“Quid pro quo, Clarice”: Wittgenstein’s ... - [email protected] “Quid pro quo, Clarice”: Wittgenstein’s Multiaspectual Notion of Clarity ... or conquers when one progresses

OriginalPaperUDC[1:81]:165.4Wittgenstein,L.ReceivedDecember6th,2010

KristijanKrkačZagrebSchoolofEconomicsandManagement/PhilosophicalFacultyoftheSocietyofJesusinZagreb,

Jordanovac110,HR–[email protected]

“Quid pro quo, Clarice”: Wittgenstein’s Multiaspectual Notion of Clarity

AbstractIn this paper, the author elucidates J. R. Searle’s famous plea for clarity and L. Wittgenstein’s multiaspectual notion of it. The concept of clarity is introduced via Searle’s plea for clarity and the problem of it is introduced via Wittgenstein’s morphological method. An ambiguity in the concept of clarity is presented, namely the difference between clarity as a transparen-cy and clarity as an understanding. L. Wittgenstein’s unambiguous notion of perspicuity as seeing and understanding is presented as a solution to the previous difference as the major source of ambiguity of the concept of clarity. Some exceptions from clarity are presented; particularly the paradox of complete understanding without clarity. Finally, Wittgenstein’s river image from OnCertainty and explication of the image in terms of a worldview and three kinds of remarks (sentences), namely empirical, grammatical/hinge, and axes remarks which make a presentation completely understood for practical purposes.

Key wordsaxessentences,clarity,empiricalsentences,grammaticalsentences,JohnR.Searle,LudwigWittgenstein, perception, perspicuity, practice, river image, transparency, understanding,worldview

1. I can see clearly now…

It1isnograndwisdomtounderstandthatclarityissomethingoneachievesorconquerswhenoneprogressesfromthedarknessofignorancetothelightofknowledge,2orwhenonecrossesthehorrifyingabyssofdoubtbytheuseofcertainmethods3ofclarificationandachievesclearanddistinctcertainties

1

I am indebted to two anonymous reviewersforpointingoutmanymistakesthatIcorrect-ed,andmisleadingandobscureplacesthatItried tomakeclearerasconsistentlyaspos-siblegiventhetopicofthepaper.

2

For the titleof thepaperIusedfamous lineofHannibalLecter(playedbyAnthonyHop-kins) in dialog with agent Clarice Sterlingin theblockbustermovieThe Silence of the Lambs. Ouid pro quo here means that whatone gains in terms of clarity, one loses intermsofprecision,style,elegance,etc.

3

Wittgenstein L. (1953)Philosophical Inves-tigations Oxford Blackwell, PI 133.Abbre-

viations: Wittgenstein’s works: OC = On Certainty,PG=Philosophical Grammar,PI=Philosophical Investigations,PR=Philo-sophical Remarks,CV=Culture and Value,TLP=Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,RPP= Remarks on Philosophy of PsychologyI, II, LW = Last Writings on Philosophy of Psychology,ROC=Remarks on Colour;AllpublishedbyBlackwellOxfordexceptTPLbyRoutledgeLondon,andPGbyUniversityof Chicago Press. Other abbreviations: LG= language-game, FOL = form of life, WP=worldpicture,ER=experientialremarks,GR = grammatical remarks,AR = axes re-marks.

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA52(2/2011)pp.(357–374)

K.Krkač,“Quidproquo,Clarice”:Wittgen-stein’sMultiaspectualNotionofClarity358

regardingthematterinquestion.4Theideaisstillthereinthecontemporaryphilosophy,namely,J.R.Searleisfamousforhisfollowingsaying“Ifyoucan’t say it clearly,youdon’tunderstand ityourself.”5Ononehand, it isobviousthatonecansaysomethingclearlywithoutunderstandingitatall(obviouscandidatesarerepeatingorluckyguess).However,thisisnotthepoint, rather the issue that saying anything clearly is a matter of specifictrainingandtechnique,whileunderstandingitisamatterofinsightandart.Besides that, clarity as a process is a matter of degree. These points areimportantforunderstandingWittgenstein’snotionofclaritywhichwillbeexplicatedlateronasasolutiontosomeproblemsinSearle’sconceptofit,sinceheobviouslystrugglestomeetthestandardofclaritybutthatofstyleaswell.Now,concerningSearle’ssaying,whatonecanbesuspiciousofisthatitisnotsosimple,namelyifSearleissaying–if you cannot say it plainly, you are stupid,thenitisnotasclearashetendstopresentit.Itisnotjustabouta plea for clarityoraboutthe hazard of being unable to understand,thefirstbeingjustifiedinitself,andthesecondbeingarealmenace,butabout certain lackofcontext ofpracticeof clarification, andof reflexiv-ityconcerningtheveryconceptofclarity.Inordertofillupthisscarcityandtosupplysomecontextoneneedsatleasttoexplicateclearlytheveryconceptofclarity.Itisnaïvetosupposethattheword‘clear’bybeingthatwordisipso factoclearerthanotherwords,say‘duck’,‘rabbit’,‘bicycle’,or ‘bull’.Now, thisseems tobeg thequestionsinceanyconceptused inexplicationoftheconceptofclarityshouldbeclearerthentheconceptofclarityitself.Theconceptofclarityisthetopicofthispaper,particularlytwosomewhatindistinct,somewhatunclearandunsuccessfulconceptsofclarity;onecon-nectedwith theconceptandactivity ofseeing, and theother related to theconceptandactivity ofunderstanding and thispoint raisesanother typeofobjection.Thesecondoneseemstobeametaphorsinceonlywhatoneseescanbeseen clearlyornotstricto sensu,whilewhatonesaysorunderstandsisclearornotonlymetaphorically,butnotliterally.“Seeingclearly”meansforinstance“seeingsharpenoughforsomefurthergoal”,likeidentifyingathing,differingitfromitsbluntsurroundings,etc.Understandingisametaphorofseeingintermsofoneunderstandingclearlywithone’s mind’s eyeasoneisseeingclearlywithone’s physical eyes.Themotive foran investigationofthesetwoconceptsofclaritycomesnaturallyfromthefactthattheconceptofclarityitselfisnotclearoratleastnotsufficientlyunambiguous,andthisvaguenessarisesmainlyfromthementioneddichotomy.Nevertheless,beingsodivergent,theconceptofclaritystillservesasanundisputedchampionofphilosophicalinquiriesandmethods(nomatterifclarity is not enough).Thefirstpartofthemotivecanbeexplicateda laLakatos,thatistosayfourwordsin theexpression“completelyclearanddistinctconcepts”areneitherclearnordistinct.Thesecondpartofthemotivecanbeexplicateda laFeyerabendthatistosayiftherearemanymethodsandiftheyareincommensurableonallgrounds,thenthereisnomethodatall.6



Table 1.Clarity:synonymsandantonyms

2. Two types of clarity

Intermsofmentioneddivergencewithintheconceptofclarityitcanbesaidthatthemostcommonfactualuseoftheword‘clarity’onecanfindisinvisualjargonandcloselyconnectedwiththeconceptofseeing;itsurelyhastodowith exactness, strictness, sharpness, precision, or accuracy of borders forinstance.However,thereisanothercommonnotionofclaritytooforwhichakindofcomprehensivenessispivotal,anotionwhichisinphilosophypresentinWittgenstein’sideasofclustersconcerningnames,andfamilyresemblanc-esanduseregardingmeaning.Saythatoneispresentedwithtwopicturesofthesamesailingboatviewedfromtwodistances,((a),and(b)asshowninFigure1).

