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Presented at ANZSEE 2012 Conference 'Green Growth or De-growth?', 12-15 November, Bond University, Gold Coast.
Citation preview
Place Shaping and Governance
in Remote Australia
Dr Boyd D Blackwell*,
Prof. Brian Dollery**, & Dr Bligh Grant***
*Post-doctorial Research Fellow, UNE Business School and CRC REP
**UNE Business School and Director, Centre for Local Government
*** UNE Business School and Deputy Director, Centre for Local
Government
Presentation made to the 2012 ANZSEE
Conference, Green growth or de-growth? 12 – 15
November, 2012, Bond University, Gold Coast
Outline
• Introduction
• Place shaping and self government
• Place shaping and governance in remote Australia
• Characteristics of remoteness
• Geographical spread of remoteness, ATSI and mining
• Remoteness problems but also success stories
• Governance structures
• Implications: potential for place shaping
2
What is place shaping?
• Lyons Inquiry into Local Government, England (Lyons, 2007)
• The creative use of powers and influence to promote the general well-
being of a community and its citizens. It includes:
1. local identity
2. represent community
3. regulate harmful and disruptive behaviours
4. community cohesiveness, debate, smaller voices
5. disagreements
6. local economy success, sensitive to environment;
7. local needs and preferences, right services to right
people; and
8. other bodies, respond to complex challenges e.g.
natural disasters
3
Place shaping and self government
• Bottom-up approach required
• democratic institutions of self government
• local government critical role socio-economic improvement in developing
countries (despite admin hurdles) (Grant and Dollery, 2010)
• Hole in Australia’s heartland needs fixing (Walker, Porter and Marsh, 2012)
• crisis in governance in remote Australian
• an urgent need for systematic change (Walker, Porter and Marsh, 2012, p. 9)
• they comment on the role of government
• our focus different, current institutional theory
• impacts not just ATSI but non-ATSI people as well.
• focus on ATSI alone futile; we share the problem together
4
NT 1978
Place shaping and remote Australia
• Many areas of remote Australia are unincorporated
– do not have locally and democratically elected
local government (Blackwell, 2012)
• How then do these people go about shaping
their places?
5
1. A say in decisions that affect
them.
2. Equitable and sustainable
financial flows.
3. Better services and a locally
responsive public service.
4. Local control and
accountability where possible.
5. Inclusion in a greater
Australian narrative.
Walker, Porter and
Marsh (2012) ?
ARIA in continental Australia (Australian Institute of Family Studies, 2011)
85% of area
BUT 4% of
population (Chaney, 2008)
6
...and 60%
of mining
platform (Walker, Porter
and Marsh,
2012)
Locations of ATSI communities (DCITA, 2006)
Note
distribution
of ATSI
communities
7
Problems associated with remoteness (See Blackwell, Dollery and Grant (forthcoming) for references)
Factors:
• Institutional
• Environmental or geographical factors:
• Health and wellbeing
• Cultural
• Economic
8
Comment on problems and adaptability, resilience and
innovation
• Factors are interwoven and compounding/confounding
• Order of factors important
• institutional factors paramount
• Contrast traditional hierarchy of needs
• Pattern versus hierarchical thinking (Bell, 1998)
• There are ATSI success stories
• Despite media focus
• Resilient (could find water, drill through hard rock)
• Adaptable (shifting settlements as found water)
• Forgiving (restrictions on civil liberties)
• Giving (cultural exchange and awareness)
• Innovative (hemi-parasitic plant, quandong)
• Remote Australia – their home, they love
• ‘a place that nourishes and provides meaning and
identity’ (Walker, Porter and Marsh, 2012, p. 9)
• at odds with typical view
Source: Iga Warta 2012, p.3. 9
A number of hurdles to tapping into ATSI initiative,
entrepreneurship and innovation
• ‘Nanny state’ – state ‘baby sitting’
• Private property versus common property rights (e.g. Iga Warta)
• Liquor prohibition – Qld reintroduce alcohol to ATSI communities
• ‘Horses for courses’ – ‘one size does not fit all’;
• BUT no systematic approach to remoteness problems,
• multitude of state and Cth approaches that confound and exacerbate (Walker, Porter and Marsh, 2012)
• Generally, an inability to shape one’s own place
• Why concept of place shaping is so important to the future of remote
Australia
10
Governance structures
• Multi-level Governance (MLG)
• Polycentric Governance (PG)
• Multi-Perspectival Governance (MPG)
• Jurisdictional integrity
• Type I and II entities
• Examples
• Functional, Overlapping, Competitive Jurisdictions
(FOCJs)
• ‘Fragmegration’
11
Multi-level Governance (MLG) (Baker, Hudson and Woodward, 2004)
• Multiple levels, domains of governance, multitude of players
• No territorial or hierarchical boundedness
• Players and actors operate at different levels, overlap domains
• Allows:
• more thorough analysis of actors, their impacts on shaping places
• Identify lack of authority and responsibility for place shaping in
remote Australia
12
Level (e.g. Global Financial Governance)
Group of three (UE, North America, Japan)
International Regulatory Authorities (WTO. IMF, World Bank)
Regional-level governance (EU, APEC etc.)
