ANSO Quarterly Data Report (Q.4 2010)...Bargi Matal Nuristan Kamdesh Gomal Dila WorMamay WazaKhwa Barmal Sharan ZarghunBand Shah Omna Urgun Sar Hawza Ziruk Mata Shamal Khan Gayan …

ANSO and our donors accept no liability for

the results of any activity conducted or omitted on the basis of this report.

-Not for copy or sale-

The Afghan i s tan NGO Sa fet y Of f i ce

Throughout 2010 NGOs were involved in 126 incidents in which 28 people were killed and an additional 33 injured. 22

deaths were attributed to AOG, three to criminals and an additional three died collaterally in IMF/AOG clashes. While

these figures represent a 27% fall in the total volume of attacks from 2009 (172 cases) they also show an alarming 42%

increase in fatalities. Of the deaths, 20 were Afghan nationals and eight foreign nationals, all of the latter dying in a sin‐

gle incident. Ten of the Afghan nationals killed worked for demining NGOs. Abduction by armed opposition grew by 7%

with 74 persons taken in 30 separate cases. All of the victims were Afghan nationals and all of them were released

without harm, often within three days. We assess that the primary motivation in AOG abduction of NGO staff is infor‐

mation gathering. One foreign national was abducted, and released, but that case was assessed as criminal. Of the sixty

eight separate NGOs involved in all incidents ANSO noted no commonality or trend in their profiles (such as nationality,

sector of intervention, funding sources) with the exception of deminers. It is clear that AOG have an opposition to this

field of work, particularly in the southern provinces. In sum, a difficult year for NGOs in which deadly ambient violence

posed as much of a threat as direct and deliberate strikes. Despite this there remains no evidence to suggest that AOG

deliberately target NGOs (except deminers) or that we will not retain space for our operations. ANSO continues to ad‐

vise that transparent dialogue with all combatants is key to NGO safety going in to 2011.

The forces of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) fought a significant campaign in 2010 expanding the total volume

of attacks by 64%, the highest annual growth rate we have recorded, and securing new strongholds in the North, West

and East of the country. Their momentum would appear unaffected by US‐led counterinsurgency measures. The cam‐

paign grew increasingly complex with reports suggesting the deployment of parallel governance structures including

courts, judges and administrators. Attacks remained focused on the IMF and Afghan Government, targeting personnel,

resources and enablers (including hundreds of Afghan civilians) and expanded to include significant attacks on Private

Development Companies for their role in supporting the IMF. The IEA will enter 2011 in a very strong position.

The International military forces (IMF) pursued their three pronged exit strategy (security, governance, development)

with massive interventions in Helmand and Kandahar that achieved little other than to diversify and diffuse the insur‐

gency. New initiatives, such as the Afghan Peace & Reintegration Program (APRP), have resulted in a few hundred sur‐

renders but not enough to undermine AOG manpower. Village Stability Operations (the formation of irregular forces)

are exacerbating tensions in the North and may be contributing to a below‐radar process of factional remobilization.

The rapid recycling of APRP reintegrees in to irregular forces is of particular concern.

Looking ahead, we expect the impending IMF drawdown to stimulate further factional separation on all sides, as lead‐

ers jostle for the best starting position, however we do not expect this to result in significant conflict between factions,

it will simply be an insurance policy against State collapse. The IEA will press their military advantage, exploiting the

fractures that emerge with ‘transition’.

Nic Lee, ANSO Director, Kabul 2011

SUMMARY & ASSESSMENT

J an 1s t— Dec 31s t 2010

ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT Q.4 2010

The views expressed in this report remain the sole responsibility of the author and do not necessarily re-flect the views of ANSO donors or partners.

Page 2 ANSO QUARTERLY DATA REPORT

1 . 1 Tr e n d s i n K e y B a t t l e G r o u n d s

The US Strategy Review in December suggested the IEA’s momentum had been blunted in some areas and,

while not specifically mentioning Kandahar or Helmand, given that those are their focus areas it is reason‐

able to assume that they meant there.

