“The Jaffa Slope Project”: An Analysis of “Jaffaesque” Narratives … · Introduction 49 “The Jaffa Slope Project”: An Analysis of “Jaffaesque” Narratives in the New

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“The Jaffa Slope Project”: An Analysis of “Jaffaesque”Narratives in the New Millennium

Ravit GoldhaberDepartment of Geography, Ben-Gurion University

IntroductionThe Jaffa Slope project is a developmentplan that was drafted for the city of Jaffa(Yaffa in Arabic) in the 1960s. Itencompasses the Arab neighborhoods ofJabaliya and Ajami and the underlyingshoreline, known as the Jaffa Slope. Theaim of the project is to create new land byland reclamation, thereby creating openspaces for the public and land for buildingapartments of a relatively high standard,and making greater use of the shoreline(Local Master Plan – Jaffa Slope No.2236). The project serves as a “shadowplan,” and accordingly any projectimplemented within its confines mustconform to its directives. Although severalstages of the project have beenimplemented over the past forty years, itwas only in 1995 that it received finalofficial approval. The project wasimplemented in accordance with the landpolicies adopted by municipal planners atvarious stages. However, its basicprinciples have remained unchanged sinceits launch: namely, to alter the social andphysical fabric of these neighborhoods.

The public discourse surrounding theproject and its implementation hasconstituted an arena in which Jaffa’svarious actors (including the Jewishestablishment and the Arab population)have battled over the redesign of the space.The municipality presents the project aspart of its overall regional policy ofintegrated socio-urban rehabilitation anddevelopment, which ostensibly aims atenhancing the lives of those living in theArab neighborhoods and improving theirimage and status. By contrast, the localArab discourse reflects a sense that thecommunity faces an existential threat.

In this article, I will argue that theimplementation of the Jaffa Slope projectreflects a convergence of national,economic and socio-urban interests thathas given rise to a struggle over spatialidentity. I will also contend that thecompetition over space and the use ofspace in Jaffa can be understood in thecontext of Israel as a society that is basedon a Judaizing spatial ideology (Yiftachel,1999; 2006) and has a liberal economicstructure (Shalev, 2006). I shall further

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examine the implications of this form ofdevelopment on the indigenous Arabpopulation, as well as its impact onrelations between the Jewish and Arabresidents of Jaffa.

I shall present my arguments throughan analysis of the discourse of theestablishment, in order to cast light on thelocal spatial policy, alongside an analysis ofthe local Arab discourse, which reflects theArab struggle to hold onto the land andunderscore its Arab character.

The article contains five sections. Thefirst proposes “ethnic logic” as atheoretical framework for the occupationof indigenous cities by settler societies andimmigrants. Next follows an outline of theprinciples of the Jaffa Slope project andplanning policy in Jaffa over time.Thirdly, the article will address thenational, economic and socio-urbaninterests that have been pursued throughthe Jaffa Slope project. The fourth sectionfocuses on the discourse of theestablishment and the local Arab discoursesurrounding the plan and itsimplementation. The final sectionconsiders the implications of the projectfor the native Arab population of Jaffa,Jewish-Arab relations in the city, and thefuture of Jaffa’s Arab community.

Ethnic logic and the occupation ofindigenous citiesAs indicated by Lefebvre (1996), urbanspace offers its inhabitants “the right to

the city”. This right consists of openness,flexibility, the recognition of differences,the right to be included, the right todevelop an individual or collectiveidentity, and autonomous decision-making, alongside an egalitariandistribution of resources and capital.However, his vision of urban space hasremained confined to the realm of theory,as the right to the city of urbaninhabitants is diminished by theconstantly shifting balances of powersbetween social groups and their strugglesover the control of spatial design. Whensocial groups do not belong to a singleethnos, ethnic logic exacerbates thestruggle over urban spatial design andcontrol. This logic marginalizes vulnerableethnic groups and relegates them to thecity’s economic, political, social andspatial margins (Sibley, 1995; Yiftachel,1999). According to Yiftachel (2006),ethnic logic comes into play where there isan attempt to consolidate theindependence of a nation, outline theboundaries of a new country and populatean external frontier (settlement in adifferent country or continent) or aninternal frontier (settlement in mixedcities) with settler societies andimmigrants (Yacobi and Zfadia, 2004;Roded, 2006). The external frontier ispopulated by the settler society followingtheir invasion of or immigration to anarea. A good illustration of this process isEuropean emigration to Australia and

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“The Jaffa Slope Project”: An Analysis of “Jaffaesque” Narratives in the New Millennium

Canada in the 18th century.The internal frontier is populated by the

settler society (the majority group) aftertheir dispersion throughout andsettlement in the areas in which the statewishes to reinforce the majority group’scontrol over the minority group. Examplesare provided by Sri Lanka, Estonia, Greeceand Malaysia (Yiftachel and Kedar, 2003).The settler society fosters its own ethno-cultural structure within the country’sborders and establishes a hierarchy ofethnic status. Within this context, thesettler society attempts to redesign thecultural-national space in order tolegitimize its appropriation andoccupation. The settler societyappropriates the space in such a way as toavoid mixing with the local populationand sometimes even to facilitate its ethniccleansing (Sibley, 1995). At the sametime, the dominant class gains in strengthrelative to the lower and middle classes,thereby creating a society founded onethno-class stratification. Yiftachel andKedar (2003) indicate that this processleads to the creation of three main ethno-classes: the founding charter group, whichacquires the dominant status; theimmigrant group, which undergoes aprocess of upward assimilation within thecharter group; and the native group(considered to be “locals” or “foreigners”),which is relegated to the economic, socialand spatial periphery of the new society.

