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“Legitimating an authoritative power through the foreign policy discourse, the example of Algeria

during the Arab uprisings”

By Côme GREVY

Written for the course:

Sociologie des relations internationales dans le monde arabe

Taught by Laurent Bonnefoy

Fall 2014

This paper has received the KSP Student Paper Award of the Kuwait Program at Sciences Po

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Sociologie des Relations Internationales dans le monde arabe (Laurent Bonnefoy) - Final Paper December 2014

Title:Legitimatinganauthoritativepowerthroughtheforeignpolicydiscourse,theexampleofAlgeriaduringtheArabuprisings

Author:CômeGREVY

Inspiteofmanypredictions,thewindofthe“Arabspring”didnotblowonAlgeria.TobemoreaccurateandtouseLaFontaine’swordsinhispoemTheOakandtheReed:facingthewindoftheArabunrestin2011,theAlgeriangovernmentdidbendbutdidnotbreak.

This could seem surprising because Algeria actually shares many characteristics with its ArabneighbourssuchasTunisiaandEgyptwheretherevolutionledtothefallofZineel‐AbidineBenAliandHosniMubarak.Indeed,AbdelazizBouteflikahasbeenleadingthecountryfor12yearsatthemomentof the Arab uprisings; Algeria is traditionally dominated by the army; the state of emergency wasimposedduring20yearsuntil2011andthere isagrowingdiscontentabout thepolitical institutionsandleadersandahighrateofyouthunemployment(23,6%)1.

TheAlgeriansocietyhasnotbeenimpervioustotheArabunrest.Onthecontrary,mobilizationsinthecountryhavehistoricallybeenquitestrong.Accordingto theAlgerianarmy,morethan10000socialmovementsbrokeoutinthecountryin20102.However,asLaylaBaamaraexplains,theseprotestsweresectorialprotestsandallattemptsforaunitedactiondidnotsucceed3.

Proteststhatoccurredin2011inAlgeriatookmoreorlessthesamepatternasprotestsinotherArabcountries: young men aged 16‐24, for many unemployed, formed several small groups in differentneighbourhoodsbeforeemergingontoroadsandsettingupbarricades4.Moreover,eventhougheveryArabsocietyhasitsownspecificities,thereasonsfortheprotestswereaboutthesameinAlgeria:lackofjobs,lackofhousing,veryhighcostoffood,fightagainstcorruption,claimformorerightsetc.5

The repressionby the security forceshasbeenseverebut is far frombeing theonly reasonwhy theuprising failed tomaterialise.Many researchers have tried to explainwhy the country has not beenconcernedbythe“dominoeffect”6thatousteddictatorsinTunisia,Egypt,YemenorLibya.

For Dris Chérif, the governmental successful strategy has been to make people believe that thedemocraticchanges inAlgeriahadalready takenplaceafter theeventsofOctober1988with,amongotherreforms,theadoptionofanewConstitutionandtheendoftheone‐partyregime7.Accordingto

1CHENASalim, « L'Algérie dans le “Printemps arabe » entre espoirs, initiatives et blocages“, ConfluencesMéditerranée,N°77,p.105‐118,20112DRIS‐AÏTHAMADOUCHE Louisa, “L’Algérie face au printemps arabe: pressions diffuses et résilienceentretenue“,Politiquesméditerranéennes,p.178‐183,20123BAAMARALayla,“Algeroulacontestationenrangdispersés:desmobilisationsqui“neprennentpas““ inCAMAU Michel et VAIREL Fréderic, Soulèvementset recompositionspolitiquesdans lemondearabe, PUM,20144Dr.AbdelNasser Jabi, “ProtestMovements inAlgeria“, CaseAnalysis,ArabCenter forResearch&Policystudies,Mai2011(online,6thNovember2014)5BAAMARALayla,Ibid6“ThedominoeffectofArabunrest“,CNN,online(6thofNovember2014)7DRISCherif,“Élections,dumpingpolitiqueetpopulisme:Quandl’Algérietriomphedu“printempsarabe““L'AnnéeduMaghreb,IX,p.279‐297,2013

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KamelBoudjemil, “thisdiscoursehasbeeninternalizedbythegreatmajorityofAlgerianpeoplewhoarenowconvincedthatthestatusquoispreferable”8.

Moreover, for LouisaDrisHamadouche, the great resilience capacity of theAlgerian state is anotherexplanation to the failureof theprotests.Theauthorhighlights the reformsadoptedby theAlgerianstate in 2011 and 2012: suspension of the state of emergency, house building projects, adoption ofmeasures tosupport thepurchasingpowerandamassiveredistributionof theoil revenues. Inotherwords,theAlgerianregimeboughtsocialpeace9.

Forother scholars, thepowerandsophisticationof the “police state”embodied in theDepartmentofIntelligenceandSecurity (DRS)andtheweaknessandthe“atomisation”of the internaloppositionaretwootherelementsthatexplaintheabsenceofashiftinpowerfollowingthe2011unrests10.