4

Indeed, thewordmethodcomesfromGreek meta-hodoswhichinfactmeansto cross over (perhaps the river Styx). Additionally, andquite later inR.Descartes’philosophyclear and distinct ideas / perceptionsareparadigmsofknowledgewiththeirmotiveinalgebraandgeometry that is to say completelydifferentfrom the clarity inGreek sense, and inphi-losophiesofsayF.Bacon,M.deMontaigne,F. Suarez, or B. Pascal andwhich by itselfraisesinterestinghistoricalissues.Seeforin-stancethebeginningoftheThird Meditation,in: Descartes R. (1997) Key Philosophical Writings, Ware: Wordsworth, pp. 147–162;seealsoCottinghamJ.(2005)The Cambridge Companion to Descartes,Cambridge:Cam-bridgeUniversityPress.

5

LawS.andWarburtonN.(2003)“FiveQues-tions about Clarity”, http://www.butterflie-sandwheels.org/2007/five-questions-about-clarity/, © ButterfliesandWheels.com 2003(retrieved 23. 2. 2010); see also: “Realism”in:BagginiJ.andStangroomJ.(eds.)(2003)What Philosophers Think,London:Continu-um,183–192(especiallyp.184).

6

ForclarityinLakatosandincommensurabil-ity in Feyerabend seeNewton-SmithW.H.(1994) The Rationality of Science, London:Routledge,pp.142–143.



a bFigure 1.Clarityassharpness

Ifthesamesailingboatisobservedfromthegreaterdistance(a)itsedgescanappearquiteblurandpreciselybecauseofthatitisnoteasytopointtotheplacewhereitstopsanditssurroundingsstarts,whileifitisobservedfromthelesserdistance(b)itsedgescanappearquitesharpanditisthereforequiteeasytodifferentiateitfromitssurroundings.Ontheotherhand,lookingataphenomenonfromtoosmalldistanceresultswithseeingsmudgythingsandseeingonlydetails/partsofphenomena(onecanofcourseachievesharpnesssaybyusingmagnifier),whilelookingataphenomenonfromgreaterdistanceresultswithseeingsharpedgesandthewholethingobserved.Infact,ifanobservedphenomenonisnotsharp(sharpnessasacuity),itcouldbeblurredbecauseitisobservedfromtooclosesooneseesonlyblurreddetails,butalsobecauseitisobservedfromtoofarsooneseesonlyblurredshapes(intermsof knownocular andoptical fact).This concept of clarity is dichotomous;onecannothaveclarityandindistinctness,detailsandthewholeinthesametimeandbybeingsuchconceptitisquiteclosetotheseoftransparencyandperspicuity.Theoppositecaseisinterestingaswell.Namely,onecanclearlyseethewholething,butitsdetails(itsfunctioningforinstance)canbeunclear.Saythatoneislookingthroughtheperiscopebutthatitisuncleartoonehowitworks(asshowninFigure2,a).

Figure 2.Clarityasunderstanding

However,ifitisexplicatedhowaperiscopeworks,namelybyusingmirrors,thenoneunderstandsandit isclearhowitworks(asshowinFigure2,b).Otherwise,saythatoneislookingatthepartofsomephenomenonanddoesnotunderstandwhatitis.Then,oneneedstomoveawayfromitortomove



closertoitinordertoseeitclearly.Thisconceptofclarityiscloselyrelatedtoconceptsofunderstandingandcomprehending.Thesetwoconceptsofclar-ityaremetaphoricallyopposite;namely,inordertoachieveclarity as seeingclearly (sharply)inmostcasesoneneedstomoveclosertotheinvestigatedphenomenon,whileinordertoachieveclarity as understandingclearlyoneneedstomoveawayfromit.

3. Wittgenstein’s concept of clarity as half-seeing and half-understanding

Itseemsthatthisparticularambivalenceoftheconcept of clarityandoftheactivity of clarification was noticed and of some interest for Wittgenstein.Namely,inCV9heclaimsthat“formeclarity,transparencyisanendinit-self”.7InPI71Wittgensteinasksthefollowingseriesofmotivatingquestions:“Isanindistinctphotographapictureofapersonatall?Isitevenalwaysanadvantagetoreplaceanindistinctpicturebyasharpone?Isn’ttheindistinctoneoftenexactlywhatweneed?”ThequestionsWittgenstein(oraninterlocu-tor)asksseemtobebesidethepointsincesurelytheobviousanswertothefirstquestionis–yes,tothesecondis–no,andtothethirdis–it depends.Re-gardingthevocabularyitcouldbesaidthatWittgensteinusestwoconceptsofperspicuity,namelyperspicuityastransparency,mono/multi-aspectuality(see-ing),andperspicuityasconceptual(grammatical)clarity(understanding).SofarWittgensteinstayswithinthelimitsofourpreliminarydifferentiationoftheconceptofclarity.However,onecanclaim,andnotwithouttextualevidence,thatthereisonlyonebasicconceptofclarityinWittgenstein’sphilosophy,spe-cificallytheconceptofhalf-seeing/half-interpretingtwo-aspectualphenomena(likedoublecross,Muller-Lyerarrows,orduck-rabbithead).Suchconceptofclarityencompassesperceptionandunderstandingboth,thatistosay,obser-vationandconceptualisation(thereisnoconceptionwithoutperception,andthere isnoperceptionwithoutconception). Inadditionsuchconcepthas itsextreme logicalpossibilities in termsofpureperceptionofmono-aspectualphenomena, andan interpretationofmulti-aspectualphenomena (in radicalcasesbesidesinterpretationimaginationisincludedtoo,asshowninTable2).

7

SeeperspicuityinPI30,47,122,133andinRFMregardingtheconceptofamathemati-calproof,andforcommentseeBacker,G.P.Hacker, P.M. S. (2005) “Surveyability andSurveyable Representations”, in: Wittgen-

stein: Understanding and Meaning, Part I: Essays,vol. Iof An Analytical Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations,(second,extensivelyrevisededitionbyP.M.S.Hack-er),Oxford:Blackwell,pp.307–326.