Our quarterly attack rate figures for each province (above) do indeed show a substantial reduction of at‐

tacks in both between August and December. Kandahar dropping by 50%, in contrast to the usual 20%, and

Helmand dropping by 40% in Q.4, a trend not seen since 2006. This demonstrates that the IEA have turned

away from the battlefield earlier, and in greater numbers, than before but it does not provide an explana‐

tion as to why. The pressure of US operations could certainly be a factor here, anecdotal reporting suggests

many commanders felt the areas to be too hot and sought sanctuary in other provinces or Pakistan, but so

too could other more benign factors like the early onset of Ramadan and the normal seasonal downturn.

However, regardless of which explanation one prefers when you put the quarterly data in its annual context,

which to us is a much more valid analytical period as it captures a full operational cycle rather than just the

tactical to & fro, it becomes completely irrelevant. Over the full year the IEA expanded their attacks in both

provinces, Helmand by a whopping 124% and Kandahar by a more conservative 20%, suggesting that in the

bigger picture their capacity to conduct attacks has improved substantially. In light of this the deep down‐

turn could just as easily be interpreted as an early winter reprieve, after an intense summer fight, and would

not represent any longer term degradation of capacity. If the 2011 spring offensives sustain, or build on, the

level of violence achieved this year then it will be a sure indicator that the surge operations achieved little. If

they do not then the US conclusions, in those provinces at least, will be validated.

To borrow a phrase from the global warming debate...keep your eyes on the climate, not the weather.

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

46 47

124

143

348

28

60

132

218208

ANSO: AOG attacks in Helmand, Per Quarter, 2006‐2010

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

113

164

239

321

400

109

143

178

246

200

ANSO: AOG attacks in Kandahar, Per Quarter, 2006‐2010

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4


1 . 2 I r r e g u l a r A r m e d F o r c e s

Irregular armed forces

(militias) continue to be

stood up in an uncoordi‐

nated and opaque man‐

ner and constitute an

emerging security threat

to NGOs. Two official pro‐

grams are active, the Vil‐

lage Stability Operations

(VSO) run by US Special

Forces and the Afghan

Local Police (ALP) led by

the Ministry of Interior

(see map for districts).

However, ANSO has re‐

ceived numerous reports

of other irregular groups

spontaneously forming

outside of these programs, for instance in Faryab, Balkh and Takhar (but there could be others), that then

seek retroactive sanction for their mobilization. While the subject is complex, the early concern is that ir‐

regulars are actually coalescing around political/ethnic leaders, in a low‐intensity arms race, stimulated by

the need to preposition ahead of the impending IMF withdrawal. If confirmed, which 2011 will show, then

this aspect of the COIN strategy will be deeply at odds with efforts to form a strong central State.

The phenomenon seems most acute in the North where we suspect the fractured ethnic landscape gives

rise to a more imminent sense of danger when the neighbor’s suddenly re‐arm and don a badge of State

legitimacy. In Kunduz recently, competing irregulars, loyal to opposing Jamiat/Tajik and Hezb‐i‐Islami/

Pashtun commanders, have engaged in armed conflict over territory and taxing rights. In other provinces

locals have reported being robbed or assaulted and some claim the Arbaki even have links to the armed

opposition. These developments are really of concern. The official response suggests that ultimately all

irregulars will be brought under the control of the MOI with the ALP program, however this seems highly

unlikely given the level of unauthorized mobilizations already occurring. The genie is out of the bottle.

In the short term the main risk to NGOs is simply that of the introduction of new armed actors to the field.

We have not yet seen an Arbaki kill an NGO worker (although we suspect we have seen some robberies

and maybe an abduction) but it will only be a matter of time. In the long run, irregular forces could pose a

significant obstacle to lasting peace in the country (by delegating State legitimacy) and leave NGOs negoti‐

ating a complex, and shifting, patchwork of competing authorities.