Alltheseworksshowaveryaccurateknowledge,byscholars,ofinternalissuesoftheAlgeriansociety.However, very few of theseworks address the question of Algeria’s foreign policy during the “Arabspring”,nordotheyfocusonofficialdiscoursesheldbytheAlgerianauthoritiesduringthisperiod.We assume that the foreign policy discourse and,more generally, the official discourse, held by theAlgerianauthorities in2011and2012canbeanothersourceofcomprehensionofthestabilityoftheAlgerianregimewhenfacingtheArabuprisings.Infact,analysingtheforeignpolicydiscourseallowsusto see in which myths this political imaginaire is grounded11. It reveals what interpretation ofinternational events has been made by the political figures and what message they have tried tobroadcast.

OurhypothesisisthattheAlgeriangovernmentusesforeignpolicyasatooltolegitimatetheautocraticregime.Ontheonehand,itservesfortheinstitutionalizationoffearwithinthepopulationandforthedesignationofacommonenemy:terrorism,inordertolimitthesocialunrestsandtomaintainsocialpeace.Forthatpurpose,theAlgerianleadersuseofamemorialdiscursivestrategy.Ontheotherhand,itlegitimates,intheeyesoftheinternationalsociety,the“policestate”andtheuseofcoercivemeasuresaimed,officially,atfightingterrorism.Eventhoughtheseelementsarenotspecifictotheperiodofthe“Arabspring”,theyarestrikingatthatmomentbecausethesurvivaloftheregimeisatstake.

SuchastudycanonlybeconductedbyreplacingAlgerianforeignpolicy inahistoricalperspective inordertoobservetheevolutionsthathavetakenplacewithinthelastfiftyyears.Thiswillbedoneinthefirst sectionwherewewill be showinghowBouteflika hasmade foreignpolicy a key element of hispresidency since 1999. In section two,wewill be analysing the foreign policy discourse held by theAlgerian authorities in 2011 and 2012 and showhow it is used as a tool for the legitimation of theautocratic regime. In the last section, we will question Algeria’s foreign policy making process andobservetheblurringbetweennationalandinternationalissuesinthatcountry.

Section1:Algeria’sforeignpolicyinahistoricalperspective

AsGuillaumeDevinexplainsinhisbookSociologiedesrelationsinternationales,“internationalrelationssociologyretainsastrongattachmenttothehistoricaldepthofthedifferentphenomenastudiedinorderto account for their evolution and, more generally, to take up the issue of change in internationalrelations”12.Thus,itisnecessarytoplaceourobjectofstudyinahistoricalperspective.

8InterviewwithKamelBOUDJEMIL,Paris,November20,20149DRIS‐AÏTHAMADOUCHELouisa etDRISCherif, “De la résiliencedes régimesautoritaires : la complexitéalgérienne“,L’AnnéeduMaghreb,VIII,p.279‐301,201210KEENANJeremyH., “ForeignPolicyandtheGlobalWaronTerror intheReproductionofAlgerianStatePower“,StateCrimeJournal,Vol.1,No.2,pp.196‐216,Autumn201211COLINGuillaume,“RussianForeignPolicyDiscourseduringtheKosovoCrisis: InternalStrugglesandthePoliticalImaginaire”,Researchinquestion,n°12,December200412DEVINGuillaume,Sociologiedesrelationsinternationales,LaDécouverte,Paris,3ed.,2013

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1. Fromthe“goldenage”ofAlgeriandiplomacytotheisolationontheinternationalstage

ThehistoryofAlgeriandiplomacy, interestinglybutnotsurprisingly,coincideswith theevolutionsofthe internal situationof the country. In 1962, theEvian agreementsput an end to 8 yearsofwar inAlgeria.Algeriaobtains its independence fromFranceafter132yearsof colonization.Thecountry ispromising on the economic and political level andAlgerian leaders arewilling to give the country acentralroleintheregionbutalsoattheinternationallevel.

The firstAlgerianPresidentAhmedBenBella chosesa twenty‐five‐year‐old formercombatantof theNationalLiberationArmynamedAbdelazizBouteflikaasMinisterofForeignAffairsin1963.BouteflikawillbeholdingthispositionuntilthedeathofPresidentBoumedienein1978.

Algeriandiplomacyhasbeenveryactiveinthe1970sandwas,accordingtojournalistAkramBelkaïd,the “branding” of the newly independent Algeria. Revolutionwas, at that time,”thebasisofAlgeriandiplomacy’sexistenceandofitsinternationalaction”13.Algeria, throughitsdiplomacy, imposed itselfasthespokesmanof the“thirdworld”andhasconstantlydefendedtheprincipleofsovereigntyandtherighttodecolonization.

During 15 years, Bouteflika and its administration will ardently defend the decolonization processespeciallyattheUnitedNations.In1974,Bouteflikaiselectedpresidentofthe29thUnitedNations(UN)GeneralAssembly14andon the10th ofApril1974PresidentBoumedienedoes, at theUN,his famousspeechontheneweconomicorderpleadingfortherefoundationofinternationalrelationsandforanequitableshareofwealthamongnations.

MostoftheAlgeriandiplomatswere,atthattime,formerrevolutionariesandmembersoftheNationalLiberation Front15. Therefore, Paul Balta and Claudine Rulleau speak about ”maquisarddiplomacy”16.Moreover,thereisastrongconnexionbetweendiplomacyandpoliticsandthecirculationbetweenthetwoworldsisveryintense.AccordingtoNicolasGrimaud,inspiteofBoumediene’sstrongpersonalityandomnipresenceontheinternationalstage,“BouteflikasharedwithhimtheconductofAlgerianforeignpolicy”17. This ambitious foreign policy and the anticolonial discourse have created, within thepopulation,astrongapprovalandagreatrespectforAlgeriandiplomats.