National-level governance (USA, Australia)
Subnational-level governance (State of Kentucky, Garrard
County; NSW, Armidale-Dumaresq Council etc.)
Source: Adapted from Hirst and Thompson (1999)
• Networks governance form in democratic society (McGinnis and Ostrom, 2012)
• multiple levels of organisations
• from the public, private, and voluntary sectors
• overlapping responsibility and functional capacities
• Important role for local solutions to complex policy problems
The basic idea is that any group of individuals facing collective action problems
should be able to address that problem in whatever way they best see fit. To do
so, they might work through the existing system of public authorities, or they might
establish a new governance unit that would impose taxes on members of that
group in order to achieve some common purpose (McGinnis and Walker, 2010, p. 293).
• ‘can also work in some of the ‘poorest regions in the world’ (McGinnis and
Walker, 2010, p. 295)
MLG – framework for understanding the
polycentricity of authority and power in human systems
PG provides a way in which government should operate
Polycentric Governance (PG)
13
Multi-Perspectival Governance (MPG)
• builds on MLG and PG by Hooghe and Marks (2003)
• Normative analysis i.e. how governance should be organised
• ‘New Perspectives of Regional Governance’ (Dollery, Buultjens and Adams 2011)
• Identify two types of MLG, Type I and Type II
14
Characteristic Type 1 Type II
Jurisdictional function General purpose Task specific
Membership Non-intersecting Intersecting
Jurisdictional levels Number limited Number unlimited
Design Systemwide architecture Flexible
Source: Adaption of Hooghe and Marks (2003, p. 236, Table 2) Driven by:
• the spillovers they create
• the negative externalities
they extinguish
• capitalise on the
efficiencies of their specific
task
Can only be a member of
one state in Australia
Covers a range of
functions and activities
e.g. security service
Arbitrary boundaries,
drive monopolistic returns
Lean and flexible adapting to
demands of governance change
Type I and II governance structures
• Type 1 governance structures
• e.g. Australian constitution and federation of states
• flexibility constrained but their durability assured by government authority
• Remote rural councils provide services normally produced by (Dollery,
Buultjens & Adams, 2011, p. 247):
• state agencies e.g. aged care and
• private firms e.g. banking facilities and funeral parlours
• Competition between sectors, overlapping – i.e. Type II/FOCJ, like in
education
• Jurisdictional integrity:
• ‘legal and political competence’ of Type I and II entities ‘to operate in a spatial
and functional realm’ (Skelcher, 2005, p. 89).
• Boundary integrity: external integrity or ‘degree of autonomy over a defined
spatial and policy domain’ (Dollery, Buultjens and Adams, 2011, p. 249)
• Relational integrity: ‘a measure of the democratic relationship between the
governmental body and the citizenry it services’ (Skelcher, 2005, p. 93)
15
Jurisdictional integrity and Type I and II
Characteristic Type I Type II: Club II: Agency II: Polity forming
body
A. Boundary integrity High Low High Medium
Response to
intersecting
jurisdictions
Inflexible Flexible Inflexible Flexible
Creation Constitution or
legislation (top-
down)
Self generated
(bottom-up)
By government (top-
down but then arms
length)
Resourced by
government,
industry, individuals
Public Policy delivery General Specific Specific General
Constituency Undefined Explicitly defined
(members)
Moderately defined Well defined
locally/regionally
Legitimacy Electoral system
Member benefits Government
mandate
Popular Participation
Consent Elected
representatives
Self interested
assessment
Appointed board Deliberative
approach (board &
constituency)
Accountability Voters Organizational SHs:
Cost Benefit
Government:
performance
Constituency:
democratic process
and policy
achievement
16
Competency constraint
Source: Development of Skelcher (2005, p. 98, Table 2) and
Dollery, Buultjens and Adams (2011, p. 250, Table 3).
