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ANTI-CORRUPTION AGENCY STRENGTHENING INITIATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTANNATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU
2016
I have great satisfaction in introducing the Anti-corruption Agency Strengthening Initiative Assessment of Pakistan’s National Accountability Bureau Report 2016.
The objective of the ACA Strengthening Initiative is �rst to produce a comprehensive qualitative performance assessment of National Accountability Bureau (NAB), including its areas of strength and weakness and secondly to identify gaps in terms of NAB’s performance and provide feedback in the form of recommendations to NAB and other relevant stakeholders. These recommendations will be shared with di�erent stakeholders. It is hoped that the Government and National Accountability Bureau will utilize this report to improve the performance of the Anti-Corruption Agency so that corruption in the country can be reduced.
This research has been made possible due to a grant from Transparency International Secretariat.
Saad RashidExecutive DirectorTI Pakistan
Foreword
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Lead Researcher:Dr. Samra Javed
Review Team:Transparency International PakistanSaad Rashid, Executive Director Kashif Ali, Assistant Project Coordinator
IllustratorMansoor Iqbal
Project Team
Acknowledgements
Transparency International Pakistan would like to thank the Chairman National Accountability Bureau, Mr. Qamar Zaman Chaudhry, Deputy Chairman, Mr. Imtiaz Tajwar, Director General Operation, Mr. Zahir Shah, Director General Karachi, Lt. Col. (R) Sirajul Naeem and other sta� members of NAB for their valuable input. TI Pakistan is also indebted to Dr. Shoaib Suddle, Ex Federal Tax Ombudsman, for moderating the Focus Group Discussion. Thanks are also due to all other stakeholders who took out valuable time to be a part of the FGD and interviews.
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About Transparency InternationalTransparency International (TI) is the civil society organization leading the global �ght against corruption. Through close to 100 chapters worldwide and an international secretariat in Berlin, Germany, TI raises awareness of the damaging e�ects of corruption and works with partners in government, business and civil society to develop and implement e�ective measures to tackle it.
For further information please contact:Transparency InternationalAlt Moabit 9610559 Berlin, GermanyTel: + 49-30-34 38 20-0Fax: + 49-30-34 70 39 12E-mail: [email protected] http://www.transparency.org
About Transparency International PakistanTransparency International Pakistan (TI Pakistan) is the National chapter of Transparency International, established in 2002 with the main aim to strengthen the global value system by making transparency and accountability more relevant public norms. Working in collaboration with other stakeholders and departments, TI Pakistan regularly publishes research papers, reform proposals and manuals with the aim of disseminating information to all stakeholders, and also conducts capacity building workshops.
For further information please contact:Transparency International Pakistan4-C, Mezzanine Floor, Khayaban-e-Ittehad,Phase VII, Defence Housing Authority Karachi.Phone : + 9221-35390408 & + 9221-35311897-8Fax : + 9221-35390410Email : [email protected] : www.transparency.org.pk
DisclaimerEvery e�ort has been made to verify the accuracy of the information contained in this report. All information was believed to be correct as of November 2016 as per the sources quoted in this report. Nevertheless, Transparency International Pakistan cannot guarantee the accuracy and completeness of the contents beyond the sources veri�ed for the purpose of this study. Nor can Transparency International Pakistan accept responsibility for the consequences of its usage for other purposes or in other contents. Contributions to this report by authors external to Transparency International Pakistan do not necessarily re�ect the view of Transparency International Pakistan
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ACRONYMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 BOUT THE ASSESSMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1. PAKISTAN’S POLICY CONTEXT AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION . . . . 19 ECONOMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 POLITICS AND SOCIETY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 LEVELS OF CORRUPTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFILE OF NAB . . . . . . . . . 25 RESOURCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 STRUCTURE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 PREVENTION, EDUCATION AND OUTREACH. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3. KEY FINDINGS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 NAB’s LEGAL BASIS, INDEPENDENCE AND MANDATE. . . . . . . . . . . 38 NAB’s FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 NAB’s DETECTION AND INVESTIGATION FUNCTION. . . . . . . . . . . 39 NAB’s PREVENTION, EDUCATION AND OUTREACH FUNCTIONS. . . . . . . 40 NAB’s COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS. . . . . . . . . . 41 NAB’s OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 NAB’s PERCEPTION OF EFFECTIVENESS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NAB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 CONCLUSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
ANNEX 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81ANNEX 2: INTERVIEWEES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 ANNEX 3: STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83ANNEX 4: REFERENCES. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84ANNEX 5: CLASSIFICATION OF INDICATORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
TABLE OF CONTENTS Anti-C
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ACRONYMSACA Anti-Corruption Agency
CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor
CPIB Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau
CPI Corruption Perception Index
CSO Civil Society Organization
FIA Federal Investigation Agency
GCI Global Competitive Index
GDP Gross Domestic Product
HDI Human Development Index
ICAC The Independent Commission against Corruption
IAM Internal Accountability Mechanism
KNAB Latvia’s Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau
KPK Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (Indonesia’s ACA)
MACC Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission
NAB National Accountability Bureau
NAO National Accountability Ordinance
PB Plea Bargain
PILDAT Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency
PPC Pakistan Penal Code
TI Transparency International
TI-Pakistan Transparency International, Pakistan
WEF World Economic Forum
USKOK Prosecutors of Croatia’s Bureau for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime
Transparency International Asia Paci�c Department has worked for the last few years with a group of regional and international experts and anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) to develop a collaborative framework to assess the enabling environment, performance and competence of these ACAs. An advisory group coordinated by Transparency International has developed a set of indicators and benchmarking standard, led by Professor Jon Quah, which aims to highlight the strengths and weaknesses of ACAs. The assessment of Pakistan’s Anti-Corruption Agency, National Accountability Bureau (NAB), is a continuation of the collaborative e�ort initially taken by Bhutan and currently in place in other Asia Paci�c countries. This report presents an analysis of Pakistan’s policy and corruption context as well as a thorough research employing the desk review of NAB’s reports, website and other relevant resources. Besides, it also presents the qualitative analysis of the interviews conducted with relevant stakeholders. The research resulted in the assessment of NAB against the set series of indicators. The assessment is followed by a series of recommendations to NAB and other relevant stakeholders including the government o�cials.
The assessment tool was developed during the two year period 2013 to 2015 through a collaborative dialogue between Transparency International, sta� from some of the ACAs in the Asia Paci�c region and a group of experts convened by Transparency International. The ACA is assessed on the basis of 50 indicators. Each indicator can be scored at three levels: high, medium and low. Each level was de�ned by an indicator, depending on the condition assessed. To score each indicator the research team identi�ed the speci�c source of information, where necessary, from the ACC's legal basis of support and reports. The team further substantiated each score with in-depth interviews with the ACC's sta� and management, as well as interviews with other government agencies, branches of government, media and civil society organizations.
The assessment aims at two speci�c goals: 1) To produce a comprehensive qualitative performance assessment of NAB, including its areas of strength and weakness and 2) To identify gaps in terms of NAB’s performance and provide feedback in the form of recommendations to NAB and other relevant stakeholders.
The assessment report entails the policy context of Pakistan and a pro�le of NAB. Section One of the report presents the economic scenario of Pakistan which is a federal republic country. Though the income inequality is high, Pakistan is categorized as a lower middle income country according to World Bank list of economies as of July 2016. Corruption is cited as the most serious problem in the country.
NAB re�ects its strength under the dimension of legal basis, independence and mandate. It is a legally independent unit operating under the aegis of the National
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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Accountability Ordinance-1999. Its scope of work involves education, detection, investigation and prosecution of cases involving corrupt practices. Its sole objective being eradication of corruption from society through an extensive strategy, it enjoys extensive powers to investigate arrest and prosecute.
There has been an extensive reliance on part of NAB on its awareness campaign to disseminate information on preventing and combating corruption and corrupt practices. Its internal integrity and accountability are guided by a Code of Conduct. It is encouraging to note that NAB takes cognizance of cases of corrupt practice by its own employees under National Accountability Ordinance.
The assessment of NAB, detailed in section three of the report tests 50 indictors, drafted to assess its performance, e�ectiveness and competence as well as to identify its weaknesses and areas for opportunity. The assessment comprises seven dimensions as follows:
1. NAB’s Legal Basis, Independence and Mandate (Seven indicators) 2. NAB’s Financial and Human Resources (Nine indicators)
3. NAB’s Detection and Investigation Function (Nine indicators)
4. NAB’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions (Nine indicators)
5. NAB’s Cooperation with other Organizations (Five indicators)
6. NAB’s Oversight and Accountability (Four indicators) 7. Public Perceptions of NAB’s Performance (Seven indicators)
TI-Pakistan followed the steps as follows to score each indicator.
1. The desk review of available resources was employed
2. It was later substantiated with interviews with NAB’s Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Director Generals and other sta�.
3. A focus group discussion was later organized with relevant stakeholders including government o�cials, media organizations, civil society, research scholars and university students. 4. Separate interviews with government o�cials and media were also held.
NAB has scored high in 49 per cent of the indicators assessed, moderate in 33 per cent of the indicators assessed, and low in 18 per cent of the indicators assessed.
The �ndings indicate that two dimensions emerge out to be strong in NAB’s assessment: its Oversight and Accountability (89%) and its Cooperation with other Organizations (87%). NAB’s Perception of E�ectiveness is its weakest dimension scoring the lowest ranking (67%).
Table 4 illustrates all indicators and scores. The indicators rated as high are represented in green color, the moderate ones in yellow and the low ones in red, respectively. The indicators colored grey are not scored, because the research team did not have su�cient information to score them.
The indicators that could not be rated because of unavailability of adequate / credible data were 1) frequency of including corruption prevention recommendations in NAB’s investigation reports, 2) its oversight mechanism, 3) public perception of adherence to due process in its use of powers among those having direct contact with NAB, 4) perception of NAB’s e�ectiveness in corruption control among persons with direct contact with NAB and 5) its e�ectiveness in dealing with females who were in direct contact with NAB. These indicators were included as it represents a best model. Not having them indicates the need to segregating data based on indicator focus or the need of developing them given the importance of their focus.
By dimensions the gaps identi�ed are as follows:
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NAB’s Legal Basis, Independence and MandateNAB re�ects its strength under the dimension of legal basis, independence and mandate. The legal set up gives NAB independence in terms of its functions, authority and jurisdiction. Its sole objective is eradication of corruption. NAB has extensive powers to investigate arrest and prosecute the corrupt. The Chairman is appointed for a �xed term of four years by the President with the mutual consent of the Leader of the House and the Leader of Opposition. The shortfall under the dimension is lack of freedom in practice as NAB is reported not free from political pressures.
The average proportion of NAB’s budget to total government budget for the past three years is the major shortfall under the dimension of �nancial resources.A comparison of the said budgets re�ects that the proportion of budget in the last three years has been below 0.10% of the country’s budget. However, according to NAB the revenue is su�cient to carry out its activities. Salaries and bene�ts of the sta� are competitive. NAB o�cials have su�cient expertise to carry out their duties. However expertise in specialized �elds is lacking.
NAB’s Financial and Human Resources
NAB’s Detection and Investigation FunctionThe major shortfall that appears under this dimension is the low number of complaints lodged as only less than one percent complaints are lodged relative to population and levels of corruption. Perhaps this is the reason behind the low con�dence of the general public in the e�ectiveness of NAB. With regards to NAB’s responsiveness to complaints, it is rated high based on the large number of complaints responded to in the last three years. NAB initiates complaints on its own, as and when required. It has intervened in and scrutinized several projects worth
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NAB’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions
billions of rupees. Complaints are also initiated on the information provided to NAB by other individuals and organizations. NAB is rated moderate in terms of number of cases investigated as between 300 to 800 cases annually have been investigated by NAB during the past three years. The working of NAB in terms of e�ciency and professionalism of corruption is rated as moderate. NAB does not identify gender in compiling corruption complaints.
A substantial part of NAB’s budget is allocated to its Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions. An extensive public outreach program is carried out each �nancial year that includes formulation of prevention plans at federal as well as provincial level, initiation of several corruption prevention initiatives and constitution of character building societies to enhance awareness through education and character building. There has been an extensive dissemination of information about corruption prevention and reliance on campaigns on part of NAB. Numerous initiatives have been taken such as activities on UN anti-corruption day, seminars, walks, academic competitions, media campaigns including radio TV and newspapers, documentaries, the slogan of Say No to Corruption on utility bills, Automated Teller Machine (ATMs) and banners and standees are put up at prominent places. The campaign would be more e�ective if anti-corruption is made a part of the curriculum at all levels of education. However, little independent research is undertaken by NAB. The use of social media to propagate its outreach activities is also limited.
NAB’s Cooperation with Other Organizations
NAB’s Cooperation with other organizations is one of its strongest dimensions. In terms of Government support to NAB for prosecution of corruption cases. It is observed that the Prosecutor General NAB is head of Prosecution Division, assisted by the Team of Legal experts and prosecutors all over the country. NAB has close coordination with Attorney General and Advocate General of Pakistan during defense of corruption cases when question of law arises. NAB collaborates with a wide range of international anti-corruption organization and initiatives including United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA), etc. It has also been cooperating with member countries that have mutual legal assistance treaties and extradition treaties with Pakistan. Recently, the SAARC Anti-Corruption Forum was established with the NAB Chairman being nominated as its �rst Chairperson.
NAB’s Oversight and Accountability emerges out to be one of its strongest dimensions. The only weak area in this dimension is that the oversight has no external accountability mechanism present to monitor its actions. There have been instances in the past when the higher courts have been exercising their supervisory jurisdiction and power of jurisdiction review whenever NAB has transgressed its limits.
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NAB’s Oversight and Accountability
NAB’s Perceptions of E�ectivenessNAB’s Perception of E�ectiveness emerges out to be the weakest dimension. As compared to other anti-corruption organizations like Federal Investigation Agency and Provincial Anti-Corruption Departments, NAB is perceived to be more e�ective. However, con�dence of NAB’s treatment of persons under investigation in a digni�ed and respectful manner is low.
The score of the indicators are as follows:
1. NAB’s Legal basis, independence and Mandate (7 indicators) 71 % 2. NAB’s Financial and Human Resources (9 indicators) 67 % 3. NAB’s Detection and Investigation Function (9 indicators) 61 % 4. NAB’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions (9 indicators) 56 % 5. NAB’s Cooperation with other Organizations (5 indicators) 80 % 6. NAB’s Accountability and Oversight (4 indicators) 83 % 7. Public Perceptions of the NAB’s Performance (7 indicators) 50 %
Way ForwardBased on the gaps analyzed and the opportunities identi�ed as a result of the assessment of NAB, Transparency International, Pakistan recommends a number of strategic and practical recommendations for reform listed below and detailed in Section 4.
RecommendationsTwo sets of recommendations have been formulated. One set of recommendationsare for the Government and the other set is for NAB itself.
Recommendations for Government
Revision in the following clauses of National Accountability (NAO) should be made.
I. The clause of Article 6 of NAO 1999 should be revised to include wider range of options in terms of selection of Chairman NAB.
Recommendation 1
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Recommendation 2
1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) should be allocated to NAB
Recommendation 3
An Oversight Committee should be formulated to ensure accountability of NAB. After studying other common law jurisdictions, it is recommended that the committee may comprise of �ve judges of the Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice.
Recommendation 4
Anti-Corruption should be included in the curriculum of the elementary, secondary and degree programs of educational institutions.
II. Revision in Article 25 (b) of the NAO should be made to include nominees of Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Pakistan and Provincial High Courts in the Conciliation Committee.
III. Article 31-C states: “No Court established under this Ordinance shall take cogni-zance of an o�ence against an o�cer or an employee of a bank or �nancial institution for writing o�, waving, restructuring or re�nancing any �nancial facility, inter-est or mark-up without prior approval of the State Bank of Pakistan. Court to take cogni-zance of o�ence with prior approval of the State Bank.” The article should be deleted as it provides protection to corrupt bank o�cials and businessmen and hence, increases corruption in the country.
IV. The provision of Voluntary Return should be eliminated as it is against Article 25 of the constitution “Equality of citizens”.
V. The option of Plea Bargain should only be exercised for approver/s in a transparent manner, only when the main accused in a corruption case can be prosecuted on the confession of the approver/s
Recommendations for NABRecommendation 1
NAB should increase collaboration with the media to encourage the public to report corruption and improve its public image.
Recommendation 2
NAB should make a thorough analysis of the entire chain of system to improve its conviction rate.
Recommendation 3
Prosecutors and investigating o�cers of NAB should receive training in recovery of assets stashed in o�shore companies/foreign countries, public procurement, banking and share trading.
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Recommendation 4
NAB should make full use of social media as a catalyst for public engagement.
Recommendation 5
NAB should ensure that its investigation procedures should be completely compliant with the basic rights of the citizens enshrined in Qanoon-e-Shahdat and the country’s constitution.
Recommendation 6
The timeline for inquiries should be in accordance with the provision in Ehtesab Act 1996 1996 which stipulates 60 days to dispose of a case.
Recommendation 7
NAB should deal with the accused and the witnesses in a digni�ed and respectful manner.
Recommendation 8
Precautionary measures need to ensure that the agency does not itself become a source for extortion and corruption by instilling the values of honesty and integrity into its culture
Recommendation 9
NAB should ensure that the reference prepared and successfully tried in the Accountability Courts should be upheld in all subsequent review petitions in High Courts and Supreme Court.
Indicators by Dimension-NAB Assessment
Transparency International (TI) is a global civil society organization combating corruption. Working collaboratively with its over 100 chapters across the world and partners in government, business and civil society, TI helps to raise awareness of thedetrimental impact of corruption and proposes measures to handle it.
The United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) prescribes the establishment of independent bodies through national legal systems to enforce, implement and promote anti-corruption policies and principles. A well-functioning oversight mechanism with a focus on anti-corruption is absolutely vital for good governance in any country. Today, there are more than 100 Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs) around the world, with 27 in the Asia Paci�c Region. However, across the world, a wide gap exists between the commitments displayed in establishing ACAs and the actual realization of their mandate.
TI embraces ACAs as natural partners in the �ght against corruption. With this in mind, Transparency International (TI) has embarked on a new project, the ‘Anti-Corruption Agency Strengthening Initiative’ aimed at strengthening the e�ectiveness of ACAs in the Asia Paci�c Region. TI strategizes to support institutions and uphold public sector integrity. Moreover, TI has developed diagnostic tools to measure strengths and weaknesses of ACAs so as to serve as a basis for sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy. The ACA Strengthening Initiative shall act as a catalyst in kick-starting an informed discussion among ACAs, governments, anti-corruption stakeholders and the public about how to improve the performance of ACA at the regional and national level. TI model of assessment has been based on wide ranged collaborative e�ort of sta� of TI, TI chapters, regional and international experts and interested ACAs of the Asia Paci�c region through a series of discussions/workshops and consultations.
TI-Pakistan is a National Chapter of Transparency International, a civil society organization devoted to reduction of both international and national corrupt practices. Its key purpose is to �ght against corruption in business dealings and to curb corruption on a national level. TI-Pakistan is one of the National Chapters of Transparency International, based in Karachi. The venture was an initiative by a group of dedicated professionals who deemed it necessary to support the Government in combating corruption at public and private domains. TI-Pakistan was recognized as a chapter in-formation in February 2001. Formal agreements were signed between Transparency International-Secretariat and representative promoters of the Pakistan Chapter. It was accredited as a full National Chapter by Transparency International, Berlin on 25 October, 2005 and was reaccredited in October 2009 and 2014. The agreement con�rmed the establishment of Transparency International-Pakistan, as a National Chapter under the basic guidelines of Transparency International.
INTRODUCTION
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Between August and November 2016, TI- Pakistan, conducted an assessment of National Accountability Bureau (NAB), the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) of Pakistan. The assessment was aimed at identi�cation of strengths and weaknesses of NAB and development of recommendations for improvement of its performance. It further aimed to create a space for NAB to have a dialogue with government and the public to make its conduct highly accountable to its stakeholders. The assessment will be made available widely to the public and anti-corruption actors in the Asia Paci�c Region, stimulating debates on the subject. In the �rst phase, the process of assessment comprised document analysis, including review of NAB’s annual reports, its website, TI, Pakistan’s National Integrity System Report 2014 and media pieces. In the second phase, semi- structured interviews were conducted with the relevant stakeholders. Field work took place between August and September, 2016 followed by a focus group discussion with relevant stakeholders on October 1, 2016. Later, a draft report was shared �rst with NAB and later with the key stakeholders.
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ABOUT THE ASSESSMENT
DIMENSIONS OF ASSESSMENT
There are seven factors that in�uence or indicate an ACA’s performance: its legal basis, independence and mandate, its �nancial and human resources, its detection and investigation function, its prevention, education and outreach functions, its cooperation with other organizations, its accountability and oversight and public perception of NAB’s performance.
The details below show the number of indicators for each of the seven dimensions of NAB’s performance. 1. NAB’s Legal Basis, Independence and Mandate (Seven indicators) 2. NAB’s Financial and Human Resources (Nine indicators)
3. NAB’s Detection and Investigation Function (Nine indicators)
4. NAB’s Prevention, Education and Outreach Functions (Nine indicators)
5. NAB’s Cooperation with other Organizations (Five indicators)
6. NAB’s Accountability and Oversight (Four indicators) 7. Public Perceptions of NAB’s Performance (Seven indicators)
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Each indicator can be scored at three levels: high, medium and low. The indicator is classi�ed high if its overall score is between 67% and 100%, medium if its overall score is between 34% and 66% and low for an overall score between 0% and 33%.
To score each indicator the research team identi�ed the speci�c source of information, where necessary, from the ACC's legal basis of support and reports. The team further substantiated each score with in-depth interviews with the ACC's sta� and management, as well as interviews with other government agencies, branches of government, media and civil society organizations.
TI-Pakistan followed the steps as follows to score each indicator.
1. The desk review of available resources was employed
2. It was later substantiated with interviews with NAB’s Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Director Generals and other sta�.
3. A focus group discussion was later organized with relevant stakeholders including government o�cials, media organizations, civil society, research scholars and university students.
4. Separate interviews with government o�cials and media were also held.
The assessment report comprises four sections. Section One describes Pakistan’s policy context and its perceived level of corruption. Section Two presents NAB’s background and pro�le. The key �ndings of the research are presented in Section Three followed by conclusion and TI-Pakistan’s recommendations for improvement presented in Section Four.
Pakistan, a federal republic country, is one of the poorest and least developed countries in Asia. Its economy is agro-industrial based. The current population of Pakistan is 193,114,874 as of Sunday, July 31, 20161, based on the latest United Nations estimates with 38.6 % of the population being urban2. In 2015 its GDP per capita has risen by 4.24 percent3 to 1,460 US dollars. Its total land area is 770,998 Km2 (297,684 sq. miles).
The World Economic Forum's (WEF) Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) for the year 2015-2016 has ranked Pakistan at 126 out of 140 economies4 . The GDP per capita, though increased over the last 25 years is still lower than other middle income countries5.
As per a recent World Bank report, over the past two and a half years, Pakistan has focused on achieving economic stability after the implementation of reform agenda. However, its slim export bases and lack of e�cient and enabling trade policies are hindering its export competitiveness. The rate of in�ation that slowed down in the beginning of 2016 has once again begun to increase. The economic stability is not su�cient to generate jobs for the emerging workforce every year. A recent World Bank report states that 33% of the population lives below the poverty line6. The �ve most challenging factors for doing business in Pakistan during 2015-2016 are cited as corruption, tax rates, in�ation, access to �nancing and insu�cient government bureaucracy7. Corruption is cited as the most problematic among these factors.
Year 2016 records a remarkable growth in industrial and services sector while other key macroeconomic indicators like in�ation, �scal and current account balance recorded improvement. Mainly, the external sector has been stable on account of vigorous growth in workers’ remittances; continued �ows from International Financial Institutions; and a drop in global oil prices. This improvement in the external sector contributed to the exchange rate stability during the year. A stable outlook of in�ation and balance of payments encouraged the policymakers to implement pro-growth strategies.
The industrial sector during FY 2016 recorded a remarkable growth of 6.8 percent against the target of 6.4 percent and is all time high in eight years. The construction activities also recorded an impressive growth of 13.10 percent. It is foreseen that the construction related activities will gain further momentum on the back of increasing public sector development spending coupled with infrastructure and power sector development program under China Pakistan Economic Corridor8.
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1. PAKISTAN’S POLICY CONTEXT AND PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION
ECONOMY
1 http://www.worldometers.info/ Accessed on August 1, 20162 ibid3 Pakistan GDP Growth Rate available at www.tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/gdp-growth Accessed on August 3, 20164 The Global Competitiveness Report 2015–2016 http://www3.weforum.org/docs/gcr/2015- 2016/Global_Competitiveness_Report_2015-2016.pdf5 ibid6 http://data.worldbank.org/country/pakistan Accessed on October 21, 20167 Pakistan Development Update From Stability to Prosperity Published : April 2016 documents.worldbank.org8 PAKISTAN ECONOMIC SURVEY 2015-16 http://www.�nance.gov.pk/survey/chapters_15/Overview_of_the_Economy.pdf
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The thrust for Pakistan’s next �ve years plan is to achieve growth, while maintaining macroeconomic stability and distributional equity and therefore, critical structural reforms are needed in many sectors and activities.
