Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures,and Arms Control

September 1985

NTIS order #PB86-182953

Recommended Citation:U.S. Congress, office of Technology Assessment, A nti-.%]h~llih’ W(wp(m.s, ( ‘(wnhv--metisures, and Arms Cmh-of, (WA- 1.S(;-281 (Wash inglx)n, 1 W: (J .S. ( ;f)vt’r-ntm’ntI)rinting office, Sepkmher 1 985).

I.ibrary of Congress Catalog Card Number 85-600587”

For sale by the Superintendent of l)ocumcntsU.S. Government f’rinting office, Washington, 1)C 20402

Foreword

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Advisory Panel on New Ball ist ic Missi le Defense Technologies●

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OTA Project Staf f on New Ball ist ic Missi le Defense Technologies

Administrative Staff

Jannie Coles Dorothy Richroath Jackie Robinson

Glossary o f Acronyms and Terms

Glossary of Acronyms

Glossary of Terms

they are deployed from a booster or post-boostvehicle until they are destroyed.

Bistatic Radar: A radar system which has trans-mitters and receivers stationed at two locations;a special case of multistatic radar.

Boost Phase: The phase of a missile trajectoryfrom launch to burnout of the final stage. ForICBMS, this phase typically lasts from 3 to 5minutes, but studies indicate that reductions tothe order of 1 minute are possible.

Brightness: In this report, the amount of powerthat can be delivered per unit solid angle by adirected-energy weapon.

Capital Satellite: A highly valued or costly satel-lite, as distinct from an inexpensive decoy sat-ellite. Some decoys might be so expensive as tobe considered capital satellites.

Chaff: Confetti-like metal foil ribbons which canbe ejected from spacecraft (or terrestrial vehi-cles) to reflect enemy radar signals, thereby cre-ating false targets or screening actual targetsfrom the “view” of radar.

Coherence: The matching, in space (transverse) ortime (temporal coherence), of the wave structureof different parallel rays of a single frequencyof electromagnetic radiation. This results in themutual reinforcing of the energy of these differ-ent components of a larger beam. Lasers and ra-dar systems produce partially coherent ra-diation.

Command Guidance: The steering and control ofa missile by transmitting commands to it.

Counter-countermeasures: Measures taken to de-feat countermeasures.

Countermeasures: In this report, measures takenby the offense to overcome aspects of a BMDsystem.

Dazzling: In this report, the temporary blindingof a sensor by overloading it with an intense sig-nal of electromagnetic radiation, e.g., from a la-ser or a nuclear explosion.

Decoy: An object that is designed to make an ob-server believe that the object is more valuablethan is actually the case. Usually, in this report,a decoy refers to a Iight object designed to looklike a satellite.

Deep Space: The region of outer space at altitudesgreater than 3,000 nautical miles (about 5,600kilometers) above the Earth’s surface.

Defensive Satellite (DSAT) Weapon: A space-based ASAT weapon that is intended to defendsatellites by destroying attacking ASATweapons.

Defensive Technologies Study Team (DTST): Acommittee, generally known as the “FletcherPanel, ” after its Chair, appointed by PresidentReagan to investigate the technologies of poten-tial BMD systems.

Delta-V: A numerical index of the maneuverabil-ity of a satellite or rocket, It is the maximumchange in velocity which a spacecraft couldachieve in the absence of a gravitational fieId.

Diffraction: The spreading out of electromagneticradiation as it leaves an aperture, such as a mir-ror. The degree of spread, which cannot be elim-inated by focusing, is proportional to the ratioof the wavelength of radiation to the diameterof the aperture.

Digital Processing: The most familiar type of com-puting, in which problems are solved throughthe mathematical manipulation of streams ofnumbers.

Directed-Energy Weapon: A weapon that kills itstarget by delivering energy to it at or near thespeed of light. Includes lasers and particle beamweapons.

Discrimination: The ability of a surveillance sys-tem to distinguish decoys from intended tar-gets, e.g., certain types of satellites.

Early Warning: In this report, early detection ofan enemy ballistic missile launch, usually bymeans of surveillance satellites and long-rangeradar.

Electromagnetic Radiation: A form of propagatedenergy, arising from electric charges in motion,that produces a simultaneous wavelike varia-tion in electric and magnetic fields in space. Thehighest frequencies (or shortest wavelengths) ofsuch radiation are possessed by gamma rays,which originate from processes within atomicnuclei. As one goes to lower frequencies, theelectromagnetic spectrum includes X-rays, ul-traviolet light, visible light, infrared light,microwave, and radio waves.

Electron-volt: The energy gained by an electron inpassing through a potential difference of 1 volt.6.25 quintillion electron-volts equals 1 joule;22.5 billion trillion electron-volts equals 1 kilo-watt-hour.

Elliptical Orbit: A noncircular Keplerian orbit.Endoatmospheric: Within the atmosphere; an en-

doatmospheric interceptor intercepts its targetwithin the atmosphere.

Ephemeris: A collection of data about the pre-dicted positions (or apparent positions) of celes-tial objects, including artificial satellites, at va-rious times in the future. A satellite ephemerismight contain the orbital elements of satellitesand predicted changes in these.

Equatorial Orbit: An orbit above the Earth’sEquator.

Excimer: A contraction for “excited dimer”; a typeof lasant. A dimer is a molecule consisting oftwo atoms. Some dimers—e.g., xenon chlorideand krypton fluoride-are molecules which can-not exist under ordinary conditions of approxi-

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mate thermal equilibrium but must be createdin an “excited’ ’-i.e., energized-condition byspecial “pumping” processes in a laser.

Exoatmospheric: Outside the atmosphere; an exo-atmospheric interceptor intercepts its target inspace.

Fission: The breaking apart of the nucleus of anatom, usually by means of a neutron. For veryheavy elements, such as uranium, a significantamount of energy is produced by this process.When controlled, this process yields energywhich may be extracted for civilian uses, suchas commercial electric generation. When uncon-trolled energy is liberated very rapidly: such fis-sion is the energy source of uranium- and plu-tonium-based nuclear weapons; it also providesthe trigger for fusion weapons.

Fratricide: In this report, the unintended destruc-tion of some of a nation’s weapons or other mil-itary systems (e. g., satellites) by others.

Free-electron Laser: A type of laser which does notuse ordinary matter as a lasant but instead gen-erates radiation by the interaction of an electronbeam with a static magnetic or electric field.Loosely speaking, free-electron laser technologyresembles and evolved from that used by par-ticle accelerators (“atom smashers”). Laserswhich are not freeelectron lasers are bound-electron lasers.

Functional Kill: The destruction of a target by dis-abling vital components in a way not immedi-ately detectable, but nevertheless able to pre-vent the target from functioning properly. Anexample is the destruction of electronics in aguidance system by a neutral particle beam.

Fusion: More specifically, nuclear fusion: The fus-ing of two atomic nuclei, usually of light ele-ments, such as hydrogen. For light elements,energy is liberated by this process. Hydrogenbombs produce most of their energy throughthe fusion of hydrogen into helium.

Graser: See Gamma-ray Laser.Gamma-ray Laser: A laser which generates a beam

of gamma rays; also called a graser. A gamma-ray laser, if developed, would be a type of X-raylaser; although it would employ nuclear reac-tions, it need not (but might) employ nuclear fis-sion or fusion reactions or explosions.

Gamma Rays: X-rays emitted by the nuclei ofatoms.

Geostationary Orbit: An orbit at an altitude of35,800 kilometers above the Earth’s Equator.A satellite placed in such an orbit revolvesaround the Earth once per day, maintaining thesame position relative to the surface of theEarth. It then appears to be stationary, and canbe used as a communications relay or as a sur-veillance post.

Geosynchronous Orbit: An orbit about 35,800 km. . .Vlll

above the Equator. A satellite placed in suchan orbit revolves around the Earth once per day.See Geostationary Orbit.

Gray: The Syst6me International unit of absorbeddose of ionizing radiation. One gray (abbrevi-ated 1 Gy) is 1 joule of absorbed energy per kilo-gram of matter.

Hard Kill: Destruction of a target in such a wayas to produce unambiguous visible evidence ofits neutralization.

Hardness: A property of a target; measured by thepower needed per unit area to destroy the tar-get by means of a directed-energy weapon. Ahard target is more difficult to kill than a softtarget,

High-Earth Orbit: An orbit about the Earth at analtitude greater than 3,000 nautical miles (about5,600 kilometers).

Homing Device: A device, mounted on a missile,that uses sensors to detect the position or tohelp predict the future position of a target, andthen directs the missile to intercept the target.It usually updates frequently during the flightof the missile.

Impulse: A mechanical jolt delivered to an object.Physically, impulse is a force applied for a pe-riod of time, and the Systi$me Internationaleunit of impulse is the newton-second (abbre-viated N-s). See Impulse Intensity.

Impulse Intensity: Mechanical impulse per unitarea. The Systeme International unit of im-pulse intensity is the pascal-second (abbreviatedPa-s) A conventionally used unit of impulse in-tensity is the “tap,” which is one dyne-secondper square centimeter; hence 1 tap = 0.1 Pa-s.

Impulse Kill: The destruction of a target, usingdirected energy, by ablative shock. The inten-sity of directed energy maybe so great that thatthe surface of the target violently and rapidlyboils off delivering a mechanical shock wave tothe rest of the target and causing structuralfailure.

Inclination: The inclination of an orbit is the (di-hedral) angle between the plane containing theorbit and the plane containing the Earth’sEquator. An equatorial orbit has an inclinationof 00 for a satellite traveling eastward or 1800for a satellite traveling westward. An orbit hav-ing an inclination between 00 and 900 and inwhich a satellite is traveling generally eastwardis called a prograde orbit. An orbit having aninclination of 900 passes above the north andsouth poles and is called a polar orbit. An orbithaving an inclination of more than 900 is calleda retrograde orbit.

Ionization: The removal or addition of one or moreelectrons to a neutral atom, forming a chargedion.

Isotropic: Independent of direction; referring to

the radiation of energy, it means “with equalintensity in all directions, ” i.e., omnidirectional.

Isotropic Nuclear Weapon (INW): A nuclear explo-sive which radiates X-rays and other forms ofradiation with approximately equal intensity inall directions. The term “isotropic” is used todistinguish them from nuclear directed-energyweapons.

Joule: The Systeme International unit of energy.One kilowatt-hour is 3.6 million joules.

Keep-out Zone: A volume around a space asset, offlimits to parties not owners of the asset. Keep-out zones could be negotiated or unilaterallydeclared. The right to defend such a zone byforce and the legality of unilaterally declaredzones under the Outer Space Treaty remain tobe determined.

Kelvin Temperature: A scale of temperature onwhich zero degrees Kelvin (abbreviated 00 K)corresponds to “absolute zero. Temperature indegrees Kelvin equals temperature in degreesCelsius plus 273.16, thus ice melts at 273.16 G

K, and water boils at 373.16° K.Keplerian Orbit: The orbit which a satellite would

follow if the Earth were a uniform sphere withno atmosphere, and if other simplifying assump-tions were valid. Such an orbit would be an el-lipse having the center of the Earth as one fo-cus. A special case of such an orbit is a circularorbit about the center of the Earth.

Kill Assessment: The detection and assimilationof information indicating the destruction of anobject under attack. Kill assessment is one ofthe many functions to be performed by a bat-tle management system.

Kinetic-Energy Weapon: A weapon that uses ki-netic energy, or energy of motion, to kill an ob-ject. Weapons that use kinetic energy are arock, a bullet, a nonexplosively armed rocket,and an electromagnetic radgun.

Lasant: A material that can be stimulated to pro-duce laser light. Many materials can be used aslasants; these can be in solid, liquid, or gaseousform (consisting of molecules–including exci-mers— or atoms) or in the form of a plasma (con-sisting of ions and electrons). Lasant materialsuseful in high-energy lasers include carbon di-oxide, carbon monoxide, deuterium fluoride,hydrogen fluoride, iodine, xenon chloride, kryp-ton fluoride, and selenium, to mention but a few.

Laser: A device that produces a narrow beam ofcoherent radiation through a physical processknown as stimulated emission. Lasers are ableto focus large quantities of energy at great dis-tances, and are among the leading candidatesfor BMD weapons.

LIDAR: A technique analogous to radar, butwhich uses laser light rather than radio or mi-

crowaves. The light is bounced off a target andthen detected, with the return beam providinginformation on the distance and velocity of thetarget.

Limited Test Ban Treaty: The multilateral Treatysigned and ratified by the United States and theU.S.S.R. in 1963 which prohibits nuclear testsin all locations except underground.

Megawatt: One million watts; a unit of power. Atypical commercial electric plant generatesabout 500 to 1,000 megawatts.

MeV: One million electron-volts. A unit of energyusually used in reference to nuclear processes.It is equivalent to the energy that & electrongains in crossing a potential of 1 million volts.

Micron: One-millionth of a meter (equivalently,one-thousandth of a millimeter). Roughly twicethe wavelength of visible light.

Midcourse Phase: The phase of a ballistic missiletrajectory in which the RVS travel throughspace on a ballistic course towards their targets.This phase lasts up to 20 minutes.

Military Satellite (MILSAT): A satellite used formilitary purposes, such as navigation or intel-ligence gathering.

Miniature Homing Vehicle (MHV)/Miniature Vehicle(MV): An air-launched direct-ascent (“pop-up”)kinetic-energy ASAT weapon currently beingdeveloped and tested by the U.S. Air Force.

Monostatic Radar: A radar system in which thereceiver and transmitter are colocated.

Multistatic Radar: A radar system that has trans-mitters and receivers stationed at multiple loca-tions; typically, a radar system with a transmitterand several receivers, all of which are geo-graphically separated. A special case is bistaticradar. An advantage of multistatic radar overmonostatic radar is that even if transmitters—which might be detected by the enemy whenoperating-are attacked, receivers in other loca-tions might not be noticed and might therebyescape attack.

Obscur-&.nt: A material-e. g., smoke or chaff-usedto conceal an object from observation by a ra-dio or optical sensor. Smoke maybe used to con-ceal an object from observation by an opticalsensor, and chaff may be used to conceal an ob-ject from observation by a radio sensor (e.g.,radar).

On-line: Operating, as distinct from dormant.Orbital Elements: Any set of several parameters

(e.g., apogee, perigee, inclination, etc.) used tospecify a Keplerian orbit and the position of asatellite in such an orbit at a particular time.Seven independent orbital elemets are requiredto umambiuously specify the position of a sat-ellite in a Keplerian orbit at a particular time.

Outer Space Treaty of 1967: A multilateral treaty

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signed and ratified by both the United Statesand the Soviet Union. Article IV of the OuterSpace treaty forbids basing nuclear weapons orother weapons of mass destruction in space.

Passive Sensor: One that detects naturally occur-ring emissions from a target for tracking and/oridentification purposes.

Perigee: The minimum altitude attained by anEarth satellite.

Phased-Array Radar (PAR): A radar with elementsthat are physically stationary, but with a beamthat is electronically steerable and can switchrapidly from one target to another. Used fortracking many objects, often at great distances.

Pointing: The aiming of sensors or defense weap-ons at a target with sufficient accuracy eitherto track the target or to aim with sufficient ac-curacy to destroy it.

Polar Orbit: An orbit having an inclination of900.Prograde Orbit: An orbit having an inclination of

between 0° and 90°. See Retrograde Orbit.Pumping: In this report, the raising of the mole-

cules or atoms of a lasant to an energy stateabove the normal lowest state, in order to pro-duce laser light. This results when they fall backto a lower state. Pumping may be done usingelectrical, chemical, or nuclear energy.

Rad: A unit of absorbed dose of ionizing radiation.One rad is 0.001 gray.

Radar: A technique for detecting targets in theatmosphere or in space by transmitting radiowaves (e.g., microwaves) and sensing the wavesreflected by objects. The reflected waves (called“returns” or “echos”) provide information onthe distance to the target and the velocity ofthe target and may also provide informationabout the shape of the target. (Originally anacronym for “RAdio Detection And Ranging.”)

Radian: A unit of angular measure. One radian isabout 57.30. One microradian (0.000001 radian)is the angle subtended by an object 1 meteracross at a distance of 1,000 kilometers.

Reaction Decoy: A decoy deployed only uponwarning or suspicion of imminent attack.

Reentry: The return of objects, originally launchedfrom Earth, into the atmosphere.

Retrograde Orbit: An orbit having an inclinationof more than 900. See Prograde Orbit.

Robust: In this report, describing a system, in-dicating its ability to endure and perform itsmission against a reactive adversary. Also usedto indicate ability to survive under directattack.

Salvage-fused: Describing a warhead, that is setto detonate when it is attacked. Usually refersto a nuclear warhead.

Sensors: Electronic instruments that can detect ra-diation from objects at great distances. The in-

formation can be used for tracking, aiming, dis-crimination, attacking, kill assessment, or all ofthe above. Sensors may detect any type of elec-tromagnetic radiation or several types of nu-clear particles.

Shoot-back In this report, the technique of defend-ing a space asset by shooting at an attacker.

Signature: Distinctive type of radiation emittedor reflected by a target, which can be used toidentify that target.

Simulation: The art of making a decoy look likea more valuable strategic target See Anti-simu-lation.

Slew Time: The time needed for a weapon to reaimat a new target after having just fired at a pre-vious one.

Smoke: An obscurant which may be used in theatmosphere or in space to conceal an objectfrom observation by an optical sensor.

Soft Kill: Same as functional kill.Space Detection And Tracking System (SPADATS):

A network of space surveillance sensors oper-ated by the U.S. Air Force.

Space Mines: Hypothetical devices that can trackand follow a target in orbit, with the capabilityof exploding on command or by pre-program,in order to destroy the target.

Stimulated Emission: Physical process by whichan excited molecule is induced by incident ra-diation to emit radiation at an identical fre-quency and in phase with the incident radiation.Lasers operate by stimulated emission.

Superfluorescence: See Superradiance.Superradiance: The process used by a superradiant

laser to generate or amplify a laser beam in asingle pass through a lasant material, or—in thecase of a free-electron laser—through an electricor magnetic field in the presence of an electronbeam. Superradiance is actually a form of stim-ulated emission. Also known as superfluores-cence, or amplified spontaneous emission.

Superradiant Laser: A laser in which the beampasses through the lasant only once; mirrors arenot required for the operation of such a laser,as they are with more conventional lasers whichare sometimes called “cavity lasers” to distin-guish them from superradiant lasers. Free-elec-tron lasers may also be superradiant; the laserbeam of a superradiant free-electron laser wouldpass once through an electric or magnetic field(instead of a lasant) in the presence of an elec-tron beam.

Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR): A radar systemwhich correlates the echoes of signals emittedat different points along a satellite’s orbit or anairplane’s flight path. The highest resolutionachievable by such a system is theoreticallyequivalent to that of a single large antenna as

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wide as the distance between the most widelyspaced points along the orbit that are used fortransmitting positions. In practice, resolutionwill be limited and by the radar receiver’s signal-processing capability or by the limited coher-ence of the radio signal emitted by the radartransmitter.

Thermal Kill: The destruction of a target by heat-ing it, using directed energy, to the degree thatstructural components fail.

Threat: The anticipated inventory of enemy weap-ons and method of using them.

Tracking: The monitoring of the course of a mov-ing target. Ballistic objects may have their

tracks predicted by the defensive system, usingseveral observations and physical laws.

Warhead: A weapon, usually a nuclear weapon,contained in the payload of a missile.

World-Wide Military Command and Control Sys-tem (WWMCCS): A communications networklinking U.S. forces.

X-ray Laser: A laser which generates a beam orbeams of X-rays. Also called an “x-raser” or“XRL.”

X-rays: Electromagnetic radiation having wave-lengths shorter than 10 nanometers (10 bil-lionths of a meter).

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Contents

PageI. Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

2. Anti-Satellite Weapons, Countermeasures, and Arms Control . . . . . . . . . 25

3. MILSATs, ASATs, and National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

4. ASAT Capabilities and Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

5. ASAT Arms Control: History. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

6. ASAT Arms Control: Options. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. ....105

7. Comparative Evaluation of ASAT Policy Options . ..................125

Appendix A: Text of the 1983 Soviet Draft Treaty onthe Prohibition of the Use of Force in Outer Space andFrom Space Against the Earth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...145

Chapter 1

Executive Summary

Contents

PageIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Principal Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3Comparison of Potential ASAT and Arms Control Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

1. Existing Constraints. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132. Comprehensive ASAT and Space-Based Weapon Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143. ASAT Weapon Test Ban and Space-Based Weapon Deployment Ban 154. One Each/No New Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175. “Rules of the Road” for Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176. Space Sanctuary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 187. Space-Based BMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Treaties of Limited Duration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

TablesTable No. Pagel-1. Effect of Regimes on ASAT Development and Arms Control ., .. ....,13l-2. Sensor Technology for Compliance Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16

Chapter 1

Executive Summary

I N T R O D U C T I O N

For over two decades the United States andthe Soviet Union have used satellites for mil-itary purposes. As a result of recent techno-logical advances, military satellites will soonbe able to play a more significant role in ter-restrial conflicts. These space assets will beable to supply more types of information, morerapidly, to more diverse locations. Some willcarry out target acquisition, tracking, and killassessment functions, thus operating moredirectly than before as components of weap-ons systems.

This growing military utility also makes sat-ellites attractive targets for opposing militaryforces. Both the Soviet Union and the UnitedStates have been developing anti-satellite(ASAT) weapons. These weapons could weakenthe opponent’s military capabilities by depriv-ing his forces of the services of some satellites.The existing Soviet anti-satellite weapons—and future, potentially more effective ASATS–pose a growing defense problem for theUnited States.

A variety of unilateral measures, passiveand active, may improve the survivability ofU.S. military satellites. At present, it is un-

clear whether such survivability measures willbe adequate to guard against the highly de-veloped ASAT threats of the future. Anotherpossible contributor to satellite survivabilityis mutually agreed arms control. A judiciouscombination of certain arms control measuresand unilateral satellite survivability measuresmight provide more security to U.S. militarysatellites than either type of measure alone.

At the same time, however, arms controlmeasures which constrained the threat to U.S.satellites would also constrain the ability ofthe United States to weaken Soviet militarycapabilities by attacking their satellites intime of war. In addition, limits on ASATSwould severely limit the kinds of ballistic mis-sile defense weapons that might be deployedin the future. (The subject of ballistic missiledefense is dealt within a companion OTA re-port, Balistic Missile Defense Technologies.)

This report explains the dilemmas facingU.S. policymakers and assesses the pros andcons of some options for dealing with the chal-lenge of anti-satellite weapons, particularly inthe light of projected future weapons tech-nology.

P R I N C I P A L F I N D I N G S

Current Soviet military satellites poseonly a limited threat to U.S. military ca-pabilities, but future space systems willpose a greater threat.

The Soviet Union currently uses satellitesto perform a wide variety of tasks includingmissile launch detection, communications,navigation, meteorological surveillance, pho-tographic and radar reconnaissance, and col-lection of electromagnetic intelligence (e.g.,radar emissions). Many of these satellites, al-

though not “weapons” themselves, supportand enhance the effectiveness of terrestrial So-viet forces that would engage in direct com-bat. For example, if navigation satellites im-prove munition delivery accuracies, then fewermunitions are required to accomplish a givenobjective. The growing military utility of sat-ellites has rekindled U.S. interest in ASATweapons.

Some Soviet satellites already supply lim-ited targeting information to other terrestrial

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assets. The Administration has expressed itsconcern about:

. . . present and projected Soviet space sys-tems which, while not weapons themselves,are designed to support directly theU. S. S.R. ’S terrestrial forces in the event ofa conflict. These include ocean reconnais-sance satellites which use radar and elec-tronic intelligence in efforts to provide tar-geting data to Soviet weapon platformswhich can quickly attack U.S. and allied sur-face fleets. ’

At present Soviet radar (RORSAT) and elec-tronic intelligence (EORSAT) ocean reconnais-sance satellites pose only a limited threat toU.S. and allied surface fleets. RORSATS andEORSATS are typically deployed at altitudesand inclinations which offer limited observa-tion range. Although the observation “swath”of these satellites will eventually cover mostof the Earth, if only one or two of these satel-lites are operational-as has been customaryin peacetime-then a ship would be exposedto observation only intermittently and mightsuccessfully evade the satellite. The SovietUnion could increase the number of deployedRORSATS and EORSATS, thereby makingevasion more difficult. Other countermeasuresexist which could further reduce the threatposed by these satellites, but such measuresmight not be available to merchant resupplyvessels operating during a protracted non-nuclear conflict.

In the future, sophisticated communication,navigation, and surveillance satellites arelikely to play a greater role in all levels of ter-restrial conflict. This will increase the incen-tive for both the United States and the SovietUnion to develop and deploy ASAT weapons.

Possible responses to the threat posedby Soviet military satellites are numer-ous and diverse.

A variety of options are available to miti-gate the threat to U.S. and allied securityposed by Soviet military satellites (MILSATS).

‘President Ronald Reagan, Report to the Congress: U.S. Po]-icy on ASAT Arms Control, Mar. 31, 1984.

These options include nondestructive as wellas destructive measures; those presented be-low are not mutually exclusive.

● Possible nondestructive responses to So-viet MILSATs:–Force Augmentation: U.S. combat or

support forces could be increased tocounter the increase in effectivenesswhich Soviet forces could derive fromuse of military satellites. Force augmen-tation is often, but not always, morecostly than other means of mitigatingthe threat posed by Soviet military sat-ellites.

–Passive Countermeasures: By usingpassive measures to conceal or disguisetheir identity and nature, U.S. forcescould reduce the utility of Soviet recon-naissance satellites. For example, as-sets now detectable by radar might beredesigned to reflect radar signals onlyweakly in order to evade detection byradar satellites, or radio silence mightbe practiced, or covert signaling tech-niques used to prevent detection by sat-ellites that collect signals intelligence.

–Electronic Countermeasures and Electro-optical Countermeasures: Electronic coun-termeasures such as “jamming” (i.e.,overloading enemy receivers withstrong signals) and “spoofing” (i.e.,sending deceptive signals) could be usedto interfere with satellite functions.Electro-optical countermeasures suchas “dazzling” (temporary “blinding”) orspoofing optical sensors are also avail-able. However, these countermeasures—especially spoofing—require detailedknowledge of the satellite systems (e.g.,operational frequencies, receiver sensi-tivity, etc.) against which they aredirected.

● Possible Destructive Responses to SovietMILSATs:–Inadvertent But Inherent ASAT Capa-

bilities: The inherent ASAT capabilitiesof nuclear weapons such as ICBMS andSLBMS could be used to destroy low-altitude Soviet satellites; with somemodifications, these weapons might

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also be used to attack satellites athigher altitudes. Some types of non-nuclear interceptors (e.g., that demon-strated in the U.S. Army’s 1984 Hom-ing Overlay Experiment (HOE)) whichmight eventually be developed and de-ployed for BMD purposes, would havesome inherent ASAT capability. Fi-nally, any highly maneuverable space-craft capable of noncooperative rendez-vous—e.g., the U.S. Space Shuttle—hassome ASAT potential.

—Planned ASAT Weapons: When oper-ational, the current USAF MV ASATweapon will be able to destroy Sovietmilitary satellites in low-Earth orbit.

–Advanced ASAT Weapons: Space- orground-based directed-energy weaponsor advanced kinetic-energy weaponscould be developed that would be ableto destroy Soviet satellites beyond therange of existing or planned U.S. ASATweapons.

The United States is now more depen-dent on satellites to perform importantmilitary functions than is the SovietUnion.

In choosing between ASAT weapon devel-opment and arms control, one wishes to pur-sue that course which makes the greater con-tribution to U.S. national security. This isoften characterized as a choice between devel-oping a capability to destroy Soviet satelliteswhile assuming U.S. satellites will also be atrisk, or protecting U.S. satellites to some ex-tent through arms control while forfeiting ef-fective ASAT weapons. The better choicecould, in principle, be identified by comparingthe utility which the United States expects toderive from its military satellites with the dis-utility which the United States would expectto suffer from Soviet MI LSATS during a con-flict. Such a comparison-although possible inprinciple–is made exceedingly difficult by thenumber of conflict scenarios which must beconsidered and by the lack of consensus or offi-cial declaration about the relative likelihoodand undesirability of each scenario.

Although national utility for space systemsupport is difficult to assess precisely andmeaningless to compare between nations, itis apparent that the United States is more de-pendent on MILSATS to perform importantmilitary functions than is the Soviet Union.The United States has global security commit-ments and force deployments, while the SovietUnion has few forces committed or deployedoutside the borders and littoral waters of mem-bers of the Warsaw Treaty Organization andCuba. The United States has correspondingrequirements for global and oceanic commandand control communications (C3) capabilitiesand relies largely on space systems to providethese requirements. The Soviet Union, on theother hand, can rely on landline communica-tions systems and over-the horizon radio linksfor many of its C’ needs. Satellite communi-cations links are used by the Soviet Union butare not as essential as those of the UnitedStates. In addition, the Soviet Union hasgreater capability to reconstitute satelliteswhich are lost in action; hence even to the ex-tent the Soviet Union is dependent on spacesystem support, it is less dependent on indi-vidual satellites for some functions. TheUnited States also has fewer alternative ter-restrial means for collecting intelligence thandoes the Soviet Union, which can exploit thefreedom and openness of U.S. society for thispurpose.

Soviet ASAT capabilities threaten U.S.military capabilities to some extent nowand potentially to a much greater extentin the future.

The Soviet Union tested a coorbital satel-lite interceptor system from 1968 until its self-imposed moratorium of August 1983. TheReagan Administration considers this ASATsystem to be operational. The interceptors arebelieved to be capable of attacking satellitesat altitudes of up to 5,000 kilometers, depend-ing on their orbital inclination. At presentthere appear to be only two launchpads for So-viet coorbital interceptors, both located atTyuratam.

6

The existing Sovieteffective for negatingtary satellites, such as

attractive targets. Both the United States and the Soviet Unionhave been developing anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons

ASAT weapon may below-altitude U.S. mili-are used for navigation

(Transit), meteorological surveillance (DefenseMeteorological Support Program satellites),and other purposes. Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle has stated:

We believe that this Soviet anti-satellite ca-pability is effective against critical U.S. sat-ellites in relatively low orbit, that in wartimewe would have to face the possibility, indeedthe likelihood, that critical assets of theUnited States would be destroyed by Sovietanti-satellite systems. . . . If, in wartime, theSoviet Union were to attack critical satelliteson which our knowledge of the unfolding con-ventional war depended, . . . we would havelittle choice but . . . to deter continuing at-tacks on our eyes and ears, without which wecould not hope to prosecute successfully aconventional war. z

‘Statement of The Honorable Richard Perle, Assistant Sec-retary of Defense (International Security Policy), in Hearingsbefore the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater NuclearForces of the Senate Comm”ttee on Armed Services: Reviewof the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Bill, Mar. 15, 1984[S.Hrg. 98-724, Pt. 7., p. 3452].

The current Soviet interceptor and thebooster that it has been tested with cannotreach critical U.S. early warning and commu-nication satellites in high orbits. If the SovietASAT weapon were mated with a larger boost-er—a procedure which has yet to be tested—it might be able to reach these U.S. satellites.

In addition to the coorbital interceptor, theSoviet Union is testing ground-based laserswhich the Reagan Administration believeshave ASAT capabilities. The U.S. Departmentof Defense estimates that the U.S.S.R. couldtest a space-based laser within the decade.3

Advanced directed-energy weapons such aslasers and particle beam weapons–if devel-oped and deployed—could give the Soviets an“all altitude, “ “instantaneous kill” capability.As the United States increases its reliance onspace systems to perform vital military func-tions (e.g., the MILSTAR communication sat-ellite system), an increase in Soviet ASAT ca-pabilities could create a significant threat toU.S. national security.

‘U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 1985,p. 44.

7

Aside from its intentional ASAT capabil-ities, the Soviet Union could currently attacklow-altitude satellites with its nuclear ABMs,ICBMs, and SLBMS. With some modification,these nuclear assets might also be used to at-tack satellites in higher orbits. Current Sovietspacecraft (i.e., Soyuz, Salyut), because of theirlimited maneuter and rendezvous capabilities,do not hate a significant ASAT potential. Fu-ture Soviet spacecraft, such as the expectedSoviet “Shuttle” and space plane, will havegreater inherent ASAT capabilities. The So-viets also have the technological capability toconduct electronic warfare against spacesystems.

Several technologies on the horizoncould lead to a new generation of highlycapable ASATS.

‘1’he following advanced ASATS could be de-\“eloped and deployed b~~ either the UnitedStates or the Soviet Union:

● 5’pace Alines.a These would be deployedwithin lethal range and would continu-ousl~’ trail their target. Using a conven-

.

tional or nuclear explosive charge, a spacemine would destroy its quarry almost ins-tantly on command or (if salvage-fused)when attacked or disturbed.High-Power Radio-Frequency Weapons:These would be devices capable of produc-ing intense, damaging beams of electro-magnetic radiation that could be used tojam communication and radar systems atlow power levels or to overload and burnout satellite electronics at higher powerlevels;High-Energy Laser Weapons: High-ener-gy lasers may eventually be capable ofproducing intense, damaging beams ofelectromagnetic radiation that could jamoptical communication and sensor sys-tems at low power levels or cause perma-nent damage at higher power levels.Ground-based lasers would have infre-quent opportunities to attack satellitesbut, unless attacked themselves, couldshoot inexpensively and repeatedly.Space-based reflectors could also be usedto relay laser beams from ground-basedlasers to their targets. Spacebased lasers

,/’

Artist’s conception of high-energy laser facility at theSary Shagan test facility in the Soviet Union,

H!gh-energy lasers may eventually be effective ASAT weapons, Ground-based lasers would have Infrequent opportunitiesto attack satellites, but, unless attacked themselves. could shoot inexpensively and repeatedly,

8

●

●

might be able to attack several satellitesin quick succession; space-based X-raylasers might be able to attack several sat-ellites instantly and simultaneously.Neutral Particle Beam Weapons: Power-ful particle accelerators, similar to thosenow used in scientific research, mighteventually be developed which could de-stroy the hardened electronics of aspacecraft.Kinetic-Energy Weapons: Space- orground-based kinetic-energy weapons(similar to the current U.S. MV ASAT)would probably be small, homing vehiclesthat destroy their target by colliding withit at extremely high velocities.

Possible U.S. responses to the SovietASAT threat are numerous and diverse.

The United States could respond to thethreat posed by the Soviet ASAT threat inseveral ways; both unilateral and diplomaticoptions are available.

● Possible unilateral responses to SovietASATS:–Reduce Dependence on Military Satel-

lites: No matter what satellite surviv-ability or arms control measures aretaken, there will always be some riskthat critical satellites can be destroyedor rendered inoperable. The UnitedStates must exercise caution in the ex-tent of its reliance on space assets toperform tasks essential to the nationalsecurity. Nonetheless, some space sys-tems perform vital military functionswhich cannot be duplicated—or can beduplicated only imperfectly-by terres-trial systems.

–Passive Countermeasures: Passivecountermeasures such as hiding, decep-tion (use of decoys), evasion (maneuver-ing), hardening (making satellites moredurable), and proliferation (adding moresatellites) all offer significant protectionfrom the current and perhaps future So-viet A SAT weapons. Decoys wouldprobably be effective against a wide va-

riety of ASAT weapons and will be par-ticularly economical for the protectionof small satellites capable of being imi-tated by small, cheap decoys. Combina-tions of these passive responses—e.g.,decoys for “dark” spare satellites–could offer even greater protection thanindividual measures alone.

—Active Countermeasures: Active coun-termeasures may be destructive or non-destructive. Destructive countermeas-ures could include giving satellites aself-defense capability or providing crit-ical satellites with an escort defense.Nondestructive countermeasures mightinclude electronic countermeasures andelectro-optical countermeasures such asjamming. Attacking Soviet ASAT con-trol facilities is also a potential-thoughdangerous— active countermeasure.

–Deterrence: The Soviets might be de-terred from attacking U.S. satellites ifthe United States declared its willing-ness to retaliate for attacks on U.S.space assets. Such retaliation could beagainst Soviet space assets, in whichcase the United States would need a ca-pable ASAT weapon, or it could beagainst Soviet terrestrial assets. Theformer alternative assumes that theSoviets value the preservation of theirsatellites at least as highly as theyvalue the destruction of U.S. satellites.The latter alternative, of course, carriesa greater risk of uncontrolled escalationif deterrence should fail.

–Keep-Out Zones: The United Statescould declare and defend protectivezones around critical satellites.Defended keep-out zones could offer sig-nificant protection against currentASAT weapons for some satellites. Thissubject is discussed in detail below.

Possible diplomatic responses to SovietASATS:–Arms Control; The United States, the

Soviet Union, and other spacefaring na-tions could negotiate limitations on thetesting, deployment, or hostile use ofanti-satellite systems.

9. —

–Rules of the Road: The United States,the Soviet Union, and other spacefar-ing nations could negotiate restrictionson potentially provocative activities inspace, such as unexplained close ap-proaches to foreign satellites or irradi-ation of foreign satellites with low-power directed-energy beams. Withsuch agreed restrictions in force, theseactivities would justify defensive orretaliatory measures.

Of the future ASAT weapons now fore-seeable, those which would be most effec-tive if used in a preemptive or aggressivesurprise attack would be space-based andtherefore subject to attack by similarweapons.

Preemptive attack would be an attractivecountermeasure to space-based ASAT weap-ons. If each side feared that only a preemp-tive attack could counter the risk of beingdefeated by enemy preemption, then a crisissituation could be extremely unstable. Whilesalvagefusing, if it proved practicable, woulddiminish this risk, it would create a risk ofspace war breaking out by accident. For ex-ample if a meteoroid destroyed a satellite, itmight set off a chain reaction of salvage fus-ing which would destroy all satellites. To theextent that protection was sought through“shoot-back” rather than “shoot-first” tactics,a premium would be placed on having the big-gest and best ASATS deployed, which couldlead to an intense arms race.

Foreseeable passive or active counter-measures may be inadequate to guaran-tee the survival of large inilitary satellitesattacked by advanced ASAT weapons.

Passive or active countermeasures mighthave only limited effectiveness against veryadvanced ASAT or BMD weapons. For exam-ple, it might be uneconomical to rely on pas-sive measures to protect large and expensivesatellites from a powerful neutral particlebeam weapon. Shielding satellites against a

neutral particle beam weapon could cost morethan it would to scale up the weapon to pene-trate the shielding, and such a weapon couldslew its beam quickly enough to make evasioninfeasible. With such a weapon it might be aseconomical to damage spare satellites as theyare brought “on line’ as it would be to dam-age initially operational satellites.

Active measures, such as “shoot-back” witha weapon of longer effective range, could pro-vide protection against some A SAT weaponsbut not against weapons such as space minesor single-pulse lasers which could destroy sat-ellites instantly and without warning. How-ever, it might not be economical to attack sat-ellite systems composed of many small, cheapsatellites—and possibly decoys as well—withexpensive advanced ASAT weapons. Such sat-ellites could perform a number of importantfunctions (e.g., communication or navigation)without encouraging a proliferation of ad-vanced weapons to attack them. Therefore, al-though it would be difficult to protect individ-ual satellites, satellite systems performingsome critical functions might retain a fair de-gree of survivability.

A commitment to satellite survivabil-ity is important whether or not ASAT de-velopment, or arms control, or both, arepursued.

The United States should place more empha-sis on means to ensure the survivability of crit-ical military satellites and, particularly, theirassociated ground stations and data links,regardless of whether ASAT limitations areagreed upon. The existence of non-ASATweapons (e.g., ICBMS, ABMs) and space sys-tems (e.g., maneuverable spacecraft) withsome inherent ASAT capability makes it im-possible to ban the ability to attack satellites.Therefore, even under the most restrictiveASAT arms control regime, programs for sat-ellite survivability and countermeasures mustbe pursued. In the absence of arms controllimitations on ASATS, ensuring satellite sur-

10

viability will be a more demanding task sincehighly capable directed-energy ASAT weap-ons or space mines could be deployed.

In the absence of restrictions on the de-velopment or deployment of ASAT weap-ons, satellite survivability can be en-hanced if the United States is willing tonegotiate or declare keep-out zones andis able thereafter to defend such zonesagainst unauthorized penetration by for-eign spacecraft.

Although passive or active countermeasuresalone may be insufficient to protect satellites,if combined with keep-out zones they could of-fer a significant degree of protection from cer-tain ASAT weapons. Without keep-out zonesspace mines could be predeployed next to allcritical military space systems. A keep-outzone of sufficient size would reduce the effec-tiveness of such weapons. However, advanced,directed-energy or kinetic energy ASAT weap-ons may be able to function effectively evenoutside very large keep-out zones.

Should ASAT development be pur-sued, the United States will need to for-mulate an employment policy.

At present, no clear consensus exists amongthose Administration military space policyanalysts and executives interviewed by OTAon the conditions under which the UnitedStates would attack foreign satellites or on themanner in which it would retaliate for an at-tack on U.S. satellites. If the United Statescontinues with its ASAT development and de-ployment plans, it will be necessary to formu-late an employment policy.

If the United States wishes to enhance thedeterrent value of its ASAT weapons, it maychoose to publicize certain aspects of its em-ployment policy. It might, for example, prom-ise that the United States would not use itsASAT capabilities in an aggressive or preemp-tive first strike but might use them in a defen-sive or retaliatory reaction to an attackagainst the United States or its allies, even ifU.S. satellites were not attacked. That is, the

United States might announce a “no firststrike but possible first use’ policy for the em-ployment of ASAT weapons as it has for theemployment of nuclear weapons.

If defensive satellites (DSATS) are deployedby the United States to defend its satellites,or if certain satellites are given self-defense ca-pabilities, the United States would have to decide under what circumstances it would usethese assets and whether it wished to publiclyannounce this employment policy. The UnitedStates might declare in advance that it wouldfire at satellites suspected of being ASATS ifthey approached U.S. satellites within possi-bly lethal range. However, such a declarationwould have an uncertain legal status andmight generate considerable political opposi-tion from both spacefaring and non-space-faring nations.

Certain arms control provisions wouldreduce the probability that advancedASATS will be developed or deployed.However, arms control could not guaran-tee the survival of U.S. satellites attackedby residual or covert Soviet ASATweapons.

Arms control provisions, such as a ban onall testing of all systems “in an ASAT mode,”would reduce the likelihood that the SovietUnion could successfully develop and deployadvanced, highly capable ASAT weapons. Thecategories of weapons eliminated might in-clude space mines capable of “shadowing” val-uable military assets in any orbit, directed-energy weapons with kill radii of hundreds tothousands of kilometers, and advanced kinet-ic-energy weapons. In the absence of an agree-ment limiting their development, each sidewould have a strong incentive to seek contin-ually more effective means to attack threat-ening satellites and to defend valuable assets.In the absence of adequate countermeasures,the “instantaneous kill” capability of some ad-vanced ASATS might be destabilizing in a cri-sis, because they would give each side an in-centive to “shoot first” or else risk the lossof its space assets.

11

Photo cred(l Lockheed

Launch of U.S. Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) totest nonnuclear anti-ballistic missile technology,

Photo cred{t U S Deparfment of Defense

Artist’s conception of the Soviet GALOSH ABMinterceptor currently deployed around Moscow.

ABM interceptors may have some inherent ASAT capabilIties, ABMs, as well as ICBMS and SLBMS, present a threatwhich may not be easily resolved through arms control,

A ban on testing weapons in an A SAT modewould be less effective at reducing the threatposed by weapon systems with inherentASAT capability and by the existing SovietASAT weapon. ICBMS, SLBMS, and ABM in-terceptors with nuclear payloads are examplesof systems with residual ASAT capability. Al-though these systems lack the kind of preci-sion guidance necessary to actually collidewith a satellite, the long-range destructivenessof their nuclear payloads makes them poten-tially effective ASATS. The Shuttle’s recentsuccess at retrieving satellites strongly sug-gests the ASAT potential of future maneuver-able spacecraft, although costly vehicles likethe Shuttle would probably not risk approach-

ing satellites which might be booby-trapped.However, the range, effectiveness, and re-action time of even advanced maneuverablespacecraft not designed as weapons would besubstantially less than those of intentionalASAT weapons. Although the development ofmaneuverable spacecraft would not be in-hibited by most ASAT testing limitations,some limits could be placed on operating them“in an ASAT mode. ”

Arms control provisions might substi-tute for passive and active countermeas-ures in reducing the threat posed byASAT weapons, but arms control wouldbe more effective if combined with coun-termeasures.

12

U.S. satellites can be protected either by in-creasing their survivability or by reducing thethreat posed by Soviet ASAT weapons. Pas-sive or active countermeasures are designedto do the former while arms control provisionswould hopefully do the latter. In consideringthe advantages and disadvantages of ASATarms control, ASAT development, and coun-termeasures, it is important to consider themin packages. A combination of arms controlprovisions and passive countermeasures, forexample, or of passive countermeasures andactive countermeasures, could provide greatersecurity than each component of such a pack-age might provide alone.

The benefits of most ASAT limitationsconflict with the benefits of ASAT exploi-tation.

Although ASAT arms control might pre-vent the Soviet Union from developing ad-vanced, highly capable ASAT weapons, itwould also place a similar restriction on theUnited States. Therefore, although U.S. sat-ellites might be less vulnerable to ASAT at-tack, the United States would have to give upthe ability to strike at Soviet satellites whichthreaten U.S. and allied forces. Although armscontrol might prevent an expensive and poten-tially destabilizing arms race in space, it wouldalso limit the ability of the United States touse its comparative advantage in advancedtechnology to protect U.S. satellites and placethreatening Soviet satellites at risk.

Not all arms control regimes are inconsist-ent with ASAT development or deployment.“Rules of the road” for space–e.g., negotiatedkeep-out zones—might be pursued simultane-ously with ASAT research, testing, and de-ployment.

Effective ASAT arms control wouldlikely place significant restrictions on thetesting and deployment of future ballis-tic missile defense systems.

There is considerable overlap between BMDand ASAT technologies. Since even a poor bal-listic missile defense system would probably

have excellent ASAT capabilities, any ASATlimitation or test ban would almost certainlyimpede BMD development. Conversely, tech-nology development ostensibly for advancedASAT systems might provide some limitedBMD capabilities, or, at minimum, informa-tion useful in BMD research.

Some available unilateral actions have clearbenefits:

●

●

●

c

Deployment of attack sensors on valuablesatellites in order to provide informationto support a retaliation decision;Deployment of a space-based, space sur-veillance system in order to provide in-formation to support verification of compli-ance with future arms control agreements;to provide warning information requiredfor effective evasion or dispensing of decoys; to support a decision to retaliate inthe event of an attack; and to provide in-formation required for the targeting ofASAT/DSAT weapons4;Hardening of military satellites againstnuclear effects to a modest degree in or-der to preclude “cheap kills” by nuclear-armed ICBMS, SLBMS, or ABMs;Development or maintenance of electronic.countermeasures and electro-optical coun-termeasures, which would be relativelycheap, useful at all conflict levels, and un-likely to be prohibited by arms controlagreements.

The ASAT weapon under development in theUnited States is sufficient to meet the threatposed by current, low-orbit Soviet military sat-ellites.

Should the United States decide that it isin our national security interest to deployASAT weapons, the current MV program and,potentially, interceptors based on the recentlytested HOE technology, are sufficient to re-spond to the threat posed by existing Sovietmilitary satellites in low orbit. The currentU.S. ASAT could be made even more effectiveby the addition of a spac~based space surveil-

4Because of its usefulness, such a surveillance system wouldbean attractive target for a Soviet ASAT attack. The ultimateutility of such a system, therefore, hinges on its survivability.

13

lance system to aid the process of targetingand/or additional basing facilities.

Many of the functions performed by Sovietmilitary satellites may eventually be per-formed by more capable satellites orbiting at

altitudes out of reach of the U.S. MV. Shouldthis happen, it would provide a strong incen-tive to extend the MV’S capabilities by add-ing a larger booster or to develop a newer,more capable ASAT system.

C O M P A R I S O N O F P O T E N T I A L A S A TA N D A R M S C O N T R O L R E G I M E S

There are widely varying views about thewisdom of deploying weapons which are tooperate in space or against space objects. Thisfact, combined with more general concernsabout the Soviet military threat and thedangers of the U.S./Soviet arms race, hasmade it difficult to forge a national consensuson the subject of ASAT weapons. Some peo-ple oppose A SAT weapons as a matter of prin-ciple because these weapons would operate inspace or because such developments wouldcontribute to the arms race. Others believe thebenefits of ASAT weapons are outweighed bythe risk they pose to current U.S. space sys-tems, which are seen as essential for maintain-ing U.S./Soviet strategic stability. Still otherssee the development of A SAT and BMD weap-ons as a means to exploit U.S. technologicaladvantages to enhance U.S. power, reduce thethreat of conflict and global nuclear war, andreduce the damage done by such a war shouldit ever occur.

In its analysis, OTA has attempted to takeinto consideration this range of viewpointsand, to the greatest extent possible, show howit leads to a range of policy options. Many ofthe choices that will be made over the next sev-eral years will require a delicate balancing ofstrategic, economic, and political considera-tions. There is little doubt that reasonable per-sons can and will disagree as to the mostappropriate nature of this balance.

Seven international legal regimes and cor-responding military postures are consideredcritically below. Each of these regimes is in-tended to facilitate assessment of the effectiveness and desirability of different combinations

of A SAT and BMD technology development,satellite survivability, and arms control. Eachregime is constructed so that it is differentfrom the other regimes and so that it containselements which might reasonably be expectedto co-exist in the same proposal.

1. Existing Constraints

The first regime is defined by treaties andagreements presently in force; these are theLimited Test Ban Treaty, the Outer SpaceTreaty, and the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.The existing international legal regime pro-hibits the use of A SAT capabilities except inself-defense, the testing or deployment ofspace-based weapons with BMD capability,and the testing or deployment in space of nu-clear space mines or ASATS that would re-quire a nuclear detonation as a power source.

Table 1-1 .—Effect of Regimes on ASAT Developmentand Arms Control

Restrict with Develop ASATarms control weapons

Existing constraints . . . . . No YesComprehensive ASAT

and space-basedweapon ban . . . . . . . . . Yes No

Test ban and space-based weapon ban . . . Yes Yes/No a

One each/no new types . . Yes Yesb

Rules of the road . . . . . . . Yes Yesc

Space sanctuary . . . . . . . . Yes Yesc

Ballistic missile defense . No Yesalrr thts regime ASAT weapons could be developed, tested, and deployed on Earth

but not In space The United States could pursue ASAT development with!n thebounds of the treaty, or it could forego ASAT development entirely

bAll ASAT weapon5 other than “current types” could not be tested or cledoyedIn space

c Development and deployment optional but strongly supported by aciwcates Ofthis regime

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With these few exceptions, all other ASATweapon development and deployment activi-ties would be allowed. It is, therefore, permis-sible for the United States and the SovietUnion to develop and deploy coorbital inter-ceptors (like the current Soviet system), direct-ascent interceptors (like the current U.S. sys-tem), terrestrial or space-based lasers, space-based neutral particle beam weapons, andweapons based on maneuvering spacecraft.