Qalay‐I‐ Zal

Archi

Imam Sahib

Chahar Dara

Ali Abad

Kunduz

Khan Abad

Nari

Pech

AsadAbadChapa

Dara

Chawkay

Narang

Khas Kunar

Sirkanay

Marawara

Qarghayi

Alingar

Dawlat Shah

Alishing

Mihtarlam

Puli Alam

Charkh

Muhammad Agh

KhushiBaraki Barak

RodatHisarak

Achin

Lal Pur

Dih Bala

Goshta

Dur Baba

Kama

Surkh Rod

Kuz Kunar

Dara‐I‐Nur

Shinwar

Bati KotChaparhar

Jalal Abad

Nazyan

Chahar Burja

ChakhansurChakhansur

Khash RodKhash Rod

Kang

ZaranjZaranj

MandolMandol WamaWama

Bargi Matal

Nuristan

KamdeshKamdesh

GomalGomal

DilaDila

Wor Mamay

Waza Khwa

Barmal

Sharan

Zarghun

Shah

UrgunOmna

SarHawza

Ziruk

Mata KhanKhan

Gayan

Nika

Zurmat

Jaji

Gardez

Jadran

Lija

Mangal

Jani Khel

Shwak

Shamal

Hisa‐I‐Awali

PanjsherHisa‐I‐Duwum

Ghorband

Salang

Shekh Ali

Surkhi ParsaKohi Safi

Bagram

Jabalussaraj

Dara‐I‐ SufDara‐I‐ Suf

AybakAybak

Ruyi Du AbRuyi Du Ab

Khuram Wa Sa

Khuram Wa Sa

Hazrati Sultan

KohistanatKohistanatBalkhabBalkhab

Sari PulSari Pul

SayyadSayyad

SangcharakSangcharak

Sozma Qala WarsajWarsaj

RustaqRustaq

FarkharFarkharChalChal

TaluqanTaluqan

Bangi

KalafganKalafgan

Ab

Chah

Ab

Ishkamish

Khwaja Ghar

KhwajaGhar

ChoraChora

NeshNesh

DihrawudDihrawudTirin Kot

Tirin Kot

Khas UruzganKhas

UruzganShahidi HassShahidi Hass

Markazi Bihs

JalrezJalrez

Nirkh

Day Mirdad

Hisa‐I‐Awal

Wakhan

JurmJurm

ShighnanShighnan

KishimKishim

Darwaz

BaharakBaharak

RaghRagh

ZebakZebak

Kuran Wa MunKuran Wa Mun

Fayz Abad

KhwahanKhwahan

Ishkashim

Shahri BuzurShahri Buzur

QalatQalat

ShamulzayiShinkayShinkay

ShahjoyShahjoy

MizanMizan

AtgharAtghar

Tarnak Wa Ja

JawandJawand

QadisQadis

MurghabMurghab

Ab KamariAb Kamari

MuqurMuqur

Qalay‐I‐Naw

KahmardKahmard

DushiDushi

AndarabAndarab

NahrinNahrin

Tala Wa BarfTala Wa Barf

Khost Wa Fir

Khinjan

Burka

Baghlani JadBaghlani Jad

Dahana‐I‐GhDahana‐I‐Ghori

BaghlanBaghlan

KhulmKhulm

KishindihKishindih

ChimtalChimtal

SholgaraSholgara

ShortepaShortepa

Nahri ShahiNahri Shahi

KaldarKaldar

Dawlat AbadDawlat Abad

Chahar Kint

Chahar Kint

BalkhBalkh

MarmulMarmulDihdadiDihdadi

Chahar

YakawlangYakawlang

WarasWaras

PanjabPanjab

BamyanBamyan

ShibarShibar

Day KundiDay Kundi

GizabGizab

Kajran

ShahristanShahristan

Anar DaraAnar Dara

GulistanGulistan

Pur ChamanPur Chaman

Bala BulukBala Buluk

Lash Wa JuwaLash Wa Juwa

FarahFarah

Qalay‐I‐KahQalay‐I‐KahBakwaBakwa

Shib KohShib Koh

Khak‐e Safid

Pusht RodPusht Rod

QaysarQaysar

AlmarAlmar

BilchiraghBilchiragh

KohistanKohistan

Dawlat AbadDawlat Abad

Shirin TagabShirin Tagab

QaramqolQaramqol

Pashtun Kot

AndkhoyAndkhoy

Khwaja SabzKhwaja Sabz

Khani ChaharKhani Chahar

MaymanaMaymana

NawurNawur

Nawa

GiroGiro

QarabaghQarabagh

GelanGelan

Andar

Ab BandAb

BandMuqur

Jaghatu

Bahrami ShahShah Dih Yak

Ghazni

Zana Khan

ShahrakShahrak

ChaghcharanChaghcharan

TulakTulak

SagharSaghar

PasabandPasaband

TaywaraTaywara

Lal Wa SarjaLal Wa Sarja

RegReg

GarmserGarmser

DishuDishu

Nad AliNad Ali

WasherWasher

BaghranBaghran

Naw ZadNaw ZadKajakiKajaki

Girishk

GahLashkar Gah

Sangin

BaraNaway i Bara

AdraskanAdraskan

GulranGulran

ShindandShindand

GhoryanGhoryan

ObeObe

KushkKushk

InjilInjil

KohsanKohsan

FarsiFarsi

KarukhKarukh

GuzaraGuzara

Zinda Jan

Zinda Jan Chishti SharChishti Shar

Pashtun ZargPashtun Zarg