The private sector will be the main engine of economic growth and development in the proposed plan for the year 2016-2017. This will require a substantial revamping of the country’s governance system, its incentive structure and the functioning of institutions. The industrial competitiveness will be increased, and cost of doing business reduced by major improvements in infrastructure, institutional reforms and policy paradigm.
The services sector contributes more than 58 per cent to the GDP, and has emerged as major driver of the economic growth in the recent past. Half of the growth of this sector comes from security-related services or public spending. It is worth noting that the growth of the services sector might have been higher than recorded in the national accounts since much of this sector remains undocumented. There is still unexplored potential in key services such as domestic commerce, transport, �nance and insurance, communication, housing, tourism, and social and community services. The said sector will remain the pillar of the economy and signi�cantly contribute to the growth impetus. Important contributions are expected from the �nancial services, transport, communication and trade services. Appropriate measures designed to e�ectively harness the potential of this sector are the expected outcomes of the said �ve year plan.
9 Percentile rank indicates rank of a country among all countries in the world. 0 corresponds to lowest rank and 100
corresponds to highest rank
DIMENSIONS DATA DATA SOURCES Land area (in sq km)
998 Km2 (297,684 sq. miles).
http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/pakistan-population/ July 31,2016
Size of population 193,114,874 http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/pakistan-population/ July 31,2016
GDP per capita (US$)
1,460 US dollars http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/pakistan-population/ July 31,2016
Type of government federal republic http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/186685.pdf
Voice & accountability
-.76/2.5 27th Percentile9
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Political stability -2.54/2.5 1st Percentile
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Government effectiveness
-.66/2.5 27th Percentile
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Rule of law -.79/2.5 24th Percentile
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Control of corruption
-.76/2.5 24th Percentile
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home
Table 1: Policy Context of Pakistan
The World Bank reports that Pakistan being located at a strategic place, the crossroads of South Asia, Central Asia, China and the Middle East, has a huge development potential10. However, the country faces security challenges at the borders that impede its potential economic growth. Large-scale manufacturing and construction activity in the �rst half of 2016, owing to the launch of China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) infrastructure and energy projects, is likely to make up for the obstacles to the agricultural sector. Furthermore, a rise in automobile retail sales, increased port activity, and higher telecom pro�ts promises �nancial stability11. In spite of these promising facts, Pakistan’s indicators on the 2015 Human Development Index (HDI) are lower than its neighboring countries with low scores in education, gender inequality, poverty and health. Pakistan’s overall ranking on HDI 2015 is 147 out of 188 countries. Its ranking is 121 out of 155 in gender inequality12, 180 out of 221 countries in education13 and 122 out of 191 countries in the world in health14.
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10 Pakistan Development Update From Stability to Prosperity Published : April 2016 documents.worldbank.org11 CPEC: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-7_v16_2_2015.pd12 Pakistan - Human Development Reports - UNDP hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PAK.pdf13 http://www.uis.unesco.org/Library/Documents/out-of-school-children-south-asia-study-2014-en.pdf14 http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/2016/en/15 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2014 — Pakistan Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 201416 ECP’s website, as of August 1st, 2013, http://ecp.gov.pk/Misc/ListPolPartiesWith addresses.pdf17 Chapter 1: Fundamental Rights [Articles 8-28], Chapter Constitution of Pakistan, 197318 Global Peace Index, 201619 State of Human Rights in 2013 http://www.hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/report14/AR2013.pdf
POLITICS AND SOCIETYPakistan, the world’s second largest Muslim majority, has witnessed a fragile democracy and a constantly rising level of poverty since its inception in 1947. Military dictatorships, terrorism, sectarian violence, insurgency along the borders, “Talibanization” and repeated devastating �oods have been the cause of general discontentment among the masses. Its development has been hampered by complex bureaucracy, non-transparent investment and widespread corruption15.
Pakistan has a multiple political party system as there are 253 registered parties comprising left wing, right wing, secular, nationalist and liberal parties16. The political parties have not been able to evolve owing to repressive condition, repeated military coups and promotion of their own dynastical interests. Family based leaderships, caste based groups, local parochial, sectarian and constituency based patterns of politics are paramount in the country. Hence the political parties are not characterized by a strong structure and sound governance.
Human rights and freedom of speech, although guaranteed by Islamic Laws and the Constitution of Pakistan17, are constantly breached. The civil society of Pakistan su�ers at the hands of sectarian, ethnic, religious and linguistics splits.
Human rights are constantly being violated at the hands of pseudo religious groups. Protection to citizens including religious and ethnic minorities is not provided by the government. The country is ranked at 154/162 as per the Global Peace Index 2016 as being one of the most violent and unstable countries18. The parties in power have never been fully successful in controlling such mayhems. As reported by Human Rights Commission, 2013 Pakistan has the second highest number of out of school children aged �ve to nine, almost ten million children are engaged in child labor and the budget allocated to education was the 2nd lowest in South Asia19 .
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20 http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/�les/GPI%202016%20Report_2.pdf?21 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/unemployment-rate22 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2014 — Pakistan Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014 http://www.bti- project.org/�leadmin/�les/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Pakistan.pdf23 The Express Tribune, Nine in every 10 Pakistanis are anxious: Survey, Published August 24, 2013, http://tribune.com.pk/story/594483/nine-in-every-10-pakistanis-are-anxious-survey24 World Bank Institute (WBI), 2007, Report on Empowering the Marginalized: Case studies of Social Accountability Initiatives in Asia. Available at (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCACCDEMSIDEGOV/Resources/Empowering TheMarginalizedFinalVersion.pdf?resourceurlname=EmpoweringTheMarginalizedFin alVersion.pdf )
Socio-economically, Pakistan is a struggling country facing lack of basic facilities and services like jobs, health and education. Unemployment rate in Pakistan decreased to 5.90 percent in 201520 which does not re�ect the real picture as almost 80 % of the workforce is engaged in informal sector21. As reported, 0.02 % of Pakistan’s total population holds almost 40% of Pakistan’s total wealth. Hence, Pakistan faces a troubled economy resulting in low living standards and slow rate of growth. Such a lack of progress is because of the con�ict between civil society and the government, social and infrastructural damage to exports and critical shortage of electricity and gas. The urban fabric of the country is supported by self-help organizations such as Edhi Foundation, Citizen’s Police Liaison’s Committee, Women Action Forum and Lawyers for Civil rights, etc. However, the rural areas have very little access to such self sustained organizations. Moreover, these organizations also need to be more developed and self-su�cient in order to cater to the need of a bigger population22.
Ideally, the electoral process needs to be fair and transparent and the rule of law for socioeconomic progress should be upheld. This entails across the board accountability of all players which is imperative for good governance and strengthening political institutions. However, in reality, the vested interests of the political and ruling parties have not enabled the electoral system to be impartial. The last two elections of 2008 and 2013 have witnessed growing interest of the masses in democracy particularly of females and the youth. Also, the 2013 elections were relatively peaceful.
Considering the bleak scenario that the country currently has, majority of the citizens perceive that their economic condition has deteriorated and only a minority hopes that it will improve in near future. For most of them, the real big issues that the country faces like terrorism and security are not paramount as compared to the practical issues they face like unemployment, in�ation and poverty. A recent survey, titled, Anxiety Index Study-Global Report 2013 reports Pakistan as the most anxious nation out of those assessed. 92% of Pakistan’s citizens were reported to be very anxious about economic worries such as fuel prices. The said worries were the foremost whereas the increased security and terror threats were next in importance. Another survey has also reported traces of frustration, violence, anger, stress and mental problems in the masses23.
The need for accountability is paramount in Pakistan not only for the masses but also for the public o�ce-bearers and the service providers. The fact that social accountability in the country can serve as a catalyst to good governance was realized rather late by Pakistan24. Nevertheless, the concept was further supported in the last few years thanks to international donors, the civil society organizations and media that took the lead to apprise the public on the signi�cance of good governance.
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25 Social Accountability in Pakistan: Challenges, Gaps, Opportunities and the Way Forward, Fayyaz Yaseen, May 2013, Working Paper Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI). # 133 https://sdpi.org/publications/�les/W-133.pdf26 Transparency International, Daily Lives and Corruption: Public Opinion in South Asia, 201127 Transparency International Pakistan, National Corruption Perception Survey, 200628 Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development And Transparency PILDAT, Citizens Report 5 Years of the 13th National Assembly of Pakistan, March 17, 2008-March 16, 2013,29 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2016
The challenges to promote social accountability in Pakistan are pretty much similar to those faced by other South Asian countries. One of the most prominent of these challenges is the resistance of the state itself to reform. For example, after the declaration of Right to Information Act through a Presidential Ordinance, a CSO was denied the information on the basis that it will lead to political unrest in the country. There have been other similar instances too when the access to information is denied by the State itself. Weak/ no Implementation of Right to Information Act is yet another impediment to social accountability. After 14 years of the promulgation of Right to Information Ordinance (October 2002) and the incorporation of Article 19-A into the Constitution regarding right to information being the basic and fundamental rights of the citizens across Pakistan, the matching mechanism is yet to be worked out that may ensure public o�ces’ compliance to this new part of the Constitution. Another challenging impediment is centralized governance system.
LEVELS OF CORRUPTIONSince the time of inception when corruption was pointed out as a big menace, it has continued to remain a huge impediment for Pakistan in its way to growth and performance. A research conducted by Transparency International in 2010-2011 reported that the majority of the people of Pakistan perceive that the level of corruption has been on a constant rise. They further perceive the government as ine�ective in terms of its control. Members of Parliament, the wealthiest citizens of the country, avoid paying taxes which has resulted in Pakistan having one of the “lowest tax-to GDP ratios” in the world26. Corruption is pervasive in all domains of Pakistan, from politics to private and corporate sector. Its history re�ects governments being overthrown in the past owing to the charges of corruption. Unfortunately, the same governments came back to power and performed even worse with 30 to 40% increased level of perceived corruption27. The promulgation of National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO) pushed back its e�orts against corruption by protecting corrupt leaders. Even after the revocation of NRO, things did not change much. The succeeding corrupt governments of 2008 and 2013 strengthened people’s lack of con�dence in their integrity and hence ine�ectiveness to control corruption28. In 2008, Pakistan's ranking in the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) was 134 out of 180 countries. Recently, in 2015-2016, its score has improved to 32 out of 100 and ranking to 116 out of 176 countries29.
The leading anti-corruption agency in the country has not been able to achieve its desired objectives. Although the need for better mechanisms for governance has been pointed out, no such mechanisms are formulated. It is surprising that besides the presence of laws such as Pakistan Penal Code (PPC), the Prevention of Corruption Act, and the National Accountability Ordinance as well as institutional mechanisms like the constitutional o�ce of the Auditor-General of Pakistan supported by Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly, public procurement regulatory
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30 Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and Institutions to Address the Problem of Corruption in Pakistan, Published: December 2015, http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/Anti- Corruption_MechanismsandInstitutionstoAddresstheProblemofCorruptioninPakistan_BackgroundPaper.pdf31 Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and Institutions to Address the Problem of Corruption in Pakistan, Published: December 2015, http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP32 Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 201633 The Global Competitiveness Report 2014–2015, http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2014-15.pdf
authority, o�ces of the Federal and Provincial Ombudsmen, National Accountability Bureau (NAB), the Federal Investigating Agency (FIA) and Provincial Anti-Corruption establishments, the country su�ers at the hands of a high degree of corruption.
The PILDAT survey conducted in 2015 reports citizens’ mistrust in these mechanisms. Moreover, the survey further reports that the people do not consider corruption as a main issue of the society in the country since energy crisis, unemployment, poverty and other issues are perceived as huge. Selection and decisions on merit are substantially supported by the citizens but when it comes to their own vested interests, they tend to ignore merit. The country faces corruption not only at the individual but also at the institutional level. Institutions such as the police, tax administrations, and the subordinate judiciary contribute immensely to the dismal picture30.
Table 2: Perception of Corruption in Three Global Indicators, 2015-2016
Indicators Rank/ScoreCPI 2016 (Transparency International) Rank 116/176 Score 32/100Control of Corruption (World Bank)Irregular Payments and Bribes (World Economic Forum)
-0.76/2.5 24th Percentile2.9/7 123 out of 144
What is encouraging is the recent freedom of both the electronic media and the social media that has become instrumental in revealing corruption. Furthermore, the Right to Information Laws being enacted by the Federation and the Provinces under the aegis of Article 19A of the constitution is yet another ray of hope31.
The Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 2016, has ranked Pakistan 116/176 with a score of 32 out of 100. This is the highest ranking Pakistan has received since the inception of CPI 199532. World Economic Forum’s WEF Global Competitiveness Report (GCR) 2014-15 has ranked the country as the third least safe place in the world due to its security situation. Of the 144 nations surveyed in the report, Pakistan is ranked 142 out of 144 nations. The ranking has remained basically the same since last year. Other factors impeding competiveness besides security are insu�cient infra-structure, political stability and ine�cient government, ine�cient labor market, technological readiness and lack of female participation in labor market33.
34 Transparency International Pakistan, National Integrity System, Country Report 201435 National Accountability Bureau, Annual Report 2015 pp.2336 Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and Institutions to Address the Problem of Corruption in Pakistan, Published: December 2015, http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/Anti-37 National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS), Islamabad, Pakistan 2002, pp. 238 Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and Institutions to Address the Problem of Corruption in Pakistan, Published: December 2015, http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/Anti-39 Interview with NAB O�cials
2. INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND PROFILE OF NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU
Pakistan has been striving to combat corruption since its independence. Originally, corruption cases were handled under the Pakistan Penal Code, 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 by its enforcement agency called the Special Police Establishment which was later replaced by the Federal Investigation Committee. Ehtesab (Accountability) Bureau, created under the Ehtesab Act 1997 was not successful in yielding the desired results and was replaced by National Accountability Bureau (NAB) after the military coup in 1999. NAB, the apex Anti-corruption Agency of Pakistan, was established with the promulgation of National Accountability Ordinance 199934.
NAB aims at elimination of corruption from the very fabric of the country. Its exclusive jurisdiction covers both public and private sector corruption including misappropriation of authority, cheating public at large, bank loan evasion, money laundering, unexplained assets, etc. It is empowered by NAO 1999 to identify, scrutinize and prosecute cases involving corrupt practices as well as to raise awareness of the masses on detrimental impact of corruption. Its jurisdiction encompasses the entire country. It operates through a head o�ce in the capital and seven branches in the main cities of the country35.
Since its foundation, NAB has recovered billions of rupees from corrupt individuals and institutions36. NAB conceived the idea of framing National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) in 2002, after an elaborative consultation process. All stakeholders, including academia, business community, public sector and civil society were involved and participated in the formulation of the strategy37. Year of 2015 is titled as the “Year of transformation” for NAB as it introduced structural reforms under its Monitoring & Evaluation System38. NAB operates on a functional budget allocated by Ministry of Finance Pakistan. In year 2013, Rs. 2,165.983 million were allocated to NAB while in 2016, Rs.2,896.196 million have been allocated39. The budget over the years is given below:
Year Budget in Billion Rs 2013-14 2.166 2014-15 2.209 2015-16 2.896
Table 3: NAB’s Budget
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Even though the budget is less than 0.10% of the country’s budget, NAB �nds the budget su�cient to carry out its activities.
NAB’s strong and independent legal status gives it independence in terms of its functions, authority and jurisdiction. It overrides all other laws and its operation extends to the whole of Pakistan and applies to all persons, public or private. It is authorized to investigate complaints that include any act as o�ence and take immediate actions under the ordinance 1999 against anyone involved in the o�ence. NAB has its own policies and rules regarding recruitment and selection. The Chairman is authorized to determine the salaries, allowances and other terms and conditions of service of the o�cers and sta�, with the approval of the president. Though formally independent, NAB has had its share of countering external pressures. NAB has been facing allegations of being a partisan agency used for political victimization by the government40.
VISION41
The National Accountability Bureau envisions being a credible, e�ective, e�cient and dynamic anti-corruption organization creating an enabling environment for a corrupt free society by engaging all stakeholders in its �ght against corruption through a programe which is holistic, inclusive and progressive.
MISSION
To eliminate corruption through a comprehensive approach encompassing enforcement, prosecution, awareness and prevention. To rejuvenate the government bodies, enhancing their capability for e�cient stewardship of public resources To establish an anti-corruption legal framework, that provides a broad and solid mechanism across the board To increase awareness and prevent corruption in society through advocacy and education
MANDATE
NAB derives its legal mandate from National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 which authorizes the Bureau:
To take cognizance of acts constituting o�ences of corruption and corrupt practices, eradication of corruption and corrupt practices and hold accountable accused persons and matters ancillary thereto. To provide e�ective measures for detection, investigation, prosecution and speedy disposal of cases involving corruption, corrupt practices, misuse of authority,
40 Transparency International, Pakistan National Integrity System, Country Report 201441 National Accountability Bureau, Annual Report 2015 pp.19
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42 Ibid pp.1543 Ibid pp. 1544 National Accountability Ordinance 1999
misappropriation of property, taking of kickbacks, commissions and for matter connected and ancillary or incidental thereto.
OBJECTIVES
Short Term: Setting in motion systemic improvements that will strengthen the national integrity system and the people against corruption. Long Term: The elimination of corruption by engaging all the stakeholders in the �ght against corruption, through a program, which is holistic, comprehensive and progressive42.
NAB’s management focuses on planning / realigning its systems in view of evolving challenges brought forth in the wake of new realities and expects perseverance and un�inching commitment from all ranks and cadres of the organization.
In the year 2015, NAB has successfully utilized advanced technologies in optimiza-tion of its manual procedures. Its Monitoring and Evaluation System (MES) provided much needed support to all tiers of supervisory management in discharge of their responsibilities. MES is an interactive online system developed to enhance the operational, monitoring and evaluation capabilities of the Bureau.
An Internal Accountability Mechanism (IAM) is now in place within NAB with a view to combat ine�ciency, misconduct, malpractice and violation of laid down SOPs/Rules that are a threat to its credibility43.
RESOURCES
The National Accountability Bureau is an independent federal executive bureau of the Government of Pakistan and as such enjoys wide �nancial autonomy. Financial authority of NAB lies with its Chairman, who is responsible for the expenditure incurred against the budget grant. Not only does NAB have budgetary resources, but it also has the authority to retain a certain percentage from the recoveries it makes under Voluntary Return (VR) and Plea Bargain (PB). The Chairman is empowered to determine the amounts of recovery from the accused under Voluntary Return and Plea Bargain44. Employees at NAB have su�cient expertise to carry out their regular duties. It has a Training & Evaluation Wing (T&E) which plans continuous training at national and foreign institutes. Curriculum of training is designed to meet the requirement of investigation of complicated white collar crime/ corruption and corrupt practices. Furthermore, experts from di�erent areas are attached and made partof combined investigation team for opinion during investigation.
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STRUCTURE 45
Hierarchical Structure of NAB
The bureau is headed by the Chairman. The Prosecutor General of Accountability (PGA) is another principal o�cer. Next in hierarchy is the Deputy Chairman. NAB’s operations are spread over six divisions: Awareness & Prevention (A&P), Training & Research (T&R), Operations, Head Quarter (HQ), Prosecution and Human Resource Management (HRM).
Jurisdiction of NAB under NAO extends to the whole of Pakistan. At present, it is operating through the Headquarters at Islamabad and seven regional o�ces at Lahore, Karachi, Quetta, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Multan and Sukkur respectively. Each regional o�ce is headed by a Director General.
During the year 2015, 110 new o�cers were appointed in NAB after a transparent recruitment process. These o�cers underwent an extensive training program organized at Police Academy Sihala by the Training & Recruitment Division of NAB before joining the �eld formations of the Bureau.
45 NAB websiteAnt
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PREVENTION, EDUCATION AND OUTREACH 46
NAB organizes a wide range programs and activities under its Prevention, Education and Outreach wing to increase awareness about the detrimental e�ects of corruption and corrupt practices. Under section 33-C (a) and (b) of NAO, it is the duty of the Bureau to educate and advise public authorities, holders of public o�ce and the community at large on measures to combat corruption and corrupt practices through media campaign and educational programs. NAB organizes activities such as seminars, workshops, lectures and other educational competitions for awareness against corruption.
Its prevention operations involve examination of the system and procedures of administration and stopping the corruption from happening through a mechanism of timely intervention which enables NAB to strengthen the regulatory mechanism of federal and provincial governments for transparency, meritocracy, fair play and compliance of relevant laws. The prevention operations include Public Project Evaluation as under the provisions of Section 33B, NAB has been entrusted with the responsibility to evaluate all mega contracts worth Rs.50 million or more.
Under the mandate of Section 33-C of NAO, Prevention Committees are constituted for reformation in the regulatory mechanism. The mandate is to look into the rules and regulations of provincial as well as federal departments and suggest doable recommendations in coordination with the concerned department. Director Generals (DGs) Conferences are held under the chairmanship of the Chairman to discuss performance of the Bureau and its Regional o�ces. Challenges faced by NAB, shift in focus and strategy, improvements in infrastructure & human resource matters, e�orts in creating enabling environment for workforce, incentives and opportunities for personal & professional growth and endeavor to transform NAB into an e�ective organization, the strengthening of the national integrity system are the topics discussed at these conferences. Measures to engage all stakeholders in the �ght against corruption are also �nalized.
An extensive public outreach program is carried out each �nancial year that includes formulation of prevention plans at federal as well as provincial level, initiation of several corruption prevention initiatives and constitution of character building societies to enhance awareness through education.
During 2015, NAB’s has also started extensive Awareness & Prevention Campaign to spread the message to general public about the nuisance of corruption. Under its hands-on approach, it has been engaging di�erent Government and Non-Governmental Organizations and civil society in �ght against corruption. NAB anticipates that joint e�orts of all stakeholders will help to check corruption and corrupt practices. Awareness and Media campaign on "Say No to Corruption” is becoming more e�ective and popular. Its awareness campaign through TV & Radio Programs, Walks, Lectures, Seminars / Workshops, Advertisements in leading English & Urdu newspapers, Banners &
46 National Accountability Bureau, Annual Report 2015 pp 4 -116
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47 National Accountability Bureau, Annual Report 2015 pp 5-115
Billboards, Newsletters, Essay Writing, Declamation, Poster and Painting Competitions at national level. NAB is extensively broadening the scope of its Prevention Operations to bring in greater transparency in governance and reduce the incidences of corruption.
International Anti-Corruption day is observed on 9th December every year all over the world. On this occasion, NAB has recently in collaboration with Asian Develop-ment Bank (ADB) organized a seminar on the topic “Say No to Corruption for Good Governance and Prosperous Pakistan”. Director General Awareness and Prevention, NAB, visit di�erent schools, institutions and universities of the country for delivering lectures on “Role of youth / students in prevention of corruption and Say No to Corruption and delivers talks on the impact of NAB’s Anti-Corruption Awareness Campaign with special focus on female students (future mothers /wives).
Six Prevention Committees have been established at HQ level in 2015. The recommendations of three such committees i.e. Prevention Committee on Ministry of Religious A�air (MORA), Prevention Committee on Tax Evasion, and Health A�airs have been �nalized while work on the remaining three is in full swing.
Awareness & Prevention Division has enforced Section 33-B of the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO), and under that enforcement, it has in its possession each and every detail of all mega and other projects undertaken by the Federal and Provincial governments. It is due to the Meeting of Prevention Committee on Health A�airs e�orts of A&P Division that now majority of the Federal/Provincial o�ces are reporting their contracts and tender processes to the Bureau.
NAB’s prevention & awareness initiatives are taken across the country through its sub o�ces and the above mentioned examples are only one of the many such ventures it takes up throughout the year47.
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Jur
isdi
ction
Fu
nctio
ns/
man
date
/ po
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Publ
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mili
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inte
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nce,
risk
as
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men
t & d
etectio
n Y
N
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e: Y
M
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ry: N
Y
Y Y
Y Y
2. C
orru
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inve
stigatio
n –
in
resp
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to c
ompl
aint
s Y
N
Polic
e: Y
M
ilita
ry: N
Y
Y Y
Y Y
Corr
uptio
n in
vesti
gatio
n –
own
moti
on p
ower
s Y
N
Polic
e: Y
M
ilita
ry: N
Y
Y
Y Y
Y
4. P
rose
cutio
n po
wer
s
Y
N
Po
lice:
Y
Mili
tary
: N
Y Y
Y Y
Y
5. A
sset
reco
very
/ co
nfisc
ation
/ re
stitutio
n po
wer
s
Y N
Po
lice:
Y
Mili
tary
: N
Y Y
Y Y
Y
6. P
reve
ntion
pow
ers
Y N
Po
lice:
Y
Mili
tary
: N
Y Y
Y Y
Y
7. E
ducatio
n an
d ou
trea
ch
pow
er
Y N
Po
lice:
Y
Mili
tary
: N
Y Y
Y Y
Y
3.
ACA
PRO
FILE
TA
BLE
TEM
PLAT
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3. KEY FINDINGSThe main �ndings of the assessment are based on a set of 50 indicators divided into seven di�erent dimensions (see above Table). These indicators are designed to assess the capacity and e�ectiveness of the ACA, and to identify gaps and areas of opportunity. Each indicator has been assigned one of three possible scores – high (3), moderate (2) and low (1), based on the level of standards set for each of the indicators. For a clear understanding of the dimensions as well as the overall score, it has been classi�ed into three categories – ‘high’ for an overall score between 67% and 100%, ‘moderate’ for an overall score between 34% – 66%, and ‘low’ for an overall score between 0% - 33%.