This exclusion is perpetrated through

territorial control, the “ethnic logic” ofcapital flows, the legal system and the landplanning regime, and establishes andimposes the dominant culture, whileundermining – even eradicating – theindigenous culture (Benvenisti, 1997;Ben-Shemesh, 2003; Bar-Gal, 2002;Roded, 2006; Yiftachel, 2006). Yiftachel(2006) and Roded (2006) illustrate theprocess of settling and occupation bysettler societies in the internal frontier inSri Lanka and Estonia, and demonstratehow planning is a crucial tool inexpanding the control exercised bydominant groups. In Sri Lanka, a battlewas waged over the division of space andpower between the Sinhalese majority andthe Tamil minority. In Estonia, theprocess involved an anti-Soviet land andplanning policy that excluded Russiancitizens, who make up a third of thecountry’s population, and even revokedtheir citizenship. In parallel, a policy of“Estonia-ization” was adopted in thepolitical, cultural and spatial system withthe aim of reviving the Estonian nationand culture.

A mixed city plays a significant role inshaping politico-spatial relations betweenethnic groups and reproducing themthrough spatial planning and production,the dominant group’s control over theaccessibility and distribution of resourcesand capital, and in forging symboliccontents for space and feeding offpreferred cultural sources (Yiftachel and

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Yacobi, 2003). In mixed cities, ethniclogic is exposed through urban policy. Attimes it is apparent, and at others it isconcealed behind various interests. Theconcept of the “mixed city” describes amixed living pattern in which severalethnic groups inhabit a collective space. InIsrael it describes a living pattern for Jewsand Arabs that is not prevalent: onlyaround 8% of Arabs live in mixed cities,all of which have a clear Jewish majority(Hadas and Gonen, 1994; Monterescuand Fabian, 2003; Hamdan, 2006;Yacobi, 2006; Falah, 1996; Yiftachel andYacobi, 2003). Most of the mixed cities inIsrael came into being as a result ofgeographic, historical and politicalcircumstances whose roots lie in theestablishment of the state (Gonen andHamaisi, 1992), and were not the productof planning or regulation on the part ofthe government. The Arab residents of themixed cities tends to live in concentratedareas separate from the Jewish residents (afrequent pattern among ethnic and racialgroups in many cities worldwide [BenArtzi and Shoshani, 1986; Boal, 1976]).However, there are also mixedneighborhoods that contain both Jewishand Arab residents, in which Arabs areagain generally a minority. Within Jaffa,Ajami and Jabaliya are isolated Arabneighborhoods with large Arab majorities.The neighborhoods located alongsidethem, to the east of Yefet Street, are mixedneighborhoods. Because mixed cities are a

marginal phenomenon within Israel’surban space and incompatible with theideology of Judaization and spatialsegregation, there is a pressing need toprobe the overall interests that lie behindpublic planning policy in thesecommunities.

This article seeks to demonstrate howthe ethnic logic that guides publicplanning policy in Jaffa (in the form ofnational and economic interests) hascontributed to the occupation of the cityand to its transformation into a Jewishcity. It will also discuss how this logic hashad a deleterious effect on the native Arabpopulation of Jaffa, through the variousspatial design and planning and theprocess of gentrification, on which I shallelaborate below, that began in Jaffa in thelate 1980s.

Main principles of the Jaffa Slopeproject and planning policy in Jaffa

The Jaffa Slope project (Local MasterPlan No. 2236), which covers the JaffaSlope (the area west of Kedem Streetdown to the sea) and the Arabneighborhoods of Ajami and Jabaliya (eastof Kedem Street) (Local Master Plan No.2660), was drafted by the localmunicipality to provide a solution to theproblem of the physical deterioration andsocial disintegration of these twoneighborhoods (see map no. 1).1 On theslope, the building plans were suspendedand only the reclaimed area is now being

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Map no. 1: Tel Aviv-Yaffa: Division of neighborhoods

and sub-neighborhoods

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dealt with.2 The plan was submitted forapproval as long ago as 1965 and firstbegan to be implemented at that time.However, it was only finally approved bythe planning authorities in January 1995.Over the years since the plan was firstsubmitted, the municipality’s publicplanning policy has altered significantlywith regard to these neighborhoods.

A serious assessment of the magnitudeof the implications of the public planningpolicy in Jaffa on its Arab residents mustconsider the status and importance of Jaffain Palestinian society prior to itsoccupation in 1948. Jaffa developed intoa major port city under Ottoman andBritish rule, and a major political,economic, social and commercial center.The city established commercial contactsboth inside and outside the country andbecame renowned, among others things,for its thriving citrus industry. Its prestigegrew to the extent that it became knownas the “port city of Jerusalem” (Kark,2003). The 1948 War of Independence,according to the Jewish narrative, or theNakba (catastrophe), in the Arabnarrative, stunted the urban developmentof Jaffa and the surrounding area, alongwith other Arab cities in Israel. Of theapproximately 70,000 Arabs living Jaffa inits heyday in 1947, only a smallpercentage of Arabs did not flee from orwere not expelled from their homes. Theremaining Arab population – around3,800 people in total – was concentrated

in Ajami and Jabaliya, which weresubjected to Israeli military rule until1950 (Portugali, 1991). Ajami andJabaliya (named Givat Aliya in Hebrew)were thereafter known as “the Arabneighborhoods”. The Al-Menashiyaneighborhood was destroyed and the OldCity of Jaffa deserted (Mazawi andMakhoul, 1991).