Table 2.Unifiedmultiaspectualconceptofclarity



4. Understanding without clarity

Leavingtheseissuesasideforthemoment,thelastofpreviouslymentionedthreeanswers(thethirdone)isquiteattractivesinceitcapturesthementionedambivalenceoftheconceptofclaritybytheuseofthewordindistinctness.Theconceptsofdistinctnessandindistinctnesswiththeirsynonymsandan-tonymscapturethedualityandunitybetweenseeingandunderstandingsincetheycouldbeappliedequallysatisfactorytobothspheresofclarity.However,itseemsthatthereisaparadoxhere,sincetherearesituationsinwhichoneneedsindistinctnessinordertoachievedistinctnessatleastincasesofvisualphenomenaandvice versaincasesofunderstanding,sincehumanssometimeneedtosquint,narrowtheireyes,inordertoseemoreprecisely.Thesearethefollowing:sometimesitisneededtosquintinordertofindsomedetailonaphenomenon,inotherwords,tolookawayfromthewholeofaphenomenon(as forexampleon twoalmost thesamedrawingswithsay tendifferenceswhich should be detected, as it is the casewith drawingswhich could befoundincrosswordpuzzlemagazines),andsometimesitisneededtosquintinordertoseeaglobalpatternofaphenomenon,orinanotherwords,tolookawayfromovercrowdednessbydetailsinordertoseeapatternofaphenom-enon(saythatoneislookingatapaintingbyArcimboldo,andoneneedstolookawayfromparticularpiecesoffruitinordertoseeafacepattern).Itissimilarwithunderstanding.Tobeprecise,whatissquintinginperceptionisapplyingmorphologicalmethodinunderstanding.Sometimesoneneedstocomparevariouspartsofaphenomenoninordertoseesomeparticulardif-ferencesandsimilarities,analogiesanddisanalogies; sometimesoneneedstolookawayfromparticulardifferencesandsimilarities,tolookawayfromparticularanalogiesanddisanalogiesinordertoseetheglobalpatternofaphenomenon(linguisticorotherwise).Finally, thereis thementionedpara-dox:oneneedstosquintinordertoseeclearly(adetailoraglobalpattern);oneneedstolookawayfromparticularknotsinthewebofmanysimilaritiesanddissimilaritiesinordertounderstandapattern.Inshort,sometimesmore blurredmeansmore clearandmore sharpmeansmore unclear(understand-ing),andviceversa(seeing).Now,preciselyinthissenseanindistinctpho-tographissometimesexactlywhathumansneed.Nevertheless,Wittgensteinstatesthatitisoftenexactlywhathumansneed.Ifthisisso,thenwhatcanbeclearlysaidonthismatterisonlythathumanshaveandusecertaincomplete-lyunclearconceptofclarityandveryrarelyhumansneedtomakeitclear,orinotherwords,inmostcasestomakeitmoreclearissomethingthattheydonotneedandbymakingitmorecleartheyaremakingitmoreunclearinfact,at least forvariouspracticalpurposes. Inanotherwords,what is supposedtobe“fairlyunclear”inabsolutetermsisformanypracticalmattersalmost“completelyclear”andpreciselythisconceptofclarityisimplicitinourdailyactionsandroutinesandbybeing implicit in themit isalsonon-reflexive,sometimeseveninexplicable,butintuitivelycompletelyunderstoodbyfull-grownhealthyhumans.Now,tobehonest,therearesituationsinlivesofhu-mansinwhichthereisanextremeneedforclearexplicationofapracticeduetosomefurtherreasonssuchasupbringingyounglings,changeinastandardpractice,aclashofcultures,andsimilar.Insuchsituationsareflexiveconceptofclarityisneeded,butisitpossible?Nowletuscommentonquotations fromthebeginningof thepaper in thelightofwhatwasjustsaidregardingclarity.ConcerningSearle’ssayingthat“Ifyoucan’t say it clearly,youdon’tunderstand ityourself.” some thingsshouldbementioned.8Whatitreallysaysisthatifanythingissaidunclear,



thenwhoeversaiditdoesnotunderstandit.Thissayingseemstobecorrectnomatterifitissomewhatunclearplea for clarity.MuchmoreclearversionofitonecanfindasfourthcategoryofP.Grice’sCooperativePrinciple,namelythatofMannerwhichincludesthesupermaxim–“Beperspicuous”,andvari-ousmaximssuchas:avoidobscurity,andambiguity,etc.9However,Searle’sversionobviouslytendstooperatewithabsoluteandcompletelyclearcon-ceptsofclarityandunderstandingandifitisso,thenitsimplybegstheques-tion.Thatistosay,ifSearle’sdictumisnotclear,thenwedonotunderstandit,anditisnotclear,however,weunderstanditcompletely.Doweunderstandthefollowingsentence“Ifa lioncouldtalk,wecouldnotunderstandhim”(PI223)?Yeswedo?However,itissaidinsomewhatunclearfashion.Thisshowsonlythatclarityisarelativeconcept;foronethingitseemstoberela-tivetotheveryprocessofclarification.Thisissomewhatcomplicated,sinceitgoesalongwithwhatSearleclaims,namely, ifone takesexamplesfromfieldarchaeology(a descriptionofanartefactpartsreallybecomingclearerandclearerbeforeoureyes),fieldgeography(a descriptionofashapeofanewlydiscovered landbecomesmore andmore clear aswe cruise arounditandchart it),orfromhistory(a descriptionofsomehistoricaleventandpersonsincludedmakessensemoreandmoreasoneseesthewholepictureofitbyputtingpiecestogether),thenitisobviouslythecasethatoneisintheprocessoftryingtosayclearlywhatneedstobesaidandwhatisalreadycompletelyunderstood.Itisafactthatduringaprocessofdiscoveryclaritysometimesgoesalongwithunderstanding,butsometimessomethingcanbeclearwithoutcompleteunderstanding(duetovariousreasons),andofcoursesometimessomethingcanbeunclearwithcompleteunderstanding.Thereisanothertypeofcases,namelyofinventions.Aninventorsometimescompletelyunderstandstheproblemandtheinventedsolution;howeveritisoftenthecasethatitcannotbesaidclearly.Clarityinsuchcasescomesactu-allywiththepatentdocumentwhichis(de facto)asummaryoraperspicuous presentation(visualandtextual,PI122)10ofaninvention.Finally,therearecaseswhichincludecreativityandtechniquelikeinartsandcraftsandinsuchcasesunderstandingcanbecompletebutanartistoracraftsmanoftencannotsayitclearly,orinotherwords,onecannotsayitclearlybutitiscompletelyunderstood(suchthingshappeninsaypoetryandpainting).Cleverness,argu-mentation,anddebatingpowersaresimplynotenoughfordoingphilosophyinthisway.Aninterestingissuetotackleisthefollowing:isitreallyimpos-siblethattherearethingsthatcanbesaidinsomewhatunclearfashiononly,andstillbecompletelyunderstood?Thelastpointraisesanother issuealtogether. Is thesentence“Heisstrongthreetimesasanaverageman.”moreclearthanthesentence“Heisstrongasalion.”?Onecanbeinclinedtosay–well, it depends.Theconceptofthestrengthofanaveragemanisquiteclearconcept.However,itisclearonlyif one knows something relevant concerning human physical strength. Ontheotherhandthefirstsentencecanbecompletelyuncleartoachild,while

8

InsomeofhisbooksJ.Searleachievedhighlevelofclarityregardingquitecomplexprob-lems.ConcerningclaritycomparehisMinds, Brains & SciencewithT.Nagel’sWhat Does It All Mean?andB.Russell’sThe Problems of Philosophyasperhapsonethemostclearintroductiontotheproblem.

9

SeeGriceP.(2001)Studies in Ways of Words,Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp.26–27.