In order to arrive at the aggregate score for each dimension, the scores were converted from the 1-3 scale to a 0-2 scale. Thus, all (1) scores become (0), all (2) scores become (1) and all (3) scores become (2). This was done because when aggregating the scores and converting them to percentages the bottom of the scale must always be 0. If we were to use the 1-3 scale then the lowest possible score for any dimension would be 33% (i.e. 1/3). Once the scores were converted from the 1-3 scale to the 0-2 scale, scores obtained by each of the indicators of a dimension were added up and then divided by total of maximum possible scores for all indicators under that dimension and then multiplied by 100. For example, the sum of the indicators under the �rst dimension (Legal basis, independence and mandate) was 10 (5 indicators received the maximum score of 2 and 2 indicators received the minimum score of 0). The maximum total possible score for that dimension is 14 (i.e. 7 indicators X the maximum possible score of 2 for each). Thus the �nal aggregate score (percentage) for that dimension was: 12/14 X 100 = 71.43%.
NAB has scored high in 49 per cent of the indicators assessed, moderate in 33 percent, and low in 18 per cent of the indicators assessed. The �ndings indicate that two dimensions emerge out to be strong in NAB’s assessment: its Cooperation with other Organizations and Oversight and Accountability. NAB’s Perceptions of E�ectiveness is its weakest dimension scoring the lowest ranking.
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Table 4: Scores by Indicators
Indicators Scored at High Level
1. NAB’s Independence2. Mandate3. Legal Powers4. Appointment of Commissioner 5. Removal of Commissioner6. Budget Su�ciency7. Sta� Salary8. NAB’s Selection Criteria for Personnel9. Sta� Stability10. Responsiveness to Corruption Complaints11. Initiation of Complaints on its Own12. Willingness to Investigate In�uential Persons13. Role in Restitution, Asset Recovery, Freezing and Con�scation14. Budget for Prevention, Education and Outreach15. Corruption Prevention Initiatives16. Awareness Campaigns17. Government Support for Prosecution of Corruption Cases18. Cooperation with Other Agencies19. International Participation20. Information provided in and Accessibility of NAB’s Annual Report21. Outcome of complaints against NAB or its personal22. Support from GovernmentA
nti-
Cor
rupt
ion
Age
ncy
Str
engt
heni
ng I
niti
ativ
e 2
01
6
34
Indicators Scoring at Moderate Level
1. Security and Stability of NAB’s Budget2. Expertise of NAB’s Personnel in Investigation 3. Expertise of NAB’s Personnel in Corruption Prevention and Education4. Training of its Personnel5. Number of Cases Investigated 6. E�ciency and Professionalism of Corruption Investigations7. Average Conviction Rate of Corruption Cases Investigated8. NAB’s Plan for Prevention and Education9. Collaboration with Other Stakeholders in Prevention, Education and Outreach Activities10. Use of its Website and Social Media 11. Cooperation with CSOs and Private Sector12. Collaboration with other countries’ ACAs13. Internal Complaints Procedure14. Con�dence in its Adherence to Due Process, Impartiality, and Fairness in Using its Powers15. Con�dence in NAB’s e�ectiveness in corruption control
Indicators Scored at the Low Level
1. NAB’s Operational Autonomy2. Government’s Reliance on NAB to Use Corruption as a Weapon against Political Opponents3. Proportion of NAB’s Budget to Total Government Budget4. NAB’s Accessibility to Corruption Complainants/Informants, including Public and Whistle- Blowers5. Identi�cation of Gender in Compiling Corruption Complaints and Monitoring Corruption Trends 6. System Reviews7. Research8. Con�dence in NAB's Digni�ed and Respectful Treatment of Persons under Investigation
The indicators that could not be rated and the reasons for not being able to rate them are as follows:
The indicator for Frequency of including corruption prevention recommendations in NAB’s investigation reports could not be rated as recommendations are not a part of NAB’s investigations.
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No external accountability mechanism exists to monitor NAB’s actions; therefore, the indicator for NAB’s oversight mechanism could not be rated.
In addition, three indicators in the dimension of public perception(public perception of adherence to due process, impartiality and fairness in its use of powers control among persons with direct contact with NAB, public perception of NAB’s e�ective-ness in corruption control among persons with direct contact with NAB and its e�ectiveness in dealing with females who were in direct contact with NAB) could not be rated as the research team could meet only a few persons having direct contact with NAB. The sample was too small to generalize the response. Moreover, the views of the accused persons may be biased and may not re�ect NAB’s actual e�ectiveness.
Table 4 presents a summary of all indicators by dimension; Indicators which scored high are colored green, indicators which scored moderate are colored yellow and indicators scoring low are red. The indicators colored grey are not scored, because there was insu�cient information to score them. The in-depth assessment of each score and its basis are presented in Table 5, which presents details of the sources and information justifying each score.
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HIG
H SC
ORE
Gr
een
MO
DERA
TE S
CORE
Ye
llow
LO
W S
CORE
Re
d SC
ORI
NG
NO
T PO
SSIB
LE
Grey
Scor
ing
Key:
Tabl
e 4
Ass
essm
ent S
umm
ary:
Indi
cato
rs b
y D
imen
sion
(mor
e de
tail
prov
ided
in s
ecti
on 3
)
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Dim
ensi
on
LEGA
L BA
SIS,
IN
DEPE
NDE
NCE
AN
D M
ANDA
TE (7
) In
depe
nden
ce
Man
date
Le
gal p
ower
s Ap
poin
tmen
t of
Com
miss
ione
rs
Rem
oval
of
Com
miss
ione
rs
Ope
ratio
nal
auto
nom
y
Politi
cal u
se o
f po
wer
by
Gove
rnm
ent
FINA
NCIA
L AN
D HU
MAN
RE
SOUR
CES (
9)
Budg
et
prop
ortio
n of
go
vern
men
t bu
dget
Budg
et
suffi
cien
cy
Budg
et st
abili
ty
Staff
sala
ry
Staff
sele
ction
St
aff e
xpertis
e (In
vesti
gatio
n)
Staff
exp
ertis
e (p
reve
ntion
) St
aff T
rain
ing
Staff
stab
ility
DETE
CTIO
N A
ND
INVE
STIG
ATIO
N
(9)
Acce
ssib
ility
Re
spon
siven
ess
Will
ingn
ess t
o in
itiat
e co
mpl
aint
s
Case
s
Inve
stiga
ted
Effici
ency
&
prof
essio
nalis
m
Conv
ictio
n ra
te
Inve
stigatio
n of
influ
entia
l per
sons
Rest
itutio
n an
d
asse
t rec
over
y
Com
plai
nant
s by
gen
der
PREV
ENTI
ON
, ED
UCA
TIO
N A
ND
OU
TREA
CH (9
)
Budg
et
allo
catio
n Pr
even
tion
initi
ative
s Sy
stem
/Age
ncy
revi
ews
Prev
entio
n re
com
men
datio
ns
Out
reac
h an
d ed
ucati
on p
lans
Stak
ehol
ders
en
gage
men
t
Rese
arch
on
Corr
uptio
n
By C
ampa
igns
Di
ssen
tion
use
of W
ebsit
e an
d so
cial
med
ia
STAT
E SU
PPO
RT,
INTE
RAGE
NCY
CO
OPE
RATI
ON
(5)
Gove
rnm
ent
Supp
ort
Coop
erati
on
with
oth
er
agen
cies
Coop
erati
on
With
civ
il so
ciet
y an
d pr
ivat
e se
ctor
Inte
rnati
onal
pa
rtici
patio
n
Colla
boratio
n w
ith o
ther
co
untr
ies’
ACA
s
OVE
RSIG
HT A
ND
ACCO
UNT
ABIL
ITY
(4)
Acce
ssib
ility
of
Annu
al re
port
Ove
rsig
ht
mec
hani
sm
Inte
rnal
Co
mpl
aint
s Pr
oced
ure
Staff
disc
iplin
ary
or d
ismiss
al
PERC
EPTI
ON
S OF
EFFE
CTIV
ENES
S (7
)
Gove
rnm
ent
givi
ng
adeq
uate
po
wer
s
Adhe
renc
e to
du
e pr
oces
s,
impa
rtial
ity,
and
fairn
ess i
n us
e of
pow
er
Adhe
renc
e to
du
e pr
oces
s in
use
of p
ower
am
ong
thos
e ha
ving
dire
ct
cont
act
Confi
denc
e in
di
gnifi
ed
trea
tmen
t of
pers
ons u
nder
in
vesti
gatio
n
Effectiv
enes
s in
corr
uptio
n co
ntro
l
Effe
ctiv
enes
s in
cor
rupt
ion
cont
rol a
mon
g pe
rson
s with
di
rect
con
tact
Effectiv
enes
s in
deal
ing
with
fe
mal
es in
dire
ct
cont
act
If we break down areas of opportunity by dimension, we �nd the following:
NAB’s LEGAL BASIS, INDEPENDENCE AND MANDATE
NAB re�ects its strength under the dimension of legal basis, independence and mandate. It is a legally independent unit under the aegis of the National Accountability Ordinance-1999 and its scope of work involves education, detection, investigation and prosecution of cases involving corrupt practices48. Its sole objective being eradication of corruption from society through an extensive strategy. It enjoys extensive powers to investigate, arrest and prosecute; examine suspect’s bank accounts, safe deposit boxes, income tax records and property; search and entry of premises, etc49.
The Chairman is appointed by the President with the mutual consent of Leader of the House and Leader of the Opposition. Appointment of the Chairman is rated high as s/he is appointed for a �xed term of four years and can only be removed on the grounds that necessitate removal of a judge of Supreme Court of the country50.
The shortfalls in the �rst dimension are lack of freedom in practice due to political pressures. As per NAB’s law, it is an autonomous and impartial organization. However, in practice, NAB is not free from political pressures. The relevant stakeholders consulted for the research shared that the political interference a�ects NAB’s credibility in terms of its impartiality. There have been instances of in�uential persons not convicted. NAB is alleged of being a partisan agency used for political victimization by the government51.
Furthermore, media reports re�ect many instances where the political elite have repeatedly attempted to use NAB as a device to victimize opponents, and sanctify their own actions52, 53, 54. Discussion with relevant stakeholders also reported such political victimization by the government55.
NAB’S FINANCIAL AND HUMAN RESOURCES
The major shortfall under the dimension of �nancial resources is the average proportion of NAB’s budget to total government budget for past 3 years. A comparison of the said budgets re�ects that the proportion of budget in the last three years has been below 0.10% of the country’s total budget56. However, as per NAB’s expectations and �nancial needs, the revenue is su�cient to carry out the activities as it also gets a percentage of the amount recovered from Voluntary Return and Plea Bargain. In addition, 100% of budget request is approved every year57.
48 National Accountability Bureau available at http://www.nab.gov.pk/ Accesses on August 2, 201649 Transparency International, Pakistan National Integrity System, Country Report 2014, pp. 16450 Ibid pp. 16551 Ibid pp. 16052 Nab Not Alone, FIA Doing Same Too: Zardari Tells Nawaz, http://www.suchtv.pk/pakistan/general/item/33682- nab-not-alone-�a-doing-same-too-zardari-tells-nawaz.html53 Fearing accountability http://nation.com.pk/columns/21-Feb-2016/fearing-accountability54 NAB refuses to become ‘puppet’ at Saad Ra�que’s hands in Lahore’s Royal Palm case, sticks to its previous probe http://www.pakdestiny.com/nab-refuses-become-puppet-saad-ra�ques-hands-lahores-royal-palm-case-sticks- previous-probe/55 Focus Group Discussion56 http://www.pkrevenue.com/category/budget-2015-16/Accessed on September 2, 201657 Interview of NAB O�cials on August 20, 2016
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Another area scored at the moderate level is security and stability of NAB’s budget during past three years. Although NAB’s budget has not been reduced except for one year, there is no formal guarantee of �scal stability as there are uneven trends in budget grants in the past few years58, 59.
All areas in human resources have been rated either high or moderate. NAB’s selection criterion is rated as high as it follows a strict procedure laid out by its Recruitment & Selection Committee. At the initial stage, candidates are short listed from thousands of applicants. The salaries of NAB’s personnel are competitive in terms of the market. Extra bene�t in the form of hardship allowance and double salary as compared to similar positions in other government departments is admissible to NAB Employees60.
NAB employees have su�cient expertise to carry out their duties. Its training wing engages them in continuous training. Ample training opportunities are provided to its personnel. An annual training plan was chalked out and implemented in 2015. Curriculum of training is designed to meet the requirement of investigation of complicated white collar crime/ corruption and corrupt practices. However, there is a need to train them in other areas such as asset recovery of proceeds stashed in o�shore companies/foreign countries, public procurement, share trading and banking crime. At present, NAB has to acquire the said expertise from various other public organizations which are corrupt themselves61. Another strong area under human resources dimension is the low turnover and resignation rate which is about 5% per year62.
NAB’S DETECTION AND INVESTIGATION FUNCTION
The major shortfall that appears in this dimension is the low number of complaints lodged as less than one percent complaints are lodged relative to population63. In addition, there is a sense of fear and experience of harassment among the general public when it comes to lodging a complaint with NAB. Past instances show that the complainants themselves have been accused of the o�ence. Perhaps this is the reason behind the low con�dence of the general public in the e�ectiveness of NAB. The recommendations to counter this are outlined in the next section.
The number of cases under trial, cases pending convictions and acquittals are available at http://www.nab.gov.pk/Reference/CourtCasesData.pdf )
58 National Accountability Bureau Budget, Accessed on August 5, 2016, http://www.dawn.com/ ac59 PIDLAT Report Score card: Federal Government of Pakistan: Assessment of the quality of Governance http://epaper.brecorder.com/60 Interview of NAB O�cials on August 20, 201661 Focus Group Discussion62 Interview of NAB O�cials on August 20, 201663 NAB Annual Report 2015 pp. 60
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With regards to NAB’s responsiveness to complaints, it is rated high based on the large number of complaints investigated in the last three years. It has intervened in and scrutinized several projects worth billions of rupees. Complaints are also initiated on the information provided to NAB by other individuals and organizations. NAB initiates complaints on its own as and when required. NAB is rated moderately in terms of number of cases investigated as between 300 to 800 cases annually have been investigated by NAB during past three years64. Moreover, the working of NAB in terms of e�ciency and professionalism of corruption is rated as moderate. As per NAB’s Standard Operating Procedure (SOP), timelines have been prescribed for e�cient, e�ective and expeditious disposal of cases putting a maximum limit of 10 months- from complaint veri�cation-to-inquiry-to-investigation and �nally to a reference in the Accountability Court65. However, long delays on part of NAB in the processing of complaints and cases are a matter of concern.
Majority of the accused still go scot free. Recommendations to improve on this dimension are outlined in the next section.
NAB has levied charges against some high pro�le politicians and government o�cials and in certain cases recovered the embezzled money. A number of former high o�cials have been penalized over the years.
NAB takes cognizance of cases of corruption and corrupt practices of public o�ce holders, bank defaulters, etc. who are in�uential persons having administrative and �nancial authorities66. However, no high pro�le politician has been prosecuted yet67.
In addition, NAB’s role in restitution, asset recovery, freezing and con�scation is rated high. As soon as a NAB inquiry is approved by the Chairman NAB to be converted into investigation, the property/assets involved in the corruption case are frozen until the case is �nalized by the Accountability Court68.
Special care is taken while handling the cases that involve accused females. The procedure is clearly de�ned in the criminal procedure code which is strictly adopted while investigating or during custody of accused females. However, NAB does not collect gender sensitive demographic information69.
NAB’S PREVENTION, EDUCATION AND OUTREACH FUNCTIONS
Under the dimension of prevention, education and outreach, the strong areas rated as high are as follows:
64 NAB Annual Report 2015 pp. 6165 www.nab.gov.pk/PRESS/NEW.ASP?125966 http://www.nab.gov.pk/Downloads/Case_studies/noorulhaq.pdf67 Masood Khan, Niaz A. Shah Kakakhel, Melvin J Dubnick, Prosecuting Corruption: The Case of Pakistan, Working Paper for the Ethics Forum held by the American Society for Public Administration, Portland, 26-27 March, 2004, http://unpan1.un.org/intra 68 Interview of NAB O�cials on August 20, 201669 Ibid
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10% of NAB’s budget outlay is devoted to awareness and prevention which is rated as high70. An extensive public outreach program is carried out each �nancial year that includes formulation of prevention plans at federal as well as provincial level, initiation of several corruption prevention initiatives, and constitution of character building societies to enhance awareness through education and character building71.
Other such examples are celebration of UN anti-corruption day, seminars, walks, academic competitions, media campaigns including radio TV and newspapers, documentaries, the slogan of “Say No to Corruption” on utility bills, Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), procurement advertisements and banners and standees put up at prominent places.
The level of NAB’s collaboration with other stakeholders has been rated as moderate. It has held conferences in collaboration with academia, intelligentsia, NGOs and public. It is also collaborating with the provincial governments and PPRA for prevention72.
The website shares press clippings and disseminates information about NAB’s activities, inquiries, recoveries and cases (without dates). NAB’s Annual report of only current year is available on the website and the reports of the previous years are removed73. NAB’s Facebook page is not very active. There is a gap of two years in terms of posts74. Only a few independent research studies have been conducted by NAB. NAB chalks out a comprehensive s plan for prevention and education.
Only a few reviews of other government organization’s procedural systems have been conducted and recommendations forwarded to those organizations75. Hence it is rated low. As the number of research studies conducted by NAB in the past three years are few. Therefore the indicator is rated low.
Recommendations are not a part of NAB’s investigations76. Therefore, this indicator cannot be rated.
NAB’S COOPERATION WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
NAB’s Cooperation with other organizations is one of its strongest dimensions. In terms of Government support to NAB for prosecution of corruption cases, it is observed that the Prosecutor General of NAB is head of its Prosecution Division. He is assisted by the Team of Legal Experts & public prosecutors all over the country and has close coordination with Attorney General and Advocate General during prosecution of corruption cases, when question of law arises.
70 NAB Report 2014 pp. 8371 Ibid pp. 8372 Ibid pp. 75-11573 http://www.nab.gov.pk/ Accessed on September 22, 201674 https://www.facebook.com/Nationalaccountabilitybureau/?fref=ts75 Interview with NAB O�cials on August 20, 201676 Ibid
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As per Clause 19 of National Accountability Ordinance “the Chairman NAB may call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself, require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to the inquiry, examine any person acquainted with the facts and circumstances, require any bank or �nancial institution, notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, to provide any information relating to any person. In addition, NAB may seek the aid and assistance of any [Government] agency and the information so collected may be used as evidence in the trial77.”
There are two anti-corruption agencies at federal level: One is National Accountability Bureau (NAB) and the other is Federal Investigation Agency (FIA). In addition, one anti-corruption establishment exists in each province. Chairman of NAB has the power to seek full and complete assistance from any department of the federal and provincial government and institution or department in the public sector or the private sector. The responsibility for inquiry into and investigation of an o�ence of corruption and corrupt practices shall rest on NAB to the exclusion of any other agency or authority, unless any such agency or authority is required to do so by the Chairman78.
TI-Pakistan provides its input regarding corruption committed within the country. NAB collaborates with a wide range of international anti-corruption organizations and initiatives including United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC), International Association of Anti-Corruption Authorities (IAACA), etc. It has also been cooperating with member countries with which Pakistan has mutual legal assistance treaties and extradition treaties.
NAB’s OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
NAB’s Oversight and Accountability emerges out to be one of the strongest dimensions. NAB submits an annual report with comprehensive information on its work throughout the year to the President of Pakistan. The said report is easily accessible to the public and is also available on NAB’s website79.
No external accountability mechanism is present to monitor its actions. Therefore, the indicator could not be rated. There have been instances in the past when the higher courts have been exercising their supervisory jurisdiction and power of jurisdiction review whenever NAB has transgressed its limits80.
However, NAB has devised a strong Internal Accountability Mechanism (IAM) to address the issue. A separate cell, Intelligence and Vigilance / Surveillance, has been established within the organization which continuously monitors the activities of employees. All complaints relating to corrupt practices by employees of NAB are monitored and investigated by this Cell.
77 National Accountability Ordinance 1999 www.nab.gov.pk/Downloads/nao.asp78 Ibid79 NAB Annual Report 2015 accessed at http://www.nab.gov.pk/80 Transparency International, Pakistan National Integrity System, Country Report 2014, pp. 170
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It is encouraging to note that NAB takes cognizance of cases of corrupt practice by its own employees under National Accountability Bureau Ordinance. O�cers found involved in corrupt practices are immediately suspended and not allowed to continue work. An independent inquiry is conducted and if an employee is found guilty, reference is �led in the Accountability Court similar to any other person accused of corruption81.
A particular instance in this respect is NAB’s action against its own Chairman in a mega corruption scam in 2013. Furthermore, disciplinary proceedings were launched against at least 83 o�cers in the last three years and 60 out of those cases have been �nalized along with 22 major penalties, 4 minor penalties and four exoneration. Outcomes of these complaints were publicized82.
NAB’s PERCEPTION OF EFFECTIVENESS
NAB’s perception of e�ectiveness emerges out to be the weakest dimension. As compared to other anti-corruption organizations like Federal Investigation Agency and Provincial Anti-Corruption Departments, NAB is perceived to be more e�ective. However, several instances of irregularities have led to public’s mistrust. NAB has not been able to put a real dent on the face of prevalent and pervasive corruption83.
Corruption has become an inevitable part of Pakistan’s environment and culture to an extent that the public has lost hope of getting justice. One can expect such mistrust in the country’s institutions where the case against the Prime Minister did not lead to conviction. The public perceives that unless the issues in morality and ethics are addressed, there can be no improvement. In addition, the public believes that although NAB is given the necessary powers and resources, it is not exercising the given powers to produce results.
NAB’s performance against corruption is reported as very poor in terms of its Standard Operating Procedures84. Following a former prime minister’s criticism of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), NAB itself regretted that it had “inherited some problems that hampered its investigation process”85. It is also reported that the statistics of the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) are not only pointing �ngers at performance of the Bureau but are also pointing to its utility. A former Prime Minister claimed that after coming to power he would constitute a powerful department for accountability but his own disposition is being questioned at present86.
Media reports record that NAB is closing cases worth billions of rupees under the so-called plea bargaining but on the other hand, it was �ling frivolous cases against others87. Recently, media reports have highlighted that the Supreme Court of
81 Interview with NAB O�cials on August 20, 201682 http://www.baaghi.tv/nab-launches-investigation-against-its-own-o�cial/ May 17, 201683 Daniyal Aziz, Anticorruption and its Discontents, Prepared for presentation at OPMN conference: Innovations in Public Management for Controlling Corruption, 27-29 June, 2012, Honolulu, Hawaii84 NAB performance http://www.dawn.com/news/1084777 published Feb 04, 2014
85 NAB ‘falls in line’ after PM’s criticism http://www.dawn.com/news/1240296 published Feb 18, 201686 Statistics show NAB’s poor performance https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/53790-statistics-show-nabs-poor-performance published July 30, 201587 NA SPEAKER HITS AT FILING REFERENCE AGAINST NAB OVER ITS POOR PERFORMANCE http://www.radio.gov.pk/12-Jul- 2015/na-speaker-hits-at-�ling-reference-against-nab-over-its-poor-performance published 12 Jul, 2015
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Pakistan went as far as saying that the Bureau was actually “facilitating corruption in the country.” It has also been observed that the National Accountability Bureau (NAB) is losing the trust of the masses with the passage of every second and has the worst condition of a�airs88. Previously, the chief minister of a province and the chairman of a political party nudged the organization by terming its plea bargain move as a “fraud” and “shameful” respectively; others have condemned NAB’s existence by calling it the remnants of a military dictator which was formed to facilitate his rule89.
Major reason behind the poor disposal and institution of cases at the Accuntability courts, they say, is the lethargic attitude of investigators and o�cials of National Accountability Bureau, apart from the administrative constraints and dearth of senior judges at NAB courts90. Majority of the key stakeholders consulted for the research reported experiencing lax attitude on part of NAB’s o�cers. Few of them also shared personal instances of display of such behavior by NAB91.
The three indicators mentioning NAB’s perception of e�ectiveness among persons who had been in close contact with NAB were not rated. The research team could meet only a few persons with direct contact with NAB. Therefore, the sample was too small to generalize the responses. In addition, the views of the accused persons may be biased and may not re�ect NAB’s actual e�ectiveness.
88 NAB losing public trust: SC https://www.thenews.com.pk/print/183490-NAB-losing-public-trust-SC?src=ilaw89 Corrupt exchanges: understanding NAB’s accountability of ‘compromise’ Featured, http://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2017/01/08/corrupt-exchanges- understanding-nabs-accountability-of-compromise/ published JANUARY 8, 201790 Performance of NAB courts far from satisfactory February 03, 2015http://nation.com.pk/lahore/03-Feb-2015/performance-of-nab-courts-far-from-satisfactory
91 Focus Group Discussion on October 1, 2016
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ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
44
Tabl
e: 5
Det
aile
d In
dica
tors
’ Sco
res
wit
h So
urce
s an
d Co
mm
ents
1.
