★Notes!★File by Rohan Singh – Berkeley Preparatory SchoolRKS 2016

AffThe aff is pretty fun, just because its about space. There are three basic advantages: space wars, debris, and NASA. China and Russia have both called for these limits before, but it was hard to define what an ASAT is due to dual-use capabilities. The plan text is that the US should seek to talk with China about limiting anti-satellite weaponry (ASATs). This would probably entail defining ASAT’s as well as just generating a dialogue about space weapons and intentions, allowing for more restrictions in the future.The way the space wars advantage works is that right now China, the US, and Russia all have large numbers of satellites in space, but they also have anti-satellite weaponry. These pose a risk because each actor builds up more weapons to target space creating a security dilemma. In the United States, space technology is vital to our military interests – it’s how we use GPS to move troops, guide missiles, and communicate. The way Chinese military strategy works is that instead of building defensive measures, they build things like ASATs to deter war, or in the event of war to severely hamper their opponent asymmetrically. The problem with this is that if China thinks another country is being aggressive, in order to get the most out of their capabilities, they have to strike pre-emptively. This would probably be seen as an act of war and escalate quickly. Thus, getting rid of ASAT’s prevents this whole conflict. This is probably the strongest advantage, because it is simple. Right now, there’s a risk ASAT’s will be used and escalate. The plan gets rid of the weapons so that the conflict can’t happen. The second advantage is about space debris. Since countries like the US, China, and Russia have tested a ton of rockets and put a bunch of satellites in space, there’s a ton of debris floating around. This can be caused by satellites simply going out of service when their lifespan runs out – it’s too expensive to waste the time getting rid of them, so they just stay in orbit. In addition, the testing or use of ASATs produces thousands of pieces of debris. A lot of cards are based on when the Chines originally tested their ASAT capabilities and produced 3000 pieces of debris. That’s bad because debris hurtles through the Earth’s orbit at thousands of miles per hour, so that even a tiny remnant of a satellite could pulverize a functioning satellite. A key issue I that the plan doesn’t actually remove debris, it just buys time until we can start to remove debris. Even in the world where we do remove debris, it isn’t happening fast enough while a single ASAT test could produce a ton of debris and potentially trigger Kessler’s syndrome (see the second scenario explanation).The first scenario is that the US keeps a number of its military satellites in Low Earth Orbit, (LEO) which is also where most of the debris flies. This makes the chance of damage very likely. The problem is, we can’t track the hundreds of thousands of pieces in orbit, companies and countries only track the big ones that are easy to spot – big being a few inches long. Even tiny

pieces of paint can destroy a satellite, so the smallest of pieces could be catastrophic. Since we aren’t tracking all of these pieces it could lead the US to think they were attacked and start a war. This is probably not a great 2AR strat because the impact scenario is very similar to the first advantage where war will result from miscalculation. The second scenario relies on an idea called Kessler’s Syndrome. Basically all satellites in space run the risk of being blown to pieces. As seen in 2007 during China’s ASAT test, blowing up a satellite produces more debris. Kessler said that at some point, there would be enough debris that when one satellite explodes, it produces more debris that kills even more satellites, and triggers a cascade of all the satellites being destroyed, filling the Earth’s orbit with a huge amount of debris. That makes space exploration and colonization impossible because then we can no longer escape the Earth’s orbit because rockets will have to fly through a maelstrom of shrapnel flying thousands of miles per hour. The third advantage is that NASA is currently having its budget cut. This means NASA will be able to do less and less as it receives less money. The plan reverses that because getting rid of ASAT’s means that the money that was going to space weaponry will be able to go to space science. NASA does a lot of good stuff and there are a ton of impact scenarios out there. The one’s in this file are that continued space research is good for the economy (which isn’t that great) and that NASA also does a lot of climate research which is important for developing models to prevent global warming. There aren’t many extensions for this advantage, so I would stick with the first advantage. There’s also a small deterrence add-on, which says that because the US is behind on its ASAT capabilities, while China is pursuing them as a means of asymmetric warfare, it is actually in the United States’ interest to get rid of ASAT’s, so that the US will remain the superior military force. To update the aff, I recommend figuring out which countries are pursuing ASAT’s and if they have tested them. Also figure out what technology and projects are being used to remove debris in the status quo. Both sides should find updates for whether NASA’s budget is increasing or decreasing.

NegI’d say the best neg option against this aff is the K, because the aff links to cap, colonialism, and probably a lot more. In addition, the counterplans are okay – the NASA counterplan really only solves the NASA advantage, while the Resilience counterplan resolves most of the aff except the NASA advantage.The NASA CP passes a law that restructures NASA’s bureaucracy to make it more efficient – the 1NC solvency advocate highlights the main points. That makes NASA more efficient with their budget so that they can continue to do science and stuff. The resiliency counterplan focuses on investing in military research so that we can build a better network of satellites that are resistant to attacks and debris. This means that it solves the first two contentions because our satellites are no longer vulnerable. The net benefits to both counterplans are pretty much any DA that involves China, since both of the CP’s are internal fixes that don’t require international interaction. Stuff like appeasement, elections, and the Indi DA work just fine. There’s an alliance DA. It says that right now China is creating an alliance with Russia, but it would prefer to work with the US. The plan causes China to pivot to the US, preventing the Russia-China strategic alliance, specifically over the One Belt One Road project and Russia’s integration of the Eurasian economy. Eurasian integration is key Turkey-Russia relations. That solves terrorism. I would not recommend reading this when you can read other DA’s. When you are updating this file, you should look for more links to K’s and DA’s.

ASATs 1AC

PLANPlan: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its diplomatic engagement with the People’s Republic of China over the limitation of the use of anti-satellite weaponry.

Contention One is Star Wars An ASAT arms race is brewing between the US and China, a treaty is key to solve. Smith 8 – Andrew K. Smith, 4-12-2008 (“The Next Space Race: Impact of Anti-Satellite Weapons on International Relations and Peaceful Space Programs,” American Public University System, Available Online at: https://www.apus.edu/content/dam/online-library/student-papers/smith-2008.pdf, Accessed: 6/27/2016, RJS) ASAT weapons will reduce international cooperation by creating a hostile and competitive environment between nation s attempting to achieve sole freedom from attack. Any attempts by a nation to accelerate anti-satellite offensive or defensive capability will be met by other nations . Regional conflicts could conceivably result from the perceived threat of anti-satellite employment. Prior to the U.S. engaging US 193, Russia and China both proposed talks to ban arms in space and the threat of force against space objects. The same movement towards peace talks evident regarding anti-ballistic missile defenses on former Soviet property, as the prospect of allowing a rival nation to achieve exclusive freedom from attack is unacceptable to any nation. This fact will provide significant drive to the arms race since defensive systems are still in their infancy, satellites are extremely fragile, and current policy of the China and the U.S. both require dominance of space. The current policies of the U.S. and China will be a major factor in expediting proliferation of space weapons. The current U.S. policy on space authorized 31 August 2006 was heavily influenced by the U.S. Air Force’s Offensive Counterspace Operations Doctrine (Krepon and Katz-Hyman 2005, 324). This doctrine treated space as a venue much like the skies over the Earth to be used by the U.S. to protect allies and attack enemies. The current policy threatens to “deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to U.S. national interests,” (U.S. President 2006, 2) and sends a message to the rest of the world that space is not off-limits in war, and will be used at any and all phases of a conflict in the best interests of the U.S. China’s response came only five months later with the destruction of Feng Yun 1-C, but can be further clarified by Bao Shixiu, senior fellow at the Academy of Military Studies of the Chinese PLA: China cannot accept the monopolization of outer space by another country. For that reason, the U.S. administration’s penchant for “exceptionalism” in space policy poses a serious threat to China both in terms of jeopardizing its national defense as well as obstructing its justified right to exploit space for civilian and commercial purposes. (Shixiu 2007, 4-5) His comments make clear that neither China nor the United States can accept a rival nation’s space policy that demands exclusive freedom of action . He further explains that any nation’s activities in space will never be exclusively peaceful due to the preponderance of dual-use satellite

technology and that “ without some kind of mutual understanding on controlling arms in space, suspicion will dominate relations between China and the United States ” (Shixiu 2007, 5). The ultimate outcome of this inherent suspicion will be reduced international cooperation between two of the most prominent space-faring nations. As long as U.S. and Chinese policy remain unchecked by a treaty clearly outlining legitimacy of war in space, escalation in anti-satellite weapons will continue.ASATs could lead to a space security dilemma. Grego and Wright 10 - Laura Grego, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program Dr. Laura Grego focuses on the technology and security implications of national missile defense and of space security. She is the author or co-author of more than 20 peer-reviewed, published papers on a range of topics. Since joining UCS in September 2002, she has been cited by Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New Scientist, New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today, and has appeared on Fox News, the Discovery Channel and NPR. She also has testified before Congress and addressed the United Nations Conference on Disarmament on space security issues. Before joining UCS, Grego was a postdoctoral researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. She earned a doctorate degree in experimental physics at the California Institute of Technology and a bachelor of science degree in physics and astronomy at the University of Michigan, and David Wright, Co-Director, Global Security Program David Wright is a nationally known expert on the technical aspects of nuclear weapons policy, missile defense systems, missile proliferation, and space weapons. He has authored numerous articles and reports on arms control and international security, including Toward True Security: Transforming U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Securing the Skies: Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space, and The Physics of Space Security. Since 1990, he has been a primary organizer of the International Summer Symposiums on Science and World Affairs, which foster cooperation among scientists around the world working on arms control and security issues. In 2001, he was a co-recipient of the American Physical Society’s Joseph A. Burton Forum Award for his arms control research and his work with international scientists. Before joining UCS in 1992, Dr. Wright was a senior research analyst with the Federation of American Scientists and served as an SSRC-MacArthur fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He received his doctorate degree in physics from Cornell University in 1983 and worked as a research physicist from 1983 to 1988.November 2010 (“Securing the Skies Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space,” Union of Concerned Scientists, Available Online at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf, Accessed 7-4-2016, RJS)Risks Are Growing The growing population of satellites and resultant accumulation of debris, as well as the greater importance of satellites, are leading to greater risks. First, the crowding of space increasingly poses collision hazards. The high speeds of objects in orbit render debris even the size of a marble capable of damaging or destroying a satellite. Three active satellites are known to have been hit by debris in the past 15 years, and it is estimated that under current conditions a collision between an active satellite and a piece of debris larger than a marble will occur every two to three years (Wright 2009). The possibility of unintentional interference between satellites—not just physical collisions between satellites but also electromagnetic interference—is also increasing, given that the crowding of space has not been accompanied by a commensurate improvement in coordination or “space traffic management.” While satellite positions and frequencies in the distant geostationary orbit (GEO) are managed by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU),4 no comparable coordination effort exists in closer orbits, even though collisions at these lower altitudes would be at higher speeds and pose greater debris risks. Second, the innate vulnerability and growing

value of satellites may render them increasingly attractive targets in a conflict. Satellites are susceptible to deliberate attack because they follow predictable orbits, have limited protections, are widely visible from the ground, and represent a long-term loss of capability —at present, repair is unlikely and replacement is costly and time-consuming. And with time, more countries will acquire the technical abilities to attack and interfere with satellites . This is particularly likely in that a number of emerging technologies, such as hit-to-kill missile defense interceptors and a spacecraft’s ability to rendezvous with another without its cooperation, are “dual-use”—applicable to peaceful and aggressive uses alike. While a satellite owner would certainly protest the deliberate or careless interference with its asset, satellites do not currently have clearly elaborated legal protections nor is there a systematic process for addressing grievances. Third, threats to satellites can amplify the risks of other undesirable outcomes, such as the creation or escalation of terrestrial crises. The development of ASAT capabilities by one country could create enough suspicion and tension to spur the development of ASAT weapons by others . Because so much of satellite and space- launch technology is dual-use, development of space systems would increase the chances of dangerous misinterpretations , especially in the absence of clearly stated policies and meaningful communication between countries. Moreover, if ASAT weapons are being developed and tested, the loss of an important satellite during a time of political tension could be interpreted—rightly or wrongly—as an attack. Quickly determining the reason for the satellite’s disruption might be difficult or impossible, and this incomplete information together with the absence of reliable channels for communication between countries that are not close allies could exacerbate the crisis even further, possibly leading to its escalation . Recent “war game” conflict simulations confirm that such a satellite loss could have very serious consequences.6Chinese strategy utilizes offensive measures defensively, making a pre-emptive strike possible. Pollpeter et. al 15 – Kevin Pollpeter, is a senior research analyst at Defense Group, Inc. (DGI), in Washington, DC. From 2013 to 2015, Pollpeter was deputy director of IGCC’s project on the Study of Innovation and Technology in China (SITC). Prior to working at IGCC, Pollpeter was the deputy director of the East Asia program at DGI, where he managed a group of more than 20 China analysts. Before DGI, he was a researcher at RAND. He is widely published on China national security issues, with a focus on China’s space program and information warfare issues. A Chinese linguist, he holds an MA in international policy studies from the Monterey Institute of International Studies. Eric Anderson, is a national security consultant. As a long-standing member of the U.S. intelligence community, he has written over 600 articles for the National Intelligence Council, International Security Advisory Board and the Department of Defense. In addition, he is a leading scholar on the rise of sovereign wealth funds. His book, Take the Money and Run: Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Demise of American Prosperity was published in March 2009. His focus on events in Asia is reflected in a forthcoming text, China Restored: The Middle Kingdom Looks Forward to 2020. Prior to assuming his current position, Mr. Anderson served as a senior intelligence officer at the Defense Intelligence Agency. In addition, he has been a senior intelligence analyst for the Multi National Forces-Iraq in Baghdad and at the U.S. Pacific Command in Hawaii. From 1990-2000, Mr. Anderson was an active duty intelligence officer in the United States Air Force—with assignments in Japan, Korea and Saudi Arabia. He remains on duty as an Air Force reserve officer, teaching at the National Defense Intelligence College. He has also taught for the University of Missouri, University of Maryland, and the Air Force Academy. Mr. Anderson has a PhD in political science from the University of Missouri, a MA from Bowling Green State University in Ohio, and a BA from Illinois Wesleyan University. A long-time Harley rider, Mr. Anderson claims to have put over 200,000 miles on motorcycles during the last 15 years. Jordan Wilson, currently works as a Research Fellow in the Security and Foreign Affairs division at the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, where he writes on issues relating to China’s military development and science and technology progress and their implications for U.S. policy. Prior to joining the Commission, Wilson worked at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation from 2013-2014 as a research assistant with the Study of Innovation and Technology in China

(SITC) project. There, his responsibilities included research, analysis, and writing work for projects on the development of China’s high performance computing industry, the nature and influence of China’s defense industry, the role of China’s science and engineering leaders in defense science and technology, and the Institute’s 2013 Defense Transparency Index. Wilson completed a Master’s degree in Pacific International Affairs from the School of International Relations and Pacific Studies (IR/PS) at the University of California, San Diego in 2013, focusing on international politics and China in particular and also studying Mandarin Chinese. His experience also includes a 2011 internship at United States Southern Command in Doral, FL, and a six-month teaching position in Taiwan from 2008-2009. He has a Bachelor’s degree in Business Administration from Thomas Edison State College in Trenton, NJ. Fan Yang, 5-2-2015 (“CHINA DREAM, SPACE DREAM: CHINA'S PROGRESS IN SPACE TECHNOLOGIES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES,” U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Available Online at http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/China%20Dream%20Space%20Dream_Report.pdf, Accessed 6-22-2016, RJS)Chinese Military Concept of Operations A second factor that affects PLA space operations is its concept of operations. Chinese writings place a heavy emphasis on gaining the initiative at the outset of a conflict , including during the U.S. military’s deployment stage. The PLA , like most militaries, would prefer to fight a “quick war with a quick resolution” (速战速决). Based on the their study of war since the 1982 Falklands War, PLA analysts assess that the relatively quick conclusion of modern wars places an emphasis on seizing the initiative at the outset of a campaign. Looking at the 1991 Gulf War, and the initial invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, Chinese military analysts assess that the PLA cannot allow the U.S. military to become fully prepared lest they cede victory. In carrying out this concept of operations, the Chinese government states that its national defense policy is “purely defensive in nature ” and that it “places the protection of national sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, safeguarding of the interests of national development, and the interests of the Chinese people above all else.” 47 In doing so, China follows a military strategy of active defense (积极防 御), which was been described by Mao Zedong as “offensive defense or defense through decisive engagements…for the purpose of counter-attacking and taking the offensive.” 48 At face value, an adherence to a defensive national defense policy would seem to be counter to the goal of fighting a quick war with a quick resolution and the need to take the initiative at the beginning of an operation. In fact, there is little operational difference between China’s active defense strategy and an offensive military strategy. Chinese analysts assert that, within the context of protecting China’s national interests, the full range of offensive actions are possible. As a result, active defense is best thought of as a politically defensive but operationally offensive strategy in which China will maintain a rhetorically defensive posture up until the time that war appears imminent. Thus, any U.S. military support or deployment that is deemed a precursor to U.S. action could be grounds for a preemptive strike. In this case, the United States would be considered to have taken a “first shot” at the strategic level that would allow China to conduct first strikes at the operational and tactical levels. Chinese thinking on active defense can be seen in writings on space operations. A 2013 textbook on space operations, for example, argues that China’s space strategy is defensive in nature and thus it will “do all it can at the strategic level to avoid firing the first shot” (emphasis added).49 In other places, however, the authors recommend conducting first strikes at the operational and tactical levels, writing that one should “strive to

attack first at the campaign and tactical levels in order to maintain the space battlefield initiative” 50 and argue that fighting a quick war with a quick resolution is one of the “special characteristics of space operations” and that a military should “conceal the concentration of its forces and make a decisive large-scale first strike.” 51Space attacks quickly escalate to nuclear (☢) use on Earth, drawing in global powers. Satellites key to solving every other war impact. Broder 16 — Jonathan Broder, writes about defense and foreign policy for Newsweek from Washington. He's been covering national security issues for more than two decades, including 12 years as a writer and senior editor at Congressional Quarterly. Before moving to Washington, Broder spent 20 years as an award-winning foreign correspondent in the Middle East, South Asia, China and East Asia for the Chicago Tribune and the Associated Press. Broder’s writing also has appeared in The New York Times Magazine, The Washington Post and Smithsonian magazine. He's a frequent commentator on foreign affairs for NPR and Al Arabiya TV. 5-4-2016 ("Why the next Pearl Harbor could happen in space," Newsweek, 5-4-2016, Available Online at http://www.newsweek.com/2016/05/13/china-us-space-wars-455284.html, Accessed 6-25-2016, RJS)In their techno-thriller Ghost Fleet, authors Peter Singer and August Cole describe a cataclysmic world war that begins with a Chinese sneak attack against the U.S. in space. First, soldiers at China’s Cyber Command Headquarters in Shanghai hack into the Pentagon’s network of GPS satellites and scramble their signals. The cyberattack sows chaos among U.S. forces, which can no longer navigate accurately, track targets or hit them with precision munitions.Then, from a space station orbiting 200 miles above Earth, Chinese astronauts train a laser gun on three dozen U.S. satellites the military relies upon for virtually all of its communications and critical surveillance. By the time the Chinese are done, America’s technological edge on this new, 21st-century battlefield has been reduced to the predigital levels of World War II.Such scenarios may read like science fiction, but the threat of what military experts call a “space Pearl Harbor ”—a sneak attack on U.S. satellites that cripples American forces before a shot has been fired— has Pentagon planners seriously worried . Space is the ultimate high ground for today's warriors, and no military has dominated those strategic heights as successfully as America's . But its constellations of GPS, surveillance and communications satellites are largely undefended , a vulnerability that hasn’t escaped notice in China and Russia. The result: a new three-way space race —the first since the end of the Cold War, and one that now includes the development of weapons to knock out the other side’s space assets . Try Newsweek for only $1.25 per week “The U.S., China, Russia are all working on not just using space but also taking it away from the other side,” Singer, a military strategist at the New America Foundation, a Washington, D.C., think tank, tells Newsweek.Chinese President Xi Jinping paid a high-profile visit last month to air

force headquarters in Beijing, where he ordered his generals to sharpen the country’s defensive and offensive capabilities in space in preparation for what many Chinese military analysts believe is an inevitable war in space with the U.S. Like the U.S. and Russia, China has sent astronauts into space and landed a spacecraft on the moon, and it is developing its own space station. The Pentagon also notes that Beijing continues to ramp up its military capabilities in space, launching 142 satellites to provide intelligence, navigation, communications and weather forecasting that can “limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries during times of crisis or conflict.”A war in space would have staggering implications. If conflict were to erupt, say, over China’s territorial claims to the South China Sea or Russia’s aggression in Eastern Europe, America’s military satellites would n’t be the only space assets at risk . Fighting would also likely cripple the civilian satellites that control so much of modern life, from cellphone networks to ATMs and personal GPS units. And although such a conflict might start in space , experts say it could easily turn into full-scale war on Earth . “If war does extend into space someday—and I hope it never does— the first [nuclear] response is not going to be in space,” warns General John Hyten, head of the U.S. Air Force Space Command.This year, the Pentagon will spend $2 billion on measures to counter threats to its national security satellites. That amount is expected to soar as part of the $22 billion set aside to maintain U.S. superiority in space in 2017. Senior U.S. officials explain such large investments reflect the Pentagon’s recognition of a major shift in U.S., Chinese and Russian capabilities. For the first 25 years after the Cold War’s end, they note, America’s conventional forces were unmatched, thanks largely to the advantages their satellites gave them on the battlefield. Making their debut in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, satellites have guided American precision munitions, provided U.S. commanders with worldwide communications and helped American forces navigate the globe ever since.But over the past 15 years , a period in which U.S. defense dollars were diverted to pay for the wars in the Middle East, China and Russia have developed advanced weapons that “challenge our advantages ...especially in cyber, electronic warfare and space,” says Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work. “As a result, our margin of technological superiority is slowly eroding.”Today, Beijing and Moscow can no longer be ignored. With their ability to deny, disrupt and degrade America’s hard-to-defend satellites, warns Lieutenant General David Buck, commander of the 14th Air Force, “there isn’t a single aspect of our space architecture that isn’t at risk.”Missiles, Lasers and Space BotsLast December, the U.S. Air Force Space Command in Colorado Springs held a large-scale war game set in outer space in 2025. Some 200 U.S. military and civilian experts, as well as representatives from Britain, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, took part. The details remain highly classified, as does the U.S. military’s arsenal of space weapons. But the Space Command said the exercise “included full-spectrum threats across diverse operating environments.” Translation: The participants had to deal with all the known dangers to U.S. satellites, plus a few that are suspected to exist.The known threats include Chinese ballistic missiles that can hit U.S. satellites in low Earth orbit about 500 miles up and possibly those in high geostationary orbits some

22,000 miles above the Earth. China and Russia also have ground-based lasers that can blind the camera on a reconnaissance satellite or burn up the spacecraft altogether, and experts say spacecraft-mounted lasers are just a few years away. Moscow and Beijing are also believed to be developing satellites that can disable, bump off course or destroy other satellites .Any combat in space also would involve cyberattacks like the one in 2011, when a Romanian hacker gained access to NASA’s confidential satellite data. Three years later, U.S. officials say, China hacked the satellite network of the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration, the nation’s weather forecaster, forcing it to shut down for two days. The penetration exposed a dangerous vulnerability: In a scenario similar to the one Singer and Cole describe in their novel, hackers could reprogram a U.S. satellite to send false weather reports, coordinates and other disinformation to American and allied forces, throwing off planning, navigation and targeting. Singer, who serves as a consultant to the Air Force Space Command and the U.S. intelligence community, says satellite hackers could even redirect a U.S. missile to strike its own forces or alter the course of the satellite.This isn’t the first time that military planners have worried about the threat of war in space. In the years following the Soviet Union’s 1957 launch of Sputnik, the first man-made satellite, the U.S., fearing a Soviet nuclear attack from space, began exploring ways to shoot down satellites. The U.S. military also conducted a series of nuclear tests in space. One, carried out some 250 miles above the South Pacific in 1962 , generated an electromagnetic pulse so powerful that it fried the electronics of five U.S. satellites and caused power, telephone and radio blackouts thousands of miles away. The tests were stopped in 1967 under the U.N.’s Outer Space Treaty, which banned placing weapons of mass destruction in space. For the remainder of the Cold War, powerful surveillance satellites became the key component in U.S. and Soviet early-warning systems to detect preparations for a nuclear test or a missile launch. But that didn’t stop the rival superpowers from figuring out ways to grab an advantage in space. The Soviets developed the space equivalent of a suicide car bomb—an unmanned vehicle that could sidle up to an orbiting U.S. satellite and then blow up beside it. In the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan launched his multibillion-dollar Strategic Defense Initiative, derisively nicknamed Star Wars, which called for a combination of ground-based interceptors and space-based lasers to shield the United States from a Soviet nuclear ballistic missile attack. In 1985, Reagan demonstrated U.S. prowess when an Air Force F-15 fighter flying at 38,000 feet launched a missile that destroyed a faltering U.S. satellite.Yet the U.S. and Soviet Union never fought in space . That’s because each side knew the other regarded its early-warning satellites as a critical component of its nuclear arsenal , U.S. officials say. Any strike against the other’s satellites would be seen as the opening shot in a nuclear attack, triggering immediate nuclear retaliation. “Both we and the Soviets understood the red lines in terms of attacks on space systems that we dared not cross,” says Work, the deputy defense secretary.But after the end of the Cold War, in 1991, the situation in space grew far more complicated. Some 60 other countries eventually joined the U.S. and Russia in space, contributing to a wreath of an estimated 1,100 satellites circling the globe.

Meanwhile, U.S. forces became ever more dependent on their satellites — not only for nuclear early warning but also for conventional military requirements such as communications, weather reports and navigation. The Pentagon, however, spent little time thinking about how to protect them. The military leaders of the world’s sole superpower came to regard space as an American sanctuary, and both personnel and budgets were shifted to other priorities. “Our adversaries noticed all that,” says Singer.Surviving an AttackSuspicions that China was developing anti-satellite weapons arose in January 2007, when Beijing fired a missile that hit one of its own aging weather satellites in low Earth orbit. Then, in 2013, China tested a missile that climbed to 18,000 miles— high enough to take out U.S. GPS satellites and nearly reaching the military’s early-warning satellites that hang in geostationary orbit 22,000 miles above the Earth. China is believed to have conducted similar tests in 2010, 2014 and 2015 , leading Pentagon planners to conclude it will deploy these missiles, placing U.S. space systems under constant threat. “You don’t have a seven-year development plan if you’re not going to make it operational,” Hyten, the Air Force Space Command chief, said last year.Meanwhile, lingering suspicions about Russia’s newest space weapons center on its launch of four military satellites in 2013 and 2014. According to Brian Weeden, a former Air Force captain specializing in space surveillance, three of the satellites have changed orbit several times. They moved close to a Russian spacecraft and even collided with it. The fourth satellite maneuvered close to several newly launched Russian satellites and came very close to two Intelsat commercial communications satellites. “The technology could be used for ASATs,” Weeden tells Newsweek, using the military abreviation for anti-satellite weapons. But he adds it's not clear that the Russians were conducting ASAT tests.U.S. military planners are now debating how to protect the country’s military satellites and maintain the flow of information from space if some of those satellites are taken out in a conflict. The Pentagon is stressing the idea of resiliency, broadening the use of defenses already on some of the military’s latest satellites. They range from adding a thick shutter to a spy satellite’s camera for protection against a laser attack to boosting a satellite’s signals to prevent jamming. Other methods include frequency hopping, which enables satellites to transmit data on alternative frequencies if some are jammed. The military also has diversified its information sources by acquiring data from neutral countries and commercial satellites.Military officials are now seeking alternatives to GPS navigation. They’re also taking a hard look at two multibillion-dollar programs for satellites that are critical for the country’s strategic nuclear defenses but also sport conventional communications and surveillance capabilities. Such add-ons became commonplace back when space was uncontested and the military’s main concern was getting the most bang for its buck with each expensive satellite launch. But with these multitasking satellites presenting such juicy targets to U.S. adversaries, Pentagon officials say, it might make more sense to spread their capabilities around on smaller, less expensive satellites—an approach they call disaggregation.“The changing nature of the threats in space, namely anti-satellite weapons and jammers being developed by countries such as China and Russia, are driving some

of the thinking,” Frank Kendall, the Pentagon’s top weapons buyer, told a Washington gathering of space businesspeople in February.As the Pentagon explores new ways to protect its satellites, America’s fallback policy remains deterrence by threat of retaliation. Depending on which satellites are attacked, the U.S. could confine itself to taking out the enemy’s equivalent satellites. But if China or Russia destroyed the Pentagon’s nuclear early-warning and strategic communications satellites, military strategists say, it’s unlikely the U.S. response would stay in space.“We would interpret such an attack as going to war against us,” says Singer. Under this scenario, commercial satellites, along with the Earth’s space-based civilian infrastructure, would probably be destroyed. “War in space would very quickly involve the civilian world,” he says.Such scenes play out in Ghost Fleet, which is now required reading for military planners in the U.S. Space Command, as well as in the Army, Navy, Marines and CIA. Singer recently testified before Congress and briefed White House National Security Council staff on the real-world lessons of his thriller, which contains 400 footnotes based on the space weaponry and battle plans of the United States, China and Russia. “It’s a novel, but it’s a realistic look at how a war might play out when we lose the opening battle in space,” Singer says, adding: “Let’s hope it stays in the realm of fiction.” Cooperation is key or else conflict is likely. Weeden and He 4-26-16 — Brian Weeden is the Technical Advisor for Secure World Foundation and has 16 years of professional experience in space operations and policy. His wealth of technical knowledge and expertise allow him to provide critical analysis that supports development of space policy. In his current role as Technical Advisor, Mr. Weeden conducts research on space debris, global space situational awareness, space traffic management, protection of space assets, and space governance. He also organizes national and international workshops to increase awareness of and facilitate dialogue on space security, stability, and sustainability topics. He is a member and former Chair of the World Economic Forum's Global Agenda Council on Space. Prior to joining SWF, Mr. Weeden served nine years on active duty as an officer in the United States Air Force working in space and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) operations. As part of U.S. Strategic Command's Joint Space Operations Center (JSpOC), Mr. Weeden directed the orbital analyst training program and developed tactics, techniques and procedures for improving space situational awareness. Respected and recognized as an international expert, Mr. Weeden's research and analysis have been featured in The New York Times, The Washington Post, National Public Radio, USA Today, The BBC, Fox News, China Radio International, The Economist, The World Economic Forum's Annual Meeting in Davos, academic journals, presentations to the United Nations, and testimony before the U.S. Congress. Mr. Weeden holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Electrical Engineering from Clarkson University, a Master of Science Degree in Space Studies from the University of North Dakota, and is also a graduate of the International Space University Space Studies Program (2007, Beijing). He is currently a Doctoral Candidate in Public Policy and Public Administration at George Washington University in the field of Science and Technology Policy, and Xiao He is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of World Economics and Politics in the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences., 4-26-2016 ("Use Outer Space to Strengthen U.S.-China Ties," War on the Rocks, 4-26-2016, Available Online at http://warontherocks.com/2016/04/use-outer-space-to-strengthen-u-s-china-ties/, Accessed 6-23-2016, RJS)With the end of the Cold War, outer space activities lost much of their urgency and hipness. But today space is back, and more important than ever. Modern militaries and the global economy are dependent on space capabilities. Private companies are daring to take on challenges that were once the domain of superpowers. And in national security circles, there is discussion of a renewed strategic competition in space that could pit the winner of the last space race, the United States, against the rising power of China. The United States and China have identified space as a

strategic domain that is critical to their national interests and development. Both nations are dedicating considerable resources to developing their civil, military, and commercial space sectors. Beijing and Washington see their space accomplishments as important to boosting national pride and international prestige. Over time, what happens in space could serve as either a source of instability, or a means of strengthening the U.S.-China relationship. The United States and China have differing goals and priorities in space. The United States is focused on assuring continued access to space and sees it as a critical domain to its security and prosperity. Space-based capabilities and services provide the foundation for U.S. national security, enabling communications with U.S. strategic forces, allowing the verification and monitoring of arms control treaties, forming the cornerstone of the United States’ intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, and serving as essential enablers for the United States’ ability to defend its borders, project power to protect its allies and interests overseas, and defeat adversaries. Space capabilities are also a critical piece of the U.S. — and the global — economy. China is focused on developing its own capabilities in the space domain, and increasingly depends on space-based assets for both economic and military aims that may be partly incompatible, and even in competition, with other key players, especially the United States. China sees space as critical to defending its national security and securing its role as a rising power. From China’s perspective, the most urgent problem is that the space capability gap between the United States and China is growing. China also seeks a voice in the creation of international norms and institutions — particularly because it perceives that it must accept rules that have been decided mainly by the United States. As the two nations act on these differing priorities and goals, tensions in the space domain have had ramifications for the overall bilateral relationship. Recent testing and development of anti-satellite capabilities by China, and a doctrinal focus on “active defense” have caused the United States to openly call for a stronger focus on space protection and warfighting. From the Chinese perspective, it is necessary to develop such capabilities to support national security, close the power gap, and defend itself from American aggression ., Failure to reconcile their differences in this domain could lead to a renewed arms race that could be to the detriment of both sides . Both countries have acknowledged the importance of developing a more stable, cooperative, and long-lasting bilateral relationship in space . Washington still hopes that Beijing can be a constructive partner for greater international space security. While China still chafes at the largely American constructed rules-based order, it likewise has a clear interest in using its development of space capabilities to promote bilateral cooperation and to play a role the formation of new international regimes. Both of these dynamics were evident in recent United Nations discussions on space governance, with an isolated Russia attempting to undermine international consensus on new guidelines for enhancing the long-term sustainability of space activities. Thus, the two sides have overlapping interests that present opportunities for cooperation and bilateral engagement. Accordingly, the United States and China should continue to engage in both bilateral and multilateral initiatives that enhance the long-term

sustainability and security of space . Working together, and with other stakeholders, to help ensure the success of these initiatives would go a long way toward reinforcing the desire of both countries to be seen as playing leading roles in space governance and being responsible space powers. The United States and China, as well as the private sectors of the two countries, should also find a way to engage in bilateral and multilateral civil space projects, including science and human exploration, though doing so will need to overcome strong political challenges. At the same time, both the United States and China should be cognizant of where their interests differ in space and look to enact confidence-building measures to reduce tensions and the risk of a crisis escalating into outright conflict. While the prospects for legally binding arms control measures are slim at this stage, they could put in place unilateral and bilateral measures to reduce tensions and development of direct ascent kinetic-kill and rendezvous and proximity operations (RPO) capabilities. Finally, both countries would benefit significantly from improving their national space situational awareness (SSA) capabilities, and increasing data sharing with each other and the spacefaring community.Diplomacy is key to stopping conflict. New York Times Editorial Board 15 — Editorial Board, The editorial board is composed of 16 journalists with wide-ranging areas of expertise. Their primary responsibility is to write The Times’s editorials, which represent the voice of the board, its editor and the publisher. The board is part of The Times’s editorial department, which is operated separately from The Times’s newsroom, and includes the Letters to the Editor and Op-Ed sections. 6-29-2015 ("Preventing a Space War," New York Times, 6-29-2015, Available Online at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/29/opinion/preventing-a-space-war.html?_r=0, Accessed 6-28-2016, RJS)Of all the places where conflict could erupt, space might seem the least likely, except in movies. But increasingly, it is becoming a contested environment posing new dangers. The United States sees this as a vital security issue. “Potential adversaries understand our reliance on space and want to take it away from us,” a senior Pentagon official, told Congress in March. And while everything from control of nuclear weapons to weather forecasting to cellphone use could be affected, the United States “is not adequately prepared for a conflict” in space with countries like China and Russia, he acknowledged. The specific concern is the security of thousands of satellites and vehicles, like the international space station, that orbit Earth. America has long dominated space, but many other nations also have valuable assets in orbit. Satellites enable the Pentagon to locate enemies on the battlefield, verify arms control treaties and ensure early warning if an adversary targeted the country with an intercontinental ballistic missile. In the Cold War, the United States and Russia engaged in limited testing of antisatellite, or ASAT, weapons. Now China , and to a lesser extent Russia, a re actively developing such offensive capabilities, including jammers, lasers and cyber weapons that could damage satellite operations. A turning point came in 2007

when China conducted its first successful ASAT test by blowing up one of its own weather satellites. The hit unleashed more than 3,000 pieces of debris into space and fed suspicions about China’s intentions. Suggestions by Chinese experts that, in a conflict over Taiwan, Beijing might be able to shoot down an American early warning satellite only deepened American concerns. Preventing conflicts in space will require more diplomacy . China, which has shown little interest in focusing on the issue, agreed last week during talks in Washington to hold regular discussions on space cooperation and avoiding satellite collisions. Some concrete progress on these issues would be helpful when President Obama and President Xi Jinping of China hold a summit meeting in the fall. China and Russia have proposed a legally binding treaty that would ban the use of force or weapons in space , but most experts consider such a pact unverifiable. A more practical course would be for them to work with the United States and the European Union to establish norms for responsible behavior , including not to test ASAT weapons . A United Nations-convened meeting planned for July should aim to approve a code of conduct proposed by the Europeans, whether or not Russia and China sign on. The Obama administration is ready to invest more in defensive measures. Officials say an additional $5 billion will be spent over five years on projects like anti-jamming technologies. The Pentagon is also looking to build satellites with greater resiliency. All of the major powers have much to lose if the potential for conflicts in space escalates further.