HiratHirat

ShibirghanShibirghan

Qarqin

Darzab

Aqcha

Khwaja Du Ko

Mingajik MardyanMardyan

AbadFayz

Surobi

Dih Sabz

Khaki Jabbar

PaghmanBagrami

Kabul

Shakardara

Istalif

Chahar AsyabChahar

Musayi

GuldaraQarabagh

Mir Bacha Kot

RegReg

PanjwayiPanjwayi

MarufMaruf

DamanDaman

Spin BoldakSpin Boldak

ShorabakShorabak

ArghistanArghistan

MaywandMaywand

Shah Wali KoShah Wali KotGhorak

Tani

Tere Zayi

Sabari Bak

Gurbuz

Nadir Shah Kot

Jaji Maydan

Nijrab

Tagab

Kohistan

Koh Band

Mazari Sharif

Kalakan

Alasay

Mahmud Raqi

Mando Zayi

Azra

Bolak

ANSO: Districts with official Irregular Force programs (VSO/ALP) plus ISAF “Key Terrain”, correct at Sept 2010 (last info available)

ISAF Key Terrain

VSO (former LDI/CDI)

ALP


Part 2.Part 2.

NGO TRENDSNGO TRENDS


2 . 1 G e n e r a l N G O Tr e n d s

A total of sixty eight NGOs were victimized in eighty eight separate AOG attacks this year (above), 14% down from the

previous year. 51 one these were rated as ‘serious’ including abductions and kinetic attacks. The rate of attacks per

month fluctuates significantly and with no obvious correlation to the rate of general conflict. A long term downward

trend remains visible, between the peaks of 2008 and 2010 for example, likely reflecting incremental changes in NGO

behavior rather than AOG intent or changes in demographics. The data still solidly supports the conclusion that NGO’s

are not broadly or routinely targeted by AOG otherwise this would be visible in this data set. Exposure to crime (below)

remains low, an additional 38 incidents, and has been dropping over time. Armed robbery is the main concern.

0

5

10

15

20

25

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to AOG per month, 2006 ‐ 2010(Includes all types of event such as kinetic, non‐kinetic, threats and abductions)

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

ANSO: NGO security incidents attributed to criminals per month, 2006‐2010(Includes all types of event kinetic and non‐kinetic)


2 . 2 C a t e g o r y o f N G O I n c i d e n t s 2 0 1 0

Abduction was the most com‐

mon form of AOG attack on

NGOs this year (right, 30

cases) accounting for 35% of

the total, significantly up from

21% of the total in the fourth

quarter of 2009. To date, all 74

victims have been released.

Small arms fire events (9

cases), mostly in the form of

roadside ambushes, also

dropped as a percentage,

down to 11% from 19% in

2009 but, as this category of

attack accounted for 12 NGO

fatalities, it remains a serious threat. The murder of 10 NGO staff in one incident in Badakshan is included

in this count. Four of the nine roadside ambushes targeted demining NGOs. IEDs (7%) continued to plague

NGO road movement with six strikes occurring, killing 10, with four of these being assessed as deliberate

and two accidental. Three of the deliberate IED strikes targeted demining NGOs. In 2009, IEDs made up 8%

of the total attack profile. Lesser events, like threats (15%) via phone or in person, theft of vehicles or sup‐

plies (11%) and the ransacking/burning of remote offices or project sites (12%) made up the remainder of

the annual profile. The data confirms what was laid out in greater detail in Q.3, that serious attacks on

NGOs by AOG are in decline. See page nine for discussion on motivations.