B. Relational integrity
Examples of Type I and II governance structures
• Across Australia:
• Commonwealth, State and Local Governments, Type I
• Regional Organizations of Councils, Type II: Club
• Murray Darling Basin Authority, Type II: Agency
• Regional Development Australia, Type II: Polity forming body
• In Remote Australia:
• Local land councils, Type I e.g. Central Land Council (CLC) under the
Aboriginal Land Rights (Northern Territory) Act 1976
• Warlpiri Youth Development Aboriginal Corporation (2012) -Type II club
• youth development program of the Warlpiri people, Northern Territory
17
Remote Australia – Type II continued
• Outback Communities Authority (OCA,
2010), Type II agency.
• Tanami Regional Partnership Agreement,
NT, Type II polity forming body
(Indigenous Studies Program, 2011).
• Includes NT, Commonwealth, local
governments, CLC (representing local ATSI
communities), and Newmont Mining
Corporation.
• Goal: Share responsibility achieving
improvements for ATSI people;
• Focus: ATSI employment and business
development (Newmont 2008, p. 73)
• NB: not accountable to a constituency
on basis of democratic process
• but is accountable by way of policy
achievement.
18
Source: Regional Development Australia 2012
Functional, Overlapping and Competing Jurisdictions
(FOCJ) (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999)
• Functional: have a specific purpose – its size matches this
• Overlapping: geographically and different for each FOCUS (indiv. FOCJ)
• Competing: with democratic institutions for regions, communities and
citizens
• Jurisdiction: power to collect taxes from constituents to finance their
function
• Strong political competition makes governments suppliers of policies that
take care of citizen’s demands and thus increase welfare... Nevertheless
political competition has often been disregarded (Frey and Eichenberger, 1999,
p. 3)
• People can choose;
• efficiency gains and greater political accountability
19
REMOTE AUSTRALIA: Insurmountable cost
of provision; and free rider problems
Fragmegration
• complex interactions, fragmenting forces of
localisation & integrative forces of
globalisation (Winters, 2004)
• Rosenau (2003) introduced concept in Distant
Proximities: Dynamics Beyond Globalisation
• phenomena both remote and close to hand,
• at same time distant but near
• acknowledging them globally but affect people
locally (Winters, 2004).
• Concept allows us to
• humanize governance arrangements
• Individuals gain agency by understanding the
‘macro and micro interactions’ in governance
arrangements (Winters, 2004, p. 285).
• ‘people count... that all... actions originate with
individuals who may then form aggregate
entities that engage in salient behaviour’
(Rosenau, 2007, p. 308).
20
8 fragmegration sources at 4 aggregation levels (Rosenau 2007)
Micro
(individuals)
Macro
(collectives &
states)
Micro-macro
(individuals &
collectives
interact)
Macro-macro
(collectives
interact)
skill revolution
organisational explosion
bifurcation of global
structures
mobility upheaval
weakening of territories,
states and sovereignty
authority crisis
globalisation of national
economies
microelectronic
technologies
21
People able to link distant events with proximate circumstances
New in/formal organisations created at every community level & world
part
Flourishing of innumerable actors other than states > WWII
Vast and rapid movement of people, people overboard
As seven other forces take affect
Authority structures are undergoing disaggregation Churches, Mafia, Govt
Free enterprise economic systems and reduced trade barriers
Allowing like minded people to coalesce and take action collectively
Positive and Normative Analysis
Implications: Possibilities for remote Australia
• Type I & II not mutually exclusive but coexistent
• can help match heterogeneous characteristics and
preferences
• not one size fits all
• BUT, there are Type I institutional hurdles for remote
Australians
• if removed may well allow for improvement in wellbeing
22
Implications: Possibilities for remote Australia cont…
• Type II structures via fragmegration allow for liberalization of institutions
• driven potentially by individuals
• i.e. self determination
• i.e. place shaping but not necessarily with local government
• NB: cost of provision, free rider problems, possibilities of benefits of FOCJ
• Do options of Walker, Porter and Marsh (2012) go far enough?
1. ‘Innovation Regions or Zones’ with high level political support to trial
changes and with defined scale and scope
2. Productivity Commission Inquiry into governance reforms’ ability to
drive micro-economic stimulus to remote Australia
3. Outback Commission – has mandate and authority to focus on remote
Australia, change the dynamic of under development, sustain change
and regional coordination
23
Type I /
II?
Type II?
?