10

For patent invention seeH. Petroski (2000)Invention by design, How Engineers Get from Thought to Thing,HarvardUniversityPress,Cambridge,Massachusetts.



thesecondcanbeclearerthenthefirst.Andclarityismeasuredbyactionsinwhichitsunderstandingisimplicitandmanifested.Paradoxicallyenough,insuchcasestobeunclearistheonlywaytobeclear.Thenagain,intheprevi-oussentencewordsunclearandcleararenotopposites;theybelongtotwodifferentlanguages,perhapsformsoflifeaswell.Furtherpointtoemphasiseisthefollowing(especiallyinthelightofSearle’sanalysisofmetaphor)–isitpossiblethattherearethingsthatcanbesaidclearlyonlyfiguratively(saymetaphorically)butnotliterally?Theproblemhereisifthisisso,thenmanytextualfigurescouldbecompletelyunderstoodandyetcompletelyuncleartooneunfamiliarwithsuchfinesseandingeneralwithaformoflifetheybelongto.Howthisispossiblewillbeexplainedinthefollowingsection.

5. Wittgenstein’s metaphor of a river: multiaspectual understanding as clarity

HerewewilluseWittgenstein’sconceptofcertaintyaspresentedinOCandbyexplicating it inbriefwewill illustratehowit ispossible that therearecompletelyunderstoodthings(descriptions,actions,practicesetc.)andwhichshouldnotbeclearerthentheyinfactareforgivenpracticalpurposes.InOChedoesn’tuseclaritybutasweshallsee“certainty”isforepistemologicalissuesjustanapplicationof“clarity”inphilosophicalmethodingeneral.Thispointconnectstheprevious(sections1.to4.)tothefollowing(5.1.to5.5.).

5.1. Is certainty epistemological clarity?

Is thereacentral ideaofWittgenstein’sworkOn Certainty?Ononehand,thisquestionhasanaspectofabroaderquestion,namely,isthereacriticalandunifiedschemeofepistemology(modernandcontemporary)andwhatisthepositionofOCinthisscheme,andontheotherhand,ithasanaspectofspecificissueofWittgenstein’streatmentofcertaintyinhiswholephiloso-phy.Letmestartfromthesecondaspect.ThetitleofOCassetofnoteswithsomecontentintegrityseemstobesomewhatmisguidedsincecertaintyisnottreatedasanepistemologicalconcept,ratherasapragmaticconcept,i.e.cer-taintywhichissimplymanifestedbyhumanactionsandpractices,linguisticandnon-linguistic; inanotherwords, it iscloselyconnected toconceptsofLGsandFOLsalreadyestablishedinPIandrelatedworks,andtoconceptslikepractice,action,andevenpragmatism.Certaintyisnotregardedasepis-temologicalcategoryasforinstanceinsomecriterionofit,saySknowsPiffPistrue,SissurethatP,andShasarighttobesure(likeinAyer,ChisholmorGettier);11assomeresultofapplyingstrictmethod,orasexplicationofcommon-senseusageofthewordknowledgewhichimpliescertainty(likeinMoore).Foronethingitseemsthathedepartsfromtheseandsimilartradi-tionsveryearlyinthecourseofinvestigationinOC(perhapsinthewholecourseofhisphilosophy)12sinceifknowledgeisofanyinteresttohimatall,thensurelyitisnotattractiveintermsofknow-thatorpropositionalknowl-edge,ratherintermsofknow-howorpracticalknowledge.Moretothat,sincecertaintyisforhimapracticalphenomenonithasmanyimportantdifferencescomparedtonon-propositionalknowledge.Letmenowturntothefirstaspect.Surely,athoroughbred20thcenturyaca-demicepistemologistwouldunmistakablyidentifysomeconnectionsbetweenWittgenstein’sapproachandtheepistemologyofanalytictraditionintermsofanexplicitorimplicitdiscussionwithsomeimportantphilosophers,withsomecharactersrepresentingwholeschoolsofmodernepistemologysuchas



anidealist,realist,rationalist,sceptic,etc.,andsometimesexaminingcentralepistemologicalconceptsandrelations,butthiswouldtellusmoreaboutaca-demicdisciplineofepistemologyitself thenaboutWittgenstein’s treatmentofthesubject.Surely,apartofunderstandingOCconsistsinunderstandingitsbackgroundandcontext,but to readMooreandRussellperhapsmeanstoreadworksthatWittgensteinusesasadversaries,whiletoreadJamesandmaybeRyle(especiallyinthelightofthedifferencebetweenknow-thatandknow-how)meanstoreadsomeofworksthatinfluencedhisvitalideasandthatwereinfluencedbythem.However,thisunderstanding,ifreachedatall,couldeasilymisleadareaderinthewaythatoneplacesWittgenstein’streat-mentofcertaintyinvarioustraditionsof20thcenturyepistemologyandthinksthatthat’sit.Personally,Idonothaveanykindofsoundargumentthatthementionedprocedureiswrong,butsomesectionsofOC,infactalotofthem,aresurelydissonantwithsuchpresentationofthework.Atsomepoint throughouthisphilosophyWittgensteinestablished thecon-cept of perspicuous presentation (or clear summarising description) as thegoalofhisphilosophy,andthemorphologicalmethodaswell.ThemethodwasappliedmostlytoLGsnomatterifitwasclearlyestablishedthatLGsareonlyapartofFOLs(PI23).WhileinvestigatingvariousLGssometimeshegetsintouchwithFOLsaninvestigatedLGbelongto,andquiterarelyhein-vestigatedpartsofFOLsascompletelydisconnectedfromtheirLGs.Itcouldbesaidthatsomepartsofhislaterworkaresuchapplicationsofthemethod(intermsofinvestigatingvariouspsychologicalphenomenainRPPI,II,LW,coloursinROC,andcertaintyinOC).Inotherwordsthequestionis:isOCanattemptofmorphological investigationandgrammaticalpresentationofpracticalcertaintybyreferencetocertainLGsandFOLs?

5.2. A river metaphor: how many remarks?

Now,supposing thatOC isanattempt toproduceaclearsummarisingde-scriptionofcertainty,oratleastastartingpointofmorphologicalinvestiga-tionofthesubject,onewouldnaturallyliketoknowwhattheresultsare,oristheresuchdescriptionamongthenotesofOC?Inspiteofthefactthattheactivity of philosophising is far more important than its results, one couldfindsomehintsofsuchdescriptioninOC.ThebasicphenomenonthatWitt-gensteininvestigatesinOCisthat(we)humansaresimplycertainofmanythings(thismuchheagreeswithMoore)andhetriestoperspicuouslypresentthisphenomenon.Thesecertaintiesshouldnotbeobservedindividuallybutin a way that they constitute a system of certainties (system of relations).Therefore,whatoneshouldobserveisthewholephenomenon,allofitsparts(sometimesLGs,sometimesFOLs)andtheirrelations,andfinallythewholepatternwhichrevealsitself,andthentheinvestigationisover.Heusesmanymetaphorsforthesystemofthesecertainties,butthemostbeautifulone,andthemostdiscussedtooisthatoftheriver(OC94-9).Themetaphor(asshowninFigure3)deservesfewnotes.

11

AyerA.J.(1955)The Problems of Knowled-ge,London:Penguin,pp.31–35.