Armed robbery (10 cases) re‐

mained the most prominent

form of crime against NGO

(right) at 29% of the total but is

also down from 52% of the to‐

tal (25 cases) of 2009. Of this

year’s cases, seven occurred at

remote facilities and just three

on the road. An additional four

robberies were attempted but

failed. Criminal homicide (SAF)

remained a concern with three

killed and six injured in armed

attacks by criminals.

7%4%

11%

35%

15%

12%

11%5%

ANSO: Composition of AOG attacks on NGO, full 2010

IED

Rocket/Mortar

SAF/RPG

Abduction (cases)

Threats/Intimidations

Facility Arson/Ransack

Theft Vehilce/Supplies

Illegal Check Post

6%

26%

6%

9%24%

29%

ANSO: Composition of criminal attacks on NGO, full 2010

Handgrenade

SAF

Arson

Abduction (cases)

Threat/Intimidation

Armed Robbery


2 . 3 N G O S e r i o u s I n c i d e n t M a p 2 0 1 0

The location of kinetic attacks against NGOs (see map) does not demonstrate any particular geographic concentration or trend. Attacks occurred in prov‐inces with dramatically different underlying levels of conflict (from safe to highly insecure) and with both high and low lev‐els of AOG presence. The un‐known variable is the population density of NGOs themselves. The number of people killed per attack type (right) shows that while deliberate targeting still accounted for the majority of deaths, collateral fatalities are a growing cause for concern.

HELMAND NIMROZ

KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL PAKTIKA

GHAZNI

FARAH

HERAT

BADGHIS

GHORDAYKUNDI

BAMYAN

FARYAB

KHOST

BADAKSHAN

BALKH JAWZJAN KUNDUZ

SAMANGAN

BAGHLAN

WARDAK

KABUL

PARWAN

NANGAHAR

IED Strike

SAF/RPG

ANSO: Location of Significant Attacks Against NGO @ Q.4 2010

0 2 4 6 8 10

Pressure Plate IED (accidental)

Collateral (AOG fire)

Civilian Homocide

Gunfire on Deminer

Collateral (IMF fire)

Command Wire IED (accidental)

IED on Deminer

Targeted Killing

1

1

2

2

2

2

7

10

ANSO: NGO staff killed per cause, countrywide, 2010


2 . 4 N G O A b d u c t i o n M a p 2 0 1 0

While Q.3 data indicated that abductions would sky

‐rocket in 2010, the last quarter rates slowed suffi‐

ciently to being the annual total in line with last

year, 74 cases compared to 69 in 2009. Still abduc‐

tion remained a major concern effecting many or‐

ganizations. The general profile remained consis‐

tent throughout the year with little violence dis‐

played in most cases, the average detention period

falling to just 3 days (down from 6 weeks in 2007)

and all victims being released unharmed. The soft

nature of most cases would suggest they are better

referred to as ’illegal detentions’ conducted for the purpose of information gathering rather than abductions for

political advantage. We expect ‘detention/abduction’ to remain a prominent risk for NGOs going in to 2011, as

AOG seek to control and understand new battle spaces, but, given the lack of violence this year, perhaps one that

could be reinterpreted as offering opportunities to open dialogue and encourage acceptance.