NA
B’s
Lega
l Ind
epen
denc
e an
d St
atus
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
45
In
dica
tor
Rang
e of
Sco
res
Sc
ore
Hi
gh (3
) M
ediu
m (2
) Lo
w (1
) 1A
N
AB’s
lega
l in
depe
nden
ce
Inde
pend
ent
agen
cy
Sepa
rate
ag
ency
ou
tsid
e m
inist
ry
With
in p
olic
e or
min
istry
Es
tabl
ished
as
an a
pex
Anti-
Corr
uptio
n Ag
ency
of
Paki
stan
for
mal
ly r
ecog
nize
d un
der
Uni
ted
Nati
ons
Conv
entio
n ag
ains
t Co
rrup
tion
(UN
CAC)
, NAB
is a
lega
lly in
depe
nden
t bo
dy o
peratin
g un
der
the
Nati
onal
Acc
ount
abili
ty O
rdin
ance
-199
9. T
he l
egal
set
up
give
s N
AB in
depe
nden
ce in
term
s of
its
functio
ns, a
utho
rity
and
juris
dicti
on. I
t ove
rrid
es
all o
ther
law
s. It
has
its o
wn
polic
ies r
egar
ding
recr
uitm
ent a
nd se
lecti
on.
Sour
ce: N
AB’s
Web
site:
htt
p://
ww
w.n
ab.g
ov.p
k/
Tran
spar
ency
Inte
rnati
onal
, Nati
onal
Inte
grity
Sys
tem
, Cou
ntry
Rep
ort 2
014
pp. 1
64
Nati
onal
Acc
ount
abili
ty O
rdin
ance
199
9
1B
NAB
’s m
anda
te
Focu
s on
inve
stig
atio
n,
Educ
atio
n,
prev
entio
n an
d pr
osec
utio
n
Prim
ary
focu
s on
in
vest
igat
ion
Educ
atio
n an
d pr
even
tion
with
out
Inve
stig
atio
n
NAB
‘s s
ole
obje
ctive
is
erad
icati
on o
f co
rrup
tion
from
soc
iety
thr
ough
an
exte
nsiv
e st
rate
gy. I
ts m
anda
te is
bro
ad a
nd f
ocus
es o
n ed
ucati
on, d
etectio
n, in
vesti
gatio
n an
d pr
osec
ution
of c
ases
invo
lvin
g co
rrup
t pra
ctice
s.
Sour
ce: N
AB’s
Web
site:
htt
p://
ww
w.n
ab.g
ov.p
k/
Issu
es in
Cor
rupti
on a
nd th
e Ro
le o
f NAB
, htt
p://
ww
w.ic
ac.o
rg.h
k/ne
wsl/
issue
27en
g/bu
tton
6.ht
m
NAB
Ann
ual R
epor
t 201
5 p
p. 1
9
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
46
1C N
AB’s
lega
l pow
ers
Exte
nsiv
e po
wer
s (e
.g.,
arre
st a
nd
sear
ch o
f arr
este
d pe
rson
s;
exam
inin
g su
spec
t’s b
ank
acco
unts
, sa
fe- d
epos
it bo
xes,
inco
me
tax
reco
rds
and
prop
erty
; se
arch
and
en
try
of
prem
ises,
etc
.)
Som
e po
wer
s Fe
w o
r non
e N
AB h
as e
xten
sive
pow
ers t
o in
vesti
gate
arr
est a
nd p
rose
cute
; exa
min
ing
susp
ect’s
ban
k ac
coun
ts, s
afe-
dep
osit
boxe
s, in
com
e ta
x re
cord
s an
d pr
oper
ty;
sear
ch a
nd e
ntry
of
prem
ises.
The
re is
no
rest
rictio
n or
ext
erna
l sup
ervi
sion
on N
AB’s
functio
nal p
ower
s and
au
thor
ity. T
he le
gal f
ram
ewor
k of
NAB
also
pro
vide
s fo
r pr
otectio
n of
witn
esse
s. T
he
finan
cial
con
trol
and
aut
horit
y of
NAB
lies
with
its C
hairm
an.
So
urce
: Tra
nspa
renc
y In
tern
ation
al, P
akist
an N
ation
al In
tegr
ity S
yste
m, C
ount
ry R
epor
t 20
14, p
p. 1
59 &
164
Sa
mad
, S. (
2008
). Co
mba
ting
corr
uptio
n: T
he c
ase
of th
e N
ation
al A
ccou
ntab
ility
Bur
eau,
Pak
istan
, JO
AAG,
Vol
. 3. N
o. 1
N
ation
al A
ccou
ntab
ility
Bur
eau:
An
Inde
pend
ent R
evie
w o
f Str
uctu
re a
nd P
erfo
rman
ce.
http:
//w
ww
.pild
at.o
rg/P
ublic
ation
s/pu
blic
ation
/Dem
ocra
cy&
LegS
tr/N
ation
alAc
coun
tabi
lity
Bure
auAn
Inde
pend
entR
evie
wof
Stru
ctur
eand
Perf
orm
ance
1D
Appo
intm
ent o
f N
AB’s
Co
mm
issio
ner(
s)
Inde
pend
ent
com
mitt
ee u
sing
obje
ctive
crit
eria
an
d pr
oced
ure
is tr
ansp
aren
t
Min
ister
ial
com
mitt
ee
usin
g ob
jecti
ve
crite
ria b
ut
proc
edur
e is
not
tran
spar
ent
Prim
e M
inist
er/
Pres
iden
t/ H
ead
of S
tate
mak
es
the
deci
sion
and
the
proc
edur
e is
not t
rans
pare
nt
The
Chai
rman
is a
ppoi
nted
by
the
Pres
iden
t w
ith t
he m
utua
l con
sent
of
Lead
er o
f th
e Ho
use
and
Lead
er o
f th
e O
ppos
ition
. As
bot
h th
e Go
vern
men
t an
d th
e O
ppos
ition
are
in
volv
ed in
the
sele
ction
, the
nom
inee
is d
eem
ed to
be
non-
parti
san.
So
urce
: Int
ervi
ew w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s N
ation
al A
ccou
ntab
ility
Ord
inan
ce 1
999
Focu
s Gro
up D
iscus
sion
1E
N
AB’s
Co
mm
issio
ner(
s)’
term
of o
ffice
and
re
mov
al
Fixe
d te
rm w
ith
tenu
re (d
ifficu
lt to
Re
mov
e Co
mm
issio
ners
w
ithou
t cau
se, e
.g.
inco
mpe
tenc
e or
pr
oven
m
iscon
duct
)
Fixe
d te
rm
with
out t
enur
e bu
t not
diffi
cult
to re
mov
e Co
mm
issio
ners
No fix
ed te
rm a
nd
Com
miss
ione
rs
can
be re
plac
ed
easil
y
The
Cha
irman
is a
ppoi
nted
for a
fixe
d te
rm o
f fou
r yea
rs a
nd c
an o
nly
be re
mov
ed o
n th
e gr
ound
s tha
t nec
essit
ate
rem
oval
of a
judg
e of
Sup
rem
e Co
urt o
f the
cou
ntry
. So
urce
: Tr
ansp
aren
cy I
nter
natio
nal,
Paki
stan
Nati
onal
Int
egrit
y Sy
stem
, Co
untr
y Re
port
20
14, p
p.16
4
Nati
onal
Acc
ount
abili
ty O
rdin
ance
199
9
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
47
1F
NAB
’s o
peratio
nal
auto
nom
y an
d im
parti
ality
High
(no
politi
cal
inte
rfer
ence
) Li
mite
d (s
ome
politi
cal
inte
rfer
ence
)
Low
(hig
h le
vel o
f po
litica
l in
terf
eren
ce)
As p
er N
AB’s
law
, it
is an
aut
onom
ous
and
impa
rtial
org
aniza
tion.
How
ever
, in
practic
e,
NAB
is
not
free
fro
m p
oliti
cal
pres
sure
s.
The
rele
vant
sta
keho
lder
s co
nsul
ted
for
this
rese
arch
sha
red
that
the
pol
itica
l in
terf
eren
ce affe
cts
NAB
’s c
redi
bilit
y in
ter
ms
of i
ts
impa
rtial
ity.
So
urce
: Tr
ansp
aren
cy I
nter
natio
nal,
Paki
stan
Nati
onal
Int
egrit
y Sy
stem
, Co
untr
y Re
port
20
14, p
p. 1
60 &
166
Fo
cus G
roup
Disc
ussio
n In
terv
iew
s with
Sta
keho
lder
s
1G
Gove
rnm
ent’s
re
lianc
e on
NAB
to
use
corr
uptio
n as
a
wea
pon
agai
nst
politi
cal
Opp
onen
ts
Gov
ernm
ent h
as
not u
sed
ACA
as a
w
eapo
n ag
ains
t
pol
itica
l opp
onen
ts
Evid
ence
of
limite
d us
e of
AC
A by
go
vern
men
t as a
w
eapo
n ag
ains
t po
litica
l op
pone
nts
Evid
ence
of
wid
espr
ead
use
of
ACA
by
gove
rnm
ent a
s a
wea
pon
agai
nst
politi
cal
oppo
nent
s
NAB
has
bee
n fa
cing
alle
gatio
ns o
f bei
ng a
partis
an a
genc
y us
ed fo
r pol
itica
l victim
izatio
n by
the
gov
ernm
ent.
The
med
ia r
epor
ts r
eflec
t m
any
inst
ance
s w
here
the
pol
itica
l elit
e ha
ve r
epea
tedl
y att
empt
ed t
o us
e N
AB a
s a
devi
ce t
o vi
ctim
ize o
ppon
ents
, and
san
ctify
th
eir
own
actio
ns.
Disc
ussio
n w
ith r
elev
ant
stak
ehol
ders
also
rep
orte
d su
ch p
oliti
cal
victi
miza
tion
by th
e go
vern
men
t.
Sour
ce:
Tran
spar
ency
Int
erna
tiona
l, Pa
kist
an N
ation
al I
nteg
rity
Syst
em,
Coun
try
Repo
rt
2014
, pp.
160
Fo
cus G
roup
Disc
ussio
n M
edia
Rep
orts
htt
p://
ww
w.s
ucht
v.pk
/pak
istan
/gen
eral
/item
/336
82-n
ab-n
ot-a
lone
-fia-
doin
g-sa
me-
too-
zard
ari-t
ells-
naw
az.h
tml
http:
//na
tion.
com
.pk/
colu
mns
/21-
Feb-
2016
/fea
ring-
acco
unta
bilit
y htt
p://
ww
w.p
akde
stiny
.com
/nab
-ref
uses
-bec
ome-
pupp
et-s
aad-
rafiq
ues-
hand
s-la
hore
s-ro
yal-p
alm
-cas
e-sti
cks-
prev
ious
-pro
be/
Inte
rvie
ws w
ith S
take
hold
ers
Sub
Tota
l: 17
2
. Fin
anci
al a
nd H
uman
Res
ourc
es
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
48
In
dica
tor
Rang
e of
Sco
res
Justi
ficati
on o
f Sc
ore
Hi
gh (3
) M
ediu
m (2
) Lo
w (1
) 2A
Av
erag
e pr
opor
tion
of
NAB
’s
budg
et
to
tota
l go
vern
men
t bu
dget
fo
r pa
st 3
yea
rs
Abov
e 0.
20%
Betw
een
0.10
% to
0.
20%
Be
low
0.1
0%
2013
-14
:
Rs. 2
,165
.983
Mill
ion
agai
nst t
he c
ount
ry’s
bud
ge: R
s3.9
45 t
rillio
n
2014
-15
: Rs
. 2,2
08.6
73 M
illio
n ag
ains
t the
cou
ntry
’s b
udge
: 4.3
trill
ion
2015
-16
: Rs
. 2,8
96.1
96 M
illio
n ag
ains
t the
cou
ntry
’s b
udge
: 4.
4 tr
illio
n Th
e pr
oportio
n of
bud
get
in t
he la
st t
hree
yea
rs h
as b
een
belo
w 0
.10%
of
the
coun
try’
s bud
get.
So
urce
: N
AB A
nnua
l Rep
ort 2
015
In
terv
iew
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s
Inte
rvie
ws w
ith S
take
hold
ers
2 B
Suffi
cien
cy o
f NAB
’s b
udge
t fo
r per
form
ing
its fu
nctio
ns
Mor
e th
an
adeq
uate
(80
% t
o 10
0%
of
budg
et
requ
est i
s ap
prov
ed)
Adeq
uate
(66%
to
79%
of
bu
dget
re
ques
t is a
ppro
ved)
Inad
equa
te
(less
th
an
66%
of
bu
dget
requ
est i
s ap
prov
ed)
and
relie
s on
fun
ding
by
CS
Os
and
dono
r age
ncie
s
The
reve
nue
is suffi
cien
t to
car
ry o
ut t
he a
ctivitie
s as
NAB
has
the
ad
ditio
nal
amou
nt r
ecov
ered
fro
m c
erta
in p
erce
ntag
e of
Vol
unta
ry
Retu
rn a
nd P
lea
Barg
ain.
In
additio
n, 1
00%
of
budg
et r
eque
st i
s ap
prov
ed e
very
yea
r bas
ed o
n pr
e pr
actic
es.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s Tr
ansp
aren
cy In
tern
ation
al, P
akist
an, N
ation
al In
tegr
ity S
yste
m, C
ount
ry
Repo
rt 2
014,
pp.
162
-163
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
49
2C
Secu
rity
and
stab
ility
of
NAB
’s b
udge
t dur
ing
past
3
year
s
NAB
bud
get i
s gu
aran
teed
bas
ed
on p
revi
ous y
ear’s
al
loca
tion
and
has
not b
een
redu
ced
NAB
bud
get h
as n
ot
been
redu
ced
durin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
NAB
bud
get h
as
been
redu
ced
durin
g pa
st
thre
e ye
ars
The
budg
et a
lloca
ted
to N
AB is
as f
ollo
ws:
20
13-1
4 :
Rs.
2,1
65.9
83 M
illio
n
2014
-15
:
R
s. 2
,208
.673
Mill
ion
20
15-1
6 :
Rs.
2,8
96.1
96 M
illio
n Th
ere
is no
form
al g
uara
ntee
of fi
scal
sta
bilit
y as
the
re a
re u
neve
n tr
ends
in b
udge
t gra
nts i
n th
e pa
st fe
w y
ears
. So
urce
: htt
p://
ww
w.d
awn.
com
/Acc
esse
d on
Aug
ust 5
, 201
6 Tr
ansp
aren
cy
Inte
rnati
onal
, Pa
kist
an
Nati
onal
In
tegr
ity
Syst
em,
Coun
try
Repo
rt 2
014,
pp.
163
PI
DLAT
Re
port
Sc
ore
card
: Fe
dera
l Go
vern
men
t of
Pa
kist
an:
Asse
ssm
ent o
f the
qua
lity
of G
over
nanc
e htt
p://
epap
er.b
reco
rder
.com
/ 2D
N
AB p
erso
nnel
’s sa
lary
an
d be
nefit
s Co
mpe
titiv
e sa
lary
and
be
nefit
s
Adeq
uate
sala
ry a
nd
bene
fits
Low
sala
ry a
nd
limite
d be
nefit
s
NAB
’s p
erso
nnel
sal
arie
s ar
e ad
equa
te. E
xtra
ben
efit
in t
he fo
rm o
f ha
rdsh
ip
allo
wan
ce
and
doub
le
sala
ry,
as
com
pare
d to
ot
her
gove
rnm
ent
empl
oyee
s in
the
sam
e ca
dre,
is
adm
issib
le t
o N
AB
Empl
oyee
s So
urce
: Int
ervi
ew w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s In
terv
iew
s with
Sta
keho
lder
s
2E
NAB
’s se
lect
ion
crite
ria fo
r pe
rson
nel
Mer
itocr
atic
and
tr
ansp
aren
t pr
oced
ures
Lim
ited
mer
itocr
atic
or
tran
spar
ent
proc
edur
es
Patr
onag
e an
d no
n-tr
ansp
aren
t Pr
oced
ures
NAB
’s
recr
uitm
ent
is do
ne
thro
ugh
a Se
lecti
on
Boar
d an
d De
part
men
tal S
electio
n Co
mm
ittee
. At
the
initi
al s
tage
, can
dida
tes
are
shor
tlist
ed f
rom
tho
usan
ds o
f ap
plic
ants
. N
AB h
as o
utso
urce
d in
itial
scr
eeni
ng p
roce
ss t
o N
ation
al T
estin
g Se
rvic
es (
NTS
). Aft
er
that
Psy
chol
ogic
al T
est,
inte
rvie
ws a
re c
ondu
cted
. So
urce
: Int
ervi
ew w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s Tr
ansp
aren
cy
Inte
rnati
onal
, Pa
kist
an
Nati
onal
In
tegr
ity
Syst
em,
Coun
try
Repo
rt 2
014,
pp.
166
In
terv
iew
s with
Sta
keho
lder
s N
ation
al
Acco
unta
bilit
y Bu
reau
(N
AB)
empl
oyee
s Te
rms
&
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
50
2F
Expe
rtis
e of
NAB
’s
pers
onne
l in
corr
uptio
n in
vest
igat
ion
High
leve
l of
expe
rtise
La
ckin
g ex
pert
ise in
so
me
area
s La
ckin
g ex
pert
ise
in m
any
area
s N
AB e
mpl
oyee
s hav
e suffi
cien
t exp
ertis
e to
car
ry o
ut th
eir d
uties
as
reve
aled
in th
e in
terv
iew
s with
NAB
per
sonn
el.
How
ever
, the
re is
a n
eed
to tr
ain
them
in o
ther
are
as s
uch
as a
sset
re
cove
ry
of
proc
eeds
st
ashe
d in
off
shor
e co
mpa
nies
/ fo
reig
n co
untr
ies,
pub
lic p
rocu
rem
ent,
trad
ing
and
bank
ing
crim
e. N
AB h
as
to a
cqui
re th
e sa
id e
xpertis
e fr
om v
ario
us o
ther
pub
lic o
rgan
izatio
ns
whi
ch a
re c
orru
pt th
emse
lves
. So
urce
: Int
ervi
ew w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s Fo
cus G
roup
Disc
ussio
n St
reng
then
ing
NAB
's fin
anci
al c
rime
win
g,
http:
//w
ww
.bre
cord
er.c
om/p
ages
/arti
cle/
1214
834/
2015
-08-
07/s
tren
gthe
ning
-nab
s-fin
anci
al-c
rime-
win
g.ht
ml/A
cces
sed
Oct
ober
14
, 201
6
2G
Expe
rtis
e of
NAB
’s
pers
onne
l in
corr
uptio
n pr
even
tion
and
educ
atio
n
High
leve
l of
expe
rtise
La
ckin
g ex
pert
ise in
so
me
area
s La
ckin
g ex
pert
ise
in m
any
area
s Al
thou
gh N
AB o
rgan
izes
a w
ide
rang
e pr
ogra
ms
and
activ
ities
und
er
its P
reve
ntion
, Edu
catio
n an
d O
utre
ach
win
g to
incr
ease
aw
aren
ess
abou
t t
he d
etrim
enta
l effe
cts
of c
orru
ption
and
cor
rupt
pra
ctice
s,
its p
erso
nnel
lack
nec
essa
ry e
xpertis
e in
str
ateg
izing
its
corr
uptio
n pr
even
tion
and
educ
ation
initia
tives
as
refle
cted
in
its l
imite
d su
cces
s in
prev
entio
n of
cor
rupti
on.
Sour
ce: F
ocus
Gro
up D
iscus
sion
Inte
rvie
w w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s In
terv
iew
s with
Sta
keho
lder
s
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
51
2H
Trai
ning
of N
AB’s
Pe
rson
nel
Wel
l-tra
ined
pe
rson
nel w
ith m
any
trai
ning
op
port
uniti
es
Som
e tr
aine
d pe
rson
nel w
ith
limite
d tr
aini
ng
oppo
rtun
ities
Trai
ning
is
unim
port
ant a
nd
negl
ecte
d
NAB
has
set
up
a de
dica
ted
Trai
ning
& R
esea
rch
Divi
sion
in 2
013.
An
annu
al tr
aini
ng p
lan
was
also
cha
lked
out
and
impl
emen
ted
in 2
015.
Aft
er In
ducti
on N
AB O
ffice
rs g
o th
roug
h 7
mon
ths
Spec
ial T
rain
ing
Cour
se r
egar
ding
inv
estig
ation
of
Whi
te C
olla
r Cr
ime
to e
nhan
ce
inve
stigatio
n sk
ills.
Its
tra
inin
g w
ing
enga
ges
them
in
conti
nuou
s tr
aini
ng.
Follo
win
g do
mestic
and
int
erna
tiona
l tr
aini
ngs
are
also
impa
rted
to
NAB
Offi
cers
to
enha
nce
thei
r ex
perti
se a
nd
skill
s: -
a.
Fore
nsic
Sci
ence
s offe
red
by P
unja
b Fo
rens
ic S
cien
ce
Labo
rato
ry (P
FSL)
b.
Cr
ime
and
Inte
llige
nce
Anal
ysis
and
Mon
ey la
unde
ring
offer
ed b
y N
ation
al P
olic
e Ac
adem
y Is
lam
abad
. c.
In
tern
ation
al T
rain
ings
offe
red
by:-
i. M
alay
sian
Anti-
Corr
uptio
n Ac
adem
y.
ii.
UN
ODC
Cu
rric
ulum
of
trai
ning
is
desig
ned
to m
eet
the
requ
irem
ent
of
inve
stigatio
n of
com
plic
ated
whi
te c
olla
r cr
ime/
cor
rupti
on a
nd
corr
upt p
racti
ces.
Am
ple
trai
ning
opp
ortu
nitie
s ar
e pr
ovid
ed t
o N
AB’s
per
sonn
el.
How
ever
, tra
inin
g in
ass
et r
ecov
ery
of p
roce
eds
stas
hed
in offs
hore
co
mpa
nies
/for
eign
cou
ntrie
s, p
ublic
pro
cure
men
t, ba
nkin
g cr
ime
and
shar
e tr
adin
g is
need
ed to
equ
ip it
s pe
rson
nel w
ith th
e re
leva
nt
skill
s.
Sour
ce: N
AB A
nnua
l Rep
ort 2
015
pp.
137
In
terv
iew
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s Fo
cus G
roup
Disc
ussio
n
2I
Stab
ility
of N
AB’s
pers
onne
l Lo
w tu
rnov
er a
nd
resig
natio
n ra
te
(0%
to 5
% p
er y
ear)
Mod
erat
e tu
rnov
er
and
resig
natio
n ra
te
(mor
e th
an 5
% to
10
% p
er y
ear)
High
turn
over
and
re
signa
tion
rate
(m
ore
than
10%
pe
r yea
r)
NAB
has
a v
ery
low
turn
over
rate
whi
ch is
bet
wee
n 0-
5%.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s In
terv
iew
s with
Sta
keho
lder
s
Sub
Tota
l: 21
3.
NA
B’s
Det
ecti
on a
nd In
vest
igat
ion
Func
tion
(9 in
dica
tors
)
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
52
In
dica
tor
Rang
e of
Sco
re
Justifi
catio
n of
Sco
res
Hi
gh (3
) M
ediu
m (2
) Lo
w (1
) 3A
N
AB’s
acc
essib
ility
to
corr
uptio
n co
mpl
aina
nts/
info
rman
,in
clud
ing
publ
ic a
nd
whi
stle
- blo
wer
s dur
ing
past
3 y
ears
NAB
is h
ighl
y ac
cess
ible
as
refle
cted
in th
e hi
gh
prop
ortio
n of
co
rrup
tion
com
plai
nts
rece
ived
rela
tive
to
popu
latio
n an
d pe
rcei
ved
leve
l of
corr
uptio
n, a
nd
prop
ortio
n of
co
mpl
aina
nts
conf
iden
t to
iden
tify
them
selv
es
NAB
is a
cces
sible
as
refle
cted
in th
e m
oder
ate
prop
ortio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts r
ecei
ved
rela
tive
to p
opul
atio
n an
d pe
rcei
ved
leve
l of
cor
rupt
ion,
and
pr
opor
tion
of
com
plai
nant
s co
nfid
ent t
o id
entif
y th
emse
lves
NAB
is in
acce
ssib
le
as re
flect
ed in
low
pr
opor
tion
of
corr
uptio
n co
mpl
aint
s re
ceiv
ed re
lativ
e to
po
pula
tion
and
perc
eive
d le
vel
of c
orru
ptio
n, a
nd
prop
ortio
n of
co
mpl
aina
nts
conf
iden
t to
iden
tify
them
selv
es
Num
ber o
f Com
plai
nts
Year
201
3
2007
1 Ye
ar 2
014
19
997
Year
201
5
2999
6 To
tal i
n 3
year
s
700
64
Less
than
one
per
c ent
com
plai
nts
are
lodg
ed re
lativ
e to
pop
ulati
on.