12

See:PI474,pp.184,204,206,andperhapsinTLP6.5–6.51aswell,butinanotherway.BesidesobviousdissimilaritiesbetweenTLP

andPI,therearestrikingsimilaritiesaswell,namely in structure of expositions (not instyleofcourse)andinsomeclaimstoo.Com-pareforinstancetheorderandthetreatmentof some topics, namely, world/facts withformsoflife,facts/propositionswithLGsandgrammar,etc.



Figure 3.Theriverimage

Thesystemofcertaintiesiscalled‘worldpicture’(WP,Weltbild,OC94-5),anditiscomparedwithariver(asshowninFigure3).Theimagehasthreeelements, namely thebank consistingof hard rock, thebank consistingofsand(washedawayordeposited,(OC99),orerodedandsediment),andwa-ters.Thereisnosharpdifferencebetweentheseelementssincetherearetwomovements:themovementofthewatersintheriverbasin(erosion),andthemovementof theriverbasin itself (sedimentation,OC97).Allof theseel-ements represent different kinds of remarks, that is to say, something likerule-sentences(OC94-6),experience/practice-sentences,andsentencesinbe-tweenrepresentedbysandandsmallrocks,whichisessentialsinceithastwoaspects.Oneaspectsissandasa residual partduringerosion (rivermove-ment),andtheotheraspectissendasa constitutivepartduringsedimentation(a bankmovement, and awhole rivermovement).To translate the image,somesentencesarehardandtheyhardlyeverchange(thesearegrammaticalsentencesorremarksfromPIandotherrelatedworks,andhingesentencesfromOC341-3,655 (explicit),87-8,415 (implicit));watersareempirical,experiential, or practice sentences; and two-aspectual send represents axissentences(OC152).13ThereforeanyWPconsistsofthreekindsofsentences,namely:(a)empirical,experiential,orpracticesentences(whicharechang-ingcomparedtob),(b)rule,grammatical,orhingesentences(whichmostlydonotchangecompareda),and(c)axissentences,whicharetwo-aspectualmeaningthattheyarepivotalforchangebetweenaandbsince(c1)theycanbecomeaorb (a changewithin the riverbetweenwaters, hard rocks, andsend),orchanges within a WP,(c2)buttheycancontributetothe change of the whole WP(achangeofthewholeriverbasin).Thisaspect changeregard-ingaxissentences isquite important (aswellas in thecaseofduck-rabbitheadinPI),itisnotthefundamentofahouse;itisaroofwhichconnectsalltheelementsofthehouse.UnderstandingaspectchangeofaxissentencesisthecoreofunderstandingaWPasawhole,seeingitspattern,andunderstand-ingclearlycertaintiesofOC.

5.3. Axes remarks: Do squirrels grow on trees?

Now,inordertoseeapatternoneneedstoseehowandinwhichsituationssuchsentencesareformed,uttered,orremarksaboutvariouspracticesmade.WittgensteinwritesthefollowinginOC287:“Thesquirreldoesnotinferbyinductionthatitisgoingtoneedstoresnextwinteraswell.Andnomoredoweneedalawofinductiontojustifyouractionsorourpredictions.”Given



thatasquirreldoesnotusedeductionorabduction,orevenintuition,andallknowndifferencesbetweensquirrelsandhumans,thequestionishowasquir-relcanbesurethatstoresareneededthisyeartoo?Thereisnotashredofdoubtinheractions.Consequently,howhumansaresosureintheiractions?Inordertoexplicatethisissueletustakeanexample.

Whatisquiteimportanthereistonotethattheremark“Squirrelsdonotgrowon trees.” should be observedwith its opposite remarks that is “Squirrelsgrowontrees.”andhowitandtheoppositeonerelatetoothers.Obviously,theremark“Squirrelsdonotgrowontrees.”fits innicelywithotherremarks,almostastheytakentogetherconstituteaharmonioussystem,asystemwhichmanifestsitselfviaouractions.Ontheotherhand,ithasnoobviousconnec-tionwith remarkswhichare rule-likeorobservational.Say thatWillard isscepticalchildaskingwhyallthetime,soheasksfather–howdoyouknowthatsomesquirrelsdonotgrowontrees?Fathercanbequitesurprisednotsomuchbythequestionastowithhisowninabilitytoprovideinstantandobviousanswer,sohesays–“Becausetheydonot,andIam100%certain”.Now,thisWPinwhichtheseremarks(a–c)areharmoniousisinverydelicatebalance,namely, thewholeWPcouldcompletelychangeif there are some rare squirrels which grow on trees.ItwouldbethecaselikeinWittgenstein’srivermetaphorthatthissimplefactwouldchangenotjustthewholeinternalbalanceandstructureofWP/sand,rocks,andwaters,butthepositionofthewholeWP/riveraswell;itwouldbeacompletelydifferentWP(concerningphysicsonecanimagineWillardsaying“Somethingscanmovefasterthan

13

For the very important difference betweenhingesandaxissee:Schulte,J.(2005)“With-in aSystem”, in:Moyal-Sharrock,D.Bren-

ner,W. H. (eds.) Readings of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty,NewYork:PalgraveMacmil-lan,pp.59–75.

Example 1.SaythatwehaveaboyWillardlivinginanicenaturalenvironmentinAkron,Ohioobservingforfirsttimeasquirrelonatreeinthebackyardandcontinuetodosoforfewdays.Therefore,helearnsmanythingsaboutsquirrels,saythattheyliveontrees,thattheyhaveflamboyant tails, that theyareveryskilledwith their“hands”whilecollectinghazelnutsandstoringthem,etc.TherearesomeothersquirrelsaroundandWillardnameshissquirrelDonaldandheiscapabletotellDonaldfromothersquirrels.Now,Willardisnot sure isDonalddifferent fromother squirrels sincehehadnever seenDonaldon theground,sohethinksthatDonaldisaspecialkindofasquirrelwhichgrowsontreeaswellashazelshecollects,especiallybecauseDonaldseemstobeabitunhandywithhis“hands”comparedtoothersquirrels.Heaskshisfatherdosomesquirrelsgrowontreeswhileothersdonot.Fatherexplainstohimthatsquirrelsdonotgrowontrees,thatsquirrelsareanimals,notplants,etc.,andthatDonaldwilleventuallycomedownfromthetreeifheobserveshimforsometime.

In thisexampleof learningaboutsquirrelswehaveallof thepreviouslymentionedsen-tences,alltheremarksaremade.Thereareexperiential(orobservational)remarksmadebyWillard(previouslya),suchas“Lookfather,Donaldisveryunhandy.”Therearealsogram-maticalremarksmadebyWillard’sfather(previouslyb)suchas“Squirrelsareanimals,notplants.”,“Squirrelshavequiteflashytailslikenootherbeings.”,“Squirrelscollectvariousnutsandstorethem.”Now,thereisanothertypeofaremarkmadebyWillard’sfather(previ-ouslyc),namely“Squirrelsdonotgrowontreeslikenutsdo.”Andthiskindofaremarkisobviouslynotanempiricaloragrammaticalone.Firstkindofaremark(a)lookslikearuleofakind,namelythatsquirrelsareanimals,notplants;thesecondonelookslikeanempiri-calone(b),asaresultofanobservation,saythatDonaldisquiteunhandy;thethirdoneisaspecialkindofremarksinceitisneitherarulenoritisaresultofobservation.