AmineAit‐ChaalalconsidersthatAlgerianforeignpolicyhasbeencharacterised,from1965to1978,bycoherence, continuity and efficiency since Bouteflika was Minister of Foreign affairs during all thattime18.

However,thepro‐SahraouianactivismofAlgeriahashamperedtheinternationalambitionsofAlgeriandiplomacyafter1976.Infact,theconflictthatopposedMoroccoandAlgeriaandthesupportofPolisariorebelsbyBoumedienediscreditedthe“newworldorder”discoursesheldbytheAlgerianpresidentandhisminister,Bouteflika.WiththedeathofBoumedienein1978andBouteflika’seviction,thecapacityof

13BELKAÏDAkram,“Ladiplomatiealgérienneàlarecherchedesonâged’or“,Politiqueétrangère,Eté,p.337‐344,200914 “Abdelaziz Bouteflika élu président de la vingt‐neuvième session de l’Assemblée générale“,http://www.un.org/french/ga/president/bios/bio29f.shtml15AIT‐CHAALALAmine,“Lapolitiqueétrangèredel’Algérieentrehéritageetoriginalité“inClaude,ROSOUXValerie,DEWILDED'ESTMAELTanguy,Lapolitiqueétrangère,lemodèleclassiqueàl'épreuve,Géopolitiqueetrésolutiondesconflits,Bruxelles,Bern,Berlin,FrankfurtamMain,NewYork,Oxford,Wien,200416BALTAPaulandRULLEAUClaudine,L’AlgériedesAlgériensvingtansaprès,Paris,Editionsouvrières,1981,p. 19117GRIMAUDNicoles,Lapolitiqueextérieurdel’Algérie(1962‐1978),Karthala,1984,p.1618AIT‐CHAALALAmine,“Lapolitiqueétrangèredel’Algérieentrehéritageetoriginalité“inClaude,ROSOUXValerie,DEWILDED'ESTMAELTanguy,Lapolitiqueétrangère,lemodèleclassiqueàl'épreuve,Géopolitiqueetrésolutiondesconflits,Bruxelles,Bern,Berlin,FrankfurtamMain,NewYork,Oxford,Wien,2004

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the Algerian diplomacy to speak out loud in the name of the “third world” has been considerablyreduced.

Inthe1980sthediplomaticwithdrawalofAlgeriafromall issuesrelatedtotheMiddleEasthasbeenprogressivebutsignificant.Inthe1990s,accordingtoAkramBelkaïd,theinterruptionoftheelectoralprocess (December 1991) and the refusal of national authorities to accept the victory of the IslamicSalvationFronthasobligedtheAlgeriandiplomacytodoeverythingpossibleinordertoavoidthetotalisolationofthecountry19.ThemessageheldbytheAlgerianofficialsto“western”countrieswasclear:eithertheregimesurvivesoritischaosinthewholeregion.The1990scivilwar,alsocalledthe“bloodydecade”orthe“darkdecade”hasreinforcedthe“mutism”ofAlgeriaoninternationalaffairs.

2. TheresurgenceofAlgeria’sForeignPolicywithBouteflika’selection

Onlybyexposingthepreviouselementsaboutthe“goldenage”ofAlgeriandiplomacyinthe1960sand1970s and its significant withdrawal from the international stage in the 1980s and 1990s can weunderstandBouteflika’sdiplomaticactionafterhiselectionasPresidentin1999.

WhenBouteflikagotelected,Algeriawasfacingtwomajorproblems.First,thestatewasconsideredaroguestatebytheinternationalsocietybecauseofthe1992coupd’Etatandbecauseoftheprominenceofthearmyinthe1990’s“dirtywar”.Moreprecisely,theperceptionofthecountryhadbeentarnishedfollowing the suspicions of military involvement in some killings attributed to Islamist groups.Secondly,asaresultoftheinternationalembargoes,thearmywasunder‐equippedandlackedmodernweaponry20.

ForYahiaH. Zoubir, “althoughtherehaveexistedperiodsofcordialityandgoodeconomicties,Algeria’srelationswith theUnited Stateshavehistoricallybeenmarkedbymisunderstandings, suspicionandattimes great antagonism as the two countries collided over the Arab‐Israeli conflict, Vietnam,WesternSahara,Nicaragua,CubaandGrenada.”21

Newly elected Abdelaziz Bouteflika has invested a lot of energy in forging a special relationshipbetweenhiscountryandtheUS.ThisnewrelationshipwascoherentwiththeAmericannewMaghrebpolicyaimingatreinforcingstabilityintheregionthroughtheimprovementofeconomy.However, inspiteof the intensediplomaticandeconomicexchangesbetweenthe twocountries theirrelationshipdid not attain the level that Bouteflika hoped. For example, the United States refused to providesophisticatedmilitaryweaponsinordertohelpAlgeriansecurityforcesfightIslamistinsurgents.