In 1950, Jaffa was merged with Tel Avivand became one of the city’s districts(District 7). Henceforth, the official nameof Tel Aviv became Tel Aviv-Jaffa. Thecultural, social and economic structuresthat had been part of Jaffa’s past collapsedentirely, as did its Arab communityinstitutions, which ceased functioning.The Arab local leaders and other membersof the upper-middle socio-economicclasses abandoned Jaffa, leaving behind adevastated community lacking a localleadership and comprised mainly ofpeople of low socio-economic standing.Thus Jaffa, whose former status hadearned it the epithets, “The Bride of theSea” and “The Bride of Palestine,” became– in the words of Shaker (1996) – the“slum of Tel Aviv”. The public planningpolicy that has guided the municipalityover the years, which I shall review below,is one of the main reasons for the currentdismal state of Jaffa.

In the 1960s, an urban renewal policywas implemented, consisting ofevacuation-construction and “brutalrehabilitation”, which was used widely in

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the Western world (Kipnis and Schnell,1978). The plan involved evacuating anddemolishing poor neighborhoods andplacing the destitute population in publichousing in other areas of the city. Most ofthe new neighborhoods planned for theevacuated areas were designed for a middleor upper class population (Hall, 1988). Itwas assumed that poverty could thereby beeradicated and private investment in thearea stimulated (Carmon, 1993, 1997;Erez and Carmon, 1996). This assessmentdid not encompass the preservation of oldbuildings or houses of unique architecturalor historical value, nor did it take intoaccount the social problems likely to arisein the wake of the evacuation of entireneighborhoods. The “evacuation-construction” project, part of the JaffaSlope project, that was planned for theneighborhoods of Ajami and Jabaliyainvolved evacuating the existinginhabitants (Arabs and Jews) from thespace and demolishing some of theexisting structures in order to buildluxurious housing on the empty land forpeople of medium and high socio-economic means.

The plan also involved expanding thebuilding areas by reclaiming a strip of landfrom the ocean (the site was declared aregional dumping ground for constructionwaste). The reclaimed site became anenvironmental, sanitary and aesthetichazard for those living on the coast and tothe marine environment (Or-Savorai,

1988). Though not official (Portugali,1991), the policy of demolishing homeswas nevertheless effective. Within thescope of the plan, the Israel LandAdministration and the Amidar HousingCompany, an Israeli housing companyowned and operated by the government,demolished – with the support of theauthorities – as many as 1,347 residentialbuildings (Shaker, 1996), amounting to41.4% of the total number of residentialunits in Ajami and Jabaliya from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s (Municipality ofTel Aviv-Jaffa, 1993). The policy ofevacuating and rebuilding the Arabneighborhoods, which was accepted by theMunicipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa and theIsrael Land Administration, wasimplemented by contractors – the Amidarand Halmish building companies – overthe course of approximately twenty years.It involved placing a freeze on newbuilding, banning renovations,demolishing or sealing off buildings, anddeliberately perpetuating the under-development of the area (Mazawi andMakhoul, 1991).

The vacant, untended plots andabandoned and partially-demolishedbuildings, together with a decline in thequality of municipal services, lent the twoneighborhoods an air of dysfunction.However, despite the deterioration of thearea and the destruction of most of itsinfrastructure and buildings, most of itsoriginal inhabitants continued to live

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there, a majority of whom were Arabs(Center for Socioeconomic Research,Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 2003).Most Jews were able to leave theneighborhoods since they had the choicebetween financial compensation andpublic housing in other neighborhoods inTel Aviv-Jaffa (such as Jaffa Daled) or innearby cities (e.g. Bat Yam, Holon orRamat Gan). Conversely, only onealternative housing project3 was built forArab inhabitants and it failed. Thus Arabswere left with the sole option of obtainingfinancial compensation, but this was notsufficient to enable most of them torelocate to other neighborhoods.

In the mid-1980s, public planningpolicy in Jaffa changed. Instead of“evacuation-construction”, the authoritiesadopted a policy of renewal, rehabilitationand development with the participation oflocal residents. Emphasis was placed onthe combined tackling of physicalplanning problems and social problems.The catalyst for this change in policy wasthe harsh criticism that was leveled againstthe policy of urban renewal through brutalrehabilitation. Those implementing theplan were accused of disregard for theevacuees and of excluding them from thedrafting process, as well asshortsightedness with regard to the heavyemotional toll extracted by forcedevacuation and the social costs ofdestroying healthy communities (Carmon,1993). In the spirit of the new planning

concept, the municipality sought toinclude the Ajami neighborhood in thenational Neighborhood RehabilitationProject, launched in the late-1970s. Themunicipality realized that the urbandegeneration that was spreadingthroughout Jaffa would not be conduciveto the creation of the infrastructure of amodern new neighborhood, and that itwould not be possible to solve theproblems of the Arab population withoutrehabilitating it on its own territory(Menachem and Shapiro, 1992).However, the NeighborhoodRehabilitation Project came to an end in1994, before the physical and social aimsof the project had been fully realized(Menachem and Shapiro, 1992).

From the beginning of the 1990s to thepresent day, the emphasis of therehabilitation and development policy ofthe Tel Aviv-Jaffa Municipality has shiftedto focus primarily on business andeconomic factors (Carmon, 1993). Thisshift has given way to rising privateenterprise, with public involvement.Private and public enterprise has primarilybeen reflected in the process ofgentrification4 (Ley, 1992; Short, 1989;Gonen and Cohen, 1989; Mazawi andMakhoul, 1991; Ginsberg, 1993;Monterescu and Fabian, 2003), which hasseen the launch of housing projects for thewealthy population. The gentrificationprocess has implications for the urban andsocial space in that it is instrumental to

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urban renewal, and can help to eradicatepoverty. It can also alter a neighborhood’simage and status by bringing in moreaffluent residents while driving out theoriginal, poorer inhabitants, and therebydamaging the social fabric of theircommunities (Schnell and Greitzer,1994).