the speedof light” andhowwould educated father answer tohisquestionbeforethenewdiscoveryandafterwards).14

Further issuewhich can easilymisguide one in thinking about remarks ofOC isconcerningcertainty.Thecertaintyof thewhole systemof remarks,ourwholeWP,restsonfinebalancebetweenelementsofWP.Butthesys-temisrarelyexplicated/clarified;however,itiscompletelyunderstood.Thepreviousexampleisoneofspecialsituationsinwhichapartofthesystemshouldbeexplicated,namelyinthecourseofupbringing(otherexceptionsarechangesinaWP,aclashoftwoWPs,andsimilarrevolutionaryandnotparadigmsituationsinalifeofaWPofparticularcommunityorculture).Cer-taintiesbelongingtoaWPinallothernormalsituationsareimplicitinactionsandpracticesofmembersofacommunityorculture,andinthesametimetheyaremanifestedbytheiractionsandpractices.Humansbytheiractionssimplymanifestthattheyarecertainasmuchastheycanbethatsay“Squir-relsdonotgrowontrees.”15Andtherearemanymoreremarksofthiskindwhich are implicitinhumanactionsandpracticesandbylivingtheirlivesincertainwayhumansmanifest that theyarecertainnot intheseindividuallytaken,ratherinthewholeWP.Now,allpreviouslysaidissurelynotenoughtosoundlyconcludethatOCisanattemptofamorphologicalinvestigationandagrammaticalperspicuouspresentation(aclearsummarisingdescription)ofpractical certainty,butitpointstothatdirection,namelytothepathatwhichendarehumanpracticesandtheirpracticalcertainty,andtheirpracticalun-derstandingwithoutclarificationorclarity.

5.4. Experiential remarks

Iftheriver-imagefromOC(94-9)istobeinterpretedasaworld-view(WV)composedofthreetypesofremarks,namelyexperiential,grammatical,andaxesremarks(asshowninFigure4asER,GR,andAR),thansomefurtherissues can be raised concerning their relations. Figure 4 presents relationsbetweenkindsofremarksconcerningtheir“similarity”,notconcerningtheir“functioning”asitispresentedinFigure4concerning“therivermetaphor”.

Figure 4.Threetypesofremarksandtheirrelationswithinaworld-viewasasystem

OverlapbetweenremarksinFigure4arelabelledasa,b,c,andd.Obviouslydstandsforthemostsimilaritiesbetweenallremarks,whilea, b,and cstandforsimilaritiesbetweenallpairs,namelyaforsimilaritiesbetweenARsand



ERs, bforsimilaritiesbetweenARsandGRs,andcforsimilaritiesbetweenERsandGRs.Consequently,regionswhichdonotoverlapareregionsofdis-similarities.WittgensteinscholarstraditionallyexaminemostlyGRsasbeingsomethinglikearule-likephenomenonespeciallyinthecontrastwithakindofrelativ-ismwhichWittgensteinseemstoacceptonvariouslevels.ARswerebythesamegroupidentifiedas“hingemetaphor”at leastuntilJ.SchulteshowedthatARs are in fact identified as “axesmetaphor”while “hinges” are themetaphorforGRs.Now,ERswereneveraprimeorcentralsubjectmatterofinquiryamongmajorityofmainstreamWittgensteinscholars.However,ERsarequiteimportantsinceintheriver-imagetheycloudtheideathatWVisakindofchange,movement,processandwatersofariverarepivotalforun-derstandingthisaspectofthemetaphor.Ontheotherhand,whatcontributesthemosttotheattributionofrelativismtoWittgenstein’snotescomesfromthenatureofERs.ERsaccordingtotheFigure4havedualrelationtootherremarks,namely,ERshavesimilaritiesanddissimilaritieswithARsandGRsalone,andsimilaritiesanddissimilaritieswithbothARsandGRs(regionsa,c,anddinFigure4).Theflowingofariverrepresentssotosaysteadyformoflife(FOL)andsteadinessofdailyexperiences(anddailycertainties).Now,whatisthemaincharacteristicofERs?DiscussiononthismatteronecanfindinPI466-90whichcanbecalledadiscussiononjustificationofem-piricalbeliefs.InPI472Wittgensteinemphasisesuniformityofproceedingsandsays“thatitcanperhapsbeseenmostclearly”inthefearfromwhatisexpected.“Sunrisesintheeast”iswhatwearecertainof,andthiscertaintyismanifestedbyouractions,say,byourturningtotheeastifwewanttoseethesuninthemorning(apartfromsomestandardexceptions).Wittgenstein’sex-ampleismoredramatic.Namely,ifonewasburntinthepastthereisnowaythatonewillputhandintoaflame(againapartfromsomestandardexcep-tions).Thebelief/certaintythataflamewillburn“is”thefearof beingburned(PI473-4).Doweneedreasonsthatwewillbeburnedifweputourhandsinflame?Well,yesandno,andyesheremeanssomethinglike–youknow,therearesomeexceptions.Reasonsareinfacteffectsofpastexperiences(PI480-1).Consequencesaredrawnprimarilyinactions(PI486).

5.5. Grammatical remarks: three examples

Grammaticalremarksarethemostobviouscandidatesforclarity.Yet,theirporousborders,deepoverlap,andinterdependencewithexperientialandaxesremarks suggests thatWittgenstein advanced previously described two-as-pectualconceptofclarity.Thispointwillbeillustratedbythreeexamples.

5.5.1. “The rain in Spain falls mainly in the plain”

Letusvisualizeworkers renovatingahouse.After they fixed the roof, in-doors,andfrontwallstheycometothefoundations,andtheystarttorepair

14

However squirrels spawn on trees and livetheresoinawaythey“growontrees”aswellashazelnuts.Thatistosay,ecologicallyspeak-ing,Willardcouldberight.However,besidesthissimilaritywithhazelnutsthereisalsodis-similarityheresincesquirrelsdonot“growontrees”astheirproperpartswhilehazelnutsin-deeddogrowontreesastheirproperparts.

15

Theysimplydonotexplorethisfact,donothave scientific projects committed to find-ingsquirrelswhichgrowontrees.Ofcourse,they have projects in ecology investigatingrelationsbetweenparticularanimalsandtheirnaturalenvironment,butevenifthesewouldbesquirrelsandtreesitwouldnotmeanthattheyinvestigatedotheygrowontrees.