The11‐septembereventshavebeenawindfallforthecountry.Infact,thebombingontheWallTradeCenterandthePentagonhasbeenanunexpectedopportunity forAlgeriatotighten its linkswiththe“western”countriesandespeciallytheUSA.Bouteflika’stwo‐dayvisittoWashingtoninJuly2001wasthefirstofanAlgerianHeadofStateintheUnitedStatessince1985.Bouteflika’s“civilconcord”policy,harshlycriticizedinAlgeria,wasstronglysupportedbythenewAmericanPresidentGeorgesW.Bush.

TheAlgerianPresidentlaunchedhiscountryintothe“globalwaronterror”and,inApril2003,theUSStateDepartmentopenlyrecognizedAlgeriaasoneofthecountriesthat“activelysupportedtheglobalcampaign against terrorism”22. Progressively, Algeria has become a masterpiece of the “western”antiterroristpolicyintheregionanditsimageofaroguestatehaschanged.

19BELKAÏDAkram,op.cit20KEENANJeremyH.,Ibid,21ZOUBIR YAHIAH, “Algeria andU.S. Interests: Containing Radical Islamism and Promoting Democracy.”MiddleEastPolicy9(1):64–81,200222ZOUBIRYAHIAH.“TheresurgenceofAlgeria’aForeignPolicyintheTwentyFirstCentury”,TheJournalofNorthAfricanStudies,Vol.9,n°2,pp.169‐183,2004

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At the national level, this international image of a country cooperating side by side with the“international community” has helped entrenching Bouteflika’s power. The return of peace in thecountryandthegoodeconomicresultsfacilitatedthistask.Asaresult,Bouteflikaenjoystheimageofthepeacemakerandofabulwarkagainstterrorism.

Section2:Algeria’sforeignpolicyduringthe“Arabspring”

Duringthe“Arabspring”,Algeria’sforeignpolicyhasbeenusedasatooltocreateconsentamongthepopulation and to legitimate the military control of the society in the eyes of the “internationalcommunity”.

1. The“institutionalizationoffear”23throughamemorialdiscursivestrategy

VerysoonaftertheoutbreakoftheArabuprisings,theAlgerianauthoritieshavetriedtodifferentiatethesituationofAlgeriafromthesituationofTunisiaandEgypt.“AlgeriaisnotTunisiaandisnotEgypt”theMinisterofForeignAffairs,MouradMedelci, said inFebruary201124.Moreover, asheexplained:“thecausesoftheArabspringwerenotmet inAlgeria,fortunately.TunisiaandEgypthadacentralizedsystemofgovernment,nofreedomofthepressandhadnottakenseriouslythe issueofregionalbalanceandethnicbalance(…)PoliticalpluralisminAlgeriadatesbackto1988,weareveryfarfromacentralizedsystem”25.

WhenanalysingtheAlgerianforeignpolicydiscourseinthecontextoftheArabrevolutions,weobservethatitsomehowbetraysafearofBouteflika’sregimetofall.AnouarBoukharsconsidersthat“AlgerianleaderswereconcernedaboutthepotentialdisintegrativeeffectsofthebreakdownphaseofauthoritarianstructuresinneighbouringcountriesonAlgeria’sinternalstability”26.

Therefore, Algerian diplomacy has insisted, in its discourses, on the risk of instability caused by thepoliticalchangesinArabstates.InaninterviewforaFrenchmagazine,theMinistryofForeignAffairs,MouradMedelcihasevokedthe“negativerepercussionsofthesemovements”.Forthediplomat,“thefirstchallenge is instability.Thiswill takea long timeandbehard tomanagebecause these countries faceeconomicandsocialdifficulties.Therefore,thetransitionwillbedifficult”27.

ThismemorialdiscursivestrategyusedbyAlgerianleaderscanbeobservedintherepeatedinsistenceon sovereignty andnon‐interference.As anexample, inBouteflika’s speech to theAlgerianNationofApril2011,thePresidentexplainedthat,inthecontextoftheArabuprising,“itisobviousthat(Algeria)takesposition in favourofpolitical forces impregnatedwithnationalist ideas thatbanany interferencewithinothercountriesinternalaffairsandwhoreject,inturn,anyforeigninterferenceintheirs.Thisisthepositionoftheoverwhelmingmajorityofourcitizens(…)whoareentitledtoexpressthemselveswhenthecountry'sstabilityisthreatened”28.Inmarch2012,MouradMeldiciexplained:“Notwantinginterferenceinourinternalaffairs,weabstaintodoso insovereigncountriesnationalaffairs,nomatterhowgeographicallyclosetheyare.This isoneof

23The expression “institutionalization of fear” is used by Mohammed Hachemaoui in “La corruptionpolitique en Algérie: l’envers de l’autoritarisme”, HACHEMAOUI Mohamed, La Corruption politique enAlgérie.Structures,acteursetdynamiquesd’unsystèmedegouvernement,Karthala,201224InterviewofMouradMEDELCIbyJean‐PierreELKABACHforFrance24,February15,201125HearingofMouradMEDELCIbytheFrenchNationalAssembly,December7,201126BOUKHARSAnouar “AlgerianForeignPolicy in theContextof theArabSpring”,Carnegieendowmentforinternationalpeace,PublishedonlineonJanuary14,201327InterviewwithParisMatch, October 26, 2011, Press release issuedby theAlgerianMinistry of ForeignAffairs,26/10/2011,online(consultedonthe17thofNovember2014)28BOUTEFLIKA Abdelaziz, speech to the Nation on March 15, 2011, online (consulted on the 17th ofNovember2014)

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thefundamentalconstantsoftheAlgeriandiplomacy”29. By inscribing Algeria’s position in a historicalperspective, we can see that Algerian leaders are trying to recall that they are the ones who havepacifiedthecountryafterthe1990sbloodydecade.