In the current regime both the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union could develop,test, deploy, and use such passive counter-measures as hiding, deception, evasion,hardening, and proliferation. Active, non-destructive defenses, such as electronic orelectreoptical countermeasures, would also beallowed. Active, destructive defenses, such asshoot-back or DSATS, would be allowed aslong as they did not violate any of the trea-ties enumerated above.

The primary advantage of the current re-gime is that it allows the almost unrestrainedapplication of U.S. technology to the twinproblems of protecting U.S. satellites and plac-ing threatening Soviet satellites at risk. Un-der this regime, the United States would befree to use its comparative advantage in ad-vanced technology to keep pace with expecteddevelopments in Soviet ASATS and other mil-itary satellites. Advanced U.S. ASATS mightdiscourage the development of more capableSoviet space systems designed to place U.S.terrestrial assets at risk. In addition, theUnited States would be free to respond to So-viet A SAT weapons with increasingly sophis-ticated defensive weapons and countermeas-ures, thereby reducing the probability that theSoviets would ever use their intentional or in-herent ASAT capabilities.

In the existing regime, research and devel-opment on new ballistic missile defense tech-nologies can also proceed without the con-straints that might be imposed by certainASAT arms control regimes. Testing of ad-vanced ASATS could provide valuable infor-mation that would contribute to the develop-ment of very capable BMD systems. There-fore, some types of generic space-weapon

research could be conducted without first hav-ing to modify or withdraw from the ABMTreaty.

Some view advanced ASAT research as dan-gerous for this very reason. They argue thatsuch research will gradually erode the useful-ness of the ABM Treaty, thereby precipitat-ing a defensive and offensive arms competi-tion on Earth and in space. Rather thanprotecting satellites, a competition in spaceweapons might severely reduce their militaryutility. Under conditions of unrestrained com-petition, security might be purchased, if at all,only at the price of a substantial and sustainedcommitment to the development of increas-ingly sophisticated offensive and defensivespace weapons. In such an environment, en-suring the survivability of satellites would re-quire more than simple hardening or evasion.Costly measures might have to be taken suchas the deployment of precision decoys, pre-deployed spares, or acquiring the ability toquickly reconstitute space assets. Satellites ca-pable of defending themselves or a compan-ion satellite might also have to be developedand deployed.

Should space-based weapons such as spacemines or directed-energy weapons be deployed,these might be capable of the almost instan-taneous destruction of a large number of crit-ical satellites and ASATS. This could force na-tions into a situation in which they must “useor lose” their own pre-deployed space weap-ons. This might supply the incentive to esca-late an otherwise manageable crisis.

2. Comprehensive ASAT andSpace-Based Weapon Ban

A comprehensive ASAT and spacebasedweapon ban would require the United Statesand the Soviet Union to agree to forgo the pos-session of specialized ASAT weapons, thetesting—on Earth or in space—of specializedASAT capabilities, the testing in an “ASATm o d e ’ of systems (e.g., ICBMS or ABMs)

‘Testing in an “A SAT mode” would include tests of ground-, air-, sea- or space-based systems against targets in space oragainst points in space.

15

which have inherent ASAT capabilities, andthe deployment in space of any weapon. Sucha regime would require the U.S.S.R. to destroyall of its coorbital interceptors and the UnitedStates to destroy all of its direct-ascent inter-ceptors. 6

Although this regime contains the most far--reaching arms control provisions, it wouldhave the disadvantage of being the most dif-ficult to verify. Unlike an ASAT test ban andspace-based weapons ban regime, a compre-hensive ban would prohibit possession andtesting of A SAT weapons on Earth.7 Becausethe current Soviet coorbital interceptor is arelatively small spacecraft launched on a muchlarger, generaI-purpose booster, the SovietUnion could maintain and perhaps even ex-pand its ASAT force without the the UnitedStates gaining unambiguous evidence of a vio-lation.

Since the United States might agree to acomprehensive ASAT ban only after consid-erable domestic political friction over ques-tions of compliance and verification, it is im-portant to consider how such a ban mightmake a greater contribution to U.S. nationalsecurity than a ban on ASAT testing andspacebased weapon deployment (discussed below). The purpose of both bans would be to prevent the use of ASATS, or, at minimum, to re-duce the probability that an ASAT attackwould be effective. An ASAT test ban wouldprimarily affect weapons reliability, while anASAT possession ban, if observed, would af-fect both availability and reliability. It is con-ceivable that the risk posed by possible ille-gal Soviet use of ASAT weapons might besomewhat lower in a regime in which theSoviets could not lawfully possess ASATweapons. Presumably, the inability to overtlypossess ASAT weapons would diminish one’sability to use them effectively. Furthermore,

6Such an agreement might resemble the draft treaty proposedto the United Nations by athe U.S.S.R. in August of 1983, ex-cept that draft also bans the testing or use of manned space-craft for military purposes. See U.N. Document A138/194, Aug.23, 1983.

7A comprehensive ban would not ban systems with inherentASAT capabilities, such as ICBMS, ABMs, and maneuvera-ble spacecraft,

an absolute ban on possession might make itless likely that the current generation ofASAT weapons could be upgraded and heldin readiness in significant numbers.

However, if the United States can only beconfident that the Soviets are complying witha treaty to the extent we can verify compli-ance, then the United States would not haveconfidence that this regime offered any greaterprotection to our satellites than would a testban and space deployment ban.

3. ASAT Weapon Test Ban andSpace-Based Weapon Deployment Ban

In this regime, in addition to adhering totreaties and agreements presently in force, theSoviet Union and the United States wouldagree to forgo all testing in an “A SAT mode”and the deployment of any weapon in space.Such a ban would not only prohibit the test-ing of both current and future ASAT systemsbut would also place similar restrictions onBMD systems with ASAT capabilities. Thisregime would not ban terrestrial research onASAT or space-based weapons and would notattempt to ban their possession. Therefore, ifit were judged to be desirable, ASAT andBMD weapons could be developed (though nottested in space) and held in readiness on Earth.

In a test ban regime, the passive counter-measures and nondestructive active counter-measures that were discussed in the “existingregime” could still be developed and employed.Destructive active countermeasures such as“shoot-back” or DSATS could not be testedor deployed but could be developed and heldin readiness.

Although a ban on testing in an “ASATmode” would not eliminate all threats to sat-ellites, it would reduce the cost and complex-ity of ensuring a reasonable level of satellitesurvivability. The United States would stillbenefit from ‘hardening’ its satellites and de-ploying spares and decoys, but the moreelaborate, expensive, precaution of developingand deploying DSATS would be prohibitedand, indeed, less attractive. In the absence ofreliable, effective ASATS, satellites would pre

16-.

Table l-2.—Sensor Technology for Compliance Monitoring

Prohibitable action Observable .—ASAT attack:

K E Wa impact . ... . . . . . . accelerationPulsed HELb irradiation . . . accelerationContinuous H EL

irradiation . . . . . . . . heatingNPB C irradiation . . . . . . . . . . ionization

Keep-out zone penetration . . . position of thermal radiation source (ASAT)Interception test . . . . . . . . . . . positions of thermal radiation sources

(ASAT and target)NPB ASAT operation . . . . . . . . thermal radiation from ASATHEL ASAT operation . . . . . . thermal radiation from ASATIrradiation of target

with NPB . . . . . . . . ... . . gamma radiation from targetIrradiation of target with

pulsed HEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . thermal radiation from targetIrradiation of target with

pulsed HEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . reflected radiation from targetIrradiation of target with

continuous HEL . . . . . . . . . . position of thermal radiation source (target)Irradiation of target with

continuous HEL . . . . . . . . . . reflected radiation from targetNuclear explosive aboard

satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . gamma radiation from fissile or fusilenuclei activated by cosmic radiation or byparticle beams—

a/(ir-r@lC.0n0r9Y weaponbHtgh.energy lasercNeutral. Darticle beam

sensors

Attack sensors:accelerometersaccelerometers

thermistorsionization detectors

space-based LWIRd thermal image~ f

space-based LWIR thermal imageP r

space-based LWIR thermal imagere

space-based LWIR thermal image~ f

gamma-ray spectrometer

space-based LWIR thermal imager

space-based multi spectral imager

space-based LWIR thermal imager

space-based multi spectral imager

gamma-ray spectrometer (and optionalparticle beam generator)

dl-ong.w~velength Infrarede T he LWlR telescope on the Infrared A~trOnOnll~al satellite (lRAs) OXOMpliflOS demonstrated space-based tflerrnal IMager technology, this Instrument IS described

in .4strophys/ca/ Journal, 278 (1, Pt. 2), L1 -L85, Mar 1, 1984 (Spectal Issue on the Infrared Ast ronomlcal Satelllte)fRadar and Passive radio direction.finding methods could also be useful for tracking, tf h!dlng measures are not employed b the Penetratln9 spacecraft LWIR trackingIS emphasized here because it is difficult to counter by such measures

gA target irradiated by a high-energy neutral panicle beam will emit gamma rays, neutrons, and other observable particles, Just as It Will, at a slower rate, when bombardedby natural cosmic rays These gamma rays could be detected by a gamma-ray spectrometer such as those which have been carried by Sowet Venusian and lunarlanders and by U S NASA Ranger and Apollo spacecraft (NASA report SP-387, pp 3.20 )

sumably be of greater utility since the UnitedStates might have higher confidence that theywould be available when needed.

Relative to the existing regime, the primaryadvantage of a regime banning testing ofASAT capabilities and deployment of space-based weapons would be that highly valuedU.S. satellites in higher orbits–e.g., the futureMILSTAR system–could be protected withsome confidence from advanced A SAT weap-ons, especially if protected as well by passivecountermeasures. The fact that advancedASATS could not be overtly tested would re-duce the probability that they would be devel-oped and deployed. If they were developed andused without prior testing, a test ban wouldreduce the probability that they would be suc-cessful.

As in the existing regime, the United Statescould retain a capability to attempt to negatelow-altitude Soviet satellites with its MVASAT (or, possibly, with interceptors based

on the HOE technology) since a “no test” banwould not prohibit ASAT possession. How-ever, confidence in the operational capabilityof both the U.S. and Soviet ASAT systemswould degrade over time without continuedoperational testing.

There would be two important disadvan-tages to this regime. First a ban on testing inan “A SAT mode” and deploying space-basedweapons would not offer absolute protectionfor satellites; there would remain some possi-bility that an untested–or covertly tested–advanced ASAT, if suddenly deployed andused, might actually work well enough to over-come passive countermeasures. Second, with-out an ASAT weapon the United States wouldlack a fully tested means to attack threaten-ing satellites. The United States would, there-fore, have to place greater reliance on coun-termeasures to protect its terrestrial assets.It is unclear whether countermeasures alonewill be able to keep pace with the threat posedby advances in military satellites.

17

Depending on one’s viewpoint, an additionaladvantage or disadvantage of this regime isthat the testing of some types of advancedBMD weapons would be prohibited. This pro-hibition might even include some ground-based BMD weapons such as the U.S. HOE(Homing Overlay Experiment) ABM intercep-tor, which is currently allowed under the ABMTreaty. Although such limitations would onlybe slightly more restrictive than those of theABM Treaty, they would be very restrictivewhen compared to a regime in which the ABMTreaty was no longer in force.

4. One Each/No New Types

Regime four would include arms limitationprovisions which would restrict the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union to their currentASATS and prohibit the testing in an “A SATmode’ and deployment, in space, of more ad-vanced systems. Existing treaties and agree-ments would remain in force. In addition tobanning the testing or deployment in space ofnew types of ASATS, the “no new types”agreement would prohibit making current sys-tems more capable so they could attack tar-gets at higher altitudes. BMD systems wouldalso be banned if they had ASAT capabilities.

In a “no new types” regime, the passivecountermeasures and nondestructive activecountermeasures that were discussed in the“existing regime” could still be developed andemployed. Destructive active countermeas-ures such as “shoot-back” or DSATS could notbe tested or deployed but could be developedand held in readiness. Current ASATs—shouldthey already possess the capability when thetreaty is signed-could be used to attack otherASATS.

The primary advantage of a “no new types”regime, relative to the existing regime, wouldbe that, by prohibiting the testing of advancedA SAT weapons, highly valued U.S. satellitesin higher orbits could be protected with someconfidence. In addition, the United Statescould retain a capability to negate low-altitudeSoviet satellites (e.g., RORSAT) in the eventof war and to respond in kind to a SovietASAT attack.

A primary disadvantage of a “no newtypes” regime would be that allowed (i.e.,tested, nonnuclear) U.S. ASAT weapons wouldbe inadequate to negate threatening Sovietsatellites if such satellites were moved tohigher orbits–a feasible but technologicallydifficult and costly Soviet countermeasure. Anadditional disadvantage to this regime is thatattempts to define “new types” of ASATSwould be likely to result in the same ambiguityand distrust that resulted from attempts todefine “new types” of ICBMS in the SALT IInegotiations. Finally, the degree of protectionafforded high-altitude satellites by a ban ontesting “new types” would be uncertain; therewould remain some probability that an un-tested advanced ASAT, if suddenly deployedand used, might actually work. Systems withinherent ASAT capabilities (ICBMS, ABMs,maneuvering spacecraft) would also still exist.

As in the test ban and space-based weaponban regime, a “no new types’ regime wouldlimit the testing of some types of advancedBMD weapons which are currently allowed un-der the ABM Treaty.

5. “Rules of the Road” for Space

Whether or not the United States and theSoviet Union agree to restrict ASAT weapons,they might negotiate a set of “rules of theroad” for space operations. These rules couldserve the general purpose of reducing suspi-cion and encouraging the orderly use of space,or they could be designed specifically to aidin the defense of space assets. Examples ofgeneral rules might include agreed limits onminimum separation distance between satel-lites or restrictions on very low-altitude over-flight by manned or unmanned spacecraft.These general rules might also be used toestablish new, stringent requirements for ad-vance notice of launch activities. Specific rulesfor space defense might include agreed andpossibly defended “keep-out zones, ” grants orrestrictions on the rights of inspection, andlimitations on high-velocity fly-bys or trailingof foreign satellites. It might also be desira-ble to establish a means by which to obtaintimely information and consult concerning am-biguous or threatening activities.

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The “rules of the road” discussed above–if implemented in the absence of restrictionson ASAT weapon development—would not re-move the threat of ASAT attack. The primarypurpose of such a regime would not be to re-strict substantially the activities of the par-ties, but rather, to make the intentions behindthese activities more transparent. Althoughthe degree of protection for U.S. space assetsto be gained from a “rules of the road” agree-ment would be less than from other arms limi-tation regimes, the costs would also be cor-respondingly less if other nations failed tocomply with such rules. One must assume thatin the absence of ASAT arms control, bothASAT development and satellite survivabil-ity programs will be given high priority. Thisbeing the case, offensive and defensive meas-ures would be available to respond to viola-tions of “rules of the road. ”

If they were defended, “keep-out zones”would probably offer the closest thing to secu-rity in a “rules of the road” regime. Spacemines designed to shadow satellites and det-onate on command would lose a great deal oftheir utility if held at bay by a defended keep-out zone. Nonetheless, there are a number ofdifficulties with trying to implement this re-gime, not the least of which would be the re-action of other space-faring nations.

ASAT weapons such as nuclear interceptorsmust be kept at a range of several hundredkilometers from moderately hardened satel-lites in order to protect such satellites; ad-vanced directed-energy ASAT weapons mighthave to be kept much farther away. Given thenumber of satellites currently in orbit, thiswould present several problems. Satellites ingeostationary orbit are already so closelyspaced that a keep-out zone sufficiently largeto protect satellites from a nuclear weaponwould displace other satellites. It is possiblethat critical strategic warning and communi-cations satellites could function in supersyn-chronous orbits.8 If so, there would be ade-quate room to accommodate large keep-outzones around satellites in such orbits.

‘I.e. higher than geosynchronous orbital altitude.

There are too many satellites in low-Earthorbit to accommodate large keep-out zones.However, it might be feasible to establishsmaller keep-out zones around such satellitesand, in addition, to specify a minimum angu-lar separation between orbital planes to pre-vent continuous trailing.

6. Space Sanctuary

Regime six would establish altitude limitsabove which military satellites could operatebut where the testing or deployment of weap-ons would be forbidden. A “space sanctuary”regime would not constrain ASAT weapon de-velopment, testing, or deployment in spacebut would attempt to enhance security by pro-hibiting these activities in deep space (i.e.,above 3,000 nautical miles, or about 5,600kilometers) where critical strategic satellitesare based. At present, the altitude of thesestrategic satellites makes them invulnerable toattack by the current Soviet and U.S. ASATS.

In a “space sanctuary” regime, the passivecountermeasures and nondestructive activecountermeasures that were discussed in the“existing regime” could still be developed andemployed. Unlike the “test ban” or “no newtypes” regime, destructive, active counter-measures such as DSATS could be tested anddeployed, but not in deep space. Deploymentin deep space of ‘‘shoot-back’ capabilities orDSATS would probably be prohibited since itmight be impossible to differentiate theseweapons from offensive ASATS.

The primary advantage of this regime wouldbe that it could protect satellites in high or-bits from the current generation of ASATweapons. In addition, a deep-space sanctuaryregime would constrain ASAT developmentless than would a comprehensive test ban re-gime or a no-new-types regime. However,should the United States and the Soviet Un-ion choose to pursue advanced ASAT weap-ons, a space sanctuary might offer only limitedprotection.

The greatest risks in a space sanctuary re-gime would be posed by advanced directed-energy weapons which could be tested and de-

19.

ployed at low altitudes. Such testing and de-ployment would probably be adequate to guar-antee effectiveness against targets at higheraltitudes. Satellites at very high, supersyn-chronous altitudes might still derive some pro-tection from this regime, but violation of thesanctuary by highly maneuverable kinetic-energy weapons or by satellites covertly car-rying powerful nuclear or directed-energyweapons would remain a risk. For this reason,sanctuaries might provide less security thanwould keep-out zones (discussed above), be-cause any foreign satellite entering an agreedkeep-out zone could be fired upon, while a sat-ellite entering a sanctuary could be lawfullyfired upon only if it could be proven that itwas, or carried, a weapon.

7. Space-Based BMD

The seventh regime might result from U.S.or Soviet withdrawal fro-m the ABM Treatyfollowed by the deployment of space-basedBMD systems. Since even a modest BMD sys-tem would make a very capable A SAT weap-on, in a “space-based BMD” regime therecould be no attempt to restrain ASAT devel-opment. Moreover, each side would probablywant the freedom to develop new A SAT weap-ons capable of destroying the opponent’sspace-based BMD systems.

The ASAT weapons allowable under the“spacebased BMD” regime would include allof those in the “existing regime, plus weap-

Artist’s conception of the Space Shuttle deploying aneutral particle beam weapon.

Neither of the weapons I Illustrated here exwts today, but I n the absence of agreed limitations, both the United Statesand the Soviet Union WI I I probably develop a wide range of advanced space weapons.

20

ons capable of countering ballistic missiles inflight. Defensive measures would be less con-strained and more essential than in the “ex-isting regime. In particular, advanced space-based weapons such as neutral particle beamweapons could be deployed at low altitudesand then used as ASAT or DSAT weapons.Passive countermeasures and nondestructiveactive countermeasures like those discussedin the “existing regime” would be developedand employed.

Depending on one’s viewpoint, the principaladvantage, or disadvantage, of a space-basedBMD regime would be that it would allow theUnited States and the Soviet Union to deployhighly capable weapons in space. On March23, 1983, President Reagan called for a vigor-ous research program to determine the feasi-bility of advanced BMD systems, suggestingthat the deployment of such systems, if fea-sible, could offer an alternative to the currentstalemate in strategic nuclear weapons. Giventhe inherent ASAT capabilities of advancedBMD weapons, satellites would be most vul-nerable in a space-based BMD regime. Beforethe United States deployed space-based BMDsystems it would have to determine, first, thatthe contribution that such systems made toU.S. security was great enough to compensatefor the threat which similar opposing systemswould pose to U.S. satellites; and, second, thatspace-based BMD components could be pro-tected at competitive cost against advancedASAT weapons.

ASAT countermeasures must prove to be ef-fective for spacebased BMD platforms if a de-cision to deploy them is to make sense. Per-haps large improvements in the effectivenessor economy of passive countermeasures suchas combinations of hardening, deception, andproliferation would provide the needed protec-tion. Alternatively, the superior fire-power ormassive shielding of BMD weapons mightgive them a degree of protection unattainableby smaller, less capable satellites.

With respect to other military satellites, theexpense of equipping them with countermeas-ures to insure some level of survivabilityagainst advanced BMD systems would be con-siderable. However if, as some argue, space-based missile defenses could make us more se-cure and encourage the Soviets to make realreductions in offensive missiles, this would re-duce the threat of U.S./Soviet conflict. In aworld where conflict was less likely, satellitevulnerability would be less important.

Others, of course, disagree strongly withthis argument. They claim that space-basedmissile defenses will decrease our security byencouraging greater competition in both offen-sive and defensive weapons. In a world ofspace-based weapons and higher U.S./Soviettension, satellite vulnerability would be a crit-ical and potentially destabilizing factor.

T R E A T I E S O F L I M I T E D D U R A T I O N

Each of the regimes examined above couldbe negotiated as a treaty of indefinite orlimited duration or, alternatively, as one whichremained in force as long as periodic reviewswere favorable. Each of these alternativeswould have its advantages and disadvantages.Treaties of indefinite duration are more effec-tive at discouraging the pursuit of bannedactivities, yet require a greater degree of fore-sight regarding the long-term interests of thesignatories and can foreclose technological op-

tions for the indefinite future.g Treaties oflimited duration allow parties to take advan-tage of future technological options, yet can

Wheaties of unlimited duration usually contain a clause whichstates that if a country’s “supreme national interests” arethreatened, then that country may withdraw from the treaty,In addition to “supreme national interest clauses, ” treaties mayalso contain specific unilateral or agreed statements regardingspecific understandings about related events. For example, The1972 ABM Treaty contains a unilateral statement by the LJnitedStates which links the continued viability of the treaty to “morecomplete limitations on strategic arms. ”

21

encourage aggressive development programsdesigned to reach fruition at the terminationof the designated period. Treaties which callfor a periodic reassessment of agreed limita-tions in theory have great flexibility, yet, inpractice, often result in a strong presumptionthat they should be continued.

The United States might, for example, en-ter into a treaty limiting ASATS with the ex-plicit and public reservation that we wouldwithdraw from this treaty if and when we wereready to test and deploy a ballistic missile de-fense system in ways that the ASAT Treatywould forbid. Alternatively, we might take thepublic position that we intended to restrict ourBMD activities so as to remain within thelimits of an ASAT Treaty. While the formerposition would suggest a treaty of limited du-ration and the latter a treaty of unlimited du-ration, this need not be the case. It would beperfectly possible to sign a treaty of unlimitedduration, with the standard provision allow-ing for withdrawal, accompanied by a clearstatement of some of the conditions underwhich we intended to withdraw.

From one point of view, the exact languagein a treaty regarding its duration would be lessimportant than the intentions of the parties.After all, there have been numerous examplesof treaties of unlimited duration that were vio-lated soon after they were signed and exam-ples of treaties of limited duration that con-

tinued in force after they had expired (e.g., the“Interim Offensive Agreement” signed atSALT I). The real issue would be whether theparties believe that adherence to the treaty inquestion continued to be in their national secu-rity interest.

The Reagan Administration has recently in-dicated that it intends to conduct ASAT teststo gather information useful in advancedBMD research.l” Given the close connectionbetween these two technologies, an ASATtreaty of even limited duration would requiremodification of current SD I program plans.Thus, to the extent that the United Stateswished to maintain the most rapid pace of ad-vanced BMD research within the bounds ofthe ABM Treaty, such a treaty would not bedesirable. Conversely, to the extent that theUnited States wished to slow the pace of So-viet BMD research and would be willing to defer decisions regarding the testing of space-based or space-directed weapons, an ASATtreaty of limited duration could contribute tothat result.

jOThe ~urpo9e of ~9t9 ‘ ‘in an ASAT mode’ would be to in-

vestigate advanced technologies without violating the ABMTreaty. The Department of Defense recently told Congress that,“To ensure compliance with the ABM Treaty the performanceof the demonstration hardware will be limited to the satellitedefense mission. Intercepts of certain orbital targets simulat-ing anti-satellite weapons can cleady be compatible with thiscriteria. ” [Report to the Congress on the Strate@”c Defense Im”-tiative, Department of Defense, 1985, app. B, p. 8.]

Chapter 2

Introduction

Contents

Pageoverview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25Space Weapons: Attitudes and Controversy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

ASATs and BMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26Attitudes Toward the Military Uses of Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Organization of the Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Chapter 2

Introduction

O V E R V I E W

This report examines the issues raised by thedevelopment of weapons capable of attackingobjects stationed in space. It analyzes the mili-tary utility of space systems, describes the tech-nical characteristics and military value of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons, and discusses the ef-fectiveness of a number of satellite defenses andtechnical countermeasures. Finally, the reportexamines how various levels of ASAT arms con-trol might contribute to U.S. national securitywhen combined with various survivability meas-ures and various levels of ASAT developmentand deployment.

Believing that the development of weapons ca-pable of attacking missiles in flight or objectsin space would likely have a strong effect on “de-terrence, crisis stability, arms control and. . . na-tional security policy, ” the House Committee onArmed Services’ and the Senate Committee onForeign Relations’ asked the Office of Technol-ogy Assessment to prepare this report. The com-mittees requested that the report should, amongother things, assess:

the feasibility, effectiveness, and cost of va-rious space-based or space-directedconcepts; 3

the relationship between capabilities thatcan reasonably be expected and the impactof the technology exploitation effort on theoverall strategic policy of the UnitedStates; 4

‘Letter from Melvin Price, Chairman, William L. Dickinson,Ranking Minority Member, and Les Aspin of the House ArmedServices Committee, to John H. Gibbons, Director, Office ofTechnology Assessment, Mar. 5, 1984.

‘Letter from Charles H. Percy, Chairman, Claiborne Pen,Ranking Member, Larry Pressler, and Paul E. Tsongas of theSenate Foreign Relations Committee to John H. Gibbons, Di-rector, Office of Technology Assessment, Mar. 20, 1984.

‘Ibid.4Supra, note 1.

●

●

the implications of anti-satellite weaponsand space-based or space-directed missiledefense concepts for standing arms controlagreements, particularly the Anti-BallisticMissile, Outer Space, and Limited Test BanTreaties;s andthe prospects for future space-related armscontrol agreements, including an assess-ment of advantages, disadvantages, andverifiability e

The subject of ballistic missile defense(BMD)–particularly space-based BMD–was ofspecial interest to both the House Armed Serv-ices and Senate Foreign Relations Committees.This subject is dealt within a companion OTAreport, Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies.

There is a strong relationship between ASATand BMD technologies and the technical, polit-ical, and diplomatic actions taken in one spherewill almost certainly affect the other. For thisreason, OTA assessed the two subjects at thesame time, with a single staff, and with the ad-vice of a single advisory panel. In each of thesereports, OTA has endeavored to make clear therelationship between these two sets of technol-ogies, and where appropriate has provided cross--references to further assist the reader.

In producing this unclassified report, OTAwas able to draw on a wide range of classifiedmaterial. Appendices of classified notes on thisreport are available to individuals having appro-priate security clearances and who require ac-cess to that material.

‘Supra, note 2.‘Ibid.

25

—

26

S P A C E W E A P O N S : A T T I T U D E S A N D C O N T R O V E R S Y

Assuming that highly capable and militarilyuseful ASAT weapons can be built at an accept-able cost, then why not proceed with develop-ment and deployment? Why should the U.S.Congress give more attention to ASATS thanit gives to other new terrestrial weapon systems(e.g., anti-ship or anti-aircraft weapons)?

ASATS and BMD

Going forward with ASAT weapon develop-ment or, alternatively, agreeing to restrictsuch development through arms control meas-ures, could have important consequences foradvanced, space-based BMD technologies.Over the past several years a major debate onstrategic defense has been taking place in theUnited States. Some believe that ballistic mis-sile defenses can be developed that may even-tually allow the United States to abandon thecurrent policy of deterrence through assuredretaliation. Others believe that even increasedresearch on BMD alternatives might precipi-tate an offensive arms race with each sidehastening to counter possible defenses withmore and better offensive arms. This debatewas intensified by President Reagan’s March23, 1983, speech which outlined what was laterto become the Strategic Defense Initiative.

Since the debate over ballistic missile de-fense involves a fundamental reassessment ofthis country’s strategic policy, decisionmakersare reluctant to proceed with ASAT weapondevelopment, deployment, or arms control decisions that may tie their hands with respectto future technologies or that may committhem irrevocably to a course with unforeseenconsequences. Some people believe that ASATweapon development programs will be used toaccomplish BMD research, thereby avoidingthe strictures of the ABM Treaty and the scru-tiny of Congress. Others believe that ASATarms control restrictions would impede futureBMD research and development programs.Given these opposing viewpoints, the decisionto go forward with or, alternatively, to restrictASAT development must be made in the

broader context of this country’s reassessmentof its strategic posture and the military util-ity of space.

Attitudes Toward theMilitary Uses of Space

In addition to understanding the complexrelationship between ASAT and BMD tech-nologies, one must also recognize that peoplethink about the military use of space in radi-cally different ways. There are a great manyviews—both pro and con—regarding weaponsthat would operate in or from space; it is use-ful to examine several of the more frequentlystated positions.7

Opposition to Space Weapons

Some people oppose the development ofweapons that would operate in or from spacebecause they feel such activities run counterto the legal and political history of space. Theypoint to the many examples of successful in-ternational cooperation in space science,commerce, law, and politics and see theseactivities as reducing international tensionand contributing broadly to peace and devel-opment. Space weapons are seen as violatingthe spirit and, in some cases, the letter of thetreaties and agreements to which the UnitedStates is a party. They point to the languageof the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which statesthat space activities should be conducted “inthe interest of maintainingg international peaceand security and promoting international co-operation and understanding. ”8 Adherents ofthis viewpoint emphasize that every Ameri-can President since Eisenhower has stated

‘For a discussion of various “space doctrines, ” see: “SpaceDoctrines, ” Lt. Col. D. Lupton, USAF (Ret.), Strt.ite~”c Rew”ew,fall 1983, pp. 36-47; see also: Lt. Col. D. Lupton, USAF (Ret.),On Space Warfare: A SpacePower Doctrine, U.S. Air Force, AirUniversity Command, center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research,and Education, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1985.

“’Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States inthe Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moonand Other Celestial Bodies, ” 18 U.S.T. 2410, T. I.A. S. 6347, Ar-ticle III.

27

support for the idea that space should not bean arena of conflict and that space explorationshould contribute to peace. The web of com-mitments that the United States has fash-ioned over the past 25 years through its agreements and unilateral declarations is seen asimposing a positive burden on the UnitedStates to support the broad ideals stated inthe Outer Space Treaty.

Others–although acknowledging the impor-tance of the laws and the history of space—base their opposition to space weapons on thebelief that the deployment of such weapons inspace, if not halted now, will be impossible toreverse. Since neither the United States northe Soviet Union now has weapons that arebased in space, they feel that it is both possi-ble and desirable to prevent the arms racefrom extending to this new environment. Thisview is widely held in countries other than theUnited States and the Soviet Union. Over thelast several years, the Soviet Union has madea strong effort to place the blame for themilitarization of space on the United States.The American point of view is that the armsrace is a burden imposed on the United Statesby the inordinate military preparations of theSoviet Union. Nonetheless, many nonalliedgovernments, as well as important segmentsof the populations of even our allies, view thesuperpower arms race as a dangerous and de-stabilizing activity.g Those who see the super-power arms race as a dangerous process whichthe protagonists are doing little to halt arelikely to see military development in space asan integral part of that process.

Some opposition to space weapons derivesfrom the fact that such weapons would placeat risk critical communication and informa-tion-gathering satellites that contribute to thestability of the U.S./Soviet relationship.l”Space weapons are seen as destabilizing andlikely to increase the possibility that a nuclear

‘U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Um”space’82: A Context for Cooperation and Competition-A TechnicalMemorandum, OTA-TM-ISC-26 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov-ernment Printing Office, March 1983).

‘“see: R. Garwin, K. Gottfried, and D. Hafner, “Anti-SatelliteWeapons, ” Scientific American, vol. 250, No. 6, June 1984, pp.45 ff.

war might occur either through accident or in-tention. At present, nations can use space topeer within the boundaries of other sovereignstates to obtain otherwise inaccessible in-formation and early warning of attack. Forthis reason, many believe that space is ofgreater value to the United States than to theSoviet Union, since the Soviet Union has othermeans of gathering information in the openU.S. society. Adherents to this position main-tain that, though there are many potential mili-tary uses of space, the communication andinformation-gathering activities are the mostimportant. They argue that these benefits willbe jeopardized by U.S./Soviet military spaceactivities such as ASAT weapons develop-ment or space-based BMD. Although theselatter activities also have military utility, theyare not seen as outweighing the risk that suchsystems would create.

Support for Space Weapons

Those who support the development ofweapons that would operate in or from spacegenerally emphasize the importance of beingable to exert military power in space. Somesupporters view space as merely anothersphere of military activity; others feel that mil-itary space activities might offer a means bywhich to fundamentally alter the U.S./Sovietstrategic balance. Advocates of the formerviewpoint emphasize that the increase in thenumber of Soviet military space systems withenhanced capabilities creates a threat to whichthe the United States must be prepared to re-spond. In particular, supporters of this posi-tion stress the importance of being able to de-stroy satellites which assist the Soviets intargeting U.S. terrestrial forces. They believethat in order to deter or, alternatively, to pre-vail in terrestrial conflicts, the United Statesmust be able to operate in, and respond tothreats from, space just as it does on land, atsea, or in the air.11

1lColin Gray, “Why an ASAT Treaty Is a Bad Idea, ” Aerospace Amen”ca, April 1984, pp. 70 ff.; and R. F. Futrell, ideas,Concepts, and Doctrine: A Histoqy of Basic Thinking in theUnited Stabs &r Force, 1907-1964, U.S. Air Force, Air Univer-sity Command, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1974, pp.279-282, summ arizing views of Gen. Thomaa D. White, USAF.

28

Some space weapons advocates see space asmore than just another theater of militaryoperation; they see it as a solution to the cur-rent stalemate in offensive nuclear weapons.They argue that space-based ballistic missiledefenses can provide the opportunity for theUnited States to abandon its current doctrineof assured retaliation. Should both the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union possess space-based defensive forces, then more desirableoffensive-defensive or purely defensive strat-egies can be developed. Other space power ad-vocates see space weapons as a means to cap-ture the “high ground. ”12 The current U.S.lead in military space technology is seen asgranting a military advantage over the SovietUnion-an advantage which, if not seized, willsoon be lost.

Because views about the military uses ofspace vary so widely, it has been difficult toforge a national consensus on the subject ofASAT weapons. Some people oppose ASATweapons as a matter of principle because these

‘zLt. Gen. Daniel O. Graham, USA (Ret.), High Fronti”er: AStrategy for IVational Survival (Washington, DC: High Fron-tier, 1983).

weapons would operate in space, others opposeASAT weapons because they believe the ben-efits of such weapons are outweighed by therisk they pose to current U.S. space systems.Some people support ASAT weapons simplybecause they feel the United States must beable to respond to Soviet threats from any theater. Other supporters see space as a meansto project U.S. power, reduce the threat of con-flict and global nuclear war, and reduce thedamage done by such a war should it ever occur.

In its analysis, OTA has attempted to takeinto consideration this range of viewpointsand, to the greatest extent possible, show itleads to a variety of policy options. As this report demonstrates, the opportunities and risksthat might result from developing or not de-veloping ASAT weapons or from pursuing ornot pursuing ASAT arms control cannot besimply stated. Many of the choices that willbe made over the next several years will re-quire a delicate balancing of strategic, eco-nomic, and political interests. There is littledoubt that reasonable persons can and will dis-agree as to the most appropriate nature of thisbalance.

O R G A N I Z A T I O N O F T H E R E P O R T

The main body of this report begins with thediscussion in chapter 3 of the military utilityof satellites and ASAT weapons. This chap-ter provides the conceptual framework neces-sary to understand how these various spacesystems contribute to or threaten U.S. na-tional security. Current and projected Sovietand U.S. military satellite capabilities are ex-amined, as are a variety of responses to suchcapabilities.

Chapter 4 provides a detailed technical lookat the existing and projected ASAT capabil-ities of the United States and the SovietUnion. This chapter discusses both existingtechnologies and the possibilities for more ad-vanced kinetic-energy, nuclear, and directed-energy ASAT weapons. It also considers thewide range of technical and political responses

available to the United States to counter orcompensate for Soviet ASAT capabilities.

Chapter 5 reviews the history of arms con-trol related to ASAT weapons. This chapterdescribes the constraints imposed by treatiesand agreements in force and discusses the in-ternational political barriers to ASAT devel-opment. The 1978-79 ASAT negotiations be-tween the United States and the Soviet Unionare examined, along with subsequent drafttreaties proposed by the Soviet Union. Recentlegislative and executive branch activities arealso summarized.

Chapter 6 describes a number of differentASAT arms control provisions that might besought by the United States. Restrictions ontesting, possession, deployment, and use are

all ex amined to determine whether they mightcontribute to U.S. national security. Provi-sions restricting spacecraft operation andorbits—so-called “rules of the road’ ’—are alsoexamined.

Finally, chapter 7 provides a comparativeevaluation of seven hypothetical legal/techni-cal regimes. Each regime combines examples

29

of technical measures and countermeasuresdiscussed in chapter 4 with examples of armscontrol as discussed in chapter 6. Each ofthese hypothetical regimes describes the ad-vantages and disadvantages of different com-binations of ASAT weapons development, em-ployment policies, defensive countermeasures,and arms control.

Chapter 3

MILSATS, ASATS, andNational Security

Contents

PageThe Role and Value of Military Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

The Role of Military Satellites. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33Current and Projected MILSAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35Possible Advanced-Technology MILSAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39The Value of Military Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . . 40The Vulnerability and Protection of Military Space Systems . . . . . . . . . . 43

The Role and Value of Anti-Satellite Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44Military Space Policy.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Military Space Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45ASAT Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45Ballistic Missile Defense as an ASAT Policy Issue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ 46

TablesTable No. Page3-l. Asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet Space System Need and Use . . . . . . . 343-2. Orbits of Some Soviet Military Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . . . . . . 373-3. Possible Responses to Enemy MILSAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

FiguresFigure No, Page3-1. Ground Track of Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite . . . . . . 373-2. Radar Imagery From Kosmos 1500 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383-3. Imagery Obtained by Synthetic-Aperture Satellite Radar . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Chapter 3

MILSATs, ASATs, and National Security

T H E R O L E A N D V A L U E O F M I L I T A R Y S A T E L L I T E S

The Role of Military SatellitesForce Support and Force Enhancement

Satellites are used for a variety of militaryapplications by the United states, the U. S. S. R.,and-in smaller numbers—by several other na-tions. Most military satellites (MILSATs) per-form nondestructive functions. For example,Soviet military satellites are used for meteoro-logical surveillance, surveillance of ballisticmissile launch areas to provide rapid warningof possible missile attack, relaying of radiocommunications to distant force elements, op-tical and radar reconnaissance of foreign forcedispositions on land and at sea, interceptionof foreign radio communications and radar sig-nals, transmission of radionavigation signals,and logistic support for space systems.1 Eventhough these functions are nondestructive andthe satellites which perform them are not con-sidered weapons, they support force elementswhich would engage in direct combat and en-hance the combat effectiveness of those forceelements.

The value, or utility, of military satellites isvery real, but it is extremely difficult to quan-tify.2 The timeliness of information or the

‘E.g., maintenance and retrieval.*The term utih”ty is used here in the sense defined by John

von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern, The Theory of Gamesand Econom”c Behavior (Princeton, NJ: Princeton UniversityPress, 1953), pp. 26-27; i.e., as a numerical index of the rela-tive preferability of an outcome [e.g., occurrence of nonnuclearwar and survival of all high-altitude satellites] which could re-sult from a decision [e.g., an agreement to ban ASAT weapontesting]. Of any two possible outcomes, the one having a higherutility would be preferred over the other. Practical methods ofassessing the utilities of a decisionmaker for possible outcomeshave been described and reviewed by M.W. Merkhofer, Com-parative Evaluation of Quantitative Decision-Making Ap-proaches, National Science Foundation report NSF/PRA-83014,April 1983.

Other notions of utility have been used in the classified liter-ature on satellite utility. Some of these notions are vaguely de-fined, while others-e. g., force multiplication factors—are pre-cisely defined and, in principle, objectively calculable, althoughless clearly related to national interests than are Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities.

speed of communications may make the differ-ence between winning a battle and losingone—or it may greatly affect the number ofcasualties suffered in a battle without decid-ing victory. In some cases satellites providecapabilities that could not be obtained in anyother way —e.g., surveillance of areas whichwould otherwise be closed to our observation,or providing very early warning of enemy mis-sile launches. In other cases, satellites providea cheaper and easier way of of doing some-thing that could be accomplished by othermeans-e. g., trans-Atlantic communications.Then there are the navigation satellites, whichprovide an added degree of precision whichmay be critical in some applications and onlyof marginal utility in others.

In a few special cases, satellites contributeto a military mission the objectives or require-ments of which can be quantified, as can,therefore, the value of the support providedby satellites. For example, the use of naviga-tion satellites may improve the accuracy withwhich certain munitions are delivered, therebyreducing wastage of munitions. If so, then theeffectiveness of the munitions used would be“multiplied” by satellite support—they wouldbe as effective as a larger number of munitionsdelivered without the assistance of navigationsatellites. The effectiveness of munitions de-livery systems would be similarly multiplied.For missions such as this, it is reasonable tothink of satellites as “force multipliers, ” andthe factor by which the forces are multipliedcan in principle be used to assess the value ofthe satellite. This has led some analysts to as-sess the significance of anti-satellite weaponsin terms of the additional forces which theUnited States would have to procure to main-tain military capability if it could not useMILSATs–or could not rely on their avail-ability—in a conflict severe enough to justifySoviet ASAT use.

33

34

However, in assessing the importance ofASATS, it maybe more important to considerthe dependence of military capabilities onspace systems. If space system support sud-denly becomes unavailable to a force elementwhich has become accustomed to it, the com-bat effectiveness of that force element maybereduced to lower than it was before it beganusing space system support. Its effectivenesswill be reduced to a fraction of what it waswith space system support; the smaller thisfraction, the greater the force element’s de-pendence on space support.

There is a trend in both the United Statesand the U.S.S.R. to use increasingly sophisti-cated satellites to perform more functions andto do so more capably. It is generally believedthat because of its sophisticated and still ad-vancing space technology and because of theglobal distribution of its interests, commit-ments, and forces, the United States derivesconsiderable utility from space system sup-port: without satellites, performance of manymilitary missions would become impossible,and performance of others would require largeincreases in the unit strengths of various U.S.force elements. Other force elements probablyderive negligible force multiplication fromspace support. In general, however, the util-ity of military satellites to both the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union is probably in-creasing. 3 It is also generally believed that be-cause of the expense of other means of provid-ing comparable support to these forces, theUnited States has not vigorously developedalternative means of support and has conse-quently become highly dependent on spacesystem support.4

Whether the United States derives moremilitary utility from space system supportthan does the Soviet Union probably cannotbe answered in general terms,5 although force

3See, e.g., Stephen M. Meyer, “Soviet Military Programs andthe ‘New High Ground ’,” Sm”val, %pt./Oct. 1983, pp. 204-215.

‘Ibid.‘According to accepted (e.g., Von Neumann-Morgernstern)

axioms of utility theory, utility cannot be assessed in absoluteterms but only to within an affine transformation; hence inter-personal or international comparisons of utility are not justifi-able in general. See, e.g., Thomas Schelling, The Strategy ofConflict (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 288n,and John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Har-vard University Press, 1971), p. 90.

multiplication of particular types of force ele-ments has been estimated in several studies.e

Insofar as such estimates are comparable,judgments of comparative space support dif-fer. Such differences may attributable, in part,to exclusion from the scope of some studies,for reasons of security classification, of con-sideration of some types of satellites which areof great value to the United States but forwhich the U.S.S.R. has no counterpart or fromwhich the U.S.S.R. might derive much lessutility. The utility of some functions of suchsatellites may be unquantifiable in any case,and this may lead to their neglect in quantita-tive assessments of utility.

It is easier to argue that the United Statesis more dependent on space system supportfor performing important military functionsthan is the Soviet Union,7 because the SovietUnion has less need for some types of spacesystem support and more alternative terres-trial means of providing similar support [seetable 3-l]. Moreover, the Soviet Union has

‘Force multiplication, in those cases where it is meaningfuland can be assessed, can be assessed in absoluti terms and com-pared between nations.

‘Just as international comparison of utility is unjustifiablein principle, international comparison of dependence on spacesystems is also unjustifiable, if dependence is defined as theloss in utility which it would suffer if its satellites were sud-denly incapacitated. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the UnitedStates is more dependent on MI LSATS to perform importantmilitary functions than is the Soviet Union, even though thevalue of these functions cannot be easily quantified.

Table 3“1.—Asymmetries in U.S. and SovietSpace System Need and Use

Asymmetry United States Soviet Union

MILSAT reliability . . . . . (+) High (–) LowerMILSAT endurance . . . . (+) Long (–) ShorterLaunch rate. . . . . . . . . . . (–) Low (+) HighStockpile of spare

MI LSATS . . . . . . . . . . . (–) Low ( +C 3 requirements . . . . . . . (–) Global and (+

oceanicTerrestrial C3

alternatives (relativeto requirements) . . . . . (–) Few ( +

Terrestrial alternativesfor informationcollection (relative to

HigherContinentaland littoral

More

requirements) . . . . . . . (–) Few (+) MoreOperational ASAT

capability . . . . . . . . . . . (–) No (+) YesASAT altitude reach . . . (–) Low (+) HigherASAT responsiveness . . (+) High (–) Low

35

greater capability to reconstitute satelliteswhich provide such support in case they arelost in action, hence even to the extent the So-viet Union is dependent on space system sup-port, it is less dependent on individual satel-lites for some functions.

Force Application

Satellites have also been used to provide de-structive capabilities. For example, since 1968the U.S.S.R. has tested a coorbital intercep-tor—a satellite which could be used to inter-cept and destroy other satellites. The U.S. De-partment of Defense estimates that the SovietUnion attained an operational anti-satellite ca-pability with this weapon in 1971.* Althoughto date there has been little testing and appar-ently no long-term basing or actual use ofweapons in orbit, there is increasing techno-logical potential to do so and, in the UnitedStates, increasing overt interest in doing so.In particular, there is strong interest in theUnited States in using space-based (i.e., sat-ellite) weapons for defensive missions, espe-cially ballistic missile defense and air defense.

Satellites could also provide destructive ca-pabilities in support of other missions. Pub-lic Soviet statements have indicated a decreas-ing interest—indeed, growing opposition—tospace-based weapons, although such state-ments have been interpreted by some in theWest as disingenuous and propagandistic, in-tended for political gain and strategic de-ception. g

Nonmilitary Functions Contributing toNational Security

Satellites are also used for nonmilitary ap-plications which contribute to national secu-

Y.J.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 4th cd.,Apr. 1985, p. 55. According to analysts of the CongressionalResearch Service, the U.S.S.R. has also tested a fractional-orbitbombardment system (FOBS), and possibly also a multipk+orbitbombgrdrnent system (MOBS), which could employ sateMtesto bombard terrestrial targets with nuclear warheads W.S. Con-gress, Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service,Science Policy Research Division, Soviet &ace Programs, 1971-1975, Committee Print prepared for the U.S. Senate, C%mrnit-tee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Aug. 30, 1976].

‘U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Intelligence Agency,Soviet Mih”tary Space Doctrine, report DDB-1400-16-84, Aug.1, 1984 [UNCLASSIFIED].

rity, such as monitoring compliance with armscontrol agreements 1 0 a n d c o l l e c t i n g d a t a ‘ o r

scientific research which could improve futuremilitary capabilities.

Current and Projected MILSATCapabilities

Important asymmetries exist between thespace systems of the United States and theSoviet Union and between the ways in whichthese systems would be employed [see table3-l]. However, simple comparisons of U.S. andSoviet space systems can be misleading. TheSoviet Union has an operational ASAT weap-on, the United States does not. Yet, the U.S.ASAT, if developed, will be more capable andversatile than the Soviet ASAT. U.S. satellitesare more sophisticated, more reliable, and ca-pable of performing more functions than theirSoviet counterparts. Yet, the Soviet’s rapidlaunch capability and policy of maintainingspares would allow them to reconstitute somespace assets during a conflict. *1

These factors are further modified by thedifferent roles that satellites or ASAT weap-ons would play in different theaters of war atdifferent levels of conflict. Soviet forces are deployed largely on the Eurasion land mass, andwould, in many scenarios, be able to rely onterrestrial communication and informationlinks. In many’of the same scenarios, satellitecommunications would be critical to globallydeployed U.S. forces which might lack thesame terrestrial communication links. Even inpeacetime, the United States relies heavily onsurveillance satellites to monitor Soviet com-pliance with arms control agreements by mon-itoring Soviet activities which could not bemonitored by other lawful means, althoughsimilar activities in the United States wouldbe readily observable by Soviet personnel k+gaily in the country.

‘OLes Aspiu “The Verification of the SALT II Agreement, ”Scientific American, vol. 240, No. 2, February 1979, pp. 38-45.

“president Ronald Reagan, Report to the Congress: U.S. PoJicy on ASA T Arms Control, Mar. 31, 1984 ~NCLASSIFIED].

36

Soviet MILSAT Capabilities

The Soviet Union currently uses satellitesto perform missile launch detection, commu-nications relaying, radionavigation, meteoro-logical surveillance, photographic and radarreconnaissance, collection of electronic intel-ligence (ELINT: e.g., radar emissions), andother functions.12 These functions support avariety of military applications. Of particularconcern to the Administration and in Con-gressl$ are:

. . . present and projected Soviet space sys-tems which, while not weapons themselves,are designed to support directly the U. S. S.R. ’Sterrestrial forces in the event of a conflict.These include ocean reconnaissance satelliteswhich use radar and electronic intelligence inefforts to provide targeting data to Sovietweapon 14 platforms which can quickly attackU.S. and allied surface fleets. In view of thefundamental importance of U.S. and Alliedaccess to the seas in wartime, including forAllied reinforcement by sea, the protectionof U.S. and allied navies against such target-ing is critical.ls

Soviet ELINT ocean reconnaissance satel-lites (EORSATS) attempt to detect, localize,and classify ships by detecting the radio sig-nals emitted by their communications and ra-dar systems, while Soviet radar ocean recon-naissance satellites (RORSATS) attempt todetect, localize, and classify ships by detect-ing radar “echoes” reflected by the ships.RORSATS and EORSATS are typically de-ployed at altitudes of about 250 and 425 kilom-eters, respectively, in nearly circular orbits in-clined about 650 with respect to the equatorialplane [see figure 3-1 and table 3-2] From thesealtitudes, these satellites can observe shipping

IZ1bid., pp. T ~d 12; and U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief ofNaval Operations, Understanding Sow”et Naval Developments,4th cd., NAVSO P-3560 (Rev. 1/81), Jan. 1981 IUNCLASSI-FIED], p. 46.