Contention Two is DebrisNow is the time to restrict ASAT use: the longer we wait, the greater the riskGrego and Wright 10 - Laura Grego, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program Dr. Laura Grego focuses on the technology and security implications of national missile defense and of space security. She is the author or co-author of more than 20 peer-reviewed, published papers on a range of topics. Since joining UCS in September 2002, she has been cited by Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New Scientist, New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today, and has appeared on Fox News, the Discovery Channel and NPR. She also has testified before Congress and addressed the United Nations Conference on Disarmament on space security issues. Before joining UCS, Grego was a postdoctoral researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. She earned a doctorate degree in experimental physics at the California Institute of Technology and a bachelor of science degree in physics and astronomy at the University of Michigan, and David Wright, Co-Director, Global Security Program David Wright is a nationally known expert on the technical aspects of nuclear weapons policy, missile defense systems, missile proliferation, and space weapons. He has authored numerous articles and reports on arms control and international security, including Toward True Security: Transforming U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Securing the Skies: Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space, and The Physics of Space Security. Since 1990, he has been a primary organizer of the International Summer Symposiums on Science and World Affairs, which foster cooperation among scientists around the world working on arms control and security issues. In 2001, he was a co-recipient of the American Physical Society’s Joseph A. Burton Forum Award for his arms control research and his work with international scientists. Before joining UCS in 1992, Dr. Wright was a senior research analyst with the Federation of American Scientists and served as an SSRC-MacArthur fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He received his doctorate degree in physics from Cornell University in 1983 and worked as a research physicist from 1983 to 1988.November 2010 (“Securing the Skies Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space,” Union of Concerned Scientists, Available Online at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf, Accessed 7-4-2016, RJS)The Need for Action Is Urgent Without near-term attention, some of the aforementioned issues could become much more difficult to address in the future. Despite the development of international guidelines for slowing the accumulation of debris, the amount of large debris (greater than 10 centimeters in size) in orbit has grown by 50 percent in the past four years, primarily because of events that would not have occurred had there been full compliance with these guidelines (see Figure 1). Half of the known collisions between objects in space have occurred since 2005 (Wright 2009). (See Table 1.) In 2009, the first collision of two intact satellites, an active Iridium satellite and a defunct Russian Cosmos satellite, produced a large amount of debris. This event demonstrated the need for better coordination among space users and better monitoring of space objects. As more countries launch satellites, the need becomes even more pressing for establishing safety standards—pertinent both to launches and to the satellites themselves—and for improving compliance with debris-mitigation guidelines. The increase in the number of satellites and debris is also highlighting the existing weaknesses of the SSN to accurately track them in a sufficiently timely manner, in turn limiting the ability of the United States to unilaterally manage space traffic and predict possible collisions. While the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) provides that all countries are free to use space for peaceful purposes so long as they respect the interests of other space users7 and operate in accordance with international law, it

does not explicitly prohibit deliberate ASAT attacks on satellites or prevent the testing of ASAT weapons in ways that pose risks to other space users. The OST bans orbiting nuclear weapons, but it does not outlaw the possession of other kinds of space weapons. Additionally, few limits or guidelines exist on technologies suited to ASAT use, such as hit-to-kill missiles and high-powered satellite-tracking lasers. The demonstrations of destructive ASAT capability by China in January 2007 and the United States in February 2008, along with recent Indian statements of interest in developing an ASAT capability,8 indicate that the long-standing restraint regarding such systems has been weakened .9 Devising effective limits on ASAT capabilities or use becomes increasingly difficult as more weapons are developed and tested and more countries develop policy rationales and military doctrine for using them.It’s a question of timeframe – we need to prevent escalation now so that in the future we can remove the debris. Oliver and Pugliese 15 - Stéphane Oliver and Antoine Pugliese, supervised by Victor Dos Santos Paulino (“Active Debris Removal: A Business Opportunity?” Toulouse Business School, Available Online at: http://chaire-sirius.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Oliver-Pugliese-2015-Active-Debris-Removal-A-Business-Opportunity-Unknown.pdf, Accessed 7-2-2016, RJS)In this paper, we tried to give a comprehensive account of the various schools of thoughts regarding how to tackle the space debris issue – if not danger. Our final goal was to underline that space debris could be considered as a business opportunity. Is it possible or not to put in place a revenue stream issued from space cleaning? As space cleaning activities are, on the short to medium term, not apparent sources of revenue , the obvious answer would have to be: ―no , there is no potential sustainable business possible in the field of space cleaning.‖ But as we try to overcome those self-conceived ideas, we discovered that a structure involving the governments of space faring countries , space industries, insurance companies, satellite operators and all the other stakeholders of the space value chain could potentially give birth to a sustainable space cleaning business . With money issued from well-conceived and legitimate taxes, collected by an international – or at least multi-national – fund organized by major space authorities, space industries could develop new technologies, new spacecraft able to service decaying satellites. In fact, more than the creation of a new business, the gathering of means trans-nationally in order to solve the common issue of space debris could very well give birth to a complete new stream of activities, that not only focus on space cleaning but that could be part of a much bigger part of the space industry: the on-orbit servicing. ―On‐ Orbit Satellite Service will accomplish logistic support, refueling, supply coolant and consumables, rescue from stranded situation (trouble in deploying antenna, solar paddle, etc.) and also on‐orbit assembly and maintenance of large space platform such as ISS and SSPS‖. (JAXA). The mere fact that according to NASA the costs of a satellite can be kept down to

30-50% if a life extension service is used can push industries and governments to develop OSS technologies and revolutionize the space industry.

Scenario One is Miscalc Space debris poses a special political danger – the risk is high as a cascade of collisions occurs. Sample 16 — Ian Sample, 1-22-2016 ("Rise in space junk could provoke armed conflict say scientists," Guardian, 1-22-2016, Available Online at https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/jan/22/rise-in-space-junk-could-provoke-armed-conflict-say-scientists, Accessed 7-2-2016, RJS)The steady rise in space junk that is floating around the planet could provoke a political row and even armed conflict , according to scientists, who warn that even tiny pieces of debris have enough energy to damage or destroy military satellites. Researchers said fragments of spent rockets and other hurtling hardware posed a “special political danger” because of the difficulty in confirming that an operational satellite had been struck by flying debris and had not fallen victim to an intentional attack by another nation. Space agencies in the US and Russia track more than 23,000 pieces of space junk larger than 10cm, but estimates suggest there could be half a billion fragments ranging from one to 10cm, and trillions of even smaller particles. The junk poses the greatest danger to satellites in low Earth orbit, where debris can slam into spacecraft at a combined speed of more than 30,000mph. This realm of space, which stretches from 100 to 1200 miles above the surface, is where most military satellites are deployed. In a report to be published in the journal Acta Astronautica, Vitaly Adushkin at the Russian Academy of Sciences in Moscow writes that impacts from space junk, especially on military satellites, posed a “special political danger” and “may provoke political or even armed conflict between space-faring nations. The owner of the impacted and destroyed satellite can hardly quickly determine the real cause of the accident.” Adushkin adds that in recent decades there have been repeated sudden failures of defence satellites which have never been explained. But there are only two possibilities, he claims: either unregistered collisions with space debris, or an aggressive action by an adversary. “This is a politically dangerous dilemma,” he writes. The warning comes after an incident in 2013 when a Russian satellite, Blits, was disabled after apparently colliding with debris created when China shot down one of its own old weather satellites in 2007. The Chinese used a missile to destroy its satellite, an act that demonstrated its anti-satellite capabilities, and left 3,000 more pieces of debris in orbit. According to the report, the amount of debris cluttering low Earth orbit has risen dramatically in half a century of spacefaring. Without efforts to clean up the space environment, Adushkin warns of a “cascade process” in which chunks of debris crash into one another and produce ever more smaller fragments. Data in the study from the Russian space agency show that the International Space Station took evasive action five times in 2014 to avoid space debris. Even small flecks of paint that have flaked off spacecraft can be hazardous. Nasa’s space shuttle was struck by flying paint several times in orbit, forcing ground staff to replace some of the spaceship’s windows. The report follows a report commissioned by Nasa in 2011 which warned that the level of space junk was

rising exponentially, and had reached a “tipping point” in the threat it posed to satellites and the International Space Station.Space debris provides a great chance of miscalculation leading to war. Gray 16 — Richard Gray, Deputy News Editor at Telegraph Media Group, Freelance Journalist and editor, MailOnline, 1-27-2016 ("Space junk could trigger a WORLD WAR," Mail Online, 1-27-2016, Available Online at http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3419432/Space-junk-isn-t-just-dangerous-astronauts-trigger-WORLD-WAR-Collisions-satellites-debris-risk-sparking-conflicts-nations.html, Accessed 7-2-2016, RJS)The space surrounding our planet is getting increasingly crowded as more and more satellites, spent spacecraft and debris orbit the Earth. But this steady rise in potentially dangerous 'space junk' could spark the start of a conflict that may lead to a new world war, a team of space scientists has warned. It claims that a collision between an operational satellite and the fragments of old space hardware hurtling around the planet could easily be mistaken as an intentional attack by another nation . There are 500,000 pieces of 'space junk' currently being tracked as they orbit the planet at speeds of up to 17,500mph (28,160km/h) - and millions more that are too small to be accurately traced. Even a tiny paint fleck traveling at these speeds can cause damage to a spacecraft. Professor Vitaly Adushkin, an expert in geosphere dynamics at the Russian Academy of Science in Moscow, and his colleagues at the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation, said space debris now posed a 'special political danger'. They warned that an impact with another spacecraft – especially one used for military purposes – could provoke political or even armed conflict between space-faring nations . Despite extensive efforts to track space debris, it would be almost impossible to identify the real cause of a collision if it occurred with an unregistered piece of 'junk'. As many military satellites also occupy low earth orbits, this puts them in a region that is at highest risk of such collisions due to the density of debris there . The experts said: 'In the last decades, there have repeatedly observed sudden failures of some spacecraft for defense purposes the causes of which have not been found either by observations or by telemetry. 'So, there are two possible explanations - first, unregistered collision with space debris, or second " machinations" of the space adversary . 'And this is a politically dangerous dilemma. 'Special political danger posed by such a grouping in near-Earth space is that the impact of its element on some spacecraft - especially for military purposes - may provoke political or even armed conflict between space-faring nations.' Nasa said it is currently tracking 500,000 pieces of debris that are larger than a marble and 20,000 that are larger than a softball. The European Space Agency estimates there are at least 700,000 dangerous pieces of debris in orbit around the Earth. The Russian Space Surveillance Systems is tracking more than 23,000 objects more than four inches wide. It estimates there are 100,000 pieces half that size, 600,000 between a third

of an inch and four inches across and hundreds of millions less than a third of an inch in size. Many are pieces of old rocket and satellites while there are also objects including a spanner, dumped rubbish from Russia's Mir space station. The space debris crisis has been made worse by past collisions and explosions that have increased the amount of material needing to be tracked. In 1996 a French satellite was damaged by debris from a French rocket that had exploded a decade earlier while in orbit around the planet. The Chinese used a missile in 2007 to destroy an old weather satellite in an anti-satellite test, creasing 3,000 pieces of debris. A defunct Russian satellite collided and destroyed a functioning US commercial satellite in 2009, producing 2,000 pieces of debris in the process. Professor Aduskin and his colleagues, whose study is published in the journal Acta Astronautica, said the International Space Station has had to take evasive action five times in 2014 to avoid space debris. The other authors of the study include Stanislave Veniaminov, from the Scientific Research Centre Kosmos at the Russian Ministry of Defence in Moscow. They suggest launching moving shielding structures that could be erected around spacecraft in low Earth orbits to help protect them from debris. But while some steps can be taken to mitigate damage to satellites, it is almost inevitable there will be collisions in the future. The researchers said: 'The owner of the impacted and destroyed satellite can hardly quickly determine the real cause of the accident. 'Evan small damage could lead to the whole structure malfunction and finally going out of service.'

Scenario Two is the Colonization Space debris accumulates over time and prevents the possibility of future space travel. Orwig 15 — Jessica Orwig, is a senior video producer at Business Insider. She has a Master of Science in science and technology journalism from Texas A&M University and a Bachelor of Science in astronomy and physics from The Ohio State University. Before NY she spent time as an intern at: American Physical Society in MD, International Center for Theoretical Physics in Italy, Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory in IL, and American Geophysical Union in DC, 9-23-2015 ("The amount of space junk around Earth has hit a 'critical density' — and it could jeopardize our space missions," Business Insider, 9-23-2015, Available Online at http://www.businessinsider.com/space-junk-at-critical-density-2015-9, Accessed 7-2-2016, RJS)Since humans launched Sputnik 1 in 1957, we have polluted the once-empty space around Earth to the point that it is now becoming dangerous, according to former NASA scientist Donald Kessler. "We're at what we call a 'critical density' — where there are enough large objects in space that they will collide with one another and create small debris faster than it can be removed," Kessler recently told Marketplace. For nearly 20 years, Kessler (who was retired until very recently) lead NASA's Orbital Debris Program Office, which keeps track of all the growing clutter around Earth. He predicts that eventually, there will be so much space junk that leaving Earth to explore deep-space will be impossible. That includes sending satellites to distant stretches of the solar system, like Pluto, and manned-missions to Mars. Something must be done, he says. So he's come out of retirement to help find a solution. So much space stuff Endeavour had a major impact on its radiator during STS-118. The entry hole is about 1⁄4 inch, and the exit hole is twice as large. Right now, more than half a million pieces of man-made space junk orbiting Earth. And about 23,000 of those pieces are the size of a softball or larger. This junk accumulates over time as defunct satellites are left in space and meteors, as well as other man-made space debris, slam into them, generating even more, smaller bits of junk. After these collisions, the junk doesn't simply go flying off into space. Instead, it is trapped by Earth's gravity, and wraps like a belt around Earth, cluttering up our path to space. While the size of this debris is an important factor, the speed at which it zips through space is what makes it so dangerous. While the size of this debris is an important factor, the speed at which it zips through space is what makes it so dangerous. At a distance of over 200 miles above Earth's surface, objects move at about 17,500 miles per hour. For comparison, that's faster than a speeding bullet fired from an AK-47 assault rifle — which is about 1600 miles per hour. Needless to say, if your spacecraft were hit with a softball-size scrap of metal traveling at 17,500 miles per hour, it could do some critical damage. For example, in 2009, a retired Russian satellite collided with a US commercial satellite, and the results were catastrophic. The collision destroyed both satellites, adding over 2,000 pieces of space junk to that already-growing pile. A solution

won't be easy Collisions like these, together with the growing number of satellites we place into orbit, have brought us to the "critical density" that Kessler is so worried about. Elon Musk, CEO of Tesla and SpaceX, has hopes to send 4,000 satellites into low-Earth orbit — where most of the space junk is located — to provide internet worldwide. But there's one small problem: If Musk gets his wish, those satellites would only add to the problem. While launching more satellites to space isn't a great idea, it's not the main problem. Most of the stuff we send up doesn't come down, and it is those dead satellies that we need to focus on, Kessler said. "The only way to [solve this problem] is to bring back the larger objects," Kessler told Huffington Post in 2013. "If you want to stop this collision cascading process, you have to bring back satellites, and we don't know how to do that." If we can't figure out how to return large satellites to Earth, then Kessler says we'll just have to start picking all the pieces up one-by-one — while traveling at 17,500 mph. It won't be an easy task.If space debris clutters Earth’s orbitals, space colonization will be impossible. Russell Schilling 16 — David Russell Schilling, Writer, Researcher IndustryTap.com, L.I.O.N.2-1-2016 ("Space Debris Could Trap Humans on Earth, Prevent Space Exploration," Industry Tap, 2-1-2016, Available Online at http://www.industrytap.com/space-debris-trap-humans-earth-prevent-space-exploration/34179, Accessed 7-4-2016, RJS)Cleaning Up the Ultimate Frontier This time of year most people are thinking about how they can tidy up around the house and de-clutter their New Year. Cleaning up is a great emotional challenge that often ends in procrastination. But for NASA and other space agencies around the world, decluttering is a 24x7x365 day obsession. Launching rockets and satellites into space is so expensive, $10,000 a pound, that fixing the space debris problem is essential to saving money and lives as well as keeping dreams of multi-planet exploration alive. Should spaceships and satellites be damaged or destroyed by space junk, these dreams and aspirations will be sabotaged. If humans are to become spacefarers, we must clean up after ourselves! Annoying Traffic Jams Only people in Los Angeles, Bangkok, Beijing and other chronically congested cities can understand how annoying traffic jams can be. Imagine getting stuck in a space traffic jam hundreds of miles from Earth and floating aimlessly amongst debris that could puncture holes in your spacecraft at any moment. For all intents and purposes, space junk is a dangerous human-created asteroid belt.Developing Technology to Clean Up Space Unfortunately, according to NASA, 65% of debris includes cataloged objects produced by more than 250 explosions and collisions. All told, the number of space debris objects exceeds 30,000. According to reports, the Chinese missile that exploded in 2007 generated 2,000 pieces of debris in just one mishap. IndustryTap has reported on cleaning up space debris that is traveling around the earth at 35,000 mph (52,327 kph). New clean up technology includes NASA’s space debris tracking system for determining which satellites/junk need to be destroyed first. Innovations including

space debris capturing “tugs”, robots that fling space debris into space, nets, and lasers are just a few of the many technologies being devised.Space Junk Has Built Up Over Six Decades Space junk has built up over six decades and may not just hinder space exploration but the billions of dollars of communication and research satellites circling the globe and providing critical data to researchers on the ground. The following video explains how space debris could negatively affect the future of space use and exploration.

Contention Three is NASANASA losing funding now. Mervis 4-19-16 — Jeffrey Mervis, reports on science policy in the United States and around the world in an effort to explain to scientists how government works. He keeps a close eye on the changing fortunes of science across the federal government. He also follows efforts to improve science and math education, as well as the factors that shape the U.S. and global scientific workforce. Jeff has reported from five continents, including Antarctica, and speaks regularly about the politics of U.S. science to both scientific and lay audiences. He's covered science policy for more than 30 years, including a stint at Nature, and joined Science in 1993. 4 19, 2016 3, xx-xx-xxxx ("Senate spending panel leaves NSF flat, cuts NASA science," Science | AAAS, , Available Online at http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/04/senate-spending-panel-leaves-nsf-flat-cuts-nasa-science, Accessed 7-17-2016, RJS)A Senate spending panel today approved a tiny budget increase next year for the National Science Foundation (NSF) and flat funding for NASA—and congratulated themselves for doing so given a cap on overall domestic discretionary spending across the government. NSF would receive $46 million above its current level of $7.46 billion. That 0.6% hike is well below the $500 million increase sought by the Obama administration. But some $400 million of that requested boost would have come from so-called mandatory spending, a mechanism that legislators have repeatedly said was a nonstarter. So the Senate panel is basically giving NSF half of what the president had requested in discretionary spending. Additional details are expected when the bill moves to the full Senate appropriations committee on Thursday. The discretionary portion of NASA’s budget would have shrunk by $1 billion under the president’s request. But the panel restored that cut, giving NASA essentially its 2016 budget of $19.3 billion. The agency’s science programs would receive $5.4 billion, some $194 million below current levels. But it’s $92 million more than the White House requested for science in the discretionary portion of its budget. Again, stay tuned for details.Treaty key to prevent the decline of NASA.Smith 8 – Andrew K. Smith, 4-12-2008 (“The Next Space Race: Impact of Anti-Satellite Weapons on International Relations and Peaceful Space Programs,” American Public University System, Available Online at: https://www.apus.edu/content/dam/online-library/student-papers/smith-2008.pdf, Accessed: 6/27/2016, RJS) Assuming ASAT weapons are not banned from use, the inevitable focus on ASAT technology and defense will be detrimental to peaceful exploration and pure science programs. Since conflict in Iraq began in 2002, while NASA’s budget has increased overall, it has seen a decrease in areas dedicated to the areas key to peaceful activities such as manned spaceflight and pure science programs. Even

after President Bush’s “Vision for Space Exploration” was released in 2004, NASA has seen their proposed five-year budget plan cut by nearly $3 billion (Schneider 2007). Programs dedicated to earth sciences have also been cut. From 1996 to 2001, NASA received $2 billion annually for climate-monitoring missions, but that sum is projected to drop 25% to 1.5 billion annually for the period 2001-2010. NASA’s own findings in 2007 showed a decrease in their earth science budget of approximately 30% (Kaufman 2007). Meanwhile, the defense budget has increased on average 8% after adjusting for inflation from 2001-2008 (Kogan 2008, 1). As anti-satellite technology escalates in capability, NASA and other domestic discretionary programs will continue to lose funding while the defense budget will increase, possibly in hopes of offering some defense against ASATs. Further, as international cooperation dwindles, NASA will have a smaller pool of available projects with which to involve itself, further decreasing its budget. The worst case scenario for NASA would be in the aftermath of a space war, where NASA would be relegated to the sole task of assessing when space launches can again be safely achieved around the threat of space debris. The ensuing arms race centering on kinetic strike anti-satellite technology will be detrimental to peaceful space programs, reduce the possibility for international cooperation, accelerate conflict between the U.S. and China, and make possible a worstcase scenario where all nations can be denied space for decades due to space debris. Because of the threat ASAT technology poses to the military and economic strength of nations, a focus on the offensive and defensive capabilities of these weapons will come from state defense departments. To diminish the chances of escalation of this arms race, nations must formally delineate what consists of legal or illegal anti-satellite technology by treaty and pursue alternative ASAT weapons (attacks on optical sensors, jamming, and others) that that would not fill space with debris post-employment. Current U.S. and Chinese policy make such a treaty difficult, and will require concessions to be made regarding access of space to rival nations for military purposes. Without these concessions, peaceful space programs will continue to suffer and receive funding cuts, and breakthroughs that depend on international cooperation and a debris-free space arena will be impossible to achieve. NASA development prevents economic decline. Executive Intelligence Review 13 — Executive Intelligence Review, 5-17-2013 ("EIR Volume 40, Number 20, May 17, 2013," No Publication, 5-17-2013, Available Online at http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2013/eirv40n20-20130517/index.html, Accessed 7-17-2016, RJS)The following is an edited excerpt from the LaRouchePAC Weekly Report webcast of April 17, detailing certain crucial parameters of the collapse of the U.S. physical economy (the graphics have been revised for use in EIR). Speaking is Creighton Jones, a member of the LaRouchePAC Basement science team. Jones’s presentation was preceded by a review by Liona Fan-Chiang of the perspective presented at the April 13-14 Forum for a New Paradigm conference held by the Schiller Institute in Frankfurt, Germany, and was followed by a discussion initiated by Lyndon

LaRouche on shifting the level of discussion to looking at man in relationship to the Solar System as a whole. The full show is archived at http://larouchepac.com/ node/26253. Jones: First, I’ll give people a sense of what has been the process of physical collapse, over the past 40-60 years, which has brought us to this point of desperation, to where you’ve got not only the economic crisis as people understand it, with the collapse of jobs and the collapse of currencies, but also the moral desperation: the collapse of the morale and the morality of the population. We see the level of violence, the school shootings, the terrorist activity, the ongoing, never-ending wars; all these things driven by an intention on the part of the British Empire, to destroy industry, destroy science, destroy populations, and really create a condition for a dark age, which is, in fact, what we’re facing now. So, let’s take a look at some of the indicators of how we got here, and the process that has brought us to this point of sheer desperation. What you see in Figure 1 is the percentage of the How Abandoning Science Has Led to Economic Collapse EIRPhysical Economy FIGURE 1 NASA Budgets Since 1958 (2007 Constant Million Dollars and % of Federal Budget) Sources: U.S. Office of Management and Budget; Wikipedia 36 Physical Economy EIR May 17, 2013 Federal budget that goes to NASA, the space program, back to 1958: So you see, there’s been a steep collapse, in terms of the actual percentage of the budget that goes toward NASA. It peaked around 1966, and this is what led into our ability to get to the Moon, where you had the initiative of John Kennedy, to say: We’re going to do what we’ve never done before; we’re going to do that which is right now impossible, but because we’re man, because we’re creative, we believe it’s achievable. And so, NASA’s percentage of the budget peaked in about 1966; and then, you see, from that point on, you’ve had a dramatic collapse down to the current state, which is a mere maybe 1% of the budget going toward NASA, going toward advancing space, technology, and everything that goes along with it. Fan-Chiang: It looks like it’s actually at a level below what it was before the Apollo project! Jones: Right! Actually, going back to right when we started, before we even initiated Apollo; we had more of the actual percentage of expenditures going toward space research and scientific research than we have now today. And it’s an indicator of the backward thinking, and the impulse of the Empire to destroy science, to destroy progress. But it also reflects a certain lack of understanding in the population about the role of science, the role of technology, the role of progress, in creating real wealth. And you’ll see how this paralleled another aspects of the economy. What Are We Producing? Figure 2 is an image of the change in the percentage of GDP that comes from manufacturing, versus the percentage of GDP that comes from finance, insurance, real estate, and rental and leasing, what they call “FIRE,” the FIRE economy. Which really I think is appropriate, because it indicates how we’ve gone ablaze in this country! So you see, going back to 1947, where this starts, 25.6% of our GDP was generated as a function of manufacturing. We had a real manufacturing economy; only 10% came from finance and these kinds of things. This stuff sort of peaked in the 1950s. At the end of World War II, we had the intention of taking the industrial machine that we had built up to win the war, to defeat fascism—Roosevelt’s intention had been to eliminate the imperial system

from the planet, to regear our war machine into a global nation-building machine. Now, you see how this has changed. Since then, you’ve had a steady collapse of manufacturing, but the steady rise of finance, to the point now, where you actually have things pretty much inverted: Manufacturing as of 2009—and it’s worse now, but these statistics only go to 2009—manufacturing only represents now 11% of GDP, whereas finance, insurance, etc., represent 21%. This really parallels what Lyndon LaRouche has developed with his Triple Curve: that you had a dynamic of a hyperinflated increase, in money pumping and growth of financial speculative instruments, paralleling, and acting as a parasite, and sucking from the real physical economy. So the real physical productive economy has been intentionally collapsed, and sucked off of, to feed this growing, hyperinflationary bubble—which produces, physically, nothing! And in fact, what it produces, is a certain level of psychosis and demoralization, in the population and on the planet. Fan-Chiang: I think they even consider other things as manufacturing, like “manufacturing” burgers, now. Mfg FIRE FIGURE 2 Manufacturing vs. FIRE Percentage of GDP Source: Bureau of Labor Statistic May 17, 2013 EIR Physical Economy 37 Now Look at the Labor Force Jones: Right. Look at some of these other images: Figure 3 shows that the percentage of employment in manufacturing going back to the 1950s was up around 30%; now, it’s down below 10%. Whereas you see the growth in other things, like services—which also includes things like finance, and anything from working at Wal-Mart as a checkout clerk, to working at JPMorgan—these are all services. That’s what’s been growing, while manufacturing employment has been collapsing. In Figure 4, you see employment, in terms of millions of workers employed in goods-producing activity, versus service-producing. So, in terms of the actual number of employees engaged in production, it’s been pretty much steady, but then collapsing even further, really going back into the 1940s, up to now—though we’ve had a massive increase in population, the actual number has been steady and going down a bit. But if you then look at the number of people engaged in providing services, it’s gone from about 2 million up to 120 million. So, you look at the difference there: You have had this massive, hyperbolic climb in the number of employees engaged in services, versus a flat line in the number of employees engaged in actual manufacturing of goods and productive activity. And what has this produced? People have seen these charts, like the growing disparity between the so-called upper 1% and the rest. Figure 5 shows the share of income, in terms of the total income in the economy which goes toward the upper 1%, which are those engaged in finance, versus everyone else, who lost manufacturing jobs, and those were replaced, if at all, by employment with simple services, mostly non-union, low-wage services. And so you see, things were somewhat on an even keel going back to the ’70s, whereas now, you’re up over 120% in terms of the change in the share of income: It’s changed by over 120%, going toward the upper 1%, and it’s been collapsing for the lower 80%. So that’s been the general trend that we’ve been Other Service Govt TTL Other G-P Mfg FIGURE 3 Composition of the Work Force Employment by Sector Percentage of Total Workers Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics Goods Service FIGURE 4 Goods-Producing vs. Service Workers Millions of workers Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics 38 Physical Economy EIR May 17,