thedrainagesystemtoprotectthehousefromunderwaterandsoilhumidity.Inordertodosofirsttheydigaditchallaroundthehousealittlebitbelowthelevelofthefoundationsandtheyrepairthefoundation’sdumpproof.Thentheystarttorepairadrainagesystem.Whiledoingsotheycommunicateinthefollowingway.Workerα:“Bigones!”β:“Coming.”γ:“Dumpthemhere.”α:“WaituntilIarrangethemproperly.”(Afterawhile.)α:“Pipes.”β:“Com-ing.”γ:“Watchforthepipeslope!”α:“O.K.”(Afterawhile.)α:“Smallpeb-blesanddumpproof.”β:“Coming.”(Afterawhile.)α:“Steelreinforcementandconcrete.”β:“Preparing.”α:“Watchfortheproportionandthedensity.”β:“Iam.”,etc.Thisshorteneddialogueisobviouslyadialoguebetweenthreeexperiencedconstructionworkers,α,βandγ.Ifoneknowsalittlebitabouttheprotectionofahousefromunderwaterbyadrainagesystem,andalittlebitofphysics,thenonewillunderstandthisdialogueperfectly.Moretothatonewillunderstandthatworkersaredoingtheirjobcorrectlyandproperly.Forinstance,oneunderstandsthat“Bigones”meansbigboulderswhichmustbesetupfirstatthebottomoftheditchandscatteredinorderforanunder-watertohaveafreepassagebesideandunderthefoundationsandnotthruthem.Bylookingatworkersdoingtheirjob,namelywhattheydoandhowtheycommunicate,onecanseethattheyaredoingproperjob.Now,bydoingtheirjobproperlyworkersaremanifestingtheverygrammaroftheexpres-sion“adrainagesystem”.Theymanifestwhat“adrainagesystem”means,namely“toconstructsotosayasystemwhichwillprotecthousefoundationsfromunderwaterandsoilhumidity”.Theymanifest that theyknow-howtoassemblethesystem,namelybymakingadumpproofofthefoundations,byputtingthebigrocksfirstandhowtoscatterthem,byputtingthesmallpeb-bleslatter,etc.(asshowninFigure5).

Figure 5.Thestructureofthedrainagesystem(author’s drawing)

Byshowingwhatisgrammaticalconcerningadrainagesystem,saybyare-marksuchas“Bigrocksfirstandsmallpebbleslater”α,βandγareshowingthenonsensicalcombinationofsignsconcerningadrainagesystemconstruc-tiontoo.Forinstance,aremark“Smallpebblesfirstandbiggerpebbleslater”isobviouslyanonsensicalcombinationofsignsconcerningthedrainagesys-temconstruction,bybeingnonsensicalitisnon-grammaticalaswell.

5.5.2. “Number 23”

Philosophical grammar (further shortened as “grammar”) describes lan-guage-games. It consists of remarks ordered in various chapters, remarkswhichmanifest familiar, intimate,andusualarrangementsof signs. It sayswhich order ofwords or a combination of signs ismeaningful andwhichismeaningless.Agrammarsimplydescribes thecorrectuseof signswith-



outexplainingit.(PI496)However,notallremarksbelongtothegrammar.Thinkofpossibilitythattoanyquestiontowhichthecorrectansweris2,likeforinstance“Howmuchis1+1?”,“Howtallisthisman?”,“Howdeepcanyoudive?”,one,insteadofanswering“2”,shouldalwaysanswerintermsofcomplexoperationthecorrectsolutionofwhichis2,forinstance:(a)–“Howtallisthisman?”–“Heis2x6–50/5meterstall.”(PI513,552)Comparethisdialoguewiththefollowing:(b)–“Howtallisthisman?”–“Thismanis1971–1969meterstall.”Andthenwiththefollowing:(c)–“Howtallisthisman?”–“Thismanis2meterstall.”Whatdoyoufindexceptthatyouareunfamil-iarwiththefirst(a)andthesecond(b)answer,whileyouarefamiliarwiththethirdone(c)?Now,combinationsofsignsinalloftheanswerspresentedpreviouslyaremeaningful,however,onlythethirdone(c)isthedescriptionofour grammar,theonewithwhichwearefamiliar.Comparethewholesitu-ationwiththefollowingone:–“Whatisthetemperatureoutside?”–“ItisxdegreesofCelsius.”–“Whatisthetemperatureoutside?”–“ItisxdegreesofFahrenheit.”(PI508)Heretheanotherfinesseisofimportance,namely,notsomuchtheissueofbeingfamiliarornotwithtellingthetemperatureintermsofFahrenheitorCelsiussinceweindeedare“familiar”withit(PG3),meaningthatweknow-howtorecalculatedegreesofFahrenheitintodegreesofCelsiusvice versa,butarewe, so tosay,more intimatewith telling thetemperatureindegreesofFahrenheitorindegreesofCelsius.Surely,thisdoesn’tshowmuch,butitshowsthatourgrammarissensitive,orthatitiscomposedofsaylayers.Someformsaregrammaticalandfamil-iar formosthumans like “1+1=2”, somearegrammatical and intimatefor somegroups like telling the temperature indegreesofFahrenheit, andsomearegrammaticalandintimateforsomesubgroupslikewaysofgreeting.ThispointcanbeconnectedwithkindsofremarkswhichourWPconsistsof,namely:meta-historicalsuchas“1+1=2”,or“Catsdon’tgrowontrees”,historicalsuchas“Waterboilsat100degreesofCelsius”,thosewhichstandforeachandeveryhuman“MynameisNN”(whichistruesince“Everyhu-manhasaname”),andthosewhicharecompletelyindividualsuchas“MostofmylifeIspentinMadagascaratthishomeaddress”.Generallyspeaking,itseemsthatthereareatleastthreekindsofremarksinourWPrepresentedbyfamousriver-image(OC94-9).Now,thepossibilityofthesetypesofremarksisn’tsomethingpostulated,butmanifestedbythewayinwhichweliveandtalk.Moretothat,thesetypesaren’tsharplydiffered,theycanmergeoneintoanothersinceourformoflifechangesinternally(regardingthebalanceofitsaspects)andexternally(regardingitsrelativepositiontootherformsoflife,nomatterifrealormerelyprobableorjustpossible).

5.5.3. “Chicken run”

Wittgensteinwritesthat“Thecockcallshensbycrowing.”(PI493)andthehenscome.Themothercallsherdaughterbysaying“ComehereJill.”andJillcomes.Analogyisobvious.However,Wittgensteinasks–“Isn’t theaspectquitealteredifweimaginethecrowingtosethensinmotionbysomekindofphysicalcausation?”(ibid)Thenotionofanaspect-changeisimportanthere.Namely,obviouslytherearesomegrammatical(orhinge)remarksheresuchas“Cockscrow”and“Henscluck”.Intheriver-imagetheyarerepresentedbyhardrocksformingriverbottomandbanks.Therearesomepossibleempiri-cal(orexperiential)remarksaswell,say,“Hensarequitenervoustoday”or“CockJohnnyisreallyquietthismorning”Thesearerepresentedbywatersof a river. Finally, there is the remark “The cock doesn’t call the hens by