‘sHearings before the Subcommittee on Strategic and Thea-ter Nuclear Forces of the Cou’ttee on Armed Serw”ces Um”tedStates Senate, Testimony on Space Defense Matters in Reviewof the FY1985 Defense Authorization Bill, S. Hrg 98-724, Pt.7, pp. 3568-3569.

“Specifically, anti-ship cruise missiles launched against U.S.surface ships: see U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Mfi”tmyPower, 3d cd., 1984; p. 41.

“Reagan, op. cit.

over a limited range. The observation “swath’of each satellite will eventually cover the en-tire earth and ocean surface between latitudesof about 650 north and south. If only one ortwo RORSATS or EORSATS were operationalat one time—as has been customary in peace-time–then a ship in this latitude band wouldbe exposed to observation only intermit-tently.l g However, larger numbers of ROR-SATS or EORSATS could be operational dur-ing wartime.

Even if only intermittent, surveillance byRORSATS or EORSATS could assist Sovietforces in targeting Allied shipping to an ex-tent dependent on details of satellite capabil-ities, such as resolution. For example, Sovietoceanographic radar satellites of the Kosmos-1500 class can obtain radar imagery with aresolution of only 1.5 to 2 kilometers [see fig-ure 3-2], which is inadequate to distinguish anaircraft carrier from a tanker, for example.17

Various countermeasures could be used byships to evade observation by these satellitesor to reduce the value of their observations tothe enemy; la some of these are discussed be-low, in the section entitled “The Role andValue of Anti-Satellite Capabilities. ”

U.S. MILSAT Capabilities

The United States uses MILSATS to per-form most of the functions performed by So-viet satellites, as well as some other functions.

. —W!ompare the discussion of radar search satellites in I14X lkfis-

sile Basing, OTA report OTA-ISC-140, September 1981.ITIn 1983 the ~viet Union launched a Cid Ocean-surveillance

satellite (Kosmos 1500) equipped with a side-looking radar andin the same year placed two satellites (Venera 15 and Venera16) equipped with similar radar systems into orbits around VE+nus. The U.S.S.R, has exhibited radar imagery obtained bythese satellites. Although the resolution of this radar imageryis poor compared to the 25-meter resolution imagery obtainedby NASA’s Seasat-A radar satellite in 1978 [see Figure 76Bof U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, hZX Mis-sile Basing, OTA-ISG140, Sept. 1981], the 40-meter resolutionimagery obtained by NASA’s experimental Shuttle ImagingRadar (SIR-A) device in 1982 [see figure 3-3], or the 25-meterresolution imagery obtained by NASA’s experimental ShuttleImaging Radar (SIR-A) device in 1984, Soviet satellite radartechnology can be expected to improve, and synthetic apertureradar could be used on future satellites.

“Reagan, op. cit., p. 13. See also testimony of VADM Gor-don R. Nagler, USN, before the HAC Subcommittee on Defense,Mar. 23, 1983.

37———— —

Figure 3.1 .—Ground Track of Soviet Radar Ocean Reconnaissance Satellite

600 inclination160-170 nmi altitude1.5-1.6 hr period

SOURCE Office of Technology Assessment

Table 3“2.—Orbits of Some Soviet Military Satellites U.S. satellites are designed to have longer

Per[gee-Apogeeoperational lifetimes in orbit than Soviet sat-

(km) (km) Inclination Apparent mission ●ellites, hence fewer satellite launches per year

3 5 , 7 8 5 - 3 5 , 7 8 5 0 communications are required to perform similar functions. The19,000-19,200 65 navigation complexity of a U.S. satellite may differ from

965-1,020 47 communications that of a Soviet satellite performing the same940-960 83 meteorological855-895 81 meteorologyical function, and the value of this function to the790-810 74 communications United States may differ from its value to the620-660 81 electronic lntelligence

(ELI NT)U.S.S.R.

425-445 65 ELINT ocean reconnaissance(RORSAT)

7 6 0 - 4 0 , 0 0 0 6 3 launch detection4 0 0 - 4 0 , 0 0 0 6 3 communicatlons356-415 73 photo- reconnaissancea

250-265 65 radar ocean reconnaissance(RORSAT)

172-351 67 photo-reconnaissance b

— — — . . —aManeUVerab}e ]nltlaj parameters for Kosmos 1499 91venbManeuverab~e Inltlal parameters for Kosmos 1454 glve~SOURCES NASA Sa/e///fe S~fuaf[on Report VOI 24 No 5 Dec 31 1984 and

“ Nicholas L Johnson The Sov/et Year In Space 7983 (ColoradoS~r!ngs CO Teledyne Brown Eng(neerlng 1984)

Attack Warning.-The United States uses in-frared sensors aboard satellites in geostation-ary orbit to detect and promptly report ICBMand SLBM launches; these reports would pro-vide early warning of a missile attack. 19

“U.S. Dep~rtment of Defense, Report of the Secretar~ of De-fense Caspar 1$”. W’ehberger to the Congress on the FY 198513udget, F}r 1986 Authorization Request, and FY 1985-89 De-fense Programs, Feb. 1, 1984 IUNCI,ASSIFIEDL p. 196.

38

Figure 3-2.- Radar Imagery From Kosmos 1500

. . ,

Left, imagery of Atlantic Ocean waves obtained bythe Soviet Kosmos 1500 Oceanographic Research

Satellite in 1983:

SOURCE: Photographs courtesy of Aviation Week and Space Technology (reprinted by permission)

Navigation and Detection of Nuclear Detona-tions.—U.S. NAVSTAR satellites carry radi-onavigation beacons for use by Global Posi-tioning System (GPS) receivers on aircraft,ships, and land vehicles. They also carry In-tegrated Operational Nuclear Detonation De-tection System (IONDS) sensors designed todetect nuclear detonations in order to moni-tor compliance with the Limited Test Ban

Treaty and other treaties in peacetime. In war-time they could be used to confirm a nuclearattack on the United States or its allies in or-der to support a decision by the National Com-mand Authorities to retaliate, and to assessthe success of a retaliatory strike.20

‘“Ibid.

39

Command and Control Communications.—TheUnited States also uses several different mil-itary and commercial communications satel-lites to provide command and control commu-nications among its globally distributed forces.An advanced satellite communications systemcalled MILSTAR has been designed to replacethese and is intended to provide survivableand enduring command and control commu-nications to all four services at all levels of con-flict, including general nuclear war.”

Meteorological Surveillance.–Defense Mete-orological Satellite Program (DMSP) meteoro-logical surveillance satellites provide timelyinformation about weather conditions world-wide. This information is of considerable valuein planning military operations, especiallyflight operations.

Compliance Monitoring.–Photoreconnais-sance satellites are used to monitor compliancewith arms control treaties and agreements;this function could not be performed as wellby any alternative means which is politicallyacceptable in peacetime, and this functionwould be unnecessary during war with anotherparty to such treaties, which would be sus-pended during such a war. However, in war-time the United States would attempt to col-lect intelligence using satellites’z and othermeans, such as aircraft overflight, which areacceptable during wartime.

“The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense,Annual Report to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY1985 Authorization Request, and FY 1984-88 Defense Pro-grams, Feb. 1, 1983 [UNCLASSIFIED].

“The Honorable Richard Perle, Assistant Secretary of De-fense for International Security PoIicy, has stated:

W’e believe that this Soviet anti-satellite capability is effec-tive against critical U.S. satellites in relatively low orbit, thatin wartime we would have to face the possibility, indeed thelikelihood, that critical assets of the United States would be de-stroyed by .Soviet antisatellite :~stems. If, in wartime, theSoviet Union were to attack crltlcal satellites upon which ourknowledge of the unfolding conventional war depended, . . . wewould ha~’e little choice but . to deter continuing attacks onour eyes and ears, without which we could not hope to prose-cute successfully a conventional war,

[Hearings before the Subcomrm”ttee on Strategic and Thea-ter NucJear Forces of the Com”ttee on Armed Services Um”tedStates Senate, Testimon-v on Space Defense Matters in Reviewof the FYI 985 Defense A uthorizati’on Bill, S.Hrg. 98-724, Pt.7., Mar. 15, 1984, p, 3452. ]

Possible Advanced-TechnologyMILSAT Capabilities

Recent and prospective technological ad-vances could be exploited by both the UnitedStates and the U.S.S.R.–at different rates–todevelop MILSATS which could perform thosefunctions now performed by MILSATS moreeffectively or economically. Such improve-ments are possible in the performance of eachof the functions mentioned. Of particular in-terest and concern are possible marked im-provements in ocean surveillance, logisticsupport of space systems, and anti-satellite ca-pability which appear technologically feasible.

For example, radar ocean surveillance sat-ellites using synthetic aperture radar tech-niques could provide radar imagery of suffi-cient resolution to permit classification ofships. An example of the potential quality ofradar imagery is provided by the radar im-agery obtained by the Shuttle Imaging Radarsystem SIR-A in 1981 [see figure 3-3]. The syn-thetic aperture radar carried by SIR-A distin-guished features as small as 40 meters across.Earlier, in 1978, NASA’s Seasat-A demon-strated a resolution of 25 meters; more re-cently, in 1984, SIR-B demonstrated a com-parable resolution. Even finer resolution ispossible, and several satellites could be de-ployed at once to provide frequent opportu-nities to observe each point on the ocean sur-face. [Deploying such satellites at higheraltitudes for greater coverage would greatlyincrease the power required and hence also sat-ellite cost.] Both the United States and theU.S.S.R. could deploy radar ocean surveillancesatellites using high-resolution synthetic aper-ture radar technology in the future. Soviet de-ployment of radar ocean surveillance satelliteswith improved performance would threatenU.S. and allied shipping to a greater extentthan does the existing RORSAT and wouldprovide the United States with a greater in-centive to maintain, or, if necessary, developan A SAT capability to destroy such satellitesor otherwise interfere with their performance.Future EORSAT performance could also beimproved. With regard to the threat posed by

40 . —

such Soviet MILSATS to U.S. and allied ship-ping, the Administration has expressed concernthat “as Soviet military space technology im-proves, the capabilities of Soviet satellites thatcan be used for targeting are likely to be en-hanced and represent a greater threat to U.S.and allied security. ”23

The logistic support and anti-satellite capa-bilities of space systems could also be en-hanced greatly in the future. Potential future

‘ ‘Reagan, op. cit., p. ‘i. See also testimony of VAI)M GordonR. Nagler, USN, hefore the IIAC Subcommittee on Defense,Nlar. 23, 1983.

ASAT capabilities are discussed in chapter 4of this report.

Recent and prospective technological ad-vances could also be exploited to enable futureMILSATS to perform functions not now per-formed by MILSATS. For example, the UnitedStates could develop and deploy space surveil-lance satellites to detect and track foreign sat-ellites. This capability could be used to detectimpending attacks on U.S. or allied satellitesin time to permit countermeasures to be used;it could confirm success of such attacks in or-der to support a decision to retaliate (not nec-essarily in kind); it could monitor compliancewith possible future ASAT arms control or“Rules of the Road in Space” agreements; andit could provide targeting information for U.S.anti-satellite weapons. Space surveillance sat-ellites could provide continuous space objectdetection and tracking capabilities which can-not be duplicated by ground-based radars(which have limited search range) and photo-graphic or electro-optical sensors (which can-not be used in daytime or through overcast).

The United States and the U.S.S.R. couldalso develop satellite (i.e., space-based) weap-ons capable of attacking a variety of targetsother than satellites—e.g., ballistic missiles,aircraft, ships, and fixed or mobile targets onland.24 Assessment of the military capabilitieswhich such weapons might eventually be ableto provide requires an understanding of thefeasibility of making them survivable at af-fordable costs and is beyond the scope of thisreport, which is limited to survivability issues.The feasibility and value of space-based bal-listic missile defense system components–including weapons—is discussed in a compan-ion OTA report, Ballistic Missile DefenseTechnologies.

The Value of Military Satellites

Estimation of the force multiplication ef-fects which satellites might provide under spe-cific circumstances might be done objectively,by means of combat modeling and simulation,

“LTC David I.upton, USAF (Ret.), op. cit., pp. 36-47.

and analysis of historical combat data. Thecosts of the additional ‘‘equivalent forces’which the satellite services would, in effect, re-place might be used as an upper bound on thevalue of the satellites under those circum-stances. However, the expected utility, orworth, of such force multiplication cannot de-termined by such an analysis without assum-ing probabilities that the forces supported willbe involved in various conflict situations, esti-mating the force multiplication expected ineach such situation and the additional costsaverted by such force multiplication, andaveraging these averted costs over all suchsituations. This would be a demanding, andprobably infeasible, analytical task, becauseassessment of such values and probabilitiesis necessarily subjective and hence subject todispute. However, some judgments of valueare conventionally accepted and can be ration-alized to a considerable extent.

For example, the missile attack warningfunction performed by U.S. MII.SATs hasbeen described as being of “vital’ importanceto national security. ” The navigation and nu-clear detonation detection functions performedby the GPS and IONDS mission packagesaboard NAVSTAR satellites have been de-scribed as “critical,” as has the communica-tions function to be performed by MILSTARand currently performed by a variety of sat-ellites [see box entitled “The Dependence ofU.S. Command and Control Performance onSatellite Communications Systems’’ ].” Sur-veillance satellites have been described as“criticaI assets, “27 and the surveillance func-

tion which they perform has been called “vi-tal.‘ ’28

Other satellites are seldom judged to be ofimportance comparable to those aforemen-tioned, although some are of considerablevalue. For example, after DMSP cloud im-agery and DMSP-derived forecasts were madeavailable to aircraft carriers operating inSoutheast Asia, sorties of carrier-based air-craft scheduled for strike and reconnaissancemissions which required clear weather in thetarget area were canceled when meteorologi-cal data from DMSP satellites showed over-cast in the target area, and the aircraft whichhad been assigned to the canceled sorties werereassigned to other missions. This use ofDMSP data decreased the number of aircraftrequired to perform a number of assigned mis-sions in a given time, or, equivalently, in-creased the number of aircraft available to flysuch missions.

As another example, the navigational ac-curacy of missiles and aircraft which rely onvery accurate, unaided inertial navigation sys-tems depends on geopotential anomaly datacollected by geophysical research satellites.

Some of the functions performed by satel-lites, and the satellites which perform them,are most valuable in peacetime, while otherswould be more important in crisis, conven-tional war, or nuclear war. However, determi-nation of the nature of the dependence ofsatellite value on the level of conflict is com-plicated by the fact that in many cases the

critical U. S, sat ellites in relat, ik’el~’ low orhit, that in wartimewe would ha~’e to face the possibility’, incfwxf the likelihood, thatcritical assets of the on it ed States would he dest rolred b)’ So-\’iet anti- sat[lllite sj’stems. ---Statement of l’he I lonor:ihl[Richard f]erle, Assistant Secretary” of I)efensc ( 1 nternati{)nalSecurit~’ I)oliq), Hearings hefore the Suhcommit tfw on Str;I-tegic and Theater Aiuclear Forces of the [’on]mit tet’ on .Armed.Ser\riceL9 ( lnited States Senate. Testin]on.)r on .Space llefen.sehfatters in fle~’ieu of the F>”] 985 L)efense .4u[horizatjon Bill,Klar, 15, 1984, S, Ilrg. 98-724, Pt. i’, p. 3452.

2“The l+onorahle I lans hl ark, then SecretarJr of the .4ir Force,in test imon}” in 1980 hearings before the U.S. Congress, 1+ ouse( )f 1{ eprc,w~n t at i ~c~, (’ommittet’ on Science and “1’echnolo~~,Stat f~d that ‘‘ two missions [strategic missile warning arrci sur-t’t’illan((~j al)oi(~ al] {)ther-s s t a n d out as }~~in~ of \’i tal inlpor-t :incf~ t () national sf’curit J. [ ( ‘nitd St at(Is (’i\’ iJian Spa(v I’ol-ic’,~, 1 IOUS(J I )(KU rnf’nt 15;1, !Mt h (Tong., Yd s[~ss,, ,Jul I’ 2324,I :W(}: pp. 9:)-WI\.

42

The Dependence of U.S. Command and Control Performance onSatellite Communications Systems

It has been estimated that about 70 percent of all U.S. military electronic communications arerouted through communications satellites.1 In peacetime, much of such traffic consists of administ-rative messages which would be unessential to the conduct of war. Therefore, the dependence ofU.S. military capabilities on satellite communication systems, although undoubtedly substantial,is not necessarily represented accurately by the fraction of message traffic routed through satel-lites during peacetime. The dependence of U.S. military capabilities in several theaters on satellitecommunication systems is reflected qualitatively in the following views of military commandersand staff analysts.

Command and Control in the Southwest Asian Theater.–The dependence of command and con-trol within the Southwest Asian theater and between that theater and the continental United Stateson satellite communications systems has been noted by Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston,USA (Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force):

. . . the challenge is to establish and maintain strategic communications upward, necessary linkages later-ally, and tactical communications downward. Strategic connectivity in the [Southwest Asian] region islimited today. The backbone of the Defense Communications System cannot be accessed directly exceptby satellite or HF over long distances. The FLTSAT and DSCS II systems support this need for all theservices. DSCS 111, the follow-on satellite, will soon be launched with a new booster. The HF programs,however, especially in the anti-jamming arena, need better interoperability. At present, limited HF linksmust transmit beyond optimum distances to reach DCA entry points and are subject to frequent atmos-pheric interruptions.2

Command and Control in the Pacific Theater.–Similar concern has been expressed by LieutenantGeneral Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., USA (Deputy Commander-in-Chief, Pacific) about the dependenceof command and control within the Pacific theater and between that theater and the continentalUnited States on satellite communications systems:

A critical problem is the Pacific area’s heavy reliance on satellite and undersea cable systems. The So-viet Union’s demonstrated ability to destroy satellites has made it urgent to implement countermeas-ures and modernize backup high frequency systems so we can deploy at least minimum essential com-munications. s

Command and Control in the European Theater.–Command and control between the Europeantheater and the continental United States depends on similar means which are similarly vulner-able. Command and control within the European theater depends less on satellite communications,for reasons noted by Major General Robert A. Rosenberg, USAF (then Assistant Chief of Staff,Studies and Analyses, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force):

It is interesting to watch a simulated war-game exercise in the central region of Europe when thecommunications circuits are removed to simulate loss or destruction. The German Post Office telephonesystem is used to contact another command center when the military primary lines are down.4

‘Colonel Robert B. Giffen, US Space System Survivabih”ty: Stretegic Alternatives for the 1990s, National Security Affairs MonographSeries 82s4 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, Fort Leslie J. McNsir, 1982), pp. 22-23.

*Lieutenant General Robert C. Kingston, USA, “C$I and the Rapid Deployment Force, ” Worldwide Deployment of Tactical Forces andthe OZ Connection, Proceedings of the National Security Issues 1982 Symposium, Oct. 4-5, 1982, MITRE Corp. document M82-64, 1982.

%ieutenant General Joseph T. Palastra, Jr., USA, “Pacific Command Perspectives, ” Worldwide Deployment of Tactical Forces and the01 Connection, Proceedings of the National Security Issues 1982 Symposium, Oct. 4-5, 1982, MITRE Corp. document M82-64, 1982.

‘Major General Robert A. Rosenberg, USAF, “Satisfying C’I Requirements for Deployed Air Forces, ” Worldwide Deployment of TacticalForces and the (Y1 Connection, Proceedings of the National Security Issues 1982 Symposium, Oct. 4-5, 1982, MITRE Corp. document M82-64, 1982.

43

value of a function performed by a satellitemay be realized at a later time and at a dif-ferent–probably higher-level of conflict thanthat at which the function was performed.

For example, missile attack warning datawould be most valuable during a nonnuclearwar, when anticipation of such an attackwould be most intense and when it would bemost important to be reassured that the na-tion is not under attack when such is indeedthe case. Once the United States has con-firmed that it has been so attacked, or is un-der attack, or decides to retaliate for a non-nuclear attack by Warsaw Pact forces againstNATO allies, further warning informationwould be of value only if additional salvos wereexpected, as in “nuclear war-fighting” scenarios.

As another example, the value of geopoten-tial anomaly data collected by satellite mightbe greatest during nuclear war, although tobe of value then such data must have been col-lected and analyzed-a lengthy process–during peacetime.

The problem of assessing the values of MIL-SAT capabilities and ASAT capabilities willbe discussed in greater detail in appendix Dto this report.

The Vulnerability and Protection ofMilitary Space Systems

The value of MILSAT functions performedduring wartime can be realized only if MIL-SATS survive long enough to perform them.Most current MILSATS are vulnerable to de-liberate nuclear or nonnuclear attack, andsome are vulnerable to nondestructive elec-tronic countermeasures and electro-opticalcountermeasures. However, only a few U.S.MILSATS are potentially vulnerable to cur-rent Soviet nonnuclear A SAT weapons, andthese could be made less so.

Satellites operate as components of spacesystems, which include terrestrial componentssuch as satellite control facilities and user ter-minals (the “ground segment”) as well as the

satellites themselves (the “space segment”).Attacks against either segment can disruptthe functioning of a military space system andnegate or reverse the force enhancement it provides. Hence both MILSATS and their asso-ciated ground equipment must be effectivelyprotected against attack if the value of theirwartime functions is to be realized. Technicalmeasures—i.e., active and passive counter-measures—can provide some protection by re-ducing the MILSAT vulnerability, and legalmeasures—i.e., arms control treaties treaty orcustomary law banning threatening activitiesin space—can provide some protection by con-straining ASAT capabilities which could beused against MILSATS. Arms control meas-ures could be used in combination with pas-sive countermeasures to constrain potentialASAT threats and reduce vulnerability tothose which would remain. However, somearms control measures would be incompatiblewith some active countermeasures, such asshoot-back with ASAT weapons.

U.S. responses to current and future ASATthreats need not be limited to legally con-straining such threats and protecting anddefending satellites from those which remain.Other possible responses include deterrence ofASAT attack by maintaining a capability toretaliate (not necessarily in kind), using non-destructive electronic countermeasures andelectro-optica.1 countermeasures against thespace and ground segments of A SAT systems,attacking the ground segment of ASAT sys-tems, augmenting other forces to compensatefor MILSAT vulnerability, and reducing de-pendence on MILSATS.

[Technical countermeasures are discussed ingreater detail in chapter 4 of this report, andarms control and other legal measures are disc-ussed in chapters 5 and 6. In practice, pas-sive countermeasures, and probably activecountermeasures as well, would be used in con-junction with arms control; such combinationsof arms control and technical countermeasuresare discussed in greater detail in chapter 7 ofthis report.]

44

T H E R O L E A N D V A L U E O F A N T I - S A T E L L I T E C A P A B I L I T I E S

To the extent that enemy MILSATS couldincrease the effectiveness of enemy forces, ca-pabilities to damage such MILSATS or to de-grade their functioning would be valuable inwartime. In addition to such destructive andnondestructive ASAT capabilities, other op-tions are available to reduce the utility of MIL-SATS to an enemy or to compensate for theirdisutility to the United States.

Electronic and electro-optical countermeas-ures can be used to provide nondestructiveASAT capabilities which could be used at anylevel of conflict. They would be particularlyvaluable during crises short of declared war,in which satellite destruction would be escala-tor and hence in many cases undesirable.“Active” electronic countermeasures such as“jamming” (i.e., overloading enemy receiverswith strong signals) and “spoofing” (i.e., send-ing deceptive signals) could be used to inter-fere with satellite functioning, as could suchactive electro-optical countermeasures as tem-porary blinding (or “dazzling”: the opticalcounterpart to jamming ) a n d s p o o f i n g . S u c hnondestructive ASAT measures are discussedin chapter 4 of this report.

At higher levels of conflict, ASAT weaponscould be used to destroy enemy satellites. Theinherent ASAT capabilities of nuclear weap-ons such as ICBMS and SLBMS could be usedfor negation of low-altitude MILSATS at nu-clear levels of conflict, while at nonnuclearlevels of conflict the inherent ASAT capabil-ities of the experimental nonnuclear ABMtechnologies demonstrated in Homing Over-lay Experiment (HOE) tests could be used forlow-altitude MILSAT negation, as could theU.S. Air Force’s Miniature Vehicle ASATweapon, when operational. Negation of satel-lites at higher altitudes or more rapid nega-tion of low-altitude satellites would requiremore capable ASAT weapons such as are dis-cussed in chapter 4 of this report.

Alternatively, or supplementally, variouspassive measures could be used in peacetime,crisis, and war not to interfere with the func-tioning of enemy MILSATS but rather to de-crease the value of their functions to the

enemy and, more importantly, to mitigate orcompensate for the harm such satellites couldcause the United States. Intelligence-gather-ing satellites may be particularly susceptibleto such measures. For example, terrestrialforce elements might employ maneuver toavoid observation by enemy imaging satel-lites, and they could use camouflage and con-cealment to prevent recognition if observed.Decoys which would also be “recognized” er-roneously could be used to thwart image inter-pretation by causing confusion as to the num-bers and locations of the assets simulated bythe decoys. Ships, aircraft, and other assetsmight be designed to reflect radar signals onlyweakly in order to evade detection by radarsatellites, and radio silence might be practiced,or covert signaling techniques used, in orderto prevent detection of radio emissions by sat-ellites. Of course, these passive measureswould impose either operational constraintsor financial costs or both.

Still other options are available to compen-sate for, rather than mitigate, the harm whichforeign MILSATS could cause to U.S. and al-lied security. For example, to the extent thatforeign MILSATS provide a force multipliereffect to foreign force elements which engagein direct combat, U.S. or allied force elementswhich might oppose these foreign force ele-ments might be augmented in order to main-tain relative combat strength. That is, forceaugmentation could offset the force multipli-cation provided to enemy forces by space sup-port. Force augmentation would be costly, butnot necessarily more costly than an ASAT ca-pability of comparable security benefit.

These possible responses to threateningMILSAT capabilities are summarized in ta-ble 3-3. These response options would be moreeffective used in combination rather than in-dividually.

Assessment of the value of ASAT capabil-ity is subject to the same methodologicaldifficulties which confound assessment of thevalue of MILSAT capability .29 These prob-—. ————

*’The value of a U.S. ASAT capability to the United Statesin a conflict could be assumed to be equal in magnitude to the

45

Table 3-3.—Possible Responses toEnemy MILSAT Capabilities

●

●

●

●

Force augmentation—offsets force multiplication by MILSATSPassive measures against satellite reconnaissance andtargeting— Evasion—Concealment—Camouflage—Decoys—Radio/radar silence—Covert communications techniquesNondestructive anti-satellite measures—Electronic countermeasures

Jamming● Spoof ing

—Electro-optical countermeasures● J a m m i n g● Spoof ing

Destructive anti-satellite measures—Use inherent ASAT capabilities of ICBMS, SLBMS,

and ABMs—Develop deliberate ASAT weapons

lems, noted above, are discussed in greater de-tail in appendix D to this report. Althoughquantification of the value of ASAT capabil-ity is necessarily subjective or complicated, orboth, it is clear that operational ASAT capa-bilities would have some value to the extentthat they would be inexpensive, stabilizing,and compatible with other (e.g., diplomatic) op-tions for enhancing security.[negative] total value to the Um”ted States of those enemy MIL-SATS which it would be expected to destroy. No analyticallysophisticated studies known to OTA have attempted to syste-matically assess and compare the utility of U.S. MILSATS tothe United States with the disutility of Soviet MILSATS tothe United States but compare Stephen M. Meyer, op. cit., pp.204-215]. It is these utilities which should be compared to de-termine whether the United States would fare better in a re-gime in which U.S. and Soviet MILSATS were mutually vul-nerable to the other’s ASAT weapons or in a regime in whichU.S. and Soviet MILSATS were protected from A SAT threatsby active or passive countermeasures or arms control.

M I L I T A R Y S P A C E P O L I C Y

Military Space Policy Issues

The fundamental task of military space pol-icy formulation is deciding how much pro-posed military space programs are worth, bothin terms of the resources for which they wouldcompete with other proposed national pro-grams, and in terms of opportunity costswhich might be incurred by failing to takeother actions (e.g., arms control) with whichsuch programs are incompatible for nonbudgetary (e.g., legal) reasons. Because the costs,risks, and benefits differ in character, a polit-ical determination of levels at which militaryspace efforts should be pursued is required.30

Prerequisite for this is the task of decidingthe relative values of proposed military spacesystems, anti-satellite systems, and arms con-trol agreements; judgment of these values alsorequires political choice.31

30 Representative of Such determinations are the annuallwdgets prepared by the executive branch and funds author-ized and appropriated by Congress.

“Representative of such determinations are PresidentCarter’s Presidential Directive 37 (PD-37) issued in June 1978,President Reagan’s July 4, 1982, statement on National SpacePolicy, and President Reagan’s Report to the Congress: U.S.Policy on ASAT Arms Control, Mar. 31, 1984,

ASAT Policy Issues

Particularly apparent is the incompatibilitybetween ASAT capabilities and ASAT armscontrol agreements; these would have differ-ent kinds of benefits and risks, and a decisionto pursue one or the other must be based ona political judgement of their respective ex-pected net benefits. A national ASATpolicyreflects such a judgement and should attemptto establish goals for national efforts to en-hance security by the chosen approach. In par-ticular, a national ASAT policy should:

1.

2.

3.

describe military posture objectives; itshould attempt to answer the question:“What ASAT capabilities do we need,and why?”indicate the extent to which pursuit ofsecurity by the chosen approach wouldprobably benefit from increased spendingin various areas of research and technol-ogy development, so that national re-search and development policy might beformulated cognizant of these potentialbenefits.establish ASA T arms contro]policy; i.e.,it should indicate types of arms control

46

4.

provisions or agreed confidence-buildingmeasures which are judged to be in thenational interest, in order to coordinateformulation of negotiating postures, inparticular, and foreign policy in general;32

andspecify U.S. ASAT employment policy;i.e., it should specify conditions underwhich U.S. use of ASAT capabilities—especially in conflicts short of declaredwar-would be deemed justifiable and inthe national interest. In addition, if we desire to deter Soviet ASAT attacks, wemust arrive at and announce a public pol-icy which we believe will make this deter-rence as effective as possible. Whetherthis policy should be explicit or insteadone of calculated ambiguity is a matterof political judgment.

Ballistic Missile Defense asan ASAT Policy Issue

The incompatibility between ballistic mis-sile defense capabilities and ASAT arms con-trol agreements is apparent. Ballistic missiledefense weapons which would be capable of at-tacking ballistic missile components in spacegenerally would have some inherent capabil-ity to attack satellites at altitudes or rangescomparable to those at which ballistic missilecomponents would be engaged, depending onsatellite “hardness.” The inherent ASAT ca-pabilities of some possible advanced-tech-nology BMD weapons would be considerable,and any arms control agreement which wouldattempt to limit the threat of such weaponsto satellites must ban or limit such weapons.Hence a restrictive ASAT arms control agree-

‘zRepresentative of such a policy is President Reagan’s Re-port to the Congress: U.S. Poficy on ASATArms Control, de-livered Mar. 31, 1984.

ment would also restrict BMD capabilities,just as the ABM Treaty-which limits, by in-tent, weapons capable of attacking ballisticmissiles-also limits ASAT weapons with in-herent BMD capability. Of all the opportunitycosts which might be imposed on the UnitedStates by an agreement to limit ASAT capa-bilities, restrictions on the development anddeployment of BMD capabilities beyond thosealready imposed by the ABM Treaty are con-sidered most costly by those who believe thatexploitation of advanced technology maymake possible BMD weapons of great effec-tiveness.

A more fundamental incompatibility be-tween ASAT and BMD capabilities is physi-cal rather than legal: the most capable BMDsystems now envisioned would use space-based sensors, and perhaps also space-basedweapons, which would be subject to attack bydeliberate ASAT weapons or by BMD or otherweapons with inherent ASAT capabilities.Such BMD systems would be effective onlyif their sensors and weapons could be pro-tected from such ASAT threats at reasonablecost by passive countermeasures, active coun-termeasures, arms control measures, or a com-bination of these. If so, perhaps such measurescould be used to protect other satellites, or elsethe functions now performed by other satel-lites could be performed by secondary missionpayloads “piggybacking” on BMD satellites.If not, such BMD capabilities would be of lit-tle value, if any, and the opportunity costswhich would be incurred by restricting themwould be small.

[Chapter 5 of this report contains a discus-sion of past arms control efforts which had theintent or effect of constraining ASAT capa-bilities. Other ASAT arms control options aredescribed and evaluated on a provision-by-provision basis in chapter 6 and as packagesof provisions in chapter 7.]

Chapter 4

ASAT Capabilitiesand Countermeasures

Contents

PageOrganization of This Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Current and Projected ASAT Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Generic ASAT System Components , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49Soviet ASAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50U.S. ASAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

Possible Advanced-Technology ASAT Weapon Systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62Isotropic Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62Kinetic-Energy Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64Directed-Energy Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

Possible U.S. Responses to Soviet ASAT Capabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75Reduction of Dependence on Military Satellites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75Force Augmentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Passive Countermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76Active Measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84Diplomatic Measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

Summary of Findings Regarding ASAT Capabilities andCountermeasures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

TablesTable No. Page4-l. Estimated Costs of the U.S. Air Force Space Defense and

Operations (ASAT) Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 624-2. Types of ASAT Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 634-3. A Comparison of Laser Weapons. ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724-4. Passive Countermeasures Against ASAT Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 774-5. Active Measures Against ASAT Attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

FiguresFigure No. Page

4-1. Generic Components of an ASAT System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504-2. Illustrative Components of the U.S. Space Defense System . . . . . . . . 514-3.The Soviet Coorbital Satellite Interceptor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 534-4. Soviet Anti-Satellite Capabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 544-5. Space Detection and Tracking System ., ..., , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 564-6. Deep Space Surveillance Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 574-7. ASAT Mission Operations Concept. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 584-8. Mission Control Events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ., . . . . . . . . . . . 594-9. The USAF Miniature Vehicle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

4-10. ASAT Mission Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 614-11. Artist’s Concept of a Neutral Particle Beam Weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . 724-12. Artist’s Conception of the Space Shuttle Deploying a

Neutral Particle Beam Weapon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 744-13. Cost Comparison: Satellite and RPV Relays for Single-Channel

UHF Tactical Theater Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 764-14. Low-Cost Packet-Switching Communications Satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

Chapter 4

ASAT Capabilities and Countermeasures

O R G A N I Z A T I O N O F T H I S C H A P T E R

A variety of technological options are avail-able for space surveillance systems, stand-offweapons, and weapon and sensor platforms foranti-satellite uses. Current and projected U.S.and Soviet ASAT capabilities, including spacesurveillance capabilities, are described in thefirst section of this chapter. More advancedASAT capabilities which could be deployed by

Some possible U.S. responses to Soviet devel-opment of such capabilities are described inthe third section of this chapter. The principalconclusions about ASAT capabilities andcountermeasures are summarized in the finalsection of this chapter. The actual militaryutility of these capabilities will be discussedin appendix D to this report, which is clas-

the United States or the U. S. S. R-. are de- sified;scribed in the second section of this chapter.

C U R R E N T A N D P R O J E C T E D A S A T C A P A B I L I T I E S

Generic ASAT System Components

A space defense system could include bothpassive countermeasures for protecting satel-lites and an ASAT system for interfering withenemy satellites in time of war. An ASAT sys-tem, whether deliberate or expedient, must becontrolled by an associated command, control,communications, and intelligence (CSI) system,which itself will have three types of subsys-tems, as illustrated abstractly in figure 4-1.First is the intelligence collection part-thespace surveillance system—which would de-tect electromagnetic radiation emitted orreflected by a satellite and, using these meas-urements, attempt to track the satellite anddetermine its orbit. Careful interpretation ofthis information may allow characterizationof the satellite-i. e., determination of its mass,shape, and other features—and even determi-nation of the function of the satellite. On thebasis of this interpretation, information wouldbe communicated over command, control, andcommunications (C3) links to command andcontrol (C*) centers, where authorities wouldconsider the information in the context ofother relevant information and possibly issueorders to negate the satellite or to interferewith its functioning nondestructively (e.g.,using electronic countermeasures). If so, other

C* elements would generate detailedtions for an attack, and these wouldmunicated by C3 links to an ASATsystem.

instruc-be com-weapon

An A SAT system would have either nondes-tructive ASAT devices such as jammers orother electronic or electro-optical countermeas-ures, or A SAT weapons capable of damagingsatellites (in which case it would be an A SATweapon system), or both. In general, eachweapon would consist of a stand-off weaponcapable of damaging a satellite at a distanceand either carried by a platform such as a sat-ellite, rocket, airplane, or land vehicle, or elsebased on the ground at a fixed site. The stand-off weapon could be a kinetic-energy weapon(KE W) such as a gun or a fragmentation war-head, a directed-energy weapon (DEW) suchas a laser or particle accelerator, or an ordi-nary “isotropic” nuclear warhead (so called be-cause it would release roughly equal amountsof energy in all directions).

The weapon platform (if any) would carrythe stand-off weapon to within lethal range ofa targeted satellite. A highly maneuverableplatform could pursue and collide with a tar-geted satellite; such a vehicle would be a “hit-to-kill” kinetic-energy weapon which would

49

50

Figure 4-1 .—Generic Components of an ASAT System

LIDAR or RADAR

Sun

Solarradiation

not need to carry a stand-off weapon. Alter- added, showing examples of its space surveil-natively, if the stand-off weapon had sufficient lance, command and control, and ASAT weap-lethal range, it would not need to be maneu- on systems.vered toward a targeted satellite but could in-stead be based on the ground or on a non- Soviet ASAT Capabilitiesmaneuvering platform.

Figure 4-2 illustrates a portion of the U.S. Space SurveillanceSpace Defense System as it will appear when The ASAT capabilities of the Soviet Unionthe planned anti-satellite weapon system is depend on Soviet space surveillance systems.

51

Figure 4-2.— Illustrative Components of the U.S. Space Defense System

Key:ASATCC:

CMC:MV:

NSSC:PMOC:ROCC:

SPADATS:SPADOC:WWMCCS:

ASAT Control Center(ASAT carrier aircraft base: prelaunch C2)Cheyenne Mountain ComplexMiniature Vehicle(satellite interceptor warhead)National Space Surveillance CenterPrototype Mission Operations CenterRegional Operations [military air traffic] Control Center(post-launch C2)SPAce Detection and Tracking SystemSPAce Defense Operations CenterWorld-Wide Military Command and Control System

The Soviet Union operates extensive militaryand civil networks of radar, LIDAR1, and photographic space surveillance sensors linked to-gether by satellite and terrestrial communica-tions systems.2 Soviet missile early warningradars and satellites can detect foreign satel-lite launches. Soviet radio/radar trackingground stations can presumably detect andtrack satellites in low-Earth orbit and tracksatellites in higher orbits. In addition, the ra-

‘ LI DAR is an acronym for L Ight Detection And Ranging;it refers to a radar-like sensor system which transmits pulsesof light, typically produced by a laser, and looks for reflectionsfrom objects. Ranges to objects can be inferred from the timedelay of pulses reflected from it.

‘Soviet Space Programs: 1976-80, Part 1, Committee Print,Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Senate,97th Cong., 2d sess., December 1982. IUSGPO 98-515 O]

dars used by the Soviet ABM system and ra-dio telescopes can be used to detect, track, andcharacterize satellites. The U.S.S.R. also usesships for satellite tracking and communica-tions and operates some tracking stations inforeign territory.

Soviet deep-space detection capabilities nec-essarily rely upon passive sensors, primarilytelescopic cameras similar to the Baker-Nunncameras formerly used by the United Statesand upon radio telescopes and ground-basedmilitary signal intelligence collections systems.Passive optical sensors, whether photographic

‘Such systems, which perform direction-finding or signal in-tercept functions, are called electronic support measure (ESM)systems.

or electro-optical, can detect sunlight reflectedby a high-orbit satellite; the power of thereflected sunlight received by a distant opti-cal sensor decreases only as the square of therange to the target, so passive optical ‘sensorsare more useful than radar for detecting high-orbit satellites.4 Similar considerations makepassive radio systems—i.e., radio telescopesor military electronic support measure sys-tems—useful for detection and tracking atlong range, provided the target is emitting aradio signal of some kind.

It is possible that the U.S.S.R. may developelectro-optical tracking sensors in the future;such sensors could provide surveillance infor-mation more quickly than can camera systems,which require development of photographicfilm or plates. Neither photographic nor elec-tro-optical telescopes can detect or track sat-ellites from the ground in daytime or throughovercast, as radar can.

Weapons

The Soviet Union has been conducting a ser-ies of tests of coorbital satellite interceptors(“killer satellites”) since 1968.5 An artist’sconception of such an interceptor is shown infigure 4-3. The U.S. Department of Defenseestimates that these anti-satellite weapons be-came operational in 1971.6 These weapons are- . — — —.— —.

‘This is because the energy of a radar return, or “echo,” froma satellite decreases as the fourth power of range to the target.Radar returns from satellites in high orbit are generally so weakthat they cannot be detected by a radar rapidly scanning thesky; they can only be detected if the approximate position ofthe satellite is already known so that the radar can scan slowlyfor signals from that general direction, accumulating signalenergy for a prolonged period of time. Hence ground-based ra-dar can measure small changes of a high-altitude satellite’s or-bit but could not easily find a satellite which had maneuveredenergetically since its last observation. Similar considerationslimit the effective search range of LIDAR systems.

The energy of a radar echo also depends on the radar wave-length used. For example, at wavelengths much longer thana satellite’s diameter, the echo energy decreases rapidly withincreasing wavelength-as the inverse fourth power, accordingto Rayleigh’s law. However, the echo also becomes more om-nidirectional (as a consequence of Babinet’s principle and—inthe special case of spherical satellites—the Mie effect) and lessdependent upon details of satellite shape and composition otherthan the electric susceptibility of the satellite, in accordancewith Rayleigh’s law.

5U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 4th cd.,April 1985.

‘Ibid., p. 55.

believed to be capable of attacking satellitesat altitudes up to 5,000 kilometers or evenhigher, 7 depending on their orbital inclina-tions; presumably they would be unable to at-tack satellites in orbits with unfavorable in-clinations, i.e., very different from the latitudeof the interceptor launch site. As of 1984 thereappeared to be only two launch pads for So-viet coorbital interceptors, both located at theTyuratam launch complex.8 Several intercep-tors could be launched per day from thiscomplex. g

In 1971 the testing of satellite interceptorswas apparently suspended, then resumed in1976, then again suspended in 1978, just be-fore the U.S.-U.S.S.R. A SAT negotiations be-gan, then again resumed in 1980 after suspen-sion of those talks, then again suspended inAugust 1983 when Soviet President Yuri An-dropov announced a unilateral moratorium onASAT testing, stating that the U.S.S.R.would not test ASAT weapons if the UnitedStates did not. The U.S.S.R. continues to ob-serve this unilaterally declared moratorium.The U.S.S.R. has never officially and publiclyadmitted developing or testing weapons ofthis type. However, on 29 May 1985, in an in-terview by a West German reporter in Geneva,Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov, a senior depart-ment head on the Soviet General Staff, claimedthat the U.S.S.R. had successfully developeda direct-ascent satellite interceptor similar tothat tested by the United States in the early1960s and operational until the mid-1970s.

— — —‘Ibid., p. 56.‘U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power, 3rd cd.,

April 1984, p. 34.‘U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Mti’tary Power, 4th cd., “

April 1985, p. 56.

Figure 4-3.— The Soviet Coorbital Satellite

.

Launchpad and storage facility for satelllte Interceptors atTyuratam

SOURCE U S Department of Defense

The Soviet Union has also been testingground-based lasers which could have someASAT capability [see figure 4-4]. The Depart-ment of Defense has stated that the Soviets“already have ground-based lasers that couldbe used to interfere with U.S. satellites. ” Asof 1985, there are two experimental Sovietground-based lasers with some ASAT capa-bility, ’O both at Sary Shagan. ”

based lasers for electro-optical countermeas-ures with some effectiveness.ls

Operational Capabilities

Existing Soviet ASAT capability could bepotentially effective for negating low-altitudeU.S. MILSATS, such as those used for navi-gation (Transit) and meteorological surveil-lance (Defense Meteorological Satellite Programsatellites). Commenting on this capability, theHonorable Richard Perle, Assistant Secretaryof Defense (International Security Policy), hasstated that:

In addition to weapons designed specificallyfor A SAT use, the U.S.S.R. could attack low-altitude satellites with its ABM interceptormissiles [illustrated in figure 4-4], 12 and pre-sumably with ICBMS and SLBMS, althoughthese might require some modification forASAT use. All of these weapons are presum-ably armed with nuclear warheads, and theiruse in a nonnuclear conflict would be viewedas escalator by the United States and pre-sumably by the U.S.S.R. as well.

We believe that this Soviet anti-satellite ca-pability is effective against critical U.S. sat-ellites in relatively low orbit, that in wartimewe would have to face the possibility, indeedthe likelihood, that critical assets of theUnited States would be destroyed by Sovietanti-satellite systems, ’4

In addition to these destructive ASAT ca-pabilities, the U.S.S.R. has a technological ca-pability to jam satellite uplinks or downlinkswith some effectiveness, and could use ground-

“’Ihici., p. 5 6 .“ Ihid., p. 5/+.121hid., p. 56,

—.“Ibid., p. 56.“Statement of The Honorable Richard Per]e, Assistant Sec-

retar~. of Defense ( International Security Policy), in HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Strategic and Theater NuclearForces of the (’ommjttee cm Armed Serl’ices United States Sen.ate, Testimon?’ on Space Defense illatters in Re\’iew of theF1’1 98,5 Defense Authorization Bill [S. Hrg. 98-724], March 15,1984, Pt. 7, p. 3452.

54

Figure 4-4.—Soviet Anit.Sateltite Capabilities

Artist’s conception of a Soviet ABM interceptor missile, namedGALOSH by Western analysts GALOSH missiles might have

capab!litles to attack satellites at low altltudes.

SOURCE U S Department of Defense

The utility of these U.S. satellites in vari-ous types of conflicts is discussed in Appen-dix D to this report, which is a separate, clas-sified document.

Projected Capabilities

The Soviet Union could develop weapons ca-pable of attacking U.S. satellites at higher al-titudes than can be reached by the currentSoviet coorbital interceptor. Laser weapons,among other types, could be be used for thispurpose. The U.S. Department of Defense esti-mates that:

The Soviets are working on technologies orhave specific weapons-related programs under-way for more advanced anti-satellite sys-tems. These include space-based kinetic-energy, ground- and space-based laser, par-ticle beam, and radiofrequency weapons. TheSoviets apparently believe that these technol-

.,4- - “ - . +— - .-—

.

Soviet high-energy laser facility at Sary Shaaan Two lasers there maybe capable of d“amagl ng unprotected satellites at low altltudes

ogies offer greater promise for future anti-satellite application than continued develop-ment of ground-based orbital interceptorsequipped ‘with conventional warheads,

. . . In the late 1980s, they could have pro-totype space-based laser weapons for useagainst satellites. In addition, ongoing Sovietprograms have progressed to the point wherethey could include construction of ground-based laser anti-satellite (ASAT) facilities atoperational sites. These could be available bythe end of the 1980s and would greatly in-crease the Soviets’ laser ASAT capability be-yond that currently at their test site at SaryShagan. They may deploy operational sys-tems of space-based lasers for anti-satellitepurposes in the 1990s, if their technology de-velopments prove successful. 15

The Soviet Union also has the basic technol-ogy required to build space-based neutral par-ticle beam weapons. The U.S. Department ofDefense estimates that:

A prototype space-based particle beamweapon intended only to disrupt satelliteelectronic equipment could be tested in theearly 1990s, One designed to destroy the sat-ellites could be tested in space in the mid-1990s. 16 ‘7

i~(j.s, ~epartment of Defense, .sot’iet ,tfi~itarJ power, qth ed.,1985.

‘G I bid.17 However, as recently as 1984, while projecting this capa-

bility, the Administration noted that Itre have, as ~~et, no evi-dence of So}’iet programs based on particle-beam technology’[President Ronald Reagan, “Report to the Congress: U.S. Pol-icy on ASAT Arms C’ontrol, ” 31 March 1984 (u NC I, AS-SIFIED~].

55

Future manned Soviet spacecraft, such asthe expected Soviet “space shuttle’ ’—and,especially, the “space plane ’’-could havegreater maneuverability and possibly non-cooperative rendezvous capability and, if so,some inherent ASAT capability .18

U.S. ASAT Capabilities

The U.S. Space Defense System is a networkof systems used for space surveillance and forcommand and control. An anti-satellite weap-on system will be added to it in the near fu-ture. Figure 4-2 illustrates a portion of the pro-spective U.S. Space Defense System as it willappear the planned anti-satellite weapon sys-tem is added. The figure shows examples ofthe space surveillance, command and control,and ASAT weapon systems which will be partof the U.S. Space Defense System.

Space Surveillance

U.S. ASAT capabilities, like those of the SOviet Union, depend on space surveillance ca-pabilities. Like the U. S. S. R., the United Statescan use its missile attack warning radars andsatellites to detect satellite launches and cantrack satellites after launch using ground-based and shipboard radar, LIDAR, passiveoptical, and passive radio sensors. The SpaceDetection and Tracking System (SPADATS)acquires, processes, stores, and transmits datafrom such sensors, including Naval Space Sur-veillance (NAVSPASUR) radar interferome-ters and Air Force Spacetrack radars andGround-based Electr~Optical Deep-space Sur-veillance System (GEODSS) sensors [see fig-ure 4-5]. The United States operates moreforeign-based space surveillance facilities thandoes the U. S. S. R., and consequently relies lesson shipboard systems, although such systemsare used.