HELMAND NIMROZ

KANDAHAR

URUZGAN

ZABUL

PAKTIKA

GHAZNI

FARAH

HERAT

BADGHIS

GHOR

DAYKUNDI

BAMYAN

FARYAB

KHOST

BADAKSHAN

BALKH JAWZJAN

SAR‐E‐PUL

KUNDUZ

TAKHAR

SAMANGANBAGHLAN

WARDAKKABUL

PARWAN

NANGAHAR

LAGHMAN

KAPISA

ANSO: NGO Staff Abducted Per Province , full 2010

17

107

6 6

7

5

4

6

2 1

2

1

Province # NGO Staff Abducted in 2010

Faryab 17

Wardak 10

Herat 7

Kabul 7

Ghor 6

Baghlan 6

Sar‐i‐Pul 6

Kunar 5

Kandahar 4

Ghazni 2

Balkh 2

Takhar 1

Kunduz 1

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

2008 2009 2010

51

6974

ANSO: NGO Staff Abducted Per Year, 2008‐2010


2 . 5 M o t i v a t i o n s

While not an area that lends itself to precise analysis, the question of AOG motivations in attacking NGOs needs unpacking. We assess that all serious incidents this year, meaning the 21 cases of kinetic attack plus 30 cases of abduction, have fallen in to one of the following four categories:

1.Information Gathering: We asses that at least 64% of serious incidents, including all of the AOG related abduc‐tions, have been committed for the purpose of systemic information gath‐ering, or in NGO parlance ’actor map‐ping’. This explains why 100% of victims have been released without harm and often within 48hrs. In this light, it would be more accurate to refer to most events as ‘investigative detentions’ rather than abductions and to see them as the IEA version of, albeit involun‐tary, civil‐military coordination offering an opportunity to open dialogue.

2. Accident/Collateral: We estimate that up to 12% of serious incidents (six of the 51 cases reviewed here) are sim‐ply accidents resulting from the volatile and fluid environment. Within this category you can find mortars and rock‐ets, fired by IMF or AOG, that fall short and hit NGO offices, command wire IEDs that mistake a target and pressure plate IEDs that simply blow up the first person that drives over them. All accidents illustrate the importance of avoiding combatants, both in terms of perception and location, even though some events would not have been mitigated by any measures. Increased IMF & AOG offensives have created more ambient violence.

3.Deliberate and Hostile: Without doubt the purpose of some attacks is precisely what it seems to be, to kill or in‐jure NGO staff. Of the 51 cases under review here we assess that eight (14%) fall in to this worst of categories but, more alarmingly, seven of these targeted demining organizations. This reflects a clear and direct opposition to the work of deminers. The eighth case involved the murder of ten NGO staff in Badakshan by a non‐local armed fac‐tion. In this case religious extremism, expressed as a desire to kill non‐Muslims, was assessed as an underlying cause essentially divorcing the murders from the surrounding political context. The common thread in all cases is that the NGO staff are killed for their direct characteristics with the attack being an end it its own right.

4.Influencing Populations: Also known as ‘effects based operations’ (or EBO), these are the types of attacks where the NGO is not targeted for its own sake but rather acts as a means through which to influence the surrounding population. Essentially the inverse of winning hearts and minds. We estimate that just 10% of the attacks (5 cases) fall in to this category with most of these being non‐fatal attacks on schools or health care facilities where the pur‐pose was to punish the community (by denying access) for supporting ‘un‐Islamic’ activities and drive them to‐wards a condition more favorable to AOG presence. The fact that the schools were run by NGOs was irrelevant, that they offered free education to young women was not.

In conclusion we suggest that deliberate attacks on NGOs, for who they are and what they do, are actually ex‐tremely rare, with the notable exception of deminers. However, even benign scrutiny by AOG, whether deliberate or mistaken, can easily leave an NGO bloodied or worse.

12%

14%

10%64%

ANSO: Assessed motivation of AOG attacks on NGOs

Accident/Collateral Deliberate & Hostile Seeking Influence Intel Gathering


Part 3.Part 3.

State of the ConflictState of the Conflict


3 . 1 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k — C o u n t r y w i d e

Consistent with the five year trend (above) attacks by armed opposition groups continue to rise. This year they were

64% higher than 2009, the highest inter‐annual growth rate we have recorded (see inset graph above). If averaged,

the total of 12,244 armed operations (mostly small arms ambushes, below right) represents roughly 33 attacks per

day, every single day of the year. In September this rate jumped to more than 50 attacks per day, or 1,541 opera‐

tions, as they ramped up their efforts to disrupt parliamentary elections that month. The year followed a familiar pat‐

ter with Jan/Feb starting slow, as AOG remobilize from the winter retreat, followed by seven solid months of expan‐

sion and a rapid de‐escalation back to December. The final month closing out at 47% higher than December 2009.