Ther
e is
a se
nse
of f
ear
and
expe
rienc
e of
har
assm
ent
amon
g th
e ge
nera
l pub
lic w
hen
it co
mes
to
lodg
ing
a co
mpl
aint
with
NAB
as
the
past
ins
tanc
es s
how
tha
t th
e co
mpl
aina
nts
them
selv
es h
ave
been
ord
ered
to p
rese
nt th
emse
lves
in th
e N
AB offi
ce u
nder
thre
at
of d
ire c
onse
quen
ces.
In
som
e in
stan
ces
the
com
plai
nant
him
self
has b
een
accu
sed
of th
e off
ence
. So
urce
: NAB
Ann
ual R
epor
t 201
5 pp
. 60
Focu
s Gro
up D
iscus
sion
Inte
rvie
w w
ith S
take
hold
ers
3B
NAB
’s re
spon
siven
ess t
o co
rrup
tion
com
plai
nts
durin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
NAB
is h
ighl
y re
spon
sive
as
refle
cted
in th
e hi
gh
prop
ortio
n of
co
rrup
tion
com
plai
nts
inve
stig
ated
and
in
vest
igat
ion
case
s co
mpl
eted
dur
ing
past
3 y
ears
NAB
is re
spon
sive
as
refle
cted
in th
e m
oder
ate
prop
ortio
n of
cor
rupt
ion
com
plai
nts
inve
stig
ated
and
in
vest
igat
ion
case
s co
mpl
eted
dur
ing
past
3 y
ears
NAB
is n
ot
resp
onsiv
e as
re
flect
ed in
the
low
pro
port
ion
of
corr
uptio
n co
mpl
aint
s in
vest
igat
ed a
nd
inve
stig
atio
n ca
ses c
ompl
eted
du
ring
past
3
year
s
NAB
is
high
ly r
espo
nsiv
e as
refl
ecte
d in
the
hig
h pr
oportio
n of
co
mpl
aint
s in
vesti
gate
d in
the
las
t th
ree
year
s.
Its a
utom
ated
sy
stem
fo
r th
e re
spon
se o
f co
mpl
aint
s w
orks
eff
ectiv
ely.
The
co
mpl
aint
s re
ceiv
ed i
n th
e pa
st t
hree
yea
rs w
ere
7006
4 an
d th
e co
mpl
aint
s re
spon
ded
to w
ere
6887
5 w
hich
is
a hi
gh p
ropo
rtion
. Th
e br
eaku
p of
the
n
umbe
r o
f com
plai
nts
res
pond
ed
into
the
th
ree
year
s is
as fo
llow
s:
Year
201
3
188
92
Year
201
4
199
89
Year
201
5
300
04
Tota
l in
3 ye
ars
688
75
Sour
ce: N
AB A
nnua
l Rep
ort 2
015
pp. 6
0 3C
N
AB’s
will
ingn
ess t
o in
itiat
e co
rrup
tion
inve
stig
atio
ns d
urin
g pa
st 3
ye
ars
High
num
ber o
f co
rrup
tion
inve
stig
atio
ns
initi
ated
by
NAB
Mod
erat
e nu
mbe
r of
corr
uptio
n in
vest
igat
ions
in
itiat
ed b
y N
AB
Low
num
ber o
f co
rrup
tion
inve
stig
atio
ns
initi
ated
by
NAB
NAB
in
itiat
es
com
plai
nts
on
its
own
as
and
whe
n re
quire
d.
Chai
rman
NAB
tak
es s
uo m
oto
acti
on in
cas
es o
f co
rrup
tion
and
corr
upt
practic
es a
s pe
r th
e pr
ovisi
ons
in A
rticl
e 22
of
Nati
onal
Ac
coun
tabi
lity
Ord
inan
ce (N
AO),
1999
. So
urce
: Int
ervi
ew w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s In
terv
iew
s with
Sta
keho
lder
s N
ation
al A
ccou
ntab
ility
Ord
inan
ce (N
AO),
1999
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
53
3D
Aver
age
num
ber o
f ca
ses i
nves
tigat
ed b
y th
e N
AB p
er y
ear d
urin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
Mor
e th
an 1
,000
co
rrup
tion
case
s in
vest
igat
ed b
y th
e N
AB p
er y
ear d
urin
g th
e pa
st th
ree
year
s
Betw
een
300
to 9
99
corr
uptio
n ca
ses
inve
stig
ated
by
the
NAB
per
yea
r dur
ing
the
past
thre
e ye
ars
Less
than
300
co
rrup
tion
case
s in
vest
igat
ed b
y th
e N
AB p
er y
ear
durin
g th
e pa
st
thre
e ye
ars
The
brea
kup
of t
he c
ases
inve
stiga
ted
by N
AB p
er y
ear
durin
g pa
st
thre
e ye
ars i
s as f
ollo
ws:
Ye
ar 2
013:
370
Ye
ar 2
014:
467
Ye
ar 2
015:
731
So
urce
: NAB
Ann
ual R
epor
t 201
5 pp
. 60
Inte
rvie
w w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s
3E
Effic
ienc
y an
d pr
ofes
siona
lism
of
corr
uptio
n in
vest
igat
ions
by
NAB
dur
ing
past
3
year
s
High
ly e
ffici
ent a
nd
prof
essio
nal
inve
stig
atio
n of
co
rrup
tion
case
s
Effic
ient
and
pr
ofes
siona
l in
vest
igat
ion
of
corr
uptio
n ca
ses
Inef
ficie
nt a
nd
unpr
ofes
siona
l in
vest
igat
ion
of
corr
uptio
n ca
ses
Each
cas
e at
NAB
is in
vesti
gate
d by
a c
ombi
ned
Inve
stigatio
n Te
am
com
prisi
ng
Supe
rviso
ry
Offi
cer,
Inve
stigatio
n Offi
cer,
Lega
l Co
nsul
tant
, Ba
nkin
g Ex
pert
and
Rev
enue
Exp
ert.
NAB
has
its
own
Fore
nsic
Sc
ienc
e La
bora
tory
to
m
eet
High
St
anda
rd
of
Inve
stigatio
ns.
As p
er N
AB’s
Sta
ndar
d O
peratin
g Pr
oced
ure
(SO
P), ti
mel
ines
hav
e be
en p
resc
ribed
for
effi
cien
t, eff
ectiv
e an
d ex
peditio
us d
ispos
al o
f ca
ses
putti
ng a
max
imum
lim
it of
10
mon
ths-
fro
m c
ompl
aint
ve
rificatio
n-to
-inqu
iry-t
o-in
vesti
gatio
n an
d fin
ally
to
a re
fere
nce
in
the
Acco
unta
bilit
y Co
urt.
How
ever
, lo
ng d
elay
s on
par
t of
NAB
in
the
proc
essin
g of
com
plai
nts
and
case
s ar
e ob
serv
ed a
s a
matt
er o
f co
ncer
n.
Mor
e pr
ofes
siona
lism
nee
ds t
o be
exh
ibite
d by
NAB
’s s
taff
as t
he
key
stak
ehol
ders
rep
orte
d ex
perie
ncin
g la
x atti
tude
on
NAB
’s p
art.
Furt
herm
ore,
it w
as sh
ared
that
all
com
plai
nant
s w
ere
mad
e to
wai
t fo
r sev
eral
hou
rs in
one
room
onl
y w
hich
sho
uld
not b
e th
e pr
actic
e to
ens
ure
confi
denti
ality
and
priv
acy.
So
urce
: NAB
Ann
ual R
epor
t 201
5 pp
.130
-138
Fo
cus G
roup
Inte
rvie
ws
Inte
rvie
w w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s M
edia
Rep
orts
NAB
fails
to
mee
t SC
dea
dlin
e fo
r co
mpl
eting
pro
be
into
maj
or c
ases
htt
p://
ww
w.d
awn.
com
/new
s/12
5152
3
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
54
3F
Aver
age
conv
ictio
n ra
te
of c
orru
ptio
n ca
ses
inve
stig
ated
by
NAB
in
past
3 y
ears
Abov
e 75
%
Betw
een
50%
to
75%
Be
low
50%
N
AB s
hare
d th
at t
he a
ccum
ulati
ve c
onvi
ction
rat
e (t
hat
incl
udes
co
nvictio
n up
to
Supr
eme
Cour
t) f
or Y
ears
201
4, 2
015
and
2016
is
61%
, 68%
and
76%
, res
pecti
vely
. So
urce
: Int
ervi
ew w
ith N
AB’ s
offi
cial
s
3G
NAB
’s w
illin
gnes
s to
inve
stig
ate
influ
entia
l pe
rson
s for
cor
rupt
ion
with
out f
ear o
r fa
vor d
urin
g pa
st 3
ye
ars
Cons
ider
able
ev
iden
ce o
f in
vest
igat
ion
of
influ
entia
l per
sons
fo
r cor
rupt
ion
Som
e ev
iden
ce o
f in
vest
igat
ion
of
influ
entia
l per
sons
for
corr
uptio
n
No
evid
ence
of
inve
stig
atio
n of
in
fluen
tial
pers
ons f
or
corr
uptio
n
NAB
ha
s le
vied
ch
arge
s ag
ains
t hi
gh
leve
l po
litici
ans
and
gove
rnm
ent
offici
als
and
in c
erta
in c
ases
rec
over
ed t
he e
mbe
zzle
d m
oney
. A
num
ber o
f for
mer
hig
h offi
cial
s ha
ve b
een
pena
lized
ove
r th
e ye
ars.
Rec
ently
, a p
ublic
offi
cer h
as b
een
sent
ence
d to
5 y
ears
of
rigor
ous i
mpr
isonm
ent (
R.I)
with
a fi
ne o
f Rs.
17.
086
mill
ion
whi
ch is
to
be
paid
with
in a
per
iod
of o
ne m
onth
faili
ng w
hich
his
asse
ts sh
all
stan
d fo
rfei
ted
to th
e st
ate
How
ever
, tho
ugh
ther
e w
ere
alle
gatio
ns
of c
orru
ption
aga
inst
hi
gh p
rofil
e po
litici
ans
in t
he p
ast
but
none
ha
s bee
n pr
osec
uted
yet
. N
AB t
akes
cog
niza
nce
of c
ases
of
corr
uptio
n an
d co
rrup
t pr
actic
es
of p
ublic
offi
ce h
olde
rs,
bank
def
aulte
rs,
etc.
who
are
infl
uenti
al
pers
ons
havi
ng
adm
inist
rativ
e an
d fin
anci
al
auth
oriti
es.
It ha
s in
vesti
gate
d ca
ses
agai
nst
high
offi
cial
s su
ch a
s th
e Pr
ime
Min
ister
, Pr
esid
ent,
Chie
f Min
ister
s, e
tc.
Sour
ce
http:
//w
ww
.nab
.gov
.pk/
Dow
nloa
ds/C
ase_
stud
ies/
noor
ulha
q.pd
f In
terv
iew
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
55
3H
NAB
’s ro
le in
rest
itutio
n,
asse
t rec
over
y, fr
eezin
g an
d co
nfisc
atio
n du
ring
past
3 y
ears
Very
act
ive
role
by
NAB
M
oder
atel
y ac
tive
role
by
NAB
In
activ
e ro
le b
y N
AB
Durin
g th
e pa
st 3
yea
rs,1
95 c
ases
invo
lvin
g 86
6 p
erso
ns a
ccus
ed fo
r co
rrup
t pra
ctice
s, h
ave
been
fina
lized
for r
ecov
ery
/ re
imbu
rsem
ent
of lo
oted
mon
ey b
y th
e co
rrup
t offi
cial
s / o
ffice
rs in
con
niva
nce
with
ac
com
plic
es.
Out
of
the
amou
nt o
f Rs
. 19
472.
54 m
illio
ns,
agre
ed
betw
een
the
guilt
y an
d N
AB, t
he r
ecov
ered
am
ount
is R
s. 5
272.
447
mill
ion.
In
add
ition
, N
AB’s
rol
e in
res
tituti
on,
asse
t re
cove
ry,
free
zing
and
confi
scati
on is
rat
ed h
igh.
As
soon
as
a N
AB in
quiry
is
appr
oved
by
the
Chai
rman
NAB
to
be c
onve
rted
into
inve
stiga
tion,
th
e pr
oper
ty/a
sset
s in
volv
ed in
the
corr
uptio
n ca
se a
re fr
ozen
unti
l th
e ca
se is
fina
lized
by
the
Acco
unta
bilit
y Co
urt.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s
3I
Does
NAB
iden
tify
gend
er
in c
ompi
ling
corr
uptio
n co
mpl
aint
s and
m
onito
ring
corr
uptio
n tr
ends
?
NAB
has
gen
der
sens
itive
de
mog
raph
ic
info
rmat
ion
that
al
low
s it t
o m
onito
r how
co
rrup
tion
and
its
serv
ices
affe
ct
wom
en d
iffer
ently
NAB
has
gen
der
sens
itive
de
mog
raph
ic
info
rmat
ion
that
co
uld
allo
w it
to
mon
itor h
ow
corr
uptio
n an
d its
se
rvic
es a
ffect
w
omen
diff
eren
tly,
but i
t doe
s not
ac
tivel
y m
onito
r th
ese
diffe
renc
es.
NAB
tak
es c
ogni
zanc
e of
cor
rupti
on a
nd c
orru
pt p
racti
ces
with
out
any
disc
rimin
ation
of
gend
er.
Spec
ial c
are
is ta
ken
whi
le h
andl
ing
case
s in
volv
ing
fem
ales
acc
used
. The
pro
cedu
re is
cle
arly
defi
ned
in
the
crim
inal
pr
oced
ure
code
an
d is
stric
tly
adop
ted
whi
le
inve
stiga
ting
or d
urin
g cu
stod
y of
fem
ale
accu
sed.
Ho
wev
er,
NAB
do
es
not
colle
ct
gend
er
sens
itive
de
mog
raph
ic
info
rmati
on.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s
Sub
Tota
l: 20
NAB
doe
s not
col
lect
gend
er se
nsiti
ve
dem
ogra
phic
info
rmati
on.
4. N
AB’
s Pr
even
tion
, Edu
cati
on a
nd O
utre
ach
Func
tion
s (9
indi
cato
rs)
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
56
In
dica
tor
Rang
e of
Sco
res
Justi
ficati
on fo
r Sco
re
Hi
gh (3
) M
ediu
m (2
) Lo
w (1
) 4A
Av
erag
e pr
opor
tion
of N
AB’s
ope
ratin
g ex
pend
iture
al
loca
ted
to p
ublic
ou
trea
ch a
nd
prev
entio
n du
ring
past
3 y
ears
Abov
e 1%
of N
AB’s
op
erat
ing
expe
nditu
re
Betw
een
0.5%
an
d 1%
of N
AB’s
op
erat
ing
expe
nditu
re
Belo
w 0
.5%
of
NAB
’s o
pera
ting
expe
nditu
re
Awar
enes
s an
d Pr
even
tion
is al
loca
ted
abou
t 10%
of N
AB’s
bud
get o
utla
y. A
n ex
tens
ive
publ
ic o
utre
ach
prog
ram
is c
arrie
d ou
t eac
h fin
anci
al y
ear.
So
urce
: Int
ervi
ew w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s
4B
NAB
’s c
orru
ptio
n pr
even
tion
initi
ativ
es d
urin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
Man
y co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n in
itiat
ives
(ave
rage
of
3 o
r mor
e pe
r ye
ar)
Som
e co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n in
itiat
ives
(a
vera
ge o
f 1-2
pe
r yea
r)
NAB
initi
ated
fe
w o
r no
corr
uptio
n pr
even
tion
initi
ativ
es
Follo
win
g co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n in
itiati
ves
have
bee
n ta
ken
by N
AB a
t Fe
dera
l and
Pro
vinc
ial L
evel
•F
orm
ulati
on o
f Pr
even
tion
Com
mitt
ees:
26
prev
entio
n Co
mm
ittee
s ha
ve
been
con
stitu
ted
at F
eder
al a
s wel
l as P
rovi
ncia
l Lev
el.
•Mon
itorin
g of
Ten
der A
dvertis
emen
ts.
•Cha
ract
er B
uild
ing
Soci
eties
. Con
stitutio
n of
cha
ract
er b
uild
ing
soci
eties
to
enha
nce
awar
enes
s th
roug
h ed
ucati
on
and
char
acte
r bu
ildin
g w
ith
educ
ation
al
insti
tutio
ns
such
as
U
nive
rsity
of
En
gine
erin
g Te
chno
logy
, La
hore
, Al
ham
ra A
rts
Coun
cil,
Laho
re,
Laho
re U
nive
rsity
of
Man
agem
ent
Scie
nces
. etc
. •
Printin
g of
Mes
sage
“ S
ay n
o to
Cor
rupti
on”
• Im
plem
entatio
n o
f Nati
onal
Anti
-Cor
rupti
on S
trat
egy
In s
uppo
rt o
f th
e N
ACS
reco
mm
enda
tions
, TI
, Pa
kist
an h
ad d
esig
ned
a Co
ntra
ct E
valu
ation
For
m, f
or th
e Im
plem
entatio
n of
the
Publ
ic P
rocu
rem
ent
Rule
s 20
04 in
all
the
Fede
ral G
over
nmen
t Pro
curin
g Ag
enci
es. T
his
form
is to
be
subm
itted
to N
AB b
y al
l pub
lic p
rocu
ring
agen
cies
for a
ll te
nder
s wor
th R
s. 50
mill
ion
and
abov
e.
{{ Sou
rce:
NAB
Ann
ual R
epor
t 201
5 pp
. 73-
116
NAB
Con
trac
t Eva
luati
on F
orm
, htt
p://
tran
spar
ency
.org
.pk/
docu
men
ts/N
AB%
20Ev
alua
tion%
20Re
port
%20
Form
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
57
4C
Num
ber o
f rev
iew
s of
org
aniza
tiona
l pr
oced
ures
, sy
stem
s &
capa
bilit
ies
cond
ucte
d by
NAB
to
pre
vent
co
rrup
tion
durin
g pa
st 3
yea
rs
Man
y re
view
s w
ere
cond
ucte
d (r
elat
ive
to n
o. o
f or
gani
zatio
ns in
ju
risdi
ctio
n)
A su
bsta
ntia
l nu
mbe
r of r
evie
ws
wer
e co
nduc
ted
(rel
ativ
e to
no.
of
orga
niza
tions
in
juris
dict
ion)
Few
or n
o re
view
s wer
e co
nduc
ted
(rel
ativ
e to
no.
of
orga
niza
tions
in
juris
dict
ion)
Revi
ews
of 1
1 or
gani
zatio
n’s
proc
edur
al s
yste
ms
have
bee
n co
nduc
ted
and
reco
mm
enda
tions
ha
ve
been
fo
rwar
ded
to
conc
erne
d de
part
men
ts,
incl
udin
g Ca
pita
l Dev
elop
men
t Au
thor
ity (
CDA,
Chi
ef C
omm
issio
ner
Offi
ce
(ICT)
, Fed
eral
Boa
rd o
f Rev
enue
rega
rdin
g ta
x ev
asio
n, M
inist
ry o
f Rel
igio
us
Affai
rs, r
efor
mati
on in
pha
rmac
eutic
al e
valu
ation
and
regi
stratio
n di
visio
n –
Drug
Reg
ulat
ory
Auth
ority
of P
akist
an.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s
4D
Freq
uenc
y of
in
clud
ing
corr
uptio
n pr
even
tion
reco
mm
enda
tions
in
NAB
’s
inve
stig
atio
n re
port
s dur
ing
past
3
year
s
Freq
uent
ly
Som
etim
es
Not
at a
ll Re
com
men
datio
ns a
re n
ot a
par
t of N
AB’s
inve
stigatio
n re
port
s. T
here
fore
, th
is in
dica
tor c
anno
t be
rate
d.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s
4E
NAB
’s p
lan
for
prev
entio
n,
educ
atio
n an
d ou
trea
ch a
nd it
s im
plem
entatio
n
Com
preh
ensiv
e an
d cl
ear p
lan
whi
ch is
im
plem
ente
d an
d ac
cess
ible
The
plan
for
prev
entio
n,
educ
atio
n an
d ou
trea
ch
exist
s but
not
im
plem
ente
d fu
lly
Ther
e is
no o
r a
wea
k pl
an fo
r pr
even
tion,
ed
ucati
on a
nd
outr
each
activ
ities
NAB
dev
elop
s a c
ompr
ehen
sive
plan
for A
war
enes
s & P
reve
ntion
eac
h ye
ar.
How
ever
, the
pla
n is
not
alw
ays
impl
emen
ted
fully
. Onl
y th
e pl
an fo
r ye
ar
2016
was
shar
ed.
So
urce
: Int
ervi
ew w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
58
4F
NAB
’s c
olla
bora
tion
with
oth
er
stak
ehol
ders
in
prev
entio
n,
educ
atio
n an
d ou
trea
ch a
ctiv
ities
High
deg
ree
of
colla
bora
tion
with
thre
e or
m
ore
join
t pr
ojec
ts
Som
e de
gree
of
colla
bora
tion
with
on
e or
two
join
t pr
ojec
ts
Litt
le o
r no
colla
bora
tion
with
oth
er
stak
ehol
ders
NAB
col
labo
rate
s w
ith o
ther
sta
keho
lder
s. I
t is
also
col
labo
ratin
g w
ith t
he
prov
inci
al g
over
nmen
ts a
nd P
PRA
for
prev
entio
n. In
add
ition
, a c
omic
sto
ry
book
“Go
gi S
ays
NO
to C
orru
ption
” ha
s be
en p
ublis
hed
in c
olla
boratio
n w
ith
Asia
n De
velo
pmen
t Ba
nk.
How
ever
, N
AB h
as w
orke
d on
a f
ew s
ubst
antia
l jo
int
proj
ects
in
prev
entio
n, e
duca
tion
and
outr
each
act
iviti
es i
nclu
ding
pu
tting
up
the
sloga
n of
Say
No
to C
orru
ption
on
utilit
y bi
lls, A
TMs,
ban
ners
an
d st
ande
es.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s N
AB A
nnua
l Rep
ort 2
015
pp.7
5-11
5
4G
NAB
's re
sear
ch a
nd
expl
orat
ion
of
corr
uptio
n ris
ks, c
onte
xt a
nd
cond
ition
s
Exte
nsiv
e us
e of
re
sear
ch, t
o de
velo
p ris
k as
sess
men
ts a
nd
sect
oral
co
rrup
tion
prof
iles
Som
e de
gree
of
rese
arch
to
deve
lop
risk
asse
ssm
ents
an
d se
ctor
al
corr
uptio
n pr
ofile
s
Litt
le o
r no
disc
erni
ble
inde
pend
ent
rese
arch
car
ried
out b
y th
e N
AB
Onl
y a
few
inde
pend
ent r
esea
rch
stud
ies
have
bee
n co
nduc
ted
by N
AB. N
AB
Kara
chi h
as c
ompl
eted
two
prev
entio
n st
udie
s und
er 3
3C o
f NAO
199
9.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s
4H
NAB
’s
diss
emin
atio
n of
co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n an
d us
e of
cam
paig
ns
Exte
nsiv
e di
ssem
inat
ion
of
corr
uptio
n pr
even
tion
and
relia
nce
on
cam
paig
ns
Lim
ited
diss
emin
atio
n of
co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n an
d re
lianc
e on
ca
mpa
igns
Does
not
di
ssem
inat
e co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n in
form
atio
n or
re
ly o
n ca
mpa
igns
Ther
e ha
s be
en a
n ex
tens
ive
diss
emin
atio
n of
cor
rupti
on p
reve
ntio
n an
d re
lianc
e on
cam
paig
ns o
n pa
rt o
f N
AB.
Num
erou
s in
itiati
ves
have
bee
n ta
ken
such
as
Char
acte
r Bui
ldin
g So
cieti
es a
re fo
rmed
acr
oss
the
coun
try
in
educ
ation
al i
nstit
ution
s. A
nti-c
orru
ption
day
s an
d w
eeks
are
cel
ebra
ted.