The effective search range of U.S. ground-based radar systems is limited to low-Earth

‘aCurrent manned Soviet spacecraft (Soyuz, Salyut) do nothave a significant inherent ASAT capability: they have littlemaneuver capability and have not demonstrated coorbital ren-dezvous with non-cooperative spacecraft. Rendezvous with cmoperative spacecraft is typically performed by an automatic sys-tem which relies on a transponder on the passive spacecraft.

orbit, although some radars can track a satel-lite out to geosynchronous altitude if the satel-lite’s approximate position is already known.”The range at which a ground-based radar cantrack low-altitude satellites is limited by therequirement for an unobscured line of sight tothe satellite. For example, a satellite at an al-titude of 185 kilometers (100 nautical miles)would be below the horizon if farther awaythan 1,590 kilometers slant range.20

For detection of satellites in deep space theUnited States relies on a system of telescopicelectro-optical sensors called GEODSS, forGround-based ElectroOptical Deep-space Sur-veillance System [see figure 4-6].2’ The GE-ODSS network, when completed, will provideworld-wide deep-space surveillance coverageusing sensors at five sites22:

Socorro, New Mexico (Site I);● Taegu, South Korea (Site II);● Maui, Hawaii (Site III);. Diego Garcia, in the Indian Ocean (Site

IV); and● Portugal (Site V).

The main telescopes at each GEODSS facil-ity are designed to detect objects as dim asa star of visual magnitude 16.5, or a reflectivesphere about the size of a soccer ball in geosyn-chronous orbit.

Command and Control

Under present policy, the U.S. NationalCommand Authorities (NCA) would have toauthorize satellite negation. Actual opera-tional control of a negation mission would beexercised by the USAF Space Command

‘eSee note 4, supra.201 e 1 ’560 kilometer as projected on the Earth’s surface.. .! ,

A closer satellite at this altitude might be below the horizon,if mountains or other terrain features obscured the view. In addi-tion, the azimuthal coverage of some radars is limited.

2’D.D. Otten, E.I. Bailis, and J.G. Klayman, “GEODSS:Heavenly Chronicler, ” Quest (Redondo Beach, CA: TRW, Inc.,August 1980), pp. 3-23.

‘zSites I, II, and 111 are presently operational, and site IVshould become operational this year. Sites I, II, and III eachhave two main 40-inch telescopes and one 15-inch auxiliary tel-escope, while sites IV and V will have three main telescopeseach. Site equipment is designed to be relocatable within 2weeks.

56

Figure 4-5.—Space Detection and Tracking System

60

0 30 60 90 120 150 180 210 240 270 300 330 360■ Radar .Electro-optical (GEODSS)

SOURCE The Aerospace Corp

Space Defense Operations Center (SPADOC)in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex usingother assets of the Space Defense Commandand Control System [see Figures 4.7 and 4.8].29

On October 1, 1985, satellite negation willbecome the responsibility of a new unifiedspace command which will also exercise oper-ational command over U.S. military space sys-tems which provide support to the combatantforces of other unified and specified com-mands. Creation of a unified space commandwas proposed in order to increase the effectiveness and responsiveness of U.S. space systemsand to ensure a clear chain of command fromthe NCA to combatant forces.24 Creation of theU.S. Space Command was authorized by thePresident on November 30, 1984.

2SR.S. Cooper, Director, Defense Advanced Research ProjectsAgency, The U.S. Anti-sate fi”te (ASAT) Program, statementbefore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 25 April 1984.

Z4Hon. Verne Orr, Secretary of the Air Force, USAF FY85Report to the 98th Congress of the United States of America,8 February 1984; reprinted in S. Hrg 98-724.

Weapons

In 1959 the United States successfully in-tercepted the Explorer VI satellite using anair-launched ballistic missile developed forother purposes and, the following year, beganto develop—but abandoned before testing—acoorbital SAtellite Interceptor system (SAINT)designed specifically for the purpose of in-specting and destroying satellites. The UnitedStates also maintained an operational direct-ascent satellite interceptor capability from1963 until 1975, using nuclear-armed Nike-Zeus missiles (Project Mudflap, 1963-1964)and Thor missiles (Project 437, 1964-1975).25

The United States has no deliberate opera-tional ASAT capability at the present time,although its nuclear-armed ICBMS and SLBMShave some inherent ASAT capabilities, as wasdemonstrated by the nonnuclear exoatmos-pheric ABM Homing Overlay Experiment

“M. Smith, “Anti-satellites (Killer Satellites), ” CRS IssueBrief 1B81123, 22 August 1983.

57

Figure 4-6.—Deep Space Surveillance Systems

Left: Today, surveillance of deep space IS performed byground-based electro-optical surveillance systems such as theGround-based Electro-Optical Deep Space Surveillance(GEODSS) system, which IS operated by the U.S. Air ForceSpace Command as part of the Space Detect Ion and TrackingSystem (SPADATS) Here, an operator at a GEODSS controland display console studies a 21 field of view of deep space.On a clear night, a GEODSS main telescope can automatical-ly survey over 500 such fields per hour and detect reflectivesatellites as small as soccer balls at geosynchronousaltltudes

SOURCE U S AIr Force

I

58

Figure 4-7.—ASAT Mission Operations Concept

ASAT ControlCenter

Tyndall AFBSE ROCC

This illustration shows communication links which would be used for a satellite negation operation.

SOURCE: The Aerospace Corp

(HOE) test of 10 June 1984. However, the U.S.Air Force is flight-testing an air-launched,direct-ascent anti-satellite weapon called theMiniature Vehicle (’(MV”). This infrared-guided nonnuclear kinetic-energy weapon [seefigure 4-9] is mounted on a two-stage SRAM/ALTAIR booster which is carried aloft andlaunched from an F-15 aircraft. F-15 carrieraircraft are to be deployed at Langley AirForce Base in Virginia and at McChord AirForce Base in Washington state [see figure 4-10]. When operational, it will be able to attacklow-altitude Soviet satellites which performreconnaissance and targeting functions; theseare viewed as most threatening by the UnitedStates. 28 If based as planned, these weaponswill not be able to attack Soviet satellites

‘“President Ronald Reagan, l?epmt to the Congress: U.S. Pol-icy on ASATArms Control, 31 March 1984 ~NCLASSIFIED].

which provide missile attack warning, navi-gation, and advanced communications func-tions.27

The Air Force plans to hold 12 flight testsof the ASAT system. Two of the twelve testshave been held–the first in January 1984 andthe second in November 1984. In the Januarytest, the ASAT missile was targeted at a pointin space to determine whether the two-stageSRAM/ALTAIR booster could deliver theminiature homing vehicle to the vicinity of thetarget point. The Air Force considered the testa success: the proper functioning of the firstand second stage propulsion systems and the

2’R.S. Cooper, Director, Defense Advanced Reeearch ProjectsAgency, The U.S. Anti-satelh”te (ASAT) program, statementbefore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 25 April 1984.

59

Figure 4-8.— Mission Control Events

—kxecution of a satellite negation mission using the USAF MV ASAT weapon would begin with an alerting order. The target would then be trackedby SPADATS and its ephemeris would be updated by the National Space Surveillance Center (NSSC) for use in generating mission tapes to beloaded on the carrier aircraft for targeting of the ASAT weapon. After an execution order is issued from the Prototype Mission Operations Center(PMOC) in the Cheyenne Mountain Complex (CMC), the carrier aircraft would take off and the missile would have to be launched before sensorcoolant exhaustion. Before missile launch, the carrier aircraft would receive updated information and instructions by high-frequency radio datalink from a Regional Operations Control Center (ROCC), which is an element of the current military air traffic control center.

SOURCE The Aerospace Corp

missile guidance system was successfully dem- The Air Force considered the test a partial suc-onstrated. 28 cess. zg

The objective of the November 1984 test Successful completion of U.S. ASAT testswas to reaffirm the performance of the mis- would provide confidence that the weaponsile and to demonstrate the capability of a min- could perform as specified if actually used.iature homing vehicle to acquire and track an Funds for completion of the planned flight testinfrared-emitting body (in this test, a star) program have been appropriated by Congressagainst the radiant background of deep space. subject to certain limitations, partly because

of concern that once the weapons are proven— effective, the Soviet Union would cease to ob-

2’U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office, “Report to the serve its self-imposed moratorium on the test-Honorable George E. Brown, Jr., House of Representatives: Sta- ing of ASAT weapons and might be reluc-tus of the U.S. Antisatellite Program, ” report GAO/NsIAl)-85-104, June 14, 1985. “Ibid.

60

USAF

.

ASAT missile carried by F-15 fighter during refueling operation

SOURCE U.S Alr Force

61———. —— ——— —— . —

Figure 4-.10. —ASAT Mission Profile

TargetsatelIite

}

vehiclehomingintercept

}

Upper stagepointing andtargetacquisition

Missile guidanceto interceptpoint in space

\Targeting dataloaded by groundsupport equipment

SOURCE The Aerospace Corp

tant to agree to arms control measures which States retained a capability to use hiddenwould ban them. Because the small weapons ASAT weapons.could be easily concealed, if they are proveneffective and then banned by agreement, So- The estimated costs of the U.S. ASAT pro-viet authorities might suspect that the United gram are listed in table 4-I.

62

Table 4.1 .—Estimated Costs of the U.S. Air Force Space Defense andOperations (ASAT) Program

P O S S I B L E A D V A N C E D - T E C H N O L O G Y A S A T W E A P O NS Y S T E M S

It will be possible in a few years to buildspace surveillance systems, ASAT weaponsystems, and ASAT countermeasure systemsmuch more capable than those used by theUnited States or expected to become opera-tional soon. These advanced systems could usetechnologies expected to be available eventu-ally in both the United States and the SovietUnion. The variety of possible systems is sogreat that this report will discuss only thosewhich seem most promising or threateningwith respect to criteria of responsiveness, sur-vivability, altitude reach, economy, early avail-ability, controllable lethality (for destructiveapplications), and usefulness at nonnuclearlevels of conflict. The most promising ASATtechnologies will be discussed in this sectionas possible U.S. options. Space surveillancesystems, although essential components ofspace defense systems, will not be discussedin this section, because the most promisingspace surveillance technologies would be usedto best advantage in space-based space sur-veillance systems; these were discussed inchapter 3 as possible advanced-technologyMILSAT capabilities.

Table 4-2 lists the major categories of ASATweapons, organized, according to physicalmeans of causing damage, into three catego-ries: isotropic (nondirectional) nuclear weap-ons, kinetic-energy weapons (projectiles), anddirected-energy weapons (particle beam weap-ons, radio-frequency weapons, and laser weap-ons). Because the boundary between destruc-tive directed-energy devices (weapons) andnondestructive directed-energy devices (e.g.,radio jammers, lasers used to overload opti-cal sensors, or particle-beam generators usedto upset the functioning of electronic systems)is blurred, being one of power or mode of userather than kind, nondestructive directed-energy devices will not be distinguished fromdirected-energy weapons except where nec-essary.

Isotropic Nuclear Weapons

Ordinary nuclear weapons, when detonatedin space, radiate energy and disperse debrismore or less uniformly in all directions. Hencethey will be called isotropic nuclear weapons(INW) to distinguish them from nuclear explo-

63

Table 4-2.—Types of ASAT Weapons

Isotropic nuclear weapons (/NW):Ground-based—Coorbital interceptor—Direct-ascent (“pop-up”) interceptorSpace-based—Coorbital interceptor (nuclear ‘{space mines”)’ b

Kinetic-energy weapons (KEW):Ground-based—Coorbital interceptor—Direct-ascent (“pop-up”) interceptorSpace-based—Coorbital interceptor (“space mines”)’—Noncoorbital interceptor

Directed-energy weapons (DEW):Ground-based—High-power radio-frequency (HPRF) and active

electronic countermeasures (ECM)—High-energy laser (H EL) and active electro-optical

countermeasures (E-OCM)Space-based—High-power radio-frequency (HPRF) and active

electronic countermeasures (ECM)—High-energy laser (HEL)d and active electro-optical

countermeasures (E-OCM)—Neutral-particle beam (NPB)

aA “space mine” Is an expendable ASAT weapon predeployed In space so asto be capable of destfoy!ng enemy satellites almost Instantly They could bearmed wtth INW, KEW, or DEW I f armed with a short-range weapon, a spacemine must be coorbital

bprohibited by the 1967 Outer space TreatyClntercepis targets at high velocity from parking orbitdlnc[udlng nuclear explosive powered X.ray lasers (X RLS), Which are nucleardirected-energy weapons (NDEW)

sive-powered directed-energy weapons (NDEW)which will be discussed subsequently. INWcould be carried to within lethal range of a sat-ellite or satellites by a rocket and detonated.Early U.S. ASAT weapons were of this type,and the United States or the U.S.S.R. coulduse nuclear-armed ICBMS, SLBMS, and ABMinterceptors in this manner. Alternatively,INW could be used as nuclear space mines:they could be concealed aboard satelliteswhich are continuously or occasionally withinlethal range of enemy satellites and detonatedon command.

As ASAT weapons, nuclear weapons haveseveral legal, political, and strategic disadvant-ages: they can only be used at the nuclearlevel of conflict-or in any case their use wouldescalate a conflict to the nuclear level—andwhen used they may upset or damage un-hardened friendly and neutral satellites atranges which depend on weapon yield butwhich can be very large. In addition, they can-not legally be based in orbit, this being pro-

hibited by the Outer Space Treaty of 1967.Moreover, existing U.S. procedures for safe-guarding nuclear weapons and for preventingtheir unauthorized use are expensive and time-consuming, and the Soviet Union may havesimilar safeguards now and incentives to re-tain them in the future. On the other hand, theadvantages of isotropic nuclear weapons aretheir present availability, their economy (rela-tive to other weapons of comparable range),their concealability (from present surveillancesystems), their great lethal range (as comparedto kinetic-energy weapons) against unhar-dened satellites, the difficulty of hardeningsatellites against nuclear detonations at closerange, and their adaptability for delivery bya variety of launch vehicles and orbital plat-forms, including those with poor guidance ac-curacy and no pointing capability.

By comparison, nuclear directed-energyweapons are not now available and, if devel-oped, would require platforms with moder-ately accurate pointing capability. However,it is possible in principle to build nucleardirected-energy weapons, such as X-ray lasers,which could have far greater lethal range thanthe nuclear explosive devices which powerthem and which could be feasibly and economic-ally delivered by platforms with adequatepointing capability. The theoretical potentialof such weapons,34 if realized in practice, wouldmake them superior to isotropic nuclear weap-ons for ASAT applications. The potentialASAT capabilities of NDEW, therefore, de-serve greater concern than do those of iso-tropic nuclear weapons which are, however, ofmore immediate concern because of their ex-istence and demonstrated capability.

Existing nuclear-armed Soviet ABM mis-siles could be used against low-altitude satel-lies. Prior testing of such weapons against sat-ellites would not be required to demonstratethe reliability of subsystem operation.

“See, e.g., F.V. Bunkin, V.I. Derzhiev and S.1. Yakovlenko,‘‘Specification for pumping X-ray laser with ionizing radiation, ”Soviet Jourmd of QuantxJrn Electronics, vol. 11, No. 7, July1981, pp. 971-972, and note that many such lasers could be pow-ered by one “exotic” source of pulsed x-radiation.

64

Isotropic nuclear weapons concealed aboardsatellites used as ‘‘space mines” could attackwithout warning and would pose a greaterthreat+ because reactive countermeasures couldnot be used for protection. Nuclear spacemines could be lethal against satellites as hardas any now operational at such range that thetesting of their trailing capability -e.g., in ge-ostationary orbit—although observable, mightnot be interpreted as such. Protection againstsuch weapons would require evading themduring placement (which would be relativelyeconomical only for a small, cheap satellite),opposing their placement by defending anagreed or unilaterally declared “keep-outzone” around satellites from penetration byany spacecraft which might contain a nuclearweapon, or possibly, after penetration andtrailing by such a spacecraft, evading (e.g., un-der cover of smoke and chaff) it until out ofits probable lethal range, at which time it couldbe attacked by ASAT weapons of greaterrange, if available.

Development and, when necessary, opera-tion of closelook inspection satellites equippedwith gamma-ray spectrometers or other in-struments capable of detecting materials usedin nuclear explosives would afford additionalprotection: if inspection by such satellites wereanticipated, the designer of a nuclear spacemine would have to shield its nuclear explo-sive device with tons of materialg5 in order toprevent collection of prima facie evidence ofhaving placed a nuclear weapon in orbit in vio-lation of the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. Plac-ing so massive a space mine into orbit wouldbe more costly, and it could be evaded at lessrelative cost than a smaller, unshielded spacemine could be.

“U.S. and Soviet scientific spacecraft, landers as well as or-biters, have carried gamrn a-ray spectrometers capable of de-tecting low concentrations of fissionable materials as deep ashalf a meter below lunar and planetary surfaces [U.S. NationalAeronautics and Space Administration, A Forecast of SpaceTechnology 1980-2000, NASA Special Report SP-387, 1976; andcf. the recent Soviet “VEGA” Venus/Halley’s Comet probe.].The United States could develop such sensors for use on satel-lites for purposes of monitoring compliance with the OuterSpace Treaty.

The risk which such weapons may pose toU.S. spacecraft now or in the future is miti-gated to some extent by the fact that theywould be useful only in a nuclear war, in whichthe ground segments of space systems wouldalso be significantly vulnerable and might beattacked by preference, and more rapidly. Thisand the other aforementioned disadvantagesof ASAT INW pose disincentives against de-veloping them, attempting to base them in or-bit covertly, and using them at nonnuclearlevels of conflict

Several conclusions follow from these con-siderations:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

It is feasible to build direct-ascent andcoorbital isotropic nuclear weapons.Weapons of this type could be as smalland inexpensive as many existing sat-ellites.Such weapons could be developed andtested covertly.Soviet nuclear weapons could threatenU.S. satellites at low and high altitudesnow and in the future but only at nuclearlevels of conflict.Protection of U.S. satellites from coorbi-tal INW may require defense of a keep-out zone around low-altitude satellites ordesigning future low-altitude satellites tobeat least as small and inexpensive as thenuclear space mines which threaten them.Many more options are available for de-fending high-altitude satellites from di-rect-ascent nuclear interceptors.

Kinetic-Energy Weapons

Anti-satellite kinetic-energy weapons pursuesatellites and destroy them by direct impactor at close range using a gun or a fragmenta-tion warhead. One example of an ASAT KE Wis a coorbital interceptor which approaches itstarget at a low closing velocity before destroy-ing it. Another example is a direct-ascent(“pop-up”) interceptor which is launched fromthe Earth’s surface or from an airplane andwhich approaches its target at a high closingvelocity. Such an interceptor could also be

65

based in space in a parking orbit, from whichit could enter a transfer orbit in which it wouldclose with its target at high velocity, just asa pop-up interceptor would. “Pop-up” inter-ception requires less energy per unit intercep-tor payload than does coorbital interception,particularly at low altitudes. A coorbital in-terceptor, on the other hand, could be used asa “space mine, continuously observing andtrailing its target, prepared to destroy italmost instantly on command or (if salvage-fused) when attacked or disturbed in specifiedways. Used in this way, a coorbital ASATKEW could take advantage of the element ofsurprise in an attack, leaving an enemy notime to react with active defenses or reactivepassive countermeasures such as evasion ordeployment of decoys or smoke.

A coorbital interceptor could pursue a tar-get (its ‘quarry”) indefinitely if it had as muchvelocity change capability (“delta-V”) as itsquarry. If it also had as much acceleration ca-pability as its quarry, it could, with trackingcapability, pursue its quarry continuously,otherwise its quarry would be able to maneu-ver out of lethal range temporarily. Undersome conditions, an interceptor may be ableto trail its quarry using less delta-V than itstarget uses for evasion; however, calculationof required velocity change is complicated,3G

particularly in the case of many-against-oneinterception. In any case, if comparable pro-pulsive technologies are available to both pur-suer and evader, pursuit can be successful ifthe interceptor’s mission payload—its arma-ment (if any) and guidance and fuzing sys-tems—is lighter than that of its quarry.

It should be possible to build space mineswith very lightweight armament. For exam-ple, a directional fragmentation warhead sim-ilar to that of a Claymore mine could project100,000 one-gram pellets in a pattern whichwould cover a 100 x 100 meter area with 10pellets per square meter at a range of 1 kilo-meter. This would be adequate to destroy un-

‘G.M. Anderson, “Differential Dynamic Progr amming Feed-back Control for a Pursuing Spacecraft with Limited Fuel, ’’(NewYork, NY: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronau-tics, AIAA Paper A78-31925, 1978).

armored satellites as small as about a meterin diameter with high probability. The pelletsfor such a warhead would weigh 100 kilo-grams, and its explosive charge could weighless than that. Even lighter warheads of thistype may be possible, possibly having disper-sion angles as small as those of shotguns oreven high-power rifles (e.g., 10 centimeters dis-persion at a range of 1 kilometer).

Guns and rockets could also be used as ar-mament by a KEW space mine. For example,a single unguided rocket which deploys a 10x 10 meter net weighing about 1 kilogram andhaving a l-gram weight at each of its 100nodes (knots) could achieve the same kill prob-ability as the Claymore-type warhead if itsaiming error were less than 5 milliradians (5meters at 1 kilometer) after rocket burnoutand net deployment. A space mine using sucha rocket as armament might weigh as little as50 kilograms but could destroy much heavierunhardened satellites.

It would not be relatively economical to usesuch mines to attack smaller, cheaper satel-lites, which could be useful for some militaryapplications, such as communications.37 How-ever, it would be economical to use spacemines to attack larger satellites. If such sat-ellites are armored as a countermeasure, thespace mine could also be made more lethal, andthis would probably require less mass thanwould be required for armor against it at theassumed lethal range38. There appears to beno relatively economical means of protectinglarge satellites against a surprise attack bysuch mines, once they are emplaced. Safetyfrom such attacks would require opposingtheir placement by defending an agreed or uni-laterally declared “keep-out zone” around sat-ellites, or else, once they are emplaced, evad-ing them (e.g., under cover of smoke and chaff)until out of their range, at which time theycould be attacked by ASAT weapons of greaterrange.

s~For example, the U.S.S.R. operates a constellation of Mht-weight satellites in low orbit, and as early as 1961 the UnitedStates operated SYNCOM communications satellites weighingonly 31 kilograms in geosynchronous orbit.98s= the di~Cu99iOn Of har&ning in the discussion Of Coun-termeasures, below.

Space mines the size of those assumed (2meters in diameter) could be detected byground-based radars if at low altitude or, if athigh altitude, by electro-optical sensors (e.g.,GEODSS) if they do not employ measures(e.g., black paint) to evade detection or byspace-based long-wavelength infrared spacesurveillance sensors even if they do employsuch measures. In order to demonstrate relia-bility, they would have to be tested in spaceby trailing satellites or space debris. Thisactivity could be observed and would be no-ticeable.

The U.S. Department of Defense has esti-mated that the U.S.S.R. views developmentof directed-energy weapons as a more prom-ising approach for improving future antisatel-lite capabilities than further development ofground-based kinetic-energy ASAT weapons.39

However, Soviet development and testing ofinterceptors of the type which is currentlyoperational have demonstrated an interest,and some capability, in coorbital, nonnuclearkinetic-kill approaches to ASAT capability.Given sufficient incentive, the U.S.S.R. mightchoose to continue these efforts and, if so,could eventually produce smaller, cheaperweapons of longer endurance. Once testing ofsuch weapons in space is observed, theremight be insufficient time for the UnitedStates to react by developing new generationsof small, inexpensive satellites against whichuse of small space mines would be uneconom-ical.40

It can be concluded from these considera-tions that it is feasible to build coorbitalkinetic-energy ASAT weapons. Weapons ofthis type could be smaller and cheaper thanmost satellites as presently designed. If suchweapons are deployed by the U. S. S. R., pro-tecting future U.S. satellites from them mayrequire defense of a keep-out zone around U.S.

‘U.S. Department of Defense, Sow”et Military Power, 4th cd.,Apd 1985, p. 44.

● OFor exmple, ~viet testing of interceptors Of the tYPe nowoperational was first observed in 1968, and the U.S. Depart-ment of Defense has judged, in retrospect, that an operationalcapability with these interceptors was achieved three yearslater, in 1971. [Ibid,, p. 55.]

satellites or designing future satellites to beat least as small and inexpensive as the spacemines which threaten them.

Directed-Energy Weapons

Several types of directed-energy weaponscould be used for ASAT purposes, includingground- and space-based systems powered bynuclear explosives, nuclear reactors, or non-nuclear energy sources. They include high-power radio-frequency (HPRF) generators,high-energy laser (HEL) weapons, and neutralparticle beam (NPB) weapons. They could alsoinclude non-laser sources of short-wavelengthradiation.

High-Power Radio-Frequency Weapons andElectronic Countermeasures

HPRF weapons–which include high-powermicrowave (HPM) weapons—are devices capa-ble of producing intense, damaging beams ofradio-frequency radiation.41 HPRF generatorscould be used to overload and damage satel-lite electronic equipment at high power levelsor, at lower power levels, merely to temporar-ily overload satellite electronic systems (i.e.,for “jamming“).” Radidrequency (RF) gener-ators could therefore be useful at all levels ofconflict.

HPRF weapons could be ground-based orbased in space. Ground-based HPRF weapons,unlike ground-based laser weapons, could oper-ate through cloud cover. However, the maxi-mum pulse energy per unit area which can bebeamed through the atmosphere is limited.4s

Space-based HPRF weapons would not be solimited, but, like ground-based HPRF weap-

4’I.e., electromagnetic radiation at wavelengths of 1 rnillim~tiror longer,

‘This continuum of HPRF effects makes distinction between“weapons” and “j ammers ” diffimk.. For arms control purposes,however, a distinction could be made based on power-apertureproduct, as is done in the ABM IYeaty. Wavelengthdependenceshould be considered as well, because at a given power-apertureproduct, shorter wavelengths can be radiated with greaterbrightness and deliver more power per unit area at long range.

4The maximurn p~se energy per unit area which can bebeamed through the atmosphere is limited to about 1 jo~e persquare meter by the phenomenon of dielectric breakdown of theatmosphere, which occurs at higher energy fluence levels.

67

ens, would have to be very large in order toconcentrate their HPRF energy into a narrowbeam. Even a relatively wide beam might beable to damage satellites of existing designsat considerable range, but this is uncertain,and hardening satellites against HPRF radi-ation is possible.

The lethality of HPRF weapons would beless certain than the lethality of other DEWbecause of uncertainties about target vulner-ability, i.e., about the beam energy per unitarea required to damage a particular enemysatellite, This will depend on details of the de-sign of the satellite and would be difficult topredict with accuracy even if those detailswere known. Moreover, even though it is pos-sible in principle to harden satellites to with-stand intense HPRF radiation, it is difficultto verify by modeling and simulation, and ex-orbitantly expensive to verify by testing, theactual degree of hardness achieved. Hence, al-though many concepts for HPRF weaponshave been studied, none of them are as resis-tant to countermeasures as are some HEL andneutral particle beam concepts.

Radio-frequency generators of lower powerwill continue to be valuable for providing ca-pabilities to jam and spoof (i.e., deceive) sat-ellite radio systems.44 The vulnerability of sat-ellites to jamming and, especially, spoofing,is also uncertain and probably varies greatlyamong satellites. However, low-power RFgenerators useful for jamming and spoofingwould be much cheaper than HPRF generators;indeed, some existing electronic countermeas-ure systems could be used against satellitelinks. Because of the prevalence and ambigu-ity of these capabilities, it would be difficultor impossible to eliminate the non-destructiveA SAT capabilities of ECM systems by meansof arms control agreements. Use of passive.

‘Jh;t’en at ~er~’ low power le~rels radio-frequency genera~orsmight be able to confuse (’‘spoof’ satellites b~ beaming de-cepti;”e signals at them. Some possible spoofing techniques ha~’ebeen described b~’ CO1, Robert B. Giffin, (JS~\ F. in [JS Space,$~,sten] SurIiLabilitjr: Strategic .A)ternacil’es for the 1990s, Na-tional Securit~ Affairs Nlonograph Series 82-$, National 1)e-fense [[ni\ersit?’ Press, F’ort I,eslie ,J. LlcNair, W’mhington, DC,19X2: p. 26. E;lectrwnic counter-counterlmeasures can be usedto reduce the ~usceptibilit~ of hl I I,SATS to spoofing.

electronic counter-countermeasures, when nec-essary, would be preferred.

High-Energy Laser Weapons and Electro-Optical Countermeasures (Ground-Based)

High-energy laser weapons are devices ca-pable of producing intense, damaging beamsof optical radiation45 by means of the phenomenon of stimulated emission of radiation. High-energy lasers could be used to permanentlydamage satellites, or, at lower power levels,to jam optical communication systems and to“dazzle” optical sensor systems (i.e., to over-load them, temporarily blinding them). Thiscontinuum of effects makes the distinction between “laser weapons” and “active electro-optical countermeasures” one of degree ratherthan kind and therefore difficult.46 Lasers ofseveral types, employing different materialsand physical processes and operating at differ-ent wavelengths, might be suitable for use asweapons; some of these types are described inthe box entitled “Types of Lasers. ”

HEL weapons could be space-, ground-, air-,or sea-based. Of the many possible types oflasers useful as ground-based A SAT weapons,continuous-wave deuterium-fluoride chemicallasers have been of particular interest becauseof their simplicity, the maturity of their tech-nology, and the possibility of focusing theirinfrared beams using mirrors of relativelyrough surface quality (compared to that whichwould be required at shorter visible and ultra-violet wavelengths).

Repetitively-pulsed free-electron lasers andelectric-discharge excimer lasers have alsobeen of interest because they would operateat short wavelengths at which small beamdivergence angles could be achieved usingsmaller mirrors than would be required for in-frared beams, although they would have to be

—“I. e., electromagnetic radiation at ~a~’elengths shorter than

1 millimeter,‘fi For arms control purposes, howe~er, a distinction could be

made based on power-aperture product, as is done in the ABMTreat~’. \$’a\elength-dependence should be considered as well,because at a git’en power-aperture product, shorter wa~’elengthscan he radiated with greater brightness and delit’er more powerper unit area at long range.

68—

Types of Lasers

A laser is described by the lasant material ituses as a source of coherent optical radiation(e.g., deuterium fluoride), the characteristicwavelength or wavelengths at which the lasantemits such radiation, the method of pumping(i.e., energizing) the lasant (e.g., chemical lasers,electric-discharge lasers, optically pumpedlasers, gasdynamic lasers, etc.), the source ofenergy used for pumping (e.g., chemical electri-cal, nuclear reactor, nuclear explosive, etc.), andits pulse waveform (e.g., single-pulse, repeti-tively pulsed, or continuous-wave).

Many materials can be used as lasants; thesecan be in solid, liquid, or gaseous form (consist-ing of molecules or atoms) or in the form of aplasma (consisting of ions and electrons).Lasant materials useful in highnergy lasers in-clude carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, deu-terium fluoride, hydrogen fluoride, iodine, xenonchloride, krypton fluoride and selenium, to men-tion but a few, Some of these-e.g., xenon chlo-ride and krypton fluoride-are molecules whichcannot exist under ordinary conditions of ap-proximate thermal equilibrium but must be cre-ated by special “pumping” processes in a laser.

of higher optical quality. Free-electron laserscan probably be ‘made more efficient thanother short-wavelength lasers and could beground- or space-based. Electric-discharge ex-cimer lasers might be available sooner, butprobably cannotbe made as efficient as free-electron”lasers can be, nor can they be tuned,as free-electron lasers can be, to wavelengthswhich would minimize beam degradation byatmospheric effects (in the case of ground-based ‘lasers) and optimize target damage.47

“Soviet laser development has emphasized other technologiesthan these; the “best” laser technologies for near-term Sovietweapons may differ from those which would be ‘‘best” for near-term U.S. weapons. Cf. N.N. Sobolev and V.V. Sokivikov, “TheCarbon Monoxide Laser: Review of Experimental Results, ” Sovie.t Jourmd of Quantum l?~ectronics, vol. 2, Jan. -Feb. 1973, p.305 ff.; M.M. Mann, “CO Electric Discharge Lasers, ” AIAAJournal, vol. 14, No. 5, May 1976, pp. 549-567; A.A. Stepanovand V.A. Schlegov, “Continuous-Wave Reaction-Product Chem-ical Lasers (Review), Soviet Journal of Quantum Electronics,vol. 12, No. 6, June 1982, pp. 681-707; and S. Kassel, SovietFree-Electron ~J~ser Research {Santa Monica, CA: The RandCorporation, report R-3259-ARPA, May 1985);

Such molecules are called excimers, a contrac-tion for “excited dimer” (a dimer is a moleculeconsisting of two atoms).

Free-electron lasers do not use lasants but in-stead generate radiation by the interaction ofan electron beam with a static magnetic or elec-tric field. Loosely speaking, free-electron lasertechnology resembles and evolved from thatused by particle accelerators (“atom smash-ers”), while other (i.e., bound+lectron) lasers useIasants heated by electrical current or chemicalcombustion and resemble fluorescent lamps orrocket engines in some respects. Some lasersuse mirrors, lenses, diffraction gratings, orother optical elements to recirculate the laserbeam through the lasant in order to achieve ade-quate amplification; such lasers are calledcavity lasers, and the arrangement of opticalelements used to recirculate the beam is calledthe laser cavity or resonator. In other lasers, thebeam passes through the lasant only once; suchcavity-less lasers are called superradiant lasers,and the process of singk+pass beam generationthey use is called superradiance, superfluores-cence, or amplified spontaneous emission.

Beams from ground-based HEL weaponswould be subject to a variety of phenomenawhich would disturb their propagation throughthe atmosphere. These phenomena include ab-sorption, scattering, thermal blooming, dielec-tric breakdown, and the refractive effects ofatmospheric turbulence. Most serious is beamabsorption and scattering by clouds: ground-based HEL weapons, unlike ground-basedHPRF weapons, could not operate throughcloud cover.48

—.——‘*Dielectric breakdown is not as serious at optical wavelengths

as it is at radio wavelengths. Scattering causes beam degrada-tion, especially at short wavelengths, but is not insurmounta-bly problematic in clear weather. Thermal blooming of a beamfocused on a distant satellite can be controlled by phase com-pensation techniques, or by using a laser which operates at awavelength at which atmospheric absorption is not severe. Adeuterium fluoride laser, for example, operates at such a wave-length and future freeelectron lasers could also operate at suchwavelengths.

69

The effects of atmospheric turbulence alsopose a serious problem for ground-based lasers:without compensation, the beam of a ground-based laser would diverge at so great an an-gle that it would be unable to damage any-thing other than the most sensitive earth-pointed optical sensors on satellites at geosta-tionary altitude. Such compensation appearspossible, in principle.

Another serious problem for ground-basedlasers is the infrequency with which a low-altitude satellite would pass within view of aground-based laser site. The interval betweensuch passes might be days or weeks, and, untilit exhausted its maneuver fuel, a maneuver-ing satellite could completely avoid comingwithin range. Deployment of a large numberof ground-based lasers would provide more frequent opportunities to engage satellites andwould increase the difficulty and expense ofevasive maneuver and of attempts to attackthe laser sites. It would also increase the prob-ability that a number of the lasers would notbe overcast by impenetrable cloud cover. Ofcourse, such proliferation would be expensive.

An alternative approach would be to baseASAT lasers on ships, which would have someflexibility to remain in clear weather near theground tracks of high-priority targets and dis-tant from most anti-shipping threats. Anothersolution to the coverage problem would be todeploy steerable reflectors on satellites to re-lay the beams from ground-based lasers to tar-gets or to other relay satellites. The opera-tional capabilities provided by such a systemwould be similar to those provided by space-based laser weapons with an unlimited powersupply, except that beam availability wouldbe contingent on the absence of overcast atat least one ground-based laser site and on thesurvival of both a ground-based laser and anorbital reflector.

High-Energy Laser Weapons and Electro-Optical Countermeasures (Space-Based)

The beams of space-based laser weaponswould not have to pass through the atmos-phere and could damage unhardened satellitesat great range. A much smaller force of suchlasers than would be required for effective bal-listic missile defense could pose a threat to anation’s most critical satellites. However,space-based laser weapons, like other satel-lites, would be subject to attack by ASATweapons.

Several types of lasers could be used asspace-based laser weapons, each having someparticuhu- advantage. For example, of thoselasers which could damage satellites by over-heating them, hydrogen-fluoride chemicallasers are particularly attractive because oftheir simplicity, while carbon-monoxide elec-tric-discharge lasers are attractive because oftheir potentially high electrical efficiency.Free-electron lasers are attractive becausethey can operate at short wavelengths atwhich small beam divergence angles can beachieved using small mirrors. Excimer laserswould be bulky and less suitable for spacebasing.

Space-based lasers of very low power, if ofan appropriate wavelength, could dazzle orpermanently blind optical sensors used byother weapons for homing guidance or forbeam pointing. More powerful lasers could beused to attack and damage a satellite by over-heating it and possibly melting its “skin,” ortearing its “skin’ as a result of the hammer-like mechanical impulse which pulsed laser ra-diation can generate on a target surface.4g

-————. --——igThe amount of mechanical impulse which a Aven amOUnt

of beam energy can generate can be estimated on the basis ofpublished impulse-coupling models, such as that of P.E. Niel-son, “High-Energy Laser-Matter Coupling in a Vacuum, ” Jour-nal of Applied Ph~wics, vol. 50, No, 6, June 1979, pp. 3938-3943,modified to account for the depth to which the beam radiation

A high-altitude satellite, on the other hand, will penetrate before surface ~aporization begins. In Directed

would be within view of a ground-based laser Energy hfissile Defense in Space IOTA Background Paper OTA-BP-l SC-26, April 1984], Dr. Ashton Carter estimated that a la-

site for a prolonged or indefinite period. For ser beam fluence of 20 kilojoules per square centimeter would

example, a ground-based laser could irradiate produce an impulse intensity of 10 kilotaps [10,000 dyrwseconds

a satellite in geostationary orbit continuously, per square centimeter], i.e., an impulse coupling of 0.5 dyne-seconds per joule. This estimate assumes that the laser pulse

weather permitting. is so brief that little heat is conducted to a depth greater than

70

Spacebased reflectors could relay beams fromground-based lasers to a target, or anotherreflector, beyond the horizon. These could beused in much the same manner as space-basedlasers and would be, in effect, space-basedlasers with an unlimited fuel supply.

All of these weapons have certain disadvan-tages, however. They would use large, expen-sive, power-handling mirrors; they would en-gage targets sequentially, thus giving otherenemy satellites time to use reactive passivecountermeasures (e.g., smoke); and they wouldbe subject to attack by expendable, singleshotweapons (INW, KEW, or DEW) against whichreactive countermeasures and shoot-back wouldbe ineffective. Hence space-based lasers whichcan damage one or several targets instantly,without warning, using a single pulse andwhich are cheap enough to be considered ex-pendable, if feasible, would be most attractive.Because they would exhaust their fuel or de-stroy themselves as soon as they were used,they would be invulnerable to shoot-back al-though subject, and possibly vulnerable, topreemptive attack.

One type of laser which might be useful asan expendable, single-shot, space-based weap-on is the X-ray laser. X-ray lasers are presentlyonly in the earliest stages of development.50

X-ray lasers (also called “x-rasers” or XRLS)could be very simple in design; they mightbe thin fibers of lasing material powered(“pumped”) by intense, pulsed radiation from— . . —the depth to which the beam radiation will penetrate before sur-face vaporization begins. Longer pulses can produce a muchgreater impulse coupling. For example, an impulse coupling of20 dyne-seconds per joule has been measured in experimentsusing infrared lasers [P. Bournot, et al., “Mesure de la Pres-sion Induite sur une Cible Metallique par une Laser C02 Im-pulsionnel, ” Journal de Physique, Tome 41, Suppl. au No. 11,Colloque C9, Novembre 1980, pp. 81-86].

‘“Successful operation of an X-ray laser was claimed by aLawrence Livermore National Laboratories group headed byDennis Matthews at the meeting of the Division of PlasmaPhysics of the American Physical Society in Boston on October29, 1984. Their laser operated at two wavelengths near 20nanometers. The design of the laser is described by D.L. Mat-thews, et al., in “ Demonstration of a Soft X-Ray Amplifier, ”Physical Review Letters, 54:110-113, 1985. More recently, theU.S. Department of Energy has stated that the nation’s nuclear-weapons laboratories conducted an underground test of a nu-clear explosive powered X-ray laser at the Nevada Test Sitelaser and achieved lasing [see note 52, infra].

— —

another laser, a nuclear explosion, or someother source. The beam from such a devicewould diverge at an angle roughly equal to thesquare root of its wavelength divided by thesquare root of the length of the fiber.5]

The U.S. Department of Energy is investi-gating the feasibility of developing nuclear-pumped X-ray laser weapons. Nuclear explo-sive pumping is of interest because even if onlya small fraction of the energy of a nuclear ex-plosion could be converted into X-ray laserbeams, it could still be lethal at great range.Most details of this research, except for thefact of its existence, are classified. However,the U.S. Department of Energy has statedthat:

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

———

The U.S. Department of Energy is inter-ested in and is conducting research on cer-tain types of nuclear explosive powereddirected-energy weapons (NDEW)–viz.,X-ray lasers, visible-light weapons, micro-wave weapons, and charged-particle beamweapons—as well as on nuclear explosivepowered kinetic-energy weapons (NKE W).Underground nuclear tests at the NevadaTest Site have been and continue to be apart of this research.NDEW could engage multiple targetsusing multiple beams, providing highleverage.NDEW could damage targets at rangesof thousands of kilometers.Nuclear explosive powered X-ray laserweapons would damage targets by meansof ablative shock.

51 Provided the square of this angle is greater than twice thecross-sectional area of the fiber divided by the square of itslength. For example, a thin, one meter long XRL operating ata wavelength of 20 nanometers would produce a beam with adivergence angle of 100 microradians. This divergence angleis large compared to those achievable by lasers operating atlonger wavelengths at which mirrors can be used, and only asmall fraction of the energy in a beam diverging at such an an-gle would would be intercepted by a satellite-sized target, at arange of thousands of kilometers. X-rays cannot be focussedusing conventional lenses and mirrors, but they can be focussedusing diffraction gratings and other special optical elements[R. W. Waynant and R.C. Elton, Proceedings of the IEEE, vol.64, No. 7, July 1976, pp. 1059-1092]. Such techniques may beuseful for generating X-ray laser beams of very high brightness.

71

6. Lasing by a nuclear explosive powered X-ray laser has been demonstrated in an un-derground nuclear test at the NevadaTest Site.52

Weapons powered by nuclear explosionswould have several disadvantages compared tononnuclear weapons: nuclear explosives arebanned from orbit by the Outer Space Treaty 53,they would require elaborate, costly, andtime-consuming command and control arrange-ments under present U.S. policy, they wouldbe useful only at the nuclear level of conflictor would signal escalation to that level, andthey might disrupt radio propagation and dam-age allied and neutral satellites when used, de-pending on burst times, locations, and detailsof weapon design. For these reasons there isalso interest in developing expendable, single-pulse non-nuclear laser weapons, if these shouldprove feasible and economical. Such lasersmight operate at short X-ray and gamma-raywavelengths 54 or at longer wavelengths (e.g.,

‘*On January 14, 1983, in the first official public discussionof U.S. research on nuclear explosive pumped X-ray lasers, thePresidential Science Advisor, Dr. George Keyworth, suggestedthat such lasers might eventually be of great military signifi-cance, and he called the “bomb-pumped X-ray laser’ program“one of the most important programs that may seriously in-fluence the nation’s defense posture in the next decades. ”[Quoted by William J. Broad, in “Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’ Bid:Many Ideas Converging, ” New York Times, Mar. 4, 1985, p.Al ff.]. Subsequently, Major General William W. Hoover,USAF (Ret.), Assistant Secretary of Energy for Defense Pro-grams, elaborated on the U.S. nuclear directed-energy research,saying that the nation’s nuclear-weapons laboratories conductedan underground test at the Nevada Test Site of an X-ray laserand achieved lasing. More recently, the Department of Energyhas released the other statements quoted here.

53Some have, however, questioned this interpretation, argu-ing that the intent of the Outer Space Treaty was to ban weap-ons of mass destruction from orbit, not ASAT or BMD weap-ons which would cause minor collateral damage, if any.

“One concept for a short-wavelength X-ray laser envisionsusing a very brief and intense laser pulse to stimulate coher-ent, collective radioactive decay of nuclei which have been ener-gized by exposure to neutrons in a reactor [C.B. Collins, et al.,“The Coherent and Incoherent Pumping of a Gamrn a Ray La-ser with Intense Optical Radiation, Journal of Apph”ed Physics,vol. 53, No. 7, July 1982, pp. 4645-4651]. Recent experimentalresults [B. D. DePaola and C.B. Collins, ;’Tunability of Radia-tion Generated at Wavelengths Below 1 A by Anti-Stokes Scat-tering from Nuclear Levels, ” Journal of the Optical Society ofAmerica B, vol. 1 December 1984, pp. 812-817,; C.B. Collinsand B.D. Paoli, “Observation of Coherent Multiphoton Proc-esses in Nuclear States, ” Optics Letters, vol. 10, January 1985,pp. 25-27] have verified that some of the problems of develop-ing such a laser can be solved. However, it is not yet knownwhether nuclei suitable for use in such a laser exist.

iodine lasers). Non-laser sources of singlepulsedirectional radiation may also be useful asweapons.

Neutral Particle Beam Weapons

Powerful particle accelerators similar tothose used for scientific research, isotope pro-duction, and fusion power applications couldbe used as particle-beam weapons to attacksatellites. Because electrically charged parti-cles would travel along spiraling paths withinthe Earth’s magnetic field, electrically neutralparticles such as atoms of hydrogen, deu-terium, tritium, or heavier elements would beused by such weapons. Because such atomswould become ionized and hence charged ifthey passed through matter as dense as theupper atmosphere, such weapons must bebased in space and are useful only against tar-gets in space, although relatively small weap-ons of this type could be kept on the groundready for launch into orbit and, after some on-orbit testing and calibration, for use.

A neutral particle beam (NPB) weaponmight consist of a negative ion source, a par-ticle accelerator, beam focusing and pointingmagnets, and a “stripping” device-e. g., a gasce1156—which strips the negative ions of theirextra electrons, thereby neutralizing them, aswell as a power source and other ancillaryequipment, s8 as shown in figure 4-11. Thesecomponents could resemble those presently inuse for other purposes and need not be muchlarger to provide a modest ASAT capability.For example, the hydrogen atoms produced byan accelerator at the Los Alamos MesonPhysics Facility (LAMPF) have energies of800 million electron volts” (MeV) and could

6’T.D. Hayward, et al., Negative Ion Beam Processes, LosAlamos National Laboratory, report UC-34C, January 1976,UNCLASSIFIED; J. H. Fink, “Photodetachment Tech.nolo~,”American Institute of Physics, Conference Pmceedm“ gs No. 111,pp. 547-560, 1984; V. Vanek, et al., “Technology for a LaserResonator for the Photodetachment Neutralizer,’ American In-stitute of Physics, Conference Proceedings No. 111, pp. 568-584, 1984.

“K. Boyer, ‘iDirected-Energy Beam Weapons, ” l?roceeo!ingsof the Society of Photo-Optical knhmentation Engineers, Vol-ume 474, 1984, pp. 79-86.

“The electron volt (eV) is a unit of energy; about 6.25 quin-tillion electron volts equals one joule, the Systeme Intemation-ale unit of energy.

72

Table 4-3.—A Comparison of Laser Weapons

Space-based laser(repetitive pulse Ground-based

Space-based laser or continuous Ground-based laser and space-(single-pulse) wave) laser based reflectors

73

penetrate aluminum shielding 1 meter thick.The hydrogen atom beam produced by this ac-celerator has a current of 1 milliampere; irradi-ation of an unhardened satellite at a range of40,000 kilometers for several minutes by abeam of this current and particle energy couldupset the functioning of its electronic circuits.

A turboalternator-powered NPB weaponmight require about 25 tons of liquid hydro-gen, liquid oxygen, tankage, and other “over-head, ”68 to deliver an absorbed dose of 10kilograys sg through shielding at a range of40,000 kilometers, regardless of the thicknessof the shielding, provided that maximumshield thickness is known or assumed in ad-vance and that the weapon is designed to pene-trate a shield of such thickness.BO An absorbedradiation dose of about 10 kilograys would per-manently damage most radiation-resistanthigh-density silicon integrated circuits. Manyexisting and planned spacecraft use, or will use,high-density integrated circuitry with a radia-tion hardness three or four orders of magnitude1ower.’l Ten times this mass–250 tons–wouldbe required to damage circuits hardened towithstand 100 kilograys, at this range.B2 On

‘*Such as fiel for propulsion of the extra weapon fuel, oxidizer,coolant, and tankage.

59A gray (Gy) is the Systeme Intemationale unit for absorbedenergy dose. One gray is one joule per kilogram, or 100 rads.One kilogray is a tenth of a megarad.

‘“A hydrogen atom having a kinetic energy of 50 MeV couldpenetrate about a centimeter of aluminum shielding. If thethickness of the shield were increased, particle energy, and hencealso weapon size, would have to be increased in order to pene-trate the shielding, but the amount of beam energy and weaponfuel required need not increase. The reason for this is that asparticle energy is increasti, beam divergence can be decreased,and the same number of particles per unit area per second couldbe delivered (over a smaller area) with a lower total beam cur-rent (particles per second). Hence a high-energy, low-currentweapon could penetrate thicker shielding and deliver the sameradiation dose in the same time over a smaller cross-sectionalarea of a target than could a lower-energy, higher-currentweapon of equal beam power ( which equals particle energytimes beam current).

alDo9e9 of 100 ways would probably upset electronic circuitson most satellites. It would be possible to shield such circuits,but the shield mass required would increase more rapidly thanwould the mass of a weapon which could penetrate it. On theother hand, it is possible to fabricate integrated circuits capa-ble of withstanding radiation doses as high as 100 kilograys.

6ZLow-density g~lium arsenide circuits which cm withstand100 kilograys have been fabricated, as have higher-density sili-

the other hand, only 1.6 tons would be requiredto damage such circuits at a range of 1,000kilometers, and perhaps as little as a kilogramwould suffice to upset or damage integratedcircuits of existing hardness levels at a rangeof 1,000 kilometers.

Although it may prove possible to hardenhigh-density electronics to withstand 10 kilo-grays without suffering permanent damage,it is unrealistic to expect that all satellites willbe hardened to that extent; transient upset ofelectronics, possibly causing memory loss incomputers, could occur at doses several ordersof magnitude lower. Hence a neutral particlebeam weapon could attack not only satellites,but decoys for satellites presumed subject toupset, using very little fuel and overhead—e.g., 250 kilograms to deliver a dose of 10grays at a range of 40,000 kilometers (the dis-tance from low orbit to geosynchronous orbit).

According to some estimates, a NPB weap-on with sufficient fuel to operate for 1,000 sec-onds must weigh about 4 tons per megawattof beam powerB3 The U.S. Space Shuttle, or itsexpected Soviet counterpart, could deploy intolow orbit a NPB weapon weighing as much as30 tons [see figure 4-12] .64 A heavier weaponcould be launched into low orbit by the antic-ipated Soviet heavy-lift launch vehicle, whichis expected to carry payloads as large as 150tons. Even heavier weapons could be assem-bled in space by the United States or the So-viet Union.