barkingbutbycrowing”.Suchremarksarerepresentedbysendandtinypeb-bleswhichcanbecomehardrockiftheycreateasandalandfinallybecomeapartofthebank(sedimentation),orwhichcanbecomeapartofwatersendchange thecourseof thewhole river (erosion).Really, theseaxes remarks(OC152)indeedarethecentreofrotationofthewholeWPandtheyhavetwoaspects,thatistosay,theycanremainastheyare(oneaspect),andtheycanchange(anotheraspect)intogrammaticalorhingeremarksorintoempiricalremarks.Thewholechickenphenomenonconsistsofremarkswhichtakenasawholelikeasliceofacakeismirroringthestructureofthewholecake,ourwholeWP,andallotherphenomenaaredoingthesamething.Now,where is theaspect-changeinthisexample?Istheremark“Bycrowingcockcalls…”ortheremark“Cock’scrowingcauses…”therightaxisremark?Well,onecouldsay,thisissuecanreallychangenotjustthebalanceinourWPbutitcanshiftthewholeWP too.This issue isn’t aboutmetaphors (does the cock really“calls”?),oraboutcommunicationinanimalworld(howcertainsoundsmadebycockscausecertainmovesbyhens?),ratheraboutournotionoflanguage,andWittgensteinwritesthatourordinarylanguageiswhatwecallalanguageandthenotherthingsbyanalogywiththis(PI494),andbybeingmoresimilarthendissimilarwithourlanguage-gamesandwithourformsoflifewecallcock’scrowinginfact“calling”,not“causing”.Inthesamemannerwesaythatplantsare“reacting”tothesunlightexceptforsunflowersforwhichwesaythatthey“turn”towardsthesunlightsimilarlyasJill“turns”tohermotherwhenshecallsher.Aformof life (cultures)consistsof (aspects)WP(lan-guage-games)andpractices(actions).AWPconsistsofatleastthreetypesofremarks,namelygrammatical(orhinge),empirical(orexperiential),andaxesremarks(asshowninFigure6).Theycreatehisfinalconceptofclarity.

Figure 6.Aformoflifeanditsaspectsstructuredlikeawhirligig(OC152)

6. Conclusion

Wittgensteinusedtheconceptofclarityinhislaterphilosophy.Hislatercon-ceptof‘clarity’as‘perspicuity’,‘certainty’,‘seeing’,‘seeingas’,etc.haslit-tle in commonwith the ‘clarity’ in earlierwritingsused as a logical term.However,inlaterworkstheconcept“developed”frommerementioning,likeinTheBlue and Brown Books,andsomemoresubstantialdescriptions,likeinPhilosophical Investigations andThe Big Typescript, to fullydevelopedconceptofclaritywhichplaysitsroleintheconceptofcertainty,especiallyin On Certainty. Parallel with this development there is a development indifferentiationbetweenvariouskindsof“remarks”,namely:empiricalorex-



perientialremarks(inThe Blue and Brown Books),besidesthemgrammaticalremarks(inPhilosophical Investigationswhicharecalled‘hinges’inOn Cer-tainty),andfinallyaxesremarks(inOn Certainty).Suchfullydevelopedtwo-aspectualconceptofclarityisimportantforgeneralphilosophicalmethodasconceptual clarification,andforunderstandingparticularlyepistemological clarityorinfactcertainty.Perhapstheseremarkscanchangeourunderstand-ingofmaintask,methods,goals,scopeandlimitsofepistemologyandphi-losophyofscience.AssuchWittgensteinstandsfairlyaloneincontemporaryphilosophythinkingthatsuchconceptofclarityisnotjustthecorrectonebutbesidesthataclearoneaswell(auto-referentiallyconsistent)andapplicabletoallphilosophicalissues(notjusttoepistemologicalones).

KristijanKrkač

“Quid pro quo, Clarice”: Wittgensteinovmultiaspektnipojamjasnoće

SažetakU članku autor pojašnjava poznati zahtjev za jasnoćom J. R. Searlea i multiaspektni pojam jasnoće kod L. Wittgensteina. Pojam jasnoće uvodi se preko Searlova zahtjeva i problema tog zahtjeva koji razotkriva primjena Wittgensteinove morfološke metode. Višeznačnost jasnoće vidljiva je u razlici između jasnoće kao preglednosti i jasnoće kao razumijevanja. Wittgenstei-nov jednoznačan ali višeslojan pojam preglednosti kao viđenja i kao razumijevanja nudi se kao rješenje poteškoća. Primjer takvog pojma preglednosti vidljiv je u slici rijeke iz Wittgensteinova djela Oizvjesnosti na način eksplikacije slike kao slike svijeta koja se sastoji od tri vrste na-pomena (rečenica), tj. iskustvenih napomena, gramatičkih ili „pant“ propozicija te napomena osi vrtnje, a sve te vrste napomena prikaz čine potpuno preglednim i dakle jasnim u praktične svrhe.

Ključneriječigramatičkerečenice,jasnoća,JohnR.Searle,iskustvenerečenice,LudwigWittgenstein,napomeneosivrtnje,percepcija,praksa,preglednost,razumijevanje,slikarijeke,transparentnost,svjetonazor

KristijanKrkač

„Quid pro quo, Clarice“: Wittgensteins multiaspektischer Begriff der Klarheit

ZusammenfassungIn dieser Arbeit erörtert der Autor den ruhmvollen Appell J. R. Searles zur Klarheit und oben-drein die vielaspektische Notion derselben bei L. Wittgenstein. Der Begriff der Klarheit wird eingeführt über Searles Aufforderung zur Klarheit, und das einschlägige Problem via Wittgen-steins morphologische Methode. Präsentiert wurde die Mehrdeutigkeit des Klarheitskonzepts, nämlich der Unterschied zwischen der Klarheit als Transparenz und der Klarheit als Deutung. L. Wittgensteins unzweideutiger Begriff der Übersichtlichkeit als Sehweise und Auffassung wird unterbreitet als Lösung der vorhergehenden Unterschiedlichkeit als Hauptquelle der Ambigu-ität des Klarheitsbegriffs. Einige Ausnahmen von der Klarheit wurden aufgewiesen; insbeson-dere das Paradox des Komplettverständnisses ohne Klarheit. Und letztendlich: Wittgensteins Flussbild aus ÜberGewißheit und dessen Explizierung unter dem Blickwinkel der Weltsicht und dreier Arten von Bemerkungen (Sätzen), genauer gesagt empirischer Bemerkungen, gramma-tischer Bemerkungen/Scharnier-Bemerkungen sowie der Drehachse-Bemerkungen, welche die Darlegung zum Zwecke der Praxis vollkommen plausibel gestalten.

SchlüsselwörterDrehachse-Sätze,Klarheit,empirischeSätze,grammatischeSätze,JohnR.Searle,LudwigWittgen-stein,Perzeption,Übersichtlichkeit,Praxis,Flussbild,Transparenz,Verständnis,Weltsicht



KristijanKrkač

“Quid pro quo, Clarice” Le concept multiaspectuel de clarté de Wittgenstein

RésuméDans cet article, l’auteur éclaire la fameuse exigence de clarté de J. R. Searle et le concept multiaspectuel de clarté de L. Wittgenstein. Le concept de clarté est introduit via l’exigence de Searle et le problème de cette exigence l’est via la méthode morphologique de Wittgenstein. Une équivoque du concept de clarté est présentée, à savoir la différence entre clarté en tant que transparence et clarté en tant que compréhension. La notion univoque de L. Wittgenstein de caractère synoptique comme vision et compréhension est proposée comme solution à cette diffi-culté. Un exemple d’un tel concept est visible dans l’image de la rivière dans Delacertitude de Wittgenstein et l’explication de l’image en tant qu’image du monde qui consiste en trois sortes de propositions, à savoir empiriques, grammaticales ou gonds et propositions pivot, lesquelles rendent une présentation complètement comprise en pratique.

Mots-cléspropositionsgrammaticales, clarté, JohnR.Searle,propositionsempiriques,LudwigWittgenstein,propositionspivot,perception,pratique,caractèresynoptique,compréhension, imagede la rivière,transparence,visiondumonde

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