The same sovereignty logic explains, on July 23rd 2012, the assertions by Algerian officials at themeetingoftheArabLeaguethatBasharAlAssadshallnotbeforcedbytheLeaguetoleavethepowerinSyria.Accordingtothereport,“Algeriaexpressed"reservations"abouttheLeague'sposition,sayingitwas"nottheprerogativeofthiscouncilbutremainsasovereigndecisionofthebrotherlySyrianpeople"”.30. Inaddition,inMarch2013,AlgeriarefusedtosigntheagreementoftheArabLeague,stronglypushedbyQatar and Saoudi Arabia, authorizing Arab states to provide a military support to the Syrianopposition31.Itmustbenotedthatthetwopresidentsaresoclosethat,inMay2013,afterBouteflika’shospitalization,BasharAlAssadwishedhim“aquickrecoveryandalonglife”,prayingGodsothat theAlgerianpresidentcould“returntohishomelandwithgoodhealthandcontinuetheconstructionandthewiseleadershipofthebrotherlycountryofAlgeria”32.

According toDrissChérif, “theAlgerianregimesawinthefalloftwoneighbouringseculardictatorships(TunisiaandEgypt)agravepreludetotheIslamizationofbothsocieties,underminingtheirownnationalsecurityaswellasthatoftheirsurroundings”33.Indeed,thereferencestoterrorismhavebeenusedmanytimesbytheAlgerianauthoritiesespeciallyatthemomentoftheLibyancrisiswherethecountrywasfirmly opposed to an international military intervention. “What is happening in Libya could be anencouragement to the development of terrorism and that encouragement can givewings to terrorismeverywhere,includingonourterritory” theAlgerianMinisterMedelciexplained. “IttookAlgeriaseveralyearstogetridofterrorismandstabilizeitsdomesticfront”theMinisterrecalled34.“We'realmostcertainthatwhatishappeninginLibyamayhaveconsequencesforthesub‐region,notonlyinAlgeriabutalsoinotherneighbouringcountries"PresidentBouteflikasaidinhisspeechtotheNationonthe15thofMarch201135.

The concept of “terrorism”, as used by theAlgerian official discourse, can be qualified amyth in thesensethatRolandBarthesgavetothisterm36.ForBarthes,“throughthe[mythical]concept,itisawholenewhistorywhichisimplantedinthemyth”.Inotherwords,whatmatterisnottheactualthreatbuttheimaginairetowhichitrefers.Hence,themyth“isanefficientinstrumentforpoliticalfigurestosolicit(...)adhesiontotheirdiscourse”37.

In theAlgerian case, the threat of terrorism is used as “aninstrumentforthemobilizationofthecivil

29Press release issued by the AlgerianMinistry of Foreign Affairs, 15/03/2012, online (consulted on the17thofNovember2014)30AFP, “Algeria rejects Arab League call for Assad to go”, July 23rd 2012, online (Daily Star website,consultedonthe5thofDecember2014)31LeMatin,“LigueArabe:l’AlgérierefusedesignerlecommuniquéfinalsurlaSyrie”,March72013,online,consultedonthe5thofDecember201432LeParisien,“Bacharal‐AssadpenseàlasantédeBouteflika”,May262013,online,consultedonthe5thofDecember201433CHERIF Driss, “La politique étrangère algérienne à l’épreuve des révoltes arabes: entre considérationsinternesetimpératifsstratégiques”,Conférenceinternationaleàl’EGERabat,Maroc,10thofMay2012.34InterviewwithParisMatch, October 26, 2011, Press release issuedby theAlgerianMinistry of ForeignAffairs,26/10/201135Interview of Mourad Medelci for the Algeria National Radio (channel III). Press release issued by theAlgerianMinistryofForeignAffairs,24/04/2011,online35BOUTEFLIKA Abdelaziz, speech to the Nation on March 15, 2011, online (consulted on the 17th ofNovember2014)35Press release issued by the AlgerianMinistry of Foreign Affairs, 15/03/2012, online (consulted on the17thofNovember2014)36BARTHESRoland,Mythologies,London:Paladin,197337COLINGuillaume,op.cit

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societyagainstacommonenemy”38. This mobilization comes from the fact that large sections of theAlgerian society have paid a heavy price in the war against terrorism in the 1990s and would beinclined to support the State in this struggle against terrorism rather than demanding ambitiousreforms.

Therefore,referencestoapotentialterroristthreatarepartofwhatwecancallamemorialdiscursivestrategy that istosayadiscoursethathasahistoricalresonancetothe“darkdecade”.The“deterrenteffectoffear”39producedbythesehistoricalreferencestothecivilwarinorderisameantoreinforceconsenttotheautocraticgovernmentwithinthesociety.