A neutral-particle beam could be made to di-verge at a small angle and would therefore

con circuits. For example, the Sandia National Laboratories ofthe U.S. Department of Energy has fabricated a pin-for-pinequivalent of the Intel Corporation’s 8085 8-bit microproces-sor chip which can function after absorbing a 100-kilogray doseof garnm a radiation and can withstand singleevent upsetscaused by 140 MeV particles. Sandia plans to fabricate a 32-bit silicon microprocessor chip hardened to withstand 10kilograys.

“E. g., see K. Boyer, “Directed-Energy Beam Weapons, ”Proceedings of the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engi-neers, Volume 474, 1984, pp. 79-86.

“U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet IUfi”tary Power, 3d cd.,1984, p. 44.

74

Figure 4-12.—Artist’s Conception of the Space ShuttleDeploying a Neutral Particle Beam Weapon

SOURCE U S. Department of Energy, Los Alamos National Laboratory

have a relatively small diameter even at greatdistances-e. g., 40 meters diameter at a rangeof 40,000 kilometers. A beam this small mustbe pointed at a target with an accuracy ofabout 1 microradian, and this presents a moredifficult problem in the case of a neutral par-ticle beam than in the case of a continuous-wave or repetitively pulsed laser. The track-ing and pointing systems of such lasers canquickly sense reflected beam energy from tar-gets and thereby determine whether theirbeams are actually on target. However, a tar-get would emit very little radiation when ir-radiated by a neutral particle beam. Sensorswithin several hundred kilometers of a targetmight be able, during NPB irradiation, to de-tect enough x-radiation or garoma or other ra-diation from the target to determine that thetarget had been hit, but it could not detectsuch radiation fast enough to correct beampointing errors based on its presence or absence.

A neutral particle beam weapon could ac-quire (i.e., detect) a target using a passive long-wavelength infrared (LWIR) sensor; it couldthen track the target using an active opticaltracker (LIDAR) and use this tracking infor-mation to determine the angle at which itsbeam must be pointed at the target. However,this approach only guarantees that the opti-cal tracker is pointed at the target and can-not directly sense whether the beam itself ispointed at the target. That is, open-loop point-ing must be used for neutral particle beams,while more accurate closed-loop pointing canbe used by lasers. Determining whether open-loop pointing of a neutral particle beam canbe done with an accuracy comparable to beamdivergence angles may require testing of neu-tral particle beam generators in space againstinstrumented targets.

Aside from these difficulties of pointing andkill assessment, neutral particle beam weap-ons are among the most promising near-termoptions for nonnuclear ASAT weapons be-cause of the maturity and demonstrated per-formance of their component technologies andthe relative diseconomy of hardening targetsagainst neutral particle beams. However, neu-tral particle beam weapons, like other space-based sequential-fire weapons, would be sub-ject to attack by single-shot weapons againstwhich shoot-back and other reactive counter-measures would be ineffective. They wouldhave little operational effectiveness unlesstheir survivability can be assured.

It appears, then, that if accurate open-loopbeam pointing can be demonstrated, it will befeasible to build neutral particle beam weap-ons which, if deployed in low orbit, would posea serious threat to satellites in low and highorbit. Against this threat only shoot-backwould be economical for protecting low satel-lites, while hardening and deception might protect high-altitude satellites at low relative cost.At close range (1,000 kilometers), neutral par-ticle beam weapons could damage satelliteelectronics of current hardness levels and up-set harder future satellite electronics using

75

relatively little fuel and tankage (etc. )—prob-ably about 1 kilogram per shot. The cost pershot at a satellite hardened to this level, or ata decoy simulating such a satellite, would bevery cheap relative to the cost per satellite ordecoy. Hardening satellite electronics wouldincrease the cost per shot, although probablynot to the cost of the smallest satellites or pre-cision decoys: damaging high-density elec-tronics hardened to the greatest extent nowforeseeable would require about 160 kilogramsper shot.

Such weapons, if encountered, could placelow-altitude satellites at risk at relatively lowcost. They could also upset or damage un-hardened electronics on satellites in synchro-

nous orbit, from low orbit, usingper shot (e.g., 25 kilograms for a

little massdose of 10

grays); however, hardening high-density elec-tronics on such satellites to 10 kilograys andusing upset-tolerant circuit design could in-crease the mass requirement for damage toperhaps 25 tons per shot and would increaserequired irradiation time enough to permit useof reactive passive countermeasures such asgeneration of smoke or deployment of reactiondecoys. Shielding satellites-as distinct fromhardening their electronics-would be econom-ically unfavorable against larger weapons: adisproportionately small increase in weaponmass, with no increase in mass per shot, couldcompensate for an increase in shield mass.

P O S S I B L E U . S . R E S P O N S E S T O S O V I E T A S A T C A P A B I L I T I E S

How might the United States respond to in-creasingly threatening Soviet A SAT capabil-ities? Several options are available. For exam-ple, an increase in U.S. ASAT capabilitiesmight—but would not necessarily-be an a-ppropriate response. Although useful for at-tacking Soviet MILSATS, they might be un-able to protect U.S. MILSATS. Other possibleresponses include reduction of dependence onmilitary satellites, augmenting U.S. combatforces (to offset possible loss of force enhance-ment as a result of an ASAT attack), use ofpassive or active countermeasures for defenseor retaliation, and arms control efforts or otherdiplomatic initiatives intended to constrainforeign ASAT capabilities or reduce incentivesto use them.

Reduction of Dependence onMilitary satellites

The United States routinely uses satellitesto support its forces deployed worldwide toreinforce allies, protect sea lines of communi-cation, and pursue other national interests.Routine use of satellites for such purposes hasengendered a considerable degree of depen-dence on them. In the past, when satellites

were less expensive and less vulnerable thanother means to these ends, dependence on sat-ellites was not risky. In the future, satellitesmay become so vulnerable that use, if possi-ble, of more expensive but less vulnerablemeans of performing functions now performedby space systems may be required for ade-quate security.

Most functions now performed by space sys-tems could be performed by alternative terres-trial systems, although terrestrial systemsproviding comparable performance of somefunctions would be unaffordable or politicallyunacceptable. Missile launch detection andspace surveillance could be performed by air-borne optical sensors; navigation by advancedinertial navigation systems which can recog-nize local gravity gradient patterns, nucleardetonation detection by ground-based over-thehorizon electromagnetic pulse (OTH EMP)sensors, and radio communications relayingby MF ground-wave, HF ground-wave andsky-wave, VHF meteor-burst, UHF tropo-spheric scatter, and UHF/SHF/EHF and light-wave airborne repeaters. Reconnaissancecould be performed in wartime by aircraftoverflight at great expense and risk.

76— —

On the other hand, the kind of informationpresently collected by satellites in peacetimeto monitor compliance with arms controlagreements cannot be obtained by othermeans which are acceptable in peacetime. Un-authorized aircraft overflight, for example,would be unacceptable. However, arms con-trol treaties—like other treaties except thosedefining “laws of war’ ’-are suspended duringwar between parties, so a survivable space-based means of performing this function is notrequired.

Although alternative terrestrial systems forperforming some functions may be infeasibleor very expensive, alternative terrestrial sys-tems for performing other functions may beonly slightly more expensive than space sys-tems. For example, providing intra-theatersingle-channel UHF communications to mo-bile ground elements in the 1980s by meansof satellite communications transponderswould be less expensive than use of remotelypiloted vehicles (aircraft) carrying transpond-ers, but only slightly so [see figure 4-13]; aslight increase in satellite vulnerability wouldmake the costs favor use of RPVS. Whetheralternative terrestrial systems are worth theircost depends on the function to be performedand is a matter of judgment deserving peri-odic reconsideration.

Force Augmentation

As satellites have been acquired and inte-grated into military systems, they have pre-sumably increased the effectiveness of forceelements which would engage in direct com-bat, so that each such force element can nowfight as well as, say, one and a half could with-out MILSAT support. Having become depen-dent on satellite support, if suddenly deprivedof that support the effectiveness of a force ele-ment would be reduced, not just to that of aforce element unaccustomed to such supportbut probably more so because of the disorga-nizing effect of losing sources of informationit had come to count on. Nevertheless, it is pos-sible, in principle, to augment current forcesso that in the event of sudden loss of MILSAT

Figure 4-13.—Cost Comparison: Satellite and RPVR-clays for Single-Channel UHF Tactical Theater

- Communications

Satellite Satellite withnull-stewing

antenna

RPV

support, larger future forces, although im-paired in effectiveness, would fight as well asor better than would current forces using sat-ellite support. The force augmentation re-quired by this criterion might, under some cir-cumstances, be modest.

Passive Countermeasures

“Passive” countermeasures against ASATcapabilities include hiding, deception, maneu-ver, hardening, electronic countermeasuresand electro-optical countermeasures, andproliferation, as well as combinations of thesemeasures [see table 4-4]. Some of these coun-termeasures—e.g., hardening-are truly pas-sive, requiring no satellite activity for their ef-fectiveness, while others—e.g., evasion—re-quire satellite activity–and hence attackwarning-and are not truly passive, althoughthey are nondestructive.

For expository purposes it is convenient todiscuss each type of countermeasure in isola-

77

Table 4-4.— Passive CountermeasuresAgainst ASAT Attacks

Hidinge.g., satellite miniaturization and orbit selection

Deceptione.g., deploying lightweight decoys

Maneuvere.g., evasion

Hardeninge.g., use of shielding

Electronic countermeasures and electro-opticalcountermeasurese.g., use of shorter wavelengths and more highly

directional antennasProliferate ion

e.g., of on-orbit spare satellites-— —. —

tion from the others in the context of a one-against-one ASAT attack, as will be done here.However, it is anticipated that such counter-measures, if used, might be used in combina-tion in the context of a many-against-many(i.e., force-against-force) space battle. It is insuch a context that the potential effectivenessof a countermeasure should be assessed. How-ever, the number and complexity of possiblecontexts precludes any attempt at assessmentof countermeasure effectiveness from being ex-haustive or conclusive.

Hiding

“Hiding” measures are measures taken toevade detection by surveillance systems. Insome sense the effective use of hiding, if fea-sible, would be most desirable, because itwould eliminate the need for other counter-measures, all of which require increases in on-orbit mass in the form of decoys for deception,fuel for evasion, shielding for hardening, orspares for proliferation.

Different hiding measures are requiredagainst different types of surveillance sensors.Space surveillance systems may be of twotypes: active and passive. Active sensors ir-radiate a target with electromagnetic radiationin order to “see” it, while passive sensors lookfor electromagnetic radiation emitted by thetarget or reflected by the target from naturalsources, e.g., the Sun. At optical wavelengths(infrared, visible, and ultraviolet), both activesensors (LIDAR) and passive sensors may be

usedGb In general, passive optical sensors onsatellites in low Earth orbit maybe able to detect satellites as small as a meter in diameterat altitudes between a few hundred kilometersand geosynchronous altitude.

Passive LWIR and visible light sensors canwork better in combination than either canalone. For example, painting a satellite blackwould prevent it from reflecting sunlight andthereby make it invisible to passive visiblelight sensors. However, painting a satelliteblack would cause it to absorb more solar ra-diation and become hotter. In thermal equili-brium it would emit more LWIR radiation,making it detectable at greater range by a pas-sive LWIR sensor [see box entitled “Long-wave Infrared (LWIR) Space SurveillanceSensors”].

Operating a satellite at very low altitude canmake it difficult to detect using space-basedinfrared sensors which must view it againstthe radiant Earth or Earth limb background.More satellites would be required to performa given function at lower altitude, and userequipment might also have to be more com-plex and expensive.

Deception

The use of decoys to induce an enemy towaste firepower on false targets-or to with-hold fire for fear of doing so–can always bemade effective, if the decoys are sufficientlyrealistic, i.e., “credible” to enemy space sur-veillance systems. A decoy can always bemade credib~e at a cost less than or equal tothat of the satellite it mimics, because a sparesatellite could be used as a decoy, and it wouldbe preferable to do so rather than spend asmuch on a nonfunctional decoy. The criticalquestion is whether a decoy can be made credi-ble at a much lower cost than that of the satel-

’51n most cases passive sensors are preferable to active sen-sors because they do not require a high-power radiation sourcefor irradiating targets, they are themselves consequently moredifficult to detect, and their effective range can be increasedmore economically, because a twofold increase in range to a tar-get decreases the irradiance received by a passive sensor onlyfourfold as compared to sixteenfold in the case of an activesensor.

78.—— —

Long-Wavelength Infrared (LWIR) Space Surveillance Sensors

The following discussion describes the phys-ical basis for the estimated detection capabil-ities of passive LWIR sensors and for the in-effectiveness of hiding measures against them.

Every object emits electromagnetic radiationas a result of thermal processes; the amount ofpower emitted by an object increasesin propor-tion to its surface area and would increase six-teanfold if its temperature were doubled. A sat-ellite at a typical operating temperature-about300° K—emits most of its thermal radiation ata wavelength of about 10 microns [10 millionthsof a meter], which is in the LWIR portion of theelectromagnetic spectrum. The wavelength atwhich thermal radiation is most intense variesin inverse proportion to the temperature of itssource; thus the surface of the Sun-which hasa temperature of about 6,000° K-emits ther-mal radiation (sunlight) which is most intenseat a wavelength of 0.5 microns, a wavelengthin the visible portion of the electromagneticspectrum Passive optical sensors which can de-tact LWIR radiation can detect the thermal ra-diation emitted by satellites, while those sensi-tive to visible radiation are best suited fordetecting sunlight reflected by satellites. Visi-ble light sensors are preferred for ground-basedspace surveillance systems because LWIR ther-mal radiation is absorbed strongly by the loweratmosphere, although LWIR telescopes havebeen operated on mountain peaks and onaircraft.

Passive LWIR and visible light sensors canwork better in combination than either canalone. For example, painting a satellite blackwould prevent it from reflecting sunlight andthereby make it invisible to passive visible lightsensors. However, painting a satellite blackwould cause it to absorb more solar radiationand become hotter.x In thermal equilibrium itwould emit more LWIR radiation, making it de-tectable at greater range by a passive LWIRsensor. Conversely, making the satellite surfacehighly reflective would reduce its absorptivityand hence also its emissivity, which equals theabsorptivity at each wavelength; this would

‘s. Stetnberg and V.P. 141am %@,elwesyatam” @h. 17), R.E.z@neer@Hantilnmk (New York: McGraw-Mtil{ed}, 8wmE

w 1965).

make the satellite less visible to passive LWIRsensors.

Passive optical sensors may be designed todetect targets within view above the horizon(ATH) or below the horizon (BTH). BTH detec-tion is more difficult than ATH detection, andthe image processing required by BTH sensorsis more complicated than that required by ATHsensors. ATH sensors are therefore preferredfor passive optical space-based surveillancesystems.

Space-based LWIR ATH sensors could noteady detect satellites which orbit at altitudesso low that they are actually within the upperatmosphere. Satellites at such low altitudeswould be in the “Earth limb” as viewed by aspace-based LWIR ATH sensor, which wouldhave to view the satellite just above the hori-zon through a thick layer of air which would ab-sorb much LWIR radiation and which wouldemit, reflect, and scatter LWIR background ra-diation against which the satellite would haveto be viewed. Satellites at such low altitudeswould experience considerable atmosphericdrag and would slow down and reenter theatmosphere sooner unless they amid maneuverand carried enough fuel to compensate for thedrag. Operating in such an altitude regime toevade detection by space-based LWIR ATHsensors would also impose operational penaltiesin some cases. For example, surveillance satel-lites could not “see” as far from lower altitudes.

Required image processing sophisticationwould be more difficult for general surveillancethan for warning of interception of the satelllitecarrying the sensor. This is because the spot offocused radiation from an interceptor approaching a satellite-borne sensor “staring” at thecelestial background in the direction of the ap-proaching interceptor would not move on thesensor’s focal plane, and a single detector ele-ment of the sensor could accumulate thermal ra-diation from the interceptor until sufficientenergy for detection has been accumulated. Bycontrast, the spot of focused radiation from aninterceptor traveling in some arbitrary directionwould move on the sensor’s focal plane, limit-ing the time available to a detector element foraccumulating image energy.

79

If the target’s angular position and velocityis approximately known by other means, thenumber of photons received by each detectorelement over which the target’s image is ex-pected to move could be added in order to ac-cumulate image photons and average out thenoise photons. However, if the target’s angu-lar position and velocity is not known ac-

curately by other means, the number of possible averages which must be calculated in thisway to detect the target reliably increases very

‘ rapidly with increasing uncertainty about tar-get position and velocity, and the required massof image-processing hardware required will in-crease correspondingly.

A low-orbit LWIR space surveillance satellite‘ with a 1 meter nonemissive primary mirror anda focal plane detector army cooled to 77° K could

lite it mimics, as well as cheaper than an enemy’scost to identify it (e.g., by dispatching a coor-bital interceptor to observe it at close range)or to attack it in a manner which would negatethe satellite it simulates. This critical questionremains unanswered.

Before any of these costs can be estimated,the designs of decoys and enemy surveillanceand weapon systems must be specified. Manydesign choices are available. For example, forthe same amount of money, a few highly re-alistic decoys (called “precision decoys” or“replica decoys”) could be built, or a muchlarger number of less realistic but less expen-sive decoys could be built. A “precision” de-coy designed to simulate an on-line satellitewould probably have to simulate attitude con-trol, stationkeeping, signal transmission,power generation and heat dissipation, andother observable functions and properties. Thesubsystems required to do this would be rela-tively expensive. If such decoys could not bedistinguished from actual satellites, all suchdecoys would have to be attacked in a man-ner which would damage the satellites theysimulate.

detect a black-painted satellite 1.5 meters in di-ameter at a range of 35,000 kilometers using al millisecond integration (energy accumulation)time. In one millisecond the image of a smallsatellite at geosynchronous altitude wouldmove across the face of a detector element thesize of the telescope’s “spot size,” if the tebscope were on a satellite at 1,000 kilometers al-titude and “Stared” Continuosly toward the ze-nith. It would be feasible and affordable, butcostly (several billion dollars), to deploy a con-stellation of satdlites of this performance whichstare continuously in all directions above thehorizon. Even smaller objects could be detectedat greater range using a larger primary mirror,or-less economically in the limit-more image-processing hardware.

Alternatively, inexpensive “traffic” decoyscould be made to simulate only those featuresof a capital satellite which might be measura-ble cheaply, quickly, and remotely. Reflectiveballoons or clouds of smoke and chaff couldbe used as “reaction decoy s,” i.e., they couldbe deployed in reaction to warning of an im-pending attack.” Even if such decoys coulddeceive an enemy for only a limited period oftime, they could be effective in some situa-tions. However, reaction decoys offer no pro-tection against single-shot ASAT weapons(e.g., “space mines”) which can destroy satel-lites almost instantly before reaction decoyscan be dispensed. Ingeniously designed light-weight decoys might be both inexpensive andhighly credible to passive remote sensors;whether they will be is uncertain.

———...—‘aFor example, a satellite under attack by a pop-up infrared-

homing interceptor could dispense several lightweight decoyswhich resemble it, from a distance, in infrared brightness tem-perature and color temperature. If the interceptor cannot dis-tinguish such decoys from the capital satellite until it has flownpast, then the decoys would be adequately “credibIe.” Becausesatellite mass cannot be measured both quickly and inexpen-sively, cheap, lightweight decoys could be effective as reactiondecoys.

80

Even if lightweight decoys cannot be recog-nized as such after prolonged remote passiveobservation, it might be possible to recognizethem using directed-energy devices.87 How-ever, use of directed-energy devices in such amanner might be provocative in peacetime andpossibly more expensive than the cost of light-weight decoys.

If lightweight decoys cannot be distin-guished from actual satellites, all such decoyswould have to be attacked, although not nec-essarily in a manner which would damage thesatellites they simulate, because the cost of at-tacking and observably damaging a light-weight decoy with some types of A SAT weap-ons could be comparable to, or smaller than,the cost of attacking a decoy in a mannerwhich would damage a satellite which it simu-lates. For example, ground-based lasers mightbe able to attack lightweight decoys inexpen-sively. Neutral-particle beam weapons couldalso be used to attack decoys at long range,as could singlepulse lasers, although less eco-nomically.

The large number of possible designs for de-coys and enemy surveillance and weapon sys-tems renders assessment of the cost-exchangeratiosW of future systems infeasible at this time.Furthermore, even if the decoy design were speci-fied, it would be difficult to estimate decoy costsaccurately. Rough preliminary estimates ofsatellite cost and of uncertainty in satellite

6TRefernng t. the possibility of active discrimination of de-coys from ballistic missile reentry vehicles, Dr. Gerold Yonas,Chief Scientist of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization,has written that “directed energy, even in a very early period,could be used in an interactive mode to assist in midcourse dis-crimination IGerold Yonas, “Strategic Defense Initiative: ThePolitics and Science of Weapons in Space,” Physics Today, June1985, pp. 24-32; cf. remarks attributed to Dr. Yonas in E.J.Lemer, “Star Wars: Part II–Survivability and Stability, ”Aerospace America, vol. 23, No, 9, Sept. 1985, pp. 80-84].

s8The relevat Cost-exchmge ratio is the minimax c05t-ex-change ratio, i.e., the ratio of decoy costs to Soviet ASAT sen-sor and weapon costs which would be incurred if decoys weredesigned to minhniz e the maximum cost-exchange ratio whichthe U.S.S.R. could subsequently force on the United States byjudicious choice of ASAT sensor and weapon designs. The cost-exchange ratio of a specific future system is of questionablerelevance, unless the system can be shown to have a cost-exchange ratio close to the minimax cost-exchange ratio.

cost are sometimes derived from estimates ofsatellite subsystem mass and complexity.However, analysis of historical cost data re-veals considerable variation in satellite costfor satellites of comparable small mass.og

Deception is more advantageous when usedin combination with other passive measures suchas hardening and proliferation. For example,dormant spare satellites can be hardened andmade to resemble cheaper decoys.

These considerations lead OTA to concludethat the question of whether decoys can be madecredible at a much lower cost than that of thesatellites they mimic or than an enemy’s costto identify them or to attack them in a mannerwhich would negate the satellites they simulateremains unanswered, and that answering thisquestion is essential in any attempt to assessprospects for making future satellites ade-quately survivable. An affirmative answer willprobably require detailed designs for decoyswhich are inexpensive and lightweight as wellas credible to possible future Soviet surveil-lance systems.

Maneuver

Satellites may maneuver in order to compli-cate enemy surveillance and targeting and toevade enemy fire. Satellites which do not ma-neuver are nevertheless unavoidably mobile,although in fixed orbits. Because of this prop-erty, the relation of maneuver to attrition isdifferent in space than on land or at sea, andproximity in terms of orbital elements (e.g.,apogee, perigee, inclination, etc.) has as muchtactical significance as does momentary prox-imity in space. A maneuver, loosely speaking,is an action which changes a satellite’s Kep-lerian orbital elements. Pursuit of another sat-ellite and evasion of an interceptor are exam-ples of maneuvers.

In order to continuously evade an intercep-tor—whether pop-up or coorbital-a satellitemust have an acceleration capability and a velocity change (“delta-V”) capability about as

‘There has been less variation in cost per kilogram amongsatellites of large mass.

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great as those of the interceptor, but some-what more or less, depending on initial posi-tions and velocities.’” Acceleration and delta-V can be maximized by minimizing the mis-sion payload, so that a large fraction of thespacecraft initial mass is contributed by itsengines (for acceleration) and fuel (for delta-V). Because an interceptor’s payload can bequite small-perhaps comparable to that of ashoulder-fired anti-tank missile—an intercep-tor might have acceleration and delta-V capa-bilities which would be much more costly toprovide to satellites with large mission pay-loads such as long-range directed-energy weap-ons. If so, it would be difficult for such satel-lites to evade small but sophisticatedinterceptors.

Hardening

For each type of ASAT weapon, there existhardening techniques which can reduce therange at which the weapon would be effective.For example, satellites may be hardened towithstand the effects of ordinary, isotropicnuclear weapons by avoiding reliance on pho-tovoltaic cells—which are vulnerable to weap-on X-rays—for power, by using massive shield-ing to block gamma radiation, and by usingFaraday shielding, magnetic shielding, andfault-tolerant electronic design to reduce vul-nerability to system-generated electromag-netic pulse. Of course, such practices cannotprotect a satellite from a nearby nuclear ex-plosion, but they can force an attacker to ex-pend at least one nuclear warhead per satel-lite and credible decoy to destroy them withconfidence.

Shielding, or armor, of different types canoffer protection against some types of projec-tiles, pulsed or continuous lasers, and neutralparticle beams. Different types of shieldswould be required for protection against dif-ferent types of ASAT threats. For example,shields could be used against projectiles,pulsed lasers, and neutral particle beams, re-spectively. For example, NASA developedshields to protect a Halley’s Comet probe craft

from 0.1 g meteoroids impacting at 70 kilom-eters per second. ’l Such shields could be all-aspect shields which completely surround asatellite, or they could be “shadow shields”deployed between the defended satellite anda weapon which poses a threat to it. Shadowshields could be deployed on a boom or theycould be independent, ‘‘free-flying” satellites.

Shadow shields could be lighter than all-aspect shields, but a separate shadow shieldmight be required for each known or suspectedthreatening weapon. All-aspect shields wouldbe superior to shadow shields in that theycould defend a satellite from multiple sequen-tial or simultaneous attack from any directionor all directions and from covert weapons andthey would require no power or warning infor-mation for their operation.

Massive shields could also protect satellitesfrom laser radiation and from neutral particlebeams. Relatively little shield mass would berequired to protect a satellite from beam oflow-energy particles (i.e., those having ener-gies of less than 50 to 100 MeV), but the shieldmass required would increase sharply if par-ticles of higher energy, produced by largerNPB weapons, were used.

Semiconductor microelectronic circuits in-side satellites could also be made more resis-tant to ionizing radiation such as would beproduced by a neutral particle beam. For ex-ample, the Sandia National Laboratories of theU.S. Department of Energy have fabricateda pin-for-pin equivalent of the Intel Corp. ’s8085 8-bit microprocessor chip which can func-tion after absorbing a 100-kilogray dose ofgamma radiation and can withstand single-event upsets caused by particles with energiesas great as 140 MeV.

The use of asteroidal materials such asnickel for large, massive, all-aspect shields hasbeen proposed. Possible advances in spacemining, manufacturing, and transportation—which would require large investments-might

‘IJ. P.D. Wilkinson, “A Penetration Criterion for DoubIe-Walled Structures Subject to Meteoroid Impact, ” AIAA Jour-nal, vol. 7, No. 10, October 1969, pp. 1937-1943.‘“G. M. Anderson, op. cit.

82

someday make use of asteroidal material forsuch purposes cheaper than use of terrestrialmaterial.72

These considerations suggest that, in gen-eral, shielding against weapons of relativelylow capability is feasible and in many casesmay be less expensive than the weaponsagainst which it can offer protection. However,as weapons are made larger, more capable, andmore numerous, the cost of protection againstsuch weapons generally increases more rapidlythan the cost of the weapons and and beginsto exceed the cost of the weapons at somepoint.

Electronic Countermeasures andElectro-Optical Countermeasures

Passive electronic and electro-optical coun-termeasures can provide protection-analo-gous to “hardening”—against nondestructiveASAT measures. For example, communica-tion links can be made increasingly resistantto jamming by using more transmitter power(which ultimately becomes uneconomical) orsignal bandwidth (which is limited except atextremely high radio frequencies and opticalfrequencies), or–in some applications-byusing larger antennas or shorter wavelengthsfor greater directionality of transmission andreception, or by transmitting at a lower datarate. Command encryption can prevent spoof-ing, and use of spread-spectrum modulationand time-division multiplexing techniques canprovide significant resistance against uplinkand downlink jamming and against downlinkexploitation (e.g., by anti-radiation missiles).

Proliferation-Replenishment

Another countermeasure against ASAT at-tack is proliferation of satellites, so that evenif a large fraction of the satellites were dam-aged by hostile action, enough undamaged sat-ellites would remain to perform their assignedfunctions. The number of additional satellitesneeded to assure survivability of a required

72C. Meinel, “Near-Earth Asteroids: Potential Bonanza forAmbitious Military Space Projects, ” Defense Sa”ence 2003 +,February-March 1985, p. 40 ff.

number of them would depend on enemyASAT capabilities. The extra satellites couldbe placed in orbit or else kept on Earth to belaunched into orbit after an ASAT attack toreplenish those satellites destroyed by theattack.

Unless on-orbit spare satellites are also de-ployed, replenishment could not be relied onto maintain uninterrupted performance of sat-ellite function, which is essential for such ap-plications as early warning of missile attackand other strategic command and control func-tions. If it is cost-effective for an enemy to ne-gate an operational satellite, it would probablybe cost-effective for the enemy to negatereplacements, if enemy ASAT capability sur-vives. It would also be cost-effective for anenemy to maintain enough ASAT weapons orfuel to avoid exhaustion of ASAT capabilitybefore replenished satellites can be negated.Hence replenishment appears unattractive asa countermeasure unless enemy ASAT capa-bility can be destroyed before replenishmentis attempted, and unless the satellites to bereplaced need not function without inter-ruption.

Proliferation-On-orbit Spares

Spare satellites could also be pre-deployedin orbit, where they could remain dormant un-til needed or else be used routinely to provideredundant capability in peacetime. Dormantsatellites would need to listen for radio com-mands to activate and might need to reporttheir status occasionally but in general wouldrequire little power generation, cooling, atti-tude control, or exposure of antennas or othersensors while dormant and could be madeharder than operational satellites. Their armorcould have a simple shape easily mimicked byinexpensive decoys; hence proliferation of on-orbit spares would work more effectively inconjunction with hiding, deception, and hard-ening measures. However, an enemy which cannegate an operating satellite might be able, bythe same means, to negate an on-orbit spareonce it became operational. Proliferating andsimulating dormant spare satellites will notpreserve the functioning of a constellation of

83

satellites if the spares can be identified andnegated quickly and cheaply after beingbrought “on-line.” Hence the use of on-orbitspares would be most attractive if enemyA SAT weapons could be themselves negatedsoon after space combat begins.

Proliferation—Modularization and Segregation

Another form of proliferation is the parti-tioning of satellite subsystems into moduleswhich can be segregated and deployed ondifferent satellites. For example, the functionof a high-capacity comsat could be performedby several small comsats which pass message“packets” to one another over radio or lasercrosslinks.7s Functions such as stationkeepingmight be performed by maneuverable satellite‘‘tenders, each of which could visit one sat-ellite after another, adjusting their positionsand velocities as needed. Segregation of sub-systems would require forgoing economies ofscale in peacetime in order to reduce vulnera-bility.

Combined Passive Countermeasures

Passive countermeasures work better incombination than individually. For example,use of decoys for deception would confer lit-tle protection against some (e.g., nuclear)A SAT weapons unless maneuver were used todisperse the decoys. It is therefore importantto consider the effectiveness of “packages” ofpassive countermeasures against variousASAT capabilities, which can also supplementand complement one another and which shouldalso be considered packages, or postures,

Active countermeasures could, and probablywould, be used to complement passive coun-termeasures unless prohibited by a compre-hensive ban on possession of ASAT weapons.Hence in hypothesizing ASAT threats to becountered by passive measures alone, it isappropriate to consider as threats only thosecapabilities which are unlikely to be bannedor those which might be developed and de-ployed (or retained) covertly. The former in-

‘-’The L~efense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPAIis investigating the feasibility of a packet-switched network oftransponders on low-altitude satellites, or on Earth,

Figure 4-14.— Low-Cost Packet-SwitchingCommunications Satellite

The Global Low-Orbiting Message Relay Satellite (GLOMR), shownhere, is designed to receive messages sent to It, store them, and relaythem to ground facilities. The GLOMR program of the DefenseAdvanced Research Projects Agency (DAR PA) is intended todemonstrate that communications satellites operating in this mannercan be produced at relatively low cost. If sufficiently Inexpensive,such satellites could be deployed at lower cost than the cost ofattacking them with some types of ASAT weapons, and so many couldbe deployed that other weapons might require a long t!me to destroymost of them

SOURCE U S Department of Defense

elude nondestructive ASAT capabilities (e.g.,ECM and E-OCM), and inherent ASAT capa-bilities of allowed weapons (e.g., ICBMS); thelatter include the existing Soviet coorbital in-terceptor, direct-ascent and coorbital nuclearinterceptors, space-based or pop-up X-ray laserweapons, and possibly ground-based lasers. Ofthese, the nuclear weapons might be based inspace disguised as, or aboard, a different typeo; satellite, the presence of which would be-ob-

84

servable but the nature of which might be im-possible to ascertain except by prolonged closeobservation or invasive sensing techniques.74

In general, nonnuclear space-based weaponscould not be expected, with confidence, to per-form well, unless they had been previously–and observably—tested in space.

Active Measures

Passive countermeasures against ASAT at-tacks may be supplemented by active meas-ures intended to deter ASAT attack or to de-fend satellites if deterrence should fail. Activemeasures can therefore be used for eitherdefensive or retaliatory purposes. Defensiveactive measures are active countermeasuresagainst ASAT attacks. Retaliatory activemeasures do not counter ASAT attacks butinstead fulfill explicit or implied threats ofretaliation which were intended to deter ASATattacks. Active measures used for either pur-pose can be either nondestructive (e.g., elec-tronic countermeasures and electro-opticalcountermeasures) or destructive (e.g., shoot-back), as shown in table 4-5.

Defensive Countermeasures

Shoot-Back.–” Shoot-back” usually refersto counter-attacking spacebased ASAT weap-ons, but can also denote counter-attacksagainst the ground segment of A SAT weaponsystems (e.g., satellite control facilities). Manyweapons capable of shoot-back would them-selves be subject to shoot-back, making the

“E. g., see U.S. Patent 4,320,298.

Table 4.5.—Active Measures Against ASAT Attack

Defensive measures:Nondestructive

e.g., jammingDestructive

shoot-backattack on ground-based ASAT command and

control facilitiesRetaliatory measures:

ASAT counterattack(retaliation in kind)

Horizontal escalation(to terrestrial theaters) ———

effectiveness of shoot-back highly dependenton the types and numbers of ASAT and otherweapons deployed and on the incentives forpreemptive attack which ASAT weapon vul-nerabilities, if any, could create. Analysis ofthe effectiveness of shoot-back is thereforevery complicated in general, although simplein certain important cases.

For example, shoot-back would be ineffectiveagainst expendable, single-shot space mines em-ploying kinetic-energy, directed-energy, or nu-clear destructive mechanisms. Such weaponswould damage their targets almost instantly,if at all, and destroy themselves in the proc-ess, leaving nothing of value to shoot back at.Moreover, shoot-back using sequential-fireweapons which are vulnerable to attack by ex-pendable, single-shot weapons would be ineffec-tive, because they could be damaged by singleshot weapons after attacking only one target.However, space-based single-shot ASAT weap-ons would themselves be subject to preemp-tive attack—i.e., “shoot-first” instead of“shoot-back.” If such weapons were mutuallydeployed in space, if each such weapon couldinstantly destroy several similar weapons andif such weapons were not salvage-fused to fireif disturbed, the resulting preemptive advan-tage could cause a condition of “crisis insta-bility, ” in which each nation, desiring peacebut fearing (perhaps mistakenly) an imminentattack by the other, would have reason to ini-tiate hostilities.7s

However, it is conceivable that even if suchincentives should induce escalation from peaceor low-level conflict to war in space, the pre-emptive ASAT attack which would begin sucha war might reduce incentives for further es-calation, either “vertically” (to higher levelsof conflict) or horizontally (to other theatersof conflict, e.g., Earth). For example, if theUnited States and the U.S.S.R. continue topossess strategic offensive missile forces ofconsiderable counterforce capability, and ifeach were to deploy a large BMD system

‘5 See M.B. Callaham and F.M. Scibilia, Proceedings of theSociety of Phot~Optical Instrumentation Engineers, vol. 474,1984, pp. 107-114.

85

which relied on vulnerable space-based com-ponents, then each nation might fear that theother nation (also fearing a preemptive attack)might attack these BMD components preemp-tively with some confidence that its BMD sys-tem could limit damage from a retaliatory mis-sile attack, if any. Each nation would thereforehave an incentive to attack the other’s spacebased BMD components preemptively. How-ever, after having done so, the attacker wouldhave no motive to launch a preemptive, dam-age-limiting missile attack, because it couldassume that the other nation—now highly vul-nerable to retaliation-would not seriouslyconsider such an option. Hence, under theseassumptions, escalation instability would ex-ist during crises in peacetime (thus “crisis in-stability’ but not at the level of war confinedto space.

It might be supposed that the crisis insta-bility which would accompany mutual deploy-ment of such weapons could be eliminated bysalvage-fusing them to fire if disturbed in cer-tain ways (presumably indicative of an attack).If salvage-fusing were feasible and actuallyused (or believed to be used), there might belittle incentive to fire first even if an attackwere expected. However, salvage-fusing sometypes of weapons against some other typesmay be inordinately difficult or infeasible.Moreover, even though an “intelligent”salvage-fusing system might be able to distin-guish among different types of disturbances,it could not be made completely reliable or in-fallible in discrimination, so there would be arisk that some natural disturbance (e.g., a me-teoroid impact) might trigger such a weaponto fire, possibly at several similar enemy weap-ons, possibly triggering them to fire, etc. Sim-ilar consequences could follow an accidentalattack or a “catalytic” attack by a third party.Moreover, if salvage-fused spacebased weap-ons only held an enemy’s spacebased assetsat risk, the prospect of losing such assets inretaliation for an attack might be consideredan acceptable or favorable trade by a nationless dependent on space assets.

Regardless of whether salvage-fusing wereemployed, mutual deployment of singlepulse

weapons would not be expected to createstrong proliferation incentives: with mutualsalvage-fusing each side could plausibly loseall its important space assets in such an ex-change regardless of whether it had many suchweapons or only a few deployed; it wouldtherefore have no incentive to deploy moreweapons than would be required to negate allthreatening satellites except single-pulseASAT weapons, against which neitherpreemptive attack nor shoot-back would be ef-fective. Without salvage-fusing, the side whichfailed to preempt could plausibly lose all itsimportant space assets in such an exchangeregardless of whether it had many such weap-ons or only a few deployed, and would there-fore gain nothing by deploying many weapons.

Electronic Countermeasures and Electro-OpticalCountermeasures.–Active electronic andelectro-optical countermeasures (jamming,blinding, and spoofing) could be used againstsome near-term ASAT command uplink sys-tems, KEW homing systems, and DEW acqui-sition, tracking, and pointing systems whichhave inadequate counter-countermeasures.

Attack on Ground-Based ASAT Weapons orSupport Systems. —At present there appear tobe only two launch pads for Soviet coorbitalinterceptors, both at Tyuratam, and only twoSoviet ground-based lasers of significantASAT capability, both at Sary Shagan. Henceattacking such ground-based facilities withconventional or nuclear weapons could be veryeffective, especially if preemptive, but wouldbe viewed by some in the United States as es-calator with respect to attacking or defend-ing satellites using nonnuclear weapons.

Retaliatory Measures

The ability to respond to ASAT attack byactive measures could be maintained and pub-licized in an attempt to deter such an attackin the first place. Postures and policies in-tended to enhance deterrence could act as ad-juncts to or substitutes for active and passivecountermeasures. Even in the event of deploy-ment of advanced ASAT weapons such as ex-pendable single-pulse lasers against which

86

“shoot-back’ and passive measures might beineffective, postures and policies intended toenhance deterrence could enhance security, al-though they cannot guarantee security.

In pursuing security through deterrence, itis appropriate to develop retaliatory capabil-ities which place at risk targets of sufficientvalue to deter attack and which do not exacer-bate crisis instability. The first of these con-siderations implies that to deter ASAT attack,retaliation need not necessarily be “in kind”—i.e., against satellites. In fact, an ability to re-taliate in kind, however thoroughly or swiftly,would be inadequate to deter an ASAT attackif the attacking nation valued destruction ofenemy satellites more than survival of its own.For example, if the U.S.S.R. developed a ca-pability to quickly destroy all on-orbit U.S.satellites, then even if the United States coulddestroy all on-orbit Soviet satellites in retali-ation, the U.S. capability to mount such aretaliatory response —although valuable in theevent—might not deter a Soviet first use ofASAT weapons. Soviet leaders might judgethe continued deployment of U.S. MILSATSto be more detrimental to Soviet interests thansurvival of Soviet MILSATS is valuable to So-viet interests. If this were the case, an abilityto retaliate against [more valuable] terrestrialassets would be required to successfully de-ter an ASAT attack. Such retaliatory capabil-ities might be provided by terrestrial or space

based weapons. [A separate, classified appen-dix to this report (Appendix D) contains amore detailed discussion of the utility of mili-tary satellites to the United States and to theU. S. S. R.]

The second consideration—avoidance of cri-sis instability—precludes reliance on desta-bilizing weapons to provide retaliatory capa-bilities. Space-based ASAT weapons capableof instantly destroying several satellites, in-cluding similar ASAT weapons, would be mostdestabilizing unless salvage-fused but wouldbe prone to accidental firing if salvage-fused.By comparison, an ideal weapon for deterringASAT attack would be nonnuclear and henceusable at all levels of conflict without escalat-ing the level of conflict. It could survive apreemptive attack and destroy enemy assetsof sufficient value to deter an attack whilecausing little collateral damage.

Diplomatic Measures

In addition to the military measures dis-cussed above, diplomatic measures such asarms control initiatives and negotiation of“rules of the road” for space operations couldbe useful responses to foreign development ofthreatening ASAT capabilities. The variety ofpossible measures is great, and assessment oftheir advantages is complicated; this topic isdiscussed in detail in chapter 6.

S U M M A R Y O F F I N D I N G S R E G A R D I N G A S A T C A P A B I L I T I E SA N D C O U N T E R M E A S U R E S

The most important conclusions which may 2.be drawn from the preceding discussion ofASAT capabilities and countermeasures are:

1. Nonnuclear ASAT weapons which arenow deployed or being tested by theUnited States and the U.S.S.R. are lim-ited in altitude capability and respon-siveness and can attack only a subset of 3.currently deployed opposing MILSATS,although this subset includes importantMILSATS.

The inherent A SAT capabilities of exist-ing nuclear weapons such as U.S. and So-viet ICBMS and Soviet ABM interceptormissiles are substantial. Such weaponscould pose a threat even to satellites insynchronous orbit, but are useful only atthe highest levels of conflict.

Technologies applicable to future ASATweapons are so varied, and many so prom-ising, that future ASAT weapons, if de-veloped, would be able to attack and dis-

87— --

able virtually all MILSATS of currenttypes as currently deployed. Hence tomaintain the survivability of constella-tions of future MILSATS, it will be nec-essary that the development and deploy-ment of such weapons be constrained byarms control or that future satellites beprotected from them by passive or activecountermeasures, or that a combinationof these approaches be pursued.

4. Of individual passive countermeasures

5

6.

which might be used against advancedASAT weapons, only deception (use of decoys) is likely to be effective against alltypes of ASAT weapons, and deceptionis likely to be economical (relative to theoffense) only if the decoys, and the satel-lites they mimic, are lightweight and in-expensive. Use of deception in combina-tion with maneuver, hardening, andproliferation might offer economical pro-tection for lightweight satellites.Active countermeasures—electronic coun-termeasures, electro-optical countermeas-ures, and shoot-back—would be ineffec-tive against an aggressive or preemptivesurprise attack using expendable, single-shot ASAT weapons (e.g., kinetic-energy,directed-energy, and nuclear “spacemines”). Actively defending keep-outzones around critical satellites might beable to protect such satellites against em-placement of short-range space mines butnot against advanced, long-range spacemines.Of future ASAT weapons now foresee-able, those which would be most effectiveif used in a preemptive or aggressive sur-prise attack—i.e., expendable, single-shotASAT weapons–would be space-basedand therefore subject to such attacks bysimilar weapons. The cost of protectingthem from such attacks—which must nec-essarily be by passive means—would ex-ceed the cost of attacking them. Suchweapons, if mutually deployed, would provide or increase incentives to attackpreemptively in crises in which similar at-tacks are anticipated. Salvage-fusing suchweapons to fire if disturbed would reduce.

7.

8.

but not necessarily eliminate incentivesto preempt but would increase risks of ac-cidental attack.A capability to confirm the occurrenceand identify the perpetrator of an A SATattack and to retaliate in proportion, butnot necessarily in kind, might deterASAT attacks. A capability to retaliatein kind—i.e., against the attacker’s sat-ellites-could contribute to deterrence, ifthis capability were survivable, but if thiscapability were vulnerable to ASAT at-tack, it could undermine deterrence byposing an opponent an incentive to attackpreemptively. However, a capability toretaliate in kind would be inadequate todeter an ASAT attack by an adversarynation which values destruction of U.S.satellites more highly than survival of itsown.Strict arms control measures could not beexpected to eliminate the inherent ASATcapabilities of weapons such as ICBMSnor provide complete confidence that noASAT weapons have been developed anddeployed covertly. In an arms control re-gime which bans ASAT weapons, use ofpassive countermeasures would be re-quired to reduce the residual risk posedby weapons such as ICBMS. However,prohibiting the testing of A SAT capabil-ities of weapons would preclude the at-tainment of confidence that certain typesof advanced, nonnuclear ASAT weaponswould perform reliably if used and wouldtherefore also reduce incentives to de-velop such weapons or to attempt to de-ploy them covertly. A ban on testingwould also render more difficult, costly,and risky any attempt to attain confi-dence, by covert testing, that other typesof advanced, nonnuclear ASAT weapons(e.g., ground-based lasers) would performreliably if used and would therefore alsoreduce incentives to develop such weap-ons or to attempt to deploy them covertly.

Prohibiting the basing in space of weaponswith ASAT capabilities, to the extent thatcompliance with such a ban could be verified,

88

would forestall the creation of strong incen- spacecraft could reduce the ambiguity of suchtives to attack such weapons preemptively provocative acts and thereby reduce the riskwhen a similar attack is feared. Even in the of ASAT attack resulting from misunder-absence of such strict restraints, if ASAT standing, while providing a legal basis for an-weapons are based in space, an agreement ban- ticipatory self-defense against ASAT weaponsning unauthorized close approach to foreign of short effective range.

Chapter 5

ASAT Arms Control: History

Contents

PageIntroduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91Constraints Imposed by Treaties and Agreements en force . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

Charter of the United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Limited Test Ban Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92The 1967 0uter Space Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I&II)... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

International Political Barriers to ASAT Development. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94ASAT Negotiations—Past and Present . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 951978-79 Negotiations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , ., ., 96Soviet Draft Treaties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96Congressional Interest in ASAT Arms Control and

Executive Response. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99Current Activities in ASAT Arms Control . ...............,........101

Chapter 5

ASAT Arms Control: History

ThisASAT

I N T R O D U C T I O N

chapter discusses the constraints ondevelopment imposed by the treaties

and agreements currently in force. It alsobriefly examines the history of ASAT weap-ons development and deployment, and de-scribes the previous attempt by the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union to conclude atreaty further restricting such weapons. Theissue of ASAT weapons and ASAT arms con-trol, a politically volatile topic, has stimulatedconsiderable interest in the U.S. Congress overthe last several years; this chapter also dis-cusses the history of the major pieces of leg-islation in the 97th, 98th, and 99th Congresses(1981-85) which concerned ASAT negotiationsand weapons development.

Chapter 4 examined how certain passive andactive ASAT countermeasures might contrib-ute to U.S. national security and provide pro-tection for critical space assets. Building onthe historical background presented in thischapter, chapter 6 will examine the contribu-tion that ASAT arms control might make tothese same goals, analyzing a number of po-tential ASAT arms control regimes and iden-tifying those which might be appropriate forthe United States to pursue. The interactionbetween technical countermeasures and armscontrol is examined in chapter 7.

C O N S T R A I N T S I M P O S E D B Y T R E A T I E S A N DA G R E E M E N T S I N F O R C E

To evaluate future space arms control meas-ures it is first necessary to understand the con-straints that existing treaties and other inter-national agreements place on military spaceactivities. No single treaty fully specifieswhich space activities are allowed and whichprohibited, and existing agreements do not ap-ply uniformly to all countries. All nations arepresumably bound by the provisions of theCharter of the United Nations,’ customary in-ternational law, and the “general principles oflaw recognized by civilized nations.’” States

party to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty’ and theLimited Test Ban Treaty4 accept additional restriations on their space activities. The UnitedStates and the Soviet Union agreed bilaterallyin the context of SALT I (the ABM Treaty5

and the Interim Agreement to limit offensivearms) not to disturb the function of satellitesused to verify compliance with those treatiesand to forgo the development of space weap-ons to counter ballistic missiles. The relevantprovisions of these instruments are discussedbelow.

1 As a general rule, only states party to a treaty are boundby its terms. An exception to this rule appears in Article 2 (6)of the U.N. Charter which provides: “The Organization shallinsure that states which are not members of the United Na-tions act in accordance the Principles (of the Charter) so far asmay be necessary for the maintenance of international peaceand security. ” Charter of the United Nations, 1970 Yearbookof the United Nations, p. 1001. See also: Ian Brownlie, Princi-ples of Public International Law (3d cd., 1979).

‘Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 38, 1970Yearbook of the United Nations, p. 1013.

“’Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States inthe Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moonand Other Celestial Bodies, ” 18 U.S,T. 2410; T. I.A.S. 6347.

“’Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere,in Outer Space and Under Water, “14 U. S.T. 1313, T. I.A. S.5433.

“’Treaty Between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on theLimitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, ” Oct. 3, 1972, 23U.S.T. 3435, T. I.A.S. 7503.

91

92

Charter of the United Nations6

Article 2(3) of the U.N. Charter directs na-tions to “settle their international disputes bypeaceful means in such a manner that inter-national peace and security, and justice, arenot endangered.” Article 2(4) requires that na-tions “refrain . . . from the threat or use offorce . . . in any . . . manner inconsistent withthe purposes of the United Nations. ” It couldbe argued that these statements and othergeneral principles of customary internationallaw in some ways inhibit the use of ASATS.7

It is important to note that the responsibil-ities imposed by Article 2 of the U.N. Char-ter are modified by Article 51, which states,“Nothing in the present charter shall impairthe inherent right of individual or collectiveself-defense. ” Taken together, Articles 2 and51 do indicate general international censureof the use of force, but do not limit specificweapon systems.