2013 seeing in the economy: We’ve had a precipitous collapse of manufacturing, collapse in employment in productive activity, with a hyperbolic growth in finance, in speculation. And it parallels what’s been happening with the NASA budget, a collapse of intention toward these kinds of front-end programs, the space program, etc. Losing Our Scientific Capacity And now, we see where that’s leading us today. Here’s another image: Figure 6 shows terms of current in-orbit and planned NASA/NOAA, Earth-observing missions: These are satellites that are up there, looking at the Earth, studying things like the weather, and other aspects of the dynamics of our planet. This peaked in around 2010, when we had roughly 26-27 satellites, looking and trying to understand the dynamics of the planet and how it works. But because of this trend away from productivity, away from science, toward speculation, toward a hyperbolic increase in money pumping, we have moved to where now, from a peak in 2010, with about 26-27 satellites, the projection is, by 2020, we’re going to have about six. Now, what does it mean to say we’re going to lose this kind of capability? I’ll just point out two things that are indicative of the capability that we get from these kinds of satellites, and then, what we face without them. There are two recent events that we can look at that give us an idea of how these satellites, as sort of an extension of our sensory apparatus, have enabled us to make appropriate forecasts to deal with the kind of extreme weather events which we’re increasingly facing in this day and age. The first one goes back to 2010. People might remember “Snowmageddon”: This was when the East Coast got pounded with a massive amount of snow which created all kinds of chaos, but fortunately, because of things like the polar-orbiting satellites, we were able to make pretty accurate forecasts about what was coming, about a week or so before the event, to where we could then prepare for it. People could make emergency preparations, stockpile food, water, etc., and that did a lot toward mitigating the damage that this could have led to. Now, what we’re facing is a period where we’re going to go blind, for at least a year or more, because one of the crucial weather satellites is going to go blind. Now they’re saying, because of sequestration, that blindness could be extended up to another two or three years, when we’re not going to have any polarorbiting satellites with these capabilities that can lead to this kind of forecasting. This is what someone from NOAA had to say about this period of going blind: “A seven-day forecast today is as accurate as a 36-hour forecast was 20 years ago. Having a full complement of satellites is also important.” To illustrate the point, they cite “Snowmageddon.” The blizzard dumped between 38 and 56 cm of snow on the mid-Atlantic in 2010. NOAA’s forecasting models, using data from multiples satellites, predicted five days in advance, that 38-45 cm of snow would fall! So, very accurate. Now, they did a model where they just took one of the satellites, and said, “Okay, what would our forecasts be, without one of these satellites?” The prediction changed to 18-25 cm. A forecast that would have left tens of thousands of people unprepared for what was to come. So they did modeling where, with these satellites, they were able to have a point-on prediction of when Lower 20% 21-80% 81-99% Top 1% FIGURE 5 Changes in After-Tax Income, 1979-2007 Indexed to 1979 = 1.00 Source: Congressional Budget Office May 17, 2013 EIR Physical Economy 39 this was

going to hit, how much snow, and then they could prepare for it. You take one of these satellites out of the equation— Fan-Chiang: You get half of the difference. Jones: Right. And as we said, we’re about to face a 70% or so decline in the number of satellites that we have flying. One other example of this is something more recent, which is Hurricane Sandy: Now, here we have an image of two different forecasts of what was going to be the effect of Hurricane Sandy. Figure 7a is what was forecasted to happen with Sandy as it hit, and it was precisely what happened: that this thing was going to hit the East Coast, it was going to dump this much water, it was going to have this much power, this much force, and it enabled people to prepare for that. Fan-Chiang: That was a case where, even days before, it could have gone either way. It could have done what normal storms do, which is go back out over the Atlantic Ocean. It had a possibility of picking up more strength in Gulf, which it did, and so on, but those were all up in the air. Jones: Right. And because of these satellites, they were able to accurately forecast where it was going to hit, and that in fact it was going to hit the coast, and give people at least some level of preparedness, forewarning, to prepare for this kind of hit. Now, they ran the model again (Figure 7b), where they took out one of these polar-orbiting satellites, and the forecast they had with the removal of one of the satellites, was in fact, this: that the storm would miss the East Coast, and would tail off and just go out to sea! Now, imagine if that had been the forecast they were putting forward: “This thing’s not going to hit, it’s just going to tail out to sea.” Fan-Chiang: People would still be driving, airlines would still be flying, the airports would be open. Jones: Right. And so you see the kind of damage, the kind of crisis we face in losing this kind of capability, and losing this “extrasensory” capability. It just highlights where we’re heading, how we’re actually devolving as a species, under the current economic paradigm, to where, even what little capabilities we were able to continue to develop up to this point, we are now losing! We’re creating the conditions where man is becoming more and more vulnerable to the forces of nature, whereas at one point we were developing and evolving to where we were able to mitigate and forecast and prepare against that. This is highlighted again, more recently, with the earthquake that just hit in Iran, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake, a massive earthquake, which—and this is something we’ve been looking at—occurred two days after a coronal mass ejection from the Sun. Now, what the exact relationship is there, we still need to investigate. These are the things that NASA could be investigating; these are the kinds of things we could be looking at as we increase our extrasensory capability, so to speak. What is that relationship between the activity of the Sun, and things like volcanoes, earthquakes, extreme weather? Fan-Chiang: And also health. Jones: Health, right: We’ve seen relationships between epidemics and changes in solar activity. All these things are questions, but we do see definite relationships between the activity of the Sun, the activity of other cosmic events, and then, extreme weather, extreme geological changes, health changes here on Earth. FIGURE 7a, 7b Hurricane Sandy, 2012 40 Physical Economy EIR May 17, 2013 But again, we’re moving into a period where we’re flying blind, because of this paradigm of anti-science, anti-culture, anti-progress, even as we’re moving into a period which

seems to be increasingly turbulent in terms of extreme events in our cosmos, as they affect things here on Earth. We’re making ourselves more and more vulnerable to these kinds of forces. And so, I think it really highlights the necessity for a paradigm shift, to get back to the Classical paradigm, where science, culture, morality, and the human creative spirit really are the driving forces of mankind, and mankind’s relationship to the universe around us. Appendix What Creates Wealth? Production vs. Overhead by John Hoefle There is a critical need to put people back to work, to restore employment that will allow them to survive. But putting people back to work in the same types of jobs they had before the financial system exploded will not solve our problems. Jobs are not just about providing money to pay the bills; what a population does for its living determines whether that society will prosper or decline. Economic activity is best measured in terms of production versus overhead. These are not value judgments on how well a person does his or her job, but are based upon the nature of the work being performed. A good example of productive activity is manufacturing, such as the chain of processes that turn ores into finished metals, and turn those metals into products like machine tools and power plants. Wealth is created in this manner, since the value of the outputs are greater than the costs of the inputs and the processing. On the other hand, banking is an example of overhead. Banks do not create wealth, but merely move it from one pocket to another. The distinction is crucial. Productive activity creates wealth, while overhead activity consumes that wealth. Some of that consumption is necessary. We gladly pay the costs of caring for our children, and perhaps less happily pay the costs of the roads, water and sewer systems, and related common infrastructure that allow our society to function. In fact, if we didn’t make such investments—as in research and development, major infrastructure projects such as the TVA, and education—our society would stagnate and die. But in a properly structured economy, the wealth created by productive activity exceeds the amounts spent on necessary overhead by a considerable margin, making the necessary overhead easily affordable. If a society abandons productive activity in favor of overhead—if it ceases producing wealth in favor of merely consuming its own surplus and wealth produced by others—then the costs of overhead activities become burdensome, even deadly. This is where we are today. Look at Labor The essence of the problem can be seen in Figure 2 (p. 36), which compares the contributions to GDP from the manufacturing sector with the contributions to GDP from the FIRE (finance, insurance, real estate) sector, as reported by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. However, the truth is actually worse, as the graph itself is a constructive fraud, in that it presents the activities of the FIRE sector as contributing to the economy, when in truth, many of those activities are parasitical. According to the official GDP calculations, the egregious frauds by Wall Street, the derivatives bets at the big banks and AIG, and the run-up in real estate values caused by financial speculation—activities which blew a giant hole in the U.S. and global economies and threw millions out of work—all contributed to our economic product. It’s the equivalent of counting the growth of a giant tumor as proof the patient is thriving, or counting shoplifting as sales. Not everything in the FIRE sector is theft. The real estate market provides places for

people to live and work, and the banking sector provides essential financial services, for example; overhead, but necessary overhead. However, much of what occurs in the FIRE sector is malignant. The same banking system that provides your checking account also manipulates interest rates, supports the drug trade by laundering its money, finances the movement of productive jobs offshore, jacks your credit-card interest payments through the roof, illegally forecloses on homes, funnels billions into Washington to prevent corrective regulations like the reinstatement of Glass-Steagall, and a host of other crimes. All of which, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, contribute to the fiction known as GDP. May 17, 2013 EIR Physical Economy 41 Production Deficit Now look at a related aspect of this problem, by comparing employment in the production of goods to employment in the providing of services (Figure 4, p. 37). The goods-producing category includes manufacturing, construction, mining and logging—all useful activities. The service-providing sector includes trade, transportation, utilities, information processing, financial activities, professional and business services, education, health care, leisure and hospitality, and other miscellaneous services. Many of these services are quite useful, even essential. But economically speaking, they are a cost which must be paid out of the profits generated by production. Since 1950, employment in goods-production has remained essentially flat, growing from 17.3 million to 18.4 million, whereas employment in services has more than quadrupled, from 28 million to 115 million. As bad as that is, it understates the problem, since our population has doubled since 1950. Figure 1 shows the same employment figures on a per-capita basis, indexed to 1950 to give a different view of the changes. The accelerating decline in the proportion of our population involved in goods production is both obvious and ominous, but so is the decline between 2000 and 2010 in the service workers. We see the rise of an unsustainable system, and the beginning—but only the beginning—of its collapse, The worst is yet to come. To put these changes in the context of the workforce as a whole, we have Figure 3 (p. 37), which shows the relative proportions of employment in manufacturing; non-manufacturing goods production; trade, transportation, and utilities (TTL); government; and other private services. The latter three categories (TTL, government, and other private services) collectively comprise the service sector. In 1950, manufacturing (31%) and non-manufacturing goods production (7%) accounted for 38% of total employment, but by 2012, that had fallen to 9% and 5%, respectively, or 14% of total employment. On the service side, TTL went from 21% to 19% for the same period, while government went from 14% to 16%, and other private services nearly doubled, from 27% to 51%. Overall, services grew from 62% of jobs in 1950 to 86% in 2012. It should be obvious by this point that simply putting people back to work in the same types of jobs they had before, will not solve the problem. What we were doing before, collectively, is the problem. We became a nation of consumers, not producers.NASA key to solving climate changeVaidyanathan 16 — Gayathri Vaidyanathan, covers climate science for E&E Publishing’s Climatewire. Her work has appeared in the Washington Post,

Discover, Nature, Cell, the Wall Street Journal, WNYC Radio News, Huffington Post and other places. She was given the 2014 Society of Professional Journalists Dateline Award for feature writing. In 2012, she received the Evert Clark/Seth Payne Award by the National Association of Science Writers given to the best science journalist under 30. She received a Groundtruth reporting fellowship in 2014 to report on youth unemployment and politics in India; a U.N. foundation grant in 2012 to report on the U.N. general assembly; and a Nature-IDRC grant in 2011 to report from the developing world. She has a M.S. in Journalism from Columbia University’s Graduate School of Journalism, and a B.Sc. in Biochemistry from McMaster University in Canada. 6-2-2016 ("U.S. Congress Aims to Cut Climate Science," Scientific American, 6-2-2016, Available Online at http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/u-s-congress-aims-to-cut-climate-science/, Accessed 7-17-2016, RJS)Congress is considering spending bills that would significantly cut funding for key climate change research by NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration in 2017. Among the losers: the oldest carbon dioxide observatories on the planet, the ability to track fossil fuel emissions in the United States and a program to study ocean acidification. “We are asking for a small amount of money to do all the right things,” said James Butler, director of global monitoring at NOAA’s Earth System Research Laboratory (ESRL). The spending bill passed by the House Appropriations Committee last week allocates $128 million for NOAA’s climate research, a 20 percent cut from the previous year. The bill allocates $1.7 billion for NASA’s earth science division, a 12 percent cut from 2016. Republican appropriators termed climate and ocean services research “lower-priority,” which earned them a rebuke from Democrats. “It’s important that we provide appropriate support across all the fields and not just the few mission directorates or a few of the sciences,” Rep. Mike Honda (D-Calif.) said. “So, to this end, I’m disappointed that the earth science funding was so dramatically cut.” The Senate Appropriations Committee passed its comparatively less brutal spending bill in April. Senate appropriators chose to maintain funding at 2016 levels for both agencies. The differences between the House and Senate appropriators will have to be resolved during conference negotiations. ClimateWire analyzed the House spending bill and NASA and NOAA’s original budget requests to identify programs that might suffer, and ones that will receive love, in 2017. CARBON MONITORING Since the 1950s, NOAA has been tracking CO2 and other gases in the atmosphere at six observatories located in Mauna Loa, Hawaii; Summit, Greenland; Trinidad Head, Calif; the South Pole; Barrow, Alaska; and American Samoa. Thousands of scientists use the data generated at these iconic observatories to study the climate system. The observatories are in dire need of updates. Congress has, in effect, kept funding flat since the 1970s, which has put them at operational risk, according to NOAA. ESRL is beginning to dip into its research funding pot to pay for things like new electrical wiring to deal with corrosion, said Butler. Without adequate funding, two of the six observatories might be affected next year, he said. “Adding up all those little things, like fuel and wear and tear and the superinflationary costs

of these sites, and increasing demand for the information from these sites, we just need a little bit more,” he said. “We are not asking for a whole lot more, but a little bit more to just bring us back to speed so we are not dipping into research dollars to maintain these.” NOAA requested an extra $3 million from Congress, though Butler said the actual need is closer to $12 million. But the plea fell on deaf ears in the House, as appropriators cut funding for climate labs run by NOAA by 17 percent below 2016 levels. The cut will not accrue solely to the baseline laboratories, which are a high priority at NOAA, but the observatories may go another year without an increase in funding. HUMAN-CAUSED EMISSIONS Nations signed a climate deal in Paris last year, and many submitted pledges to curb their CO2 emissions. NOAA would like to set up a facility that would allow scientists to check if nations are keeping their word. “In the light of the Paris climate agreement, there’s going to be a very strong need for some form of objective verification for policy purposes,” said Pieter Tans, a climate scientist at ESRL. “We have an opportunity to come up with an observing system that will give us an objective tool to measure the amount of success that [nations’ climate] pledges have.” At present, no one directly measures CO2 emissions in the atmosphere released by humans. CO2 has many origins, some natural, such as respiring trees, and some man-made, such as power plants. Isolating just the human contribution can be challenging because the natural emissions can be large and varying. So, NOAA scientists will rely on a quirk of nature: All living beings, including trees, respire a heavier CO2 molecule comprising a carbon isotope called C14. CO2 emitted by power plants, in contrast, does not contain C14. By tracking C14, scientists can pinpoint the carbon emissions of a particular region. Most other proposals to track CO2 typically suggest the use of satellites, such as the Orbiting Carbon Observatory-2 (OCO-2) that NASA launched in 2014 with the goal of identifying the sources and sinks of CO2 (ClimateWire, May 28, 2014). The European Space Agency also has similar projects in the pipeline. But scientists who track CO2 with their boots firmly on the ground are skeptical about the utility of satellite data, which scientists have to tinker with to resolve biases in the data stream that can overwhelm the signals. Ultimately, satellites would have to detect changes of 0.1 part per million of CO2 in an atmosphere containing 400 ppm. That’s a level of accuracy that no satellite has so far accomplished, Tans said. It may take more than a decade for OCO-2’s data to be useful, he said. The same goals could be accomplished using the proposed ground-based system. NOAA would like to track U.S. emissions by collecting 5,000 samples per year and analyzing them at a dedicated center in Colorado. Tans estimates the program would cost $5 million annually to operate. “Which, in the big scheme of things, is nothing really,” he said. “It is a hell of a lot cheaper than satellites.” NOAA requested a budget increase of $3 million for launching this program and for expanding its existing regional network of carbon measuring stations. This program also falls under climate labs, which suffer a 17 percent cut in the House spending bill. OCEAN TRACKING The oceans are a large carbon sink, absorbing about a quarter of the CO2 emitted by humans between 2002 and 2011. NOAA has been measuring the uptake of CO2 by the oceans for more than 25 years, using a

network of 40 moorings and oceangoing vessels. The work has revealed that the oceans, on average, take up 2.6 billion metric tons of carbon a year. The uptake is not uniform throughout the oceans. In some parts, such as the equatorial Pacific Ocean, upwelling currents expel CO2 into the atmosphere. And in other parts, such as off the coast of Japan, a springtime phytoplankton bloom sucks CO2 back into the ocean. “We have to study that very carefully to understand how all that balances out,” said Christopher Sabine, director of NOAA’s Pacific Marine Environmental Laboratory. Ideally speaking, scientists could use more ships and moorings to get more accurate measurements, Sabine said. “Right now, 40 moorings for the entire ocean is not very many, so we have to use various mathematical and statistical approaches for extrapolating the few measurements we have out to the global oceans,” he said. “We are fairly confident in what we’re doing, but more observations are better and we can begin to knock down that uncertainty.” The House budget allocates the $42 million that NOAA requested for oceans monitoring and observation programs. But it does not fund related ocean acidification research that the Obama administration had identified as a priority. The oceans have been acidifying due to the input of excess CO2, affecting some aquatic species with calcium carbonate shells. NOAA would like to launch a program to assess the vulnerability of various communities to the problem. “That is the one piece of ocean acidification that has been very limited because of funding,” Sabine said. The president requested an increase of $11 million in 2017 for integrated ocean acidification research, but the House appropriators instead cut funding for the program by 15 percent below 2016 levels. Senate appropriators allocated an extra $3.5 million to the program. NASA EARTH SCIENCES The House spending bill allocates $1.7 billion for NASA’s earth sciences, a 12 percent cut from 2016 funding levels, while the Senate bill allocates $1.9 billion, slightly more than the president’s request. The appropriators do not specify how the cuts should be distributed across the directorate, but they did pick out their favorite programs. The House bill directs NASA to prioritize the NASA-Indian Space Research Organization’s Synthetic Aperture Radar mission that would monitor ecosystem disturbances such as ice sheet collapse, earthquakes, tsunamis and landslides once launched in 2020. Senate appropriators stipulated that $131 million should be allocated for Landsat 9, an Earth-observing satellite that would be launched in 2020. They also allocated $90 million for PACE, a satellite that would track aerosols, clouds and oceans once launched in 2021.

Contention Four is SolvencyInherency – US has repeatedly shot down space treaties, US is losing space dominance as more countries (namely China) enter space along with the private sector. Hampson 15 — Joshua Hampson studied International Relations and Economics at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, and graduated in 2013 with a First Class MA degree. He has since worked as a political risk analyst, a foreign policy fellow in the US House of Representatives, and an international relations forecaster. He is currently a macroeconomic and international strategy analyst for Wikistrat, 10-15-2015 ("Space to Breathe: The Argument for a New Outer Space Treaty," The Potomac Institute, 10-15-2015, Available Online at http://www.potomacinstitute.org/steps/views-in-brief/46-space-to-breathe-the-argument-for-a-new-outer-space-treaty, Accessed 6-28-2016, RJS)The United States has thus sought to protect its ability to exploit space independent of international oversight. Within the current mindset, it is intolerable to cede potential capabilities to global veto. Thus the United States has not supported UN efforts to ban weapons in space and to prevent an outer space arms race.5 A list of recent actions include: In 2014, The United States voted against a UN “no first placement of weapons in outer space” draft resolution. In 2008, The United States argued in the UN that it is impossible to define space-based weapons, and that an effective agreement on banning terrestrial-based anti-satellite systems is also impossible;6 In 2005, The United States voted against an at- tempt in the UN to stipulate that the legal regime in outer space needed enhancement to prevent an arms race.7 The era of unconstrained American exploitation of space is passing, however, regardless of a potential treaty. There are new technological and developmental trends that will force a new American approach to space. The first trend ties into the increasing use of space and the inherent low level of survivability of space infra- structure. Shrapnel fields, for example, prove incredibly disruptive to space operations. In 2007, China demonstrated its capability to destroy space infrastructure in a test that generated thousands of highly dangerous shrapnel fragments.8 The anti-satellite test demonstrated that potential challengers to the global order are pursuing means to deny American space services9 through asymmetric exploitation of American vulnerabilities in space.10 The United States recognizes that space infrastructure will likely be a future target. War games organized by the US Army have demonstrated American vulnerability and dependency on space.11 Yet deterring an attack against its space infrastructure is difficult. Few comparative threats can be leveled against a non-space-integrated military when American space infrastructure is threatened. American allies have also pursued a greater space presence, increasing the complexity of the space environment.12 An equally demanding problem is the growing crowdedness of space as private enterprise enters the space arena. In all, it is becoming difficult for any single power to keep track of what exactly is up there. The shift in the international environment of

space – growth of rival powers, asymmetric balancing, and the growing complexity of maneuvering within space itself – must lead to a shift in the American approach to international space policy. When international involvement was limited it was easier to reject draft treaties, but as exploitation of space has progressed, the lack of a comprehensive structure could prove dangerous. There are, however, steps that could be taken.US key – aff spills over, dialog alone solves. Grego and Wright 10 - Laura Grego, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program Dr. Laura Grego focuses on the technology and security implications of national missile defense and of space security. She is the author or co-author of more than 20 peer-reviewed, published papers on a range of topics. Since joining UCS in September 2002, she has been cited by Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New Scientist, New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today, and has appeared on Fox News, the Discovery Channel and NPR. She also has testified before Congress and addressed the United Nations Conference on Disarmament on space security issues. Before joining UCS, Grego was a postdoctoral researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. She earned a doctorate degree in experimental physics at the California Institute of Technology and a bachelor of science degree in physics and astronomy at the University of Michigan, and David Wright, Co-Director, Global Security Program David Wright is a nationally known expert on the technical aspects of nuclear weapons policy, missile defense systems, missile proliferation, and space weapons. He has authored numerous articles and reports on arms control and international security, including Toward True Security: Transforming U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Securing the Skies: Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space, and The Physics of Space Security. Since 1990, he has been a primary organizer of the International Summer Symposiums on Science and World Affairs, which foster cooperation among scientists around the world working on arms control and security issues. In 2001, he was a co-recipient of the American Physical Society’s Joseph A. Burton Forum Award for his arms control research and his work with international scientists. Before joining UCS in 1992, Dr. Wright was a senior research analyst with the Federation of American Scientists and served as an SSRC-MacArthur fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He received his doctorate degree in physics from Cornell University in 1983 and worked as a research physicist from 1983 to 1988.November 2010 (“Securing the Skies Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space,” Union of Concerned Scientists, Available Online at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf, Accessed 7-4-2016, RJS)U.S. Leadership Is Necessary Achieving the long-term goals listed above requires serious and sustained engagement among all space actors. Given the United States’ preeminence in space and its recent opposition to negotiations on space issues, it should assume a major collaborative role. It needs either to initiate efforts or to respond constructively to others’ initiatives so that progress can be made. The Obama administration has signaled that it is open to discussions, though not to negotiations, on space security issues at the CD. However, making progress at the CD or another forum requires more than just openness to the process; it also requires active commitment by the United States and other nations to find a way forward. By initiating multilateral discussions or stating its commitment to engaging in them, the United States would show that it is serious about trying to find mutually beneficial solutions to outstanding space security issues. These gestures alone could have important initial effects, such as the building of contacts and the establishment of better channels of communication among appropriate U.S. individuals and their counterparts in other space-faring nations. U.S. participation would also compel these countries and other interested parties to develop the necessary national expertise on space security—diplomatic,

technical, legal, and economic—that dissipated, if it existed at all, during the many years’ absence of substantive discussions. Raising the priority of space security and prompting governments to develop nuanced policies would give important domestic stakeholders, who previously may not have been weighing in, a voice in their country’s policy discussions. This would be true not only in the United States but elsewhere as well.A treaty is key to solve, China says yes. Smith 8 – Andrew K. Smith, 4-12-2008 (“The Next Space Race: Impact of Anti-Satellite Weapons on International Relations and Peaceful Space Programs,” American Public University System, Available Online at: https://www.apus.edu/content/dam/online-library/student-papers/smith-2008.pdf, Accessed: 6/27/2016, RJS) The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 is little help in the matter. The spirit of the treaty is conducive to peaceful exploration and cooperation in space, but fails to specifically address the issue of launching a weapon from Earth into space with the intent of destroying a satellite (United Nations 1967). In 1967, many of the capabilities disallowed by the treaty were unachievable by any nations, and it was in the best interests of most nations to ratify the treaty out of fear that they would not be the first to develop the capabilities to allow domination of space for military purposes. Forty years later, with nations now discovering the ability to wage a limited form of war in space based around targeting satellites, specific methods of doing so such as kinetic strike missiles may be outside of the spirit but within the confines of the language in the treaty. This creates challenges for a new treaty, and will require a combination of deterrence from other nations and significant changes to several national policies before a new treaty can be ratified. The U.S. made Russia and China both eager for a new arms treaty after US 193’s destruction in February and continued efforts to achieve antiballistic missile defenses in eastern Europe, but there seems to be little reason for the U.S. to ratify a treaty that would force it to abandon its hopes for space dominance and freedom of action against enemy missile launches. Adjustment to U.S. national policy would obviously change this state of affairs, but will only come if U.S. policymakers are convinced of the devastation that would result from a shooting war in space. This requires China to continue a policy of deterrence using a combination of nuclear and ASAT weapons. With China only possessing 60 ASAT-vulnerable low-earth orbit satellites, the U.S. has significantly more to lose if such a conflict were to arise as both nations losing a satellite would be a net loss for the United States (Hoffman 2007). Because of this, China merely needs to possess enough ASATs to achieve “second strike” capability against a hostile U.S. action (Shixiu 2007, 7-9). If China is able to outmaneuver the U.S. regarding ASATs, it may serve as sufficient incentive for the U.S. to seek a treaty before the aforementioned second strike capability is utilized in a first strike scenario. The U.S. faces another challenge in that no real physical defenses for satellites are currently feasible.

Satellites that can shoot down incoming missiles are pipe dreams, while any large-scale anti-missile shield development would only further accelerate hostilities between the U.S. and China. The fact remains that satellites will remain vulnerable to even low-tech attacks, and that the biggest killer to space-based objects during a space war would be debris. Because of this vulnerability, the U.S. must depend on a treaty to protect its assets. As mentioned before, the U.S. has the most to lose if space were denied to all nations and must understand that defending a satellite against debris or some other low-tech attack is impossible. With these ideas in mind, the U.S. must embrace the futility of defending its satellites in space with anything short of a preemptive war to deny the propagation of anti-satellite weaponry. Such a conflict would be an absurd action to take and utterly impossible to sell to the American public postIraq, so the appropriate course of action would be to set ground rules on the legitimate use of ASAT weapons in wartime, and ban outright the use of kinetic strike weapons if necessary due to their creation of space debris (Krepon and Katz-Hyman 2005, 328). Cooperation with China is key, despite security concerns. Weibin, 14 — Zhao Weibin, Dr. Zhao Weibin is a Research Fellow for the Center on China-America Defense Relations (CCADR) at the PLA Academy of Military Science (AMS), 7-9-2014 ("Sino-US Competition and Cooperation in Outer Space," No Publication, 7-9-2014, Available Online at http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/sino-us-competition-and-cooperation-in-outer-space/, Accessed 7-4-2016, RJS)Early this June, the National Research Council (NRC) released a report entitled Pathways to Exploration— Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration, advocating the inclusion of China in international space collaboration. Indeed, as an increasingly important domain of the global commons, outer space is experiencing growing interests of both the United States and China. Despite various areas of competition, the two countries may still find many benefits in space cooperation. To overcome the obstacles, this article attempts to propose some approaches to effective cooperation. With the advent of the 21st century, the strategic significance of outer space has been elevated. It has been a strategic choice for major powers to advance space technologies, build up space power, and compete for advantageous positions in space. However, with the increase of emerging space-faring countries and commercial entities, there are more spacecraft, less orbit and electromagnetic spectrum resources, and more space debris. Additionally, space arms control is encountering many difficulties. Development, competition, cooperation and confrontation are coexisting and interweaving in outer space. Reaching for the stars is one of China’s dreams in order to catch up with other powers and realize the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Scientifically, the advancement of space technologies can help boost innovations in material science, systems engineering, and other relevant areas. Politically, space exchanges and cooperation with other countries can provide a new stage to present national prestige and exert international influence. For the United States, space assets are indispensable to economic prosperity and national

security. Economically, certain technologies can guarantee smooth commercial and financial activities such as global communications, GPS, navigation and timing (PNT), environmental monitoring, etc. Militarily, space capabilities have proven to be a significant force multiplier when integrated into military operations. Unfortunately, there is competition between China and the U.S. in outer space at the legal, military and diplomatic levels. At the legal level, negotiation and bargaining on the establishment of an international code of conduct to govern behavior in space is now the focus of Sino-U.S. competition. In February 2008, China and Russia proposed a draft “Treaty on Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space and of the Threat or Use of Force against Outer Space Objects” (PPWT). The EU has also put forward three versions of a code of conduct for behavior in space. For fear of restrictions and concessions on military uses of space, the U.S. has refused to accept both the EU and the China-Russia versions. At the military level, control and the ability to counter control space will be the key to future Sino-U.S. confrontation. In the 14 versions of U.S. DoD annual reports on China’s military strength, the U.S. DoD has maintained consistent concern over the PLA’s space and counter-space capabilities. As mentioned in the Joint Publication 3-14 Space Operations released on May 29, 2013, the U.S. has decided to negate adversary space capabilities through deception, disruption, denial, degradation, or destruction, thus targeting an adversary’s space-related capabilities and forces by use of both lethal and nonlethal means. At the diplomatic level, winning international support is the hot point of Sino-U.S. competition. Due to U.S. obstruction, China now can only have limited international exchanges and cooperation on space technologies and activities. Nevertheless, both China and the U.S. can gain benefits from space cooperation. For example, joint promotion of establishing a fair and reasonable space code of conduct can guarantee the peaceful, stable and sustainable development of outer space. Both countries should join hands to deal with common threats such as space debris. Furthermore, against the background of a U.S. rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region, space cooperation can help reduce suspicion, increase trust, and maintain strategic stability between the two countries. Possible areas for Sino-U.S. space cooperation may include an invitation by the U.S. for China to join efforts in international space exploration (as suggested by the NRC report), the sharing of space situation awareness (SSA) information, relief of a space technology blockade against China, establishing crisis management mechanisms to guard against miscalculations, as well as the beginning of bilateral and multilateral dialogues on sensitive issues such as space weaponization. Major obstacles to Sino-U.S. space cooperation are U.S. security concerns and political resistance. With a huge generation gap in space capabilities, Americans may gain much less than the Chinese and it is understandable that the U.S. side is reluctant to cooperate and share. In addition, discrepancies on maritime disputes, cyber issues, and others concerns also hinder space cooperation between China and the U.S.. The removal of zero-sum thinking and political shackles, the integration of China into international efforts of space exploration, and the establishment of institutional bilateral space cooperation mechanisms would be effective approaches to Sino-U.S. space cooperation. Against

the backdrop of building a new model for major power relations and in the face of common space security threats, China and the U.S. should overcome the resistance, build a framework for broad space cooperation, and try to overwhelm the impulse of confrontation by the impetus of cooperation.

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Case

Star WarsASAT war would be devastating as it would destroy US military capabilities. Bussert 15 — James C. Bussert, a retired USN Master Chief Sonarman, is an ASW fire control safety deputy. He is the author of nearly 200 military/technical ariticles and cartoons, author of People’s Liberation Army Navy, 2-1-2015 ("Antisatellite Weapons Pose Major Cyberthreat," SIGNAL Magazine, 2-1-2015, Available Online at http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=antisatellite-weapons-pose-major-cyberthreat, Accessed 7-7-2016, RJS)Both technical and human solutions must be at the ready before a space attack. While infocentric nations and military forces focus on the threat to their systems from malware-wielding cyber attackers, a significant danger to cyberspace may come from outer space in the form of kinetic weapons that attack vital satellites. A great number of the tactical and strategic military systems that all major, and many minor, powers use 24 hours a day rely on satellites for vital input data. Also, nearly all satellites have dual civilian and military modes, and all nations and businesses would be impacted by any loss of the vital satellites. Even developing nations as well as major powers could cripple an opponent’s military and economic structures by using antisatellite (ASAT) capabilities, possibly as a devastating first strike. Secret think tank papers or Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) proposals would not be at the operator’s shoulder if navigation, communication or reconnaissance satellites are destroyed. U.S. operators and joint warfare exercises need to train in emergency procedures before the loss of these system-reliant capabilities in a pre-emptive attack. The defense industry and military forces need to assess what they can do to continue engagement without satellites. First and foremost are possible workarounds or backups that could mitigate the loss of satellites. There probably are black programs in these areas, but absent those, preparedness by operators if satellites are lost is essential. Users have to train as they would fight under these conditions. The nation that makes the first strike has the advantage, and it can develop alternative operations—if any—before the unsuspecting enemy can react. Target satellites fall into three basic categories. First are navigation satellites, which can be global or regional. The only operational global navigation satellite systems (GNSS) are the United States’ NAVSTAR GPS and Russia’s GLONASS. China’s regional BeiDou navigation satellites will be expanded into a global Compass GNSS by 2020, as will the European Union Galileo regional system, which launched its first operational satellite in August 2014. The United States is considering having dual GPS M-code and Galileo Public Regulated Service (PRS) receivers for backup. France, India and Japan also are developing regional navigation satellite systems. Communication satellites are another prime target. They initially were in low Earth orbit (LEO) below 1,240 miles (2,000 kilometers) and later moved to medium Earth orbit (MEO) (1,200-22,000 miles, or 2,000-36,000 kilometers). The Iridium 66 satellite constellation is in LEO. The Russian Molniya series of communications satellites

have a unique elliptical orbit that is low in the southern swing but in high Earth orbit (HEO) (above 22,000 miles) in the north above Russia for maximum use time. They have been HEO for coverage, but lately they are moving to MEO with smaller satellites and more launchers. Many of these are in fixed areas of coverage in geosynchronous orbits optimally positioned above the equator. MEO satellites include GPS navigation satellites at 20,000 kilometers, which need at least four GPS signals for accurate use. Third are the reconnaissance and tactical targeting missions done by LEO satellites. Vulnerable to many types of ASAT weapons, these even have been intercepted by surface-to-air missiles in naval ballistic missile defense (BMD) tests. One of the first ASAT programs was formed by the United States in 1959, when a 1,100-mile range Altair missile, mounted atop a Sergeant missile, conducted a mock attack on an Explorer satellite at 156 miles altitude. In May 1962, shrapnel from a close-intercept ASAT launched from Kwajalein was successful. Two months later, a nuclear warhead electromagnetic pulse (EMP) ASAT destroyed other “nontarget” satellites. After nuclear EMP satellite damage tests in the early 1960s, the ASAT program 437, based on Thor missiles, became operational in 1975. ASAT research was low priority until 1982, when news of Soviet ASAT tests was revealed. Again, the United States used the Altair upper stage, which an F-15 launched on an AGM-69 short-range attack missile, designated ASM-135 ASAT in January 1984. After a successful interception in 1986, the program was cancelled in 1988. In 2008, following a Chinese ASAT test the previous year, an SM-3 Standard Missile launched from a U.S. Aegis cruiser destroyed a U.S. spy satellite, USA-193, in a 133-mile-altitude decaying orbit. Directed energy weapons (DEW) and particle-beam weapons, such as the railgun at the Navy’s Dahlgren Laboratory, may be the next-generation ASAT technologies. The Soviet Union’s first development decision was in April 1960, which led to the UR-200 rocket that included a killer satellite among its payloads. Delays in the UR-200 program resulted in mounting the killer satellite on an R-36 rocket in 1964. After 21 test launches spanning six years versus a special target craft that recorded shrapnel hits, the R-36 ASAT was operational in 1979. The Soviets experimented with ground-based lasers and beam weapons from the 1970s to the 1980s until forced to stop because of technology and funding problems. Russia mounted ASAT missiles on some MiG-31s in the 1980s, copying earlier U.S. F-15 ASAT ASM tests. After the fall of the Soviet Union, GLONASS was crippled with only partial capability because of disrepair until the new Russian government fully restored it by 2011. The Soviets experimented with Salyut/Almaz space stations armed with autocannons to destroy approaching satellites in the 1970s. In the 1980s, the Soviets developed the Polyus orbital weapons platform designed to be equipped with nuclear space mines, a recoilless cannon and a chemical laser. It failed to reach orbit in its only test launch in 1987. China’s first ASAT test was in January 2007, when an obsolete Fengyun 1C weather satellite was destroyed by a Long March 1C rocket that collided with the satellite. In 2011, some maneuvering satellites were suspected of being part of an ASAT test. China is limited to northern latitude satellite or ASAT launches, but that drawback is being rectified by recent construction on southern Hainan Island for a geosynchronous equator

launch site. During July 2013, China used Long March 4C rockets to launch three satellites with unusual maneuvers, one having extension arms to contact target satellites. Another recent Chinese ASAT test was in May 2013, when an ASAT based upon a new Kuaizhou rocket was launched from the Xichang launch site. China could be seeking an asynchronous advantage by causing maximum damage to the West with much less impact on its less sophisticated systems with minimal noncontinental links. A 2014 U.S. government report stated that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had successfully jammed GPS signals. The Russian company Aviaconversiya has been marketing satellite jamming systems with a 200-kilometer range to Middle Eastern nations since 1999. Ironically, the United States recently destroyed Iraqi GPS jammers with GPS weapons. Future leading candidate ASAT nations are Israel and India. With Israel, development of the Arrow 3, or Hetz 3, could supply the necessary tool to provide ASAT capability if needed. India’s successful test of a new Agni-V missile in May 2012 triggered speculation of ASAT-type capabilities in that rocket at 2,000-kilometer LEO or higher geosynchronous orbits in the next few years. With all these nations threatening to remove orbital assets, countries must consider the effects of warfighting without satellite capabilities. Some solutions are technical, while others are human-oriented. Navigation satellite input data is coded into the requirements for many combat systems. As code currently is written, the lack of GPS data could greatly degrade or stop the engagement process in some combat systems. It might be possible for some system code to allow manual inputs by the operator, if selected. An obvious recommendation would be to have a patch that would not stop the computation if satellite data is suddenly lost, so that a launch could be continued when ordered by the operator. Inertial navigation systems (INS) used on platforms have the advantage of updating their position and speed without external references by revising the initial position provided by an operator with internal motion sensors. These include gyroscopes, accelerometers and motion-sensing devices. Because of small errors of the measurement devices that increase over time—termed integration drift—INS usually supplements more accurate external systems, such as GPS. Thus, INS is the initial redundancy if GPS is lost. In June 2014, DARPA briefed industry on two possible methods to navigate without GPS. They were Spatial, Temporal and Orientation Information in Contested (STOIC) environments and All Source Positioning and Navigation (ASPN) to develop positioning, navigation and timing (PNT) technology. This is the type of thinking that is needed to have a chance to continue military operations without GPS. About a dozen years ago, most seagoing vessels had navigation consisting of Sperry SRP-2000, Raytheon S-band and two X-band radars, GPS and NAVSAT (Transit) satellites, Omega VLF and Loran-C, not counting charts, star fixes and other traditional tools. The U.S. government eliminated Omega VLF, Transit and Loran-C. These possible navigation alternatives to GPS are gone. Dead reckoning technology enhancements, such as ring laser gyroscopes, help accuracy amid longer time between fixes. In past conflicts, navy warships conducted navigation and combat engagements with analog dead reckoning tracers (DRTs) and grease pencil status boards. These have been replaced with computer-aided DRT (CADRT) relying on

