same thing, or for them to be set over the same things but do differentthings.23 The criterion does not address these possibilities. It does notspecify whether such powers would be the same or different. WhatSocrates has provided are conditions sufficient for the identity or diversityof powers, but he has not given necessary and sufficient conditions. Lackingnecessary and sufficient conditions, merely knowing that two powersdiffer is not enough to legitimate the inference that they both are set overdifferent things and do different things. For the distinctness of the powersof knowledge and opinion to imply mat they are set over different things,however, requires that inference, and Socrates and Glaucon make it at478a. It would thus appear that Socrates' argument is in trouble.

There are a number of ways of approaching this problem, but mypoint is that, to the extent that this is a real problem, it is not a problemwhose existence undermines the plausibility of the veridical interpreta-tion. First, the interpretation can lessen (if not remove) the trouble thatSocrates is in here. Glaucon has already granted that opinion is the powerin virtue of which we opine and that knowledge is the (distinct) powerin virtue of which we know (477b, 477d-e). The connoisseurs are likelyto agree that knowing and opining differ, even before Socrates intro-duces his criterion of individuation, because it is reasonable to expectthat they would want to distinguish what they do (knowing) from whatthe untutored masses do (opining).

Given that the distinction between what knowledge does and whatopinion does has been granted even before the powers argument begins,one can ask whether it is reasonable to suppose that knowledge andopinion are therefore set over different things. In the special case ofknowledge and opinion, the inference is reasonable. This is becauseknowledge and opinion do not need disjoint domains to be set overdifferent things; overlap is permissible so long as there is something over

23 This purely logical point does not depend on any particular interpretation of theambiguous expression 'set over' ('epi'). Brought to you by | York University Libraries


104 Chase B. Wrenn

which one is set but not the other.24 In this case, it will turn out thatknowledge is set over the whole of category 1 (with complete knowledgerestricted to category l.a.)/ while opinion is set over a part of category 1,as well as a part of category 2.

Suppose that knowledge and opinion were set over exactly the samethings. Because knowing is set over 'what is [so] to know it as it is[independently of how things seem]' (477b), this means that opinionmust be set over what is so to opine it as it is independently of how thingsseem. Then, however, there would be no difference between knowingand opining. In each case one comes to believe what is so independentlyof how things seem. Opining, like knowing, would be infallible. Butopinion is fallible, and knowledge is not (477e). The difference in whatopinion does and what knowledge does in part depends on there beinga difference in what they are each set over.

Although this approach provides a plausible reconstruction of theinference from the distinctness of knowledge and opinion to the distinct-ness of their domains, it does not follow very closely the way thatSocrates and Glaucon actually argue in the text. Glaucon says plainly at478a-b, '[I]f a different power is set over something different, and opin-ion and knowledge are different powers, then the knowable and theopinable cannot be the same.' He is invoking Socrates' criterion ofindividuation of powers in its general form, and he is not appealing tothe special relationship between opining and knowing.25

Another possibility is to grant that Socrates has made a mistake. Evencharity has its limits, and the inference from the difference of the powersto the difference of both their domains and what they do is drawnunequivocally at 478a-b. Even if we try to interpret Socrates' words at477d as merely claiming that different (mental) powers are always setover different things and always do different things, then we face thedifficulty of determining why merely doing the same or merely being setover the same things would be sufficient for their identity (as in that case

24 Fine (1990: 91) makes essentially the same point.

25 This fact about the text also poses a problem for Annas (1981) and Fine (1990). Eachof them attempts to make the inference reasonable in terms of her interpretation of'to be', and each of them appeals to special characteristics of the relationship ofknowing to opining. In particular, they neglect the fact that, as Socrates and Glauconapply the criterion, it is perfectly general and distinguishes knowledge from opinionas well as hearing from seeing (477c). Brought to you by | York University Libraries



it would). My version of the veridical interpretation gives us reason tothink that the mistake, if it is a mistake, is harmless in this case, but itdoes not make the mistake go away.26 It seems unlikely, however, thatthere is any other interpretation of 'to be' that would resolve the problem.It is Socrates and Glaucon's uses of 'same' and 'different', not 'to be' thatare problematic.