Limited Test Ban Treaty8

The Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 pro-hibits nuclear weapons tests “or any other nu-clear explosion “ in outer space, as well as inthe atmosphere or under water. The treatytherefore prohibits the testing, in space, of ex-otic ASAT weapons that would derive theirpower from a nuclear explosiong—a conse-quence probably not anticipated by the treaty’sdrafters. The Limited Test Ban Treaty wouldnot limit the development or testing, on Earth

%upra, note 1.‘Terrestrial international law is explicitly extended to space

by Article III of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which statesthat the exploration and use of outer space shall be conducted“in accordance with international law, including the Charterof the United Nations. ”

‘Supra, note 4.‘An additional limitation on nuclear-pumped space weapons

can be found in the “Threshold Test Ban Treaty” of 1974. Ar-ticle 1 prohibits tests of nuclear weapons greater than 150 kilo-tons in yield, bannin g even underground testing of any nuclear-driven weapon requiring an explosion larger than that. TheThreshold Test Ban Treaty was signed by the United Statesbut has yet to be ratified. “Treaty Between the United Statesof America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on theLimitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, ” reprintedin, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, U.S. ArmsControl and Disarmament Agency (1982 cd.), p. 167.

or in space, of other nonnuclear componentsfor such weapon systems. The power sourcecould be tested underground on Earth,1° as areother nuclear weapons, and the nonnuclearcomponents could be tested separately inspace.

The 1967 Outer Space Treatyll

Article III of the Outer Space Treaty statesthat space activities shall be carried out inaccordance with international law “in the in-terest of maintaining international peace andsecurity and promoting international co-oper-ation and understanding. ” This Article ex-presses the sentiment of the drafters thatspace be used to benefit mankind and contrib-ute to peace.

In contrast to the general language of Arti-cle III, Article IV of the Outer Space Treatyestablishes a clear prohibition against placing“in orbit around Earth any objects carryingnuclear weapons or any other kinds of weap-ons of mass destruction. ”12 Orbiting weaponsusing nuclear explosions for power would pre-sumably be included. This provision does notlimit ground-based ASATS or ASATS whichuse conventional explosives or other means todestroy a target. Neither does it ban nuclear-armed “pop up” ASAT interceptors thatascend directly to their targets without enter-ing into orbit.13

. —IOSubject to other treaty limitations-see previous note.“Supra, note 3.“According to Ambassador Arthur Goldberg, chief U.S.

negotiator of the Outer Space Treaty, weapons of mass destruc-tion include “any type of weapon which could lead to the sametype of catastrophe that a nuclear weapon could lead to” (Hear-ings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Exec-utive D, 90th Cong., 1st sess., p. 23. ) In 1948, the U.N, Com-mission for Conventional Armaments advised the SecurityCouncil that the term ‘weapon of mass destruction’ would in-clude, “atomic weapons, radio-active material weapons, lethalchemical and biological weapons, and any weapons developedin the future which have characteristics comparable in destruc-tive effect to those of the atomic bomb or other weapons men-tioned above. ” (Resolution adopted by the Commission for Con-ventional Armaments at its 13th meeting, Aug. 12, 1948. U.N.Security Council, S/C.3/32/Rev. 1, Aug. 18, 1948.)

‘~esting of such weapons which involved detonating nuclearwarheads in space would be banned by the Limited Test BanTreaty.

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Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty directsnations to “undertake appropriate interna-tional consultations” before proceeding withany activity that might cause “potentiallyharmful interference with the activities ofother states in the peaceful exploration anduse of outer space. ” It is possible to argue thatstates developing ASATS (weapons intendedto cause “harmful interference”) should do soonly after ‘‘appropriate international consul-tations. ” Nonetheless, the vague wording ofArticle IX and the forced nature of such aninterpretation reduce the Article’s value as anarms control provision.14

Taken together, the provisions of the OuterSpace Treaty afford satellites some measureof legal protection against attack. The precisenature of this protection is unclear since thetreaty was not drafted for the specific purposeof limiting deliberate hostile activities. Thetreaty clearly does not limit the development,testing, or deployment of nonnuclear weaponscapable of interfering with satellites of othernations; moreover, the U.N. Charter provisionfor self-defense might be taken to permit suchinterference in some cases.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks(SALT I & 11)’5

The verification provisions of SALT I andII state that the parties shall use “nationaltechnical means” (NTM) of verification to

liThe ‘‘Accident~ Measures’ Agreement of 1971 IW@IWS the

United States and the Soviet Union to “notify each other im-mediately in the event of . . . signs of interference with [missilewarning systems] or with reiated communication facilities. ”However, this agreement places no limitations on the develop-ment or use of ASAT capabilities. “Agreement on Measuresto Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between theUnited States of America and the Union of Soviet SocialistRepublics, ” reprinted in U.S. Arms Control and DisarmamentAgency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements (Wash-ington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 159.

“’’Interim Agreement Between the United States of Amer-ica and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Meas-ures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic OffensiveArms” (SALT 1) reprinted in, Arms Control and DisarmamentAgreements, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency(1982 cd.), p. 139.; “Treaty Between the United States of Amer-ica and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limita-tion of Strategic Offensive Arms” (SALT 11), reprinted in U.S.Arms Control and Disarmament Agency Arms Control and Dis-

monitor adherence to the Agreements. NTMis understood, though not explicitly specified,to include certain reconnaissance satellite sys-tems. The SALT Agreements further statethat “Each Party undertakes not to interferewith the [NTM] of the other Party” as longas these assets are operated “in a manner con-sistent with generally recognized principles ofinternational law. ” The SALT Agreements im-plicitly sanction the use of satellites for veri-fication of treaty compliance and provide somemeasure of protection against peacetime attackon these assets. These Agreements do not, how-ever, restrict the development, testing, ordeployment of ASAT systems capable of at-tacking NTM. In addition, whatever legal protection these Agreements provide is limitedto systems used to verify the SALT Agree-ments. Other space systems used for combatsupport during hostilities would not be pro-tected under the SALT provisions.

Article IX of SALT II prohibits the devel-opment, testing, or deployment of “systemsfor placing into Earth orbit nuclear weaponsor any other kind of weapons of mass destruc-tion, including fractional orbital missiles. ”This provision was included to limit the devel-opment of Fractional Orbital BombardmentSystems (FOBS), in which missiles enter par-tial Earth orbit and fly the long way aroundthe Earth rather than taking the much moredirect trajectory of normal ICBMS. However,this provision could also be read as expand-ing the prohibition of Article IV of the OuterSpace Treaty. Whereas Article IV prohibitsonly the act of orbiting nuclear weapons, Ar-ticle IX of SALT 11 would seem to prohibitin addition the development, testing and de-ployment of systems (e.g., launchers) to ac-complish the orbiting of these weapons. Sointerpreted, Article IX could create an addi-tional legal barrier to the development of— . — — —armament Agreements (Washington, DC: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1982), p. 246.

The completed SALT 11 agreement was signed by PresidentCarter and GeneraI Secretary Brezhnev on June 18, 1979. Al-though Senate consent to ratification has not been given, Presi-dents Carter and Reagan both declared that they would do noth-ing to jeopardize the treaty as long as the Soviet Union abidedby it.

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orbital, nuclear-pumped, directed-energyweapons.

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty’B

In the ABM Treaty, the United States andthe Soviet Union agreed not to deploy anti-bal-listic missiles except under the very limitedconditions set forth in the treaty .17 Each partyalso undertook not to “develop, test, or deployABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobileland-based. ”

The distinction between advanced ASATand BMD technologies is not always clear. Asnoted by Secretary of Defense Weinberger ina report to Congress, Ia directed-energy weap-

16’’ Treaty Between the United States of America and theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, ” supra, note 5.

“Article III limits each side to two fixed, ground-based ABMdeployment areas (later reduced to one), each of which has limi-tations on radar facilities and interceptors and launchers.Agreed Statement D provides that should ABM systems basedon other physical principles than missile interceptors be devel-oped in the future, these would be subject to discussion andagreement. Unless such systems were explicitly permitted byfuture agreement, they would continue to be banned.

‘UC. Weinberger, Fiscal Year 1985 Annual Report to Congress(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February1984), p. 263.

ons “could perform a variety of missions, suchas antisatellite or ballistic missile defense. ”For the purposes of the ABM Treaty, “anABM system is a system to counter strategicballistic missiles or their elements in flighttrajectory. “ Therefore, ASAT weapons wouldbe prohibited by the ABM Treaty if they werecapable of countering strategic ballistic mis-siles. * Such systems are banned unless theyare fixed, land-based and deployed at per-mitted sites. The testing of ASAT weaponsof lesser capability would not be inhibited bythe treaty. If an ASAT weapon became capa-ble of intercepting missiles, it would fall withinthe terms of the ABM treaty. This capabilitytest includes future systems having compo-nents “based on other physical principles”than those of the ABM system components(interceptors, launchers, and radars) describedin Article 11 of the treaty. However, the ABMTreaty does not control highly capable ASATsystems lacking ABM capability, and it doesnot clearly indicate how such capability is tobe inferred.

*The ABM Treaty is discussed in grater detail in OTA’S re-port, Ballistic Missi/e Defense Technolo~”es, OTA-ISC-281,app. A.

I N T E R N A T I O N A L P O L I T I C A L B A R R I E R S T OA S A T D E V E L O P M E N T

Although there are few clear internationallegal barriers to ASAT development, the de-sire of the United States to remain in someway responsive to international opinion cre-ates certain inhibitions to the unrestrainedpursuit of weapons that are based or operatein space. In the United Nations and other in-ternational fora, the United States and, to alesser extent the Soviet Union, have been crit-icized for their military activities in space.Some view the “militarization” or “weaponi-zation” of space as breaking a de facto politi-cal taboo; others see it as a violation of cus-tomary international law. Some of our allies,responding to strong domestic political pres-

sures to limit the arms race, see U.S. and So-viet cooperation in controlling space weaponsas one means to reduce international tension.It is important to note, therefore, that theremay be a significant political or diplomaticcost to developing space weapons.

Opposition to “space weapons” derives, inpart, from the belief that space is a uniqueenvironment which must be preserved for“peaceful” activities and should be responsiveto international controls. The “uniqueness” ofspace is seen as deriving from the fact thatsome space activities, such as remote sensingand satellite communications are inherently

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global in effect; i.e., they pass over the terri-tory of other countries and may require inter-national coordination, such as frequency allo-cation. These characteristics have resulted inthe development of a number of successful in-ternational institutions such as the Interna-tional Telecommunication Union (ITU), theInternational Telecommunication SatelliteOrganization (INTELSAT), and the Interna-tional Maritime Satellite Organization (IN-MARSAT).

The fact that certain space activities havebeen the subject of international controls hasfostered a belief among some that all spaceactivities should somehow require interna-tional consent. In this view, an unrestrainedarms race between the United States and theSoviet Union in space is seen as threateningthe interests of nations not having strongspace programs as well as being a threat topeace.

The United Nations, and in particular itsCommittee on the Peaceful Uses of OuterSpace (COPUOS), has been responsible for fiveinternational treaties dealing with space. Eachof these treaties emphasizes to some degreethe necessity that the exploration and use ofspace be for “peaceful purposes. In addition,many world leaders (including every Presidentof the United States since Eisenhower), scho-lars, and jurists have, since the beginning ofthe space age, emphasized the unique natureof space and its ability to contribute to peaceand the common good.

Having been nurtured for over 25 years, theidea that space is a unique environment whichshould be used for peaceful purposes has cometo be considered by some to be a principle ofcustomary international law. As a result, thedevelopment of weapons which would operatein or through space has met with strong op-position in international fora.

The 1982 General Assembly Resolution onthe “Prevention of an Arms Race in OuterSpace” reflects this international concern. ’gThe Resolution reaffirms the belief of the Gen-eral Assembly that “space [activities] shouldbe for peaceful purposes and carried on for thebenefit of all peoples, ” and notes “the impor-tant and growing contribution of satellitesfor . . . the verification of disarmament agree-ments and . . . their use to promote peace, sta-bility and international cooperation. ” Point-ing out the “threat posed by anti-satellitesystems and their destabilizing effect for in-ternational peace and security, ” the Resolu-tion urges all states “to contribute actively tothe goal of preventing an arms race in outerspace and to refrain from any action contraryto that aim. ” Finally, it requests the U.N.Committee on Disarmament to consider “thequestion of negotiating effective and verifiableagreements aimed at preventing an arms racein space.

“’U. N.G.A. Dec. A 36192, .4ug. 11. 1982.

ASAT N E G O T I A T I O N S – P A S T A N D P R E S E N T

Background

The first test of a weapon against a satel-lite was conducted by the United States in1959 when a Bold Orion missile launched froma B-47 aircraft successfully passed within 20miles of the U.S. Explorer VI satellite as itpassed over Cape Canaveral. In 1963 and1964, the U.S. Army operated a system ofnuclear-armed direct-ascent ASAT intercep-tors on Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific Ocean.

From 1964 until 1970, another such systemwas maintained on Johnston Island by the AirForce; this system was formally decommis-sioned in 1975. z0

‘(’Marcia Smith, “ ‘Star W’ars’: Antisatellites and Space-BasedBMD” (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, CongressionalResearch Service, Issue Brief 11381123, Nov. 26, 1984); PaulStares, “Deja Vu: The ASAT Debate in Historical Context, ”,4rms Control Toda)’, December 1983, p. 2.

96— — — — —

The Soviet Union initiated a series of ASATtests in 1968 which continued through 1971.2’Although the United States suspected thatthe Soviets were developing an “inspect anddestroy” capability, this system was not seenas posing so significant a threat to U.S. assetsthat a response was necessary. However, whenthe Soviets conducted another series of ASATtests between 1976 and 1978, U.S. officials be-gan to express concern.

The Carter Administration adopted a “two-track” policy. In March 1977, President Carterannounced that he had suggested to the So-viets that “we forgo the opportunity to armsatellite bodies and also to forgo the opportu-nity to destroy observation satellites. ’22 Alsoin that month, the Department of Defense an-nounced that U.S. military space programswere being accelerated.23

1978-79 Negotiations

The Soviets responded positively to Carter’sproposal for ASAT negotiations and in March1978, agreement was reached on an explora-tory meeting. Three rounds of the ASAT limi-tation talks were held: June 8-16, 1978, in Hel-sinki; January 23-February 16, 1979, in Bern;and April 23-June 15, 1979, in Vienna. Thethird round of talks ended when the two sidesfelt they had gone as far as they could with-out further consultation and study in theirrespective countries.24 According to Ambas-sador Robert W. Buchheim, head of the U.S.delegation for most of the 1978-79 ASATtalks, the two delegations agreed that wheneither decided that it was ready to resume ac-tive negotiations, the other party would be sonotified through diplomatic channels.25 Al-—

21 Soviet S~ace Programs: 1976-$0, Committee Print, SenateCommittee on Commerce Science and Transportation, 97thCong., 2d sess., December 1982, p. 184.

Z~The ~~ash~n~on Post, Mar. 10, 1977, p. A4.231 bid.“Lynn F. Rusten, “Soviet Policy on Antisatellite (ASAT)

Arms Control” (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, Congres-sional Research Service, 84-670-S, June 22, 1984), p. 1.

25’’Arms Control and the Militarization of Space, ” HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, Interna-tional Operations and Environment of the Committee on For-eign Relations on S.J. Res. 129, U.S. Senate, 97th Cong., 2dsess., Sept. 20, 1982, pp. 54-55.

though neither side formally withdrew fromthe negotiations, after the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan, the U.S. refusal to ratify theSALT II Treaty, and a general deteriorationof U.S.-Soviet relations, discussions neverresumed.

The 1978-79 talks did not result in an ASATarms control agreement; however, they didclarify some of the concerns of the two par-ties. The talks focused on two main topics:limits on ASAT use, and limits on the devel-opment of ASAT capabilities.2G

During the 1978-79 negotiations, as now, thedifferent status of the U.S. and Soviet ASATprograms was a substantial impediment toprogress. The Soviet ASAT system was con-sidered by the United States to be “opera-tional, ” whereas the potentially more capableAmerican system had yet to be tested. Alimited moratorium or treaty would havegiven the United States time to conductground-based research and development whileinhibiting Soviet ASAT weapons tests inspace. An indefinite test ban, on the otherhand, might have locked the United Statesinto a position of ASAT inferiority.

Soviet Draft Treaties

In 1981 and again in 1983, the Soviets sub-mitted draft space weapon treaties to theUnited Nations.27 U.S. experts disagree as towhy the Soviets have continued to advocatespace weapon arms control. One theory holdsthat the Soviet interest is not in arms control,but rather in propaganda. Since the ReaganAdministration was not actively seeking limi-tations on space weapons, the Soviets couldportray the United States as being responsi-ble for the escalation of the arms race and the

“For a more detailed discussion of the 1978-79 talks, see:Walter Slocombe, “Approaches to an ASAT Treaty, ” SpaceWeapon~-The Arms Contro] Dilemma. 13hupendra .Jasani (cd.)(I,ondon: Taylor and Francis, 1984), p. 149; and Lynn F. Rusten,op. cit.

“’’Draft Treaty on the Prohibition of the Stationing of Weap-ons of Any Kind in Outer Space, U.N. General Assembly, Dec.A/36/192, August 1981; “Treaty on the Prohibition of the Useof Force in Outer Space and From Space Against the Earth,U.N. ~OC. A138/194, Aug. 26, 1983.

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“militarization” of space. Another hypothesisis that the Soviets have a genuine interest inlimiting ASAT technology because this is anarea where the United States would be ableto excel. Since the Soviets have clearly statedtheir opposition to the Reagan Administra-tion’s plans to develop spacebased BMD tech-nologies, their interest in arms control inspace—especially after March 1983—could beintended to inhibit the progress of this program.

The United States refused to participate inmultilateral negotiation with the Soviets oneither the 1981 or 1983 draft treaties. What-ever the true reason or combination of reasonsfor Soviet interest in ASAT arms control, theSoviets have used this issue–and the U.S. re-fusal to negotiate–effectively in their politi-cal propaganda. The Soviet position has been,until recently, that their space program hasbeen purely peaceful in nature. Since 1958,according to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko,the Soviet Union “invariably stated and con-tinues to state that space should be a sphereof exclusively peaceful cooperation. “28

From an American point of view, the Sovietpropaganda seems absurd since the SovietUnion has an “operational” ASAT and a veryactive military space program. From the pointof view of many nonaligned governments, aswell as important segments of the populationsof our allies, the fact that the Soviet Union wasas responsible for the “militarization of space”as the United States, or more so, did not lessenthe culpability of the United States for refus-ing to negotiate. As a result, the Soviet prop-aganda on the “militarization’ of space wasinitially successful in enhancing the interna-tional image of the Soviets while fostering crit-icism of the United States. More recently, theinability of the United States and the SovietUnion, in the summer of 1984, to come to anagreement regarding ASAT weapon and otherarms control negotiations (discussed in detail.

Z81bid. However, m May 29, 1985, in an interview b a westGerman reporter in Geneva, Col. Gen. Nikolai Chervov, a sen-ior department head on the Soviet General Staff, claimed thatthe U.S.S.R. had successfully developed a direct-ascent satel-lite interceptor similar to that tested by the United States inthe early 1960s and operational until the mid-1970s.

below) served to shift some of the burden ofthe “militarization” issue back to the Soviets.

Since their introduction at the United Na-tions, a good deal of attention has been givento the language of the two Soviet draft trea-ties. It is useful to examine these drafts sincethey provide valuable insights into how theSoviets have been thinking about arms con-trol in space.

1981 Soviet Draft Treaty

The provisions of the 1981 and 1983 Sovietdraft treaties reflect the major issues raisedin the 1978-79 negotiations. Articles I and III,the operative provisions of the 1981 Sovietdraft -

I.

III.

treaty, state:

The member states undertake not to putinto orbit . . . objects with weapons ofany kind, . . . and not to deploy suchweapons in outer space in any other way,including also on piloted space vessels ofmultiple use . . .Each member shall . . . not destroy, dam-age, or disturb the normal functioningand not to alter the flight trajectory ofspace vehicles of other member stateswhere the latter have . . . been put intoorbit in strict accordance with . . . Arti-cle I.

Because it prohibited only weapons sta-tioned in orbit, the 1981 draft would not haverestricted the testing, development, and de-ployment of ground-based or air-launchedASATS. Accordingly, the United States andthe Soviet Union could have kept their currentASAT systems and also pursued future tech-nologies such as ground-based or air-bornedirected-energy weapons. The 1981 drafttreaty would, however, have prohibited the development of space-based BMD systems.

According to Article III of the 1981 draft,parties would agree not to “destroy, damage,or disturb the normal functioning and not toalter the flight trajectory of space vehicles. ”Presumably, signatories to such a treaty couldagree as to the meaning of the words “de-stroy, ” “damage,” and “alter the flight trajec-tory. ” It is less clear that a quick consensus

98— —.

could be reached on what would be inhibitedunder the injunction against “disturbing thenormal functioning. ” Would this prohibit in-terference with ground stations or the use ofelectronic countermeasures such as jammingor spoofing? Had the treaty been negotiated,these issues would have certainly been thesubject of great attention and possible com-promise.

Article II of the 1981 proposed treaty statesthat space vehicles shall be used in “strict ac-cordance with international law. This lan-guage seems to reflect the often stated Sovietbelief that certain space activities—e.g., theoperation of direct-broadcast satellites-are aviolation of national sovereignty. However,under the terms of Article III, the only satel-lites that would be denied the treaty’s protec-tion would be objects carrying “weapons ofany kind. ”

1983 Soviet Draft Treaty

In August 1983, when then Soviet ChairmanAndropov met with several U.S. Senators hemade the following statement:

. . . (T)he Soviet Union considers it necessaryto come to an agreement on a complete banof tests and of deployment of any space-based weapons for striking targets on Earth,in the air and in space.

Furthermore, we are ready, in the most rad-ical way, to resolve the issue of anti-satelliteweapons—to agree to eliminate anti-satellitesystems already in existence and to ban cre-ation of new ones.

At the forthcoming session of the GeneralAssembly of the United Nations, we will in-troduce proposals developed in detail on allthese issues.zg

As indicated by Chairman Andropov, onAugust 22, 1983, Soviet Foreign MinisterGromyko submitted a new draft treaty to theU.N. General Assembly .’” The new draft wasmore comprehensive than the 1981 draft, and

.“’’Dangerous Stalemate: Superpower Relations in Autumn

1983, A Report of a Delegation of Eight Senators to the Sovi-et Union, ” Senate Dec. 98-16, Sept. 22, 1983, p. 28.

‘“’’Treaty on the Prohibition of the Use of Force in OuterSpace and From Space Against the Earth, ” U.N. Doc, A/38/194,Aug. 22, 1983.

in particular went beyond it in calling for a banon all testing of ASAT systems and the elim-ination of all existing ASAT systems (see ap-pendix A). However, it also repeats many ofthe themes of the 1981 draft and of the 1978-79 negotiations.

Article 1 prohibits the “use or threat of forcein outer space and the atmosphere and on theEarth through the utilization of . . . space ob-jects” and the “use or threat of force againstspace objects. ” The “use or threat of force”language echoes the language of Article 2 ofthe U.N. Charter. Since by the terms of Arti-cle III of the Outer Space Treaty, the U.N.Charter already applies to space, it is unclearwhat this provision would add to existing in-ternational law. Article I does make it clearthat: 1) space objects are not to be used tothreaten objects in “outer space and the at-mosphere and on the Earth”; and 2) space ob-jects themselves are not to be threatened. Thisarticle would prohibit threats from space-based assets—e.g., ASAT or BMD weapons–and threats to space-based assets, whetherfrom ground-, air-, sea-, or space-basedsystems.

Article 2 has five sections. Section 1 prohib-its testing and deploying space-based weap-ons; this goes well beyond the simple “no-use’provision of the 1981 draft, which is repeatedin section 2. Section 3 repeats the prohibitionof the 1981 draft against destroying, damag-ing, disturbing the normal function or chang-ing the flight trajectory of space objects ofother states.

Under section 4 of Article 2, parties agreenot to “test or create new anti-satellite sys-tems and to destroy any anti-satellite systemsthat they may already have. ” There is no at-tempt in the treaty to define what constitutesan “anti-satellite system. ” Presumably, itwould include both the proposed U.S. and cur-rent Soviet orbital interceptors. It is unclearhow systems, such as the Soviet GALOSHABM, which might have some ASAT capabil-ity, would be dealt with under the draft treaty.

Section 5 of Article 2 prohibits the “test oruse of manned spacecraft for military, includ-

ing antisatellite, purposes. ” Because of thelimitations that this would place on the U.S.Space Shuttle, it is unlikely that the UnitedStates would agree to such a provision. In anycase, since the SALT agreements allow veri-fication by “national technical means” (NTM)and the Shuttle is the launch vehicle for Gov-ernment payloads—including satellites usedfor NTM—this provision would seem to con-flict with current Soviet and U.S. agreements.

Congressional Interest in ASAT ArmsControl and Executive Response

Following the introduction of the two Sovietdraft treaties, the Reagan Administration ex-pressed no interest in negotiating these or anyother limitations on ASAT weapons. As timepassed, Members of Congress in both Housesbegan to apply pressure on the Administra-tion to halt ASAT testing and to begin nego-tiations with the Soviets. This pressure wasapplied most effectively in amendments to theDepartment of Defense authorization and ap-propriations bills.

The following resolutions concerning spaceweapons were introduced in the 97th Congress(1981 -82).” None of them were reported out ofcommittee or passed by either House:

Senate Resolution 129 (introduced byPressler, R-S. Dak.) calling for resumptionof ASAT limitations talks.Senate Executive Resolution 7 (Pressler),calling for negotiation of a protocol to the1967 Outer Space Treaty that would pro-vide a complete and verifiable ban onASAT development, testing, deployment,and use.Senate Resolution 488 (Matsunaga, D-Hawaii)j calling for talks with the SovietUnion concerning the possibility of estab-lishing a weapons-free international spacestation.

31 For a more detailed historv of congressional activity dur-ing the 97th and 98th Congres~es, see Marcia S, Smith, “ ‘StarMrars’: Antisatellites and SpaceBased BhlD” (J$’ashington, DC:Library of Congress. Congressional Research Service. IssueBrief IB81 123, No\’. 26, 1984).

●

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House Joint Resolution 607 (Moakley, D-Mass. and 29 cosponsors), calling for theimmediate negotiations for a ban on spaceweapons of any kind.

The number of bills and resolutions on spaceweapons introduced in the 98th Congress(1983-84) rose dramatically, with all but onedying in committee.” The exception wasS. J.Res. 129 (Pressler and 28 others), whichwas reported favorably out of the Senate For-eign Relations Committee and significantlymodified before being introduced, and laterwithdrawn, as an amendment to the fiscal year1985 DOD authorization bill. A resolution sug-gesting that international cooperation in spacebe pursued as an alternative to the arms racewas passed by Congress and signed into law(S. J.Res. 236; Public Law 98-562), but only af-ter most of the language concerning the armsrace had been deleted. The most important ac-tions of the 98th Congress resulted fromamendments to the DOD authorization andappropriation bills.

The Fiscal Year 1984 DOD Authorization Bill

While the House of Representatives was de-bating the fiscal year 1984 DOD authorizationbill (H.R. 2969), two amendments concerningASAT weapons were introduced. The first, in-troduced by Representative George Brown (D-Calif.), would have denied procurement fund-ing for the ASAT weapon; the second, intro-duced by Representative Seiberling (D-Ohio),would have prohibited the flight testing of theASAT until authorized by Congress. Bothamendments were defeated.

In the Senate, an amendment introduced bySenator Tsongas and unanimously passed pro-hibited the expenditure of funds for tests of

“1.egislati~n not reported from committee in either Houseor Senate:

I,egislation Opposed to Space Wreapons: H.J. Res. 87 (Kasten-meier, D-W’is. ); H.J. Res. 120 (Moakley, D-Mass. and 130 others);S J.Res. 28 (Tsongas, D-Mass. and 8 others); H. J.Res. 523(I)icks, D-W’ash. and 58 othersl and 524 (Dicks and 55 others);1l..J. Res. 53 I (Brown, D-Calif. and 96 othersj.

Z,egislation in F’a\or of Space J{’capons: S.Res. 100 {W’allop,lt-W’jo. and 14 othersl: S, 2021 (.Armstrong, R-CO1O.I: H.Res. 215(t\’hitehurst, R-\”a. }, H. Res. 259 [Rennett, D-Fla. and 17 others:l:1{, R. 3073 ( Kramer, R-CO1O. and 13 others)

Source; Sm]th, op. cit.; and Iiibrary of Congress SCORPIO database

100

explosive or inert ASAT weapons (i.e., exempt-ing directed-energy weapons) against objectsin space, unless the President determined andcertified to Congress that: 1) the United Stateswas endeavoring in good faith to negotiate atreaty with the Soviet Union for a mutual, ver-ifiable, and comprehensive ban on ASATS; and2) that pending such an agreement, such testswere necessary for the national security.

The Fiscal Year 1984 DOD Appropriation Bill

Following a proposal by RepresentativeMcHugh, the House Appropriations Commit-tee deleted the fiscal year 1984 ASAT procurement funds pending a report from the Presi-dent on his policies regarding arms control inspace. The Senate Appropriations Committeetook no similar action, but during floor debate,the Senate adopted an amendment introducedby Senator Tsongas requiring the Presidentto submit a report on the national security im-plications of the Strategic Defense Initiative.

In the course of the House and Senate con-ference on the appropriations bill, the con-ferees agree to provide $19.4 million for ad-vance procurement for the ASAT program asproposed by the Senate, instead of no fundsas proposed by the House. However, the con-ferees direct that these funds not be obligatedor expended until 45 days following submis-sion to Congress of a comprehensive report onU.S. policy on arms control. The appropria-tions bill, as amended, was passed by bothHouses and signed into law (Public Law 98-212).

President Reagan’s March 1984 Report onASAT Arms Control

On March 31, 1984, the Reagan Administra-tion issued its “Report to the Congress on U.S.Policy on ASAT Arms Control,” thus satis-fying the requirements of the fiscal year 1984DOD appropriation bill. The report stated thatthe Administration was “studying a range ofpossible options for space arms control witha view to possible negotiations with the So-viets. ” However, it concluded that “no ar-rangements or agreements beyond those al-ready governing military activities in outer

space have been found to date that are judgedto be in the overall interest of the UnitedStates and its Allies.” The report stated thatthe search for effective ASAT arms controlwas impeded by the “difficulties of verifica-tion, diverse sources of threats to U.S. and Al-lied satellites and threats posed by Soviet tar-geting and reconnaissance satellites whichundermine conventional and nuclear deter-rence, ” and it emphasized the necessity for thedevelopment of a U.S. ASAT weapon.

The Fiscal Year 1985 DOD Authorization Bill

When considering the fiscal year 1985 DODauthorization bill, the House approved anamendment introduced by RepresentativeGeorge Brown. The amendment prohibited theuse of funds for ASAT testing against objectsin space until the President certified to Con-gress that the Soviet Union had conducted anASAT test after the enactment of the bill. TheHouse later accepted an amendment (offeredby Representative Gore) to the Brown amend-ment which limited testing until the Presidentcertified that either the Soviet Union or anotherforeign power had conducted such a test.

The Senate Armed Services Committee rec-ommended that the fiscal year 1984 authori-zation language restricting ASAT tests berelaxed to permit ASAT tests against objectsin space provided only that the President cer-tified such tests to be essential for pursuingarms control arrangements. During floordebate, the Senate adopted a compromiseamendment offered by Senators Warner andTsongas that prohibited spending funds fortesting ASAT weapons against objects inspace until the President certified to Congress:

●

●

that the United States was endeavoringin good faith to negotiate a mutual andverifiable agreement with the strictestpossible limitations on ASATS consistentwith the national security interests of theUnited States;that pending agreement on such a ban,tests against objects in space were nec-essary to avert clear and irrevocable harmto the national security;

101

● that such testing will not constitute anirreversible step which will gravely impairprospects for negotiations; and

that testing is fully consistent with U.S.obligations under the ABM Treaty.

With some minor changes, the Warner-Tsongas amendment was adopted in theHouse and Senate conference report.

The Fiscal Year 1985 DOD Appropriation Bill

Fiscal year 1985 appropriations for the De-partment of Defense were included in the Con-tinuing Appropriation Bill (Public Law 98-473). The appropriation bill, as enacted, re-flects the compromise reached on the DOD au-thorization bill. The only differences are thatno tests against an object in space are per-mitted before March 1, 1985, or 15 days afterthe President submits the required certifica-tions, whichever is later, and no more thanthree tests against objects in space are per-mitted in fiscal year 1985.

Current Activities inASAT Arms Control

On June 29, 1984, about 3 months after thePresident’s March 31 report had been released,the official Soviet news agency Tass announcedthat the Soviet Government had offered tostart talks “to prevent the militarization ofouter space. “33 “To provide favorable condi-tions for the achievement of agreement, ” Tassreported that the Soviet Union was prepared,“to impose on a reciprocal basis a moratoriumon the tests and deployment of these weapons,starting with the date of the opening of thetalks. 34 The Soviets suggested that suchmeetings should take place in Vienna in Sep-tember 1984.

In response, the Reagan Administrationstated that it was now ready to “discuss andseek agreement on feasible negotiating ap-proaches which could lead to verifiable and ef-fective limitations on antisatellite weapons. 35

The Administration also announced that inaddition to discussing space weapons it in-tended “to discuss and define mutually agreeable arrangements under which negotiationson the reduction of strategic and intermediaterange nuclear weapons can be resumed. 36

However, the Administration stressed thatthere were “no preconditions on the U.S. will-ingness” to discuss the entire range of armscontrol issues.

The Soviets objected to discussing strate-gic and intermediate-range missiles at thesame time as space weapons. The Soviets pro-posed that the parties publish a joint publicannouncement that would define the purposesof the talks as being limited to the subject ofspace weapons and would endorse the conceptof a moratorium on testing. The United Statesresponded that it was prepared to talk aboutspace weapons but that it was not preparedto agree to a moratorium.37 The Soviets re-jected the U.S. position and declared that itmade the talks “impossible. “38 Although theU.S. Administration sent new messages mod-ifying and “clarifying’ its initial stand, thesetoo were spurned by the Kremlin.

In the weeks following the initial exchangesthere was little communication between theparties. The real argument seemed to be overwhich side would take the blame for refusingto negotiate. No meeting was held in Septem-ber although both Washington and Moscowcontinued to express interest in arms controlin space.

Six months later, on January 8, 1985, U.S.Secretary of State George Schultz and SovietForeign Minister Andrei Gromyko concluded2 days of talks concerning the structure of fu-ture arms control negotiations. They jointlyreleased a communique indicating that plan-ning would commence on “the forthcomingU.S.-Soviet negotiations on nuclear and spacearms” on “a complex of questions concerningspace and nuclear arms, both strategic and in-

“’’Soviet and U.S. Statements on Space Weapons Negotia-tions, ’ New York Times, June 30, 1984, p. 4.

“Ibid.‘bIbid.

“Ibid.“’’Soviets Say U.S. Makes Talks on Space ‘Impossible’, ” The

Washington Post, July 28, 1984, p. Al.“Ibid.

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termediate range . . . The objective of the ne-gotiations will be to work out effective agree-ments aimed at preventing an arms race inspace” along with constraining terrestrialarms and increasing strategic stability.3g

Negotiations between the United States andthe Soviet Union began in Geneva in March1985. Throughout these negotiations, the So-viet delegation has insisted that the termina-tion of President Reagan’s Strategic DefenseInitiative is a necessary first step to any re-duction in offensive arms. U.S. negotiatorshave, for their part, argued that advanced bal-listic missile defense systems could provide ameans by which both parties could safely ne-gotiate deep reductions in their nuclear ar-senals. As a result of this deadlock, both sidesappear to remain far from agreement on anti-satellite limitations.

On August 20, 1985, pursuant to the Fis-cal Year 1985 DOD Authorization Act (dis-cussed above), the President certified that thefour requirements set out by Congress had

‘“Statement text from The Washington Post, Jam 9, 1985,p. A14.

been fulfilled.40 President Reagan’s decision totest the U.S. MV ASAT weapon against anobject in space has reinvigorated congression-al debate on the ASAT issue.

The Soviet response to the U.S. ASAT pro-gram has fluctuated. In 1983, President An-dropov implied that the U.S.S.R. would re-scind its self-imposed moratorium on ASATtesting if the United States began its ASATtest program. Then, in May 1985, in an inter-view with a West German reporter, Col. Gen.Nikolai Chervov, a senior department head ofthe Soviet General Staff, stated that theU.S.S.R. would rescind its moratorium if theUnited States completed testing the F-15launched ASAT weapon. Most recently, theofficial Soviet news agency Tass, said that ifthe United States “holds tests of antisatelliteweapons against a target in outer space, ” theSoviet Union “will consider itself free of itsunilateral commitment not to place antisatel-lite weapons in space. ’

‘“Presidential Determination No, 85-19 of August 20, 1985,Federal Reg”ster, vol. 50, No. 165, Aug. 26, 1985, pp.34441-34443.

4’Wtishington Post, Sept. 5, 1985, p. A-17.

Chapter 6

ASAT Arms Control: Options

Contents

PageIntroduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .105Provisions Restricting ASAT Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .106

Monitoring Compliance With a Test Ban. . .........................106Utility of an ASAT Test Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....109

Provisions Restricting ASAT Possession or Deployment . ...........,..112Monitoring Compliance With Limitations on

Possession and Deployment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....112Utility of Limitations on Possession and Deployment . ...............113

Provisions Restricting ASAT Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..114Monitoring Compliance With a ’’No Use” Agreement . ...............115Utility of a”No Use’’ Agreement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..115

Provisions Restricting Spacecraft Operation and Orbits. . ..............116Monitoring Compliance With a ’’Rules of the Road” Agreement . . . . . . .118Utility of a ’’Rules of the Road’’ Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .118

BMD and ASAT Treaties of Limited Duration . ......................119Compliance Monitoring, Verification, and Recourse . ...................120

Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....................120Interpretation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................121Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......121Recourse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....122

TableTable No. Page6-1. Sensor Technology for Compliance Monitoring . ...................110

Chapter 6

ASAT Arms Control: Options

I N T R O D U C T I O N

This chapter explores how various ASATarms control provisions might affect the long-term national security interests of the UnitedStates. The interaction between these armscontrol provisions and the unilateral satellitesurvivability measures that the United Statesmight pursue is discussed in greater detail inchapter 7. Four types of arms control are pre-sented below: restrictions on ASAT testing,possession, use, and “rules of the road’ forspace. Each of these provisions is describedand an assessment is given of its ability to pro-tect U.S. space assets and contribute to otherlong-term U.S. goals. Potential conflicts be-tween ASAT arms control and the develop-ment of military capabilities (e.g., the U.S. MVASAT program and the Strategic Defense Ini-tiative) are also examined.

The development of anti-satellite weaponsposes a significant threat to the military sat-ellites of both the United States and the So-viet Union. These military satellites, in turn,provide information and services which can bethreatening to either side. Here lies the inher-ent difficulty in arriving at acceptable A SATarms control agreements-given the choice,the United States would like to protect its ownsatellites while eliminating any military threatposed by Soviet satellites. ] Since such a one-sided advantage is not possible, it is reason-able to examine whether there are mutual re-straints that would contribute to nationalsecurity and protect U.S. satellites, yet allowan adequate response to the threat posed bySoviet satellites.

The debate over ASAT arms control con-tains many familiar themes: To what extent

‘ Not all So~riet military satellites threaten the United States,Presumabljr, the L)nited States would like the So\iet IJnion toretain some reconnaissance and earl?’ warning satellites sincethese satellites contribute to stability b~ allowing verificationof arms control agreements and by assuring the So\,iets thatthe} are not under nuclear attack,

can the the United States monitor Soviet com-pliance? Do the Soviets intend to cheat, andif so, can they? What recourse would theUnited States have if faced with either clearor ambiguous Soviet violations? Is the UnitedStates better off pursuing arms control, tech-nological superiority, or some combination ofboth? What will be the response of our alliesto new development programs or arms controlproposals? These issues are discussed below,both in the context of specific arms controlprovisions and in a more general discussionof monitoring treaty compliance.

Most of the provisions discussed in thischapter would require the United States andthe Soviet Union to enter into a bilateral agree-ment to limit A SAT weapons development. Asa result of the technologies involved, their the-ater of operation, and the closed nature of So-viet society, it is unlikely that the UnitedStates could monitor Soviet compliance withcomplete certainty. The United States canknow only part of what the Soviet Union doesand little or nothing about what it intends;therefore, any arms control agreement in-volves some degree of risk. For the purposesof this discussion, the value or danger of a par-ticular arms control provision is measured byits likely impact on U.S. national security afterallowance is made for possible covert Sovietviolations. In other words, given the risks of en-tering into an agreement with the Soviets, arewe better off with or without a particular pro-vision?z

This chapter focuses primarily on bilateraltreaties of unlimited duration. Other arrange-ments for ASAT constraints, such as multi-

—z 1 t is important to note that ‘‘risk, as it is used here, does

not imply merely the probability that the Soviets can or would\.iolate a particular provision of an A SAT agreement. Rather,risk signifies both the probabilit~’ that the Soviets would vio-late the agreement and the threat to U.S. national security thatwould likel~ result from such a Soviet violation.

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lateral agreements, joint declarations, executive ity and primarily to formal treaties of un-agreements or even unilateral declarations, limited duration because they are the hardestmight also be in the national interest. How- to obtain and have the most lasting effect onever, this report is limited exclusively t o national policy and programs.bilateral agreements for the sake of simplic-

P R O V I S I O N S R E S T R I C T I N G A S A T T E S T I N G

An agreement that established limits ontesting could be a useful means by which to

prevent the development of reliable, dedicatedASAT systems. The effectiveness of test re-strictions is assumed to derive from the nat-urally conservative nature of military plan-ners. Many informed observers believe that,except when forced by necessity, Soviet mili-tary planners would be reluctant to rely onsystems that have not been tested near theirfull capabilities, particularly in situationswhere the stakes are high, second chances maynot come, and the penalties for failure couldbe severe.

A test ban would prevent the testing whichwould increase confidence in new ASAT weap-ons or, at minimum, would force testing to bedone covertly, under less than optimal condi-tions. In either case, the result would be to

erode the confidence that an ASAT systemwould work as planned, when needed.

There are several ways to frame a test ban.The most comprehensive would be a ban onall “testing in an ASAT mode. ” For the pur-poses of this discussion, “testing in the ASATmode” would include tests of ground-, sea-,

air-, or space-based systems against targetsin space or against points in space. Testing ofASAT systems or components on the groundwould not be prohibited. Such an approachwould avoid both the necessity of defining anASAT weapon and of restricting systems that,although not designed as ASATS, might havesome inherent ASAT capability. For example,it is possible that the Soviet GALOSH ABMsystem might have some ASAT capability. Anagreement that banned all “testing in anASAT mode” would not require the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union to agree whether

GALOSH was an ASAT or if it could functionas an ASAT, but would simply ban the test-ing of this system as an ASAT.

More limited “no-test” agreements couldalso be used to inhibit the development of spe-cific types of ASATS or to place restrictionson certain types of testing. Such a treatymight be used to ban the testing of only ASATweapons that would be based in space. Alter-natively, it might be used to ban the testingof specific space-based ASAT weapons (e.g.,directed-energy weapons or space mines)thought to be particularly destabilizing. Sucha ban might also limit ASAT testing to lowaltitudes to protect critical early warning andcommunication satellites that are in higherorbits.

All of these examples of limited test banscould be further modified by agreed limita-tions on allowable numbers of tests. For ex-ample, the United States and the Soviet Un-ion might agree to limit themselves to only 10tests over the next 5 years, or to a set num-ber (either constant or declining) of tests peryear for the duration of the agreement.

Monitoring Compliance Witha Test Ban

In past bilateral agreements between theUnited States and the Soviet Union, the So-viet Union has tended to take advantage oftreaty ambiguities and to engaged in activi-ties that—although sometimes difficult tocharacterize-bordered on treaty violation.3 Itis prudent, therefore, to assume that should

‘There is reason to believe that the Krasnoyarsk radar, whencomplete and ready for o~ration, will violate the ABM Treaty.

an ASAT test ban be negotiated, the Sovietswould comply only to the extent that theUnited States was able to verify its compli-ance. This being the case, it is important toexamine some of the problems associated withmonitoring the wide range of Soviet activitiesthat might be related to A SAT weapon devel-opment.

Scope of Monitoring Task

One barrier to verifying compliance with atest ban is the enormous volume of spacewhere illicit activities might be conducted.Verification of compliance with a SALT orSTART arms control agreement involves in-spection of a number of areas in the Soviet Un-ion or its immediate airspace. This area, al-

though large, is relatively well determined andis amenable to close inspection by spacebasedphotographic reconnaissance satellites. The re-gion where space activities must be monitoredstarts at altitudes of about 100 km and canrange well past geosynchronous orbit at 36,000km. In addition, advanced ground-based ASATScould be located anywhere in the Soviet Un-ion and air-based ASATS might even operatefrom non-Soviet airfields.

Although the volume of space is indeedlarge, spacebased ASAT activities must starton the ground. Relevant ground sites, includ-ing launch facilities, can be observed by an ex-tensive array of U.S. monitoring facilities;launches of ICBMS and similar vehicles fromSoviet territory can be detected. To some ex-

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tent, the problems created by the large volumeof space are offset by the fact that space istransparent and accessible to monitoring. Cur-rent weaknesses in ground-based surveillancesystems can be mitigated by putting surveil-lance systems into space.

If the Soviets were to develop air-based,ground-based, or ‘“pop-up” directed-energyweapons, these would require extensive test-ing. It is likely that some portion of this test-ing could be conducted out of the sight of (e.g.,indoors or underground) U.S. monitoring as-sets. However, full development would prob-ably require some in-space testing against tar-gets. Possible targets could, in principle, bemonitored to see if they are being illuminatedby strong lasers, are giving off gases, are be-ing unexpectedly accelerated, or are emittingunusual signals. Air- and ground-based sys-tems might be detectable by national techni-cal means. Nonnuclear, spacebased systemswould be quite large and might emit detecta-ble amounts of hydrogen fluoride or othergases.

Problems of Discrimination

Verifying treaty compliance is complicatedby the growing number and variety of Sovietspace launches. Although the launch rate maydecrease in the future as the Soviets developlonger lived satellites, space surveillance re-quires a body of experience with each addi-tional type of satellite in order to classify itsfunction and discriminate between unusualactivity and routine behavior. The functionalcharacteristics distinguishing ASAT weapons,such as space mines, from other satellites maynot be readily observable. Some occurrencesmight have multiple interpretations. For ex-ample, a satellite fragmenting in orbit couldbe accidental, the test of a self-destruct mech-anism (either to avoid capture or to preventlarge components from falling back to Earth),or the test of a space mine.4 All national tech-nical means have imperfect discrimination,

@ne could, of course, ban all deliberate explosions in space.If such a ban were made part of a more general test ban, therewould be less ambiguity to resolve.

and the physical differences between per-mitted and prohibited satellites may be small.

Although the annual number of Sovietlaunches is large, the number of new satellitesor satellites engaged in “unusual activities”is relatively small. Even if U.S. national tech-nical means of verification could not by directobservation distinguish between space minesand normal satellites, other indicators, suchas orbital parameters, proximity to other—particularly U.S.—satellites, and other sourcesof intelligence might supply the needed infor-mation. If in addition to a test ban the treatyalso included some mechanism for resolvingambiguities —e.g., the Standing ConsultativeCommittee established in SALT I–the prob-lem might be further resolved.

Assuming that the difficulties associatedwith deliberate ASAT systems were resolved,it would still be necessary to reach some agreement concerning tests of advanced, ground-based, BMD systems. Should conventionalground-launched BMD systems be developed—similar to the system recently demonstratedin the U.S. Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE)—they may have some limited ASAT capa-bility.

Covert Development

There are numerous ways for the Soviets toengage in covert ASAT development. It is pos-sible that space mine or orbital interceptortests could be masked as legitimate rendez-vous operations or satellite repair missions.ASAT weapons might be directed againstpoints in space or space debris, thereby obviat-ing the need for recognizable target satellites.ASAT vehicles or their targets could be in-strumented to store test data for broadcastover the Soviet Union or for deorbit in a reen-try capsule, thereby preventing the UnitedStates from intercepting test information.Nuclear-armed ICBMS or ABM launcherssuch as the Soviet GALOSH might also betested (though not detonated) in a mannerwhich would be difficult to characterize. Rela-tively low-powered lasers capable of blindingsatellite sensors are already available and

109

Photo credft U S Department of Defense

Artist’s conception of the nonnuclear ABM interceptorrecently tested i n the Homing Overlay Experiment(HOE). The current Soviet GALOSH nuclear ABMinterceptor or future, nonnuclear systems based onHOE technology could complicate the process of

monitoring an ASAT weapon test ban.

might be tested without being clearly identi-fied as being ASATS.

It is, on the other hand, possible to exagger-ate the threat posed by covert development.The United States is sufficiently familiar withthe operational characteristics of the currentgeneration of Soviet ASAT interceptors tomake its covert testing unlikely. The develop-ment of a new system would require an exten-sive testing program, some portion of whichwe would almost certainly identify. New or un-usual orbiting vehicles would be noticed, espe-cially maneuvering ones. Monitoring equip-ment could be developed that would detect thelaser illumination of Soviet satellites, andwhich could aid in monitoring Soviet directed-energy facilities. (See table 6-1, below). Sovietefforts to hide covert testing might serve tonarrow down the regions where the United

States needs to concentrate its verification ef-forts. In any case, it is likely that an ASATtest limitation agreement would provide themeans by which parties could inquire aboutsuspicious activities.

Utility of an ASAT Test Ban

Considering both the limitations of U.S.monitoring capabilities and the possible ill-intentions of the Soviet Union, what then isthe value of an ASAT test ban? To answer thisquestion completely, one must examine thespecific test bans being considered in combi-nation with possible technical countermeas-ures (this is done in chapter 7). However, somepreliminary generalizations can be helpful.

Some of the satellites that the United Statesrelies on for critical information are now vul-nerable and few in number. With respect tothese specific systems, a small degree of So-viet cheating under a test ban agreementmight have a significant effect on U.S. secu-rity. On the other hand, the United States hasbeen quite successful at monitoring past So-viet space activities and the deployment ofmore capable monitoring assets—e.g., space-based surveillance systems–could substan-tially aid the process of treaty monitoring.

It is important to note that modest satel-lite survivability measures would reduce therisk posed by current ASAT weapons andcould do much to reduce the risk posed by c-vert weapons development. In the absence ofan agreement limiting ASAT weapon devel-opment, the United States must still monitorSoviet activities but modest survivabilitymeasures might not be effective. Without limi-tations, advanced ASATS would pose a greaterrisk to a larger number of satellites and fail-ure to effectively monitor these advancedASATS could create a significant danger toU.S. national security.