GPS inputs to function. Operators should be trained to switch to alternate navigation sources to continue operations. Modern warship command and control systems such as Aegis have navigation sensor integration systems that are programmed to change automatically from one sensor to an alternate if one is lost in the auto mode. Inputs include INS, altitude or bottom depth and pitlog, in addition to GPS. Good systems allow the operator to manually choose the best alternate, which would occur if GPS were lost, for example. Plans to eliminate U-2 reconnaissance aircraft should be reconsidered, because if reconnaissance satellites were destroyed, the U-2 could provide a backup reconnaissance capability that it has demonstrated successfully for decades. If a communications satellite link is lost, other frequency band communication such as HF to SHF bands should be attempted as alternatives. To avoid the operator trying to figure out which redundant communication equipment possibly could augment the lost communications satellite, a poster should be available with the best or worst choices as determined by senior communication staffs. Planning can enable ready availability of such plans when they suddenly and unexpectedly are needed. The United States also could have additional GPS-capable satellites that send no signals to reveal their capabilities to the enemy. When other active GPS satellites are destroyed, these sleeper satellites could be activated by ground controllers to replace destroyed satellites. Hardening satellites to counter jamming, radiation and other threats is an obvious ongoing design objective. In the same realm as redundant replacement navigation systems for our forces, equal attention should be paid to elimination of alternate Chinese navy navigation aids such as coastal LORAN-A, chains of differential GPS (DGPS) buoys and VLF stations from Manchuria down to Hainan and the South China Sea. Similarly, careful electronics intelligence (ELINT) and intelligence monitoring detecting unusual enemy communication or navigation patterns, and training as if its own assets were destroyed, could be a clue that China is planning a pre-emptive ASAT attack. In its advertisement literature, the newest versions of Chinese antiship missiles have replaced GPS with China’s BeiDou satellite navigation. Although ASAT threats could have a worldwide effect on military and civilian commerce, some likely scenarios would be limited to one geographic area, such as the western Pacific and the South China Sea. This could provide China with an advantage over the United States by having the target satellites above its airspace. If land-launched ASAT rockets are the vehicles as in the Chinese April 2014 tests, that could be the case; but higher-technology U.S. ASAT lasers on ships would put the United States on more than equal footing with unlimited ASAT beams versus single-shot Chinese rockets. Of course, China also is developing lethal lasers. Politically, it may not be possible to keep ASAT destruction limited to only one geographic area, and escalation to higher level warfare would be hard to avoid. One obvious complication is that nearly all GPS-type satellites designed by different nations or organizations share the GPS frequencies and commercial capabilities that are in orbit. The only military difference is the higher-resolution features supposedly not available to most other nations. Open sources say this adds up to a 20-meter commercial circular error probability (CEP) versus a 10-meter military CEP. All of

these satellites might have to be destroyed in addition to the opponents’ assets to deny them navigation information for their weapon systems and platforms. This raises the issue of how U.S. forces would be able to utilize allied nation GPS-type navigation or communication satellites if U.S. assets are destroyed. The enemy may not want to destroy neutral-nation satellites to avoid having them as adversaries. Also, they may want to use them if their own navigation satellites are destroyed. Examples adjacent to China would be the Indian Regional Navigation Satellite System (IRNSS) seven-satellite network to be completed this year or the Japanese Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) development system that launched in 2010.War escalates even if US loses their satellite capabilities. Osborn 16 — Kris Osborn became the Managing Editor of Scout Warrior in August of 2015. His role with Scout.com includes managing content on the Scout Warrior site and generating independently sourced original material. Scout Warrior is aimed at providing engaging, substantial military-specific content covering a range of key areas such as weapons, emerging or next-generation technologies and issues of relevance to the military. Just prior to coming to Scout Warrior, Osborn served as an Associate Editor at the Military.com. This story originally appeared in Scout Warrior, 5-26-2016 ("This Is How the U.S. Army Will Fight If American Satellites are Smashed," National Interest, 5-26-2016, Available Online at http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/how-the-us-army-will-fight-if-american-satellites-are-16354, Accessed 7-12-2016, RJS)The Army is evaluating a new vehicle-mounted radio technology that enables Strykers, tactical trucks, HMMWVs and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles to share real-time, combat-relevant information across the force. The new radios, called the Mid-tier Networking Vehicular Radio, was recently assessed in various combat scenarios to include rugged, mountainous terrain, woodland areas and dense vegetation to assess its ability to relay IP packets of info through various high-bandwidth waveforms, service officials told Scout Warrior. A concept behind this technology, referred to as software programmable radio, is to enable mission command tactical information sharing across the force in a combat environment in the event that satellite systems are disabled due to an enemy attack. “The mid-tier network assessment utilized approximately 85 MNVR radios to provide voice, data and retrains communications and connectivity from one operational battalion to brigade. The assessments were conducted in various terrain including wooded areas,” Paul Mehney, Communication Director for Program Executive Office Command, Control and Communications. The MNVR, made by the Harris Corp., uses NSA certified encryption for additional safety and protection. It integrates into vehicles on-the-move in combat to transmit voice, pictures and data, he explained. With software programmable radio, each device functions as both a radio and router able to wirelessly transmit information through several government-owned high-bandwidth radios. Some of these waveforms include Soldier Radio Waveform and Wideband Networking Waveform engineered to wirelessly send IP packets, pictures and data across the force without needing a

fixed infrastructure such as a cell tower or satellite. (This piece first appeared in Scout Warrior here.) For instance, if anti-satellite weapons were used to destroy or disable a U.S. satellite, SatCom communication could be compromised or destroyed. In this circumstance, operational forces in combat would still need to communicate location, tactical information and various command and control details while on-the-move in a fast-moving battlefield. A key part of the rationale for this emerging technology is an ability to rapidly relay important data while on-the-move from the company level up to battalion and brigade authorities. Potential rivals, such as China, are known to be developing what is called ASAT, or anti-satellite, weapons designed for that purpose. As a result, Army engineers, scientists and experts have been working vigorously on developing technologies able to function in what’s called a “SatCom denied” environment. This is particularly significant because the well-known and widely used force-tracking technology, called Blue Force Tracker, relies upon satellites to provide icons on a digital map displaying combat, terrain and force-tracking information. The high-bandwidth radios are able to operate in what’s called a “beyond-line-of-sight” environment where mountains, weather or terrain might otherwise obscure communications. “The WNW waveform brings the ability to transmit voice, data and video in worse terrain or where there is a lack of SatCom. It provides you a more robust capability. It provides you a mobile cell tower but through radio waveforms instead of satellite if you are in a SatCom denied environment, offering beyond line of sight capability to transmit data,” Mehney added. The combat scenarios were executing during a regular Army event called the Network Integration Evaluation at White Sands Missile Range, N.M. The Network Integration Evaluation, or NIE, included approximately 2,000 Soldiers from the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division performing Combined Arms Maneuver missions over more than 1,062 square miles. “Army used the NIE to assess the mid-tier of our network. During the NIE we observed that the mid-tier network provided an important link enabling communications and connectivity at the platoon and company level with higher echelons such as battalion and brigade,” Mehney said. The MNVR is slated to field with Soldiers by 2018 and 2019, he added.

A2 MuellerTheir card is a strawperson argument – Mueller goes aff, 3 reasons:Mueller 13 – Karl Mueller, is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He specializes in research related to military and national security strategy, particularly coercion and deterrence. Mueller has written and lectured on a wide variety of national security subjects, including airpower theory, grand strategy, economic sanctions, nuclear proliferation, counterterrorism policy, space weapons, and wargaming. Among his recent RAND publications are Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (2015), Denying Flight: Strategic Options for Employing No-Fly Zones (2013), Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Forrest E. Morgan et al., 2008), and Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy (2006). He is currently working on projects about defending the Baltic States, managing crisis escalation, and the future of U.S. airpower. Before joining RAND in 2001, Mueller was a professor of comparative military studies at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). He is currently an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University and in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. Mueller received his Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University, September 2013, (“The Absolute Weapon and the Ultimate High Ground: Why Nuclear Deterrence and Space Deterrence Are Strikingly Similar - Yet Profoundly Different,” part of Stimson report: “Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations,” edited by Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, published by Stimson, Accessible Online at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/170907/Anti-satellite_Weapons.pdf, Accessed 7/13/16, RJS) Yet there are conditions under which attacking US satellites might indeed appear to be sound policy for an adversary, even though these are likely to be more limited than is often supposed. Three sets of circumstances loom especially large. The first is situations in which an ASAT attack, or a series of them, would offer a substantial military payoff in a situation of ongoing or imminent crisis or conflict. This would be most likely if attacking satellites were a way to exploit key vulnerabilities of US military power; how substantial the potential for that to be the case in the future will depend greatly on the ways in which the United States carries out the various elements of its military transformation plans over the coming generation, in addition to how well it deals with the challenges of satellite protection per se. Achieving such effects on a large scale would require considerable ASAT capabilities, and thus would likely be the purview of relatively major powers.11 Second, ASAT attacks promising more limited benefits might be attractive in cases where ASAT capabilities had already been built – perhaps only as a deterrent to US ASAT attacks – and a conflict or crisis subsequently broke out in which it appeared likely that the systems eventually would be destroyed or rendered ineffective: a “use it or lose it” situation. In a conflict in which the adversary faced the prospect of conquest or regime change being imposed by the United States, of course, every weapon would fall into the “use it or lose it” category, and high stakes (and possibly psychological desperation) could be expected to make deterrence particularly difficult. Third, ASAT attacks could be appealing by offering a way to attack the United States or its allies (or to send a powerful coercive signal about one’s willingness to use force) while limiting escalation risks, making retaliation problematic or allowing the state launching them to maintain the moral high ground. Damaging or destroying satellites 47 could cause considerable economic or perhaps military damage without killing many people – depending on the nature

of the attack it is conceivable there would be no immediate loss of life – and without attacking the adversary’s homeland. Among the possibilities, a high-altitude nuclear detonation could offer a way to employ nuclear weapons without causing mass destruction, in response to which the likelihood of US nuclear retaliation might appear to be quite low.

Debris

A2 PrivatizationLack of jurisdiction means that the private sector cannot remove space debris. Oliver and Pugliese 15 - Stéphane Oliver and Antoine Pugliese, supervised by Victor Dos Santos Paulino (“Active Debris Removal: A Business Opportunity?” Toulouse Business School, Available Online at: http://chaire-sirius.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Oliver-Pugliese-2015-Active-Debris-Removal-A-Business-Opportunity-Unknown.pdf, Accessed 7-2-2016, RJS)A clear lack of jurisdiction. Since the first steps of mankind in space, spacefaring nations have established agreements in order to create a juridical framework for the space conquest and the space industry. The Outer Space Treaty, ratified in 1967, forms the basis of space law and gives the first principles for governing the activities of States in the exploration and the use of outer space. In 1972 the Space Liability Convention, dealing with the eventual damages caused by space objects, started including space debris in its scope, thus expanding the former treaty. One of the main principles of this convention is that ―States are internationally responsible for all space objects that are launched within their territory [...], and then States are fully liable for damages that result from their space object‖. In other words, nations are responsible for their actions and potential damages that they can cause in the space environment. It means also that the consent from the country owning a spacecraft is mandatory to remove the aforementioned object, may it be from a private or a public ownership. Indeed, the Outer Space Treaty specifies that ―countries are responsible for the outer space activities of both sides, their governmental and non-governmental entities‖. However, despite all these measures written to create a jurisdiction regarding space activities, the clear lack of a comprehensive definition of space debris remains a major issue for the development of an active debris removal solution. Indeed, even if the United Nations Committee On the Peaceful Use Of Space (UNCOPUOS) implements a new definition for space debris, we observe that the definition is too evasive. For instance, according to the IAA Cosmic Study on Space Traffic Management ―no legal distinction is made between valuable active space-craft and valueless space debris.‖ In fact, international organizations did not even take into account the fact that some space debris may not have an assigned launching state. According to Paul Kallender -Umezu in A Market for Cleaning Up Space Junk ?, ―Neither the Liability Convention nor the OST cover who is at fault if a third party disturbs a piece of debris, which explodes and later collides with another satellite, or who is liable for a removed debris object that lands on a house, private property, etc.‖ Eventually, it seems that the lack of definition and details of international laws regarding space debris makes it impossible to identify removable objects and to actually create a legal framework that would manage ODR operations and deal with space disputes. Active Debris Removal: A Business Opportunity ? 10 Oliver & Pugliese – Toulouse Business School – 2015 But as we will explain it in this second part, the fragility of space laws is not the only issue in this matter.

Colonization I/LThe Kessler Syndrome means absent action, space exploration will be impossible. Tracey 14 — Janey Tracey, Junior Editor at Outer Places LLC, Blogger at Ploughshares Journal 9-11-2014 ("Hunting Down Garbage that May Hinder Space Colonization," No Publication, 9-11-2014, Available Online at http://www.outerplaces.com/science/item/5859-garbage-orbiting-earth-may-hinder-space-colonization, Accessed 7-4-2016, RJS)Although there were many inaccuracies in the movie Gravity, the idea of some kind of disaster occurring as a result of space debris is not that far off the mark. NASA claims that there are more than 500,000 objects orbiting Earth, with one researcher going so far as to say that they've "lost control of the environment." Many scientists believe that the sheer amount of space junk will hinder any future efforts to colonize space, or even safely get out of Earth's orbit. But researchers at MIT are attempting to mitigate this problem, as they have devised an algorithm that will help human or robot garbage collectors hunt down specific pieces of space debris. The algorithm, which has been tested at the International Space Station, only uses visual data in order to track debris. Using trial-and-error methods that build a visualization of the space around the user, the algorithm allows debris collectors to track the movements and spin of objects in space. The researchers predict that once the algorithm is perfected, it will be able to track the movements of an object as large as a comet. Predicting the movements of objects as well as their spin will not only render the removal process safer, but also less expensive, as it will allow for more efficient and targeted removal. "There are thousands of pieces of broken satellites in space. If you were to send a supermassive spacecraft up there, yes, you could collect all of those, but it would cost lots of money," said Alvar Saenz-Otero, director of MIT's Space Systems laboratory. "But if you send a small spacecraft, and you try to dock to a small, tumbling thing, you also are going to start tumbling. So you need to observe that thing that you know nothing about so you can grab it and control it." The space debris problem may not only lead to increased danger surrounding future space missions, but also to the realization of the predicted Kessler syndrome. Kessler syndrome, also called collisional cascading, is the projected effect in which debris collisions create more debris, which leads to a cascade of further collisions, until the number of collisions and amount of space debris increases exponentially. Some project that collisional cascading could make both space exploration and the use of satellites impossible for many generations.

Colonization ImpactMars colonization is key to prevent extinctionJavier E. David, 15 — Javier E. David is CNBC's weekend homepage editor. He joined the site as a writer in 2012, covering energy, markets and general business/financial topics. Prior to CNBC, he covered foreign exchange and macroeconomics for Dow Jones and The Wall Street Journal, where he on occasion covered top Federal Reserve officials. He got his first start in journalism reporting on Forex/macro, capital markets and corporate governance at Reuters, also covering global policymakers, 10-17-2015 ("Why Humanity's Survival May Depend on Colonizing Mars," NBC News, 10-17-2015, Available Online at http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/innovation/why-humanitys-survival-may-depend-colonizing-mars-n446196, Accessed 7-13-2016, RJS)After decades of space exploration and countless movies on the subject, why exactly does Mars continue to inspire such high levels of cultural and scientific fascination? Both the red planet and NASA are coasting on a wave of newfound popularity, taking center stage in big-budget Hollywood productions. Whether by coincidence or design, the favorable treatment of NASA by Tinseltown comes at a time when the space agency recently discovered evidence for flowing water on Mars, and last week openly declared colonizing the planet within the next 20 years "an achievable goal." And at least a few scientists think the survival of humanity may hinge on finding a new, hospitable planet to colonize. Just a few years ago, NASA critics and even some supporters were openly questioning whether the Mars science laboratory was worth its $2.5 billion price tag. Fast forward a few years, and the space agency is moving full speed toward establishing a human presence on the planet — a quest that looks less and less quixotic by the day. Read More from CNBC: Evidence Found of 'Flowing Liquid Water' on Mars: NASA "Mars is obviously the logical next place to expand our capabilities and getting Earth crews there," Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin told CNBC in a recent interview. The famed astronaut and second man to walk on the moon's surface said sending humans to the planet would be an accomplishment "that's unparalleled in humanity." In a document outlining its rationale for sending humans to the far-flung planet — which lies 140 million miles from the Earth — NASA invoked the 1969 Apollo voyage, adding that unlike the moon, a mission to Mars would involve "going to stay." Mars' atmosphere is noted for its thin, carbon dioxide-filled air and ferocious dust storms that last for months. But given the right conditions, some think Mars could eventually be capable of sustaining humans. "We need to keep public interest stimulated and demonstrate to our leaders ... this is a most historical opportunity," Aldrin said, speaking from a conference in Israel. He added the human race was in a prime position to become "pilgrims in setting up permanence on Mars." In fact, the prospect of humans pioneering on Mars is gradually becoming more and more of a reality — and in some ways may be a necessity, a top-ranking NASA scientist told CNBC recently. "If the human species is going to survive, is it going to survive solely on Earth or not," asked Jim Greene, NASA's director of planetary science. "The appeal has been that as we explore, the next frontier beyond our atmosphere

is Mars. That captures a lot of imagination in science, but also in science fiction." Yet Greene also underscored the inherent dangers of outer space, and the imperative to discover other systems capable of sustaining human life. Read More from CNBC: The Millionaire Offering a One-Way Ticket to Mars He characterized Earth as existing in "a dangerous part of the solar system" that runs the outside risk of being hit by a "planet-killing" asteroid. Although it may sound like a plot from a science fiction movie, Greene explained that NASA has identified 876 out of more than 12,000 near-Earth objects that the agency is "really monitoring carefully." "In the last 500 million years of the Earth's history there have been five mass extinctions of species. The last one was the end of the dinosaurs," Greene said, referencing the event that scientists surmise brought about the extinction of dinosaurs more than 65 million years ago. Within the known range of potential "planet killers" — asteroids that are at least 2 km in size — that the space agency monitors, "there are more than 150 that we're really watching carefully," Greene said. These "potentially hazardous asteroids" will come within 5 million miles of the planet over the next 100 years. "They cross our orbit frequently, and we know we're going to get hit again," Greene said. "It's not a matter of if, but when." Within the last several decades, there have been minor brushes with asteroids, but none that have the potential to endanger human life on a large scale — at least not yet. Recently, NASA disclosed it was monitoring a 480-meter asteroid that could collide with the Earth sometime within the next four decades. British astronomers have been even more stark in speaking of the likelihood that a space rock of large enough size could create pandemonium around the world. Read More from CNBC: Forget Rockets, This 'Space Elevator' Could Loft You Into Orbit Asteroids "cross our orbit frequently, and we know we're going to get hit again," Greene said, underscoring that factors such as trajectory and conditions in space can determine whether asteroids hit the earth or pass it by. However, "it's not a matter of if, but when. This planet won't have a planet killer hit it for many hundreds of years, but it will happen," he added. The panoply of risks makes it important to seek out viable alternatives to ensure humanity's survival. Likening the idea of an extraterrestrial colony to a computer's external hard drive, Greene told CNBC that "If we're going to live as a species, we're going to have to 'back up' in other places ... and that place is Mars."Must get off the rock. Welsh 13 — Ian Welsh, Ian Welsh has been blogging since 2003. He was the Managing Editor of FireDogLake and the Agonist. His work has also appeared at Huffington Post, Alternet, and Truthout, as well as the now defunct Blogging of the President (BOPNews). In Canada his work has appeared in Pogge.ca and BlogsCanada. He is an editor, writer and social media consultant 12-16-2013 ("Extinction is Guaranteed if We Do Not Colonize Space," No Publication, 12-16-2013, Available Online at http://www.ianwelsh.net/extinction-is-guaranteed-if-we-do-not-colonize-space/, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)The Earth is a dangerous place, and humans make it more so. There are many scenarios, from nuclear war, to designer diseases, to nanotech goo, too

environmental catastrophe where we can wipe ourselves out. Further, there are events almost entirely beyond our control, like meteor impacts, which could wipe us out. The Earth is a mass-graveyard: most species which have ever existed are extinct. The Earth is a single point of failure. If all self-sustainable human breeding populations are on Earth, we are much more likely to go extinct, and far sooner. Getting of the rock is about human survivability in the longer run. Getting out into the solar system, learning how to create habitats and breeding populations, increases our viability. Spreading to other solar systems, whenever we can, will increase it even further. On the other hand, if we stay on Earth, especially given how incapable we are of acting in basic racial self-interest (as proved by climate change) our odds of an extinction event, and soon, go way, way up.

SolvencyEngagement with China (and Russia) key, they say yes. Grego and Wright 10 - Laura Grego, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program Dr. Laura Grego focuses on the technology and security implications of national missile defense and of space security. She is the author or co-author of more than 20 peer-reviewed, published papers on a range of topics. Since joining UCS in September 2002, she has been cited by Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New Scientist, New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today, and has appeared on Fox News, the Discovery Channel and NPR. She also has testified before Congress and addressed the United Nations Conference on Disarmament on space security issues. Before joining UCS, Grego was a postdoctoral researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. She earned a doctorate degree in experimental physics at the California Institute of Technology and a bachelor of science degree in physics and astronomy at the University of Michigan, and David Wright, Co-Director, Global Security Program David Wright is a nationally known expert on the technical aspects of nuclear weapons policy, missile defense systems, missile proliferation, and space weapons. He has authored numerous articles and reports on arms control and international security, including Toward True Security: Transforming U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Securing the Skies: Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space, and The Physics of Space Security. Since 1990, he has been a primary organizer of the International Summer Symposiums on Science and World Affairs, which foster cooperation among scientists around the world working on arms control and security issues. In 2001, he was a co-recipient of the American Physical Society’s Joseph A. Burton Forum Award for his arms control research and his work with international scientists. Before joining UCS in 1992, Dr. Wright was a senior research analyst with the Federation of American Scientists and served as an SSRC-MacArthur fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He received his doctorate degree in physics from Cornell University in 1983 and worked as a research physicist from 1983 to 1988.November 2010 (“Securing the Skies Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space,” Union of Concerned Scientists, Available Online at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf, Accessed 7-4-2016, RJS)Step 6. Begin discussions with the international community to identify the most productive venue and agenda for negotiations on space security and sustainability. Play a leading role in setting up these discussions. As noted in Chapter 3, addressing urgent space security issues requires coordination and agreement among all the countries using space. The administration should articulate that its interests are enhanced by international diplomacy, and it should announce its intention to pursue mutually beneficial limits and controls that will improve stability and security overall. The administration should place a high priority on getting broad-based international discussions started. The goal of discussions—and, ultimately, negotiations—is to protect the beneficial uses of space and prevent hostile or irresponsible uses through agreed-upon rules, institutions, and coordinating mechanisms that set standards of behavior, establish predictability, and define rights and responsibilities. The United States should begin by announcing its interest, and willingness to engage constructively, in these discussions; the administration should then gain a commitment to this process from the other actors with the biggest stakes in space. To encourage progress on the wide-ranging and sometimes thorny set of space security and sustainability issues, the initial exchanges should include discussions of the appropriate venue, format, and goals of the talks to follow. More specifically, participants should start to identify and prioritize the issues, as well as the most effective and appropriate mechanisms for addressing each one. Less formal types of cooperation, including

voluntary codes of conduct, coordination mechanisms, or transparency measures that provide information about capabilities or activities but do not constrain them—may be appropriate for some issues. By contrast, some problems are best addressed with legally binding obligations, complete with verification and compliance-management mechanisms. The full range of options should be considered in each case. To make the process more manageable, one possibility is to begin the discussions with a relatively small number of interested countries rather than all members of the CD. Initial talks should identify the other important stakeholders, including those that are not countries, that need to be included in discussions on each issue. The range of issues to be addressed is wide, encompassing space environmental and security issues and involving stakeholders from civil, governmental, and commercial sectors. Because civil and commercial satellites predominate in space,44 diplomatic efforts must be sensitive to the need for space policies to balance the full spectrum of interests in order to succeed. Thus policies should include, but not be dictated by, military concerns. As the dominant civil and military space user,45 the United States’ leadership would give this diplomatic process the most momentum. The administration must therefore make clear its commitment to moving the process ahead. It is important to remember that reaching agreements will take time, but also that beginning the process is especially important. Starting a credible high-level discussion will require countries to identify key domestic stakeholders, assemble teams of experts on relevant issues, and develop detailed policy positions. The resulting informed dialogue will increase understanding between countries, identify important areas of agreement and disagreement, clarify intentions, and establish better channels of communication. Diplomatic engagement on space security has a strong and broad base of political backing in the United States. It has been supported, for example, by the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Task Force on U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, headed by former Secretary of Defense Dr. William J. Perry and former National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft; and by the Congressional Commission on U.S. Strategic Posture, chaired by Dr. Perry and vice-chaired by former Secretary of Defense James R. Schlesinger. The international community, including the major space powers, also has called for discussions on outstanding space issues. The United States should carefully consider its first steps. For example, the CFR Task Force has recommended developing a ban on testing ASAT weapons as an initial effort: “Propose a trilateral ban with China and Russia on tests of kinetic anti-satellite weapons that can destroy both civil and military satellites with projectiles fired from land-, air-, or space-based launching systems. Discuss with China and Russia how to expand such a ban to the global level and the broader issue of space weapons.” A ban on kinetic energy anti-satellite (KE ASAT) weapons would indeed be desirable. It would help protect the space environment, given that these weapons produce tremendous amounts of debris, and it would eliminate a demonstrated threat to satellites. And both China and Russia have expressed their willingness to discuss a ban on ground-based ASAT weapons as part of wider negotiations on banning space-based weapons. However, singling out KE ASAT weapons for limitation may be seen as selfserving for the United States, as it has

the strongest ability to interfere with satellites using methods other than kinetic-kill attack. China in particular may view a U.S.-sponsored KE ASAT ban, in the absence of other limits, as an indication that the United States is not serious about the process, instead seeing a KE ASAT ban as a restriction directed at, and not benefiting, China. A lack of interest by Russia and China in such an opening proposal may not be a true indication of their interest in space weapons agreements in general. A set of limits on ASAT weapons as part of a package that addresses China’s and Russia’s expressed security concerns, such as space-based weapons overall, would more likely generate a positive response.

Starting a discussion is key to get the ball rolling, uniquely key to China. Grego and Wright 10 - Laura Grego, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program Dr. Laura Grego focuses on the technology and security implications of national missile defense and of space security. She is the author or co-author of more than 20 peer-reviewed, published papers on a range of topics. Since joining UCS in September 2002, she has been cited by Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New Scientist, New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today, and has appeared on Fox News, the Discovery Channel and NPR. She also has testified before Congress and addressed the United Nations Conference on Disarmament on space security issues. Before joining UCS, Grego was a postdoctoral researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. She earned a doctorate degree in experimental physics at the California Institute of Technology and a bachelor of science degree in physics and astronomy at the University of Michigan, and David Wright, Co-Director, Global Security Program David Wright is a nationally known expert on the technical aspects of nuclear weapons policy, missile defense systems, missile proliferation, and space weapons. He has authored numerous articles and reports on arms control and international security, including Toward True Security: Transforming U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Securing the Skies: Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space, and The Physics of Space Security. Since 1990, he has been a primary organizer of the International Summer Symposiums on Science and World Affairs, which foster cooperation among scientists around the world working on arms control and security issues. In 2001, he was a co-recipient of the American Physical Society’s Joseph A. Burton Forum Award for his arms control research and his work with international scientists. Before joining UCS in 1992, Dr. Wright was a senior research analyst with the Federation of American Scientists and served as an SSRC-MacArthur fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He received his doctorate degree in physics from Cornell University in 1983 and worked as a research physicist from 1983 to 1988.November 2010 (“Securing the Skies Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space,” Union of Concerned Scientists, Available Online at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf, Accessed 7-4-2016, RJS)Step 7. Assemble a negotiating team and begin building the diplomatic, technical, legal, and other kinds of expertise needed to support negotiations. Encourage other countries to do so as well. To develop detailed space security proposals and engage in fruitful discussions, the United States and the other stakeholders must assemble teams of experts that can address the relevant diplomatic, technical, and legal issues, among others. This should begin immediately, as opposed to waiting for the details of a negotiating process to be decided. Until such expertise is built up, participants are likely to come to the discussions without detailed and carefully considered positions, and progress may be frustratingly slow. Many countries

possess some expertise in individual areas. But because of the lack of meaningful diplomatic engagement on space security issues for many years, few if any of them have in place the range of dedicated expertise needed to address these issues in sufficient detail to make significant progress. While encouraging them to begin the process of assembling expertise, the United States must be careful not to assume that other countries’ initial lack of progress in discussions necessarily reflects their lack of commitment to working on space security issues. For example, in recent years the Chinese Foreign Ministry was instructed to develop language and positions that reflected China’s longstanding support for negotiations on PAROS. However, it did not have a mandate to actually negotiate or even develop serious proposals designed to move the CD toward negotiations, which were seen as highly unlikely.46 The Chinese Foreign Ministry is charged with communicating with the outside world on arms control treaties,47 but because of the lack of an agenda at the CD and the absence of arms control negotiations, other important parts of the Chinese government, including the Party leadership, have not yet been meaningfully engaged. Moreover, experts from groups outside the Foreign Ministry, who years ago may have been prepared to represent their bureaucratic interests, have moved on in their careers and there has been no need to replace them. If, however, negotiations on space security move forward and potential agreements are on the table that could affect the interests of the Chinese military and aerospace sectors, these domestic stakeholders will likely insist on participating; they will weigh in heavily, in fact, just as nuclear stakeholders did when China began negotiating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in the 1990s. Foreign Ministry representatives will have an important role to play, but technical and military matters will need to be resolved by others who understand the implications and who will eventually be constrained by any agreement that might be negotiated. Moreover, because China’s space sector has experienced incredible growth and numerous reforms over the last decade, its own perspectives must necessarily be included. The United States has some updating to do as well. Decades have passed since the nation took part in high-level international discussions on space security.48 Additionally, in the intervening years new and powerful space stakeholders have emerged—such as the commercial satellite and launch industries and users of satellite-provided data—and their perspectives must also be included.The Chinese are developing ASAT’s to defend themselves from the US. The aff resolves their security concerns. Lewis 14 — Jeffrey Lewis is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program for the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, 8-9-2014 ("They Shoot Satellites, Don’t They?," Foreign Policy, 8-9-2014, Available Online at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/09/they-shoot-satellites-dont-they/?wp_login_redirect=0, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)