At first glance, the gentrification processin Jaffa appears to have been a naturalurban process. In fact, however, it hasbeen primarily driven by the municipalauthorities through the investment ofbudgetary funds, the granting of buildingpermits to real estate developers andindividuals, the acceleration of the processof approving urban building plans, andrezoning of the land in Ajami(Monterescu and Fabian, 2003). Thisprocess is the response of a “defensivespace”: the dominant Jewish group isdefending itself against the original ethnicgroup by attempting to alter thedemographic balance in the area. Thisdefense is achieved through thegentrification of the traditionally Arabneighborhoods, a process which attracts anew Jewish population to these areas.Gentrification can therefore be perceivedas a means of occupying the indigenouscity that takes place at an advanced stageof the settling process. As a result, thenative Arab group views the gentrificationprocess as a violent invasion of its spaceand as an attempt to intensify competitionover the national and ethnic identity of

the land. This feeling is heightened bychronic housing shortages in thetraditional Arab neighborhoods. Suchsentiment was recently expressed indemonstrations that were staged in Jaffa inApril 2007 in protest against the acuteshortage of housing for young Arabcouples and the authorities’ failure toaddress this problem.

The national, economic and socio-urban interests behind theimplementation of the Jaffa SlopeprojectThe website of the Municipality of TelAviv-Jaffa features a copy of UrbanBuilding Plan 2236, the Jaffa Slopeproject. The Jaffa planning team and theJaffa local administrative unit, establishedby the local municipality, provideextensive planning information on theupgrading of Jaffa’s image within theurban landscape of Tel Aviv-Jaffa. TheIsrael Land Administration speaks of landprivatization processes, the marketing ofland to the public of Jaffa under preferredterms and ongoing investments in Jaffa aspart of the general rehabilitation of thespace. All of the above creates theimpression that the discourse surroundingthe Jaffa Slope project revolves around theprofessional spheres of planners andarchitects, who strive to rehabilitate theurban fabric to the benefit of the currentand future populations. The discourseemploys the universal language of

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planning and architecture, which is devoidof any political or nationalistic expressionsand is presented as a means of attainingfunctional and aesthetic goals in Jaffa forall citizens on an equal basis. It makes noreference to local history, culture orpolitics. The technocratic, rationalcharacter of this discourse blurs andobscures the implications of the JaffaSlope project for the local Arab populationand camouflages the Jewish nationalinterest in gaining control over the land, aswell as the economic interests that areinvolved in land privatization.

In the mid-1980s, the Municipality ofTel Aviv-Jaffa declared that its sights wereset on the south of the city with theobjective of rehabilitating the physical andsocial fabric of Jaffa, following many yearsof neglect. The Jaffa planning team wasestablished for that purpose. The teamcame to the realization that the policy ofrehabilitation through evacuation andconstruction had failed and that the JaffaSlope project must be implemented in adifferent manner in order to achieve thefollowing goals: preserve the area’s urbancharacteristics and unique landscapes;nurture Jaffa’s unique features to attract anew population to reinforce the existingone; and rehabilitate the local populationwithin its traditional neighborhoods(Municipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, 1997).The rehabilitation of Jaffa required amassive allocation of resources. To thisend, the municipality took action on

several levels. It promoted the drafting ofan urban building plan for Jaffa to enablefuture construction in the area. Itspearheaded efforts to include Jaffa in theNeighborhood Rehabilitation Project, andidentified – through the Jewish Agency –the Jewish community in Los Angeles as adonor community for the rehabilitationproject in Ajami. The municipality signedan economic agreement with the IsraelLand Administration, the owner of theland and the structures standing on it,according to which the latter wouldallocate part of the profits from the sale ofproperty in Jaffa to the development of itsinfrastructure. These actions made theimplementation of the Jaffa Slope projectpossible.

In the mid-1990s, the Ministry ofHousing and Construction initiated twoseparate public housing projects for Arabsliving in Jaffa. The first project wasdesigned for those entitled to housing inJaffa’s Arab community by the ministry.However, of the 400 housing units thatwere promised, only 50 were actuallydelivered. The second project wasdesigned for young Arab couples andallowed them to construct their ownhouses on the land. However, the projectfailed due to the high development costsinvolved and because it was locatedoutside of the traditional Arabneighborhoods. In the summer of 2001, asecond attempt was made to market the“build your own house” project. This

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attempt also ended in failure, for similarreasons. The municipality assumed thatthe project had failed because it lackedprovision of housing, a problem which itheld must be solved at the governmentallevel by the Ministry of Housing andConstruction.

The Jaffa local administrative unit,which operates under the auspices of theMunicipality of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, wasestablished in 1999 to promote social andphysical projects in Jaffa tailored to itsparticular needs (Municipality of TelAviv-Jaffa, 2003). The unit was anothermeans through which the municipalityattempted to demonstrate its willingnessto address the problems faced by Jaffa andits Arab residents in a genuine manner andto promote its development and physicaland social rehabilitation.

A description of the municipality’sactivities reveals what is, on its face, agenuine attempt at the socio-urbanrehabilitation of the traditional Arabneighborhoods. The resentment that theseactions provoked among the Arabcommunity is therefore puzzling at firstglance. However, this resentment5 reflectstheir fears over the implications of theplan on their future in the area asindividuals and as a community, ratherthan the community’s objection torehabilitation and development per se.The development plan attracted investorsto Jaffa, who acquired land and propertythrough competitive bids. Consequently

property prices in Jaffa soared to levelsthat drove the local Arab residents out ofthe competition. Massive, modern, luxuryconstruction will bring a change in thelocal architectural landscape and efface itscultural past. Moreover, the Arabneighborhoods provide a sense ofbelonging and protective domesticity(Suttles, 1972), in the sense of personaland cultural security. Thus the struggleagainst the Jaffa Slope project is perceivedby the Arab residents of Jaffa as anexistential struggle against the destructionof the existing social fabric, and the “buildyour own house” project is not viewed asa viable solution to the housing problem,for the reasons discussed above. Thesefactors substantiate fears that the Arabpopulation will be excluded from theirtraditional neighborhoods and be evictedfrom the area, and that Jaffa’s Arabcommunity will continue to disintegrate.