O
ther
suc
h ex
ampl
es a
re s
emin
ars,
wal
ks,
acad
emic
com
petiti
ons,
med
ia
cam
paig
ns in
clud
ing
radi
o TV
and
new
spap
ers,
doc
umen
tarie
s, t
he s
loga
n of
Say
No
to C
orru
ption
on
utilit
y bi
lls, A
TMs,
ban
ners
and
stan
dees
. So
urce
: NAB
Ann
ual R
epor
t 201
5 pp
.75-
115
Nati
onal
Acc
ount
abili
ty B
urea
u: A
n In
depe
nden
t Re
view
of
Stru
ctur
e an
d Pe
rfor
man
ce.htt
p://
ww
w.p
ildat
.org
/Pub
licati
ons/
publ
icati
on/D
emoc
racy
&L
egSt
r/N
ation
alAc
coun
tabi
lityB
urea
uAnI
ndep
ende
ntRe
view
ofSt
ruct
urea
ndP
erfo
rman
ce.p
df
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
59
4I
NAB
’s u
se o
f its
w
ebsit
e an
d so
cial
m
edia
for
diss
emin
atin
g in
form
atio
n on
co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n
Exte
nsiv
e us
e of
its
web
site
and
soci
al
med
ia to
spre
ad
corr
uptio
n pr
even
tion
info
rmat
ion
Lim
ited
use
of it
s w
ebsit
e an
d so
cial
med
ia to
sp
read
co
rrup
tion
prev
entio
n in
form
ation
ACA
does
not
ha
ve a
web
site
and
does
not
rely
on
soci
al m
edia
to
spre
ad
corr
uptio
n pr
even
tion
info
rmat
ion
N
AB’s
web
site
shar
es p
ress
clip
ping
s, d
issem
inati
on a
ctivitie
s, i
nqui
ries,
re
cove
ries
and
case
s (w
ithou
t da
tes)
Ann
ual r
epor
t of
onl
y cu
rren
t ye
ar is
av
aila
ble
on th
e w
ebsit
e an
d re
port
s of t
he p
revi
ous y
ears
are
rem
oved
. Fa
cebo
ok p
age
of N
AB is
the
re b
ut n
ot v
ery
activ
e. T
here
is a
gap
of
two
year
s bet
wee
n of
pos
ts
Sour
ce: N
AB’s
Web
site
http:
//w
ww
.nab
.gov
.pk/
N
AB’s
Fac
eboo
k Pa
ge:
https
://w
ww
.face
book
.com
/Nati
onal
acco
unta
bilit
ybur
eau/
?fre
f=ts
In
terv
iew
with
Sta
keho
lder
s
Sub
Tota
l: 17
5 N
AB’
s Co
oper
atio
n w
ith
othe
r Org
aniz
atio
ns (5
indi
cato
rs)
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
60
In
dica
tor
Rang
e of
Sco
res
Justi
ficati
on o
f Sco
re
Hi
gh (3
) M
ediu
m (2
) Lo
w (1
) 5A
Go
vern
men
t sup
port
(e
.g. A
ttorn
ey-
Gene
ral’s
Offi
ce,
Dire
ctor
of
Publ
ic P
rose
cutio
ns)
to N
AB fo
r pr
osec
utio
n of
co
rrup
tion
case
s
High
leve
l of s
uppo
rt
as re
flect
ed in
ab
senc
e of
in
terf
eren
ce a
nd
aver
age
pros
ecut
ion
rate
of a
bove
75
%
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f su
ppor
t as
refle
cted
in so
me
inte
rfer
ence
and
av
erag
e pr
osec
utio
n ra
te
of 5
0% to
75%
Low
leve
l of
supp
ort a
s re
flect
ed in
su
bsta
ntia
l in
terf
eren
ce a
nd
aver
age
pros
ecut
ion
rate
of
bel
ow 5
0%
Pros
ecut
or G
ener
al o
f NAB
is h
ead
of P
rose
cutio
n Di
visio
n th
at is
ass
isted
by
the
Team
of L
egal
exp
erts
& p
rose
cuto
rs a
ll ov
er th
e co
untr
y. T
he
Pros
ecut
or G
ener
al N
AB h
as c
lose
coo
rdin
ation
with
Att
orne
y Ge
nera
l and
Ad
voca
te G
ener
al d
urin
g pr
osec
ution
of c
orru
ption
cas
es w
hen
questio
n of
la
w a
rises
. As p
er C
laus
e 19
of N
ation
al A
ccou
ntab
ility
Ord
inan
ce th
e Ch
airm
an N
AB m
ay
call
for i
nfor
mati
on fr
om a
ny p
erso
n fo
r the
pur
pose
of
satis
fyin
g hi
mse
lf, re
quire
any
per
son
to p
rodu
ce o
r del
iver
any
doc
umen
t or
thin
g us
eful
or r
elev
ant t
o th
e in
quiry
, exa
min
e an
y pe
rson
acq
uain
ted
with
the
fact
s and
circ
umst
ance
s, re
quire
any
ban
k or
fina
ncia
l instit
ution
, no
twith
stan
ding
any
thin
g co
ntai
ned
in a
ny o
ther
law
for t
he ti
me
bein
g in
fo
rce,
to p
rovi
de a
ny in
form
ation
relatin
g to
any
per
son.
In a
dditi
on, N
AB
may
seek
the
aid
and
assis
tanc
e of
any
[Gov
ernm
ent]
age
ncy
and
the
info
rmati
on so
col
lect
ed m
ay b
e us
ed a
s evi
denc
e in
the
tria
l.
Sour
ce: F
ocus
Gro
up d
iscus
sion
Inte
rvie
w w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s N
ation
al A
ccou
ntab
ility
Ord
inan
ce 1
999,
w
ww
.nab
.gov
.pk/
Dow
nloa
ds/n
ao.a
sp
Sam
ad (2
008)
. Com
batin
g co
rrup
tion:
The
cas
e of
the
Nati
onal
Acc
ount
abili
ty B
urea
u, P
akist
an, J
OAA
G,
Vol.
3. N
o. 1
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
61
5B
Coop
erat
ion
betw
een
NAB
and
ot
her i
nteg
rity
agen
cies
(inc
ludi
ng
othe
r ACA
s if t
here
ar
e m
ultip
le A
CAs i
n co
untr
y)
High
deg
ree
of
coop
erat
ion
betw
een
NAB
and
ot
her i
nteg
rity
agen
cies
Lim
ited
coop
erat
ion
betw
een
NAB
and
ot
her i
nteg
rity
agen
cies
Conf
lict a
nd/o
r la
ck o
f co
oper
atio
n be
twee
n N
AB
and
othe
r in
tegr
ity a
genc
ies
NAB
is t
he fo
cal a
genc
y fo
r co
ordi
natio
n of
wor
k of
all
ACAs
in t
he c
ount
ry.
Ther
e ar
e tw
o an
ti-co
rrup
tion
agen
cies
at
Fede
ral
Leve
l na
mel
y N
ation
al
Acco
unta
bilit
y Bu
reau
and
Fed
eral
Inv
estig
ation
Age
ncy.
A P
rovi
ncia
l An
ti-Co
rrup
tion
Esta
blish
men
t ex
ists
in e
ach
prov
ince
. Ch
airm
an N
AB h
as t
he
pow
er t
o se
ek f
ull
and
com
plet
e as
sista
nce
from
any
Dep
artm
ent
of t
he
Fede
ral
and
Prov
inci
al G
over
nmen
t an
d in
stitutio
n or
dep
artm
ent
in t
he
publ
ic s
ecto
r or
the
priv
ate
sect
or.
The
resp
onsib
ility
for
inq
uiry
int
o an
d in
vesti
gatio
n of
an
offen
ce o
f cor
rupti
on a
nd c
orru
pt p
racti
ces r
ests
sole
ly o
n N
AB t
o th
e ex
clus
ion
of a
ny o
ther
age
ncy
or a
utho
rity,
unl
ess
any
such
ag
ency
or
auth
ority
is
requ
ired
to d
o so
by
the
Chai
rman
NAB
. He
nce
all
othe
r int
egrit
y ag
enci
es h
ave
exce
llent
coo
peratio
n w
ith N
AB.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s
5C
Coop
erat
ion
betw
een
NAB
and
no
n- g
over
nmen
t or
gani
zatio
ns
incl
udin
g CS
Os
and
priv
ate
com
pani
es
High
deg
ree
of
coop
erat
ion
betw
een
NAB
and
ot
her o
rgan
izatio
ns
incl
udin
g CS
Os a
nd
priv
ate
com
pani
es
Lim
ited
coop
erat
ion
betw
een
NAB
an
d ot
her
orga
niza
tions
Conf
lict a
nd/o
r la
ck o
f co
oper
atio
n be
twee
n N
AB
and
othe
r or
gani
zatio
ns
NAB
col
labo
rate
s w
ith a
lim
ited
num
ber
of C
SOs.
NAB
has
a w
orki
ng
relatio
nshi
p w
ith T
I Pak
istan
for i
nput
rega
rdin
g co
rrup
tion
com
mitt
ed w
ithin
th
e co
untr
y. F
urth
er,
NAB
may
dur
ing
the
cour
se o
f an
inqu
iry o
f an
offen
ce
unde
r N
AB O
rdin
ance
cal
l fo
r in
form
ation
fro
m a
ny p
erso
n, f
rom
any
de
part
men
t in
the
priv
ate
sect
or, b
anks
or fi
nanc
ial i
nstit
ution
to p
rovi
de a
ny
info
rmati
on r
elati
ng t
o an
y pe
rson
who
soev
er,
incl
udin
g co
pies
of
entr
ies
mad
e in
a b
ank’
s or a
fina
ncia
l instit
ution
’s b
ooks
such
as
ledg
ers,
day
boo
ks,
cash
bo
oks
and
all
othe
r bo
oks
incl
udin
g re
cord
of
in
form
ation
an
d tr
ansa
ction
s sa
ved
in e
lect
roni
c or
dig
ital
form
, an
d th
e ke
eper
s of
suc
h bo
oks o
r rec
ords
shal
l be
oblig
ed to
certif
y th
e co
pies
.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s In
terv
iew
s with
Sta
keho
lder
s
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
62
5D
NAB
’s
part
icip
atio
n in
in
tern
atio
nal
netw
orks
Very
act
ive
with
N
AB p
artic
ipat
ing
in
3 o
r mor
e ne
twor
ks
Activ
e w
ith N
AB
part
icip
atin
g in
1 o
r 2
netw
orks
NAB
doe
s not
pa
rtic
ipat
e in
an
y N
etw
ork
NAB
’s p
artic
ipati
on i
n th
e In
tern
ation
al A
nti-C
orru
ption
Org
aniza
tion
and
initi
ative
s is a
s und
er:
a.
Uni
ted
Nati
ons C
onve
ntion
aga
inst
Cor
rupti
on (U
NCA
C)
b.
Inte
rnati
onal
Ass
ociatio
n of
Anti
-Cor
rupti
on A
utho
rities
(IAN
AB)
c.
ADB-
OEC
D An
ti-Co
rrup
tion
Initi
ative
for A
sia P
acifi
c.
d.
Asia
Pac
ific
Grou
p on
Mon
ey L
aund
erin
g (A
PG)
e.
OIC
Anti
-Cor
rupti
on a
nd E
nhan
cing
Inte
grity
For
um (A
CEIF
) f.
Inte
rnati
onal
Anti
-Cor
rupti
on C
onfe
renc
e (IA
CC)
g.
Glob
al F
orum
on
Figh
ting
Corr
uptio
n an
d sa
fegu
ardi
ng In
tegr
ity.
h.
Inte
rnati
onal
Anti
-Cor
rupti
on A
cade
my
(INAB
) Aus
tria
. I.
ECO
Reg
iona
l Ce
ntre
for
Coo
peratio
n of
Anti
-Cor
rupti
on
Agen
cies
and
Om
buds
men
(RCC
ACO
) S
ourc
e: In
terv
iew
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s M
edia
Re
port
: htt
ps:/
/ww
w.th
enew
s.co
m.p
k/pr
int/
5933
0-un
cac-
team
-to-
visit
-pak
istan
-nex
t-m
onth
N
AB P
ress
Rel
ease
: htt
p://
ww
w.n
ab.g
ov.p
k/PR
ESS/
NEW
.ASP
?107
3
5E
NAB
’s c
oope
ratio
n w
ith
ACAs
in o
ther
co
untr
ies
High
deg
ree
of
coop
erat
ion
with
jo
int p
roje
cts a
nd
tech
nica
l as
sista
nce
with
se
vera
l AC
As i
n ot
her
coun
trie
s
Lim
ited
coop
erat
ion
in
som
e ar
eas w
ith
one
or tw
o AC
As
in o
ther
cou
ntrie
s
No
coop
erat
ion
betw
een
NAB
an
d AC
As i
n ot
her c
ount
ries
NAB
has
bee
n co
oper
ating
with
mem
ber
coun
trie
s th
at h
ave
mut
ual
lega
l as
sista
nce
and
extr
aditi
on tr
eatie
s w
ith P
akist
an. M
OU
s ar
e be
ing
signe
d w
ith
Chin
a an
d M
alay
sia afte
r Cab
inet
app
rova
l. In
add
ition
, it i
s co
llabo
ratin
g w
ith
SAAR
C co
untr
ies
at r
egio
nal
leve
l an
d U
nite
d N
ation
s Offi
ce o
n Dr
ugs
and
Crim
e (U
NO
DC) i
n th
eir e
ffort
s in
com
batin
g co
rrup
tion.
Th
e fir
st e
ver
two-
day
sem
inar
on
Anti-
Corr
uptio
n fo
r SA
ARC
ACAs
was
co
nduc
ted
in S
epte
mbe
r 201
6 in
Isla
mab
ad.
At t
he s
emin
ar,
NAB
pro
pose
d th
e fo
rmati
on o
f an
initia
tive,
SAA
RC A
nti-
Corr
uptio
n Fo
rum
. The
pro
posa
l was
acc
epte
d by
the
oth
er c
ount
ries.
NAB
’s
Chai
rman
was
nom
inat
ed a
s the
firs
t Cha
irman
of t
he S
AARC
foru
m.
Sour
ce: I
nter
view
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s N
ews
Repo
rt:
http:
//pp
inew
sage
ncy.
com
/saa
rc-c
ount
ries-
agre
ed-o
n-sa
arc-
anti-
corr
uptio
n-fo
rum
-cha
irman
-nab
/
Sub
Tota
l: 13
6. N
AB’
s A
ccou
ntab
ility
and
Ove
rsig
ht (4
indi
cato
rs)
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
63
In
dica
tor
Rang
e of
Sco
res
Justi
ficati
on o
f Sco
re
Hi
gh (3
) M
ediu
m (2
) Lo
w (1
) 6A
In
form
atio
n pr
ovid
ed in
and
ac
cess
ibili
ty o
f N
AB’s
ann
ual
repo
rt a
nd w
ebsit
e
Com
preh
ensiv
e in
form
atio
n on
NAB
is
prov
ided
in a
nnua
l re
port
and
web
site;
su
bmitt
ed to
Pa
rliam
ent a
nd e
asily
ac
cess
ible
to th
e pu
blic
Lim
ited
info
rmat
ion
on
NAB
is p
rovi
ded
in
annu
al re
port
and
w
ebsit
e; su
bmitt
ed
to P
arlia
men
t bu
t not
eas
ily
acce
ssib
le to
the
publ
ic
Subm
its a
nnua
l re
port
to
gove
rnm
ent b
ut
is no
t ava
ilabl
e to
the
publ
ic
Com
preh
ensiv
e in
form
atio
n on
NAB
is
prov
ided
in
its a
nnua
l re
port
and
w
ebsit
e; su
bmitt
ed to
the
Pres
iden
t and
eas
ily a
cces
sible
to th
e pu
blic
. So
urce
: NAB
Ann
ual R
epor
t 201
5 N
AB’s
web
site,
htt
p://
ww
w.n
ab.g
ov.p
k/
Inte
rvie
w w
ith S
take
hold
ers
6B
NAB
’s o
vers
ight
M
echa
nism
O
vers
ight
co
mm
ittee
s with
ac
tive
part
icip
atio
n by
Mem
bers
of
Parli
amen
t, se
nior
ci
vil s
erva
nts a
nd
prom
inen
t ci
tizen
s
Ove
rsig
ht
com
mitt
ees w
ith
Mem
bers
of
Parli
amen
t and
/or
seni
or c
ivil
serv
ants
as
mem
bers
Acco
unta
ble
to
Exec
utiv
e w
ithou
t any
ov
ersig
ht
com
mitt
ee
The
ind
icat
or c
anno
t be
rat
ed a
s no
ext
erna
l ac
coun
tabi
lity
mec
hani
sm
exist
s to
mon
itor i
ts a
ction
s. B
ut th
e hi
gher
cou
rts
have
bee
n ex
erci
sing
thei
r su
perv
isory
jur
isdictio
n an
d po
wer
of
juris
dicti
on r
evie
w w
hene
ver
NAB
tr
ansg
ress
es it
s lim
its.
Sour
ce:
Tran
spar
ency
Int
erna
tiona
l, Pa
kist
an N
ation
al I
nteg
rity
Syst
em,
Coun
try
Repo
rt 2
014,
pp.
170
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
64
6C
NAB
’s p
roce
dure
fo
r dea
ling
with
co
mpl
aint
s aga
inst
N
AB p
erso
nnel
Com
plai
nts a
gain
st
NAB
per
sonn
el a
re
inve
stig
ated
by
anot
her p
ublic
ag
ency
to a
void
co
nflic
t of i
nter
est
and
resu
lts o
f in
vest
igat
ion
and
puni
shm
ent i
mpo
sed
are
publ
iciz
ed
Com
plai
nts
agai
nst N
AB
pers
onne
l are
in
vest
igat
ed b
y its
in
tern
al c
ontr
ol
unit
but r
esul
ts o
f in
vest
igat
ion
and
puni
shm
ent a
re
not p
ublic
ized
Com
plai
nts
agai
nst N
AB
pers
onne
l are
ig
nore
d an
d/or
no
t inv
estig
ated
w
ithou
t any
ex
plan
atio
n
NAB
has
dev
ised
a st
rong
Int
erna
l Ac
coun
tabi
lity
Mec
hani
sm (
IAM
). A
Sepa
rate
cel
l, In
telli
genc
e an
d Vi
gila
nce
/ Su
rvei
llanc
e ha
s be
en e
stab
lishe
d w
ithin
th
e or
gani
zatio
n w
hich
co
ntinu
ously
m
onito
rs
the
activ
ities
of
em
ploy
ees.
All
com
plai
nts
relatin
g to
cor
rupt
pra
ctice
s by
em
ploy
ees
of N
AB
are
mon
itore
d an
d in
vesti
gate
d by
this
Cell.
N
AB t
akes
cog
niza
nce
of c
ases
of
corr
upt
practic
e by
its
ow
n em
ploy
ees
unde
r N
AB O
rdin
ance
. Offi
cers
fou
nd i
nvol
ved
in c
orru
pt p
racti
ces
are
imm
edia
tely
sus
pend
ed a
nd n
ot a
llow
ed t
o w
ork
anym
ore.
Ind
epen
dent
in
quiry
is c
ondu
cted
and
if a
n em
ploy
ee is
foun
d gu
ilty,
ref
eren
ce is
file
d in
th
e Ac
coun
tabi
lity
Cour
t lik
e an
y ot
her
pers
on a
ccus
ed o
f co
rrup
tion.
NAB
ha
s fil
ed a
ref
eren
ce w
ith t
he a
ccou
ntab
ility
cou
rt o
f Is
lam
abad
aga
inst
its
thre
e fo
rmer
per
sonn
el,
incl
udin
g tw
o fo
rmer
dire
ctor
s ge
nera
l on
the
ch
arge
of
misu
sing
auth
ority
in
a la
nd d
isput
e ca
se i
nvol
ving
bill
ions
of
rupe
es.
Ther
e is
a co
de o
f con
duct
whi
ch m
akes
it o
blig
ator
y on
its
empl
oyee
s to
be
high
ly e
thic
al a
nd st
rive
for e
xcel
lenc
e in
per
form
ance
of t
heir
dutie
s.
Inte
rvie
w w
ith N
AB Offi
cial
s So
urce
: M
edia
Rep
ort:
https
://w
ww
.daw
n.co
m/n
ews/
1249
471/
refe
renc
e-fil
ed-a
gain
st-t
hree
-ex-
nab-
office
rs A
cces
sed
Oct
ober
10,
201
6 Co
de o
f Con
duct
and
Eth
ics’
,htt
p://
ww
w.n
ab.g
ov.p
k/Do
wnl
oads
/ Co
de_o
f_Co
nduc
t.asp
6D
Out
com
es o
f co
mpl
aint
s aga
inst
N
AB o
r its
per
sonn
el
in p
ast 3
yea
rs
All v
alid
com
plai
nts
agai
nst N
AB
pers
onne
l res
ult i
n pu
nish
men
t or o
ther
re
med
ies,
and
ou
tcom
es p
ublic
ized
Som
e va
lid
com
plai
nts a
gain
st
NAB
per
sonn
el
resu
lt in
pu
nish
men
t or
othe
r rem
edie
s,
and
outc
ome
is pu
blic
ized
Com
plai
nts
invo
lvin
g N
AB
pers
onne
l ar
e ig
nore
d an
d n
ot
inve
stig
ated
at a
ll
In 2
013,
NAB
too
k actio
n ag
ains
t its
cur
rent
Cha
irman
in
NIC
L m
ega
corr
uptio
n sc
am. D
iscip
linar
y pr
ocee
ding
s w
ere
laun
ched
aga
inst
at
leas
t 83
offi
cers
in th
e la
st th
ree
year
s an
d 60
out
of t
hose
cas
es h
ave
been
fina
lized
al
ong
with
22
maj
or p
enaltie
s, 3
4 m
inor
pen
altie
s an
d fo
ur e
xone
ratio
n.
Out
com
es o
f the
se c
ompl
aint
s ar
e pu
blic
ized
So
urce
: Tr
ansp
aren
cy
Inte
rnati
onal
, Pa
kist
an
Nati
onal
In
tegr
ity
Syst
em,
Coun
try
Repo
rt 2
014,
pp.
160
htt
p://
ww
w.b
aagh
i.tv/
nab-
laun
ches
-inve
stigatio
n-ag
ains
t-its
-ow
n-offi
cial
/May
17,
201
6 In
terv
iew
with
NAB
Offi
cial
s C
ode
of C
ondu
ct a
nd E
thic
s htt
p://
tran
spar
ency
.org
.pk/
docu
men
ts/n
is14.
Page
No.
172
NIS
Rep
ort
Sub
Tota
l: 8
7. P
ublic
Per
cept
ions
of t
he N
AB’
s Pe
rfor
man
ce (7
indi
cato
rs)
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
65
In
dica
tor
Rang
e of
Sco
res
Justi
ficati
on fo
r Sco
res
Hi
gh (3
) M
ediu
m (2
) Lo
w (1
) 7A
Pu
blic
con
fiden
ce
that
gov
ernm
ent h
as
give
n N
AB th
e re
quire
d po
wer
s an
d re
sour
ces f
or
curb
ing
corr
uptio
n
High
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
surv
ey
findi
ng (a
bove
75%
) an
d vi
ews o
f NAB
se
nior
per
sonn
el,
CSO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrup
tion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f co
nfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in su
rvey
fin
ding
(50%
-75%
) an
d vi
ews o
f NAB
se
nior
per
sonn
el,
CSO
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrup
tion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Low
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
su
rvey
find
ing
(bel
ow 5
0%) a
nd
view
s of N
AB
seni
or p
erso
nnel
, CS
O le
ader
s,
anti-
cor
rupt
ion
expe
rts a
nd
jour
nalis
ts
The
publ
ic b
elie
ves
that
NAB
has
bee
n gi
ven
nece
ssar
y po
wer
s. H
owev
er, i
t is
perc
eive
d th
at
NAB
is
not
exer
cisin
g th
ese
pow
ers
fully
. N
AB
is an
in
depe
nden
t fe
dera
l exe
cutiv
e ag
ency
of t
he G
over
nmen
t of
Pak
istan
and
as
such
enj
oys
wid
e fin
anci
al a
uton
omy.
Fin
anci
al a
utho
rity
of N
AB li
es w
ith it
s Ch
airm
an, w
ho is
resp
onsib
le fo
r the
exp
endi
ture
incu
rred
aga
inst
the
budg
et
gran
t. In
add
ition
, th
ere
is no
res
trictio
n or
ext
erna
l su
perv
ision
on
NAB
’s
functio
nal p
ower
s and
aut
horit
y.
Sour
ces:
Foc
us G
roup
Disc
ussi
on
Nati
onal
Inte
grity
Sys
tem
, Cou
ntry
Rep
ort
2014
, Tra
nspa
renc
y In
tern
ation
al-
Paki
stan
pp.
162
&16
3
7B
Publ
ic c
onfid
ence
in
NAB
’s a
dher
ence
to
due
pro
cess
, im
part
ialit
y, a
nd
fairn
ess i
n us
ing
its
pow
ers
High
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
surv
ey
findi
ng (a
bove
75
%) a
nd v
iew
s of
NAB
seni
or
pers
onne
l, CS
O
lead
ers,
ant
i-co
rrup
tion
expe
rts
and
jour
nalis
ts
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f co
nfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in su
rvey
fin
ding
(50%
- 75
%)
and
view
s of
NAB
sen
ior
pers
onne
l, CS
O
lead
ers,
ant
i- co
rrup
tion
expe
rts a
nd
jour
nalis
ts
Low
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
su
rvey
find
ing
(bel
ow 5
0%)
and
view
s of
NAB
seni
or
pers
onne
l, CS
O
lead
ers,
ant
i- co
rrup
tion
expe
rts a
nd
jour
nalis
ts
As c
ompa
red
to o
ther
anti
-cor
rupti
on e
stab
lishm
ents
in th
e co
untr
y N
AB w
as
perc
eive
d be
tter
in
term
s of
adh
eren
ce t
o du
e pr
oces
s, i
mpa
rtial
ity,
and
fairn
ess
in u
sing
its p
ower
s by
the
key
sta
keho
lder
s co
nsul
ted
for
the
rese
arch
. Ho
wev
er,
they
sha
red
seve
ral
inst
ance
s of
irr
egul
ariti
es i
n N
AB’s
pr
oces
ses w
hich
mad
e th
em p
erce
ive
NAB
as u
nfai
r in
its u
se o
f pow
ers.