Look, I understand if you missed it, what with all the missiles flying around these days. But China conducted another missile defense test in late July. Even for a terse statement clocking in at a mere 64 words, the official announcement by the Chinese Ministry of Defense is marvelous for how little it says. Let me try to convince you that it is worth about 2,800 words of wonky exegesis. I promise, it’s worth it. This is the third so-called missile defense test that China has conducted. More importantly, it is at least the fourth test of something called the "SC-19" — China’s direct-ascent interceptor, first tested against a satellite in 2007. There is a big debate about whether the SC-19 is intended to shoot down missiles or satellites. In fact, it’s supposed to do both. Or neither. The pointy end of the SC-19 — the part known as a "kill vehicle" — is best understood as a technology that can be used for many missions. China’s development of a specific technology — "exoatmospheric kinetic intercept" or, in English, "hit-to-kill" — represents a new, disturbing trend in the proliferation of advanced conventional weapons. Let me walk you through the history of the system. Along the way, it should become clear that China’s so-called missile defense tests represent a big threat to U.S. satellites. While shooting down missiles may be hard, shooting down satellites is easy. And the spread of hit-to-kill technologies is an enormous danger to the use of space. China’s first test of the SC-19 occurred on Jan. 11, 2007. I was at a space conference at the U.S. Air Force Academy when a disturbance rippled through the room. BlackBerrys on silent buzzed; people slipped out the back. It was pretty quickly an open secret in Washington that China had shot down an aging weather satellite named the FY-1C in the first anti-satellite test since Ronald Reagan’s administration blasted a solar observatory in orbit in 1985. We would later learn that China had tested the SC-19 several times by aiming at empty spots in space, not physical targets. (SC-19, by the way, is a U.S. designation. This is the 19th type of rocket observed first at the Shuangchengzi Missile Test Center, also known as the Jiuquan Space Launch Center. Confusingly, since 2007, the rocket has been launched from other locations.) Apparently, George W. Bush’s administration knew about the tests in advance and had thought about discouraging the Chinese, but decided that it didn’t feel like sitting down to tea if the Chinese were going to bring up U.S. missile defense programs that use the same technology. Suddenly, cryptic comments to my colleague Gregory Kulacki by worried congressional staffers earlier in the year made more sense.) When the SC-19 slammed into the FY-1C, the satellite shattered into thousands of pieces of debris. This was the largest debris-creating event on record. It was a major political headache for the Chinese government, which suddenly found itself criticized for jeopardizing the ability of all states to use orbits. Debris is incredibly persistent and poses a threat to all satellites orbiting at similar altitudes. (That said, there were a few benefits: The debris offered an early opportunity for open-source analysis and one of my first scoops on Arms Control Wonk.) The Chinese, of course, must have known that the test would be immediately picked up, but seemed totally unprepared for the story to break. Aviation Week published a short story by Craig Covault on Jan. 17, but the Chinese Foreign Ministry had nothing to say until the 23rd. In the intervening days, lots of governments, especially in Europe, started to get angrier and angrier

about the debris created by the test. The mess in orbit led a lot of people ask: What the heck were they thinking? The terrified deer-in-the-headlights look adopted by Chinese spokespeople added to the confusion. The test seemed so poorly conceived, its rollout so clearly botched, that a lot of very smart people like Bates Gill — and Bates is very, very smart — wondered whether the Chinese military had done it without getting approval from the top leadership. This notion, that the anti-satellite test was a rogue PLA operation, has persisted. Former U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates even repeats it in his memoir, Duty. We would later conclude that this action had been taken by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) without the knowledge of the civilian leadership in Beijing; we believed the same of their test of an anti-satellite weapon some while before. For what it’s worth, I think Gates is wrong. Kulacki and I traveled to China several times in the period after the test, conducting interviews with individuals who might have some insight into the event. They were absolutely clear that the decision to destroy the FY-1C satellite had been made at the highest levels. This was no rogue operation. The only breakdown came at the end of the process, when the people with "responsibility for crafting and delivering the post-test message … never got their instructions," as Kulacki and I later wrote. Our sources were coy about whether there would be future tests (you can guess why), but they made clear that China’s leadership had put in place, as Kulacki and I wrote, "a new interagency review process that will be applied to future tests of potentially sensitive technologies with significant international consequences." In 2010, I was attending a conference in the Italian Alps — and playing euchre with the aforementioned Bates Gill — when China did it again. This time, the Chinese announced that they had shot down a missile. By the way, they added, there was no debris created. The only hint in the announcement that this was the same system tested in 2007 was its date — Jan. 11, three years to the day after the 2007 test. U.S. officials started hinting that the intelligence suggested another test of the SC-19, just this time against a missile. We now know the assessment of the U.S. intelligence community, thanks to leaked State Department cables posted by WikiLeaks. (In case you can’t read the cable, I’ll summarize: China launched a CSS-X-11 ballistic missile from Jiuquan at 7:50 p.m. local time. China launched the SC-19 from Korla 2 minutes and 42 seconds later. The SC-19 intercepted the CSS-X-11 missile 5 minutes and 15 seconds after that, at an altitude of about 250 kilometers.) The intelligence was good enough that the leaked cables indicate the United States knew about this test in advance, too. Exact same SC-19. The only difference is that the test was repackaged as a "missile defense" test for a smooth, coordinated rollout. The Chinese announced the test immediately, the Foreign Ministry had talking points, and they pointedly stated that the test "would neither produce space debris in orbit nor pose a threat to the safety of orbiting spacecraft." Since then, China has tested the SC-19 in its missile defense mode two more times — once in January 2013 and in late July 2014. There’s another interesting little event worth mentioning, but we’ll turn to that later. Since China stopped using the SC-19 to destroy satellites, a little debate has emerged: Do we take the Chinese seriously about the missile defense thing? That’s the wrong question to ask. It fundamentally misunderstands what the

Chinese are up to. Think about the technology — not its applications. China is developing hit-to-kill. Watching my 2-year-old’s soccer class, I can’t tell you whether the kids will end up playing in the World Cup, performing with the Rockettes, or who knows what else. If hit-to-kill is like kicking, what gets kicked is a detail that comes later. As part of the Strategic Defense Initiative in the early 1980s, the United States invested in hit-to-kill technologies, starting with something called the Homing Overlay Experiment. (You can see one of these bad boys at the National Air and Space Museum’s Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center. Don’t miss it!) The technology, however, can be used to intercept either missiles or satellites. It is, in fact, easier to shoot down satellites than missiles since orbital paths are easy to calculate in advance.It is, in fact, easier to shoot down satellites than missiles since orbital paths are easy to calculate in advance. Let me give you a perfect example. After China’s anti-satellite test in 2007, the Bush administration suddenly decided that a dying U.S. intelligence satellite called USA-193 posed a risk to civilians on the ground and needed to be shot down. The United States has had a kinetic energy anti-satellite (KE-ASAT) ready to test for decades, but guess what the Pentagon used instead? An SM-3 missile defense interceptor on an Aegis destroyer, with a specially modified software package. It worked. Now, not many of us bought the idea that the frozen hydrazine in the satellite posed a risk to humanity. It’s pretty clear that this was a message. Bush wanted to stage an anti-satellite test without incurring the political cost incurred by his counterpart, Hu Jintao. (Sing it with me now: "Anything Hu can do, I can do better. I can do anything better than Hu.") Hit-to-kill is really just an advanced defense technology. There is a lot of talk about China pursuing "asymmetric" technologies to threaten the United States. But this is a case where China’s interest is totally symmetric. The Chinese are interested in hit-to-kill for the same reasons as the United States is. In fact, the Chinese are probably doubly interested because they don’t want to be left behind as the United States develops an important new defense technology that can be used to intercept anything — airplanes, missiles, and satellites. China might have shot down a missile during its last test, but it is really building up a broad technological capability that can be used for any number of missions. What Beijing ultimately chooses to do with its hit-to-kill capability, once the country has it, depends on a lot of factors, not all of which are under our control. It’s not only the United States and China. Russia, as well as many of America’s allies like Japan and Israel, are investing in hit-to-kill systems that can be used for missile defense or anti-satellite applications. This is the basic technology that Israel uses in Iron Dome to intercept short-range rockets. (Iron Dome doesn’t have any capability against satellites, but Israel’s Arrow system does, as might longer-range versions derived from Iron Dome.) Even India is getting into the act. Which brings us to the problem. Whatever one thinks of missile defenses, the proliferation of hit-to-kill technologies means that many, many countries are going to have very fancy anti-satellite weapons in the not-so-distant future. Satellites are far more vulnerable than ballistic missiles — and a lot more important. China will never come under ballistic missile attack from the United States unless America is starting a nuclear war. That’s not very likely. On the other hand, in a conventional conflict over

Taiwan or some rock outcropping doomed by global warming, China might be tempted to start knocking down U.S. or Japanese satellites. No country depends on satellites for military operations more than the United States do. The problem is that many countries also depend on these satellites for a range of civilian applications including communications and navigation. And all of these assets would be jeopardized by the debris from anti-satellite test strikes. For a long time, some people argued that the proliferation of hit-to-kill systems might be a problem — but only for satellites in low-Earth orbit. These are mostly (though not exclusively) the satellites that take the sort of pictures you find in Google Earth. The International Space Station and Hubble Space Telescope are in this orbit too. The really high-value civilian and military satellites are used for communication, navigation, and missile warning. These are higher up, with navigation satellites in medium-Earth orbit and satellites for missile warning and communications higher still in geosynchronous orbit. Which brings us to an ambiguous, but distressing event. In May 2013, China conducted a curious high-altitude scientific experiment, sending a sounding rocket into the magnetosphere to release a cloud of barium powder. Although Beijing has a real research program to study the magnetosphere, this launch seemed different in a lot of important ways, from how it was conducted to the secrecy surrounding it. The evidence is really quite ambiguous, but as my colleague Brian Weeden argues in a very long essay, the simplest explanation is that it was a test of a hit-to-kill system that can reach geostationary orbit. If China is developing an anti-satellite capability to hold at risk all U.S. satellites, this is a very distressing development. After the mid-1980s, the United States gradually lost interest in developing debris-creating anti-satellite weapons because it has the most to lose if space becomes so littered with debris that it is unusable. China and Russia, on the other hand, might not be so delicate if push came to shove. A world filled with hit-to-kill anti-satellite missiles should be very disturbing. A world filled with hit-to-kill anti-satellite missiles should be very disturbing. So what to do? One option is to negotiate some sort of ban on hit-to-kill anti-satellite weapons. Washington and Moscow tried to do this in the 1970s, but issues of definition and verification were pretty difficult. Remember the U.S. missile defense system modified to shoot down USA-193? How would the Russians know that software isn’t installed on every U.S. Aegis destroyer? Despite these problems, there are some verifiable partial measures, such as a ban on any hit-to-kill test that creates orbital debris. That won’t stop the development of hit-to-kill capabilities for missile defense — but it would mean that China’s newest SC-19 and any follow-on systems would remain untested against a real target. That’s not much, but it’s something — and a place to start. In 2008, then President-elect Barack Obama actually came out in support of such an agreement. That’s right, he filled out a little survey for the Arms Control Association that included the sentence: "I will pursue negotiations of an agreement that would ban testing anti-satellite weapons." (Full disclosure: I volunteered on the team that actually filled out the survey for him. I hope you aren’t scandalized that presidents don’t fill out questionnaires by themselves or that people try to put words in the president’s mouth!) The administration simply hasn’t followed up on the idea of negotiating a ban on anti-satellite testing, despite

the importance of protecting U.S. assets in space. The administration has stated, in its National Space Policy, that it "will consider proposals and concepts for arms control measures if they are equitable, effectively verifiable, and enhance the national security of the United States and its allies." This is an improvement over the 2006 edition, as U.S. officials argue, but it is still a passive position of waiting for someone else to come up with an idea to solve the problem. And it sure as hell doesn’t do anything to prevent China from developing ever better anti-satellite missile technology. Still, there are already a number of proposals outlined by various experts who share my concern about the proliferation of hit-to-kill technologies and the threat to space assets. So, perhaps it is time that the administration consider some of them. Bruce MacDonald wrote a report for the Council on Foreign Relations that contained the model for such a treaty. Geoffrey Forden outlined a slightly different version in Arms Control Today, while the Stimson Center’s Michael Krepon has suggested that the United States, Russia, and China could agree to a moratorium on "further [anti-satellite] tests that generate long-lived, indiscriminately lethal space debris" as part of the now-stalled effort to develop a code of conduct for space activities. I have even offered my own meager thoughts on such an agreement in exchange for a few days per diem in Geneva. The short version of all the proposals is simple: no blowing things up in space that leaves a bunch of space junk. All of these proposals aim to prevent the creation of yet more debris that will threaten the commercial, civil, and military uses of space, while also trying to slow the development of dedicated anti-satellite systems. States will still develop hit-to-kill systems — like the United States, Russia, and China — and have a latent capability to threaten space assets. But the least we can do is prevent a race to start testing these systems against live targets in orbit. I think a fair-minded observer would conclude that such a treaty certainly meets the criteria outlined in the National Space Policy. There is value to limiting anti-satellite testing; the creation of debris is easily verified; and it would not limit U.S. missile defense programs. But perhaps most importantly, a ban on anti-satellite tests that create debris in space would be more in the interest of the United States than any other country on Earth.International cooperation keyWoellert 9 — Kirk Woellert is a former Navy intelligence officer with experience in space systems and information technology. He is currently a graduate student at The Space Policy Institute, George Washington University, 5-18-2009 ("The Space Review: Space debris: why the US cannot go it alone," No Publication, 5-18-2009, Available Online at http://www.thespacereview.com/article/1373/1, Accessed 7-7-2016, RJS)A recent article in The Space Review claims the US should deal with the issue of space debris unilaterally (see “Unilateral orbital cleanup”, May 4, 2009). A complete analysis of individual space debris removal strategies is beyond the scope of this forum. For that matter, even the question of a passive or active strategy for

dealing with space debris is a complex issue by itself. The purpose herein is to look at one active space debris strategy proposal and point out some technical and policy implications. The conclusion is the US cannot afford to, nor should it attempt to, deal with space debris on its own. Technical Considering the assertion in that article: What is required is a new type of space maneuver vehicle, one that can rendezvous with, catch, and store a bit of debris, and then proceed to the next one. Such a vehicle would not need to move very fast: the process would be a leisurely one, and thus would allow for the use of a highly efficient space propulsion system such as a pulse plasma thruster or ion engine. The proposal is for a dedicated spacecraft to maneuver and capture individual pieces of space debris. The proposed vehicle would rely on ultra-efficient propulsion such as ion or plasma arc-jet thrusters. On the surface the concept may appear sound. However, it’s worthwhile to delve into a bit of orbital mechanics. The US cannot afford to, nor should it attempt to, deal with space debris on its own. First, there are thousands of space debris objects actively tracked and many thousands more that are not tracked. Although on a large scale there are clusters and gaps in the debris field, each of these objects are in unique orbits. Various types of orbital maneuvers would need to be continuously executed. These maneuvers will include changes in the vehicle altitude, period, right ascension, and inclination. A first order analysis of the mission profile would consider the most costly maneuver in terms of energy, a change in orbital inclination. Typically such analysis calculates the change in velocity or “deltaV” required to perform a maneuver. Although there are relative concentrations at select inclinations between roughly 60° and 100°, space debris takes on many inclination values spanning 0°–100°. Atmospheric drag dominates for circular orbits below about 200 kilometers. Hence any space debris orbiting at or below these altitudes will decay in a reasonable period of time. For purposes of this discussion, consider a space debris collection satellite performing an inclination change at an altitude of 500 kilometers. The orbital velocity for a satellite at any altitude is given by: (1) V = GMe/r where; G = universal gravitational constant Me = mass of the earth r = Radius of the earth plus the altitude of the satellite Using these values, the orbital velocity V = 7613 m/s. This would be the initial velocity of the spacecraft prior to any maneuver. Next let’s calculate the velocity change required for an inclination plane change. The formula for deltaV for an inclination change is: (2) deltaV = 2 x (Vi) x Sin (theta/2), where: Vi = initial velocity of the spacecraft prior to the maneuver Theta = angle between the planes of the initial and final orbits As a minimal case, what is the deltaV required for a 1° inclination change? From equation (2); Vi = 7613 m/s, theta = 1, resulting in a deltaV = about 66 m/s. Ion propulsion is very efficient and while propellant requirements are important, in this context they are less of a mission driver than the time required for maneuvers. How long must a typical ion thruster fire to achieve a deltaV of 66 m/s? A review of the literature shows calculating this involves tradeoffs and intermediate calculations that are probably beyond the scope of this forum. Instead we can draw upon real world experience and observations of aerospace professionals. The NASA Dawn spacecraft, which utilizes a contemporary ion thruster, can be a reference case. The Dawn web site quotes

its ion engines at full thrust can achieve a velocity change of “0-60mph in 4 days”. That is equivalent to a deltaV of 27 m/s in 4 days. For this discussion the acceleration in this case should be computed: v = 27 m/s t = 4 days = 345,600 sec (1) a = v/t = (27 m/s) / (345600 sec) = 7.8 x 10e-5 m/sec2 or .00078 m/sec2 How long would the Dawn spacecraft need to achieve a 66 m/sec deltaV? Solving for t in equation (1): t = v/a = (66 m/sec) / (.00078 m/sec2) = 844,800 sec = 9.7 days Per the aforementioned analysis, a 1° change in inclination would require 9.7 days. This time does not include fine orbit maneuvers required to close to within a reasonable distance to the target debris. Another limiting factor to this concept is the mission profile does not allow for the advantage of continuous acceleration often cited for ion propulsion. Continuing on with the analysis, NORAD tracks about 19,000 objects in orbit. Assume half of these objects, or 9,500, require an inclination plane change maneuver of at least 1° for the vehicle to achieve co-orbit with the target. This implies the time to capture these objects would be (9,500 x 9.7 days) = 254 years. Admittedly this analysis is simplistic but it gives some sense of the time scale involved. Space debris concerns all spacefaring nations and should be addressed as an international issue utilizing a multilateral approach. Ion engine operation is limited by erosion of thruster elements caused by exposure to charged particles of the exhaust stream. Current ion thruster technology has demonstrated continuous firing for 3.5 years. The ion thrusters on the Dawn spacecraft launched in 2007 have a design mission life of 5.5 years. In either case, it’s well short of the two and half centuries for a single spacecraft to address a significant portion of all debris on orbit. An ongoing program to replace aged vehicles would be needed. To achieve practical results in a reasonable time frame, a constellation of such vehicles would be needed. A program of such scope is obviously a multi-billion dollar initiative. It should be noted that many of the logistical and technical challenges of removing space debris are similar to those involved with ballistic missile defense. A space debris collector capturing a space debris object is subject to the same orbital mechanics as a kinetic ASAT. A space- or ground-based laser used to vaporize small pieces of debris is subject to the same physics as a laser used for destroying ballistic missile or adversary satellites. The US has not elected unilaterally field a global ballistic missile defense system in part due to the huge costs and technical challenges. Why would a space debris removal system be any different? It seems reasonable to assume, based on this “back of the envelope” analysis, that the technical and resource challenges involved with eliminating the space debris hazard would be daunting for the US to achieve on its own. Policy From a policy perspective a unilateral approach by the US is counter to historical precedent and trends in US space policy. The ISS the most audacious example to date of international cooperation cost an estimated $100 billion to design and deploy. Would the ISS exist today if the U.S. were the only country willing to pony up the money? Space science program managers appear to want more international cooperation. Indeed, as noted in this publication, NASA and ESA are actively working to promote international cooperation in space science programs as a way to address limited budgets (see “Doing more for less (or the same) in space science”, The Space Review, May 4, 2009). The U.S. civil space

budget is already under considerable stress with the competing requirements of safely retiring the Space Shuttle, operating the ISS, and pursuing the Constellation program. It seems improbable Congress would appropriate the additional funding for NASA to effectively clean up space debris. The assertion that space debris is a problem best left to the DOD seems misguided. The US military budget is already committed to fighting wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and, as evident in recent news, may need to commit resources to stabilize Pakistan. The DOD space acquisition track record is not exactly a paragon of success with several major programs experiencing major cost and schedule overruns (e.g. NPOESS, FIA). More fundamentally, assigning the responsibility of cleaning up space debris to the DOD has implications for the US as a signatory to the Outer Space Treaty. As space assets are dual-use by nature, what prevents a space debris removal vehicle from also performing in the role as a space adversary ASAT? Conclusion Space debris concerns all spacefaring nations and should be addressed as an international issue utilizing a multilateral approach. International cooperation takes significant time to build consensus and on occasion has led to ineffectual results. Nevertheless, the US can best protect its interests in space not by unilateral action but by using its influence and leadership to establish an effective international response to mitigating—and perhaps one day eliminating—the hazard of space debris.

Add-On: DeterrenceTreaty key to preserve dominance, limit ASATsHampson 15 — Joshua Hampson studied International Relations and Economics at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, and graduated in 2013 with a First Class MA degree. He has since worked as a political risk analyst, a foreign policy fellow in the US House of Representatives, and an international relations forecaster. He is currently a macroeconomic and international strategy analyst for Wikistrat, 10-15-2015 ("Space to Breathe: The Argument for a New Outer Space Treaty," The Potomac Institute, 10-15-2015, Available Online at http://www.potomacinstitute.org/steps/views-in-brief/46-space-to-breathe-the-argument-for-a-new-outer-space-treaty, Accessed 6-28-2016, RJS)The United States should pursue a treaty on our own terms. First, the treaty should seek operational coordination. Space is getting crowded, and the growing number of satellites and pieces of junk in orbit will threaten military, economic, and scientific use of space. The inter- national community needs to create a framework for public and private sector use of space and much clearer measures of liability for incidents in space. Built-in de-orbiting measures should also be an international norm. Second, The United States should lead a discussion on space code of conduct. It has been American policy to avoid altering the 1967 Space Treaty, but the usefulness of that treaty has long since expired. The international community needs to ban ASAT tests, even with claims that it is an unenforceable ban. The lack of testing would constrain ASAT utility during times of conflict. A ban would help protect American space assets and provide a moral argument for moving aggressively if space assets are attacked. The treaty could codify an international response to violations. The sabotage of another country’s space assets could, for example, lead to a ban from using international space constellations. The response could also incorporate economic sanctions. In this regard, the 1967 Space Treaty is too vague, and allows different space-faring countries to interpret the terms with great fluidity. For example, it explicitly forbids weapons of mass destruction in space, but little else. If damaging space assets results in coordinated punishment, The United States will be able to more confidently rely on its space assets to support power projection and deterrence. The United States currently relies on its own military and scientific prowess to prevent damage to its space assets. That might not be enough in the future, and so The United States should establish space norms while it is still the dominant actor. Creating an international regime that would ease concerns about the safety of space infrastructure would allow The United States to more confidently use its military power for terrestrial deterrence.A space treaty would increase US deterrence!!!Hampson 15 — Joshua Hampson studied International Relations and Economics at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland, and graduated in 2013 with a First Class MA degree. He has since worked as a political risk analyst, a foreign policy fellow in the US House of Representatives, and an international relations

forecaster. He is currently a macroeconomic and international strategy analyst for Wikistrat, 10-15-2015 ("Space to Breathe: The Argument for a New Outer Space Treaty," The Potomac Institute, 10-15-2015, Available Online at http://www.potomacinstitute.org/steps/views-in-brief/46-space-to-breathe-the-argument-for-a-new-outer-space-treaty, Accessed 6-28-2016, RJS)Since the beginning of the space race, military space policy has been pursued in an environment with little international consensus. The force-enhancement capabilities provided by military space assets have been tied into the overall deterrence structure of the US, and because of this, American policymakers have resisted international efforts to regulate military actions in space. Given growing complexities in the space environment, however, and an increase in the number of space-faring nations, it would be wise for the US to reconsider its approach to space policy. The pursuit of a new international space treaty, along with changes to American space policy, could create needed stability, protect space infrastructure, and strengthen US deterrence capabilities. The past few decades have seen international actors internalize outer space as a theater for economic, scientific, and military operations. The use of space has not only revolutionized technology, but has also led to dramatic changes in organizational arrangements and strategy. Space infrastructure is frequently used in support of civilian and military operations. The US military in particular has come to rely on space power. As the most space-dependent country in the world, the US predicts that its use of space will only deepen in the future.1 In particular, space infrastructure has provided key force-enhancement capabilities, and these capabilities are couched within the language of deterrence. “By being exceptionally powerful in all dimensions … the United States is a factor in the calculations of many rogues, aggressors, and patriots who do not need to receive personal American messages of discouragement addressed to them by name, place and issue.”2 It is therefore important to examine how the development of the space environment interplays with American deterrence. While complex military space capability has certainly benefited the force-enhancement side of American deterrence, the world is slowly entering a new stage of space exploitation. So far, there has been little pressing need for a strong international treaty involving space, but it may benefit the US to pursue a new international space treaty in the near future. The benefits of military space infrastructure are well known. Satellites provide an impressive line-of-sight view, and facilitate communications to and from battlefield operations. These force-multiplying benefits provide the US with large increases in accuracy, agility, range, and effectiveness. Space assets have effectively altered the “nature of war”.3 Space infrastructure allows for smaller, more efficient military units to wield the same level of power projection as erstwhile larger forces. The growth of external commitments, bilateral treaties, multipolar concerns, and international influence post-Cold War has meant that conflict demands lighter, more flexible units whose strength rests on knowledge, not necessarily size. As such, space infrastructure has become a significant tool for information dominance and therefore deterrence. Space infrastructure is also crucial for drone operations,

which in turn increases power projection while limiting human exposure to risk.4 While drones themselves are not spacefaring, they would not be so effective or ubiquitous without their satellite links and satellite-guided munitions.

A2 Tech Leak turnRussia reacts badly to US space militarization, turns the DA. Beckhusen 15 — Robert Beckhusen, 9-18-2015 ("Russia Is Concerned About America's Far-Off Space Weapons," Motherboard, 9-18-2015, Available Online at http://motherboard.vice.com/read/russia-is-concerned-about-americas-far-off-space-weapons, Accessed 7-7-2016, RJS)In a near-future war, 1,000 missiles scream toward Russia at Mach 20. Each one a pinpoint strike hitting the Kremlin’s nuclear missiles, military radars, submarine bases—you name it. Within minutes, 80 percent of Russia’s nuclear arsenal is destroyed without the United States launching a single nuclear weapon of its own. Russia’s military networks are blind, the nation’s ability to strike back eliminated or severely degraded. The incoming missiles were no ordinary weapons, but hypersonic glide vehicles developed largely in secret under the US Prompt Global Strike program. They travel so fast, shooting them down is effectively impossible. The capability, begun as a Pentagon project in the mid-2000s, was envisioned as allowing America to strike anywhere on the globe nearly instantaneously, without resorting to nukes. In this futuristic war, it succeeds wildly. To be sure, Prompt Global Strike is real, but the scenario above is fiction. It will take many years, and billions upon billions of dollars, to make it possible. And that’s if the technology works. That scenario is a real fear, however, in the minds of many Russian military officials. Russian military journals regularly feature articles presenting future American hypersonic weapons as an existential threat. Far more significantly, the Pentagon’s research—haphazard as it is—has provoked a radical restructuring of the Kremlin’s armed forces. Since the early days of the Cold War, Russia—then the Soviet Union—and the United States dared not go to war because of the presence of nuclear weapons on both sides. It would be far too dangerous for the planet and human civilization to risk an atomic exchange. Hypersonic weapons pose a different risk. Namely, that they would make nuclear weapons obsolete. The extremely fast-moving conventional cruise missiles—and atmospheric reentry vehicles plunging down to Earth from space—could decapitate an entire nation’s command and control structure and nuclear arsenal without leading to Armageddon. In theory. For hypersonic weapons that travel in ballistic arcs into outer space and back down again, they are indistinguishable from nuclear ICBMs. A nuclear-armed nation would have minutes to decide whether to launch a counter-strike. The Pentagon’s far-out hypersonic weapons have had mixed results. The US Army is working on an endo-atmospheric one called the Advanced Hypersonic Weapon. The first test in 2011 was a success, as the ultra-fast missile flew 2,300 miles from Hawaii to Kwajalein Atoll in 30 minutes. Engineers aborted the second test a few seconds after taking launch. X-51 Sidewinder. Photo: US Air Force/War Is Boring The Air Force, Boeing and the blue-sky Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency have worked on the X-51 Waverider—a Mach 6 scramjet cruise missile that keeps itself in the air using its own shock waves. Its fourth and most recent test in 2013 was successful. The first three crashed or failed in flight. Far

more radical was DARPA’s Falcon Project, a guitar pick-shaped glider boosted into the upper atmosphere on a rocket. From there, the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle 2 would speed along at Mach 20. Two test flights ended prematurely and DARPA ended the program. “A gradual wearing away of the vehicle’s skin as it reached stress tolerance limits was expected,” DARPA noted after the second failure. “However, larger than anticipated portions of the vehicle’s skin peeled from the aerostructure.” It’s all interesting, but far from a deployable weapon. Cue a Russian freak out. And how. In 2015, Russia replaced its air force with a new branch called the Aerospace Forces specifically aimed at defending against Prompt Global Strike. This new branch merged the old air force together with another service branch called the Aerospace Defense Forces. It’s a little confusing, but the latter included responsibility for space and missile defense. (The new, combined Aerospace Forces has more in common with the US Air Force, sorta.) The missile defense soldiers, cosmo-troops and the air force are all now reporting to the same command center—a high-tech, fortified base in Moscow that looks like a cross between Dr. Strangelove’s war room and the bridge from the reimagined Battlestar Galactica. The Kremlin's National Defense Command Center. Screengrab via Federation of American Scientists/War Is Boring Plus, the Aerospace Forces—which began operations on August 1—is heavily pushing war in space as an answer to Prompt Global Strike. Essentially, knock out the satellites upon which precision weapons depend. The Russian state media has made it explicit. “It will be a comprehensive system, which will help detect and eliminate targets even at distant approaches,” a Russian Defense Ministry official told the Interfax news agency. “It can be viewed as our response to the Prompt Global Strike concept being implemented by the US.” Russia has upgraded its optoelectronic satellite-monitoring station at Okno in Tajikistan. And since 2013, Russia has blasted at least three suspected anti-satellite weapons into orbit, disguised as communications satellites. “If Russia (or China) acquires the capability to destroy US military satellites in low orbits, this will entail rendering the American army blind and deaf, and precision ‘smart’ weapons will be turned into scrap metal,” Konstantin Dushenov, editor of the nationalist Analytical Information Agency, told Nezavisimaya Gazeta. Knock out the satellites, and hypersonic weapons are in trouble. To hit a fixed location, such as a building, the missiles will do fine. But to change direction mid-course and hit a moving target, they need satellites to transmit fresh data. But the biggest loser of all this might be the Russian air force. In January 2014, Russian news website Vzglyad reported that the air force’s “army aviation” assets—i.e. helicopters and transport planes—could shift to the army. OE Watch, the monthly journal of the US Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, took note and called it an “organizational demotion.” Pity the poor air force. Pity it more that one of its main jobs is now defending against a far-off hypothetical threat from outer space.

A2 Off Case

TCounter interp: Diplomatic engagement includes space, prefer contextual lit. Grego and Wright 10 - Laura Grego, Senior Scientist, Global Security Program Dr. Laura Grego focuses on the technology and security implications of national missile defense and of space security. She is the author or co-author of more than 20 peer-reviewed, published papers on a range of topics. Since joining UCS in September 2002, she has been cited by Boston Globe, Chicago Tribune, Los Angeles Times, New Scientist, New York Times, Washington Post and USA Today, and has appeared on Fox News, the Discovery Channel and NPR. She also has testified before Congress and addressed the United Nations Conference on Disarmament on space security issues. Before joining UCS, Grego was a postdoctoral researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics. She earned a doctorate degree in experimental physics at the California Institute of Technology and a bachelor of science degree in physics and astronomy at the University of Michigan, and David Wright, Co-Director, Global Security Program David Wright is a nationally known expert on the technical aspects of nuclear weapons policy, missile defense systems, missile proliferation, and space weapons. He has authored numerous articles and reports on arms control and international security, including Toward True Security: Transforming U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Securing the Skies: Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space, and The Physics of Space Security. Since 1990, he has been a primary organizer of the International Summer Symposiums on Science and World Affairs, which foster cooperation among scientists around the world working on arms control and security issues. In 2001, he was a co-recipient of the American Physical Society’s Joseph A. Burton Forum Award for his arms control research and his work with international scientists. Before joining UCS in 1992, Dr. Wright was a senior research analyst with the Federation of American Scientists and served as an SSRC-MacArthur fellow at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government. He received his doctorate degree in physics from Cornell University in 1983 and worked as a research physicist from 1983 to 1988.November 2010 (“Securing the Skies Ten Steps the United States Should Take to Improve the Security and Sustainability of Space,” Union of Concerned Scientists, Available Online at http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/securing-the-skies-full-report-1.pdf, Accessed 7-4-2016, RJS)Substantial Diplomatic Engagement Is Essential The purpose of diplomatic discussions and negotiations on space is to assure the beneficial uses of that environment and prevent hostile or irresponsible ones. This goal may be achieved through agreed-upon rules, institutions, and coordinating mechanisms that would set standards of behavior, create predictability, and define rights, responsibilities, and consequences. Active diplomatic engagement, as well as the agreements it produces, can also help ensure that disputes over the use of space are averted—or at least managed in ways that do not create conflicts or exacerbate crises on the ground. While efforts to control some dangerous technologies are valuable, the primary emphasis of these efforts should be on regulating behaviors rather than technologies. The fact that much space technology is dual-use can make it difficult to construct a detailed definition of “space weapon.” But by focusing on behaviors, making progress on space security does not depend on agreeing on such a definition.18 The CD is seen by many countries as the legitimate forum for discussions on space security. However, to make fruitful space talks more likely, the countries involved might also consider new procedures that avoid the CD’s requirement of reaching consensus on an agenda, which has linked other issues to space security discussions. For example, countries at the CD could agree to allow an agenda to move forward even without unanimous agreement. Consensus could still be required for any formal agreement resulting from the discussions. More

generally, the best venue, format, and scope of diplomatic engagement should all be part of initial discussions, during which time they could be chosen through agreement among the countries with the biggest stakes in the issues involved. In addition, such initial discussions should consider not only the range of problems but also the range of possible solutions and outcomes. The goal of negotiations should be to reach agreements, while recognizing that those agreements may take different forms. Less formal types of cooperation—including voluntary codes of conduct, coordination, or transparency measures (which provide information about capabilities or activities but do not constrain them)—may be appropriate solutions to some problems. Other issues may best be addressed with legally binding obligations, verification, and compliance-management mechanisms. These various options should all be considered possible parts of whatever solution is being sought. The temptation to rely entirely on informal agreements may be hard to avoid, as they are sometimes easier to negotiate and are less constraining. However, formal legal agreements have important benefits. They are binding and more durable than informal agreements, they can include more extensive and effective verification and compliance-management mechanisms, and they often establish a body with the legal authority and resources to facilitate implementation and resolve disputes. Because formal agreements are more likely than informal ones to provide the confidence and predictability that is a key benefit of diplomacy, for some issues they will be the most appropriate solutions. These solutions must be guided by the interests of the full spectrum of stakeholders. National security issues, while important, are only one aspect of space activities. The U.S. approach to these discussions (and U.S. policy) should reflect this fact by better balancing military, commercial, and civilian interests in space. Unfortunately, current international forums segregate the discussions of civil and military space issues. The United Nations (UN) Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, which works closely with the UN General Assembly, considers only matters of “peaceful” civilian use of space, while the CD committee on PAROS focuses on arms control and military issues. Currently there is little coordination between these two bodies, though the CD may be able to accommodate a wider range of issues in the course of negotiations.