In addition to socio-urbanrehabilitation, national and economicmotivations underlie the efforts to advancethe implementation of the Jaffa Slopeproject in its current format. The nationalZionist movement, whose mission is toredeem the land and conquer the desert,had consolidated an ideology of Judaizingthe space even before the establishment ofthe State of Israel (Yiftachel, 2006). Thisideology was the basis for the belief amongthe supporters of Zionism that they couldsettle on Jewish land and demarcate itsboundaries. Consequently, at the heart of


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Zionist nationalism lies the project of de-Arabization, which has been conductedthrough the demographic, political andcultural homogenization of the territorialspace and the de-ethnicization of theArabs in Israel (Shenhav, 2006). Policiesfor implementing the Jewish ethno-national ideology have focused andcontinue to focus on the issue of land. Ituses state institutions and non-governmental Jewish organizations, suchas the Jewish National Fund and theJewish Agency (Yiftachel and Kedar,2003), to achieve its goals, which includethe dispersion of the Jewish populationthroughout the land space in Israel, themitzpim “lookout” settlements in theGalilee the cokhavim “star” settlementsand the “individual” settlements in theNegev.6 The way in which the Jaffa Slopeproject has been implemented reveals thatthe intention of its implementers is theJudaization of the space, even if there hasbeen no official public declaration to thiseffect. The plan obscures the Arabcommunity’s ideological and materialconnection to its traditionalneighborhoods in various ways, all ofwhich are indicative of the exclusionarynature of the spatial policy.

Firstly, as mentioned above, themunicipality was engaged in themethodical destruction of housing units inthe traditional Arab neighborhoods in Jaffaover a period of around twenty years andcontributed to the underdevelopment of

the area. These policies were instrumentalin driving the Arab community out of itstraditional neighborhoods and in effacingits history, architecture and culture there.Secondly, and in retrospect, theNeighborhood Rehabilitation Project ofthe 1980s served only a small minority ofJaffa’s Arab inhabitants, and failed tocompensate for the many previous years ofphysical and social neglect (Mazawi andMakhoul, 1991). Thirdly, the supportprovided by the municipality for theprocess of gentrification led to an increasein the rental value of properties and relatedexpenses. Since most Arab inhabitantswere financially unable to bear the taxburden or buy the properties, they left thearea. Moreover, the Jaffa Slope projectapplies to the existing division of land,according to which building can be carriedout on small areas of land only. Thebuilding zones for the areas covered by theplan are limited (the average area perhousing unit is about 100m2), the buildingdensity is low (at about 70% coverage),and the height of the buildings cannotexceed three storeys. Thus the homes thathave and will be built in the area coveredby the plan will be suited to a culture thatencourages small families, and not Arabculture, which traditionally encourageslarge families. Moreover, small housingunits will prevent the neighborhoods’ localArab residents from preserving its currentliving arrangements, in which parents livewith their married children and families.

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The resulting overcrowding will alsoprobably drive many of the original Arabinhabitants out of the area.

Furthermore, within the scope of theproject statutorily unregulated commercein the Ajami market (known as the CitronMarket or Gan-Tamar Market), washalted and its illegal operators (whoaccording to the Municipality weremerchants from Gaza) vacated. A largestructure, the ground floor of which willhouse local shops and the upper floorsresidential apartments, is now planned inits stead. The building will also feature aEuropean-style piazza, suited to theenvisioned future population (Interviewwith the Jaffa planning team’s architect inthe Municipality, 2007). The plannersexpect that this residential building willattract a non-local population of anaverage socio-economic status, bothbecause this socio-economic group has yetto coalesce in Jaffa and because of theEuropean-inspired building style. Theevacuation of the market primarilyaffected the poor population – namely themajority of the local Arab community –which was then forced to shop onJerusalem Avenue and therefore to paymore for their goods.

The plan also includes several “flagshipprojects” built on large plots of land,including Andromeda Hill and JaffaVillage, which offer secluded residentialgrounds that are isolated from theirphysical and social environment. These

projects are designed for residents of ahigh socio-economic status and ensure thelocal Arab population’s exclusion from thespace. Indeed, the planners anticipate thatthe influx of a Jewish population of anaverage-to-high socio-economic status willlead to a maximal out-flux of the localArab population from the traditionalneighborhoods, and that only the Arabeconomic elite will be able to afford toremain in these neighborhoods. Thisrestricted segment of the local population,which is expected to aspire to the pleasuresof a luxury environment, will blend moreeasily into the new population and adaptto the majority culture. Thus, the physicaland symbolic presence of the Arabresidents in Ajami and Jabaliya is todecline and the area to assume a Jewishidentity.

Accordingly, the implementation of theJaffa Slope project assumed an ethno-national, Judaizing character. In the1990s, it also took on an economic aspect,a development which reflected thestructural changes that had taken placewithin Israel’s state economy over theprevious two decades, most notably theprocess of liberalization, through whichdirect state involvement declined and thatof private business grew (Aharoni, 1998).Within Israel’s economic structure therewas a declining role for the state in thedivision of revenue and capital, and agreater openness to the world market andprocesses of privatization. These processes


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permeated Israel’s planning policy, even ifthe planning authorities did not adopt aspecific policy of privatizing public space.In Jaffa, these processes were reflected insupport for private and publicgentrification, through offering taxincentives and foreign capital investments,for example in Andromeda Hill, and theacceleration of the privatization process bythe Israel Land Administration. Luxurybuildings as well as private and publicinvestment in infrastructure have attractedan affluent population to the area, whichin turn has brought quality services andluxury stores. This process has led to anincrease in the rental value of the land,which has generated an increase inmunicipal taxes in the area, to the benefitof the public purse.