So
urce
: Foc
us G
roup
Disc
ussio
n In
terv
iew
with
stak
ehol
ders
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
66
7C
Conf
iden
ce in
N
AB’s
ad
here
nce
to d
ue
proc
ess,
im
part
ialit
y, a
nd
fairn
ess i
n us
ing
its
pow
ers,
am
ong
pers
ons w
ho h
ad
dire
ct c
onta
ct w
ith
NAB
High
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed
in su
rvey
find
ing
(abo
ve 7
5%) a
nd
view
s of N
AB se
nior
pe
rson
nel,
CSO
le
ader
s, jo
urna
lists
an
d, if
pos
sible
, pe
rson
s with
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith N
AB
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f co
nfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
g (5
0%-7
5%) a
nd
view
s of N
AB
seni
or p
erso
nnel
, CS
O le
ader
s,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd, i
f po
ssib
le, p
erso
ns
with
dire
ct c
onta
ct
with
NAB
Low
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
su
rvey
fin
ding
(bel
ow
50%
) with
dire
ct
cont
act w
ith
NAB
The
rese
arch
tea
m c
ould
mee
t on
ly a
few
per
sons
with
dire
ct c
onta
ct w
ith
NAB
. Th
eref
ore,
the
sam
ple
was
too
sm
all
to g
ener
aliz
e th
e re
spon
ses.
In
additio
n, th
e vi
ews
of th
e ac
cuse
d pe
rson
s m
ay b
e bi
ased
and
may
not
refle
ct
NAB
’s a
ctua
l effe
ctive
ness
. Hen
ce th
e in
dica
tor i
s not
rate
d.
7D
Conf
iden
ce in
N
AB's
dign
ified
and
re
spec
tful
tr
eatm
ent o
f pe
rson
s und
er
inve
stig
atio
n
High
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
the
view
s of
NAB
sen
ior
pers
onne
l, CS
O
lead
ers,
jour
nalis
ts
and
pers
ons s
ubje
ct
to in
vest
igat
ion,
if
poss
ible
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f co
nfid
ence
as
refle
cted
in v
iew
s of
NAB
sen
ior
pers
onne
l, CS
O
lead
ers,
jo
urna
lists
and
pe
rson
s su
bjec
t to
inve
stig
atio
n, if
po
ssib
le
Low
leve
l of
conf
iden
ce a
s re
flect
ed in
vie
ws
of N
AB s
enio
r pe
rson
nel,
CSO
le
ader
s,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd
pers
ons s
ubje
ct
to in
vest
igat
ion,
if
poss
ible
Mor
e pr
ofes
siona
lism
nee
ds t
o be
exh
ibite
d by
NAB
’s s
taff.
It
has
been
re
port
ed b
y se
vera
l key
sta
keho
lder
s, c
onsu
lted
for
the
rese
arch
, th
at N
AB
offici
als d
ispla
yed
lax
and
unpr
ofes
siona
l atti
tude
on
thei
r visi
t to
NAB
’s offi
ce.
Furt
herm
ore,
it w
as s
hare
d th
at a
ll pe
rson
s ca
lled
wer
e m
ade
to w
ait
in o
ne
room
onl
y, a
pra
ctice
not
con
duci
ve to
ens
urin
g co
nfide
ntial
ity a
nd p
rivac
y.
NAB
’s n
otice
s, r
eque
sting
peo
ple
calle
d fo
r pr
esen
ting
evid
ence
in
case
s un
der
inve
stigatio
n, s
tate
: “Yo
u ar
e in
form
ed t
hat
faili
ng t
o co
mpl
y w
ith t
he
notic
e m
ay e
ntai
l pen
al c
onse
quen
ces
as p
rovi
ded
in S
.2 o
f th
e sc
hedu
le o
f N
AO, 1
999.
” So
urce
: Foc
us G
roup
Disc
ussio
n In
terv
iew
s with
stak
ehol
ders
Anti-C
orruption Agency S
trengthening Initiative 20
16
67
7E
Publ
ic p
erce
ptio
n of
N
AB’s
effe
ctiv
enes
s in
cor
rupt
ion
cont
rol
High
leve
l of
effe
ctiv
enes
s as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
g (a
bove
75%
) and
vi
ews o
f CSO
le
ader
s, a
nti-
corr
uptio
n ex
pert
s and
jo
urna
lists
Mod
erat
e le
vel
of e
ffect
iven
ess
as re
flect
ed in
su
rvey
find
ing
(50%
-75%
) an
d vi
ews o
f CSO
le
ader
s,
anti-
corr
uptio
n ex
pert
s and
jo
urna
lists
Low
leve
l of
effe
ctiv
enes
s as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
g (b
elow
50%
) an
d vi
ews o
f CS
O le
ader
s,
anti-
co
rrup
tion
expe
rts a
nd
jour
nalis
ts
As p
er T
I Pa
kist
an’s
Nati
onal
Cor
rupti
on P
erce
ption
Sur
vey,
201
0, N
AB i
s pe
rcei
ved
as m
ore
effectiv
e in
its r
ole
as c
ompa
red
to o
ther
ACA
s.
The
perc
eptio
n of
the
key
sta
keho
lder
s co
nsul
ted
for
the
rese
arch
also
co
nsid
ered
NAB
mor
e eff
ectiv
e. H
owev
er, t
he so
me
of th
e st
ake
hold
ers w
ere
of t
he v
iew
tha
t N
AB h
as b
een
give
n au
thor
ity a
nd p
ower
by
law
but
in
practic
e, th
ese
pow
ers a
re n
ot fu
lly util
ized.
So
urce
: Foc
us G
roup
Disc
ussio
n In
terv
iew
s with
Sta
keho
lder
s
7F
Perc
eptio
n of
NAB
’s
effe
ctiv
enes
s in
corr
uptio
n co
ntro
l am
ong
pers
ons
with
dire
ct c
onta
ct
with
NAB
High
leve
l of
effe
ctiv
enes
s as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
g (a
bove
75%
) and
vi
ews o
f CSO
le
ader
s, a
nti-
corr
uptio
n ex
pert
s, jo
urna
lists
an
d pe
rson
s with
di
rect
con
tact
with
N
AB, i
f pos
sible
Mod
erat
e le
vel
of e
ffect
iven
ess
as re
flect
ed in
su
rvey
find
ing
(50%
-75%
) and
vi
ews o
f CSO
le
ader
s, a
nti-
corr
uptio
n ex
pert
s,
jour
nalis
ts a
nd
pers
ons w
ith
dire
ct c
onta
ct
with
NAB
, if
poss
ible
Low
leve
l of
effe
ctiv
enes
s as
refle
cted
in
surv
ey fi
ndin
g (b
elow
50%
) an
d vi
ews o
f CS
O le
ader
s,
anti-
co
rrup
tion
expe
rts,
jo
urna
lists
and
pe
rson
s with
di
rect
con
tact
w
ith N
AB, i
f po
ssib
le
The
rese
arch
tea
m c
ould
mee
t on
ly a
few
per
sons
with
dire
ct c
onta
ct w
ith
NAB
. Th
eref
ore,
the
sam
ple
was
too
sm
all
to g
ener
aliz
e th
e re
spon
se.
In
additio
n, th
e vi
ews
of th
e ac
cuse
d pe
rson
s m
ay b
e bi
ased
and
may
not
refle
ct
NAB
’s a
ctua
l effe
ctive
ness
. Hen
ce th
e in
dica
tor i
s not
rate
d.
Sour
ce: F
ocus
Gro
up D
iscus
sion
Ant
i-C
orru
ptio
n A
genc
y S
tren
gthe
ning
Ini
tiat
ive
20
16
68
7G
Perc
eptio
n of
N
AB’s
ef
fect
iven
ess i
n de
alin
g w
ith
com
plai
nts a
mon
g fe
mal
e ci
tizen
s w
ho h
ad d
irect
co
ntac
t with
NAB
High
leve
l of
effe
ctiv
enes
s as
refle
cted
in su
rvey
fin
ding
(abo
ve 7
5%)
and
view
s of C
SO
lead
ers,
anti
-co
rrup
tion
expe
rts,
jo
urna
lists
and
fe
mal
es w
ith d
irect
co
ntac
t with
NAB
if
poss
ible
Mod
erat
e le
vel o
f ef
fect
iven
ess a
s re
flect
ed in
surv
ey
findi
ng (5
0%-7
5%)
and
view
s of C
SO
lead
ers,
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4. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONSThe main �ndings of the assessment were based on a set of 50 indicators divided into seven di�erent dimensions. These indicators were designed to assess the capacity and e�ectiveness of NAB, and to identify gaps and areas of opportunity. Each indicator has been assigned one of three possible scores – high (3), moderate (2) and low (1), based on the level of standards set for each of the indicators. In order to arrive at the aggregate score for each dimension, the scores were converted from the 1-3 scale to a 0-2 scale. Thus, all (1) scores become (0), all (2) scores become (1) and all (3) scores become (2).
NAB has scored high in 49 per cent of the indicators assessed, moderate in 33 per cent of the indicators assessed, and low in 18 per cent of the indicators assessed. The �ndings indicate that two dimensions emerge out to be strong in NAB’s assessment: its Cooperation with other Organizations and Oversight and Accountability. NAB’s Perceptions of E�ectiveness is its weakest dimension scoring the lowest ranking.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Two sets of recommendations have been formulated. One set of recommendations are for the Government and the other set is for NAB itself.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR GOVERNMENT
Recommendation 1
Revision in the following clauses of NAO :
i. Revision in Article 6 of the NAO
The clause of Article 6 of NAO 1999 should be revised to include wider range of options in terms of selection of Chairman NAB. The clause of Article 6 of NAO 1999 states “A person shall not be appointed as Chairman NAB unless he (i) is a retired Chief Justice or a Judge of the Supreme Court or a Chief Justice of a High Court, or (ii) is a retired o�cer of the Armed Forces of Pakistan equivalent to the rank of a Lieutenant General; or (iii) is a retired Federal Government O�cer in BPS 22 or equivalent92.”
Considering the complex nature of crimes in Pakistan, diverse expertise is needed on part of Chairman NAB. A combination of technical expertise, foreign exposure and experience in a managerial/administrative position may contribute signi�cantly to NAB’s strategic decisions and operation.
92 National Accountability Ordinance 1999, www.nab.gov.pk/Downloads/nao.asp
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The commissioners of Indonesia's ACA, Corruption Eradication Commission (Indonesian: Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK), examined best practices in the private sector to develop a new human resources model for its o�ce. Amien Sunaryadi93 and Erry Hardjapemekas94 (Former Commissioners KPK) relied heavily not only on their own corporate experiences, foreign exposure and administrative capability, but also on the consultants they hired to create policies for strategic planning, �nance and human resource. Resultantly, Indonesia, where white-collar criminals had been mostly unpunished in the past, won back public’s con�dence owing to its 100 % conviction rate.
Article 6 should be revised to include the option of a technocrat having 35 years of administrative/judicial experience.
ii. Revision in Article 25 (b) of the NAO
As per Article 25 (b) of the NAO, an accused person charged for committing an o�ence of willful default on account of non-payment of dues to a bank/�nancial institution/Co-operative Society may apply to the Governor, State Bank of Pakistan for reconciliation of his liability through the Conciliation Committee. The Conciliation Committee comprises a nominee of the Governor, State Bank of Pakistan, two nominees of the NAB and two Chartered Accountants to be nominated by the Governor, State Bank of Pakistan. The conciliation must be concluded within a period of 30 days, subject to any extension of time granted by the Governor. Once an accused accepts the recommendations of the committee (provided the Governor, State Bank, and Chairman of the NAB also approve the same), the decision is implemented. Although, the Conciliation Committee provides a mechanism for settlement of loan defaults, mitigating apprehensions of the business community in this regard, the Committee proceedings have slowed down the process of accountability. For proceedings against employees of banks and �nancial institutions, NAB must �rst obtain the approval of the State Bank of Pakistan95.
In order to mitigate the potential of any bias in terms of the working of the Committee and to make its proceedings more judicious, it is recommended that there should also be nominees of Chief Justices, Supreme Court of Pakistan and Provincial High Courts in the Conciliation Committee.
iii. Revision in Article 31-C of the NAO
Article 31-C of the NAO 1999 states: “No Court established under this Ordinance shall take cognizance of an o�ence against an o�cer or an employee of a bank or �nancial institution for writing o�, waving, restructuring or re�nancing any �nancial facility, interest or mark-up without prior approval of the State Bank of Pakistan. Court to take cognizance of o�ence with prior approval of the State Bank.”
93 amien-sunaryadi, http://pro�l.merdeka.com/indonesia/a/amien-sunaryadi/94 Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=8251267&privcapId=87841395 National Accountability Bureau: An Independent Review of Structure and Performance http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Democracy&LegStr/NationalAccountabilityBureauAnIndependent ReviewofStructureandPerformance.pdf
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Banking sector has been instrumental in the increasing rate of corrupt activities in the country. Several bank o�cials have been named in fraudulent cases. Also, many cases of willful bank defaulters have been reported to NAB in the past. Huge loans are sanctioned without proper securing of collateral96, and suspicious transactions are on a constant rise97. NAB itself has been working on prevention of corruption to curb the mal practices in the banking sector98.
Article 31-C should be deleted as it provides protection to corrupt bank o�cials and businessmen and hence, increases corruption in the country.
iv. The provision of Voluntary Return should be eliminated.
Article 25 a) of NAO 1999 states: “Notwithstanding anything contained in section 15 or in any other law for the time being in force, where a holder of public o�ce or any other person, prior to the authorization of investigation against him, voluntarily comes forward and o�ers to return the assets or gains acquired or made by him in the course, or as the consequence, of any o�ence under this Ordinance, the Chairman NAB may accept such o�er and after determination of the amount due from such person and its deposit with the NAB, discharge such person from all his liability in respect of the matter or transaction in issue. “
The provision of Voluntary Return is cited as one of the biggest criticisms on NAB as the accused gets away without the punishment by returning a relatively meager amount as compared to the original amount of embezzlement. Furthermore, after Voluntary Return, the accused have been known to be reappointed at the previously held position. Recently, the Supreme Court of Pakistan has restrained NAB from approving deals for voluntary return. There are several members of National and Provincial Assemblies and high-ranking government and autonomous organizations’ o�cers who are still holding respective o�ces despite committing corruption and have availed the VR facility of NAB and that too by paying a portion of the embezzled amount in installments99.
A certain extent of exemplary punishment needs to be there to serve as a lesson for others. Therefore, it is recommended that the provision of Voluntary Return should be eliminated.
v. The option of Plea Bargain should only be exercised for approver/s in a transparent manner, only when the main accused in a corruption case can be prosecuted on the approver’s confession.
The accused persons request a plea bargain under section 25 (b) of the National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) 1999 that states: “The accused o�ers to return to the NAB the assets or gains acquired or made by him in the course, or as a consequence, of any o�ence under this Ordinance, the Chairman NAB, may, in his discretion, after taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case, accept the o�er on such terms and conditions as he may consider necessary, and if the accused agrees
96 The Loan Default Drive, http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/issue1999/issue47/cover.htm97 Money Laundering and Financial Crimes http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100922.pdf98 NAB tells Prevention of Fraudulent Practices in Banking Sectorhttp://lahoreworld.com/2013/01/04/nab-tells-prevention- of-fraudulent-practices-in-banking-sector/99 NAB chief barred from voluntary return deals, http://www.dawn.com/news/1292113/nab-chief-barred-from- voluntary-return-deals
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to return to NAB the amount determined by the Chairman NAB, he(the Chairman NAB) shall refer the case for the approval of the Court100.”
Across the world, the provision of plea bargain is considered as a potential solution to curb corruption such as clearing case backlogs or in case of prosecution of accused it would be lengthy and costly. However, the provision has resulted in inadvertent consequences, at the same time; including contributing to a negative public perception and boosting corrupt practices101. In Pakistan, the provision of Plea bargain has faced severe criticism in terms of its ethical and legal connotations. Exemplary penalization of the perpetrators of �nancial crimes is emphasized by the stakeholders and critics. Such criticism appears justi�ed as the country’s wealth has been “gobbled up by criminals.”
This is regardless of the fact that large amounts have been recovered through the plea bargain provisions102. To minimize the unintended consequences of plea bargaining, it is recommended that the option of Plea Bargain should only be exercised for approver/s in a transparent manner, only when the main accused in a corruption case can be prosecuted on the approver’s confession.
Recommendation 21% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) should be allocated to NAB.
One of the best ACAs across the globe, Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB), has been allocated a budget of $34.87 million which is 8.6% of the Prime Minister O�ce’s total expenditure103. Similarly, The Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC)’s budget accounts for 0.38% of the national budget. In Mongolia, the law prohibits any reduction of the budget for ACAs, compared with the year before which is an e�ective guarantee that demonstrates a continued political will towards helping ACAs conduct their work104.
The �ndings show that NAB is allocated below 0.10% of the total government’s expenditure. In a country such as Pakistan where corruption has continued to remain a huge menace and impediment in its way to growth and performance since its inception, a higher proportion of budget should be allocated to NAB to improve its system and procedures. NAB should request 1% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and chalk out a plan of spending it to improve further its e�ciency and e�ectiveness.
Recommendation 3An Oversight Committee should be formulated for NAB’s Accountability.
E�ective oversight is extremely crucial for NAB’s accountability for its actions and prevention of abuse of power. To give a brief overview of the best practices, the e�ectiveness of Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC), Hong Kong’s ACA, lies with an elaborate check and balance system-the operations review
100 National Accountability Ordinance 1999101 Introducing Plea Bargaining into Post Con�ict Legal Systemshttp://inprol.org/sites/default/�les/publications/2014/introducing_plea_bargaining_0.pdf102 The Plea Bargain National Accountability Bureau Pakistan, http://www.icac.org.hk/newsl/issue14eng/button3.htm103 Singapore Budget 2013 - Expenditure Overview - Prime Minister's O�ce http://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/budget_2013/expenditure_overview/pmo.html104 Comprehensive & E�ective Approach to Anti-Corruption, The Hong Kong ICAC Experience, with a View on New Approaches in the Fight Against Corruption
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committee, which is a high powered committee that reviews each and every report of corruption and investigation. In addition, there is an independent complaint committee where members of the public can lodge any complaint against the ACA and/or its o�cers and there will be an independent investigation.
ICAC also formulated multiple citizen advisory committees comprising eminent private citizens who are also authorized to review closed cases. Citizens perceived such nongovernmental oversight as comparatively neutral105.
The New South Wales’ ACA operates under the supervision of two committees: a Parliamentary joint committee and an operations review committee that hold the ACA accountable for its actions, investigations, and general comportment as a government agency106. An oversight committee should be formulated to keep an e�ective check over NAB’s performance and practices. The committee comprising �ve judges of Supreme Court should be headed by the Chief Justice.
Recommendations 4Anti-Corruption should be included in the curriculum of the elementary, secondary and degree programs of educational institutions.
Educational interventions by ACAs are believed to work e�ectively in reshaping mind sets and hence result in long term gains. In this respect, the anti-corruption agencies of Botswana and Indonesia collaborated with the educational institutions to develop pioneering educational interventions.
University courses were designed to train students to identify corruption around them and trace its impact. Special Investigation Service of the Republic of Lithuania developed anti-corruption curricula for all educational levels to gradually change the public mind-set. Many ACAs also worked on collaborative research projects107.
It is recommended that Anti-Corruption should be included in the curriculum of the elementary, secondary and degree programs of educational institutions to motivate the youth to participate actively in anti-corruption activities. Joint research projects at the higher education level particularly for PhD and MPhil scholars, training programs for the youth at executive education centers and curriculum development at all levels are some areas NAB can focus to collaborate with the academia. Donors like USAID and UNDP can be approached for grants in such areas.
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR NABRecommendation 1NAB should increase collaboration with the media.
“Publicity for an anti-corruption agency is one of the bases for survival. We had to be visible, very visible.” said Mr. Loskutovs, Former Director, Latvia’s Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB). Prosecutors of Croatia’s Bureau for Combating Corruption and Organized Crime (USKOK) received training in media
105 Tony KWOK Man-wai (2006) Formulating an E�ective Anti-Corruption Strategy –The Experience of Hong Kong ICAC, accessed on September 1, 2016 https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=239417106 John R. Heilbrunn (2004) Anti-Corruption Commissions Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption? accessed on September 1, 2016 siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdf107 From Underdogs To Watchdogs: How Anti-Corruption Agencies Can Hold O� Potent Adversaries, https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/.../�les/Policy_Note_ID236.pdf
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relations. Media’s attention was drawn to Slovenia’s ACA, Commission for the Prevention of Corruption (CPC), through the personal standing and public relations of its commissioner108. The Independent Commission against Corruption (ICAC) of Hong Kong has been working e�ectively in collaboration with the media to encourage public to report corruption; promote public awareness on the evil of corruption and the need for a fair and just society109. In 2008, the KPK collaborated with the media to run a campaign, “Indonesia Is Calling” which was able to stimulate patriotic feelings in the public. The campaign motivated 28,000 people to apply for 85 vacant positions at KPK. The collaboration led to a competitive hiring process resulting in highly competent personnel110.
NAB should collaborate with the media to encourage the public to report corruption. Awareness should be raised regarding the procedure of lodging a complaint. NAB can work on further improvement of its public image with support by the media.
Recommendation 2NAB should make a thorough analysis of the entire chain of system to improve its conviction rate.
Best practices of the ACAs re�ect how a higher conviction rate has been has led to public’s con�dence in ACAs’ performance. The e�orts and commitment by the Singaporean’s ACA, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) has contributed to a high conviction rate for corruption-related cases over the years.
In 2015, the conviction rate of CPIB was 97% while the average conviction rate for the past 3 years has remained consistently above 95%111.
When Indonesia’s ACA Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi (KPK ) initiated its robust approach to counter corruption, the public had little con�dence in the �ve commissioners appointed, mainly because of the country’s past practices of political corruption. However, owing to its 100% conviction rate, it is now “Indonesia’s most trusted public institution112.”
NAB should make a thorough analysis of the entire chain of system that leads to conviction in order to identify what factors impede the progress and at what particular point. More resources such as training programs, hiring of competent o�cials and additional budget should be devoted to the gaps identi�ed in the analysis.
Recommendation 3Prosecutors and investigating o�cers of NAB should receive training in specialized �elds.
Indonesia’s KPK, at the very onset, focused speci�cally on building capacity as compared to issues of public mistrust. The KPK’s commissioners meticulously
108 From Underdogs To Watchdogs: How Anti-Corruption Agencies Can Hold O� Potent Adversaries https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/.../�les/Policy_Note_ID236.pdf109 Comprehensive & E�ective Approach to Anti-Corruption, The Hong Kong ICAC Experience, with a View on New Approaches in the Fight Against Corruption http://www.kwok-manwai.com/articles/Comprehensive_E�ective.html110 Inviting a Tiger into Your Home: Indonesia Creates an Anti-Corruption Commission with Teeth: 2002–2007 (2012).111 The Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau Annual Report 2015, https://www.cpib.gov.sg/sites/cpibv2/�les/ CPIB_AnnualReport2015_.pdf112 Indonesia's Anti-corruption Commission, www.icac.org.hk/newsl/issue22eng/button3.htm
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recruited o�cers through a strict competition, set up ethical codes, and started training investigators. Depending on foreign as well as local expertise, procedural and substantive topics were covered in the training programs. A case study of ACAs of eight countries (Botswana, Croatia, Ghana, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mauritius, and Slovenia) reports how they motivated their employees to specialize, often through training abroad.
For instance, Indonesia’s KPK formed an electronic surveillance team, and Latvia groomed �nance specialists. Workers’ performance in KPK was tracked by an online balanced-scorecard system113. In house expertise in the above mentioned areas will give NAB further independence keeping external in�uences to a minimum. Prosecutors and investigating o�cers of NAB should receive training in proper investigation to enable them to present convincing cases. Training in asset recovery of proceeds stashed in o�shore/foreign banks, public procurement, share trading and banking crime should be conducted for its o�cers. In addition, a continuous screening process aimed at ensuring competence and professionalism should be in place for NAB’s employees to undergo at periodic intervals.
Recommendation 4NAB should make full use of social media as a catalyst for public engagement.
The negative perception in relation to NAB’s ine�ectiveness in the use of its powers is paramount in the country. As discussed before, the sense of harassment by NAB o�cials prevalent among the general public and the resultant loss of con�dence in NAB’s powers needs to be addressed. In the digital era, social media serves as a strong communication tool among the educated strata of society in particular and the masses in general. Furthermore, engaging the youth which represents a signi�cant portion of the population in Pakistan, as 64% of the country’s population is below the age of 30114, in the �ght against corruption and shaping public opinion is extremely important.
Malaysian Anti-Corruption Commission (MACC) has been successful in the use of social media to enhance its public image and to reverse the negative perception of the public in its e�ectiveness. Social media was used regularly to disseminate any news or issues highlighted by the public.
Popularity of MACC Facebook is fast growing and gaining popularity especially amongst younger generation. Its discussion board which periodically deliberates matters on arrests, community education information, current issues, guidance on anti-corruption, o�ences and sentences on corruption, etc. is monitored by a Media Monitoring Consultant115.