DAs

A2 Alliance DAUS refusing to cooperate escalates the space race and hurts relations.Palmer 6/26/16 — Coburn Palmer, an experienced news man, Coburn Palmer has written national, state and local news for eight different news outlets including the USA Today and SF Weekly. A graduate from the San Francisco State University School of Journalism he has experience covering government, crime and neighborhood beats. Coburn has been a leader of award winning newsrooms and has also won several personal awards for outstanding articles. 6-26-2016 ("Russia And China Sign Space Alliance To Threaten U.S. Supremacy, Target Military Satellites," Inquisitr News, 6-26-2016, Available Online at http://www.inquisitr.com/3247550/russia-and-china-sign-space-alliance-to-threaten-u-s-supremacy-targets-military-satellites/, Accessed 7-2-2016, RJS)Russia and China signed a space alliance this week to protect their interstellar interests as the Roscosmos space agency threatened to publicly disclose the location of U.S. military satellites. Russia desperately wants to partner with NASA and prevent the militarization of space, but Russia has been rebuffed by the American space agency, so in retribution they’ve threatened to publicize the location of U.S. military satellites, reports SpaceDaily. The upcoming Russian catalog of near-Earth objects would include a number of asteroids and space debris, but also the location of secret U.S. military satellites. The Pentagon published the location of Russian military satellites a long time ago, but it keeps information on its own space-going vessels and those of its allies a secret. This political stance helped push China and Russia into a space alliance designed to protect their interstellar rights, promote cooperation in peaceful space exploration, and further the development of interstellar vehicles, according to Sputnik News. “The Russian and Chinese governments have signed an agreement on measures to protect technologies in connection to cooperation on peaceful space exploration and usage as well as creation and exploitation of launch vehicles and land-based space infrastructure.” Russia is attempting to expand its influence with the international community in space affairs and originally intended its catalog of near-Earth objects to be part of a UN database. The Union of Concerned Scientists estimates there are some 1,380 satellites and 500,000 pieces of space junk orbiting Earth, and Russia insists its comprehensive catalogue would increase safety, according to the DailyMail. “The Russian Federation proceeds to establish a national information service, whose function shall be to provide open access to the results of monitoring objects and events in outer space.” Retired U.S. Defense Department analyst Franklin Spinney said America should welcome cooperation with Russia in space affairs, according to Sputnik News. “My gut reaction is that the Russian move should (but probably will not) be viewed as a constructive move.” Russia’s intention to publicize the location of U.S. military satellites is also in line with the Open Skies Treaty signed in 1992 that includes 34 other countries and was designed to regulate unarmed aerial surveillance flights. It would be similar to the list maintained by the North American Aerospace Defense Command

(NORAD). China, Russia and many other countries already know the location of U.S. military satellites so the only people left in the dark are everyday citizens of the Earth who may be unaware of the extent of America’s surveillance capability, reports Sputnik News. “The real threat…would be that the American people should be amazed by the shear scope of our presence, compared to that of the Russians and Chinese.” One thing is sure, the space race is heating up as countries around the world compete to see who will be the first to colonize the moon, mine nearby asteroids, and establish a Mars colony. Russia is developing a space taxi it intends to park at the International Space Station to help ferry astronauts to the lunar surface in preparation for a moon colony. Meanwhile, China is continuing with plans to launch its own space station, build a Hubble Telescope, establish a lunar colony, and send a robotic mission to Mars. Both countries lag far behind the U.S., which intends to launch a NASA-organized mission to Mars in 2030. In addition private American space transport companies have made huge strides in developing space faring vehicles. It is, in fact, these private developments that has helped fuel Russian anger. The country is outraged the U.S. has allowed private companies to do whatever they want in space. What do you think? Do you welcome Russia’s publication of U.S. military satellite locations?Eurasian integration fails. EurActiv 12 —12-18-2012 ("Eurasian Economic Union: Less than favourable outcome for economic integration – EurActiv.com," EurActiv, 12-18-2012, Available Online at http://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/eurasian-economic-union-less-than-favourable-outcome-for-economic-integration/, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)In the lead-up to the creation of a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), foreseen for 2015, the Customs Union (CU) and the Common Economic Space (CES) between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan represent two elements of the most ambitious regional integration projects launched in the post-Soviet space since 1991, write Steven Blockmans, Hrant Kostanyan and Ievgen Vorobiov. Steven Blockmans is a CEPS Senior Research Fellow and Head of the EU Foreign Policy unit. Hrant Kostanyan is an Associate Research Fellow at CEPS and Ievgen Vorobiov is an intern at CEPS. This comment is based on a CEPS Special Report by the same authors entitled “Towards a Eurasian Economic Union: The challenge of integration and unity”, December 2012. "Over the last two decades, observers of the post-Soviet space have witnessed a proliferation of reintegration efforts among different constellations of countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). This has resulted in the creation of several structures with partly overlapping memberships, different integration objectives and varying modes of governance. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation, the GUAM Organisation for Democracy and Economic Development and the Organisation of Black Sea Economic Cooperation are cases in point. These arrangements have provided platforms for continuous interaction and socialisation among countries. However, both the speed and the level of integration within these structures vary greatly and none of the arrangements has reached the levels of integration

attained within the EU. In the lead-up to the creation of a Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), foreseen for 2015, the Customs Union (CU) and the Common Economic Space (CES) between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan represent two elements of the most ambitious regional integration projects launched in the post-Soviet space since 1991. An initiative conceptualised by President Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan in 1994, the institutionalisation of the EEU has gained momentum since Vladimir Putin promoted it in the newspaper Izvestia on 4 October 2011. The reactions of policy-makers and analysts have ranged from describing the plan as a pipedream to the next real thing. Leaving politics aside, how can one assess whether or not the Eurasian integration effort is economically viable? The best way forward is to select practical indicators to analyse the existing Customs Union and CES, so as to glean insights into the levels of economic integration and project them onto the model of the future EEU. In this regard, an adapted version of the framework conceptualised by Haas and Schmitter in their seminal article of 1964, which has been applied to assess the early stages of the European integration process, is a helpful tool. The indicators outlined in the adapted model are classified in three groups i) background conditions, ii) formation conditions and iii) process conditions of the economic unions. The background conditions include the size of units (e.g. population, GDP), distance between economic centres and initial rates of transaction (i.e. share of regional exports in overall foreign trade). The formation conditions assess the implementation of common policies and the power of supranational institutions in these policy areas. The process conditions evaluate the change likely to be brought about by the functioning of the integration structures in terms of the governance mode and the economic effects attained. When testing these indicators, the relative size of the units and the distance between economic centres present tougher background conditions for Eurasian economic integration compared to those during the earlier years of the European integration process. The analysis of the current rates of transaction between the members of the future EEU also show an imbalanced pattern of regional trade integration. Coupled with rather slow dynamics for the movement of capital and labour force, this starting-point makes the creation of a fully-fledged economic union between Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan more challenging than the one undertaken by the six founding states of the European Economic Community. The analysis of the implementation of the powers attributed to the supranational institutions of the future EEU in designated common policy areas shows less then favourable process conditions for the EEU. The Eurasian Economic Commission’s powers and the Court’s jurisdiction are rather limited in comparison to those which allowed the European Commission and the European Court of Justice to build a strong law-based community. The governance mode in the current Customs Union and CES is predominantly intergovernmental. Moreover, the outcome-based transactions that were largely positive for the European integration process (investment flows, migration changes, dynamics of intra-union trade volumes in the most important sectors) are ambiguous for the EEU, and unlikely to change much in light of the preceding considerations. In sum, when applying the model to the current Customs Union and Common Economic Space between Russia, Belarus and

Kazakhstan, and when comparing the findings with the figures applicable to the early stages of the European integration process, the conclusion points to less than favourable outcome for economic integration within the context of the EEU."The Strategic alliance will not last, the two are only cooperating because of convenience. Dingli 16 — Shen Dingli is deputy dean of the Institute of International Studies at Fudan University, 6-27-2016 ("Russian cooperation with China is tactical, not strategic," Global Times, Available Online at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/990867.shtml, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)During Russian President Vladimir Putin's just concluded state visit to China, a series of massive deals were sealed between the two sides and Sino-Russian strategic mutual trust has been hailed and consolidated. Apart from that, in the joint statement signed by Chinese President Xi Jinping and Putin, both countries voiced their concern over an increasing number of "negative factors" affecting global strategic stability without mentioning names. The two major powers are showing a clear intention to join hands in counterbalancing the US. China is a realistic country, and it is aware of the power of leverage. In the early 1970s, Beijing developed a close relationship with Washington to respond to Moscow's military threat. The two later cooperated on strategic defense, and the US served as a source of advanced technology and equipment for China's military. At that time, even though the White House maintained a "diplomatic relationship" with Taiwan, China still tried to seek US help to counter the pressure from the former Soviet Union. Today, against the backdrop of the accelerating US rebalance to the Asia-Pacific strategy, which aims at containing the rise of China, we have no reason to refuse the use of realistic measures for our own interests, including counterbalancing the US-Japan alliance through cooperation with Russia. China's wisdom since ancient times will not be lost in the current era. Such wisdom is shared by all members in the international community, including Russia. Moscow is now using the same strategy to maintain its own national interests. If there is a way that can help it resist the threat from the US while preserving a certain degree of mutually beneficial collaboration with Washington, cooperation with Beijing is the way forward. Some Russian media have claimed that after Russia announced the "turn to the East" strategy in 2010, no solid progress has been made so far. The country's joint work with China is more of a grand vision rather than actual improvements in projects. Indeed, the Kremlin's "turn to the East" is only a contingency plan, which was basically put into effect under pressure. In the light of this, Russia's collaboration with China is more a matter of expediency, instead of a "strategy." Russia's heart is always with the West. Its biggest hope is to earn the respect from the West and integrate into the Western hemisphere. This is the mainstream value among Russian elite. If the next US president shows more respect to Russia and is less tough toward Moscow, the Kremlin's "turn to the East" will very likely swing to the West. Recently, Putin initiated the establishment of a Greater Eurasian partnership on the basis of the Eurasian Economic Union

(EEU). The goal of his proposal is to integrate resources in its neighborhood while preventing the West from further expanding to the east. In the meantime, Russia is also on guard against China. Even though such broad partnership has a place for Beijing, this is an outcome of bilateral compromise. Beijing is concerned about the EEU's negative impact on China's westward development, while Moscow is worried over China's growing influence in its peripheral countries via the "Belt and Road" initiative. That's why we now see the programs from the two sides are connected to each other. This is a structure of balance as well as a result of give-and-take. No matter what the Sino-Russian bilateral relationship is going through for the moment, be it big deals, Russia's "turn to the East" strategy or the Greater Eurasian partnership, none of them are long-term strategies, but only tactical cooperation. Due to the different core values of the two sides, cooperation between Beijing and Moscow is mostly aimed at third parties. Yet history has proven numerous times that any collaboration based on considerations aimed at a third party will be bound to change with the times. A crucial challenge that China-Russia ties are now confronting is how to transform their joint work based on realism into a foundation of long-term bilateral cooperation. Eurasian integration bad, allows for Russian regional hegemony and instability. Cohen 13 — Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., Visiting Fellow in Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Policy, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign and National Security Polic 6-14-2013 ("Russia’s Eurasian Union Could Endanger the Neighborhood and U.S. Interests," Heritage Foundation, 6-14-2013, Available Online at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/06/russias-eurasian-union-could-endanger-the-neighborhood-and-us-interests, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)In the fall of 2011, Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed forming a Eurasian Union (EAU) with Kazakhstan and Belarus. In November 2011, the presidents of these three countries signed an agreement to launch the Eurasian Union and make it fully operational by 2015. Stretching from the Polish border to the Pacific, the length of the former Soviet Union, the new Eurasian Union will be the nucleus of a larger transnational entity. Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus are uniting their economies, legal systems, and customs services to create a stronger Eurasian global player. They are coordinating their militaries through the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and Putin is pushing for more coordination of their security services. This geopolitical consolidation will likely affect their neighbors’ sovereignty, independence, and political orientation. Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Ukraine may be considered for future membership in the Eurasian Union. A Eurasian Union that evolves into a Russian sphere of influence would adopt a mercantilist approach to the global economy. It will likely monopolize regional security, could threaten regional stability, and

undermine economic and political freedom in Central Asia and beyond. U.S. policy should hedge against such efforts and make the case that an open economic environment offers a greater prospect for regional development. Such an approach would serve U.S. interests and create a better environment for a peaceful and prosperous Central Asia. The U.S. should organize an interagency effort to promote good governance and rule-based market economics as well as to combat efforts to close markets to the West. Eurasian Union Map Small The Eurasian Union: Putin’s Top Geopolitical Priority Vladimir Putin famously said in 2005 that the collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century and a genuine tragedy for the Russian people.[1] While focusing on the post-Soviet erosion of Russian power and the rise of the U.S., NATO, China, and India on the global stage, the Russian leader disregarded the quest of the 14 former Soviet states for independence. In an article in Izvestia in October 2011, Putin proposed forming a Eurasian Union as part of his presidential election campaign.[2] He envisioned integrating Russia and ultimately all of the former Soviet republics, except the Baltic states, by removing barriers to the flow of goods and people within a common economic space and by harmonizing domestic and external policies and legislation. He wrote: It is crucial that the Common Economic Space [the precursor of the Eurasian Union] is rooted in coordinated action in key institutional areas such as: macroeconomics, ensuring competition, technical regulations, agricultural subsidies, transport, and natural monopolies tariffs. Later, this framework will also include common visa and migration policies, allowing border controls between our states to be lifted. In fact, we are adapting the experience of the Schengen [visa] Agreement that benefits Europeans as well as everyone who comes to work, study, or holiday in the EU.[3] The high-level leadership, speed, large staff, and considerable funding set the Eurasian Union apart from past integration efforts. In 2010, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Belarus implemented a uniform external customs tariff and adopted a customs code. In 2011, they lifted internal border controls. In July 2012, they inaugurated the Single Economic Space and a Eurasian Economic Commission in Moscow to administer it. The commission is headed by Victor Khristenko, former Russian Vice Premier and Minister of Industry and Energy, and 85 percent of its personnel are citizens of Russia. The presidents of Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed the agreement to launch the Eurasian Union in November 2011. It will be fully functional in 2015, and then, as Khristenko said, “longer-term action” can be considered, presumably leading to further integration.[4] Not Like the European Union The Eurasian Union is based on two major documents: the Customs Code and the Codified Agreement on the Customs Union and Common Economic Space, which spell out the legal rules and norms for the functioning of a common market. This is a major break with past integration efforts, which generated hundreds of vague, fragmented agreements that largely remained unimplemented. The key institution is the Eurasian Commission, which was launched in July 2012. Similar to the Commission of the European Union, its main responsibility is to ensure smooth operation of the common market by enforcing rules and regulations and to carry out initiatives for further integration. The commission has jurisdiction over tariff and non-tariff

regulation (e.g., sanitary controls), customs administration, technical regulation, competition policy, energy, transport, intellectual property protection, migration, and other areas. The commission’s employees are formally “supranational bureaucrats” who supposedly take no instructions from their member states and act in the interests of the EAU as a whole. The commission’s headquarters is located in downtown Moscow, although its future headquarters might be relocated to Astana upon Kazakhstan’s insistence. Unlike the EU, the EAU Commission will make decisions by majority vote, not by consensus. Of course, Russia will dominate the decision-making process with its 57 percent vote, while Belarus and Kazakhstan have 21.5 percent each. Textbox for BG2801 The Military Dimension The Eurasian Union can be seen as a “soft power”—primarily economic—project. Russia hopes to translate its relatively large population, power, wealth, and size into greater influence around its periphery. With 600 years of empire building behind them, the Russian leaders are well aware that they must back up this influence with a hard power (military and security) component. The Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) charter signed in 2002 entered into force in 2006, when its members appointed a secretary general to lead the organization. The CSTO includes the other Customs Union members—Belarus and Kazakhstan—as well as several potential members: Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Uzbekistan withdrew from the treaty in July 2012. As a military alliance, the CSTO is dominated by the Russian armed forces, which maintain military bases in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Russia also controlled until recently the Gabala radar station in Azerbaijan; three military bases in Abkhazia and one base in South Ossetia, regions of Georgia that are occupied by Russia; ground forces in Transnistria, Moldova; an infantry division in Tajikistan; and a naval base in Sevastopol, Ukraine. The Russian Federation is currently spending $800 billion to reform and rearm the military, which will force the CSTO to adapt the alliance to the context of Eurasian integration.[5] In February 2009, the CSTO agreed to form the Rapid Reaction Forces (KSOR), a permanent combat-ready military component for crisis response. As one military expert writes, the alliance is moving toward establishing a unified command and empowering the Joint Chief of Staff in charge of CSTO military forces, effectively creating a military arm of the Eurasian Union.[6] Russia’s airborne forces, which constitute the majority of KSOR troops, are expanding from 7,500 to 20,000 troops by 2017. The Russian Defense Ministry nominated General Vladimir Shamanov, the popular commander of Russia’s airborne troops, to be the next CSTO Chief of Staff.[7] The CSTO has sought partnerships with NATO and the U.N. to boost its legitimacy, but its overtures to Washington have been unsuccessful, as the White House has been careful to avoid legitimizing Russia’s presence in the post-Soviet space.[8] Russia’s Eurasian Vocation Geographically, Russia has been a Eurasian power since its conquests of Central Asia, Siberia, and the Far East in the 16th–19th centuries.[9] The Russian Empire undertook numerous campaigns to gain territories in the Caucasus and Central Asia, taking Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan from the Ottomans and the Persian Empire and bringing to heel the khanates of Khiva, Khorezm, and Bukhara in the 19th century.[10] However, Eurasianism as a political ideology emerged

after the Russian Revolution of 1917. The Russian émigré thinkers formulated a third way for Russia between East and West and between capitalism and socialism. The idea never fully developed due to the predominance of Leninism. Debate on Eurasianism reemerged following the Soviet collapse in 1991, dividing those who favored integration with Western Europe and the U.S. and those who argued that Russia should focus on dominating Ukraine, Belarus, and the Eurasian “heartland,” including Central Asia and the Caucasus, in opposition to the West. In the 1990s the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had little supranational power and participation was lukewarm. Declining Russian influence over the post-Soviet space alarmed Kremlin strategists who feared that Russian security would suffer if Russia failed to regain some clout there, possibly leading to NATO membership by such countries as Ukraine and Georgia. Yevgeny Primakov, who served as director of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service (1991–1996), foreign minister (1996–1998), and prime minister (1998–1999) envisioned the emergence of a multipolar world, in which American influence would be first diluted and then opposed. He envisaged future integration of the CIS countries with Russia. He also actively supported and personally managed Russia’s collaboration with anti-Western states—such as Iraq, Iran, and China—to promote a multipolar international order.[11] The 1996 treaty of integration with Belarus, which created the Union State, was post-communist Russia’s first major foreign policy step to reintegrate the former empire. In the 2000s, rising energy prices enabled Russia’s resurgence in the neighborhood and on the world stage. In October 2000, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan formed the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC) with the declared goal of creating a customs union and single economic space.[12] Today, Moscow opposes Western attempts to reach out to the post-Soviet countries. Russia was even upset with the EU’s Eastern Partnership program, which was launched in 2009 to facilitate relations with post-Soviet states. President Dmitry Medvedev called for a “sphere of privileged influence” in the aftermath of the 2008 Georgia war, and his half-baked proposal of a treaty on European security failed to find support in the West.[13] Vladimir Putin’s promotion of the Eurasian Union in the fall of 2011 is a multipronged and strategic move aimed at: Creating an independent pole in the perceived global multipolar system, consolidating the Eastern Slavic and Christian Orthodox demographic core with the industrial and natural resources potential of Kazakhstan; Meeting the Chinese economic challenges, primarily in Central Asia; and Opposing the Islamist expansion into Central Asia, the North Caucasus, Siberia, the Urals, and the Volga region. Russia Turning East Russia is also undertaking its own “pivot to Asia” for political and economic reasons. First, the Putin administration is tired of the Western leaders “lecturing” them about political freedoms and human rights. Second, as Russian trade with the EU stagnates and business with the U.S. remains abnormally low due to hostility, analysts point to the Kremlin spending $20 billion to host foreign delegations at the recent Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Vladivostok as a sign that Russia is turning away from recession-stricken Europe and toward Asia.[14] Although the EU accounts for 50 percent of Russian foreign trade and is a

major cultural influence and tourism destination, in 2012, China surpassed Germany as Russia’s top trading partner for the first time.[15] Russia’s Far Eastern and Siberian Federal Districts, which share land borders with China, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia, account for 66 percent of Russia’s territory. With Asia’s growing importance, it is understandable that Eurasian integration is strategically appealing to the Russian leadership. The Drivers for Eurasian Union To date, the Eurasian Union is the most serious attempt by post-communist Russia to recreate a deeply integrated sphere of influence. The Russian elites already refer to it as Bolshaya strana (the Big Country). While Vladimir Putin states that the Eurasian Union is not an attempt to restore what did not work in the past but to achieve greater integration based on new values, politics, and economy, the project appears to head straight for the past—to Soviet-like integration.[16] This comes at a cost to Russia and Eurasia’s partners. The proposed union will likely divert its trade away from the rest of the world. According to one World Bank study, Kazakhstan actually lost real income per capita in 2011, mostly due to the Customs Union’s higher external tariffs, which hinder trade diversification.[17] The Eurasian Union may also harm the economies of neighboring non-members. Russia has been courting Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Ukraine to join the organization, but Azerbaijan and Georgia have clearly indicated that they will not become members. The Eurasian project flows not only from Russia’s preoccupation with influence and prestige in the post-Soviet space, but also from Russia’s need to adapt to the changing international environment. Thus, the Russians are apprehensive about the expected U.S. pullout from Afghanistan in 2014 and are determined to maintain security in the region. Russia’s goals in Central Asia include containing radical Islam and fighting narcotics trafficking. Containment of Islamic Fundamentalism and Fighting Narcotics Trafficking. Russia is facing an Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus that threatens to turn the whole region into a haven for international terrorism. Following the American departure from Afghanistan in 2014, a surge of extremists from Afghanistan into Central Asia and from the North Caucasus into the rest of Russia would be Moscow’s worst nightmare. Russia currently has the 201st Division (approximately 7,000 personnel) in Tajikistan, the Kant airbase in Kyrgyzstan, and the 102st Military Base (approximately 3,000 personnel) in Gyumri, Armenia. Russia intends to build a major counterterrorism center in Osh, Kyrgyzstan. The CSTO’s efforts are directed at reforming and integrating allied forces, including air defenses, and making them compatible and interoperable; boosting weapons sales; conducting training and exercises; and expanding its network of military bases. A major $800 billion military reform program is aimed at creating well-equipped mobile brigades capable of fast response to local and regional conflicts.[18] Insurgency, cross-border infiltration, and smuggling are especially acute in Tajikistan, which shares a porous 800-mile border with Afghanistan. This long border is the major avenue for smuggling Afghan drugs to Russia and Europe. In Russia, which has approximately 2.5 million heroin addicts, drugs have become a health disaster. Building a Sphere of Influence. Russia is striving to create a sphere of influence in Eurasia, making it more difficult for foreign powers, especially the U.S. and China, to operate in

Central Asia, the Caucasus, or the western tier of the Commonwealth of Independent States (Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine). The Kremlin was frightened by “color revolutions” in Ukraine and Georgia and views them as U.S.-led conspiracies aimed at undermining Russian influence. Furthermore, some nationalists and Eurasianists view the revolutions as rehearsals by pro-American political forces to topple the current regime in Russia. The Kremlin has supported the NATO military mission in Afghanistan, but Moscow (and Beijing) have never been comfortable with the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. The Kremlin pressured Kyrgyzstan to close the Manas Air Base at Bishkek’s international airport in 2008 and 2010 in exchange for discounted loans of over $1 billion. Kyrgyzstan promised to shut the base, but never did because Russia failed to provide the loans.[19] Russia’s strategic and defense partnership with Kazakhstan is of crucial importance. Moscow views the Kazakh territory as a buffer separating the mostly unguarded 5,000-kilometer Russian frontier from instability originating in other Muslim-populated states in Central Asia and beyond. By 2013, Astana and Moscow plan to integrate their common air and missile defense command with Russia’s latest S-400 “Triumph” missile defense systems deployed in Kazakhstan,[20] and they are calling for active military cooperation within the CSTO.[21] Control of Natural Resources and Key Infrastructure. The Eurasian Union is modeled after the 19th century customs and currency unions, which were at the heart of spheres of influence in Central Europe. Whether the proposed union has a sound foundation and the potential to promote stability and prosperity in the post-Soviet space is debatable. To a significant degree, its success will depend on Russia’s willingness to play by the rules and to act as an impartial and reliable partner, not as a hegemon which manipulates the organization for its own gains. Of course, Russia’s imperial past and endemic corruption undermine its trustworthiness and economic leadership. Russia ranks an abysmal 133rd in Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index, 112th in the World Bank’s Doing Business index, and 139th in the Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom.[22] Its history of conquest, exploitation, and hardball politics with its neighbors does not help and sometimes backfires.[23] That history makes it difficult to see how Russia can effectively and cooperatively lead a supranational rule-based economic organization. Similarly, doubts remain about Russia’s capacity to manage the region with complex interethnic relations and interstate issues, especially given its serious domestic Islamist insurgency problem and recent nationalistic and Christian Orthodox revival.[24] The Eurasian Union will help Russia retain privileged access to resources and help to pull the post-Soviet states’ economies into a closer Russian orbit. Central Asia is rich in natural resources, especially energy, including oil, gas, coal, and uranium. Russian firms have invested heavily in the Kazakh energy sector and are active across the post-Soviet space. In the West, Moscow has worked to obstruct the EU-backed Nabucco pipeline from Azerbaijan, which would bypass Russia, and has so far derailed the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which would bring Turkmen gas to Europe. The Nord Stream gas pipeline to Germany and the planned South Stream pipeline to European markets are part of Russia’s strategy to bypass transit countries in

Europe, especially Ukraine, and enhance Europe’s dependency on energy supplies from Russia. The Eurasian Union includes an energy commission that will make it easier for Russia to promote and impose pipelines based on Moscow’s preferences. However, when competing with China over natural resources, Moscow has not seen great success. For example, the Central Asia–China gas pipeline from Turkmenistan via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan, constructed in 2009, has undermined Russia’s monopoly over energy exports from Central Asia. China already controls a large portion of Kazakhstan’s energy sector and is the principal importer of Turkmen gas.[25] To counter this trend, Russia hopes that the Eurasian Union would strengthen its grip on Central Asia. Promotion of Transportation Routes via Russia. Russia wants to become a major transit country for commodities and finished goods transported between Asia and Europe. The abolition of customs controls between Russia, Belarus, and Kazakhstan will help to increase transit between China and Western Europe. Thus, Moscow views the possibility of major land connections between China and the West via Central Asia (bypassing Russia) as a threat to Russian interests. Russia faces challenges because China is willing to finance and build expensive transport infrastructure in the region. China has been expanding and upgrading its railroads to the Kazakh border, building free trade zones in Kazakhstan,[26] and exploring new routes through Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Construction of a railroad from China to Iran and to Turkey and Western Europe may become feasible in the foreseeable future. One example of Russia’s new approach is Rossotrudnichestvo, Russia’s arm for the outreach to Russian-speakers and co-ethnics, which was set up in 2008 and is headed by Konstantin Kosachev. The agency’s mission is to reach out to and work with Russian-speaking communities and other groups living in Russia’s periphery to nurture positive views of Russia and to promote the Eurasian Union.[27] In addition to television broadcasting, Russia uses university education and training of bureaucrats and security elites to tie its peripheral neighbors to Moscow. In September 2012, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov urged Rossotrudnichestvo to work more actively to encourage inter-CIS cooperation in humanitarian efforts, proposing to double the number of student scholarships—currently 10,000 per year—that Russia gives to foreigners, especially those from friendly countries. He also spoke of the need to promote the Russian language and to protect the “legitimate rights of compatriots.” Rossotrudnichestvo is the leading platform in advancing Russian soft power abroad, including in the Eurasian Union.[28] The International Reaction Attitudes toward Russia’s supranational design vary widely in the region. Central Asia. Although Kazakhstan has been the staunchest supporter of Russia’s integration projects, many in Kazakhstan are skeptical of the idea, and some Kazakh economic sectors, such as chemicals and agriculture, may suffer from greater competition with Russia firms. However, Kazakhstan is weary of China’s growing clout and does not want to alienate Russia, yet it wants to keep concessions at a minimum and limit integration to economic matters.[29] Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have signaled interest in the Eurasian Union membership, but have made no commitments. Their exports markets, migrant workers, and the need for Russian and Kazakh investment are the main

motivations for joining the Eurasian Union. Kyrgyz and Tajik elites know that the Customs Union and the potential Eurasian Union would make Russia an even more significant stakeholder in their domestic affairs; hence, they are uncertain.[30] Neutral Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have been pursuing policies of economic and strategic emancipation from Moscow. Uzbekistan’s Islam Karimov took Uzbekistan out of the CSTO in 2012 and shows no enthusiasm for Moscow’s integration projects. South Caucasus. Armenia may consider joining the Customs Union because of its economic dependence on Moscow. Russia is Armenia’s main trading partner and controls 80 percent of its energy resources. Moscow also has a 49-year agreement to station troops at the Gyumri military base. However, while Serge Sargsyan has praised the Eurasian Union, the dominant policy is nonetheless “not to rush” any such development.[31] Azerbaijan President Ilham Alyev has expressed no interest in the Eurasian Union or the Customs Union because they offer no benefits to Azerbaijan’s economy and are incompatible with Azerbaijan’s pro-Western orientation. Georgia withdrew from the Commonwealth of Independent States during the brief military conflict with Russia in August 2008. The Georgian situation remains unclear after the victory by the Georgia Dream coalition, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. Yet it is difficult to imagine that Tbilisi would warm up to membership in the Eurasian Union. Ukraine. Ukraine is one non-member of the Customs Union that Russia sees a strategic imperative to rope into the organization. Moscow is trying to lure Kyiv by offering heavily discounted gas prices.[32] However, pro-Russian politicians in Kyiv are unsure whether to embrace the union. Ukraine is a partner country within the European Neighborhood Policy. Kyiv is also seeking to sign an EU Association Agreement with important trade benefits. The EU Members. EU policies in Eurasia have lacked clear goals, a strategic focus, and able leadership. The EU Commission and other EU institutions have adopted the “wait and see” approach toward the region, particularly toward the Eurasian Union, because some in Europe still regard geopolitics as a dirty word. As one writer noted, the Eurasian Union seems to be designed in parallel with the European Union, rather than in harmony with it, thus closing the door to Eurasia’s integration into the EU.[33] China. China has typically remained tight-lipped. It has neither opposed nor endorsed the Eurasian Union. China does not see the Eurasian Union as a significant concern because China is already highly invested in Central Asia, especially in energy, and can ensure that its interests are properly protected. If the Eurasian Union promotes stability in the region, China welcomes it because stability promotes greater economic cooperation.[34] On the other hand, Belarus and Ukraine would remain in Russia’s orbit, while China selectively pursues its business goals there. Why the Eurasian Union Matters for the U.S. and the West A new authoritarian, anti-Western, mercantilist Russian sphere of influence would recreate the dynamics of the 19th century Great Game between the Romanov Empire and the British Empire and of the 20th century Cold War. It could deny NATO and the U.S. strategic access to air, land, and sea lanes, or control them, as Moscow did during the Afghanistan campaign. This is not what the U.S. and NATO want. Moscow is already demanding an end to the U.S. presence in Central Asia. It wants American

forces out of the Manas Transit Center in Kyrgyzstan. Russia is also pressuring Ukraine to join the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union, which would effectively foreclose Ukraine’s European integration and future NATO membership. The geopolitical level playing field is a sine qua non of American political engagement, just as Washington does not seriously oppose Moscow’s current deep economic involvement in Cuba and Venezuela. Russia uses all elements of state power in Eurasia, while the U.S. and its allies limit themselves primarily to diplomacy. Speaking to the Federal Security Service command on February 14, 2013, Putin ordered the counterintelligence service to “deal” with opponents of post-Soviet integration, including in cyberspace. He equated “extremists” with “terrorists,” opening the door to covert action operations against those who do not share his vision of Russian tutelage, from the Polish border to the Pacific.[35] The future of the Eurasian Union holds many unknowns. For example, Russia is unlikely to reverse the gradual decline of Russia’s economic influence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Russia has already lost economic ground to China and will likely continue to do so because it lacks comparative advantages in most sectors except energy, military, and nuclear industries. (See Table 1.) Today, Moscow’s attempts to define the rules of the Eurasian geopolitical game are adversely affecting U.S. interests. The Kremlin is excluding American security and economic interests by using force, covert action, corruption, and non-customs trade barriers and by undermining the rule of law. Russia will attempt to construct its own ideology and define its sphere of influence in opposition to free market, liberal values and their champions—Europe and the U.S. This need not happen. It is in the interests of the United States and the peoples of Russia and Eurasia to ensure that values of personal and economic freedom flow freely and are not subverted by expansion of Islamist radicalism or by authoritarian powers, such as Russia and China. The West should be concerned that liberty may suffer from Russia’s quasi-imperialist agenda in the post-Soviet space. Since the fall of 2011, the Russian government has criminalized unauthorized protests, expanded the definition of espionage, and made it harder for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—especially those with foreign financing—to operate within the country.[36] One can predict that the suppression of democratic values, organizations, and activists will be one of the Eurasian Union’s principal priorities. Eurasian Union Table Small What Should the U.S. Do About the Eurasian Union? The Bush and Obama Administrations have viewed the region almost exclusively through the prism of Operation Enduring Freedom, particularly through building the Northern Distribution Network, a supply system for the NATO contingent in Afghanistan. This may have been necessary, but it is not suitable for future U.S. policies. The U.S. should develop a hedge that would protect its national interests in the Central Asian and other former Soviet countries and promote constructive development. It would also be to Russia’s benefit if her neighbors developed into functioning, prosperous states in partnership with the U.S. Such ties could open avenues for economic and security cooperation, bringing jobs and business opportunities to American firms, and peaceful civic and economic development to peoples of the region. In fiscal year 2011, the United States gave $47 million[37] to Eurasian

countries and $50 million[38] to Eastern European countries. The vast majority came from the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). Aid from the Department of Defense and the Department of Energy is comparatively low and inconsistent, fluctuating greatly from 2001 to 2011. The majority of the money from State and USAID goes to “stabilization operations and security sector reform.”[39] However, following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, Washington will be in a much weaker position to promote development in a region where violent Islamism, poor governance, corruption, and drug trafficking are growing problems. To remain geopolitically relevant in the 21st-century Eastern Hemisphere geopolitics, the Obama Administration should: Prepare for involvement in the heart of Eurasia after the drawdown of the U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan. The U.S. should not abandon the field to Moscow or to Beijing, its de facto regional competitor. Combine the Central Asia/Afghanistan and Russia interagency task forces. The combined task force, coordinated by the National Security Council, should systematically analyze U.S. strategic priorities and formulate long-term U.S. policies in Russia and Eurasia, including opposition to Moscow’s neo-imperialist policies. The task force should develop and integrate the Eurasian strategy, including the New Silk Road strategy, with the “pivot to Asia” approach. To date, this effort is lacking. Such an interagency approach would span the Departments of Defense, State (including USAID), Energy, and Commerce and the intelligence community. Despite declining budgets, the U.S. should put in place intelligence and Special Operations platforms and contingencies to collect critical information and surgically fight violent Islamist threats in Central Asia past 2014. The United States should also develop an NGO component to promote good governance, rule-based market economics, individual rights, and media freedom. Boost regional geopolitical, linguistic, religious, and historical expertise in the U.S. government, while taking into account limited budgetary resources. Since the end of the Cold War, regional expertise has declined in the intelligence community, the military, and the State Department. While America should remember that geography and history dictate that these countries maintain good relations with Russia and China, Washington should not see these triangular ties as a zero-sum game. It should appreciate and encourage the “multi-vector policies” of the Central Asian states, while reaching out to secular nationalists and pro-Western circles. Thus, the U.S. and its allies should resist Russia’s strong-arm tactics to carve out a 19th century–style sphere of influence. Promote continuous bilateral U.S. involvement in Eurasia. This includes strengthening bilateral diplomatic, political–military, and economic partnerships and regional cooperation with key states, especially Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Uzbekistan. Strengthening these cooperative relations should be America’s top priority in the region. Expand economic and political freedom through international organizations. The U.S. should work through the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, World Trade Organization, and other institutions to protest Moscow’s strong-arm tactics in imposing the Single Economic Space and Eurasian Union integration and to draw attention to Russia’s quasi-imperial policies. Emphasize economic freedom.