Comprehensive Test Ban

A ban which prohibited all testing “in theASAT mode” would severely reduce the likeli-hood that the Soviet Union could successfullydevelop advanced, highly capable ASAT weap-

110

Table 6-1 .—Sensor Technology for Compliance Monitoring

Prohibitable action Observable Sensors

ASAT attack:KEW a impact ., . . . . . . . . . . . accelerationPulsed HELb irradiation . . . . accelerationContinuous HEL

irradiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . heatingNPB C irradiation . . . . . . . . . . ionization

Keep-out zone penetration . . . position of thermal radiation source (ASAT)Interception test . . . . . . . . . . . . positions of thermal radiation sources

(ASAT and target)NPB ASAT operation . . . . . . . thermal radiation from ASATHEL ASAT operation . . . . . . . . thermal radiation from ASATIrradiation of target

with NPB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . gamma radiation from targetIrradiation of target with

pulsed HEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . thermal radiation from targetIrradiation of target with

pulsed HEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . reflected radiation from targetIrradiation of target with

continuous HEL . . . . . . . . . . position of thermal radiation source (target)Irradiation of target with

continuous HEL . . . . . . . . reflected radiation from targetNuclear explosive aboard

satellite . . . . . . . . . . . . . gamma radiation from fissile or fusilenuclei activated by cosmic radiation or byparticle beams

Attack sensors:accelerometersaccelerometers

thermistorsionization detectors

space-based LWIRd thermal image~ f

space-based LWIR thermal image~ f

space-based LWIR thermal imagere f

space-based LWIR thermal image~ f

gamma-ray spectrometer

space-based LWIR thermal imager

space-based multispectral imager

space-based LWIR thermal imager

space-based multi spectral imager

gamma-ray spectrometer (and optionalparticle beam generator)

aKlnetlc.energy weaponbHigh-energy lasercNeutral particle beam.dLong.wavelength infraredf?The LWlR telescope on the Infrared AStrOnOnll~al satelllte (lRAs) e~ernpllfles demonstrated space-based ttleunal Irnager technology, this Instrument iS described

in Astrophys/ca/ Journa/, 278 (1, Pt 2), L1 .L85, Mar 1, 198-4 (Spectai Issue on the Infrared Astronomical Satelllte)fRadar and passive radio direct ion.f indi ng methods could also be useful for tracking, If hiding measures are not employed by the penetrating Spacecraft LWIR tracking

is emphasized here because it is difficult to counter by such measures.gA target Irradiated by a high-energy neutral particle beam will emit gamma rays, neutrons, and other observable part! cles, Just as !t WI II, at a slower rate, when bombarded

by natural cosmic rays These gamma rays could be detected by a gamma-ray spectrometer such as those which have been earned by Soviet Venus Ian and lunarlanders and by US NASA Ranger and Apollo spacecraft (NASA report SP.387, pp 3.20)

ens. The categories of weapons eliminatedmight included space mines capable of “shadow-ing” valuable military assets in any orbit, ordirected-energy weapons with kill radii of hun-dreds to thousands of kilometers. In the ab-sence of an agreement limiting the develop-ment of these weapons, each side might seekcontinually more effective means to attackthreatening satellites and to defend valuableassets. This could result in a potentiallydestabilizing arms race in space. The “instan-taneous kill” ability of the most advancedASATS would be destabilizing in a crisis, sinceeach side would have the incentive to “shootfirst” or else risk the loss of its space assets.

A comprehensive test ban would requireboth the United States and the Soviet Unionto cease testing their current generation ofASAT weapons. The Soviet ASAT is alreadyconsidered operational. Assuming the UnitedStates also had an operational ASAT when theagreement entered into force, each side’s ex-

isting system would pose some threat to theother side. Over time, a comprehensive testban would gradually erode each side’s confi-dence in its respective weapons, thereby reduc-ing the possibility of their use. If a test banwere combined with additional restrictions onpossession or deployment, this might resultin somewhat greater security.

A comprehensive test ban would be less ef-fective at reducing the threat posed by weaponsystems with “inherent” ASAT capability.ICBMS, SLBMS, and ABM interceptors withnuclear payloads are examples of systems withinherent ASAT capability. Although thesesystems lack the kind of guidance necessaryto intercept a satellite with great precision, thelong-range destructiveness of their nuclearpayloads makes them potentially effectiveASATS. However, some of the ASAT threatposed by nuclear weapons is offset by theirvery nature. The collateral physical, political,and military consequences of using nuclear

171

ICBMS or ABMs as ASATS could well detertheir use in most conflicts short of a terres-trial nuclear war.

The Shuttle’s recent success at retrievingand refurbishing satellites strongly suggeststhe ASAT potential of future maneuverablespacecraft. However, the range, effectivenessand reaction time of even advanced maneuver-able systems would be substantially less thanthat of future dedicated ASATS. Although thedevelopment of maneuverable spacecraft wouldnot be inhibited by most ASAT testing limi-tations, some limits could be placed on oper-ating them in an ASAT mode.

The Soviet draft treaties and the 1983 uni-lateral Soviet moratorium on ASAT testingsuggest that the Soviets would be willing tonegotiate about a comprehensive ASAT testban. To date, the U.S. response to Soviet sug-gestions has been to point out that since theSoviets have an “operational” ASAT and theU.S. testing program has just begun, a com-prehensive test ban would prevent the UnitedStates from ever having a reliable interceptorASAT and would increase the threat posed bya Soviet “breakout.” Nonetheless, the UnitedStates has continued to express interest inASAT negotiations and has not ruled out thepossibility that it would agree to some kindof test limitations.

Limited Test Bans

Should a comprehensive test ban be consid-ered undesirable or nonnegotiable, it mightstill be worthwhile to limit testing to the cur-rent generation of ASATS or to ASATS onlycapable of attacking satellites in low-Earth or-bit. A ban which limited each side to testingits current ASAT would have three advan-tages: 1) a ban on testing new types of ASATSwould reduce the likelihood that advancedASATS, such as space mines or space-baseddirected-energy weapons, would be developed;2) the threat to critical early warning and com-munication satellites would be diminished; and3) the United States would retain the abilityto negate Soviet low-orbiting, targeting, anddata collection satellites judged to pose athreat to U.S. surface forces.

.

Photo credft U S Department of Defense

Ocean recovery of what is believed to be an unmannedscale model of a new Soviet space plane. The developmentof maneuverable spacecraft would not be inhibited bymost ASAT testing limitations, but some restrictions

might be placed on operating such spacecraft“in an ASAT mode. ”

If a limited test ban could restrict each sideto its current, low-orbit, ASAT capability, itwould, in effect, create high-altitude “no at-tack zones. This might encourage adver-saries to move some Earth monitoring spaceassets into those zones. The development ofhigh-altitude data collection systems would re

‘If advanced directed-energy weapons with kill radii of thou-sands of kilometers are developed, such “no attack zones” mightbe meaningless.

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quire considerable time and expense. For thenext decade and perhaps beyond nationswould probably be forced to operate their cur-rent low-altitude systems.

Although it is possible that some reconnais-sance satellites might be able to function fromhigher orbits with some degradation of per-formance, radar satellites-useful in trackingsurface ships-would have substantially greaterdifficulty. Current systems employ active ra-dar, which means that the strength of the re-turn signal decreases as the fourth power of

the range to the target. The substantial in-crease in range necessary to take advantageof a high-altitude “no-attack’ zone would se-verely degrade the performance of current sys-tems. It is possible that, over time, improve-ments in technology could solve the problemscreated by the increase in range. Nonetheless,by the time this occurred new ECM and EOCMcapabilities might also be developed that couldhelp to negate systems taking advantage ofhigh-altitude “sanctuaries.”

P R O V I S I O N S R E S T R I C T I N G A S A T P O S S E S S I O NO R D E P L O Y M E N T

An agreement which sought to restrict thepossession or deployment of ASAT weaponscould be either comprehensive or limited. Acomprehensive ban might prohibit the posses-sion or deployment of any deliberate “anti-satellite system. A limited ban, on the otherhand, might allow the possession of someASAT weapons but not others, or establishlimitations on allowable ASAT capabilities oron the number and kind of deployments.

In order to establish a comprehensive banon the possession or deployment of ASATweapons, it would first be necessary to cometo an agreement as to what exactly was be-ing banned. As explained above, the existenceof systems that have an inherent ability to at-tack satellites complicates the process of elim-inating all ASAT capability. A ban on all sys-tems with ASAT capabilities would be sobroad as to be unworkable since it would in-clude ICBMS, SLBMS, ABMs, and maneuver-able spacecraft such as the Shuttle. On theother hand, a ban on deliberate ASAT systemsalone might allow the development of non-ASAT systems having sophisticated ASATcapabilities. For this reason, the most effec-tive comprehensive ban on possession and de-ployment would probably be one which wasalso accompanied by a prohibition on testingnon-ASAT systems in an ASAT mode.

Many types of limited-possession regimescan be imagined. The United States and theSoviet Union might decide to keep the ASATSthey are currently testing, but prohibit thepossession or deployment of more advancedsystems. Alternatively, each side might be al-lowed to have one designated system in addi-tion to the one they are currently testing; thecapabilities of this additional system might ormight not be limited (e.g., low-Earth orbit ca-pability only). Still another regime might limitthe parties to ground-based ASAT weaponsand ban possession of weapons that would bebased in space.

In all of these limited-possession regimes ad-ditional restrictions on the number and loca-tion of allowable ASAT deployments could beadded.

Monitoring Compliance WithLimitations on Possession and

Deployment

A comprehensive ban on the possession ordeployment of the existing Soviet ASATweapon would raise some important monitor-ing problems. The launch vehicle for the So-viet ASAT is used in several other non-ASATroles. These launchers will remain availableeven if the Soviet ASAT weapon is banned.

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Since the ASAT weapon itself is small, itwould be difficult for the United States to ver-

ify with high confidence that the Soviets hadnot clandestinely retained a stockpile.

A limited possession ban that granted eitherside the right to possess and deploy the ASATweapon it was currently testing would raisefewer verification problems. Significant Sovietcheating would involve covertly testing anddeveloping a new and unproven advancedASAT weapon, rather than simply hiding anexisting system. As discussed above, it islikely that such a development program wouldinclude some testing requirements that wereobservable.

Given the small size of the current SovietA SAT weapon, restrictions on the number ofA SAT weapons that could be deplcyed at eachlaunch site would be difficult to monitor in theabsence of onsite inspection. Even onsite in-spection would not provide complete security,since ASATS could be covertly stored and eas-ily transferred to the launch area when needed.The United States would have higher confi-dence at monitoring restrictions on the allow-able number of launch sites. Restriction onlaunch facilities would increase the time be-tween A SAT launches and decrease the prob-ability of sudden, multiple kills. A combina-tion of restrictions on both the allowablenumber of launch sites and on the number ofASAT weapons that could be stored at eachsite could reduce the likelihood of a surpriseattack or, at minimum, reduce the effect ofsuch an attack.

Utility of Limitations on Possessionand Deployment

A comprehensive ban on ASAT possessionand deployment is complicated by: 1 ) the ex-istence of the Soviet, and, in the near future,

The U.S. ASAT weapon currentl~ under dmrelopment is quitesmall, I~owe~.er, the %y’iet monitoring task is easier becau S[Jthe U.S. AS.AT weapon requires large and ciistincti~e supportequipment and becaus(~ significant expenditures for milit ar~rfacilities, personnel. and weapons procurement would be re-vealed in the annual authorization and appropriate ion proces<of Congress or by the popular press.

the U.S. ASAT weapons; 2) the fact that thelack of possession or deployment could not bemonitored with high confidence; and 3) the fearthat a ban on possession and deployment—even if monitored with high confidence—wouldnot eliminate the knowledge of how to buildthese systems, and that the forces might bereconstituted at some time in the future.

Balancing these three concerns is the under-standing that for the Soviets to retain someA SAT weapons in violation of a possession ordeployment ban would not in itself be threat-ening—they must also be able to use theseA SAT weapons in a way that is militarily sig-nificant. Differences of opinion exist as to themilitary significance of minor violations of aban on possession and deployment. Some ar-gue that the Soviets must be able to launcha sufficient number of A SAT weapons withsufficient rapidity to gain an important mili-tary advantage. To do this, the ASAT weap-ons and launch vehicles would have to be pre-mated and held in readiness, activities thatwould probably be observable. Others believethat the Soviets would not have to launch amass A SAT attack in order to gain importantmilitary advantages. They point out that insome limited war scenarios, destroying a verysmall number of critical satellites could havegrave consequences. Therefore, there mightnot be a need for a large number of observa-ble, pre-mated A SAT weapons and launchers.

Assuming the United States did have ad-vance notice of Soviet A SAT activities, itcould respond through diplomatic channels orthrough a Standing Consultative Committee,if established. Even short-term notice of intentto use A SAT weapons would allow the UnitedStates time to maneuver its satellites or takeother appropriate action.

The fact that every element of an agreementcannot be monitored with high confidence doesnot necessarily mean it has no value. It is ex-tremely difficult to monitor the “no nuclearweapons in space’ provision of the OuterSpace Treaty and yet the United States con-tinues to adhere to it. Presumably, this is be-cause the benefits of the treaty outweigh therisk posed by potential Soviet cheating.

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Even if a ban on possession and deploymentcould not be monitored with high confidenceit would, at minimum, oblige the Soviets toconduct future A SAT weapons tests covertly.This would complicate maintenance of thecurrent system, make upgrades difficult andadvanced ASAT development less likely. Thecombination of these effects would make U.S.satellite survivability programs more effectiveand might discourage the use of ASATweapons.

Space systems with inherent rather than in-tentional ASAT capabilities would be difficultto restrict by a comprehensive ban on posses-sion or deployment. Nonetheless, such sys-tems pose only a modest threat to critical U.S.assets. Those systems which employ nuclearwarheads (e.g., ICBMS, SLBMS, ABMs) mightonly be used in a terrestrial nuclear war or atthe risk of precipitating one. They would alsorisk damage to the attacker’s own satellites.Future maneuverable spacecraft, although ca-pable of some limited ASAT activity, wouldnot be able to provide the rapid, multiple-killcapability likely to be obtained from futurededicated ASAT systems, and are thereforea considerably lesser threat.

A regime which banned only deliberateASAT systems and disregarded systems with

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some inherent ASAT capability would still beuseful in as much as it would reduce the threatof the most highly capable and destabilizingfuture ASATS systems. Nonetheless, a ban onthe possession and deployment of ASAT sys-tems would probably be most valuable if ac-companied by a prohibition against the test-ing of non-ASAT systems in an A SAT mode.

The 1983 Soviet draft treaty contained anexample of a comprehensive ban on posses-sion. Article 2(4) of the draft treaty would haverequired that parties undertake, “Not to testor create new anti-satellite systems and to de-stroy any anti-satellite systems that they mayalready have. ” Given the past statements ofSoviet officials and the draft treaties proposedby the Soviet Union, it is likely that theSoviets would be willing to negotiate a com-prehensive ban on possession. It is less clearwhether they would be willing to negotiatesome form of limited ban. If their primary con-cern is protecting all of their space assets, thena limited ban might not be acceptable. If, onthe other hand, their purpose in negotiatingany ban is to limit the development of moreeffective ASATS or spacebased BMD technol-ogies, then there might be some partial bansthat they would find acceptable.

P R O V I S I O N S R E S T R I C T I N G A S A T U S E

Perhaps the least complicated ASAT agree-ment would be one that prohibited hostile actsagainst satellites. Such an agreement wouldprobably not attempt to limit specific ASATsystems, but would instead prohibit the useof all ASAT capabilities. Although a “no use’agreement could not strictly be considered“arms control, ” in as much as both partieswould be free to develop and deploy any num-ber and kind of advanced ASAT system, itmight usefully define what constituted a “hos-tile act” against a satellite. This agreed defi-nition of “hostile act” might serve to avoidsome future conflict brought about by a con-fusion of intentions. It would also establish a

satellite attack as an unambiguous warningof further aggressive intent.

Although a “no use” agreement might notsubstantially reduce the threat of ASAT at-tack, it could serve as a useful component ofother, broader arms control agreements. Thedefinition of prohibited acts that might rea-sonably result from the negotiation of a “nouse’ agreement could lead to a clearer under-standing of the systems capable of perform-ing those acts. This, in turn, might assist inthe negotiation of agreements that prohibitedthe testing, possession, or deployment ofASAT weapons.

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Monitoring Compliance Witha “No Use” Agreement

Compliance with a “no-use” agreementwould be relatively easy to monitor. This isparticularly true for the current generation ofASAT weapons. The monitoring task wouldbecome slightly more difficult if the Sovietswere to follow the U.S. example and developan air-launched interceptor. This would allowthem to launch an ASAT attack outside of theSoviet Union-perhaps even from the westernhemisphere if the appropriate facilities wereinstalled in Cuba.

If it were possible to covertly developground-based directed-energy facilities ormore flexible air-based facilities, these mightbe used to damage the sensors of a U.S. satel-lite in such a manner as to mimic an equipmentmalfunction. This is particularly true when theobject of an attack is not to destroy the satel-lite, but rather to “blind” or “dazzle” delicatesensors.

On the other hand, the effective use of on-board monitoring equipment could substan-tially reduce this threat. To a limited degree,satellites now have some on-board “state-of-health” monitoring equipment. It is possibleto augment these sensors to determine whethera failure is due to an internal flaw or whetherit has been externally induced. These sensorsmight, for example, measure incident laserlight, rises in temperature, or sudden acceler-ations. The inclusion of “stateof-health’ mon-itoring equipment on satellites combined witha future spacebased surveillance system couldprovide the necessary ingredients to verify a“no use” treaty with high confidence.

Utility of a “No Use” Agreement

In order to judge the utility of a “no use”agreement it is first necessary to understandwhat such an agreement could and could notaccomplish. Even if a “no use” agreementcould be monitored with very high confidence,in an environment of unconstrained ASAT development, a “no use” treaty might make onlya small contribution to protecting U.S. space

assets. Should nations eventually possessdirected-energy weapons or space mines withan instantaneous and multiple kill capability,there will be significant advantages to beinga first user of these weapons. Nations may findthemselves in the position of having to use orlose their offensive space-based assets. If themeasure of effectiveness of a “no use” agree-ment is how well it protects U.S. satellites inan otherwise unconstrained environment, thenone would have to conclude such an agreementwas of limited value.

Although the U.N. Charter and the OuterSpace Treaty both implicitly prohibit hostileacts against the satellites of other countries,there may be some value to obtaining a for-mal agreement that such hostile interferenceis a violation of international law and poten-tially a cause of war. A “no use” ASAT treatywould, like the Geneva protocol on use of poi-sonous gases, establish more clearly the “lawof civilized nations. ” Codifying what is alreadyimplicit in international law might serve to in-hibit the willingness of nations to attack sat-ellites in a crisis before hostilities have bro-ken out on Earth and perhaps even for someperiod of low intensity conflict.

Although a “no use” agreement would not, initself, substantially reduce the risk or the effectof an ASAT attack, it would serve as a usefuladdition to other, more comprehensive, ASATlimitations. For example, an agreement thatrestricted ASAT testing would benefit fromthe clear statement that hostile acts againstsatellites were forbidden. Such an agreementwould assist in developing the principle thatthe goal of ASAT limitations was to protectspace assets and to keep space from becom-ing an area of unrestrained conflict and notsimply to control the development of one oranother class of offensive weapons.

It is likely that some type of “no use” agreement would be acceptable to the Soviet Un-ion. It would, of course, be necessary to clearlydefine what constituted “use” under the agreement. In their 1983 draft treaty, the Sovietsdefined “use” as meaning “to destroy, dam-age, disturb the normal functioning or change

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the flight trajectory. ” Although the UnitedStates might agree in principle with the intentof such a provision, it is unlikely that it wouldaccept this exact language. The Soviet phrase“disturb the normal functioning” might beinterpreted as prohibiting the use of electroniccountermeasures, and this interpretationwould probably be unacceptable to the UnitedStates.

viet draft except the phrase “disturb thenormal functioning” is replaced by “render in-operable. ” The UCS language is, from a U.S.perspective, probably more acceptable, sinceit would seem to cover only actions that harmthe satellite and not those that make its jobharder. In the absence of formal negotiations,it is impossible to assess Soviet intentions orwillingness to compromise on this point.

The 1983 draft treaty of the Union of Con-cerned Scientists (UCS) is similar to the So-

P R O V I S I O N S R E S T R I C T I N G S P A C E C R A F T O P E R A T I O NA N D O R B I T S

Whether or not the United States and theSoviet Union agree to restrict ASAT weaponsor capabilities it might be useful to negotiatea set of “rules of the road” for military spaceoperations. These rules could serve the gen-eral purpose of reducing confusion and en-couraging the orderly use of space, or theycould be designed specifically to aid in the de-fense of space assets. Examples of generalrules might include agreed limits on minimumseparation distance between satellites or re-strictions on very low-orbit overflight bymanned or unmanned spacecraft. These gen-eral rules might also be used to establish new,stringent requirements for advance notice oflaunch activities. Specific rules for space de-fense might include declared and possiblydefended “keep-out zones, ” grants or restric-tions on the rights of inspection, and limita-tions on high-velocity fly-bys or trailing. Itmight also be desirable to establish a meansby which to obtain timely information and con-sult concerning ambiguous or threateningactivities.

Precedents can be found for each of the gen-eral rules suggested above. The clearest exam-ple of international acceptance of “rules of theroad” is the 1960 multilateral agreement on“International Regulations for PreventingCollisions at Sea. ”7 This agreement estab-

733 U.S.C. 1051: T. I.A.S. 5813

lished the rule of international conduct on thehigh seas and provided the basis for the 1972Soviet-U.S. treaty on the “Prevention of In-cidents On and Over the High Seas.”8 In thislatter agreement, the United States and theSoviet Union established more specific rulesfor the operation of their respective warships.

In the civilian communications field, nationshave agreed to work with the InternationalTelecommunication Union (ITU) to developrules to insure orderly use of the geostation-ary orbit and the radiofrequency spectrum.Those nations possessing military satellitesmight wish to establish an organization, ormore limited working groups, to develop sim-ilar technical rules of conduct for militaryspace activities.

The Chicago Convention of 1945 establishedthe fundamental principle of state sovereigntyover territorial airspace. g The 1967 OuterSpace Treaty established the equally impor-tant principle that space should be freely avail-able for the use and exploitation of all na-tions.’” Since the beginning of the space age,nations have wrestled with, but failed to re-

623 U.S.T. 1168; T. I.A.S. 7379.“’Convention on International Civil Aviation” (Chicago 1947),

61 Stat. 1180, 15 U. N.T.S. 295, T. I.A.S. 1591‘“’’ Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States “

in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moonand Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967 (Article I) 18 U.S.T.2410, T. I.A.S. 6347.

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solve the question of how to characterize theboundary between airspace and outer space. ”As one author has observed, the very impor-tant difference between these two regimes isthat “states shoot at aircraft not authorizedto be in their airspace; they do not shoot atsatellites passing over that airspace. “12 Thisdistinction will become increasingly harder tomake as maneuverable space vehicles becomemore capable. Will nations continue to allowoverflight of their territory by military space-craft which are also capable of aerodynamicflight? Practical and internationally consist-ent “rules of the road’ may be necessary toresolve this problem.

Article IV of the “Convention on Registra-tion of Objects Launched into Outer Space”currently requires signatories to supply theSecretary-General of the U.N. with informa-tion concerning its space objects and launches.However, since the Convention requires onlythat the signatories supply this information“as soon as practicable, ” it is of little use inclarifying ambiguous activities in a timelymanner. Article 4 of the “Agreement on Meas-ures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nu-clear War Between the United States of Amer-ica and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics”also requires that “each Party . . . notify theother Party in advance of any planned missilelaunches if such launches will extend beyondits national territory in the direction of theother Party. ” Unfortunately, since this arti-cle does not apply to space launch vehicles itis of little use as a means to protect space as-sets. As space launches become more numer-ous and varied, an agreement providing fortimely notification of launch and informationon the characteristics of the vehicle may beessential to avoid crisis through confusion.

“This question has been considered almost annually in theU.N. Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space but hasyet to be resolved. The position of the United States has beenthat such a delimitation has not been necessary and, indeed,might impede beneficial space activities.

‘z’’ Anti-Satellite Weapons, Arms Control Options, and theMilitary Use of Space, ” William J. Durch, U.S. Arms Controland Disarmament Agency, contract No. AC3PC103, July 1984,p. 3.

International law recognizes that the con-cept of sovereignty extends to more than a na-tion’s land mass. For example, a country’s ter-ritorial waters and contiguous airspace areconsidered to be sovereign and defendable ele-ments of that country. Extrapolating fromthis concept, one method for protecting sat-ellites would be to negotiate or declare “keep-out zones” around the most critical space as-sets. The agreement or declaration of these“keep-out zones” might also include the rightto defend these zones once declared. Precedentfor the concept of “keep-out zones” can befound in the history of the SALT negotiationspertaining to submarines. During the courseof these negotiations a number of proposalswere discussed such as, ‘‘nesubmarine zones’which would have prohibited missile-carryingsubmarines from operating in certain parts ofthe ocean, and “no-ASW zones” (anti-sub-marine warfare) that would have allowed theunhindered operation of submarines in selectareas to ensure that reliable retaliatory forceswould exist to deter a possible first strike.

Photo credit Nat/onal Aeronautics and Space Adm/n/strat/on

Artist’s conception of the U.S. Space Shuttle servicinga Space Station. As commercial and scientific spaceactivities increase, internationally accepted “rules ofthe road” may be necessary to ensure that both militaryand nonmiIitary space activities are conducted i n a safe

and orderly manner.

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Negotiated or declared “keep-out zones”would have to be reconciled with Article II ofthe 1967 Outer Space Treaty which states,“outer Space . . . is not subject to national ap-propriation by claim of sovereignty, by meansof use or occupation, or by any other means.“Keep-out zones” might be considered bysome nations to be contrary to the OuterSpace Treaty’s ban on “national appropria-tion. ” A counter argument might hold thatcurrent international practice with respect tocommunication satellites in geosynchronousorbit already incorporates a variation of the“keep-out zone” principle. Current geosyn-chronous orbit must be space several degreesapart in order to avoid frequency interference.Therefore, such a satellite precludes the place-ment of other satellites near its position in theorbital arc.

In order to reduce uncertainty regarding thepurpose of certain satellites and the tensionlikely to result from unauthorized close ap-proach, it might be useful to establish rulesregarding inspection, high-velocity fly-by andtrailing. Such agreements might allow close-approach and inspection under certain circum-stances (e.g., prior consent) but might other-wise ban high-velocity fly-by and trailing—either of which could be a prelude to satelliteattack.

One of the functions of a regime of rules inspace would be to reduce instances whereprovocative or threatening activities are ob-served but not explained. To resolve this prob-lem, a forum or a “hot line” might be estab-lished through which questionable spaceactivities could be discussed in a timely man-ner. Precedent exists for this in the 1971“Agreement on Measures to Reduce the Riskof Outbreak of Nuclear War, which requiresthe United States and the Soviet Union tonotify each other “in the event of signs of in-terference with [early warning systems] orwith related communication facilities, if suchoccurrences could create a risk of outbreak ofnuclear war. ” The 1971 agreement might bestrengthened to require consultation regard-ing activities that might threaten satellites

and not just activities which create a risk ofnuclear war.

Monitoring Compliance Witha “Rules of the Road” Agreement

The ability to monitor individual “rules ofthe road” with high confidence would varydirectly with the specific measures adopted.As a general rule, however, monitoring “rulesof the road” would be easier than monitoringother “arms control” regimes. The primarypurpose of such rules would not be to restrictsubstantially the activities of the parties, butrather, to make the intentions behind theseactivities more transparent. Although the de-gree of protection for U.S. space assets to begained from a “rules of the road” agreementwould be less than from other arms limitationregimes, the costs are also correspondinglyless for failure to completely verify compli-ance. One must assume that in the absence ofASAT arms control, both ASAT developmentand satellite survivability programs will begiven high priority. This being the case, offen-sive and defensive measures would be avail-able to respond to violations of “rules of theroad.

Utility of a “Rules of the Road”Agreement

The “rules of the road” discussed above–if implemented in the absence of restrictionson ASAT weapon development—would not re-move the threat of ASAT attack. If they weredefended, “keep-out zones” would probably of-fer the closest thing to security in such a re-gime. Space mines designed to shadow satel-lites and detonate on command would lose agreat deal of their utility if held at bay by adefended keep-out zone. If these zones weresufficiently large, or if satellites were appro-priately shielded, they might even be effectiveagainst nuclear space mines. Keep-out zoneswould be less effective against advanceddirected-energy weapons with kill radii ofthousands of kilometers. However, thesemight be controlled by other arms controlmeasures.

. — —

‘‘Keep-out zones” combined with defensivesatellites (DSATS) would offer substantial—though still incomplete–protection but wouldlikely be extremely expensive. As an alterna-tive to defended “keep-out” zones, the UnitedStates might wish to develop redundant sys-tems and an ability to rapidly reconstitute lostassets.

“Rules of the road” would be substantiallymore effective at encouraging the orderly useof space by the military and at reducing thechances of escalation or misunderstanding in acrisis. Even in the absence of controls onASAT weapons it would be valuable to havea multinational consensus concerning ambig-uous activities such as close-approach, verylow-orbit overpass, and high-velocity fly-by.If the “rules of the road” were part of otherlimitations on ASAT weapons and capabilitiesthey would likely contribute to the effective-ness of these agreements and make their im-plementation more manageable.

Whether “rules of the road” were negotia-ble would depend on the specific provisionschosen. The negotiations pertaining to suchrules might require the United States, the So-viet Union, and perhaps others, to sit downand discuss secret and extraordinarily sensi-tive issues relating to the operation of military

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space assets. Some rules, such as very low-orbit overflight by manned, reusable vehicles,may be so politically sensitive as to not beamenable to discussion. Other rules, such as“keep-out zones” and minimum separationdistance for satellites, may not be desirable because they are not technically possible at al-titudes where the majority of current U.S. andSoviet satellites are located. On the otherhand, some rules, such as high-velocity fly-by,or close inspection might lend themselves todiscussion and agreement.

The United States and the Soviet Unionmay wish to adopt “rules of the road” as aresult of their increased use of space for mili-tary-including ASAT—purposes, or becausethey are engaged in negotiations designed tolimit the arms race in space. “Rules of theroad” might be an attractive companion agreement to far-reaching limits on A SAT weapondevelopment. On the other hand, in the totalabsence of ASAT weapon limitations, therewould be a need to clarify ambiguous activi-ties before it became necessary to “use or lose’offensive space weapons. The negotiability-orlack thereof–of “rules of the road” can onlybe discovered as a result of serious negotia-tion between interested parties.

B M D A N D A S A T T R E A T I E S O F L I M I T E D D U R A T I O N

Each of the regimes examined above couldbe negotiated as a treaty of indefinite orlimited duration or, alternatively, as one whichremains in force as long as periodic reviewsare favorable. Each of these alternatives hasits advantages and disadvantages. Treaties ofindefinite duration are more effective at dis-couraging the pursuit of banned activities, yetrequire a greater degree of foresight regard-ing the long-term interests of the signatoriesand can foreclose technological options for theindefinite future. 13 Treaties of limited duration

.‘Treaties of unlimited duration usually contain a clause which

allows the signatories to withdraw from the treaty if their “su-preme national interests” are threatened. In addition to ‘‘su-

allow parties to take advantage of future tech-nological options, yet can encourage aggres-sive development programs designed to reachfruition at the termination of the designatedperiod. Treaties which call for a periodic reas-sessment of agreed limitations in theory havegreat flexibility, yet, in practice, often resultin a strong presumption that they should becontinued.

preme national interest clauses, ” treaties may also contain spe-cific unilateral or agreed statements regarding specificunderstandings about related events. For example, The 1972ABM Treaty contains a unilateral statement by the UnitedStates which links the continued viability of the treaty to “morecomplete limitations on strategic arms. ”

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The United States might, for example, en-ter into a treaty limiting ASATS with the ex-plicit and public reservation that we wouldwithdraw from this treaty if and when we wereready to test and deploy a ballistic missile de-fense system in ways that the ASAT Treatywould forbid. Alternatively, we might take thepublic position that we intended to restrict ourBMD activities so as to remain within thelimits of an ASAT Treaty. While the formerposition would suggest a treaty of limited du-ration and the latter a treaty of unlimited du-ration, this need not be the case. It would beperfectly possible to sign a treaty of unlimitedduration, with the standard provision allow-ing for withdrawal, accompanied by a clearstatement of some of the conditions underwhich we intended to withdraw.

From one point of view, the exact languagein a treaty regarding its duration is less im-portant than the intentions of the parties. Af-ter all, there have been numerous examples oftreaties of unlimited duration that were vio-lated soon after they were signed and exam-ples of treaties of limited duration that con-tinued in force after they had expired (e.g., the“Interim Offensive Agreement” signed atSALT I). The real issue is whether the partiesbelieve that adherence to the treaty in ques-

tion continues to be in their national securityinterest.

The Reagan Administration has recently in-dicated that it intends to conduct ASAT teststo gather information useful in advancedBMD research. ” Given the close connectionbetween these two technologies, an ASATtreaty of even limited duration would requiremodification of current SD I program plans.Thus, to the extent that the United Stateswishes to maintain the most rapid pace of ad-vanced BMD research within the bounds ofthe ABM Treaty, such a treaty would not bedesirable. Conversely, to the extent that theUnited States wishes to slow the pace of So-viet BMD research and is willing to defer de-cisions regarding the testing of space-basedor space-directed weapons, an ASAT treaty oflimited duration could contribute to thatresult.

—.“The purpose of tests “in an ASAT mode” would be to in-

vestigate advanced technologies without violating the ABMTreaty. The Department of Defense recently told Congress that,‘{To ensure compliance with the ABM Treaty the performanceof the demonstration hardware will be limited to the satellitedefense mission. Intercepts of certain orbital targets simulat-ing anti-satellite weapons can clearly be compatible with thiscriteria. “ “Report to the Congress on the Strategic Defense Ini-tiative, ” Department of Defense, 1985, app. B, p. 8.

C O M P L I A N C E M O N I T O R I N G , V E R I F I C A T I O N , A N D R E C O U R S E

Verification of compliance with an arms con-trol treaty provision involves three distinctprocesses: monitoring the activities of otherparties to the treaty, interpretation of theinformation obtained by monitoring, and,assessment of the risk which such activitiespose to U.S. security. Each of these processespresents a different set of problems and op-portunities to the intelligence community.Should violations or potential violations oftreaty obligations be discovered during theverification process, then it becomes necessaryto decide what, if any, action is to be takenin response. Verification of compliance and re-course are discussed in greater detail below.

Monitoring

When discussing the ability of the UnitedStates to monitor Soviet treaty compliance,it is important to distinguish existing andplanned-capabilities from potential capabil-ities. Existing and planned monitoring capa-bilities are described in chapter 4. Some of theexisting systems used to monitor compliancewith SALT and other arms control agreementswould be useful for monitoring compliancewith possible ASAT arms control provisions.16

—“Some of these capabilities have been described in general

terms by Congressman Les Aspin in “The Verification of theSALT II Agreement,” Scientifi-c Amen”can, vol. 240, No. 3, February 1979, pp. 38-45.

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For example, capabilities to monitor the con-struction and dismantling of ICBM launchers–the number of which is constrained by theSALT II agreement-could also be used tomonitor the construction and dismantling oflaunchers for boosters used for ASAT weapons.

By investing in new monitoring systems andpersonnel, future monitoring capabilities canbe made more comprehensive than existing ca-pabilities. To a limited extent, one can actu-ally ‘‘buy’ more monitoring capability. (Seetable 6-l). However, such additional capabil-ities would, in most cases, require years ofwork and substantial expenditures of funds.As in weapon system procurement, it will benecessary to judge “how much is enough”-i.e., to determine the level of investment abovewhich the value of monitoring capability im-provement obtainable per dollar ceases to beworth a dollar.

The fact that future monitoring systemscould be more capable than current systemsdoes not mean that all monitoring problemscan be solved by spending more money onadvanced technologies. Some activities willalways be unmonitorable (e.g., some forms ofunderground testing), other dual-purpose ac-tivities (e.g., manned spaceflight) will often bedifficult to characterize. Although future tech-nologies will increase our ability to monitor theactivities of other countries, similar technol-ogies may make the job of treaty verificationmore difficult. Specific examples of these prob-lems are presented above in the discussionsof specific treaty provisions.

Interpretation

Once indications of a potentially prohibitedactivity have been detected by monitoring sys-tems, the data must be further interpreted todetermine the intent of the activity and howthe activity affects specific treaty agreements.For example, suppose that while a space-weapon ban is in effect, the deployment or con-struction of a large mirror is observed in space.In this case, the monitoring data might bescrutinized to determine whether the mirrorwas capable of reflecting intense laser beams

and changing its pointing direction quickly—as a prohibited weapon system might—orwhether, instead, it was only capable of reflect-ing low-intensity radiation and changing itspointing direction slowly, as communicationsystem or telescope components might. 16 Theability to make such a determination woulddepend both on the sophistication of the mon-itoring system employed and prior knowledgeregarding similar activities.

Even if the monitoring system provides datasufficient to clearly identify the nature of aquestioned activity, it still remains to be de-termined whether that activity is prohibitedby the language of the relevant treaty. In theexample of a mirror deployed in space, therewould remain the question of whether deploy-ment in space of any large mirror capable ofreflecting intense laser beams would be a vio-lation. Since similar mirrors have been pro-posed for peaceful purposes (e.g., propulsionof laser-powered rockets17), even if the relevantagreement defined weapons in terms of theircapabilities rather than intended uses, therecould be ambiguity as to the legality of deploy-ing such mirrors.

When ambiguities are foreseen, treaty lan-guage can be worded to avoid them. However,history has demonstrated that it is extremelydifficult to foresee all the significant ambi-guities that could arise in an arms controlagreement.

Assessment

If monitoring data are interpreted to indi-cate that an activity prohibited by a treaty (orpossibly inadvertently allowed by ambiguityof the treaty) is taking place (or about to takeplace), the risk which the activity poses to U.S.security must be assessed. This assessmentmust take into consideration at least three fac-tors: 1) the threat to U.S. national securityposed by the specific violation; 2) assuming the

loThe lmge deployable reflector (LDR) under development byNASA is an example of such a component.

l~R.R. Berggren and G.E. Lenertz, ‘‘Feasibility of a 3@ MeterSpace Based Laser Transmitter, ” NASA-CR-134903, 1975[NTIS accession number N-761 1421].

122

violation, the extent to which the relevanttreaty still contributes to U.S. national secu-rity; and 3) the ability of the United States totake actions which will prevent, mitigate, orcompensate for damage that might be causedby the violation. The result of such an assess-ment will often imply the appropriate natureof the recourse to be pursued.

Recourse

Given the many different activities thatASAT arms control could restrict and the nu-merous ways that such agreements could beviolated, it is difficult to make generalizationsabout how the United States might or shouldrespond. Faced with a clear violation of a ma-jor treaty provision that seriously jeopardizedU.S. national security, the United Stateswould be wise to withdraw from the treaty inquestion. If, on the other hand, the existenceof a violation was uncertain and it pertainedonly to a subsidiary portion of an otherwisevaluable treaty, then it might be appropriateto seek consultation to resolve this particularactivity while leaving the treaty otherwise in-tact.18 Alternatively, unilateral defensive coun-termeasures or R&D on treaty compliant

Wthers have argued that the mere fact that a treaty has beenviolated is as important as the national security impact of theviolation. For example, Colin Gray writes:

The Soviet noncompliance issue is not important as a matterof ethics or because the sanctity of international legal normsmust be upheld . . Nor is Soviet cheating primarily importantin terms of military advantage and disadvantage . . (Tlhe great-est danger . . . results from the loss of U.S. credibility. . . (W~aris more likely to explode out of a mutual diplomatic miscalcula-tion (than a military imbalance), That miscalculation could berooted . in a Soviet lack of respect for the quality of determi-nation in U.S. policy.

Cohn Gray, “Moscow is Cheating, $’ Fore&n Poficy, No. 56, fall1984, pp. 141-152.

offensive measures might be pursued to hedgeagainst breakout. The hardest questions arethose that arise somewhere between these twoexamples.

ASAT arms control raises a number of ques-tions common to all high-technology treaty re-strictions. For example, if one party violatesa test ban on advanced directed-energyASATS and then, when confronted with theviolation, declares its intent not to repeat thisviolation, what is the appropriate response?Some would argue that the damage has beendone. One side has had the opportunity to ver-ify a technology which it may have been de-veloping covertly over a period of years. Theside which remained in compliance has lost notonly the information it could have gotten fromsimilar tests, but potentially, years of researchexperience. Others might argue that limitedtesting or minor ambiguities offer no real andenduring military advantage.

Other responses to clear or uncertain treatyviolations include negotiating modifications tothe agreement or matching cheating with iden-tical or equivalent conduct. Negotiating modi-fications can be a long and contentious proc-ess, particularly if the negotiations require oneparty to admit to treaty violations or ambig-uous conduct. Given the differences betweenSoviet and U.S. force structure and technol-ogy base, matching cheating with identicalconduct is often not a useful alternative. Forexample, the United States may not desire tobuild a Krasnoyarsk-style radar. On the otherhand, matching cheating with equivalent con-duct (the so-called “parallel interpretation”alternative) runs counter to notion that atreaty should have one common understand-ing which is accepted by both parties.

Chapter 7

Comparative Evaluationof ASAT Policy Options

Contents

PagePolicy Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................125

ASAT Policy Choices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................125Alternative Legal/Technical Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .125

Regime I: Existing Constraints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....127Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............127Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............128Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..128Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............129

Regime 2: A Comprehensive Anti-Satellite andSpace-Based Weapon Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......130

Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........,.....130Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............131Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............,131Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........................131

Regime 3: An ASAT Weapon Test Ban andSpace-Based Weapon Deployment Ban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .132

Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................132Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...........132Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................133Net Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............133

Regime4: “OneEach/NoNew Types’ ’ Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .134Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............134Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............134Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..135Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................135

Regime 5: Rules of the Road . . . . . . . . ...............................136Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............136Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............138Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................138Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . + . . . . . . . . . . . . ......138

Regime6: Space Sanctuaries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............138Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............138Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....4... . ...............139Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .....................139Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................139

Regime 7: A Space-Based BMD Regime . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .140Legal Regime.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................140Offensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................140Defensive Posture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......................140Net Assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................141

TableTable No. Page7-1. Effect of Regimes on ASAT Development and Arms Control. . ......126

.

Chapter 7

Comparative Evaluationof ASAT Policy Options

POLICY OVERVIEW

ASAT Policy Choices

Over the next 5 years, the United States willhave to make key decisions regarding researchand development programs for anti-satelliteweapons and countermeasures and for ballis-tic missile defense (BMD) systems. In addi-tion, the United States must also considerwhether it wishes to seek agreement with theSoviet Union to halt or limit the developmentof certain weapons that would operate fromspace or against space objects. This chapteranalyzes the relationships between offensiveand defensive weapons programs and armscontrol. In so doing, it utilizes the technologydiscussions contained in chapters 3 and 4 andthe discussions of arms control found in chap-ters 5 and 6.

As discussed in chapter 6, those regimeswhich require negotiated arms control agree-ments could be either of limited or unlimitedduration. Opponents of developing BMD sys-tems might prefer an agreement of unlimitedduration. Agreements of limited duration–perhaps 5-10 years—might be attractive toproponents of advanced BMD research if theycould be fashioned so as not to interfere withplans to develop and test prototype BMDweapons. Such agreements would have the ad-ded benefit of temporarily constraining the de-velopment or testing of advanced .ASAT weap-ons which could attack space-based BMDsystem components.

Alternative Legal/Technical Regimes

This chapter considers possible arms controlprovisions, ASAT postures, and counter-meas-ures together as packages in order to exan~-ine their interaction. Since there are many con-ceivable packages, it is necessary to select a

limited number for analysis. These packageshave been constructed so that each will haveat least one advantage over the others consid-ered and so that each contains elements whichmight reasonably be expected to coexist in thesame proposal. Consideration of these regimesis intended to facilitate assessment of the ef-fectiveness and desirability of different com-binations of ASAT and BMD technology de-velopment, satellite survivability, and armscontrol.

The seven regimes considered in the remain-ing

1

2.

?<.

sections of this chapter are]:

Existing Constraints. The first regime isdefined by treaties and agreements pres-ently in force. The ways in which this legalregime would affect technology develop-ments designed to protect U.S. satellitesor to place Soviet satellites at risk will beexamined.A Comprehensive Anti-Satellite and Space-Based Weapon Ban. Regime two could beestablished by adhering to treaties andagreements presently in force and, inaddition, agreeing to forgo the possessionof deliberate anti-satellite weapons, thetesting—on Earth or in space—of anydeliberate ASAT capability, the testingin an ‘‘ A SAT mode’ of systems with in-herent ASAT capabilities, and deploy-ment—on Earth or in space—of anyASAT weapon.An ASA’T Weapon Test Ban and a Space-Based Weapon Deployment Ban. The third

‘These reginles might usefully include elements not discusswih(rc, ~70J” ex:jmp]t, r~~~jn]t,s ~, ,?, 4, and 5 might also include a“no-use” pro~ l~ion w hi(h would prohihit the parties from de-st ro~ri ng or ‘‘ rend(’rirrg inoperah]e each others satellites.

“resting in an “AS. A’I’ mode” would include tests of land-,vea , air-, or spacf~-has(wi s~’st(~nls agairlst targets in space ora~rai ns t points in spa(YI

125

126

4.

5.

6,

‘7.

regime could be created by adhering totreaties and agreements presently in forceand, in addition, agreeing to forgo test-ing in an “A SAT mode” and the deploy-ment of any weapon in space. This regimediffers from regime 2 most importantlyin that it would not ban possession ortesting–on Earth-of deliberate ASATweapons.A “One Each/No New Types” Regime. Re-gime 4 includes arms limitation provi-sions which would permit the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union to test anddeploy their current ASATS but wouldprohibit testing of more advanced sys-tems. Advanced systems prohibitedwould include those capable of operatingor attacking targets at higher altitudesand those that would be deployed inspace. For the purposes of this assess-ment, the U.S. MV will be considered tobe the only deliberate “current” U.S.ASAT.Rules of the Road. The fifth regime illus-trates the advantages and disadvantagesof establishing ‘‘keep-out zones’ aroundindividual, high-value satellites.Space Sanctuaries. Regime 6 would pro-vide high-altitude sanctuaries where sat-ellites could operate but where the test-ing or deployment of weapons would beforbidden.A Space-Based BMD Regime. The seventhregime might result from U.S. or Sovietwithdrawal from the ABM Treaty fol-lowed by the deployment of space-basedBMD systems.

As table 7-1 demonstrates, the regimes dis-cussed here can be characterized both by theextent to which they rely on negotiated armscontrols and by the extent to which they al-low or encourage ASAT development. Withthe exception of the “Existing Constraints”and the “Space-Based BMD” regimes, allother regimes involve some type of arms con-trol. With the exception of the “Comprehen-sive Anti-satellite and Space-Based WeaponBan, ” and perhaps, the “A SAT Weapon Test

—

Table 7-1 .—Effect of Regimes on ASAT Developmentand Arms Control

—.————Restrict with Develop ASATarms control weapons

Existing constraints ... No YesComprehensive ASAT

and space-basedweapon ban . . . . Yes No

Test ban and space-based weapon ban . . . . Yes Yes/No a

One each/no new types ., Yes Yesb

Rules of the road . . . . Yes Yes c

Space sanctuary ... . . . Yes YesC

Ballistic missile defense . No Yesain this regime ASAT weapons could be developed, tested, and dePloyed on Eaflh

but not In space The United States could pursue ASAT development wlthln thebounds of the treaty, or (t could forego ASAT development entirely

bAll ASAT weapons other than “current types” could not be tested or deployedIn space

c Development and deployment opt !onal but strongly SU pported by advocates ofthis regime

Ban and Space-Based Weapon DeploymentBan, ” all other regimes assume some level ofASAT development. These regimes demon-strate that although anti-ASAT arms controlarguments and pro-ASAT weapon argumentsare related, there are many distinguishing fea-tures. ASAT arms control proponents believethat an ASAT treaty is in the national inter-est; those who support ASAT weapon devel-opment believe that this also is in the nationalinterest. However, ASAT arms control propo-nents do not necessarily oppose all types ofASAT development and ASAT weapon prop~nents do not necessarily oppose all types ofASAT arms control.

Although the individual regimes vary con-siderably, all of them should be assessed withtwo important considerations in mind:

1. First, if we wish to continue to use spacefor military purposes, a commitment to sat-ellite survivability is essential whether ornot any arms limitation agreements are inforce. The existence of space systems withsome inherent A SAT capability makes itimpossible to ban the ability to attack sat-ellites. Therefore, even under the most re-strictive ASAT arms control regime, pro-grams for satellite survivability andcountermeasures must be pursued. In theabsence of arms control limitations on

127

2.

ASATS, ensuring satellite survivability there will always be some risk that criti-will be a more demanding task. cal satellites can be destroyed or renderedSecond, the United States should exercise inoperable. The value of continued and fu-caution in its reliance on space assets to !per- ture reliance on space systems must beform tasks essential to the national secu- balanced against the probability thatrity. No matter what arms control or sat- such assets may not be available in a con-ellite survivability measures are taken, flict situation.

REGIME 1: EXISTING CONSTRAINTS

Legal Regime

The United States could decide that thereare no additional arms control limitations re-lating to space weapons that are in its nationalsecurity interest. If so, development of anti-satellite and space-based weapons by theUnited States and the U.S.S.R. could continueunrestrained except by the Limited Test BanTreaty, the Outer Space Treaty, and the ABMTreaty.’

Even in the absence of new arms controllimitations there are restrictions on what theUnited States and the Soviet Union can do inspace. As discussed in chapter 5, under exist-ing international law and the treaties to whichthe United States is a party, the followingactivities are already banned:

●

——.

Unprovoked Attack on Another Country’sSatellite: Subject to the right of individ-ual or collective self-defense, Article 2 ofthe U.N. Charter prohibits the use orthreat of force. A similar sentiment is tobe found in Article III of the 1967 Outer

.‘The unratified Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the unrati-

fied SAI,T 11 Treaty, if adhered to, would supply additionalrestrictions. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, which was signedin 1974, prohibits testing orI Earth of nuclear weapons with ayield greater than 150 kilotons. Should a nuclear ASAT weaponrequire a nuclear explosive of greater yield than this, it couldnot be fully tested without violating the Threshold Test BanTreaty. Under Article IX of the Salt II Treaty, the partiesagreed not to develop, test, or deploy “systems for placing intoEarth orbit nuclear weapons. ” This might be interpreted to in-clude nuclear A SAT weapons.