Although provincial level data (p.12) shows that each province per‐

formed differently, taking the national data as a whole we consider

this indisputable evidence that conditions are deteriorating. If

losses are taken in one area they are simply compensated for in an‐

other as has been the dynamic since this conflict started.

More so than in previous years, information of this nature is sharply

divergent from IMF ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting

improvements. We encourage NGO’s to recognize that, no matter

how authoritative the source of any such claim, messages of this na‐

ture are solely intended to influence American and European public

opinion, ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an

accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work here.

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

JAN

FEB

MAR

APR

MAY

JUN

JUL

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

335

405

634

1093

533

1541

786

ANSO KEY DATA: Monthly Attacks by Armed Opposition Groups, 2006 to 2010(Significant kinetic attacks only, does not include criminal activity. Includes all AOG cooperating under the IEA umbrella (HiG, LeT, HQN, TTP, IMU etc) )

48%53%

41%

64%

2006‐2007 2007‐2008 2008‐2009 2009‐2010

ANSO: Annual growth rate in AOG attacks, 2006‐2010

48%53%

41%

64%

2006‐2007 2007‐2008 2008‐2009 2009‐2010

ANSO: Annual growth rate in AOG attacks, 2006‐2010

Suicide Attacks1%

Close Range54%

Indirect Fire45%

ANSO: Composition of AOG attacks, 2010


3 . 2 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k s — P e r P r o v i n c e

PROVINCE 2009 2010 % ChangeSAR‐E PUL 23 81 252%

GHAZNI 461 1540 234%

PAKTYA 180 491 173%

PAKTIKA 379 897 137%

HELMAND 620 1387 124%

BAGHLAN 101 222 120%

TAKHAR 65 140 115%

FARYAB 137 293 114%

SAMANGAN 10 21 110%

BALKH 88 182 107%

KHOST 478 906 90%

URUZGAN 196 356 82%

NANGARHAR 295 504 71%

PARWAN 52 83 60%

FARAH 162 256 58%

JAWZJAN 48 74 54%

BADGHIS 239 356 49%

LOGAR 188 263 40%

ZABUL 259 353 36%

LAGHMAN 149 195 31%

WARDAK 414 511 23%

KUNDUZ 292 355 22%

DAYKUNDI 19 23 21%

KANDAHAR 970 1162 20%

HERAT 227 254 12%

KUNAR 1318 1457 11%

KAPISA 116 126 9%

GHOR 83 84 1%

KABUL 177 146 ‐18%

BADAKHSHAN 43 35 ‐19%

NIMROZ 135 108 ‐20%

NURISTAN 85 64 ‐25%

BAMYAN 22 4 ‐82%

ABOVE AVER

AGE GROWTH

AVER

AGE GROWTH

DECLINE

ANSO: AOG Attacks Per Province, 2009 to 2010 comparison and % of change.

This table provides raw AOG attack rate data per province for 2009 and 2010, plus the percentage growth

rate, per province. The average referred to is the 64% overall growth rate countrywide. Notable is that of the

10 provinces in RC‐North six of them saw above average growth from 107%‐252%. As a bloc, the provinces of

P2K (Paktya, Paktika & Khost) plus Ghazni saw the sharpest deterioration with an average 158% increase of

attacks across all four. Only five provinces saw less violence than last year with one being the capitol.


3 . 3 A O G I n i t i a t e d A t t a c k s — I n s e c u r i t y R a t i n g

The most important and notable trend of the year was the AOG offensive in the North which concen‐

trated on disrupting main supply routes, killing Government personnel and exploiting ethnic and political

tensions to obtain a foothold. The offensive was initiated in early February from strongholds in Dahana‐i‐

Ghuri and Baghlan‐i‐Jadid but soon spread to encompass large areas of Kunduz, Takhar and even Badak‐

shan. Today Kunduz district is the focus of the most sustained attacks. On the western flank, AOG devel‐

oped an impressive campaign in Faryab which by now has established resilient pockets in Jawzjan and Sar