The U.S. should work to prevent the Eurasian Union from closing market access and expanding state sectors. The U.S. should oppose exclusion of U.S. weapons sales and limitations on investments in energy and other natural resources, which is already happening in Russia. The U.S. should also oppose non-tariff barriers through WTO adjudication procedures and condition Russia’s OECD accession on economic transparency and the rule of law for all Customs Union members. Employ U.S. public diplomacy tools, including international broadcasting and exchanges, to communicate the pre-tested key messages to elite and mass audiences in the region. Conclusion Despite Moscow’s efforts to impose its will, the domination-bound, post-imperial mindset in Moscow will likely undermine economic and political integration through the Eurasian Union. This mindset makes it difficult for Russia to contemplate a truly voluntary, mutually beneficial integration or to allow its neighbors to prioritize relations with the U.S., EU, or China. Moscow promotes bilateral and regional integration to keep its neighbors in Russia’s orbit, strengthening Russian influence over their politics and constraining their ability to develop relations with outside powers. Success in Central Asia may encourage Moscow to expand its control over the Caucasus and Eastern Europe, threatening the independence and pro-Western orientation of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Ukraine—and even the Baltic states. While some amount of Russian presence underpinning regional trade and development may be unavoidable to prevent the meltdown of weak and failing states into religious or narcotics-driven civil wars and anarchy, it is not in America’s interest to encourage unencumbered Russian hegemony in Eurasia for the reasons of regional and global balance of power. The U.S. should act multilaterally with its European allies, Japan, India, South Korea, and its Eurasian partners to balance the Russian geopolitical offensive.

A2 Appeasement DASanctions fail.Johnson-Freese, 15 — Joan Johnson-Freese, is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College. The views expressed here are those of the author only and do not represent the U.S. Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy, or the Naval War College, 8-7-2015 ("US-China: Civil Space Dialogue," Diplomat, 8-7-2015, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/us-china-a-civil-space-dialogue/, Accessed 6-26-2016, RJS)It has repeatedly been demonstrated though that sanctions, denying a country “things” that it wants, only works when all countries possessing whatever the desired thing cooperate in denial. If the rationale for snubbing China is to deny it space-related technology, it should be considered that other space-faring nations do not share U.S. views toward China. Other Western countries have shown themselves eager to work with and sell to China, with restrictions and enforceable controls on dual-use technology, negating the effectiveness of U.S. actions. That leaves only defending the moral high ground – the U.S. as a democracy doesn’t work with communist authoritarian governments – as a rationale for the Congressional position. Sometimes, however, realism isn’t pretty, as it fundamentally involves acting in your own best interests. And while the United States would like to always work with countries sharing its values, in pursuing those interests that has not always proven possible, witness Iraq under Saddam, Iran under the Shah, and numerous other examples. Further, as President Richard Nixon showed with China and Ronald Reagan demonstrated during his second term with the Soviet Union, diplomacy does not equate to appeasement, as seems currently to be the popular Washington beltway interpretation.Appeasement good: cooperation is key to effecting change, especially in the context of space – Soviets prove. Turner 15 — Ronald E. Turner, Ph.D., Analytic Services Inc. 5-6-2015 ("Should the United States Cooperate with China in Space?," No Publication, 5-6-2015, Available Online at http://www.anser.org/babrief-us-china-space-coop, Accessed 6-23-2016, RJS)-China’s government does not respect basic human rights for its peopleThe United States has a long history of engaging its enemies to pursue change. The most recent example is the about-face in the U.S. relationship with Cuba. Isolation complicates opportunities to have effective give-and-take dialogue.Even when the broader posture is to restrict trade or other exchanges, at times the United States has made space or science an exception, thus opening doors to an adversary and providing valuable ways to learn more about how the other side perceives the United States and the motivations and actions it uses to counter the

United States. A classic example is U.S.-Soviet cooperation in the 1970s, which gave the United States valuable insight into the tightly closed Soviet space industry. This cooperation during the Soviet era later opened the door to Russian cooperation, eventually enabling the United States to complete the ISS and giving the Russians access to a station after Mir was no longer available. More recently, when sanctions were imposed on Russia after it began supporting Ukrainian separatists, the restrictions did not include U.S.-Russian cooperation in the International Space Station, avoiding an interruption of ISS operations.Sanctions have empirically failed to prevent Chinese development, and only seems to accelerate Chinese space programs. Kulacki 11 – Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and the China Project manager for the Union of Concerned Scientists, 6-23-2011, “US and China need contact, not cold war,” Nature, Available Online at: http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/Kulacki_US-China-coop_Nature_6-23-11.pdf, Accessed: 7-2-2016, RJS)Then, in February 1996, a US communications satellite was destroyed during a failed Chinese launch. It was reported that US workers had given Chinese officials investigating the accident sensitive technical information with potential military uses. This too led to an investigation, which figured prominently in the final report of a select House committee on commercial and scientific relations between the United States and China. The 1999 Cox Report, named after chairman Christopher Cox (Republican, California), ended the satellite launches and led to tighter restrictions on all scientific and technical cooperation with China. George W. Bush did not challenge these restrictions. China took them in its stride, increasing domestic spending on space and completing its first human space flight in October 2003. When the United States pressured Europe to limit Chinese participation in the Galileo project, the European rival to the Global Positioning System, China began building its own system. US refusals to allow China to join the International Space Station prompted Chinese leaders to green-light a national spacestation plan. In January 2007, Chinese tests of anti-satellite weaponry included the dramatic destruction of a defunct Chinese weather satellite used for target practice, scattering debris that threatens to strike other satellites and the International Space Station. In sum, the sanctions meant to inhibit Chinese progress in space have done no such thing.

A2 Elections DANo link: Candidates distance themselves from space policy and voters don’t care. Foust 15 — Jeff Foust is the editor and publisher of The Space Review, and a senior staff writer with SpaceNews. He also operates the Spacetoday.net web site, 9-8-2015 ("The Space Review: Why there’s no “space candidate”," No Publication, 9-8-2015, Available Online at http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2821/1, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)Summer’s over. Congress reconvenes today after a summer recess that lasted more than a month, with a full slate of work ahead of them, not the least of which is passing a temporary spending bill to keep the government funded when the new fiscal year stars October 1. (One space-specific item on their to-do list: convene a conference committee to hammer out differences between House and Senate versions of a commercial space launch bill that includes extensions of a regulatory “learning period” and third-party indemnification.) “Up,” Bush said when asked about NASA’s budget. “I’m a space guy.” The return of Congress—to debate spending bills, the Iran nuclear weapons deal, and other issues—will likely take some of the spotlight away from the 2016 Presidential race, which has dominated the headlines for much of the summer. However, the race won’t cede the spotlight entirely, or much at all, given both the quantity of the candidates (more than a dozen running for the Republican nomination alone) and their qualities. And that’s with still nearly five months to go until the Iowa caucuses. That heightened interest in the Presidential race has, for space advocates, created a desire to understand their positions on space issues. Some have even tried to anoint a “space candidate” for the White House: an article published late last month by Inverse asked, “Who Is the 2016 Presidential Race’s Space Candidate?” Its subhead teased, “Probably not who you'd guess.” (Spoiler: they picked as their “space candidate” Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX), who chairs the Senate Commerce Committee’s space subcommittee.) “Cruz seems like the guy, but if you can’t bring yourself to vote for a hardcore conservative and you think exploration is a priority, your vote should probably go to [Martin] O’Malley,” the article concluded. O’Malley, the former Maryland governor running far back in the polls for the Democratic nomination? That was based on his decision to create a “Space Business Development Initiative” in the state while governor, and for congratulating on Twitter the Maryland-based New Horizons team for the successful Pluto flyby in July. That’s not much to go on. And that’s pretty much the case with all the candidates, both Republican and Democratic: most have said nothing about space, and those that have mentioned space have said so little that any policy projections are, at best, ill-advised. Take, for example, former Florida governor Jeb Bush. Near the end of an interview with the editorial board of the New Hampshire Union Leader in early July, Bush fielded a question about whether he would increase or decrease NASA’s budget. “Up,” he said. “I’m a space guy. I think we need to be aspirational as a country, and the space program… I would add, R&D in general is a proper role for the federal

government.” “Honestly, I think it’s wonderful,” Trump responded. “I want to rebuild our infrastructure first, okay? I think it’s wonderful.” Left unsaid, though, is how much he would increase NASA’s budget, and in what areas. The conversation turned almost immediately to drug legalization, relations with Cuba, and other issues that got more airtime than space policy. Bush spent more time discussing how he used his Apple Watch than about NASA funding. Last month, the current frontrunner in many Republican polls, Donald Trump, fielded a question during a speech in New Hampshire about human Mars exploration. “What do you think about putting humans on Mars?” that audience member asked, in between numerous interruptions by Trump. “Honestly, I think it’s wonderful,” Trump responded. “I want to rebuild our infrastructure first, okay? I think it’s wonderful.” That “wonderful” is clearly meant sarcastically by Trump: he’s more interested in rebuilding our infrastructure (however that is defined) that going to Mars, but is silent on other aspects of space policy. On the Democratic side, Hillary Clinton mentioned SpaceX in passing in a July speech. “Innovators like Google and SpaceX are investing in research that does little for today’s bottom line, but may yield transformational benefits down the line,” she said. She did not elaborate on what those “transformational benefits” might be in the case of SpaceX. A few candidates have space policy track records to run on, but they’re either short or dated. Cruz, as noted above, chairs the Senate’s space subcommittee, but has held that post only since the beginning of the year. Clinton ran for president in 2008, but in a very different space policy environment, when NASA was still carrying out the Constellation program with plans to return humans to the Moon. Many other candidates, by contrast, have said little or anything about space—some, like Trump, Ben Carson, and Carly Fiorina, have never even held elected office at any level. That makes declarations like the one published by Inverse on the “space candidate” highly premature, at best. Space advocates will no doubt continue to press the candidates for their views on space issues in the months to come, taking advantage of the opportunities presented by frequent campaign events in Iowa, New Hampshire, and South Carolina, where the earliest caucuses and primaries are scheduled. History, though, suggests that candidates will not go too far out on a limb when it comes to space policy. It’s been less than four years, after all, since Newt Gingrich, leading in many polls after a win in South Carolina’s Republican primary, went to Florida and pitched his vision of humans to the Moon, to stay and to even, perhaps some day, become a state (see “Campaign lunacy”, The Space Review, January 20, 2012). “There are issues here beyond just having a president” interested in space, Dreier noted. “Having a president is good, but it is not the end all and be all of what we want here.” The rest was history, especially for Gingrich’s campaign. “The reception was great from people and utterly stupid from my opponents,” he recalled during an appearance Sunday on CBS’s “Face the Nation” program, where he criticized the “political elite” in the White House an Congress for space exploration approaches that are “slow, overly planned, and frankly very pork barrel.” That experience might deter 2016 candidates from making bold stands on space—or any stands at all, given the low priority of space policy when there are so many larger issues, from the economy to foreign policy to

immigration, that are more likely to sway voters’ opinions one way or another. And, some argue, presidential positions on space policy are overrated. “Having a president fond of the space program is great,” said Casey Dreier, director of advocacy for The Planetary Society, during a panel session at the annual Mars Society conference in Washington last month. But, he noted, past presidential space policy proposals, like the Space Exploration Initiative and the Vision for Space Exploration, failed to survive in the long run. “There are issues here beyond just having a president” interested in space, he noted. “Having a president is good, but it is not the end all and be all of what we want here.” Space, he advised the relatively small audience at the conference (at least one of whom, he noted, was yawning during the post-launch discussion) is not a big issue in presidential or other elections. “We’re in a minority here… space has never been a high priority for most Americans,” he said. “That’s a good reality check to remember, that not everyone feels the way we do about space as a priority.” That doesn’t mean, he suggested, giving up on space advocacy, but that small groups have to work harder to be heard. “We do have the advantage as well as there is no anti-space coalition out there, either,” he added. “There’s no one organizing against Mars. There’s no one organizing against the Moon or an increased NASA budget.” There are, though, few people organizing for Mars, the Moon, or an increased NASA budget. That should be mean it’s no surprise that presidential candidates say much about space policy: there are few votes to win. Worse, as Gingrich demonstrated in the 2012 campaign, there may be many more to lose if you take a specific position that opens you up to criticism and ridicule. That doesn’t mean it isn’t worth trying to get the candidates to think more about space policy, and elucidate their views on the campaign trail in the months to come. Just don’t expect them to say too much—or be able to follow through on their proposals if elected. Trump might go either way on China. Global Times 5/4 — Global Times, 5-4-2016 ("Unpredictable Trump could swing either way on China," Available Online at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/981347.shtml, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)The GOP presidential front-runner Donald Trump won a sweeping victory in the Indiana Republican primary on Tuesday, dealing a heavy blow to his rival Ted Cruz, who dropped out of the race later that night. Trump cleared his way to the Republican nomination for the 2016 US presidential election. Chairman of the Republican National Committee Reince Priebus declared Trump to be the party's "presumptive" presidential nominee and called for unity against Hillary Clinton. Trump's breakthrough in the Republican primaries has caused a sensation in US politics, public discourse and the international community. At the beginning of the race, most analysts and observers believed that Trump was no more than a clown. A few months ago, few people believed that the endgame would be between Trump and Clinton. Although many analysts still insist the odds are in favor of Clinton, they are somewhat uncertain about the final result. Trump's performance in the primaries has proven them wrong. Why can't the unstoppable candidate prove them wrong again? If Trump really captures the White House, what will it mean?

This scenario is becoming increasingly serious. The US traditional political elite and media have long ignored the drastic changes in US society. Rising against the repression of the GOP establishment and the mockery of US mainstream media, Trump will substantially shake the conventional US' way of operation. Acquiring more authority from US society, he will be expected to bring in more reforms, that might change many established policies. According to Trump's current policy proposals, a Trump-led US might be inclined to isolationism and attach more importance to "America First," and American economy. Ideology will be downplayed. Washington might engage in more squabbles with its free-riding allies, and tighten up its immigration policy which as a result will upset the Latin Americans. After enjoying massive trade surplus from the US for years, China and Japan will be demanded by Washington to widen market access. If Clinton is elected, the US politics will be more predictable and revolve around the previous orbit. Although Washington is expected to be tougher on Beijing, its policies are controllable. While Trump represents pragmatism, Clinton prioritizes ideology in political affairs. To China, this distinction is more important. Clinton sees the Sino-US relationship from a traditional perspective, and Trump from a much newer viewpoint. The latter will bring changes to the Sino-US relationship. However, a single individual is unable to dictate the Sino-US relationship and the US domestic issues. If elected, Trump will be restricted by interior and exterior realities. As a result, he will be subject to "transformation." In fact, the "transformation" is an interaction between Trump and the US. He will be more prudent if taking office in the White House. In fact, compared with the past, Trump has become more attentive to his words. If elected as the president, Trump's ability to take action and make change will not be as great as suggested by his unrestrained performances. He has already "created history" today. Even if he is defeated by Clinton, Trump has deeply impressed the US politics. The US election pattern is basically finalized: Trump versus Clinton. It will be a super political show, attracting unprecedented attention and closely bound up to the world interests. While Trump is a practical business tycoon subverting US political correctness, Clinton is a former secretary of state and former first lady, representative of US political correctness and the mainstream thoughts. Improving strength is the most reliable way to respond to the US uncertainties. We believe that no matter whether Trump or Clinton prevails, they will see a "China with strength" from different perspectives.

A2 India DAPlan key to prevent US-India relations from tanking. Vasani 16 – Harsh Vasani, a Postgraduate Research Scholar at the Department of Geopolitics and International Relations of Manipal University, 3-27-16 (“THROUGH ADVERSARIES, TO THE STARS,” International Politics Review, Avqilable Online at: http://www.internationalpoliticsreview.com/through-adversariesto-the-stars/, Accessed: 7/8/2016, RJS)Tensions between India and China move to the final frontier On the eve of the Second World War, just as France was about to fall and the Nazis were going to start their air battle for England, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Winston Churchill, addressed the House of Commons. The address later came to be remembered as the “we shall fight on the beaches” speech. The rousing monologue mobilised the British nation for the war ahead, and continues to evoke images of that brutal war: standing armies fighting in the fields, battles in the air, over seas, or on the hills. However, if one were to study the evolution of modern warfare, it becomes increasingly clear that, should a war between great powers break out today, outer space will add another dimension to war as we know it. Outer space, or simply ‘space,’ has evolved into the fourth frontier of war. The utility of space as a medium for war has grown exponentially since the days of the Cold War Space Race. The utility of satellites for military purposes is manifold, from communications, to navigation, early-warning systems, reconnaissance, and signals intelligence. Any state that manages to get the upper-hand in this frontier can be expected to dominate the outcome of any war. A state with command over space-based assets can jam enemy satellites, or destroy them outright, and stop the enemy from communicating with their troops or accessing vital information about troop movements or incoming missiles. It is in this context that the events in India’s neighbourhood have caused anxiety in New Delhi, and have led to calls for a new space policy aimed at countering the growing might of China’s space military programme. I. Beijing Reaches for the Stars According to some reports, Beijing conducted its latest anti-satellite missile test in 2013, when it launched its new ASAT (Anti-Satellite) missile, the Dong Ning-2, or ‘DN-2.’ A U.S. defence official familiar with military intelligence, speaking on condition of anonymity, described the DN-2 as a “ground-based, high earth-orbit attack missile.” Further, a report by the Secure World Foundation stated that “while there is no conclusive proof, the available evidence strongly suggests that China’s May 2013 launch was the test of the rocket component of a new direct ascent ASAT weapons system derived from a road-mobile ballistic missile.” This was not the first time Beijing has tested its ASAT programme. A more prominent test occurred in January 2007, when the Chinese military launched a KT-1 rocket that successfully destroyed a redundant Chinese Feng Yun 1-C weather satellite in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), approximately 800 kilometres above the Earth. The test left behind approximately 2,500 to 3,000 pieces of dangerous debris in the Lower Earth Orbit. Important to note here is that in LEO satellites and manned space missions are vulnerable to

space debris. In May 2013, a Russian satellite was struck and destroyed, reportedly by one such piece of debris. Hazardous space debris aside, the test also confirmed China’s capability to attack and destroy enemy satellites in the event of war, sabotaging the enemy’s military operations. Such developments have not gone unnoticed in New Delhi’s defence establishment, and security experts and scholars have called for a rethink of India’s space policy, augmenting India’s ASAT weapons capability. Following the 2007 ASAT weapons test, the then General of the Indian Army, Deepak Kapoor, was quoted in a Times of India report saying that China’s space programme was expanding at an “exponentially rapid” pace in both offensive and defensive capabilities, and that space was becoming the “ultimate military high ground” to dominate in wars of the future. The then Integrated Defence Staff Chief Lt-General H S Lidder was also quoted saying, “with time, we will get sucked into the military race to protect space assets and inevitably there will be a military contest in space. In a life-and-death scenario, space will provide the advantage.” A breakthrough emerged in 2012 when V.K. Saraswat, then the chief of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO), India’s premier R&D organisation, announced that India has all the building blocks in place to build an anti-satellite weapon to neutralise hostile satellites in low earth and polar orbits. In an interview, Saraswat suggested that India’s Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Defence Programme could be utilised as an ASAT weapon along with its Agni series of missiles. This was corroborated by DRDO, which said that the Indian Ballistic Missile Defence Program could incorporate the anti-satellite weapon development. It should also be remembered that with the recent successes of its Mars mission and the geosynchronous satellite launch vehicle (GSLV-D5), the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) now has the capability to launch satellites weighing in excess of two tons, an important prerequisite for the deployment of any weapons system. And while existing space treaties prohibit placing weapons of mass destruction in space, they do not explicitly prohibit the placing of other types of weapons. For DRDO then, the next goal would likely be to develop orbital weapons, which could remain in space for as long as required while orbiting Earth or the moon. II. A Question of Capabilities While statements by V.K. Saraswat created ripples all over, at home his statements were dismissed by some scholars as an exaggeration. Questioning India’s “purported” capabilities, scholars like Michael Listner and Victoria Samson have pointed out that without conducting a test and demonstrating its capability explicitly, India will only be seen as a “paper tiger” by the arms control and intelligence communities. Listner pointed out that the acknowledgement by Saraswat about India developing and bringing together the basic technologies to create a system that could be used against enemy satellites, and the decision to adapt India’s Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) technology for an ASAT role was “doubtless encouraged by the ancillary capability demonstrated by the United States when it adapted its ABM system to deorbit USA 193 in 2008,” but should such ancillary capability be taken as a evidence of full ASAT capability? Expressing perplexity over contradictory statements from Indian officials, and their refusal to clear the air about India’s ASAT programme, Listner states that public statements about India’s purported ASAT capability seem to “fit

neither an active program to develop an ASAT or an ancillary capability to ballistic missile defence.” However, in 2011, Bharath Gopalaswamy, who was then a researcher in the Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Programme at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute claimed that India’s scientific community is open to having an ASAT test, if it was done with caution. Rajeswari Rajagopalan, senior fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, a New Delhi-based think tank, said that “India might do an ASAT test in the next five to ten years.” While these statements are illuminating as to the goings-on in India’s academic and scientific circles, actually testing India’s purported ASAT capacity is easier said than done. As pointed out by Arvind Kumar, Professor of Geopolitics and International Relations at Manipal University, ASAT capabilities require a number of technologies related to space based sensors, synthetic aperture radars, electronics, a sound navigation system, guidance and control and global positioning systems. A number of different types of sensors, including infrared sensors, optical sensors, electronic-optical sensors and magnetic sensors are vital to monitor, detect and help in sensing the events. Whether India has the ability to acquire or build these technologies is doubtful. III. New Delhi’s Dilemma The questions raised over India’s ASAT weapons capacity are doubtless important. Even if New Delhi does have anti-satellite weapons capability, it will only be acknowledged if it comes out in the open with a successful test. But such a demonstration will come with its own costs. What would be the consequences if New Delhi decided to demonstrate its purported ASAT weapons capability? It should be remembered that along with causing grave insecurity, and possibly a space-weaponisation race in the region, such a test will also lead to creation of hazardous space debris which would doubtlessly elicit international opprobrium, possibly even sanctions. The burgeoning relations between the United States and India—which led to the signing of the 2007 India-US Civil Nuclear Agreement and made India the first country with nuclear weapons which is not a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), but still allowed to carry out nuclear commerce with Nuclear Weapons States—could be jeopardised if India unilaterally tests its ASAT weapons. At a time when India is looking at indigenisation of its defence industry to cut the costs of importing weapons (India is the world’s largest arms importer) and hoping to garner international investments in its defence and manufacturing industry, such a move could stall such developments as investors would see the tests as a sign of aggression and defiance of international norms. Additionally, for India to establish its defence-industrial base it needs the transfer of technology from technologically advanced states; if New Delhi decides to go ahead with ASAT tests, it may end up looking at sanctions, instead. It would also also be incongruous with its conduct if New Delhi decided to test its ASAT weapons. India is a member of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), and has contributed significantly to crafting that organisation’s guidelines. A successful test of an ASAT weapon by India and the resulting debris would seriously erode India’s credibility in this arena. Security analysts and scholars advocating the demonstration of weapons should not be under any impression that New Delhi will be treated to the same measured response from the international community as Beijing was after

2007. However, a new treaty banning space weaponisation could inhibit India from demonstrating its ability in the future. After the 2007 test conducted by China, there is renewed talk of a restrictive treaty banning space-weaponisation. Much like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that forced restrictions on the non-nuclear weapons states of the time (including India), a new restrictive regime on space-weaponisation could foreclose India’s options, giving the US, China, and Russia ASAT-weapons-state status à la NPT, while keeping India out of the club. This could again lead to discrimination against India in case it decides to conduct a test to display its existing ability. It would also put New Delhi at a serious disadvantage, as it would then only be able to negotiate on such a new treaty as an “outsider” rather than an “insider” with recognised ASAT weapons capability. It is clear that if India shies away from demonstrating its ASAT weapons capability before a restrictive treaty is enforced, it will be repeating a historic mistake. It is evident that for policymakers in New Delhi the situation is tricky. There are both pros and cons for demonstrating India’s ASAT weapons capability. In this scenario, it is important to look for a middle ground where India can test its ASAT weapons without creating any hazardous debris in outer space. One possible way is to test the anti-satellite weapons at a low altitude where the resulting debris would enter the Earth’s atmosphere and burn without causing any damage. At a lower altitude, the atmospheric drag results in orbital decay that reduces the altitude of such detritus, which eventually enter Earth’s atmosphere and due to increased heat, usually burn on re-entry. Yet another way to demonstrate ASAT capability without causing debris would be to do a fly-by test where the ground-based direct ascent missile will fly-by the targeted satellite without destroying it. Lastly, New Delhi could test its ability to sabotage satellites by testing its ability to jam satellites using space-based lasers. This method falls under the category of “soft-kill” methods and does not create debris. Whether a fly-by test or jamming a satellite, both require technological superiority to conduct the test and also to satisfactorily gauge the results. Whether DRDO and ISRO have such technological capability is not known. Scholars working in the field of space security will do a whole lot of good by expending scholarship on these innovative ways to test ASAT weapons without causing any debris.Aff solves the DA – Chinese ASAT’s are the reason why India is militarizing space. Ibc News 15 — Ibc News Bureau, 9-6-2015 ("Indian Defence’s new target: Anti-Satellite Weapons," IBC World News, 9-6-2015, Available Online at https://www.ibcworldnews.com/2015/09/06/indian-defences-new-target-anti-satellite-weapons/, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)After testing the over 5,000km Agni V missile, which traveled up to 600km into space during its parabolic trajectory, the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) now feels it can fashion deadly anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons in double-quick time. Agni V’s launch has opened a new era in developing space weapons. Apart from adding a new dimension to our strategic defence, it has

ushered in fantastic opportunities in, say, building ASAT weapons and launching mini/micro satellites on demand. The ASAT weapon would include marrying Agni V’s propulsion system with the “kill vehicle” of the under-development two-tier BMD (ballistic missile defence) system that has been tested a few times to track and destroy hostile missiles both inside (endo) and outside (exo) the Earth’s atmosphere. An ASAT weapon would require to reach about 800km altitude… Agni V will give the boosting capability and the ‘kill vehicle’, with advanced seekers, will be able to home into the target satellite. The government had not given its nod for the ASAT programme. “India does not believe in weaponization of space. DRDO is only contemplating about having the capability. There are no firm plans for offensive space capabilities. The fact, however, remains there is a re-think on the entire issue ever since China shocked the world by using an ASAT weapon to destroy an old satellite in 2007. Beijing has set a scorching pace in developing advanced ASAT capabilities with “direct-ascent” missiles, hit-to-kill “kinetic” and directed-energy laser weapons. The defence ministry in 2010 had even drafted a 15-year “Technology Perspective and Roadmap”, which held development of ASAT weapons “for electronic or physical destruction of satellites (2,000km altitude above earth’s surface) and GEO-synchronous orbits” a thrust area. Consequently, apart from directed energy weapons, defence scientists are focusing on “space security” to protect India’s space assets from electronic or physical destruction. Another spin-off from Agni V test is that the DRDO feels it can work towards launching mini-satellites for battlefield use if an adversary attacks the country’s main satellites. ‘The mini-satellites will provide communication, navigation and some sort of GPS to armed forces for a limited time. Agni-V in itself is a stronger booster shot for India’s dissuasive deterrence posture, bringing as it can the whole of China under its strike envelope. An even more potent missile with MIRV (multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles) warheads is in the pipeline, which is likely to be named Agni-VI. The govt. has not placed a cap on missile ranges. Agni-V’s ”over 5,000-km range” was sufficient to take care of India’s current threat perceptions. ‘DRDO has no problem in augmenting the range if in the future, threat perceptions change. India is not in a missile race with anyone and is building missiles to mitigate current threats.India is pro-plan Rajagopalan 11 — Rajeswari Rajagopalan, member of the security studies department of the Oberver Research Foundation, 11-10-2011 ("India's Changing Policy on Space Militarization: The Impact of China's ASAT Test," India Review, Available Online at http://www.academia.edu/15276319/Indias_Changing_Policy_on_Space_Militarization_The_Impact_of_Chinas_ASAT_Test, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)India’s Traditional Position on Space MilitarizationIndia’s traditional policy was to oppose any indication of militarizationof space, including criticizing programs such as missile defenze andASAT programs, usually those announced by the US. Indian officialsand leaders repeatedly and consistently

took a clear position opposingany move that suggested space militarization until at least the turn of the century. This went from general opposition to space militarizationin the 1960s to opposing the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)or the ‘Star Wars’ program in the 1980s to ASAT programs, especiallyAmerican ASAT programs in the 1990s. Note that much of this crit-icism was related to what were perceived as weaponization of spaceor to active use of space technologies for military purposes in missiledefense and ASAT programs rather than to the passive use of space forpurposes such as surveillance or communication, even for military pur-poses. This complicates definitional issues related to “weaponization”or “militarization” of space because many technologies included werenot space-based, including many types of anti-ballistic missiles andASAT technologies.In one of the first UN meetings on the subject of spacemilitarization, India’s representative Krishna Rao stated, “Outer spacewas a new field and there were no vested interests to prevent theIndia’s Changing Policy on Space Militarization 359 international community from embarking on a regime of co-operationthan conflict. The problems of outer space were fortunately not thoseof modifying an existing regime but of fashioning a new pattern of international behaviour. 21 Similarly, way back in 1968, Indian PrimeMinister Indira Gandhi said in a message to the UN Secretary General,“The peaceful uses of outer space, particularly in the fields of telecom-munications and meteorology, promise to confer great benefits todeveloping nations . . . India looks forward to expanding areas of international collaboration and would take initiatives as she has at theUnited Nations sponsored International Rocket Launching Station inTrivandrum and at the Experimental Satellite Communication EarthStation.” 22 As Raja Mohan argues, “In the debates on outer space in the 1970sand 1980s, India tended to focus on strengthening state sovereignty.Like most other developing countries, India sought to limit the use of direct broadcast satellites based in outer space.” 23 This was also thetime when concepts like “non-discriminatory, comprehensive and uni-versal disarmament” gained popularity and became the buzzwords atleast among the Indian arms control analysts. Another argument—athird world argument—to increase the limit of a state’s jurisdiction inspace was also propounded around this time but they were dismissedas well. Broadly, all the arguments, be it on the space or the nucleardisarmament, were to do with the morality, and the sovereignty angle,as Raja Mohan suggested. India was, therefore, pro-active in its par-ticipation in the negotiation of the Outer Space Treaty and the UNConvention on the Law of the Sea.Keeping with this historical position, highlighted throughout theentire 1970s and 1980s, India continued with its opposition to the US’Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the space race between the US andUSSR, as well as their ASAT tests, during the same period. SDI drewsharp criticism from much of the world including India, which saidthat it contributed to the growing arms race including that of nuclearweapons. While Indira Gandhi only indirectly criticized the US moveat the UN General Assembly in September 1983, the then ForeignMinister P.V. Narasimha Rao was much forthcoming, warning “thatextension of [the] arms build-up to outer space would mean a perma-nent goodbye to disarmament and peace and [would] plunge mankindinto a perpetual nightmare.” The resulting

escalation “would eitherblowuptheentireglobetosmithereensorreducehumanitytoastateof utter helplessness, making it a permanent hostage to terror from withinand hegemony from without.” 24 Thereafter, India’s Ambassador tothe Conference on Disarmament (CD), Muchkund Dubey, opposedthe SDI in 1985 at the CD in Geneva and “called for negotiations toprevent an arms race in outer space.” 25 While development of ground-based anti-satellite weapons forusing conventional, nuclear and directed energy capabilities by thetwo superpowers are well-known, neither is known to have employedsuch capabilities for hostile attacks. Nevertheless, India has repeatedlysought a ban on space weapons at the UN and other international forasuch as the CD. In fact, India went one step further to seek a ban onweapons in any global commons including sea beds and outer space,while arguing the need to strengthen global measures for a weapons-free outer space. 26 Keeping with Indira Gandhi’s policy on space, RajivGandhi sponsored in January 1985 “a declaration of six nonalignedcountries opposing an arms race in outer space and nuclear testing.” 27 The stand in the 1990s, even after the end of the Cold War, con-tinued to be no different. In a Rajya Sabha debate questioning theUS space technology, Minister of State for External Affairs SalimIqbal Sherwani replied, stating that while the government is awareof the US’ activities including the use of laser-based ASAT systems,“India’s stand against use of anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons for preven-tion of arms race in outer space has been articulated in the relevantfora such as Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. India has alsoproposed negotiations for an international treaty to ban anti-satellite(ASAT) weapons. Government remains fully committed to takingall necessary steps to safeguard its security and national interest inaccordance with its assessment of developments relating to India’ssecurity environment.” 28 In July 2000, when Defense Minister GeorgeFernandes was asked to comment on the US plans for national mis-sile defense, he was disapproving, stating that “the US should give upthis whole exercise as it will lead to far too many problems than wecan visualize now.” 29 As Ashley Tellis points out, other senior officialssuch as the Minister for External Affairs Jaswant Singh too maintaineda similar position saying that, “We have consistently held a view thatopposes the militarization of outer space. . . . We cannot support thisdevelopment.” 30 Meanwhile, India became a signatory to almost all of the UNtreaties on outer space law except for the Agreement Governing the activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies; it isa signatory to the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moonand Other Celestial Bodies; Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts,the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects Launchedinto Outer Space; Convention on International Liability for DamageCaused by Space Objects; and Convention on Registration of ObjectsLaunched into Outer Space. 31 India has also been active in interna-tional fora including the United Nations Committee on the PeacefulUses of Outer Space (UN-COPUS), the international COSPAS-SARSAT system for search and rescue operations, the InternationalAeronautical Federation (IAF), the Committee on Earth ObservationSatellites (CEOS), the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR),

theInter Agency Debris Coordination Committee (IADC), the SpaceFrequency Coordination Group (SFCG). India is also a party to theInternational Charter for Space and Major Disasters through whichthe ISRO has been providing satellite data for disaster management.India in the meantime established the Centre for Space Science andTechnology Education for Asia and the Pacific (CSSTE-AP) under theUN Office for outer space affairs. 32 The government has also continued with the policy of seekingregional collaborations with other countries on the need to insti-tute arms control measures in space so as to prevent weaponizationof the outer space. Accordingly, India entered into agreements withseveral countries including Australia, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,Canada, China, EUMETSAT-1, European Space Agency (ESA),France, Germany, Hungary, Indonesia, Israel, Italy, Mauritius, theNetherlands, Norway, Peru, Russia, Sweden, Syria, Thailand, UK,Ukraine, and USA. Similarly, there are bilateral agreements betweenISRO and other space agencies such as Brazilian Space Agency,National Institute for Aeronautics and Space of Indonesia, Israel SpaceAgency, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and theNational Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration of the US.