2. Theuseoftheforeignpolicydiscoursetojustifytheautocraticpower

Moreover, this threat of terrorismhas been used since the endof the1990s as a justification of theautocratic regimeandof themilitary controlof theAlgerian society in the eyesof the “internationalcommunity”. For Narrimane Benakcha, “residualstruggles from thecivilwarhave justified furtherthemilitarizationoftheregime”40.

According toKamelBoudjemil, “Algeriaisverysensitivetointernationalcriticism.Therefore,itsleadersuse the antiterrorist discourse to express the idea that autocracy is the counterpart to an efficientantiterroriststrategy”41. In February 2011, Mourad Medelci explained, in an interview: “Wemustbevigilant. The Algerian government has brought peace back but never lowered the guard againstterrorism”42.InJanuary2012,duringtheofficialvisitofMouradMedelci inWashington,HillaryClintoninsistedonthesupportofAlgeriainthewaragainstterrorism.“Ourtwonationshaveworkedcloselyonsecurityandeconomicissues,particularlyoncounterterrorismformorethanadecade”43sherecalled.

Withmorethan200000policeman(1for180inhabitants44)andaverypowerful intelligenceservicethatconstitutesthelinkbetweenthemilitaryandthepoliticalworld,militarycontrolisverystrongintheAlgeriansocietyand isacentral tool for theregime.Therepressionofopponentsand the lackoffreedomarethereforehiddenbehindtheneedforsecurityresultingfromthe1990sdecade.

Hence, the Algerian government has used this image of a spearhead of counterterrorism as ajustification for the military control over social movements and, among other things, the massivepresence of the police during the popular demonstrations in 2011. As an example, on the 12th ofFebruary 2011, on the National Coordination for Change and Democracy initiative, about 3000protestorsgatheredinthecenterofAlgerbut30000policemenweredeployedthatdayinthestreetsandhundredsofparticipantswerearrested45.Inits2013Annualreport,Amnestyinternationalrevealedthat in Algeria, “despite lifting the state of emergency in 2011, the authorities continued to prohibitdemonstrations in Algiers under a 2001 decree. There and elsewhere, security forces either prevented

38BAGHZOUZAomar,“l’Algérieetlesrévoltesarabes:niexceptionnidomino”,Outre‐Terre,n°29,p.159‐174,200139DRIS‐AÏTHAMADOUCHE Louisa, “L’Algérie face au printemps arabe : pressions diffuses et résilienceentretenue”,Politiquesméditerranéennes,p.178‐183,201240BENAKCHANarrimane,“TheAlgerianRegime:AnArabSpringSurvivor”,ColumbiaJournalofInternationalAffairs,7thofmarch2012,onlinehttp://jia.sipa.columbia.edu/online‐articles/algerian‐regime‐arab‐spring‐survivor/(consultedonthe18thofNovember2014)41InterviewwithKamelBOUDJEMIL,Paris,November20,201442InterviewofMouradMEDELCIbyJean‐PierreELKABACHforFrance24,February15,201143PressconferenceofMouradMedelciandHillaryClinton,Washington,January12,201244DRIS‐AÏTHAMADOUCHELouisa,“L’Algériefaceauprintempsarabe:pressionsdiffusesetrésilienceentretenue“,Politiquesméditerranéennes,p.178‐183,201245“Unemanifestationd'opposantsdisperséeàAlger”,LeMonde,February12,2012

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demonstrationsbyblockingaccessandmakingarrestsordispersed them throughactualor threatenedforce”46.

For researcher Francesco Cavatorta “the struggle against terrorism triggered by the United StatesallowedtheArabauthoritarianregimesto squelchwithevenmorestrengththepoliticaloppositionatatimewhentherepressionwasbeginningtobecostlyattheinternationallevel”47.The fact thataresidualbut mastered terrorism still continues to exist in Algeria is a way, for the Algerian authorities, toreactivateitwhenevertheirsecuritystrategyrequires.

Eventually, it is interesting to note that the recent strengthening of ties between Algeria and Egyptoccursonthebasisofthefightagainstterrorism.Between2009and2011,therelationshipsbetweenthetwocountrieshaddeterioratedbecauseofpersonaldisputesagainstleaders.However,theelectionofAlSissi in June2014hasbroughtan importantchangeandthetwocountrieshaverecentlysignedseveralcooperationagreements,particularlyonterrorismissues.ForEgyptianresearcherChérifAmir,“diplomatically,thetwocountriesalreadyformastrongfront”48.InNovember2014,thevisitofAlgerianPrimeMinisterAbdelmalekSellal toPresidentAlSissi inCairo,gavethe twomen, theopportunity toshow the common positions of both countries. "Therecanbenosustainabledevelopmentoreconomicrecoverywithoutpeaceand stability,henceweneed toeradicate terrorism toachieve theseobjectives"AbdelmalekSellalargued,usingwordsverysimilartothoseofAlgerianofficialdiscourse49.

Section3.ThedifficultyanalysingtheforeignpolicymakingprocessinAlgeria

Analyzing the Algerian foreign policy discourse cannot be done without questioning the processthroughwhichit isproduced.However, thisquestionisverycomplicatedbecauseofthescatteringofthe different decision‐making centers and because of the competition between various actors.Moreover, the blurring between national and international issues makes the analysis even moredifficult.