‐E Pul. In the East Paktya, Paktika & Khost dramatically destabilized with two of the three seeing triple

digit growth rates. The reported relocation of the Haqqani headquarters from Waziristan to Kurram no

doubt supporting this trend. Ghazni surprised by surpassing Helmand, Kandahar and Kunar in attack

rates, the majority of which occurred in just two districts Andar and Ghazni. This will be critically con‐

tested terrain in 2011. No surprises in the South as AOG put up a respectable resistance to the enhanced

US pressure, doubling the attack rate in Helmand although mostly in the form of victim operated IEDs. In

the West displaced AOG turned up in Farah and Ghor bringing instability, particularly to Pasaband and

Taywara in the latter province. Going in to 2011, the AOG position looks strong.

HELMAND 1387NIMROZ 108

KANDAHAR 1162

URUZGAN 356

ZABUL 353

PAKTIKA 897

GHAZNI 1540

FARAH 256

HERAT 254

BADGHIS 356

GHOR 84

DAYKUNDI 23

BAMYAN 4

FARYAB 293

KHOST 906

BADAKSHAN 35

BALKH 182 JAWZJAN 74

SAR‐E‐PUL 81

KUNDUZ 355 TAKHAR

140

SAMANGAN 21 BAGHLAN 222

WARDAK 511KABUL 146

PARWAN 83

NANGAHAR 504

LAGHMAN 195

KAPISA 126

ANSO: Provincial Insecurity Rating, December 2010(Rating based on analytical assessment and not just incident rate. Total AOG

attacks for 2010 indicated in map)

Extremely Insecure

Highly Insecure

Moderately Insecure

Deteriorating

Low Insecurity


3 . 4 C o n f l i c t R e l a t e d F a t a l i t i e s

Conflict related civilian fatalities grew by 18% this year

(above left), to a total of 2,428 persons killed, with 17% caused by IMF and 83% caused by AOG. The lead‐

ing cause of death was roadside IED strikes (below) with 820 people dying this way, 58% of them in the

Southern provinces. This reflects the increased volume of ‘pressure plate’ (VOIED) devices utilized as AOG

sought stand‐off strike capability against overwhelming IMF numbers. The IMF have succeeded in reducing

both the volume and percentage of fatalities caused by them, although IMF airstrikes killed a comparable

number to AOG suicide attacks. Within the security forces*, the ANP still account for the majority of fatali‐

ties (above right) with a roughly 5:1 ratio against ANA/IMF deaths. (*ANSO’s ANSF/IMF fatality figures indicative only)

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

2008 2009 2010

465 464 401

12901590

2027

ANSO: Conflict related civilian fatalities, by AOG/MF, 2008‐2010

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

2009 2010

15471612

ANSO: ANA, ANP, IMF fatalities, 2009 ‐2010

IMF

ANP

ANA

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900

Roadside IED (AOG)

Ground Op (AOG)

Suicide Attacks (AOG)

Airstrike (IMF)

Ground Op (IMF)

Indirect Fire (AOG)

EOF (IMF)

820

687

230

213

149

98

39

ANSO: Leading causes of civilian collateral fatality, 2010


REPORT ENDS

For fur ther informat ion

[email protected]

© ANSO, January 2011

This document will be stored in the public domain at www.afgnso.org

It may be reproduced, stored or transmitted without permission for non-commercial purposes only and with

written credit to ANSO. Where it is transmitted elec-tronically a link should be provided to ANSO website

www.afgnso.org

Acronyms:

IEA - Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (Taliban)

AOG- Armed Opposition Groups (specifically Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA, Taliban); Haqqani Network (HQN) and Hezb-i-Islami Hekmatyar (HiH/HiG), Lashghar-e-Taihba (LeT)

IMF - International Military Forces (specifically ISAF, USFOR-A, PRTs and SOF)

ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces (mostly Police & Army)

IED - Improvised Explosive Device (home made bomb)

IDF—Indirect Fire (rockets, mortars)

CAS - Close Air Support (airstrike)

EOF - Escalation of Force (shooting a vehicle at a check post that fails to stop)

SAF - Small Arms Fire (from a machine gun such as AK47)

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