Another example in this respect is Singapore’s ACA, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau, which launched its �rst social media platforms in the form of Facebook in2014116. At present, NAB’s Facebook page in not very active and its posts are not
113 From Underdogs To Watchdogs: How Anti-Corruption Agencies Can Hold O� Potent Adversaries https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/.../�les/Policy_Note_ID236.pdf114 National Human Development Report 2016, http://nhdr.undp.org.pk/nhdr-2016-on-youth115 Ahmad Khusairi Yahaya, War Against Perception: The Role of Social Media In Gaining Public Support www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_GG5_Seminar/GG5_Malaysia1.pd116 Corruption Situation in Singapore Under Control (Embargoed until issuance on 2 April 2015) Key Highlights www.cpib.gov.sg
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updated on a regular basis. An e�ective and e�cient Facebook page will sound more approachable and practical to the citizens in order to report corrupt practices. In addition, social media will be far more cost e�ective than the traditional dissemination of information tools.
It is recommended NAB should make full use of social media as a catalyst for public engagement. A strategic plan on the utilization of social media needs to be laid out and implemented and dedicated sta� should be assigned to monitor its online performance.
Recommendation 5NAB should ensure that its investigation procedures should be completely compliant with the basic rights of the citizens enshrined in Qanoon-e-Shahdat and the country’s constitution.
The Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984 (Article 37) states: A confession made by an accused person is irrelevant in a criminal proceeding, if the making of the confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against the accused person, proceeding from a person in authority and su�cient, in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds which would appear to him reasonable, for supposing that by making it he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of a temporal nature in reference to the proceedings against him117.”
Clause 24 of Singapore’s Evidence Act (1997)118 Section 24 of Malaysia’s Evidence Act 1950119 and Criminal Evidence in Hong Kong (1996)120 state similar conditions for confession.
The word "confession" itself denotes that it is a voluntary statement made by the person charged with the commission of the crime. Therefore, it is recommended that NAB should ensure that its investigation procedures should be completely compliant with the basic rights of the citizens enshrined in Qanoon-e-Shahadat and the country’s constitution, both by law and practice.
Recommendation 6The timeline for inquiries should be in accordance with the provision in Ehtesab Act 1996.
Delays in the investigation of inquiries were quoted by the stakeholders as one of the biggest reasons of public’s mistrust in NAB’s e�ectiveness. Such delays in completion of proceedings can impede e�orts to reduce malpractices. On one hand, the innocent persons could be harassed at the hands of perceived unprofessionalism on NAB’s part and on the other hand, the guilty would get an opportunity to evade retributive action for longer periods of time.
117 The Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984118 Singapore Statutes Online - 97 - Evidence Act statutes.agc.gov.sg/aol119 The Annotated Statutes of Malaysia: Evidence Act 1950 (1996 Issue)120 Criminal Evidence in Hong Kong (Issue 3, 1996)
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Therefore, it is recommended that the inquiries are �nalized in an expeditious manner. The timeline for inquiries should be in accordance with the provision in Ehtesab Act 1996, i.e. 60 days to dispose of a case. The Accountability Courts should also complete the investigation within their de�ned limit of 30 days. In case of default, the accused should be released on bail.
Recommendations 7
NAB should deal with the accused and the witnesses in a digni�ed and respectful manner.
NAB treats people in a threatening way which leads to a sense of harassment in the general public. As discussed, the key stakeholders consulted for the research reported lax and unprofessional attitude on NAB’s part. Such examples of internal abuses of power while handling persons under investigation can damage not only NAB’s credibility but also its competence.
NAB should deal with the accused and the witnesses in a digni�ed and respectful manner and should not treat them as guilty of crimes at the very onset. NAB’s notices requesting witnesses to present themselves state: “You are informed that failing to comply with the notice may entail penal consequences as provided in S.2 of the schedule of NAO, 1999.” The notice should be worded in a polite way. NAB, during the review process of this report, shared that Standard Operating Procedures (SOP)s have been formulated in this respect wherein NAB o�cers have been instructed to facilitate the general public when they wish to lodge complaints.
Recommendation 8
Precautionary measures need to ensure the agency does not itself become a source for extortion and corruption.
Understanding the situations where its sta� could be tempted to abuse their authority, Indonesian ACA, KPK decided on a policy of “zero tolerance for abuse of power.” A "solid, uni�ed sta�," was developed through rigorous six months long training e�orts emphasizing on acceptance of KPK’s values of integrity121.
It is encouraging to note that NAB takes cognizance of cases of corrupt practice by its own employees under National Accountability Bureau Ordinance. However, NAB needs to instill the values of honesty and integrity into its culture as precautionary measures to ensure the agency does not itself become a source for extortion and corruption.
121 Inviting a Tiger into Your Home: Indonesia Creates an Anti-Corruption Commission with Teeth: 2002–2007 (2012)
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It is recommended that NAB should follow similar practices and its “Zero Tolerance Policy” should be upheld in the true sense of the word. Active participation of all NAB’ o�cials, particularly the new inductees, in NAB’s anti-corruption prevention projects with the academia and other stakeholders should be mandatory to equip them with a sense of commitment and ownership for its own values.
Recommendation 9
NAB should ensure that the reference prepared and successfully tried in the Accountability Courts should be upheld in all subsequent review petitions in High Courts and Supreme Court.
Meeting public’s expectations appears to be the greatest challenge for NAB in the wake of corruption being the major impediment in the way to growth of the country. NAB should follows the best practices of e�ective ACAs of other countries like Croatia122 , Indonesia, Latvia123, and Slovenia124 which decided to pursue cases of in�uential persons at the very onset to enhance their credibility.
NAB can mitigate public’s distrust by ensuring that the reference prepared and successfully tried in the Accountability Courts should be upheld in all subsequent review petitions in High Courts and the Supreme Court. NAB, during the review process of this report, shared that Special Prosecutors have been hired to serve this purpose.
122 “Cleaning House: Croatia Mops Up High-Level Corruption, 2005–2012” (2013).123 From Underdogs To Watchdogs: How Anti-Corruption Agencies Can Hold O� Potent Adversaries https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/ sites/.../�les/Policy_Note_ID236.pdf124 Toothless but Forceful: Slovenia’s Anti-Corruption Watchdog Exposes Systemic Graft, 2004– 2013 (2013)A
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NAB’s Enabling Factors & Performance
Each indicator of NAB’s assessment is categorized according to whether it relates to a set of enabling factors beyond NAB’s control or its performance within its control. There are a total of 50 indicators, 17 of which relate to the enabling factors and 33 relate to the performance of the NAB (see Annex 5).
Enabling Factors 75%Agency's Performance 60%
Graph showing position of NAB
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ConclusionNational Accountability Bureau holds the responsibility of eradication of corruption following an encompassing approach of awareness, prevention and enforcement since its inception. For the �rst three years, it focused only at detection, investigation of white collar crime. After launching the National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) in 2002 and amendments in NAO, it developed a broader strategy and a detailed action plan. Since then, NAB has been empowered to broaden its horizon and focus on awareness and prevention in addition to its enforcement functions.
Being Pakistan’s primary anti-corruption institution, NAB faces huge challenges. Corruption has been a huge impediment for the country since the time of inception. The public perceives that nothing can be done to curb corruption that the country faces. People have lost their faith in the government and higher institutions as being ine�ective in handling the corruption in the country.
Working under such a challenging situation, NAB investigated cases against politicians, public service o�cials and other citizens who were guilty of gross abuse of powers. In addition, it has recovered billions of rupees from corrupt individuals and institutions. NAB envisions being a credible, e�ective, e�cient and dynamic anti-corruption organization creating an enabling environment for a corruption free society by engaging all stakeholders in its mission to eliminate corruption.
NAB’s assessment re�ects that it is a legally independent organization by law and has been given maximum powers to carry out its duties. However, the �ndings depict that NAB is not exercising the given powers fully and e�ectively which it is recommended to excersice so as to win back the trust and con�dence of the public.
Although, NAB itself reports su�ciency in the budget assigned by the government, a higher proportion of budget is recommended. In such a case, the additional �nancial resources can be spent on the areas for improvement such as training, in outsourcing its recruitment, strengthening its outreach, etc.
The inability to punish the in�uential persons needs to be addressed. Perhaps this is the reason behind the public’s mistrust in the e�ectiveness of NAB. Strong support from the stakeholders including the government is required to do that.
Another issue related to public’s con�dence and good governance that the government needs to address is strong oversight and accountability mechanism. An e�ective and transparent monitoring and evaluation system needs to be developed immediately.
NAB’s e�ectiveness and integrity will be addressed itself if the measures mentioned above are undertaken. NAB needs to exercise its powers fully and improve its processes so that it leads to the prosecution of powerful persons in the country to set examples for the public. Furthermore, NAB should conduct public perception surveys in collaboration with CSOs periodically to be informed of its strengths and weaknesses.
The purpose of the assessment initiative is to encourage a strong drive for improvement in collaboration with relevant stakeholders and chalk out an e�ective strategy for change. It is sincerely hoped that the initiative is successful in its objective and a consultative process engaging all stakeholders begins soon.
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Transparency International believes that Anti-Corruption Agencies (ACAs), as public institutions tasked with combatting corruption, must be transparent, accessible and accountable to citizens. They must operate with the utmost integrity, maintain a reputation of objectivity and professionalism and demonstrate e�ectiveness in their duties. Transparency International has identi�ed ACAs as key partners in the �ght against corruption and plans to work in constructive collaboration with governments who are ready to invest in improving their anti-corruption e�ectiveness by building strong oversight and enforcement mechanisms.
Transparency International's initiative aimed at strengthening anti-corruption agencies combines biennial assessments of ACAs with sustained engagement, dialogue and advocacy at both national and regional levels. A robust assessment tool was developed over a period of two years in consultation with numerous experts and practitioners around the world. In mid-2013, Transparency International convened an experts meeting in Kuala Lumpur to explore the possibility of developing an ACA assessment tool. After receiving encouraging feedback and useful input, Transparency International commissioned a background review and draft framework by anti-corruption specialist, Alan Doig. The concept received further interest and backing from ACAs in Asia Paci�c during the 18th and 19th Steering Group Meetings of the ADB/OECD Anti-Corruption Initiative for Asia-Paci�c in 2013 and 2014.In 2014, Transparency International commissioned anti-corruption expert, Dr Jon Quah to further re�ne the framework, producing a set of indicators incorporating elements of TI's National Integrity Systems assessment methodology and other relevant tools and principles. In April 2015, Transparency International organized a Focus Group Discussion in Bangkok, bringing together practitioners, researchers and ACAs to scrutinize the indicator framework and approach. Participants subsequently formed an Advisory Group to guide the �nalization of the tool.
ANNEX 1: BACKGROUND TO THE PROJECT
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ANNEX 2: INTERVIEWEESPersons Interviewed during NAB’s Assessment August 2016 - October, 2016
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Position Organization
1. Chairman National Accountability Bureau
2. Deputy Chairman National Accountability Bureau
3. Director General, Operations National Accountability Bureau
4. Director General NAB (Karachi) Office
5. General Manager, Planning & Development Karachi Port Trust
6. Chairman Autonomous Government Entity
7. Senior Official Accountant General Pakistan
8. Senior Staff Reporter The News
9. Senior Journalist Agence France-Presse
10. Senior Free Lance Journalist Press Club
ANNEX 3:STAKEHOLDERS CONSULTED
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Position Organization
1. Chairman, Deputy Chairman, Director
Generals, Management and Staff
National Accountability Bureau
2. Ex-Federal Tax Ombudsman Federal Tax Ombudsman, Pakistan
3. Director Investigation Wing NAB Sindh NAB Sindh
4. Ex-Advocate General Advocate General, Sindh
5. Ex-Senior Police Officer Sindh Police
6. 7. 8.
Former vice president , FPCCI Ex-Chief Justice Ex-Justice
Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce & Industry Shariat Court Supreme Court of Pakistan
9. General Secretary
Shehri-Citizens for a Better Environment (CBE), Civil Society Organization
10. Senators Senate of Pakistan
11. Chief, political party Jamaat-e-Islami, Karachi
12. Economic Growth Advisor USAID
13. Parliamentarian Sindh Provincial Assembly
14. CEO Mubarak Institute of Literacy and Learning, Civil Society Organization
15. Academician University of Karachi
16. Ex Director General Auditor General of Pakistan
17. 18. 19.
Chairman Chairman Students
Citizens Police Liaison Committee The Pakistan Institute of International Culture Civil Society Organization Institute of Business Management (IOBM)
ANNEX 4:REFERENCESAhmad Khusairi Yahaya War Against Perception: The Role Of Social Media In Gaining Public Support www.unafei.or.jp/english/pdf/PDF_GG5_Seminar/GG5_Malaysia1. Amien-sunaryadi http://pro�l.merdeka.com/indonesia/a/amien-sunaryadi/Anti-Corruption Mechanisms and Institutions to Address the Problem of Corruption in Pakistan, Published: December 2015, http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/FP/AntiCorruption_MechanismsandInstitutionstoAddresstheProblemofCorruptioninPakistan_BackgroundPaper.pdfBertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2014 — Pakistan Country Report. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2014, http://www.bticjproject.org/�leadmin/�les/BTI/Downloads/Reports/2016/pdf/BTI_2016_Pakistan.pdfCase Study DFO Noor Ul Haq Of Forest Department Accumulates Huge Property through Illegal Means http://www.nab.gov.pk/Downloads/Case_studies/noorulhaq.pdf Accessed: September 5, 2016 Comprehensive & E�ective Approach to Anti-Corruption. The Hong Kong ICAC Experience, with a View on New Approaches in the Fight Against CorruptionCriminal Evidence in Hong Kong (Issue 3, 1996)Cleaning House: Croatia Mops Up High-Level Corruption, 2005–2012 (2013)Corruption Situation in Singapore under Control (Embargoed until issuance on 2 April 2015) Key Highlights www.cpib.gov.sgData on Poverty in Pakistan available at http://www.adb.org/countries/pakistan/poverty, Accessed: August 1, 2016Daniyal Aziz, Anticorruption and its Discontents. Prepared for presentation at OPMN conference: Innovations in Public Management for Controlling Corruption, 27-29 June 2012, Honolulu, Hawaii.Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/people/person.asp?personId=8251267&privcapId=878413Focus Group Discussion on October 1, 2016From Underdogs to Watchdogs: How Anti-Corruption Agencies Can Hold O�Potent Adversaries https://successfulsocieties.princeton.edu/sites/.../�les/Policy_Note_ID236.pdfFundamental Rights [Articles 8-28], Constitution of Pakistan (Chapter 1)1973Global Peace Index, 2016, http://static.visionofhumanity.org/sites/default/�les/GPI%202016%20Report_2.pdf?Human Development Report 2015 available at http://hdr.undp.org/sites/all/themes/hdr_theme/country-notes/PAK.pdIndonesia's Anti-corruption Commission www.icac.org.hk/newsl/issue22eng/button3.htmIntroducing Plea Bargaining into Post Con�ict Legal Systemshttp://inprol.org/sites/default/�les/publications/2014/introducing_plea_bargaining_0.pdf
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Inviting a Tiger into Your Home’: Indonesia Creates an Anti-Corruption Commission with Teeth: 2002–2007 (2012).Issues in Corruption and the Role of NAB, http://www.icac.org.hk/newsl/issue27eng/button6.htmJohn R. Heilbrunn (2004)Anti-Corruption Commissions Panacea or Real Medicine to Fight Corruption? September 1, 2016 siteresources.worldbank.org/WBI/Resources/wbi37234Heilbrunn.pdfList of Court Cases http://www.nab.gov.pk/Reference/CourtCasesData.pdfMoney Laundering and Financial Crimes http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/100922.pdfPress Release http://www.nab.gov.pk/PRESS/NEW.ASP?1260NAB tells Prevention of Fraudulent Practices in Banking Sectorhttp://lahoreworld.com/2013/01/04/nab-tells-prevention-of-fraudulent-practices-in-banking-sector/NAB chief barred from voluntary return dealshttp://www.dawn.com/news/1292113/nab-chief-barred-from-voluntary-return-dealsNAB Launches Investigations against its own o�cials http://www.baaghi.tv/nab-launches-investigation-against-its-own-o�cial/ Published: May 17, 2016 Accessed: September 20, 2016National Accountability Bureau: An Independent Review of Structure and Perfor-mance. http://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Democracy&LegStr/NationalAccountabilityBureauAnIndependentReviewofStructureandPerformance.pdfNational Accountability Bureau https://www.facebook.com/Nationalaccountabilitybureau/?fref=ts Accessed: Sep-tember 20, 2016National Accountability Bureau, Annual Report 2015National Accountability Bureau (NAB) employees Terms & Conditions of Services (TCS) 2002. Source: Second Interim TechnicalReport on Public Accountability Institutions in Pakistan and their macroeconomic Impacts, Governance Institutions NetworkInternational (GINI, 2007), p.160National Accountability Bureau Budget 2016, Accessed: August 5, 2016. http://www.dawn.com/acNational Accountability Ordinance 1999 www.nab.gov.pk/Downloads/nao.aspNational Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS), Islamabad, Pakistan 2002National Corruption Perception Survey, 2010, Transparency International PakistanNational Human Development Report 2016 http://nhdr.undp.org.pk/nhdr-2016-on-youthhttp://www.pildat.org/Publications/publication/Democracy&LegStr/NationalAccountabilityBureauAnIndependentReviewofStructureandPerformance.pdfNational Integrity System, Country Report 2014, Transparency International PakistanAccording to ECP’s website, as of August 1st, 2013, http://ecp.gov.pk/Misc/ListPolPartiesWith addresses.pdfInterview of NAB O�cials on August 20, 2016
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“Nine in every 10 Pakistanis are anxious” Survey, The Express Tribune. Published: August 24, 2013. http://tribune.com.pk/story/594483/nine-in-every-10-pakistanis-are-anxious-surveyPakistan GDP Growth Rate available at www.tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/gdp-growth. Accessed: August 3, 2016Pakistan Development : Update from Stability to Prosperity. Published: April 2016, documents.worldbank.orgPakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency PILDAT, Citizens Report 5 Years of the 13th National Assembly of Pakistan, March 17, 2008-March 16, 2013, Patrick Meagher & Caryn Voland, U.S. Agency for Int’l Dev., Anticorruption Agencies (ACAS): O�ce of Democracy and Governance Anticorruption Program Brief 4 (2006) [hereinafter USAID], available at http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/ACA_ 508c.pdf.PIDLAT Report Score card: Federal Government of Pakistan: Assessment of the quality of Governancehttp://epaper.brecorder.com/Samad, S. (2008). Combating corruption: The case of the National Accountability Bureau, Pakistan, JOAAG, Vol. 3. No. 1Singapore Budget 2013 - Expenditure Overview - Prime Minister's O�ce http://www.singaporebudget.gov.sg/budget_2013/expenditure_overview/pmo.htmlSingapore Statutes Online - 97 - Evidence Act statutes.agc.gov.sg/aolSocial Accountability in Pakistan: Challenges, Gaps, Opportunities and the Way Forward by Fayyaz Yaseen. Published: May 2013, Working Paper Sustainable Devel-opment Policy Institute (SDPI). https://sdpi.org/publications/�les/W-133.pdfStrengthening NAB's �nancial crime wing, http://www.brecorder.com/pages/article/1214834/2015-08-07/strengthening-nabs-�nancial-crime-wing.html/Accessed October 14, 2016Text of Amendments in NAB Ordinance as proposed by Dr Arif Alvi available at https://www.scribd.com/doc/305731961/ Accessed: October 8, 2016The Annotated Statutes of Malaysia: Evidence Act 1950 (1996 Issue)THE CORRUPT PRACTICES INVESTIGATION BUREAU ANNUAL REPORT 2015 https://www.cpib.gov.sg/sites/cpibv2/�les/CPIB_AnnualReport2015_.pdfThe Global Competitiveness Report 2015–2016: http://www3.weforum.org/docs/gcr/2015-2016/Global_Competitiveness_Report_2015-2016.pdfTHE LOAN DEFAULT DRIVE http://www.pakistaneconomist.com/issue1999/issue47/cover.htmThe Plea-Bargain National Accountability Bureau Pakistan http://www.icac.org.hk/newsl/issue14eng/button3.htmThe Qanun-e-Shahadat Order, 1984Tony KWOK Man-wai (2006) Formulating an E�ective Anti-Corruption Strategy –The Experience of Hong Kong ICAC accessed on September 1, 2016 https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/publications/abstract.aspx?ID=239417Toothless but Forceful: Slovenia’s Anti-Corruption Watchdog Exposes Systemic Graft, 2004–2013 (2013)
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Transparency International, Daily Lives and Corruption: Public Opinion in South Asia, 2011Transparency International Pakistan, National Corruption Perception Survey, 2006Transparency International, Pakistan National Integrity System, Country Report 2014Unemployment in Pakistan available at http://www.tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/unemployment-rateWorld Bank Institute (WBI), 2007, Report on Empowering the Marginalized: Case studies of Social Accountability Initiatives in Asia. Available at (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTSOCACCDEMSIDEGOV/Resources/Empoweri ngTheMarginalizedFinalVersion.pdf? resourceurlname=EmpoweringTheMarginalizedFin alVersion.pdf )World Populationhttp://www.worldometers.info/ Accessed: August 1, 2016Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index 2015
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ANNEX 5:CLASSIFICATION OF INDICATORS
Indicator Relating to: Enabling Factors ACA Performance
1 ACA’s legal independence Yes No
2 ACA’s mandate Yes No 3 ACA’s legal powers Yes No 4 Appointment of ACA Commissioner(s) Yes No 5 ACA Commissioner(s)’ term of office and removal Yes No 6 ACA’s operational autonomy and impartiality Yes No 7 Government’s reliance on ACA to use corruption as a
weapon against political opponents Yes No
8 Average proportion of ACA’s budget to total government budget for past 3 years
Yes No
9 Sufficiency of ACA’s budget for performing its functions Yes No 10 Security and stability of ACA’s budget during past 3 years Yes No 11 ACA personnel’s salary and benefits Yes No 12 ACA’s selection criteria for personnel Yes No 13 Expertise of ACA’s personnel in corruption investigation No Yes 14 Expertise of ACA’s personnel in corruption prevention
and education No Yes
15 Training of ACA’s personnel No Yes 16 Stability of ACA’s personnel No Yes 17 ACA’s accessibility to corruption
complainants/informants, including public and whistle-blowers during past 3 years
No Yes
18 ACA’s responsiveness to corruption complaints during past 3 years
No Yes
19 ACA’s willingness to initiate corruption investigations during past 3 years
No Yes
20 Average number of cases investigated by ACA personnel during past 3 years
No Yes
21 Efficiency and professionalism of corruption investigations by ACA during past 3 years
No Yes
22 Average conviction rate of corruption cases investigated by ACA in past 3 years
Yes No
23 ACA’s willingness to investigate influential persons for corruption without fear or favour during past 3 years
No Yes
24 ACA’s role in restitution, asset recovery, freezing and confiscation during past 3 years
No Yes
25 Does the ACA identify gender in compiling corruption complaints and monitoring corruption trends?
No Yes
26 Average proportion of ACA’s operating expenditure allocated to public outreach and prevention during past 3 years
Yes No
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27 ACA’s corruption prevention initiatives during past 3 years
No Yes
28 Number of reviews of organizational procedures, systems & capabilities conducted by ACA to prevent corruption during past 3 years
No Yes
29 Frequency of including corruption prevention recommendations in ACA’s investigation reports during past 3 years
No Yes
30 ACA’s plan for prevention, education and outreach and its implementation
No Yes
31 ACA’s collaboration with other stakeholders in prevention, education and outreach activities
No Yes
32 ACA's research and exploration of corruption risks, context and conditions
No Yes
33 ACA’s dissemination of corruption prevention information and use of campaigns
No Yes
34 ACA’s use of its website and social media for disseminating information on corruption prevention
No Yes
35 Government support (e.g. Attorney-General’s Office, Director of Public Prosecutions) to ACA for prosecution of corruption cases
Yes No
36 Cooperation between ACA and other integrity agencies (including other ACAs if there are multiple ACAs in country)
No Yes
37 Cooperation between ACA and non-government organizations including CSOs and private companies
No Yes
38 ACA’s participation in international networks No Yes
39 ACA’s cooperation with ACAs in other countries No Yes 40 Information provided in and accessibility of ACA’s annual
report and website No Yes
41 ACA’s oversight mechanisms Yes No 42 ACA’s procedure for dealing with complaints against ACA
personnel No Yes
43 Outcomes of complaints against ACA or its personnel in past 3 years
No Yes
44 Public confidence that government has given ACA the required powers and resources for curbing corruption
Yes No
45 Public confidence in ACA’s adherence to due process, impartiality, and fairness in using its powers
No Yes
46 Confidence in ACA’s adherence to due process, impartiality, and fairness in using its powers among persons who had direct contact with ACA
No Yes
47 Confidence in ACA's dignified and respectful treatment of persons under investigation
No Yes
48 Public perception of ACA’s effectiveness in corruption control
No Yes
49 Perception of ACA’s effectiveness in corruption control among persons with direct contact with ACA
No Yes
50 Perception of ACA’s effectiveness in dealing with complaints among female citizens who had direct contact with ACA
No Yes
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4-C, 1st �oor, Khayaban-e-Ittehad, Phase VII,Defence Housing Authority, Karachi
Phone : 021-35311897-8 & 021-35390408
Fax 021-35390410
Email [email protected]
Website www.transparency.org.pk