Furthermore, in flagship projects suchas Andromeda Hill and Jaffa Village, themunicipality transfers the costs ofdeveloping and maintaining the publicareas to the tenants, thereby reducing itsown expenses. Conversely, the circle ofservice providers and blue-collar workersexpands. Prima facie, this policy wouldappear to benefit the general good andraise the economic status and thus qualityof life of local inhabitants through theraised value of their properties. In fact,however, it has led to a situation in whichlocal Arab inhabitants, the majority ofwhom are poor, cannot withstand thefinancial competition or the cost ofmaintaining property in expensive areas,

and are forced to leave for other poorneighborhoods. In practice, classpolarization in Jaffa has grown and theArab residents have been compelled toprovide labor and services to new, richJewish inhabitants.

The Establishment Discourse: Apolicy of socio-urban rehabilitationThe establishment discourse thatsurrounds the Jaffa Slope project echoes amore general narrative about socio-urbanrehabilitation. The quotations providedbelow were selected from amongapproximately thirty interviews conductedwith representatives of the Jewishestablishment (the Jaffa planning teamwithin the Tel Aviv Municipality, thespokesperson for the Jaffa localadministrative unit, the Israel LandAdministration – Tel Aviv District)between 2003 and 2004 and in 2007. Theestablishment discourse focuses on theshifting physical, social and class characterof the Arab neighborhoods and onimproving the quality of the lives of thelocal inhabitants. The focus on theseparticular factors stems from tension thatdeveloped between the establishment andlocal Arab inhabitants as a result of long-standing neglect and unmet promises ofrehabilitation. The establishment lacksunderstanding or recognition that anyprocess of rehabilitation and preservationmust be inclusive of the residents withintheir traditional neighborhoods and their

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national heritage, and be commensurate totheir financial capacity. No other form ofdevelopment will ensure sustainabledevelopment for Jaffa and its originalinhabitants.

The plan, in its new format, has become

a pro-resident plan. It will enable

residents to build, renovate and even buy

their apartments from the Israel Land

Administration. In fact, it will enable

them to continue to live in Ajami in far

better environmental conditions… The

Jaffa Slope project will attract affluent

people of a higher socio-economic level

and ultimately alter the image of these

neighborhoods from poor neighborhoods

into the pearl of Jaffa.

Interview with an architect from the Jaffa

planning team, 2 February 2004.

It is important to stress that a large

portion of the profits will be channeled

back into Jaffa. We have an agreement to

this effect with the municipality. As far

as we are concerned, we are prepared to

sell both to the residents and on the free

market in order to promote development

and enhance the appearance of the

neighborhoods. Selling on the free

market is important in order to bring

new, affluent blood to Jaffa and change

its unfortunate image.

Interview with the Head of the Israel

Land Administration – Tel Aviv

District, 26 January 2003.

All of the plans include directives for

preserving the existing physical fabric,

and design directives that are suited to

the current style. Expropriations are kept

to a minimum and there is sensitivity to

the existing structures… The new

buildings will also display different styles,

including a European piazza and

elongated windows instead of rounded

ones. They [the locals] will have to get

used to it or leave. But in any case, the

majority will leave because they will not

be able to bear the financial burden of

maintaining the property and living in a

luxury environment.

Interview with an architect from the

Jaffa planning team, 8 January 2007.

The Local Arab Discourse: TheMunicipality’s policy as anexistential threat to the communityThe local Arab discourse surrounding theJaffa Slope project revolves around astruggle for control of the area and itsArab identity. The quotations below wereselected from approximately one hundredinterviews conducted with members ofJaffa’s Arab community between 2003and 2004 and in 2007.

The local Arab discourse reflects a fearof an intent among the establishment torid Jaffa of its Arab inhabitants and toJudaize the city. The Arab residents ofJaffa are aware of the fact that, as an ethnicminority in the city whose already weakinfluence is likely to evaporate within a


62

space that is controlled by the majority,becoming further dispersed as acommunity means being cut off fromreligious sites, Arab public institutions anda supportive social and spiritualenvironment, as well as the disintegrationof the very fabric of their society.Therefore the struggle is perceived asbeing existential in nature. As a minoritywhose historical existence in the area hasbeen interrupted and whose cultural andphysical character has been devastated,nationalism by itself has not providedenough of a basis for identity, andtherefore the local space has played acentral role in maintaining the national-cultural identity of the Arabs in Jaffa(Schnell, 1994). The sense of territorialitywithin the traditional Arab neighborhoodsin Jaffa is reflected in the concept of “senseof place”, as proposed by Relph (1976),who stressed the manifestation of feelingsof identification with a place as a functionof experiences that are attributed to theplace, and then used to identify it. Thephysical changes that have been made tothe environment and the alteredcomposition of the Arab community inJaffa have made experiences of the placefor its Arab inhabitants a distant memorythat cannot be recaptured.

Since 1948, attempts have been made to

erase Arab Jaffa. The municipality,

through its policy and plans, is waging a

battle for the character of the space,

seeking to turn the once Arab city into a

Jewish one.

Interview with a 28-year-old Arab

woman living in Jaffa.

The Jaffa Slope project and the land

reclamation were designed to develop

Ajami not for the benefit of the Arab

inhabitants who live here, but at their

expense. These plans rob Jaffa’s Arabs,

who are mostly poor, of any opportunity

to continue to live in Jaffa. The plans

expel the Arabs from their homes and

their city… Building luxury

neighborhoods creates a situation in

which only people of high a socio-

economic status can afford to buy homes

here – in other words, Jews. Thus the

plans were not designed to rehabilitate

Ajami, but to Judaize it. This is a

sophisticated way of kicking the Arabs

out of here and settling Jews in their

stead. If the idea really is to carry out

renovations for the sake of the local

population, then why is renovation not

allowed? Why is there no construction

for the Arab community? Why is there

no building for young couples? New,

expensive construction is beyond the

financial means of most of the Arabs

living here, and the only people who will

be able to live here are rich Jews.