With it settled that knowledge and opinion are set over differentthings, the argument of 478b-e proceeds fairly (but not entirely) un-problematically to the conclusion that opinion is set over what is inter-mediate between what is completely and what is in no way. This sets thestage for the argument from opposites (478e ff.), in which Socrates arguesthat the 'many beautiful things,' 'the many just things,' 'the many piousthings,' 'the many doubles/ and 'the many bigs and smalls and lightsand heavies' all 'participate in opposites' and therefore both are (category1) and are not (category 2). Because opinion, but not knowledge, is setover what is so as well as what is not so, the many beautiful things (interalia) are what opinion and not knowledge is set over. The challenge formy version of the veridical reading of 'to be' is to make sense of thisargument, and in particular of its claims to the effect that the manybeautifuls (for example) both are and are not.

I remain agnostic as to whether there are any purely nominalisticconnoisseurs. My inclination is to say that there are some, and thatSocrates is being systematically ambiguous in using expressions like 'themany beautifuls.' One reason for this is that, on the veridical interpreta-

26 I here say 'harmless' in that it does not lead Socrates to draw a false conclusion.However, it is far from harmless so far as the overall project of the Republic goes. Ifthis inference does not work, then the argument Socrates offers to persuade theconnoisseurs does not go through, and that could have disastrous consequences. Itcould render the approximately ideal city, and thus personal justice, impossible.

I think the problem can be solved, but I do not have an argument for my favoredsolution. Eric Brown has suggested to me, for example, that perhaps 'same' and'different' are being used as contraries rather than contradictories in this passage.On that interpretation, powers that are purely the same do the same things withregard to the same things, and powers that are purely different do different thingswith regard to different domains. Powers that do different things with regard to thesame domain, or the same thing with regard to different domains, would then bein one sense the same as one another and in another sense different. Whether oneagrees with this interpretation or not (I do), it does show that the problem in mepowers argument derives from the ways that 'same' and 'different' are used, notfrom the use of 'to be'. It is 'to be' that I am concerned with in this paper.Brought to you by | York University Libraries


106 Chase B. Wrenn

hon, one can make sense of this passage either way. Assume first thatSocrates is arguing against those who believe in the many beautifulthings (but not the beautiful itself) in the sense of believing only in themany beautiful objects. That is, assume that he is arguing against nomi-nalists. The key point is that he frames the relevant contrasts in terms ofhow things appear.

"My dear fellow," we'll say, "of all the many beautiful things, is thereone that will not also appear ugly? Or is there one of those just thingsthat will not also appear unjust? Or one of those pious things that willnot also appear impious?" (478e-9a)

What about the many doubles? Do they appear any the less halves thandoubles? (479b)

So, with the many bigs and smalls and lights and heavies, is any of themany more the thing someone says it is than its opposite? (479b, myemphasis)

The cognitive faculties of nominalistic connoisseurs are directed atparticular objects. They might judge it true that something is beautiful,just, double, or pious, but they can do so only on the bases of how thingsseem to be and of common opinion as to whether that thing is beautifulor just or pious or double. They can appeal only to sensible beauty, andnot to the intelligible Form of Beauty itself. Thus, they must also recog-nize that whatever seems beautiful also seems ugly, and similarly for whatseems just or pious or double.27 If all there is to beauty is seemingbeautiful, then all the beautiful objects are also ugly objects. That theyare beautiful is not so independently of how things are, but rather it inpart depends on how things seem to be. That is why Socrates and Glauconagree that 'according to the conventions of the majority of people aboutbeauty and the others, they are rolling around as intermediate betweenwhat is not and what purely is.' A particular beautiful thing 'participatesin opposites' and falls into both categories 1 .b. and 2.b. Its being beautiful

27 The double, being a mathematical matter, might appear to raise special difficultiesof its own for these appeals to how things seem to be. For discussion of a platonistic(but perhaps not Platonic) view of things seeming mathematically different whilein fact being grounded in a single, objective, mathematical truth, see C.B. Wrenn(1998). Brought to you by | York University Libraries



both is and is not because it might or might not be beautiful, dependingon how one looks at it.