1. PowerinAlgeria:a“blackbox”

ThereisalackofknowledgeaboutthewaydecisionsaretakeninAlgeria.AsAkramBelkaidexplains,“thepower,inAlgeria,isablackbox”, “nooneknowshowitactuallyworks”50. During the uprisings, asSalim Chena notes, “thescatteringofthedifferentdecision‐makingcentersbetweenthePresidency,theSecurityServicesandthearmy“blurredthetarget"wheretodirectclaims”51forAlgerianprotestors.Michel Camau notes that “thedemands(ofprotestors)werenotdirectedattheheadofstateorattheGovernment,consideredasdecoys,butweredirectedagainstamoreabstract"system"or"power"”52.Theimprecision of the Algerian slogan "the system must leave" used in 2011 reveals the incapacity ofprotestortograsptheconsistencyofpower.

When Bouteflika was Minister of Foreign Affairs, “hewasdirecting “his”Ministry inaveryenergeticmanner,farfromanyinterference,hisonlyinterlocutorbeingPresidentBoumediene”53.Today,thepuzzle

46AmnestyInternational,AnnualReport2014,“Thestateoftheworld’shumanrights“,Algeria47CAVATORTA Francesco, “La reconfiguration des structures de pouvoir en Algérie” Entre le national etl'International,RevueTiersMonde,n°210,p.13‐29,201248InterviewofChérifAmirfortheAlgeriannewspaperLetemps,November172014,online,(consultedonDecember5th2014)49Algerie Press Service, “L'Algérie et l'Egypte soulignent leur convergence de vues sur l'impérativepréservation de l'unité territoriale de la Libye”, November 13th 2014, online (consulted on December 5th2014)50BALKAIDAkram,InterviewforMediapart,July8,201351CHENASalim,op.cit52CAMAUMichel,“Ladisgrâceduchef.Mobilisationspopulairesarabesetcriseduleadership“,Mouvements,66,été,p. 22‐29,201153AIT‐CHAALALAmine,op.cit

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ismuchmorecomplex:manyactorsparticipateinthedecision‐makingprocessandlotsofinterestsareatstake.

Formanyobservers,therealleadersofthecountryaretheArmyandoftheSecretservices(DepartmentofIntelligenceandSecurity)54.Since 1992 and the coupd’Etat, the two bodies have remained united.According to José Garçon, “each clan, the military high command and the secret services, has thecharacteristics of a secret societywhosemembers are trying to empower, compete, balance,monitor,cooperate and neutralize each other in respecting an absolute red line: sticking together facing apopulationthatdoesnottakeadvantageofthewealthofthecountryandpartofwhichisalmostinastateofinsurrection”55.Thepresident isnothingmore than theexpressionof theweakconsensusbetweenthechiefoftheArmyandthechiefoftheDRS.Moreover,theMinistryofEnergyandMiningalsoplaysan important role in themanagement of Algeria’s rentier economy,which constitutes an element ofAlgeria’sforeignpolicy.

Even thoughhehas skillfullybeenable todealwith the twomainbodies formore thanadecade, inparticularthroughthesuppressionoftheMinisterofDefenseathisarrivalatthePresidencyin199956,itisnowclearthatBouteflikaisnotleadingthecountryanymore.Indeed,thefrailhealthofthe77‐year‐oldPresident,whonowmovesinawheelchair,andthefactthathehashardlybeenseeninpublicsincehisre‐electioninApril57makeobserversaythatheisnotabletogovernthecountryanymoreandthatthe«after‐Bouteflika»isbeingprepared.

There aremultiple poles of power: GéneralMohamed ‘Toufik”Mediene (DRS), someGenerals of theArmy in their seventies likeGeneralGaïdSalahand thepresidential clan,with thegrowingpowerofBouteflika’sbrother:SaïdBouteflika. “Gossipssaythatitwon’tbeBouteflika’sfourthmandatebutSaid’sfirst” journalistKamelDaoudexplains58.Thecompetitionwithinthis“tribalandmilitaryconsortium“59seemstohaveincreasedinthelastmonths.TheconflictsopposingBouteflika’sclantoGeneralMediene,chiefoftheDRS,isaproofthatthebalanceofpowermightbeevolvingsoonbutnonecessarilytowardmoredemocracy.

2. Theblurringofinternalandinternationalissues

Algeria’sforeignpolicyisagoodexampleoftheblurringbetweeninternalandinternationalissues.Fora long time, scholars havemade a distinction betweenhighpolitics and lowpolitics. For example, in1984,MarcelMerledefinedforeignpolicyas“theportionofgovernmentactivitythatisorientedtowardthe‘outside',thatistosay,asopposedtointernalpolitics,problemsarisingbeyondthenationalborders”60.However,withtheriseofmoderndiplomacy,theborderhasfadedandAlgeria’sforeignpolicyrevealsthissignificantblurring.

According to Nicoles Grimaud, “in the history ofAlgeria, inside and outsidemaintain subtle dialecticrelationsandbyakindofsway,oneortheotherdominates”61.Thisistrueforseveralreasons.