Space Treaty. The SALT and ABM Trea-ties also prohibit interference by eitherstate with space assets used by the otherto monitor those treaties.Placement of Nuclear Weapons in Orbit:Article IV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty(OST) prohibits orbiting nuclear weapons.This would include nuclear “space mines’and, presumably, ASATS that used a nu-clear explosion as a power source.Detonation of Nuclear Weapons in Space:The 1963 Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT)prohibits nuclear weapons tests or othernuclear explosions in space. This wouldprohibit the full testing of ASATS thatuse nuclear explosions for destruction oras a power source.Development, Testing, or Deployment ofWeapons Capable of Countering StrategicBallistic Missiles, or Their Elements inFlight: Space-based weapons sophisti-cated enough to “counter strategic ballis-tic missiles or their elements in fLight” arebanned under the terms of the 1972 ABMTreaty. This establishes a somewhatvague upper limit on the capabilities ofadvanced ASAT weapons.

To summarize, the existing international le-gal regime prohibits the use of ASAT capa-bility except in national or collective self-defense, the testing or deployment of space-based weapons with strategic BMD capabil-ity, and the testing in space or deployment inorbit of nuclear space mines or ASATS that

128

would require a nuclear detonation as a powersource. The existing regime places few restric-tions on the current ASAT research and de-velopment programs of either the UnitedStates or the Soviet Union.

Offensive Posture

In the absence of further restrictions, the fol-lowing weapons could be developed, tested,and deployed as deliberate ASAT weapons byeither the United States or the Soviet Union,if deployed in compliance with the ABMTreaty (i.e., so as not to be capable of coun-tering strategic ballistic missiles or their ele-ments in flight)4:

●

●

●

� ✍ �

Coorbital Interceptors: Ground-launched,nonnuclear coorbital interceptors—e.g.,the current Soviet ASAT–are allowableunder the existing regime. Ground-basednuclear systems could be developed anddeployed but not tested in space. Thereare no restrictions on nonnuclear coorbi-tal interceptors predeployed as spacemines.Direct-Ascent Interceptors: Ground-launched or air-launched direct-ascent in-terceptors–e.g., the U.S. ASAT beingdeveloped–are allowable. Direct-ascentinterceptors carrying nuclear weaponscould be developed and deployed but nottested in space.Ground-Based or Airborne Lasers: Thereare no restrictions on nuclear or nonnu-clear ground based lasers, or on airbornelasers that would not require a nuclear ex-plosion in the atmosphere.———

‘The constraint that ASAT weapons not be deployed so asto be capable of countering strategic ballistic missiles or theirelements in fight is restrictive, but several deployment schemescan be conceived which would be both lawful and useful. Forexample, a neutral particle beam weapon of relatively low powermight be deployed in geosynchronous orbit for ASAT or DSATpurposes. It might be capable of damaging an enemy satelliteor ASAT several hundred kilometers away within severalseconds, but incapable of darnaging a distant ballistic missileduring its flight time of a few minutes. Deployment of suchweapons might also be allowed in low orbit, if the U.S.-SovietStanding Consultative Commission-which was established bythe ABM Treaty to consider allegations of treaty violations—should agree that such weapons, if never tested as BMD sys-tems, could not reasonably be expected to have a significantBMD capability.

●

●

●

Space-Based Lasers: Nonnuclear, space-based lasers are allowable.Space-Based Neutral Particle Beam Weap-ons: There are no restrictions on space-based neutral particle beam weapons.Maneuverable Spacecraft: Although notnecessarily “deliberate” ASAT systems,maneuverable spacecraft could be givensubstantial A SAT capabilities under theexisting regime.

In addition to these deliberate ASAT sys-tems, other weapon systems such as ICBMSor ABMs that have some ASAT capabilitycould be developed and deployed, but couldnot be completely tested as ASAT weapons.Such systems could be tested in space as longas they were not detonated. The SALT agree-ments and the ABM Treaty do place other re-strictions on ICBMS and ABMs.

Defensive Posture

The United States and the Soviet Unioncould develop, test, deploy, and use defensivemeasures such as hiding, deception, evasion,hardening, and proliferation without legal re-straint in the existing regime. In addition tosuch passive countermeasures, nondestructiveactive countermeasures such as electroniccountermeasures (ECM) and electro-opticalcountermeasures (E-OCM) could also be used.ECM and E-OCM are likely to be available andinexpensive and are unlikely to by restrictedby arms control agreements; however, thesecountermeasures could be defeated at a rea-sonable cost.

Many destructive active countermeasureswould also be allowed under the present re-gime. Satellites could be given a self-defensecapability (shoot-back) or provided with an es-cort defense (DSAT). The current ASAT in-terceptors being developed by the UnitedStates and the Soviet Union (respectively, theU.S. Air Force Miniature Vehicle and Sovietcoorbital interceptor) are not capable of attack-ing each other. However, many advancedASAT weapons that could be built in the cur-rent regime would have some effectivenessagainst some types of ASATS. For example,

129

a space-based neutral particle beam weapon,in addition to its ASAT role, could also be usedas a DSAT to provide ‘enclave defense’ ‘—i.e.,to defend a number of distant satellites fromother weapons such as coorbital or direct-ascent interceptors or continuous-wave lasers.However, neutral particle beam weapons de-ployed as DSATS could not shoot back effec-tively at larger neutral particle beam ASATS,nor could they shoot back effectively at ex-pendable single-pulse weapons such as pre-deployed nuclear “space mines” or some nu-clear or nonnuclear directed-energy weapons.

Moreover, if shoot-back is to be effective,space objects with known or suspected A SATcapabilities would have to be fired upon whilestill some distance from U.S. satellites be-lieved to be in danger. As discussed above, at-tacking an approaching spacecraft is pro-hibited by international law except in self-defense and one could not be certain that theapproaching spacecraft had a hostile intentuntil it was too late. Hence, active defenseagainst suspected “space mines” might beconsidered to be unlawful in the existing re-gime, although deployment of means for suchdefense may not be.

Neither passive nor active countermeasurescould guarantee the survival of satellites at-tacked by some advanced directed-energyweapons. Although, as discussed in chapter4, the cost of destroying small, inexpensivesatellites and decoys with advanced directed-energy weapons might exceed the cost ofbuilding such satellites and decoys. Securityfor large and expensive satellites might ulti-mately have to rely on an attempt to deterA SAT attacks by credibly threatening retali-ation against enemy space-based or terrestrialassets. A credible retaliatory capability wouldrequire a means of discovering that U.S. sat-ellites had been attacked and identifying theattacker. This would probably require attacksensors mounted on satellites and a space-based surveillance system to track and distin-guish ASATS from meteorites or space debris.The latter could also be used to verify com-pliance with future A SAT arms control agree-

ments, if any, or for targeting future ASAT(or DSAT) weapons, if any.

Net Assessment

Treaties and agreements presently in forcecreate no significant barrier to the develop-ment, testing, and deployment of very capa-ble, nonnuclear ASAT weapons. 5 The currentregime also allows a wide range of active andpassive countermeasures, including the de-velopment of satellites capable of defendingthemselves by striking at attacking ASATweapons.

The primary advantage of the current re-gime is that it allows the almost unrestrainedapplication of U.S. technology to the relatedproblems of protecting U.S. satellites and plac-ing threatening Soviet satellites at risk. Un-der this regime, the United States would befree to use its comparative advantage in ad-vancecl technology to keep pace with expecteddevelopments in Soviet ASATS and other mil-itary satellites. Advanced U.S. ASATS mightdiscourage the development of more capableSoviet military satellites designed to placeU.S. terrestrial assets at risk. In addition, theUnited States would be free to respond to So-viet ASAT weapons with increasingly sophis-ticated defensive weapons and countermeas-ures, thereby reducing the probability tl-iat theSoviets could successfully use their intentionalor inherent A SAT capabilities. Effective A SATcapability could also give the United Statesa powerful countermeasure against potentialSoviet space-based BMD systems.

In addition, research and development onnew balfistic missile defense technologies canalso proceed without the constraints thatmight be imposed by certain ASAT arms con-trol regimes. Testing of advanced ASATScould provide valuable information that wouldcontribute to the development of very capa-ble BMD systems. Such testing in the “ASAT

5ASAT weapons capable of operating in an “ABM mode’ are,or course, limited by the ABM treaty. See discussion, supra,p. 127.

mode” could allow some research to go for-ward that, if designated as BMD research,might be considered to be inhibited by theABM Treaty .

The primary disadvantage of the current re-gime is that it might lead to an expensive andpotentially destabilizing arms race in space.Rather than protecting satellites, a competi-tion in space weapons might severely reducetheir military utility. Under conditions of un-restrained competition, security might be pur-chased only at the price of a substantial andsustained commitment to the development ofincreasingly sophisticated offensive and defen-sive space weapons. In such an environment,ensuring the survivability of satellites wouldrequire more than simple hardening or eva-sion. Costly measures might have to be takensuch as the deployment of precision decoys,pre-deployed spares, or the ability to quicklyreconstitute ones space assets. Satellites ca-pable of defending themselves or a compan-ion satellite might ~so have to be developedand deployed.

Should space mines or directed-energy weap-ons be deployed, they might be capable of thealmost instantaneous destruction of a largenumber of critical satellites and ASATS. Thiscould force nations into a situation in whichthey must “use or lose” their own pre-de-ployed space weapons. This might supply theincentive to escalate an otherwise manageablecrisis. If missile early warning and communi-cation satellites were highly vulnerable, crisisstability might be lessened. The malfunction

of such satellites could be misinterpreted asa sign of imminent attack, since potential nu-clear aggressors would find such satellites tobe attractive targets.

Another potentially destabilizing factor isthat some satellites (particularly communica-tion satellites) play a dual role—they are in-tended to be force multipliers in a conventionalwar, yet they are to play a key role in manag-ing a conflict so as to avoid unwarranted es-calation. In the event of a conventional war,the possessor of a capable ASAT systemwould have a strong incentive to attack sat-ellites that were providing support to conven-tional enemy forces. Destruction of these sat-ellites, however, might contribute to escalationfrom conventional to nuclear war.

An unrestra ined compet i t ion in ASATweapons would also increase the risk posed tospace-based ballistic missile defense systems.Such systems are likely to have many criticalassets based in low-Earth orbit. So situated,extensive precautions would have to be takento protect them from even modest ASATweapons.

It is possible that an ASAT weapon com-petition could also inhibit the use of space forcommercial and scientific purposes. Mannedspace stations would be quite vulnerable toASAT attack. Should considerable ASATtesting take place, the resulting debris couldprove harmful to scientific and commercialsatellites.

REGIME 2: A COMPREHENSIVE ANTI-SATELLITE AND SPACE-BASED WEAPON BAN

Legal Regime

This regime could be established by adher-ing to treaties and agreements presently inforce and, in addition, agreeing to forego thepossession of deliberate anti-satellite weapons,the testing—on Earth or in space—of any de-liberate ASAT weapon, the testing in an “ASATmode” of systems with inherent ASAT capa-

bilities, and the deployment–on Earth or inspace—of any ASAT weapon.6 In addition, theU.S.S.R. would be required to destroy all its

. — —‘iSuch an agreement might resemble the draft treaty proposed

to the United Nations by the U.S.S.R. in August of 1983, ex-cept the testing or use of manned spacecraft for military pur-poses would not, in general, be banned as proposed in Article2 of the 1983 Soviet draft treaty. (U.N. Document A/38/194,Aug. 23, 1983). The fifth provision of Article 2 of this proposed

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coorbital interceptors and the United Stateswould be required to destroy the direct-ascentinterceptor it is currently developing.

Offensive Posture

In this regime, the United States could notmaintain any deliberate ASAT weapons,whether dedicated or multi-role, nor would theU.S.S.R. be allowed to do so. Space systemswith inherent ASAT capabil it ies such asICBMS, ABMs, and maneuverable spacecraftwould still be allowed, but they could not betested in an “A SAT mode. ”

Defensive Posture

Under a comprehensive ASAT ban the UnitedStates would retain the right to deploy and usepassive countermeasures such as hiding, de-ception, evasion, hardening, and proliferation.The United States would not be allowed to de-velop, possess, test, or deploy weapons for sat-ellite self-defense, defensive satellites (DSATS),or other systems intended to have anti-sat-ellite capabilities, even for defensive purposes.

If the U.S.S.R. complied fully with the let-ter of such a comprehensive ASAT ban, therisk posed to U.S. satellites would be limitedto the risk posed by possible Soviet use ofICBMS, SLBMS, ABM interceptors, and pos-sible future highly maneuverable spacecraft.If U.S. satellites were hardened against the ef-fects of nuclear explosions to a modest degree,only low-altitude U.S. satellites would be atsignificant risk of damage by such inherentASAT capabilities, and then primarily at thenuclear level of conflict. Assuming Soviet com-pliance, U.S. warning and communications

——treaty would obligate parties “not to test or use manned space-craft for military, including anti-satellite, purposes. ” If this pro-vision were stricken or changed to read “not to test or usemanned spacecraft for anti- satellite purposes, the resultingdraft treaty, if acceded to by the United States and the U. S. S. R.,would establish a regime of the type considered in this section.The fifth provision of Article 2 of the proposed Soviet drafttreaty would obligate parties *’Not to test or create new anti-satellite systems and to destroy any anti-satellite systems the~may already have.

satellites in high-altitude orbits would enjoya high degree of security in this regime.

Net Assessment

Although this regime would contain themost far-reaching arms control provisions andtherefore might be most effective at prevent-ing the development of new and more threat-ening ASAT weapons, it would have the dis-advantage of being the most difficult to verify.Unlike an ASAT Test/Space-based WeaponDeployment Ban (regime 3), a comprehensiveban would prohibit possession of ASAT weap-ons on Earth. Because it is difficult to obtaininformation about Soviet military affairs, theUnited States would have to assume that theSoviet Union could possess some number oftheir current ASAT weapon.

The current Soviet coorbital interceptor isa relatively small spacecraft launched on muchlarger, general-purpose boosters. Maintainingsuch boosters and their launchpads would beallowed, and it would have to be assumed thatthe U.S.S.R. would continue such activities.Construction of additional boosters and launch-pads would also be allowed by an ASAT banof the type considered here. Hence the U.S.S.R.could maintain and even expand its ASATforce with some confidence that the UnitedStates could not gain unambiguous evidenceof a violation of an A SAT possession ban.However, even if the U.S.S.R. maintainedsome coorbital interceptors, it could not testthem without risking almost certain detection,and in time the confidence of Soviets in a long-untested and never perfected A SAT weaponmight erode.

There would always be the possibility thatthe Soviets might develop a new type of A SATweapon with the intention of using it, with-out prior testing, in extremis (e.g., if anticipat-ing an imminent attack). For example, theU.S.S.R. might equip an existing booster orsatellite vehicle with a nuclear explosive—either an isotropic nuclear weapon or possiblya nuclear directed-energy weapon—and main-tain it in readiness for launch or actuallylaunch it into space. The military utility of

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such untested systems would be questionable,particularly if the United States aggressivelypursued available satellites survivabilitymeasures.

Since the United States might agree to acomprehensive ASAT ban only after consid-erable political friction over question of com-pliance and verification, it would be importantto consider how such a ban might make agreater contribution to U.S. national securitythan a ban on ASAT testing and space-basedweapon deployment (regime 3). The purposeof both bans would be to prevent the use ofASATS, or, at minimum, to reduce the prob-ability that an ASAT attack would be effec-tive. An ASAT test ban would primarily affectweapons reliability, while an ASAT possessionban, if observed, would affect both availabil-ity and reliability. It is conceivable that the

risk posed by possible illegal Soviet use ofASAT weapons might be somewhat lower ina regime in which the Soviets could not law-fully possess ASAT weapons. Presumably, theinability to overtly possess ASAT weaponswould diminish one’s ability to use them ef-fectively. Furthermore, an absolute ban onpossession might make it less likely that thecurrent generation of ASAT weapons could beupgraded and held in readiness in significantnumbers.

However, if the United States could only beconfident that the Soviets were complyingwith a treaty to the extent we could verifycompliance, then the United States would nothave confidence that this regime offered anygreater protection to our satellites than doesregime 3 (test ban and space-based weaponsban).

REGIME 3: AN ASAT WEAPON TEST BAN AND SPACE-BASEDWEAPON DEPLOYMENT BAN

Legal Regime

This regime would ban what can be moni-tored with greater confidence—testing in an“ASAT mode”7 and ASAT deployment inspace. Everything that is prohibited under thecurrent regime would continue to be prohib-ited. In addition, further testing—in space—of the current Soviet coorbital interceptor andthe U.S. direct-ascent interceptor would beprohibited, as would the placement of anyweapons in space. Unlike regime 2, this regimewould not attempt to ban testing, possession,or deployment of ASAT weapons on Earth.

Offensive Posture

Although they could not be tested overtlyin an “ASAT mode, ” a number of weaponswhich have some limited A SAT capability al-ready exist or could be developed. ICBMS,ABMs, and maneuverable spacecraft already———— .———

‘Testing in an “A SAT mode” would include tests of ground-,air-, sea-, or space-based systems against targets in space oragainst points in space. Testing on the ground of ASAT sys-tems or components would not be prohibited.

exist and have inherent ASAT capabilitieswhich pose some threat to satellites. It mightbe possible to increase the ASAT potential ofthese systems without violating a ban on thetesting of ASAT weapons. In addition, uponentry into force of a ban on ASAT testing, theUnited States and the U.S.S.R. would possessdeliberate ASAT weapons which would haveundergone some developmental testing, al-though possibly not enough to perfect theirdesigns. Such weapons could be maintainedin partial readiness. However, without opera-tional testing for reliability evaluation andtraining purposes, confidence in the effectiveness of such weapons would probably degradein time.

Advanced ASAT weapons such as neutralparticle beam weapons or x-ray lasers couldbe developed and maintained in partial readi-ness, but could not be completely tested. Con-fidence that such weapons would perform adequately if used might be so low that one wouldnot rely on them in an aggressive first strikenor find it cost-effective to develop them forthat purpose. On the other hand, one might

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use them, if attacked, to degrade enemy ca-pabilities supported by satellites, and mightfind it cost-effective to develop them for thatpurpose. That is, the discrepancy between of-fense conservatism and defense conservatismmight decrease the risk which untested weap-ons could pose if possessed by an aggressivenation.

Defensive Posture

In this regime, testing and deployment inspace of advanced ASAT weapons would beprohibited but might be attempted by theU.S.S.R. covertly or after a breakout.8 Hencethe choice of passive countermeasures in thisregime would be influenced by the same con-siderations which favor deception and modestnuclear hardening in the existing regime. Suchmeasures would be more effective, however,in a test-ban regime because it could be as-sumed that the ASAT threat would be reducedto some degree by the arms control provision.Passive countermeasures would also be moreimportant in this regime, because destructiveactive security measures—e.g., shoot-backwith reliable, tested DSAT weapons—wouldnot be an option. Deep-space surveillancewould be even more desirable in this regimethan in the existing regime, because of theneed to monitor compliance as well as for itsrole in providing attack assessment informa-tion. Hence, in a test-ban regime, attack sen-sors, space-based LWIR sensors, satellite de-coys, and modest nuclear hardening would beat least as desirable, as in the existing regime,if not more so.

Nondestructive active countermeasures suchas ECM and E-OCM would be desirable, if not

‘Although deployment of an NPB in space—a prerequisitefor testing-would probably be observable, maintaining an un-tested NPB weapon on Earth in readiness for quick launchmight not be, and would be allowed. Maintaining an untestedXRL weapon on Earth in readiness for quick launch might alsobe difficult to dekt and would also be allowed under the termsof an ASAT test and SBW deployment ban. Illegal deploymentof an untested XRL in space would be difficult and costly toobserve. However, an enemy could have little confidence in thereliability and performance of untested NPB or XRL weapons,so such weapons would not be as threatening as in the exist-ing regime in which NPB weapons could be legally tested inspace.

inherent, in a test-ban regime, just as in theexisting regime. Destructive active counter-measures, on the other hand, would be se-verely constrained: new ASAT weapons use-ful as DSATS could be developed but could notbe tested nor deployed in space. An untestedNPB or XRL built and readied for quicklaunch and use as a DSAT could not be respon-sive enough to use for defensive shoot-backagainst expedient ASAT weapons such asICBMS but might have value if maintained forretaliatory shoot-back.

Net Assessment

A negotiated ban on the testing of weaponsin space or against space objects would limitthe nature and extent of U.S. and Soviet armscompetition in space. Advanced ASAT di-rected-energy weapons which could threatenhigh-altitude satellites with prompt destruc-tion could not be lawfully tested and attemptsto extensively test such weapons covertlywould probably be detectable. Although sucha ban could not eliminate all threats to satel-lites, it would substantially reduce the costand complexity of ensuring a reasonable levelof satellite survivability. The United Stateswould still benefit from hardening its satellitesto some extent and deploying spares and de-coys, but the more elaborate, expensive, andpossibly ineffective precaution of developingand deploying DSATS would be prohibitedand, indeed, less attractive. In the absence ofreliable, effective ASATS, satellites would beof greater utility since the United Statesmight have higher confidence that they wouldbe available when needed.

Relative to the existing regime, the primaryadvantage of a regime banning testing ofASAT capabilities and deployment of space-based weapons would be that highly valuedU.S. satellites in higher orbits–e.g., the futureMILSTAR system–could be protected withsome confidence from advanced A SAT weap-ons, especially if protected as well by passivecountermeasures. The fact that advancedASATS could not be overtly tested would re-duce the probability that they would be devel-

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oped and deployed. If they were developed andused without prior or complete testing, the im-probability of their success compounded withthe improbability of their attacking an oper-ational satellite rather than a decoy (if suchare deployed) would afford such satellites con-siderable protection and would, at least, dis-proportionately increase an enemy’s cost foran effective ASAT capability. In addition, aban on testing advanced ASAT weapons anddeploying them in space would plausibly in-hibit future competition in developing space-based weapons and would discourage devel-opment and covert testing and deployment ofASAT weapons of types which would pose thestrongest incentives for preemptive ASAT at-tack. These benefits might be deemed advan-tageous by both the United States and theU.S.S.R.

As in the existing regime, the United Statescould retain a capability to attempt to negatelow-altitude Soviet satellites (e.g., RORSAT)with its MV ASAT in the event of war and torespond in kind to a Soviet ASAT attack.However, confidence in the operational capa-bility of this system might degrade over timewithout continued operational testing.

From the point of view of those interestedin preserving the present agreement beweenthe United States and the Soviet Union limit-ing ballistic missile defenses, another advan-tage of an ASAT test ban would be its pre-vention of tests of ASAT technologies withpotential BMD applications.

On the other hand, from the point of viewof those favoring intensive BMD research, aprimary disadvantage of this regime, relativeto the existing regime, is that the testing ofsome types of advanced BMD weapons mightbe prohibited. Such limitations could beslightly more restrictive than those of theABM Treaty, and would be very restrictivecompared to a regime in which the ABMTreaty was no longer in force [regime 7]. Fi-nally, it must be recognized that a ban on test-ing ASAT capabilities and deploying space-based weapons would not offer absolute pro-tection for satellites; there would remain somepossibility that an untested or partially testedASAT, if suddenly deployed and used, mightactually work well enough to overcome pas-sive countermeasures.

REGIME 4: A “ONE EACH/NO NEW TYPES” REGIME

Legal Regime

A “one each/no new types” regime might beestablished by adhering to agreements cur-rently in force and further agreeing to ban thedeployment in orbit of any weapon and thetesting in space, “in an ASAT mode” of anysystem except the currently operational typeof Soviet coorbital interceptor and the U.S.MV direct-ascent interceptor.g Research on ad-vanced systems and testing of these systemson Earth would not be prohibited.

‘Although the U.S. Department of Defense has stated its be-lief that the Soviets have two ground-based lasers which couldbe used against satellites [U.S. Department of Defense, SovietMfi”hry Power, 1984, p. 35], testing of such lasers as ASATweapons would be prohibited. If these lasers had already beentested as ASATS by the time a “no new types agreement” couldenter into force then this regime might have to be appropri-ately modified.

Offensive Posture

Offensive postures in a “no new types” re-gime would be as in an ASAT test ban andspace-based weapon deployment ban regime(regime 3), except ASAT weapons of the sin-gle allowed type would almost surely be main-tained for offensive ASAT missions in war-time.’” It is possible that each side would besatisfied with the capabilities such fully testedweapons could provide and would be lesstempted than it would be in a test ban regimeto covertly develop advanced ASAT weapons.

loIt is po9sible, of course, that one or both nations woulddecide–as the United States did after ratifying the ABMTreaty–that its allowed system was not worth maintaining.

135——

Defensive Posture

Passive countermeasures appropriate in atest-ban regime would also be appropriate inthis regime, and for the same reasons. In addi-tion, the unambiguous, if limited, threat posedby the one allowed ASAT weapon would pro-vide an additional incentive to deploy passivecountermeasures tailored to that weapon. Forexample, evasion might effectively countercoorbital interceptors such as those tested bythe U. S. S. R., and maneuver-although not lit-erally “evasion”- could complicate targetingof the U.S. MV. These countermeasures wouldprobably be developed and employed eventhough they would not be effective againstmore capable weapons which might be devel-oped but not tested nor deployed in space.

ECM and E-OCM would be allowed in thisregime as in a test-ban/space-based weaponban regime. Current U.S. and Soviet ASATweapons would be insufficiently responsive tobe effective for defensive shoot-back; however,they could be used in retaliation.

Net Assessment

The primary advantage of a “no new types”regime, relative to the existing regime, wouldbe that critical U.S. satellites in higher orbitscould be protected with some confidence fromadvanced ASAT weapons. If developed andused without prior testing, it is possible thatsuch advanced A SAT weapons would not workproperly. If they did work, it would not beclear that they could overcome the survivabil-ity measures that could be given satellites inthis regime. More generally, a ban on testingadvanced ASAT weapons would inhibit tosome extent future arms competition in space.

Assuming the United States had success-fully developed its MV ASAT, a “no new

types” regime might be particularly desirable.Such an agreement could prohibit the testingof Soviet ground-based lasers or MV-typeASAT weapons and limit them to their cur-rent, unsophisticated A SAT weapon. Of course,this would make such an agreement less ac-ceptable to the Soviet Union. Should the So-viets test advanced ASAT weapons beforesuch an agreement can enter into force, suchan agreement would be less advantageous tothe United States. However, since such anagreement might avert the risks posed by evenmore advanced-particularly directed-energyASATs–a “no new types” agreement mightstill be considered valuable and negotiable byboth the United States and the Soveit Union.

As in the existing regime, the United Statescould retain a capability to negate low-altitudeSoviet satellites (e.g., RORSAT) in the eventof war and to respond in kind to a SovietASAT attack. A primary disadvantage of a“no new types” regime, relative to the exist-ing regime, would be that allowed U.S. ASATcapabilities would be inadequate to negatethreatening Soviet satellites if such satelliteswere moved to higher orbits—a feasible butdifficult and costly Soviet countermeasure. Asin the test ban and space-based weapon banregime, the testing of some types of advancedBMD weapons which would be allowed in theexisting regime would be limited in this re-gime. Such limitations could be slightly morerestrictive than those of the ABM Treaty andwould be very restrictive compared to a regimein which the ABM Treaty was no longer in force.

Finally, it must be recognized that the relia-bility of protection afforded high-altitude sat-ellites by a ban on testing “new types” wouldbe uncertain; there would remain some prob-ability that an untested advanced ASAT, ifsuddenly deployed and used, might actuallywork.

136—— — —

REGIME 5: RULES OF THE ROAD

Legal Regime

A legal regime providing for “keep-outzones” around satellites could be establishedby a “rules of the road” agreement similar tothe “Rules of the Road at Sea” Treaty. ” Asdiscussed in chapter 6, such an agreementwould not prohibit development, testing, or de-ployment in space of advanced ASAT weap-ons but would, instead, attempt to enhancesecurity by establishing rules regarding spaceactivities such as close approach of foreign sat-ellites, advance notice of launch activities,high-velocity fly-bys, minimum separation dis-tance between satellites, low-altitude over-flight, and “keep-out zones. ”12

‘‘Keep-out zones’ would probably offer theclosest thing to security in a “rules of theroad” regime. The following “rules of theroad” are illustrative of those which might beagreed should it be decided that “keep-outzones’ are in the U.S. national security in-terest:

9

●

●

●

●

●

Keep 100 kilometers and three degreesout-of-plane from foreign satellites below5,OOO km.Keep 500 km from foreign satellites above5,000 km except those within 500 km ofgeosynchronous altitude.One pre-announced close approach at atime is allowed.In the event of a violation of the rulesabove, the nation of registry of the satel-lite which most recently initiated a ma-neuver “burn” is at fault and guilty oftrespass.Satellites trespassing upon keep-out zones—

‘116 UST 794, TIAS 5813.’21n addition to agreeing to such “rules of the road, ” the

United States and the Soviet Union might have to modify theircommitment to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (18 U.S.T. 2410;T. I.A.S. 6347). Since Article 11 of the Outer Space Treaty statesthat “outer space . . . is not subject to national appropriationby claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or byany other means, ” this could be interpreted as prohibiting estab-lishment of such keep-out zones. A contrary argument main-tains that a precedent for “keep-out zones” can be found in theinternational acceptance of the principle that a satellite shouldnot be placed in geostationary orbit if it will interfere with asatellite already in that orbit,

may be forcibly prevented from continuedtrespass.

The rationale for these rules is as follows:

ASAT weapons such as nuclear intercep-tors would have to be kept at a range ofseveral hundred kilometers from moder-ately hardened satellites in order to pro-tect such satellites; advanced ASAT di-rected-energy weapons might have to bekept much farther away. ’3Satellites in geostationary orbit are al-ready so closely spaced that a keep-outzone sufficiently large to protect satellitesfrom nuclear attack could not be estab-lished around such satellites without dis-placing satellites already there and reduc-ing the number of geostationary orbitalslots available to other nations in thefuture.There are now very few satellites in su-persynchronous orbits,” but critical stra-tegic warning and communications func-tions could be performed by satellites insuch orbits. Should space systems be de-veloped to operate in this region, therewould be adequate room to accommodatelarge keep-out zones.There are presently few satellite orbits indeep space’s but below geosynchronousorbital altitude. The most notable excep-tions are the orbits of various Soviet sat-ellites in highly elliptical, semi-synchro-nous “Molniya-type” orbits, U.S. AirForce Satellite Data System (SDS) satel-lites in similar highly elliptical orbits, andU.S. (NAVSTAR) and Soviet (GLONASS)navigation satellites in semi-synchronouscircular orbits. Although there are, orsoon will be, many such satellites de-

“In re: NDEW, see, e.g., L.A. Wojcik, “Separation Require-ments for Protection of High-Altitude Satellites from Coorbi-tal Anti-Satellite Weapons, ” (Pittsburgh, Pa.: Carnegie-MellonUniversity, Department of Engineering and Public Policy, dis-sertation, March 1985); in re: NPB weapons, see ch. 4 of thisreport.

“I. e., higher than geosynchronous orbitaJ altitude.“I. e., higher than 3,000 nautical miles, or about 5,600

kilometers.

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ployed, several satellites will (or could) oc-cupy the same orbit. For example, 24NAVSTAR satellites will occupy onlythree orbits, with eight satellites follow-ing one another around each of the threeorbits. Hence there would be enough roomin this region of space to accommodatekeep-out zones of several hundred kilom-eters radius around the satellites pres-ently deployed there.

● There are too many satellites in 1ow-Earthorbit—particularly below the inner VanAllen radiation belt which extends fromabout 1,800 km (1,000 nmi) to about 5,600km (3,000 nmi)–to accommodate keep-out zones of several hundred kilometersradius around the satellites presently de-ployed there. Indeed, many satellites haveperigees within several hundred kilome-ters of the Earth’s surface. Requiringkeep-out zones of several hundred kilom-eters radius around low-altitude satelliteswould therefore be impractical.

s However, it would be feasible to establishsmaller keep-out zones around satellitesin low orbit and, in addition, to prohibitsatellites from entering an orbital planeinclined less than, say, three degrees fromthe orbital plane of a foreign satellite atsuch altitudes. Specifying a minimum an-gular separation between orbital planeswould prevent continuous trailing; for ex-ample, two satellites in 1,000 km circularorbits with orbital planes separated bythree degrees would approach each otherclosely every 53 minutes, if properly“phased,” but would separate by as muchas about 400 km at intermediate timesand would be separated by at least 200km about half the time. If, in addition,such satellites were phased so as to notapproach one another more closely than100 km at any time, their separationwould vary between 100 km and morethan 400 km, at minimum. Under suchrules, although satellites would occasion-ally approach one another so closely as tobe mutually vulnerable to, for example,covert on-board nuclear weapons, such ap-proaches would not all occur simultane-

ously. Therefore, adequately hardened,low-altitude satellites could not be in-stantly and simultaneously destroyed byrelatively primitive ASAT weapons.

● There would be some value in allowingone pre-announced close approach at atime as an exception to the rules above.Such an exception would, for example,permit an inspection satellite carrying agamma-ray spectrometer to trail a foreignsatellite while trying to determine whetherthe foreign satellite carried fissionablematerial, possibly in violation of ArticleIV of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. A dis-advantage of such an exception would bethat a trailing “inspection” satellite couldcarry a weapon and destroy the trailedsatellite at close range. However, deploy-ment of one on-orbit spare for any trulyessential satellite would eliminate thisrisk.

Although, given adequate space surveil-lance, it could be verified that two foreignsatellites approached one another moreclosely than would be allowed by theserules, there could be a problem in deter-mining which nation or other party wouldbe guilty of a violation. It is difficult topredict, to within an accuracy of 100 km,where a satellite will be in several monthsas the result of an orbital transfer orstationkeeping maneuver. This is particu-larly true if the satellite is at very low al-titude where it would be subject to atmos-pheric drag or at very high altitude whereit would be subject to the lunar gravita-tional field. Hence, inadvertent close ap-proach might be possible. legal allocationof responsibilities in such a regime mightfollow precedents established in maritimeand, especially, aeronautical law, whichspecifies minimum separation distancesbetween aircraft and gives right-of-way torelatively unmaneuverable aircraft suchas aerostats (balloons) and gliders. Onepossibility would be to give right-of-wayto satellites already in orbit and, by im-plication, to assign fault to whicheverspacecraft most recently initiated or con-tinued a maneuver “burn.”

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The rules suggested above are intended tobe illustrative rather than precise. Carefulframing of an agreement would be required inorder to prohibit unintended abuses such asestablishment of a de facto barrier to deepspace by deploying many small satellites inlow orbit in order to fill an altitude band withkeep-out zones. Rationing keep-out zones—e.g., 10 per nation —could solve this problem,but careful study may be required to foreseeother possible abuses. In addition to its tech-nical problems, this regime is likely to havea significant political dimensions inasmuch asit will affect the rights of all present and fu-ture spacefaring nations.

Offensive Posture

A “keep-out zone” agreement would notconstrain offensive postures, and these couldbe as in the existing regime. The protectionafforded by defended keep-out zones woulddiminish the effectiveness of some types ofweapons such as coorbital interceptors andthereby diminish incentives to include themin a space order of battle. However, the effec-tiveness of advanced ASAT weapons—e.g.,directed-energy weapons–would not be signif-icantly reduced by keep-out zones of the sizeconsidered here.

Defensive Posture

A “keep-out zone” agreement would notconstrain defensive postures, and these couldbe as in the existing regime. Decoys might bean attractive defensive measure in this regime,because “keep-out zones” would inhibit or preelude certain types of close inspection which

might otherwise be able to distinguish decoysfrom valuable satellites (see discussion inchapter 4). The deployment of DSATS or self-defense weapons would also be attractive, be-cause such weapons could be used to enforceagreed keep-out zones. In the existing regime,attempts to enforce a declared keep-out zoneby firing upon a “violating” suspected (but notproven) A SAT would probably be consideredunlawful unless lethal capability and hostileintent of such spacecraft could be established.

Net Assessment

An agreement establishing minimum satel-lite separation rules could establish importantlegal rights to actively defend satellites, andwould be an improvement over the existing regime if an active defense posture were desired.Enforcing agreed keep-out zones using DSATSwould provide protection against relativelyprimitive ASAT weapons such as the currentSoviet coorbital interceptor. However, keep-out zones large enough to protect satellitesfrom advanced directed-energy weapons couldbe accommodated only beyond geosynchro-nous altitude.

A “keep-out zone” regime would have theadvantage of not limiting research, develop-ment, and deployment of ASAT, DSAT, andBMD technologies. On the other hand, sincea defended “keep-out zone” would provide sig-nificant protection against current ASATweapons, it would encourage the developmentof more advanced systems. Such systemswould likely increase in sophistication until themore advanced directed-energy technologies reduced the effectiveness of “keep-out zones. ”

REGIME 6: SPACE SANCTUARIES

Legal Regime Such an agreement would be similar in some

A legal regime prohibiting the deploymentrespects to the Antarctic Treaty,lG the OuterSpace Treaty,” the Treaty for the Prohibition

of weapons in deep space (i.e., at altitudesgreater than 3,000 nmi (5600 km)) or the test- - “The text of the Antarctic Treaty is reprinted in U.S. Arms

ing of any weapons against instrumented tar- Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disar-

gets or other objects in deep space could bemament Agreements (Washington, D. C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office, 1982), pp. 22-26.

established by a “Deep-Space Sanctuary. ” “ibid., pp. 51-55.

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of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America,18 theso-called Seabed Arms Control Treaty,lg andother treaties and agreements which establishdemilitarized or deweaponized zones. Such anagreement would not prohibit development,testing, or deployment in space of ASATweapons but would attempt to enhance secu-rity by banning the testing and deploymentof weapons in deep space where critical stra-tegic satellites are presently based. At present,such systems are invulnerable to currentlyoperational tested ASAT weapons.

In addition to such an agreement, other relevant agreements currently in force (LimitedTest Ban Treay, Outer Space Treaty, ABMTreaty) could remain in force in a “deep-spacesanctuary’ regime. Amendment of the OuterSpace Treaty would not bean issue, since, un-like the “keep-out zone” regime, the “spacesanctuary” regime could not be considered asa national appropriation of space.

Offensive Posture

Offensive postures appropriate in a “keep-out zones” regime [regime 5] would also beappropriate in a deep-space sanctuary regime,and for the same reasons. However, nuclearor kinetic-energy weapons—which would re-quire more time to reach a satellite in deepspace than to reach a satellite inside a smallkeep-out zone—would be less attractive asASAT weapons than in a “keep-out zones’ regime. Advanced directed-energy weapons,when feasible, would be the most capableASAT weapons allowed in this regime, as ina “keep-out zones” regime.

Defensive Posture

Passive countermeasures appropriate in a“keep-out zone” regime would also be appro-priate in this regime, and for the same reasons.

‘aIbid., pp. 64-75; the texts of Protocols I and 11 thereto arereprinted in ibid., pp. 76 and 77, respectively.

‘gFormally titled “Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplace-ment of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruc-tion on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the SubsoilThereof, ” the text of which is reprinted in ibid., pp. 103-105.

However, as in a “keep-out zone” regime, pas-sive countermeasures could not economicallyprotect large and expensive satellites as highas in geosynchronous orbit from advanceddirected-energy weapons, which would be al-lowed in low orbit and which could be ade-quately tested against instrumented targetsatellites in low orbit. As in the existing re-gime, small, inexpensive satellites might beprotected from such advanced weapons be-cause they might cost more to attack than tobuild.

Active countermeasures appropriate in theexisting regime would also be appropriate inthis regime, and for the same reasons. As inthe existing regime, attacking suspicious ap-proaching ASAT weapons would be unlawfulat low altitudes where such objects would haverights of innocent passage. Deployment indeep space of “shoot-back” capabilities orDSATS would probably be prohibited since itmight be impossible to differentiate theseweapons from offensive weapons.

Net Assessment

The primary advantage of this regime wouldbe that it could protect satellites in high or-bits from the current generation of ASATweapons. In addition, a deep-space sanctuaryregime would constrain ASAT developmentless than would a comprehensive test ban re-gime or a nonew-types regime. However, shouldthe United States and the Soviet Union chooseto pursue advanced ASAT weapons, a spacesanctuary might offer only limited protection.

The greatest risks in a space sanctuary re-gime would be posed by advanced directed-energy weapons which could be tested and de-ployed at low altitudes. Such testing and de-ployment would probably be adequate to guar-antee effectiveness against targets at higheraltitudes. Satellites at very high, supersyn-chronous altitudes might still derive some pretection from this regime, but violation of thesanctuary by highly maneuverable kinetic-energy weapons or by satellites covertly car-rying powerful nuclear or directed-energyweapons would remain a risk.

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REGIME 7: A SPACE-BASED BMD REGIME

Legal Regime

If the United States or the Soviet Unionwithdrew from the ABM Treaty, this would,in addition to allowing ballistic missile de-fense, eliminate constraints on ASAT capabil-ities now imposed by that Treaty. The result-ing regime would allow both advanced ASATand space-based BMD weapons. Withdrawalfrom the Limited Test Ban Treaty and theOuter Space Treaty would also be necessaryif the United States or the Soviet Uniondesired to test and deploy space weapons thatused nuclear explosives as a power source.

Offensive Posture

In a space-based BMD regime, ASAT op-tions would be less constrained than in the ex-isting regime and advanced ASAT weaponswould be more essential for defeating space-based enemy BMD system. In such a regime,advanced space-based weapons could be de-ployed at low altitudes and used as ASAT orDSAT weapons as well as for BMD. Somespacebased weapons which would be useful—but not preferred-for satellite negation mightbe deployed in this regime because of their usefulness as BMD weapons. For example, ki-netic-energy weapons and continuous-wavelasers which could destroy fast-burn boostersdeep within the atmosphere might be preferredas BMD weapons over neutral particle beamor X-ray laser directed-energy weapons. Thelatter, although more useful in an ASAT role,could not readily penetrate the atmosphereand therefore may have more limited value asBMD weapons.

Defensive Posture

In a space-based BMD regime, defensivemeasures would be less constrained and moreessential than in the existing regime. Ad-vanced space-based weapons could be de-ployed at low altitudes and then used asASAT or DSAT weapons. In a DSAT role,these weapons could offer some protection tolow-altitude satellites. However, such satel-

lites would probably remain vulnerable to at-tack by larger weapons or by expendablesingle-shot weapons (e.g., single-pulse lasers)which could attack from great range unlessheld at bay by large “keep-out zones. ” As dis-cussed in chapter 4, it is possible that futuretechnological advances might allow decoys tobe developed that were cost-effective whencompared to future offensive weapons and dis-crimination capabilities.

In evaluating offensive and defensive pos-tures in a space-based BMD regime, it is nec-essary to assume that future technology willconfer an advantage to ASAT countermeas-ures vis-a-vis ASAT capabilities. Althoughsuch an assumption may be unjustified atpresent, if the United States is to deploy ad-vanced space-based BMD weapons then itmust also have developed highly effectivecountermeasures to ASAT weapons. It wouldbe irrational for the United States to seek toestablish a “spac~based BMD” regime unlessit judged that adequate numbers of the space-based BMD components would survive or un-less it judged that non-space-based BMD com-ponents could provide an adequate defensewithout spacebased components. Scenarios il-lustrating each of these conditions are im-aginable; for example:

1. The United States may judge that BMDsystems with space-based componentscould not be destroyed by the U. S. S. R.:For example, the United States might de-ploy, in addition to ground-based BMDcomponents, spacebased electromagneticlaunchers for kinetic-energy weapons anddefend them by hardening, deception, andshoot-back. Deceptive measures employedmight include massive decoys made fromasteroidal material such as nickel.zo While

—.20It is speculated that the cost of transporting such material

to low Earth orbit and refining and fabricating finished prod-ucts with it there may eventually be several orders of magni-tude lower than the cost of refining and forming such materi-als on Earth and transporting the products to space. Shouldthis forecast prove accurate, deception may have a favorablecost-exchange ratio even against ASAT systems which can dis-criminate decoys on the basis of mass density.

141— .—

2.

3.

the Soviets might be able to destroy someBMD components, the system as a wholewould survive.The United States may judge that space-based BMD components would not be de-stroyed by the U. S. S. R.: Even if futuretechnology does not favor A SAT counter-measures to the extent assumed in (l),A SAT countermeasure technology couldbe so effective that the Soviet leadershipwould be unwilling to pay the costs ofdefeating the countermeasures.The United States may desire an exten-sive BMD system without space-basedcomponents: For example, U.S. aspirationmight be limited to defense of hardenedfacilities which house strategic retaliatoryforces or command and control systems;this might be accomplished using ground-based radars and interceptors but wouldrequire deployment of more of these overlarger areas than is allowed by the ABMTreaty. Alternatively, the United Statesmight desire an extensive BMD systemcapable of defending industry and popu-lation using only ground-based weapons.

Net Assessment

Depending on one’s viewpoint, the principaladvantage, or disadvantage, of a space-basedBMD regime would be that it would allow theUnited States and the Soviet Union to deployhighly capable weapons in space. Since evena limited BMD system would probably makea very good A SAT system decision to proceedwith BMD deployment necessarily includes adecision not to proceed with certain types ofASAT arms control.”

On March 23, 1983, the President called fora vigorous research program to determine the

“lt is p~ssiblc that in a space-based BMD regime one mightalso wish to negotiate ‘ ‘rules of the road’ such as “keep-outz o n e s , or perhaps ex’en a deep-space sanctuary.

feasibility of highly effective, advanced-tech-nology BMD systems, suggesting that the deployment of such systems, if feasible, wouldbe desirable. Before the United States de-ployed space-based BMD systems it wouldhave to determine, first, that the contributionthat such systems made to U.S. security wasgreat enough to compensate for the threatwhich similar opposing systems would pose toU.S. satellites, and second, that space-basedBMD components could be protected at com-petitive cost against advanced ASATweapons.

The threat to satellites would be greater ina space-based BMD regime than in any otherregime because the BMD weapons wouldlikely have extensive ASAT capabilities. Theexpense of equipping all military satelliteswith countermeasures against such capabil-ities would be considerable, particularly if, assome fear, deployment of space-based BMDsystems will lead to a major arms race in bothoffensive and defensive weapons. However, if,as some argue, space-based missile defensescan make us more secure and encourage theSoviets to make real reductions in offensivemissiles, this would reduce the threat ofU.S./Soviet conflict and to contribute to amutual desire to protect space assets. In aworld where conflict was less likely, satellitevulnerability would be less important.

A SAT countermeasures must prove to be ef-fective for spacebased BMD platforms if a decision to deploy them is to make sense. It ispossible that large improvements in the effec-tiveness or economy of passive countermeas-ures such as combinations of hardening, de-ception, and proliferation might provide theneeded protection. If such improvements oc-cur, they might also be used effectively for sat-ellites in the other regimes discussed above.Alternatively, the superior fire-power or mas-sive shielding of BMD weapons might givethem a degree of protection unattainable bysmaller, less capable satellites.

Appendix A

Soviet Draft Treaty on theProhibition of the Use of Forcein Outer Space and From Space

Against the Earth

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Appendix A

Soviet Draft Treaty on the Prohibition ofthe Use of Force in Outer Space and

From Space Against the EarthU.N. General Assembly document A/38/194, Aug. 22, 1983

The States Parties to this Treaty,Guided by the principle whereby Members of the

United Nations shall refrain in their internationalrelations from the threat or use of force in anymanner inconsistent with the purposes of theUnited Nations,

Seeking to avert an arms race in outer space andthus to lessen the danger to mankind of the threatof nuclear war,

Desiring to contribute towards attainment ofthe goal whereby the exploration and utilizationof outer space, including the Moon and other celes-tial bodies, would be carried out exclusively forpeaceful purposes,

Have agreed on the following:

Article 1

It is prohibited to resort to the use or threat offorce in outer space and the atmosphere and on theEarth through the utilization, as instruments ofdestruction, of space objects in orbit around theEarth, on celestial bodies or stationed in space inany other manner.

It is further prohibited to resort to the use orthreat of force against space objects in orbitaround the Earth, on celestial bodies or stationedin outer space in any other manner.

Article 2

In accordance with the provisions of article 1,States Parties to this Treaty undertake:

1.

2.

Not to test or deploy “by placing in orbitaround the Earth or stationing on celestialbodies or in any other manner any space-based weapons for the destruction of objectson the Earth, in the atmosphere or in outerspace.Not to utilize space objects in orbit around theEarth, on celestial bodies or stationed in outerspace in any other manner as means to de-

3.

4.

5.

stroy any targets on the Earth, in the atmos-phere or in outer space.Not to destroy, darnage, disturb the normalfunctioning or change the flight trajectory ofspace objects of other States.Not to test or create new anti-satellite sys-tems and to destroy any anti-satellite systemsthat they may already have.Not to test or use manned spacecraft for mil-itary, including anti-satellite, purposes.

Article 3

The State Parties to this Treaty agree not to as-sist, encourage or induce any State, group ofStates, international organization or natural or le-gal person to engage in activities prohibited bythis Treaty.

Article 4

1.

2.

For the purposes of providing assurance ofcompliance with the provisions of this Treaty,each State Party shall use the national tech-nical means of verification at its disposal ina manner consistent with generally recognizedprinciples of international law.Each State Party undertakes not to interferewith the national technical means of verifica-tion of other States Parties operating in ac-cordance with paragraph 1 of this article.

Article 5

1.

.

The States Parties to this Treaty undertaketo consult and co-operate with each other insolving any problems that may arise in con-nection with the objectives of the Treaty orits implementation,Consultations and co-operation as provided inparagraph 1 of this article may also be under-taken by having recourse to appropriate in-

145

146

3.

temational procedures within the United Na-tions and in accordance with its Charter. Suchrecourse may include utilization of the serv-ices of the Consultative Committee of StatesParties to the Treaty.The Consultative Committee of States Partiesto the Treaty shall be convened by the deposi-tary within one month after the receipt of arequest from any State Party to this Treaty.Any State Party may nominate a representa-tive to serve on the Committee.

Article 6

Each State Party to this Treaty undertakes toadopt such internal measures as it may deem nec-essary to fulfil its constitutional requirements inorder to prohibit or prevent the carrying out of anyactivity contrary to the provisions of this Treatyin any place whatever under its jurisdiction orcontrol.

Article 7

Nothing in this Treaty shall affect the rights andobligations of States under the Charter of theUnited Nations.

Article 8

Any dispute which may arise in connection withthe implementation of this Treaty shall be settledexclusively by peaceful means through recourse tothe procedures provided for in the Charter of theUnited Nations.

Article 9

This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

Article 10

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

This Treaty shall be open to all States for sig-nature at United Nations Headquarters inNew York. Any State which does not sign thistreaty before its entry into force in accordancewith paragraph 3 of this article may accedeto it at any time.This Treaty shall be subject to ratification bysignatory States. Instruments of ratificationand accession shall be deposited with theSecretary-General of the United Nations.This Treaty shall enter into force between theStates which have deposited instruments ofratification upon the deposit with the Secre-tary-General of the United Nations of the fifthinstrument of ratification, provided that suchinstruments have been deposited by theUnion of Soviet Socialist Republics and theUnited States of America.For States whose instruments of ratificationor accession are deposited after the entry intoforce of this Treaty, it shall enter into forceon the date of the deposit of their instrumentsof ratification or accession.The Secretary-General of the United Nations