With regard to non-nominalistic connoisseurs, the argument works inmuch the same way. Rather than contending that the many beautifulobjects (etc.) also appear to be ugly, Socrates contends that the manysensible ways of being beautiful are also ways of being ugly. He gives anexample of precisely that at 474d-e, where he notes that sallowness issometimes a feature in virtue of which someone is beautiful, and some-times a feature in virtue of which someone is ugly. Once he gets agree-ment that the sensible features in virtue of which something is beautifulor just or pious are also features in virtue of which something is ugly orunjust or impious, the conclusion is the same. Without appeal to thebeautiful itself, our account of beauty can point only to features that cancontribute to a thing's ugliness. The beauty of a sallow complexion is aconventional matter of how one looks at it. To say that sallowness isbeautiful is to say something that is so at least in part depending on howthings seem. It falls into category 1 .b. and category 2.b.; it both is and is not.

The rest of the argument follows because the connoisseurs claim tohave knowledge while denying that there is any such thing as the beauti-ful itself. That is why they cannot be taken to study or contemplatebeauty itself, but only to form judgments about beautiful objects orproperties. Socrates has won their agreement that knowledge is set overwhat is (with complete knowledge attaching only to what is completely),and that opinion is set over what is and is not. Because the judgments ofthe connoisseurs are dependent on how things seem to be, and inparticular on sensible objects and properties, their judgments pertain towhat is and is not. This conclusion also follows from premises that theconnoisseurs must accept. Thus, the connoisseurs must admit that, inconcerning themselves with what is and is not, they are exercising onlythe power of opinion. They must also admit that philosophers, whoattend to the beautiful itself rather than to beautiful things, are concernedwith what is so independently of what seems to be the case. They are inthe business of knowing, while the connoisseurs must admit to beingonly in the business of opining.28

28 This paper has benefitted tremendously from helpful comments and criticisms fromEric Brown, A.M.C. Casiday, Josefa Toribio, Richard Watson, and an anonymousreferee for Apeiron. Brought to you by | York University Libraries


108 Chase B. Wrenn

References

Allen, R.E 1961 'The Argument from Opposites m Republic V The Review of Metaphysics15: 325-335.

Annas, J. 1981. An Introduction to Plato's Republic. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Benitez, E. 1996. 'Republic 467d6-e2: Plato's Dialectical Requirement'. The Revieiv of Meta-physics 49: 515-546.

Bloom, A. trans. 1991. The Republic of Plato. 2nd ed. New York, NY· Basic Books.

Cooper, J.M. ed. 1997 Plato: Complete Works. Indianapolis, ΓΝ: Hackett Publishing Com-pany.

Fine, G. 1990. 'Knowledge and Belief in Republic V-V1I'. In S. Everson, ed., Companions toAncient Thought l· Epistemology. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Goldman, A.I. 1979. 'What is Justified Belief?' In G. Pappas, ed., Justification and Knowledge.Dordrecht: Reidel.

Gosling, J. 1960. 'Republic Book V: Ta Polla Kala etc'. Phronesis 5.116-128.

Grube, G.M.A., trans, rev. C.D.C. Reeve, 1997. Plato. Republic. In Cooper (1997).

Kahn, C.H. 1981. 'Some Philosophical Uses of "to be" in Plato'. Phronesis 26:105-134.

Reeve, C.D.C. 1988. Philosopher-kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic. Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press.

Wrenn, C.B. 1998. 'Explaining Mathematical Objectivity'. MS. Presented to the SouthernSociety for Philosophy and Psychology on 9 April 1998, New Orleans, LA.

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Apeiron Volume 33 Issue 2 2000 [Doi 10.1515%2FAPEIRON.2000.33.2.87] Wrenn, Chase B. -- Being and Knowledge- A Connoisseur's Guide to Republic v.476e Ff