54ThecountryhadthelargestdefencebudgetontheAfricancontinentwith$10.3billionin201255GARÇONJosé,“Alger:toutchangerpourqueriennebouge“,L’observateurduMaroc,November13,2013,online(consultedonthe14thofNovember2014)56In 1999, Bouteflika explicitly suppressed the post of Minister of Defence from the members of theGovernmentandattributedittohimself.Hereplaceditbyavice‐MinisterofDefencethatwouldassisthim.57One of Bouteflika’s rare public appearance was on November 1st 2014 for Algeria’s independencecelebrations–LePoint,“RareapparitiondeBouteflikaenpublic“,November1st2014(online,consultedonthe4thofDecember)58DAOUDKamel,“Commentl’Algériea‐t‐ellepudevenirunemonarchie?“,Algérie‐Focus,October19th,201359InterviewwithKamelBOUDJEMIL,Paris,November20,201460MERLEMarcel,Lapolitiqueétrangère,Paris,PressesuniversitairesdeFrance,1984,p.761GRIMAUDNicoles,op.cit,p.21

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Firstof all, the importantactorsat thenational level (DRS,Army, thePresidentandsomeMinisters)alsoplayan important role at the international level andparticipate in thedecision‐makingprocess.Thetwotypesofpoliticsemanatefromthesameinstitutionsandarepartofthesamepoliticalproject.Thus,theyarecomplementary.

Secondly,sometoolsusedbythenationalauthoritiestoensurethestabilityoftheregimearealsousedat the international level.Oneof theseelements is,aswehaveseen, the “waron terrorism”which isused,atthenationallevelasameantocreateunitybehindacommonenemyand,attheinternationallevel,asameantojustifytheautocraticregimeandtoenhancetheimageofthecountry.Moreover,oilisanothertoolthatserves,atthenationallevelasalevertoneutralizecontestationandtorestore national cohesion through redistribution and, at the international level, as amean to ensureAlgeria’sindependenceanditsgoodeconomicrelationswiththeUSAandtheEuropeanUnion.AsLuisMartinezexplains,“oneofthebenefitsofoilrevenueshasbeentoimmunizeitsholdersagainstanyformofpressure or threat from the international community. Oil wealth produced interested friendships indemocraticcountries,whichhasprotectedregimesfromfearofeconomicordiplomaticretaliationincaseofhumanrightsviolations”62.

Finally,theclaimoftheAlgeriandiplomacythatthesovereigntyprinciplemustberespected,especiallyatthemomentofthe“western”interventioninLibyaandthecriticismsthatAlgeriahasissuedagainstthemembers of the coalition, are actually amessage to the international community saying that thecountrywillnot tolerateany foreign interference in its internalaffairs.Asaresult, the foreignpolicydiscoursecanbeseenassynthesisbetweennationalandinternationalissues.

Conclusion

AnalyzingAlgeria’sforeignpolicydiscourseduringtheArabuprisingsisinterestinginmanyways.First,itshowsthat,inspiteofthenewstrategicallianceofAlgeriawiththe“western”countriessince1999,theprincipleofnon‐interferencewithintheinternalaffairsdefendedbytheAlgeriandiplomacyforhalfacenturyremainsakeyelementintheregime’sofficialdiscourse.Inthecontextofthe“Arabspring”,itsreactivationreflects the fearof theAlgerianauthoritiesabout thecreationofapotentiallydangerousprecedentforregimechange“fomented”by“western”countriesintheArabworld.

Moreover,thisdiscourse,aimedatlegitimatingtheautocraticregimeandatreinforcingconsentwithinthesociety,revealstheblurringofinternalandinternationalissues.Risksoninstability,terroristthreat,refusalofinterferencewithintheinternalaffairsandnationalismarethemaindiscursiveelementsusedbytheAlgeriandiplomacyduringtheArabuprisings.

It is difficult to assess the role of this discourse in the failure of themobilizations tomaterialize inAlgeriabut, aspartofaglobal resiliencestrategyengagedby theregime, it seems tobea significantelementtotakeintoaccount.

Forsomeobservers,theregimeisstrugglingtopositionitselfinthenewarchitectureofinternationalrelationsbecause ithasnotyetrealizedthat theworld ischanging.Forthe formerAlgeriandiplomatAbdelazizRahab,“thisproblemofadaptationdoesnotapplytoforeignpolicyalone,butitaffectsthewaythewhole country is governed aswell”63. The non‐renewal of elites can be an explanation to theseadjustmentdifficulties.In2004,IsabelleWerenfelshasdescribedverypreciselythestructureofelitesinAlgeria fromthe1992coupd’Etat andhasshownthatdynamicsandchangesdidnotprovokeany

62MARTINEZLuis,Violencedelarentepétrolière.AlgérieIrakLibye, PressesdeSciencesPo,Paris,2010,p.19963SonieLeyes, InterviewwithAbdelazizRahabi, ‘Onfaitunmauvaisà ladiplomatiealgérienne,’”ToutSurl’Algerie,July26,2012;AbdelazizRahabi,“Quellediplomatiepourl’Algérie?”ElWatan,April9,2009.

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system change. On the contrary, changes have guaranteed continuity64. Therefore, even with thegenerational change thatmightoccur in thenext years, it isdoubtfulwhethera significantevolutionmighthappenintheupcomingyears.

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