Interview with a 49-year-old Arab

woman living in Jaffa.

The gentrification process has been partly

Introduction

63

spontaneous and partly the result of theplanning initiatives of the localmunicipality, which have attracted privatedevelopers, real estate developers andwealthy individuals seeking highlyprofitable investments in Jaffa. At thebeginning of the 1990s, the price of realestate in Ajami began to climb, and at itsheight in the mid-1990s reached the sumof 300,000 US dollars for a small housebuilt on a 60m2 plot (Sheffer, 2003).7 Asa result, local inhabitants were excludedfrom the space they lived in and from anyshare of the profits earned from theproperty in that space.8 The involvementof the municipality in initiating andinvesting in these projects, coupled withthe shortage of resources allocated forrenovations and building residential unitsfor the local population in the traditionalneighborhoods, compound the sense ofexclusion of Jaffa’s Arab inhabitants.

The municipality’s policy is clear: Jaffa is

for sale! Jaffa is on the free market for the

highest bidder. The municipality is

calling the money to Jaffa, regardless of

whether it comes from a Jewish

contractor, an Arab broker or a foreign

investor… Take me, for example. My

mother’s house was sealed off twenty

years ago and declared unfit for

habitation by the municipality. Now,

from the apartment I am renting from

the Amidar, I see how a Jewish

contractor is making a profit in dollars

on my mother’s renovated house.

…

To wage war against the municipality.

To wage war against the private

developers and assessors. This is what we

want in Jaffa, so that any rich developer

will think twice before coming to buy up

property in Jaffa.

Interview with a 45-year-old Arab man

living in Jaffa.

The Jaffa Slope project has evoked strongfears of mass evacuations from the area,similar to those that were carried out inthe 1970s and 1980s. These evacuationswere conducted through legal means, be itby slating a building for demolition,expropriating yards and other parts ofhomes for public purposes, or by offeringthe building owners large financialincentives to leave. The financialcompensation provided in exchange fordilapidated homes (since renovations areprohibited) is not sufficient to purchase anew house in Ajami, but only a smallapartment in a housing project in Jaffa oranother city. The end result is that Arabsare leaving the traditional Arabneighborhoods and are being cut off fromits religious and cultural institutions.

They [the municipality] cheat people

into leaving their homes, but they do it

legally. They don’t let you renovate and

they let your house get run down until

the roof falls in over your head, and if


64

that doesn’t work they tempt you into

leaving for money, which is not enough

to buy a place in Jaffa. And if that

doesn’t work, they build a highway

through your living room. How do they

do it? They confiscate it – it becomes

public property. They tell you that

you’re best off taking monetary

compensation and for you it’s the best

solution. Move cheaply to Lod, to

Ramle, maybe to a village in the

Triangle… You end up with small

change, stuck in a housing project

apartment that doesn’t belong to you, far

away from everything you’ve ever

known.

Interview with a 38 year-old Arab man

living in Jaffa.

The implications of the Jaffa Slopeproject for the native populationand for Arab-Jewish relationsThe future of the local Arab communityin the traditional Arab neighborhoods ofJaffa is uncertain, since it has not beendefined by the state as a unique ethno-national minority within a predominantlyJewish space. Such a definition wouldhave made it possible to preserve the Arabculture and identity within thesetraditional neighborhoods and reduce thepossibility of their disappearing into therecesses of planning history. Planningpolicy in Jaffa has been guided over theyears by ethnic logic, which breedsdisregard for the historical background

and the local cultural characteristics of thecity. Entire streets, with their uniquearchitectural and cultural flavor, havevanished forever. Today, even thoughsome preservation directives have beenissued, as well as design directives and aguarantee that the Jaffa Slope project willserve the “general good” of all citizens, themain issue seems to have been forgotten,namely, the fate of the native Arabcommunity of the city. The planninginstitutions, their architects and plannersare committing the mistake of creating animaginary essence of Jaffaesque, designedto attract wealthy people to fill up thepublic purse and create an exclusive“Jaffaesque” style.9 However the originalessence and identity of the space will betarnished in the process and ultimatelyfade away. Thus we will have Ajamiwithout Ajamites, a Jaffa Slope withoutfishermen, and pseudo-Jaffan houses withWestern inhabitants. Mazawi andMakhoul (1991) have aptly described thephenomenon of forgetting the humanessence that gives meaning to a place, andcharacterizes, in my opinion, institutionalstructures and their representatives –architects and planners – who shape ourspace, as follows:

Jaffa is an ancient city that is estranged

from its past, transplanted like a foreign

limb on the wings of history; a city that

presents the official, commercialized

version of a time that never was, of

inhabitants who never existed. Historical

Introduction

65

uniqueness and cultural spatial

authenticity are relegated to a remote

corner and become victims at the altar of

the war of cultures. Nothing is

reminiscent of Arab Jaffa anymore, not a

single tattered painting in a side room of

a local museum, not a single street or

alley name. Time has evaporated and a

distorted present is speaking on its behalf

in a new language… The Old Jaffa

project takes its inspiration from a

politico-economic perception according

to which non-Jews are considered nation-

less, culture-less cave dwellers who left

not a single trace worthy of inclusion in

the chronicles of the city…

As a result of the municipality’s planningpolicy, most of the native Arab populationwill leave Jaffa, unable to compete forhousing on the free market, buyapartments in the traditional Arabneighborhoods or pay high property taxes.What will ultimately remain in theseneighborhoods is a limited segment of thenative Arab population, of an average-to-high socioeconomic status, which iscapable of bearing these economicburdens. One can already see themansions of Jaffa’s wealthy Arab families,which have sprouted up in the last two tothree years. This spatial pattern, which istaking shape before our eyes, is the lesserof two evils from the viewpoint of themunicipality’s public planning policy. Thefew Arab inhabitants who will remain in

Jaffa as an insignificant minority willredecorate the imaginary Jaffaesqueenvironment with a few authentic drops ofcolor, rather than paint it with broadbrush strokes.

Today’s development policy in Jaffa hasgenerated an environment in whichopenness toward the original, indigenoussetting is not encouraged, but ratherintensifies competition over ethno-national identity and further exacerbatesspatial isolation in Jaffa. Like AndromedaHill, other similar projects planned for thesurrounding area will increase the sense ofalienation between the two populationgroups, although a significant socio-economic gap between either is unlikely,since the Arabs who remain in Jaffa will berelatively prosperous. However, ineveryday life, spatial seclusion will persist,the Arab minority will remain across thefence from “pure Israeliness” and occupythe new space as a handful of individualswithin the surrounding Jewish space, fromwhich they will be cut off (Goldhaber,2004).

In summary, behind the Jaffa Slopeproject lies the local municipality’sundisguised and openly declared interestin socio-urban rehabilitation, as well ascamouflaged interests based on the ethniclogic of Judaizing and privatizing thespace. Revealing and recognizing theseother interests serves to bring their victimsinto focus. The implementation of theplan has generated a discourse within the


66

establishment that extols the virtues ofsocio-urban rehabilitation. Conversely, thelocal Arab discourse flags up the maskedinterests of Judaization and privatizationof the space as threats to the ongoingsurvival of their community in theirtraditional neighborhoods. Contrary toMonterescu and Fabian (2003), whoperceive waning nationalism as a sign thatthe national project in Jaffa has come toan end and that neo-liberal forces arerising in its place, I contend that theobjective of Judaization remains endemicand that the force of nationalism has not,in fact, waned. Rather, it has beenchanneled towards the technocraticstrongholds of planning committees andtenders that merely camouflage itspresence.

The sense of existential danger amongthe Arab community in Jaffa stands on avery real foundation, given that the JaffaSlope project does not involveconstruction appropriate to the majorityof the Arab population inhabitants. Thispopulation will ultimately be forced tomove out of the traditional neighborhoodsand scatter across Jaffa and other Arabtowns and villages. The dispersal of Jaffa’sArab community within the space istantamount to a death sentence.

Notes

1 The plan is currently being implemented onlyin the Ajami and Jabaliya neighborhoods; LocalMaster Plan No. 2660.

2 I shall also use the term “the slope project”in reference to the Arab neighborhoods.

3 In the 1970s, several apartment buildings forArabs were constructed in the southern partof the Jabaliya neighborhood, bordering BatYam. However, the inhabitants’ response tooffers to buy apartments in these projects wassubdued. Their reluctance was due to the highbuilding density, apartments that were toosmall to house large families, high prices, thelack of suitable community services and, inparticular, the great distance separating themfrom the community’s public institutions inAjami (Mor, 1994).

4 The process of gentrification refers to thetransformation of neighborhoods in declinehousing a population of a low socio-economicstatus into neighborhoods of a higher socio-economic status through an influx of “yuppie”and “dinky” populations (Gonen and Cohen,1989). These mid to mid-upper classpopulations move into the lower-classneighborhoods, improving the neighborhoodenvironment and creating a residential stylethat reflects the preferences and values of theirclass. As a result, the physically deterioratedneighborhoods “siphon upward” on thehousing market and their rental value increases.The gentrification process is part of a morecomprehensive, multi-dimensional processthrough which the residential boundaries ofthe middle classes are expanded. This processoccurs in Western cities and is also commonin Israel and is primarily the result of anincrease in the ranks of the middle classes overpast decades following a general increase instandards of living.

5 One of the clearest manifestations of the Arabcommunity’s resentment is the hundreds of

Introduction

67

objections officially submitted by residents ofAjami against the Jaffa Slope project. Anotheris the activities of Al-Rabita, the League forthe Arabs of Jaffa, which organizes protestactions questioning the ethics of the spatialplans drafted for Jaffa and stressing thehistorical injustice that has been perpetratedagainst the Arabs of Jaffa. The League furtherappeals to public opinion and the press andpetitions the Israeli Supreme Court. It providesArab inhabitants of Jaffa with professional,financial and technical assistance to help themto avoid selling their homes.

6 These are the names of different kinds ofJewish settlements.

7 The sale price of a sea-facing apartment wasestimated to be similar to that of a similarly-sized apartment in the luxury areas of the city.In other areas in Jaffa prices are approximately100,000 US dollars lower than the prices inAjami (Table of Apartment Prices providedby Yitzhak Levy, 2000). The table waspublished prior to the events of October 2000,following which the demand for apartmentsin Ajami from people outside of Jaffa fell foraround a year and the prices of apartmentsplunged to less than half of their previous value(Sheffer, 2003).

8 Ajami and Jabaliya were ranked 4th of 100in the socio-economic ranking of the city’sneighborhoods (Hadad and Fadida, 1993).

9 The engineering department in themunicipality published a detailed designmanual for the “Jaffaesque” style, that appliesto all construction in Jaffa (Municipality ofTel Aviv-Jaffa, 1995).

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Documents

“The Jaffa Slope Project”: An Analysis of “Jaffaesque” Narratives … · Introduction 49 “The Jaffa Slope Project”: An Analysis of “Jaffaesque” Narratives in the New