CPs

A2 NASA CPCP fails – creates a bureaucratic mess. Messier 16 — Doug Messier, is a communications expert with more than a decade of experience with entrepreneurial startups. A skilled analyst with superb written communication skills, he has broad knowledge of the aerospace, Internet, education, and environmental fields. He is an expert in translating scientific and technical concepts for lay audiences and in helping individuals and organizations craft their messages in print and online. Douglas is Managing Editor of Parabolic Arc . Offering “Space Tourism…and Much More,” this popular blog provides daily coverage of space tourism, commercialization, human spaceflight, and other key areas in humanity’s conquest of the final frontier. Parabolic Arc’s combination of up-to-date news and insightful analysis has made this website a must read for anyone who wants to stay informed about the new era of commercial spaceflight. Douglas is a Co-owner of SpaceJobs.com – the world’s largest online career site for the aerospace, defense and aviation industries. He has helped to forge business strategy as member of the Board of Directors and collaborated on web designs and advertising. He helped to found the Earth and Space Foundation, a non-profit focused on connecting the environmental and space communities. The foundation funds expeditions that use space technologies to help protect Earth’s environment. It also funds scientists who study extreme environments to help us better understand conditions on other worlds. Douglas worked for five years in relevance analysis for Yahoo!, helping to greatly improve the company’s search results. He worked with engineers to devise relevance tests, wrote test guidelines and procedures, and trained more than 150 analysts. This work gave him an intuitive understanding of search marketing and online branding. It also honed his analytical skills, giving him the ability to quickly analyze large amounts of information. He has worked extensively in the education area and served as Publications Director and Distance Education Manager at the University of Management & Technology in Arlington, Virginia. This start-up, for-profit university – led by project management guru J. Davidson Frame – offers high quality management programs worldwide and has pioneered graduate management education in China. He worked for five years as an Associate Editor at the National Science Teachers Association, where he collaborated with authors to develop curriculum. One of the projects was Views of the Solar System, a CD-ROM tour of the planets and moons. Other projects focused on global climate change and the environment. Douglas has written everything from technical documentation to magazine and newspaper articles to movie and television spec scripts. He pitched stories to three different Star Trek series – an opportunity that arose by submitting an unsolicited spec script. Douglas is the author of "Carl: The Biography of William Carl Condie". This 220-page private biography is the story of a Salt Lake City man who lived from 1909-2003. This private work – commissioned by one of Carl’s grandsons – was distributed to family and friends. Thomas Monson, the president of the Mormon Church, said he “couldn’t put down” the account of his cousin Carl’s life. Douglas holds a master’s degree in Science, Technology and Public Policy from The George Washington University, where he studied at the Space Policy Institute. He is a graduate of the International Space University and holds a B.A. in Journalism from Rider University. 2-26-2016 ("Why the Space Leadership Preservation Act Solves Nothing at Parabolic Arc," Parabolic Arc, 2-26-2016, Available Online at http://www.parabolicarc.com/2016/02/26/space-leadership-preservation-act-solves/, Accessed 7-17-2016, RJS)WASHINGTON, DC – Today, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology held a hearing to receive testimony on H.R. 2093, the Space Leadership Preservation Act, and to consider the issue of maintaining a “constancy of purpose” for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The Committee also held a hearing on the Space Leadership Preservation Act last Congress. H.R. 2093 would amend existing statutes on NASA by providing specific direction to the President with regards to how the leadership of NASA must be selected and appointed; and how annual agency budgets and associated priorities must be reconciled with budgets formulated external to NASA. Specifically, the Act would mandate a ten-year term for the Administrator of NASA and would require the President to appoint the Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and Chief Financial Officer from among a list of nominees provided by a Board of Directors established under this Act. In addition, the Act would require that the Board submit to the President and specified Congressional entities, not later than November 15 of each

year, a proposed budget for the agency for the next fiscal year. Each budget proposed by the President for NASA would be required to include a detailed justification of any differences between the President’s proposed budget and the budget provided by the Board of Directors. Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-TX) said in her opening statement, “I believe that all Members of this Committee—and our witnesses—share my belief that NASA is a cornerstone of our nation’s R&D enterprise, a source of inspiration for our young people, and a worldwide symbol of America’s technological prowess and dedication to the peaceful exploration of space. We want it to succeed. “Today’s hearing is entitled “The Space Leadership Preservation Act and Need for Stability at NASA.” While I have concerns about the legislation itself, I wholeheartedly agree with the premise that we want to preserve America’s leadership in space, and that NASA will need stability if it is to maintain that leadership role. I am heartened that Chairman Culberson has long felt the same way. That said, I regret that the legislation being discussed today, while obviously well intentioned, unfortunately is not likely to fix the fundamental causes of instability at NASA.” Democrats on the Committee expressed numerous concerns with the bill: that allowing Congress to use a party-based formula to appoint Board Members would inject partisan politics into that Board; having the Board prepare a NASA budget at the same time as NASA would create wasteful duplication, confusion, and instability; and that establishing a fixed, 10-year term for the Administrator would increase instability, not mitigate it, especially if a new President plans to pursue a different policy agenda from his or her predecessor and doesn’t see that Administrator as being part of his or her “team”. Ranking Member Johnson said, “The reality is that we don’t need to set up a new bureaucracy outside of NASA or alter the appointment process for its leaders. If we are interested in ensuring stability at NASA, it is already in our power as Congress to do so. We are the ones who ultimately determine NASA’s budget. We can provide the necessary budgetary stability to NASA—or we can destabilize it with appropriations delays, continuing resolutions, and shutdowns. The choice is ours.” Ranking Member of the Space Subcommittee, Donna F. Edwards, said in her statement for the record, “We need a challenging and compelling goal for our human space program. We need a goal that will allow our young people to know where we are aiming and when we want to get there. We need a goal that will bring out the best in us as a Nation, as great national challenges have done in the past. And the House of Representatives has done just that. Indeed, in passing the bipartisan NASA Authorization Act of 2015, the House singled out Mars as NASA’s goal for Human Exploration and directed NASA to develop a Roadmap to achieve that goal.” Invited witnesses addressed a number of issues during the hearing about H.R. 2093 including concerns regarding the proposed 10 year term for a NASA Administrator, the requirement for a budget developed by a Board, questions about the accountability of a Board of Directors, and potential issues if multi-year contracting were expanded at NASA. There was no groundswell of support for the bill in their responses.

A2 Remove Debris CPLegal barriers to debris removal, the aff’s dialogue is key. Sorge 15 — Marlon Sorge, 12-10-2015 ("Legal Issues for Active Debris Removal," No Publication, 12-10-2015, Available Online at http://www.aerospace.org/crosslinkmag/fall-2015/legal-issues-for-active-debris-removal/, Accessed 7-7-2016, RJS)Active debris removal (ADR) involves changing the orbit of a debris object via the actions of another system. This system may take different forms: for example, a “space tug” that grapples with a piece of debris to relocate it or attach to it a drag-enhancing device to speed up its reentry; a ground-based laser that vaporizes a small part of the debris to shift its orbit; or a large sphere of aerogel that captures small debris. Most debris mitigation actions—such as moving a satellite to a lower orbit at the end of its mission—involve only the object itself. ADR is different in that it involves an external actor. This puts ADR in a unique legal position. The Outer Space Treaty (OST) of 1967 established international rules regarding the salvage of objects in space. Article VIII specifies that ownership of space objects stays with the original owner, no matter where the object is found, whether it is in orbit, or on Earth after reentry. This is binding to all states that are party to the OST, and any salvage of another owner’s object must happen only with permission. Nations that have signed and ratified this agreement include Brazil, Canada, China, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, France, Germany, India, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Article VI of the OST makes state parties responsible for the actions of their nongovernment entities, so private organizations are also bound to these rules. This also applies to fragmentation debris, which can make “ownership” even trickier to define. Ownership of the debris remains with the owner of the original satellite or rocket body per “…their component parts…” but the difficulties become murkier for debris that is too small to be cataloged, and whose specific originating source is unlikely to be determined. This adds another layer of making ADR concepts difficult to regulate, because it can be tough to determine which nation(s) need to grant permission to remove certain objects. Liability may be an issue even if the original owner of the debris object grants permission. For example, what if nation A rendezvouses with an old nation B rocket stage, moving it to a low orbit, where drag will cause it to reenter Earth’s atmosphere a few months later? Then the rocket breaks up on reentry, and its debris falls onto nation C, causing damage. Who is liable? Current international law states that the launching country, nation B, retains permanent ownership and liability of the rocket stage, yet the debris clearly would not have landed where it did if nation A had not moved it. This is the sort of liability issue that needs to be resolved prior to an ADR program that involves more than one party. An additional hurdle that must be overcome for large-scale ADR to become practical is the possible misperception of ADR technologies. For example, a technology that can move a defunct object or piece of debris in orbit is also capable of disrupting, disabling, or destroying an active

satellite. This opens up the potential for one organization’s ADR development effort to be perceived by another’s as an attempt to develop an antisatellite (ASAT) capability, for example. The difficulty is that the majority of the ADR concepts considered do indeed contain most or all of the technologies that would be required to disrupt the functioning of a satellite. For example, a laser that is powerful enough to target and move a debris object is also likely capable of targeting and damaging an active satellite. One nation’s benign ADR system may be considered a threat by other nations. Creating a practical ADR system requires the resolution of a number of engineering challenges, but it also requires the resolution of relevant legal and political issues at an international level. The legal issues may prove more difficult to resolve than the technological challenges.

Case

Star WarsN/U – collaboration exists between non-government scientists. Kulacki 11 – Gregory Kulacki, senior analyst and the China Project manager for the Union of Concerned Scientists, 6-23-2011, “US and China need contact, not cold war,” Nature, Available Online at: http://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/assets/documents/nwgs/Kulacki_US-China-coop_Nature_6-23-11.pdf, Accessed: 7-2-2016, RJS) The Union of Concerned Scientists has more than two decades of experience working with scientists from across the world on public-policy issues that require international scientific and technical cooperation, notably: the pursuit of nuclear disarmament; nuclear-power safety and security; and security in outer space. More than 100 Chinese scientists and engineers have participated in our annual Summer Symposiums on Science and World Affairs, and many have gone on to hold important positions in Chinese institutes. The China Project that I manage for the union has used these relationships to expand dialogue and pursue joint research on the contentious security issues that have long divided Chinese and US scientists. In the process, we have established relationships with China’s defence-science community that our counterparts in government cannot. We have used these relationships to ease Chinese anxieties about US missile defences, US discussions of developing new nuclear weapons, and the Pentagon’s overblown rhetoric about ‘space control’. We are starting discussions aimed at helping Chinese scientists to make decisions that reduce the risks of nuclear power. Scientists with access to good support networks and information can make a positive difference to government policies, or at least try to. The Union of Concerned Scientists has learned that the January 2007 anti-satellite test was approved in part thanks to distorted representations of data on space debris provided by the Chinese military. We watched with admiration as our Chinese research colleagues risked their careers to provide their government with more reliable information. US scientific and technological cooperation is unlikely to reform China’s oppressive political system. But experience shows that it can contribute to mitigating some of the dangers to US citizens. It can also foster communication and understanding, setting the stage for cooperation on issues that require international solutions. Wolf is to be commended for his support for human rights, and congressional concerns about US–China rivalry are understandable. But President Obama’s decision to use scientific cooperation as an instrument of diplomacy is not only his constitutional prerogative, it is the best way to advance US interests. The two joint statements and the efforts of NASA and the OSTP are hopeful signs that the Obama administration is pursuing a healthy approach to collaboration. Gaining congressional support for such efforts requires a broader awareness of the constructive role that scientists can have in international relations.

No Space WarNo space war. Space hotline prevents miscalc. Banerjee 15 — Brinda Banerjee, is a researcher working on security, armed conflict and military policies. She holds a Bachelor’s in Journalism (with Honors), a Master’s in Peace and Conflict Studies and is currently pursuing her Ph.D. in state responses to internal conflict. Brinda writes extensively about current events, conflict resolution and geopolitical dynamics in the modern world, 11-27-2015 ("China, U.S. To Launch Space Hotline To Avoid Space War," ValueWalk, 11-27-2015, Available Online at http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/11/china-u-s-launch-space-hotline-avoid-space-war/, Accessed 6-23-2016, RJS)That space is the new- perhaps even final- frontier is a widely acknowledged fact. Even as territorial expansionism and resource-driven ambitions continue to dominate international relations, the new-age marker of geopolitical supremacy is space. And China knows this. Which is why Beijing is working hard to establish China’s preeminence in space. However, security experts in China and elsewhere have clearly realized that the risk of in-space collisions and accidents is high and such an incident could easily lead to war back home on earth. Given that the relationship between China and the United States is particularly defined by the desire to outcompete one another, the possibility of a space collision is particularly worrying. And so, Beijing and Washington have decided to set up a “space hotline” to address these concerns. China, U.S. Start ‘Space Hotline’ The space hotline is going to allow direct communication between Beijing and Washington; The Financial Times reports that the hotline will enable the two governments to quickly and efficiently exchange information about each other’s projects and actions in space. The hotline has been conceptualized for the express purpose of avoiding run-ins and unintentional confrontations in space. Using the hotline, officials in China and the United states hope to be able to discuss plans, tests and the likelihood of their paths meeting in space. The hotline will serve as a conduit between military authorities and space program officials. An assistant secretary of state in the United States has shared that the U.S. hopes to cut down on the time it takes to be able to communicate effectively with China on space-related matters. Typically, if Washington wants to convey a message to Beijing, it will start with the Joint Space Operations Center (JspOC) contacting the Pentagon, from where the message is transmitted to the State Department and then onto the U.S. Embassy in Beijing, which will relay it to a Chinese contact and then, once an answer is confirmed, the message is sent back through the chain. The U.S. assistant secretary of state said that in the past Washington has had to “send notifications to the Chinese via their Ministry of Foreign Affairs” and the entire process of contacting the Chinese authorities and receiving a response takes too much time- and in some cases of space-related emergencies and enquiries, neither side has enough time to engage in bureaucratic protocol. In case an impending accident or possible threat is identified, authorities on both ends should be able to quickly reach other and enact a situation-appropriate response strategy without expending

too much time on communication and clarification. It is believed that the space hotline will prove helpful in doing just that. The space hotline with China is not the first time the U.S. has chosen to pursue faster communications systems and cooperation with a rival power: in the post-Cold War era, Russia and the United States established a direct line between Moscow and Washington, known as the “red telephone”. Direct links such as these are developed to help traditional competitors avoid catastrophes because the tenuous nature of their ties may trigger off a conflict at any given moment. Authorities Want To Avoid Space Warfare As problematic as space collisions are as of themselves, Beijing and Washington are particularly worried about accidents being interpreted as acts of aggression. A chance encounter may create severe misunderstandings between the two countries and could be incorrectly understood as an act of war, thus inciting actual conflict between the states. The two governments have identified potential risks that may create such a misunderstanding; for instance, experts suggest that unintentionally harming another country’s orbiting satellites would render that country’s intelligence and other systems useless: while this may not, in fact, be a desired outcome it would no doubt be received badly and may force the affected state to enforce counter-measures or retaliate in kind. These concerns are informed by real-life experiences: in 2007, China inadvertently destroyed an orbiting satellite while testing its own anti-satellite weapons systems and the incident sparked off a raging debate on space warfare. The satellite in question was a non-operational weather satellite and while the incident itself did not pose a military threat, it did reveal potential for the same. China’s Space Program Advances Rapidly China’s space program is advancing in leaps and bounds, with one of the most recent developments being the launch of a satellite that is equipped for sub-meter resolution imaging. China has also installed a brand-new space launch base on Hainan Island. China’s strides in the lunar exploration niche are also impressive. The Chinese space program has been successful in landing a rover on the surface of the Moon. The Jade Rabbit was sent to travel over the Moon in 2013. China’s current priority is to have its first manned orbiting space station up and running by 2020. China has also completed an orbit-and-back mission of an unmanned spacecraft. In November 2014, China unveiled a prototype for its Mars rover. The Chinese space agencies are currently developing the Long March-9 rocket. The rocket is reportedly marked by an “unprecedented lift capability” and will be used for China’s first-ever manner lunar exploration mission. The China Daily reports that the rocket will have a payload of 130 tons and will equal the lift capability of NASA’s Space Launch System, which is also currently under development. The rocket launch has been scheduled for 2028. China Prioritizes ‘Counter-Space’ Systems To Offset The U.S. Earlier this year it was revealed that Beijing is investing heavily into developing and testing anti-space technologies and systems as part of its space program. The Pentagon submitted a report regarding the same to the Congress, expressing concern at Beijing’s interest in processing weapons systems and defense technologies meant for use in space. The report reads, “By the end of October 2014, China had launched 16 spacecraft, either domestically or via a commercial space launch provider. These spacecraft mostly

expanded China’s SATCOM and ISR capabilities, while a few others tested new space technologies”. The report was released by the United States Department of Defense in May 2015. According to the Pentagon, China is not only developing space technology and assets for scientific and technological progress purposes, but also investing in “a variety of capabilities designed to limit or prevent the use of space-based assets by adversaries during a crisis or conflict, including the development of directed-energy weapons and satellite jammers”. These developments are contradictory to China’s assurances that it will not contribute to the militarization of space. Many of China’s recent space-related projects and actions have created an atmosphere of concern and tension in Washington. Amongst these was a May 2013 space mission: China deployed an unknown item on a ballistic trajectory ranging higher than 30,000 km. The said object’s trajectory loomed close the geosynchronous orbit where many countries position their communications and other satellites. According to the Pentagon, the mission did not result in the deployment of any space asset into the orbit, an action that defies the usual missions undertaken by “traditional space-launch vehicles, ballistic missiles or sounding rocket launches used for scientific research”. The U.S. agencies thus suspect that China may have been testing an anti-satellite weapon instead. Space security experts reveal that being able to destroy or hinder satellites belonging to rival states could give the thus-capable states a winning advantage over adversaries. Being able to target enemy satellites, restrict access and completely demolish intelligence systems would allow states to disarm their enemies’ precision weapons and defense systems back on earth. China has rubbished reports that it is developing and testing anti-satellite systems, but the U.S. remains concerned nonetheless. The Pentagon’s report states, “China’s continued development of destructive space technologies represented a threat to all peaceful space-faring nations.”No space war – there’s too much at stake. Wordsworth 15 – Rich Wordsworth, a UK journalist, and write for Gizmodo, Kotaku and Vice, 12-18-2015 (“Why We'll Never Fight a Real-Life Star Wars Space Conflict,” Gizmodo UK, 12-18-2015, Available Online at: http://www.gizmodo.co.uk/2015/12/why-well-never-fight-a-real-life-star-wars-space-conflict/, Accessed 7-4-2016, RJS)There was always a strange disconnect between space and the battlefield in Star Wars. Things whizzed around amongst the stars, zapping each other with handy, colour-coded laser beams, and people, droids and sentient teddy bears milled about on the ground, shooting at the enemy (or in the third case, chasing them with sticks) unaided. Not much that happened above the planets in the galaxy far, far away seemed to have a big effect on the ground war (with the obvious exception of the Death Star), and barring a lone shield generator in Return of the Jedi, the same was true vice versa. But in the galaxy closer to home, at least, the heavens are becoming progressively more important to the wars we fight on the

surface. The Cold War nightmare of superweapons in space never came to pass, thanks to the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which barred signatories from dangling weapons of mass destruction over the cities of their adversaries from satellites. But what filled the void was no less significant: an entire warfighting doctrine that was, especially for the West, increasingly dependent on unimpeded access to a globe-spanning satellite network. Take drones, for example. The US has thrown billions at its various unmanned aerial vehicle programmes – from the Predators in the early years of Afghanistan and Iraq, to the Reapers that now stalk enemies wherever a conflict flares up. All are operated from ground stations – usually on different continents – via satellite. Or take the GPS satellite network. That same system that leads you down bendy roads on the Christmas exodus also guides not just troops on the ground, but the GPS-guided bombs Western militaries in particular use to precision-target enemies. Without the GPS network, reliably hitting an IS stronghold – rather than the hospital next to it – becomes substantially more difficult. Even if the weapons can be targeted using backup redundancy systems, developed militaries rely on satellites to provide surveillance and communications. It’s no use being able to see the target if you can’t communicate its position to your pilots. Satellites, then, are a linchpin of modern warfighting. So what’s the problem? In a word: vulnerability. “We are more vulnerable in the West, because we rely on satellites a lot,” says Bhupendra Jasani, visiting Professor at King’s College London’s War Studies Department. “The Russians and the Chinese probably don’t [have such a reliance], simply because of their capabilities. Even now, if you compare [the US] with the Russian ability to see objects [from space], the Americans can see a ten centimetre object from 200km, which the Russians may not be able to do – their optics are not that good. And the Chinese [optics even] less so.” The difficulty is that Russia and China both know this, and in a space war scenario would see Western reliance on satellites - whatever its benefits - as an exploitable advantage. As with cyber-warfare, the irony is that the countries that are the best networked are also the most vulnerable. And while it would be comforting to think that things like drones were protected through well defended military satellite networks, the truth is more unsettling. “The Chinese have, with their doctrine on information warfare, identified that the US’ dependence on network-centric warfare is very much dependent on space-based assets,” says Elizabeth Quintana, senior research fellow and director of military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI). “Not just military space-based assets, but commercial ones as well. Various US officials have said in the past that 80 per cent of their military capability was based on commercial SATCOM [satellite communications]. I have heard very recently a senior US DOD official say that 90 per cent of its military capability is now dependent on commercial satellite communications. “Suffice it to say that the majority of US [military] communications are conducted over commercial networks.” Image: Wikipedia Traditionally, exploiting this vulnerability has meant developing anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles. During the Cold War, the US and Russia both demonstrated their ability to shoot down satellites with ground-launched missiles (and in the US case, with missiles launched from fighter jets flying at high

altitude). In 2007, China upset every spacefaring nation in the world by demonstrating its own ASAT missile, which it used to destroy one of its own weather satellites, creating a cloud of around 950 pieces of debris, posing a persistent threat to future space ventures. The launch was intended as a warning, a demonstration of capability – but the real lesson was just how devastating the long-term consequences of a full-scale attack on a satellite network could be for everyone. How to break a satellite If you absolutely have to destroy another country’s satellite today, ASAT missiles are still your best bet. Jasani tells us that the US, at least, has the capability to destroy every significant satellite in both the Russian and Chinese military arsenal. But ASATs are also the products of a different time, when the world was more concerned about avoiding nuclear annihilation than whether or not delivery men could get Google Maps to work. Blowing up satellites – particularly if two warring counties are doing it at once – would have a potentially catastrophic impact on developed nations’ civilian populations. The resulting whirlwind of orbiting shrapnel could create a domino effect, destroying satellite after satellite, turning space into a perpetually shifting minefield. But while it’s comparatively difficult (or at least expensive) to destroy a satellite from Earth, it’s potentially much easier if you already have your own hardware in space. Putting something into space is no longer the challenge it was. The US and Russia have been doing it since the late-50’s. Universities are doing it. Richard Branson is doing it. And that creates a problem: how can you tell which objects being blasted into space really are just science experiments, or weather satellites, or vanity projects, and which are weapons? Image: Boeing In practice, you can’t, for two reasons. One: countries that launch things into space are often secretive about their payloads. The US, for example, has been sending its two X-37B space planes regularly into orbit, while maintaining a distinct caginess about what either is actually doing. Russia and China both regularly send satellites into orbit, which occasionally do suspicious things. Without any system of mutual inspection, as you might have with WMD (inspectors can’t just pop up into space and have a look), everyone more or less has to take everyone else’s word for it that their operations in space are benign. Two: straightforward weapon platforms aren't the pressing issue. The trickier problem is one of what’s called ‘dual-use’ technology – something that has a perfectly legitimate, peaceful use in day-to-day life, but which could potentially be used for something nasty. For example, some technologies from agriculture or the biosciences designed to cultivate crops or make medicine might also be used to produce biological weapons. If you suspect a state of buying your legitimate technologies for these sorts of nefarious purposes (agricultural and medical ambitions aside), you probably shouldn’t sell it to them. But in space, almost everything is dual-use. A repair robot with an extendable arm could just as easily use its arm to bend a broken antenna back into place as it could tear a functioning one clean off. You might not even need the arm – if you really need to crash another country’s communications satellite, you could, in a pinch, just redirect one of yours into its path and let physics do the rest. Of course, if questioned, your official explanation would be that your space robot is up there doing repairs, or something else useful, like removing orbital debris. But in a

conflict, with a bit of ingenuity, that same device could be turned into a weapon. “Both the Russians and the Chinese have conducted tests manoeuvring satellites, which has got the US very worried,” Quintana says. “You could feasibly argue that they are demonstrations of debris removal. You could also feasibly argue that they are demonstrations of ASAT capabilities. And maybe they are both. It may be that it is a debris removal capability, clearly just demonstrated to scare the others. ‘Don’t mess with us because we could also mess with you’.” So Why Won’t It Happen? Well, never say never. You might not make to the end of this paragraph before the sky lights up and the world goes dark. But there are some good reasons to be optimistic that won’t happen. One reassuring factor is that the more other countries develop their militaries, the more dependent on networks they become as well. China is developing its own drone programme, and so is Russia, which will both presumably be dependent on satellites to operate. And the more their (and our) economies and business interests develop, the more everyone will rely on satellites to further their economic ambitions. In the event that countries were to start knocking out each other’s satellites on a large scale, the consequences across the board – for everyone – would be disastrous. It would also be expensive in the short term. Getting things into orbit – peaceful or otherwise – still isn’t cheap, which is why only a handful of countries regularly do so. And if you want to blow up a network of many satellites today (as you would have to in a first strike, to ensure other satellites couldn’t pick up the slack), launching small satellites or missiles into orbit is the only practical way to do that – arming satellites with their own weaponry just isn’t financially or technologically feasible on a grand scale. We are, happily, a long way from a Death Star. “I don’t think [a large first strike] would be financially too costly [if you’re] thinking about kinetic energy weapons and the air-based or ground-based lasers,” says Jasani. “It’s viable. But if you say, ‘I’m going to put an [ASAT] weapon [permanently] in orbit’, we are then getting into very expensive and very complicated technology. So my guess is that in the foreseeable future, what we are going to focus on are the kinetic energy weapons and possibly lasers that could blind satellites or affect, for example, the solar panels. That kind of technology will be delivered in the foreseeable future, rather than having lasers in orbit [like] the Star Wars kind of thing.” But there’s another, possibly even more persuasive reason that a kinetic war in space may not happen: it’s just so much easier – and less damaging – to mess with satellites without getting close to them. “Jamming from the ground is not difficult,” says Quintana. “If you look at the Middle East, pick a country where there’s a crisis and the chances are that the military in that country has tried to jam a commercial satellite to try and avoid satellite TV channels broadcasting anti-government messages.” “My guess is that by the time we are ready for space warfare, I think you may not be banking on your hit-to-kill ASATs, but more on [non-destructive] high-energy laser-based systems,” Jasani agrees. “[Space debris] affects all sides, not just the attacked side. The attacking side will have its own satellites in orbit, which might be affected by the debris [of its own attack].” And if you really need to remove an enemy’s satellite coverage, you can always try to flatten or hack the control stations on the ground, leaving the satellites talking with no-one to listen. “I don’t

think physically blowing things up from the ground is something that people are looking at again,” says Quintana. “Countries and governments try to find means other than physical conflict to achieve their strategic ends. So as space becomes more commercial and more civilian and as more scientific satellites go up, then you’ll find that states will not seek to directly attack each other, but will seek other means. “It may just be that they will try to cyber-attack the satellites and take them over, which has been done in the past. It’s much easier to physically or cyber-attack the ground control station than it is to attack the satellite itself - so why would you not look to do that as a first port of call and achieve the same ends?” Ultimately, then, what might keep us safe from a war in space isn't the horror of explosives in orbit, but a question of cost and convenience.Deterrence prevents space war and conventional attacks are easier. Mueller 13 – Karl Mueller, is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. He specializes in research related to military and national security strategy, particularly coercion and deterrence. Mueller has written and lectured on a wide variety of national security subjects, including airpower theory, grand strategy, economic sanctions, nuclear proliferation, counterterrorism policy, space weapons, and wargaming. Among his recent RAND publications are Precision and Purpose: Airpower in the Libyan Civil War (2015), Denying Flight: Strategic Options for Employing No-Fly Zones (2013), Dangerous Thresholds: Managing Escalation in the 21st Century (Forrest E. Morgan et al., 2008), and Striking First: Preemptive and Preventive Attack in U.S. National Security Policy (2006). He is currently working on projects about defending the Baltic States, managing crisis escalation, and the future of U.S. airpower. Before joining RAND in 2001, Mueller was a professor of comparative military studies at the U.S. Air Force's School of Advanced Air and Space Studies (SAASS). He is currently an adjunct professor at Johns Hopkins University and in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. Mueller received his Ph.D. in politics from Princeton University, September 2013, (“The Absolute Weapon and the Ultimate High Ground: Why Nuclear Deterrence and Space Deterrence Are Strikingly Similar - Yet Profoundly Different,” part of Stimson report: “Anti-satellite Weapons, Deterrence and Sino-American Space Relations,” edited by Michael Krepon and Julia Thompson, published by Stimson, Accessible Online at https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/170907/Anti-satellite_Weapons.pdf, Accessed 7/13/16, RJS) The issue of who might need deterring and under what circumstances often receives less attention than it merits. It is easy to list a wide variety of potential adversaries who might be interested in launching ASAT attacks against the United States or its allies if they had the capability to do so, but in practice there is a relatively limited set of opponents and scenarios that appear to be plausible foci for space deterrence concern rather than merely being imaginable. It is worth noting that in virtually every conflict the United States is vulnerable to attack in many forms and many places that are not actually carried out, either because enemies lack the inclination to do so (before or after taking the likely consequences into account), because they lack the imagination to recognize the possibility, or because they have more attractive things to do with their capabilities. Although satellites 46 are intrinsically vulnerable to attack in absolute terms, thanks to orbital mechanics and the limited potential for concealment in space, on the whole they tend to be relatively challenging targets for physical attack when compared with the relevant alternatives. The most economically valuable satellites, and many of the most militarily important ones, operate in high orbits that make them much

more difficult to attack than their counterparts in low Earth orbit (LEO). Moreover, enemies interested in inflicting economic damage or psychological trauma on the United States will find many easier ways to do at least as much harm by striking terrestrial targets. This is likely to be less true for attacks seeking to cause military damage or disruption, but even there, striking at the ground segments of space systems, or interfering with their effective operation through terrestrial jamming or other means, will often be easier than attacking the satellites themselves in orbit.

Debris

Squo SolvesSwiss Pac-Man satellites solve. RT 15 — 6-7-2015 ("Switzerland to send 'Pac-Man' into orbit to clear space junk," RT International, 7-2-2016, Available Online at https://www.rt.com/news/271939-swiss-satellite-debris-capture/, Accessed 7-2-2016, RJS)The Swiss "Clean Space One" project has come up with a cleanup satellite to capture space debris. In a so-called "Pac-Man" solution, it will capture an old satellite before destroying it in the Earth’s atmosphere. Engineers from Lausanne's Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (EPFL) have been tasked with creating an effective object to capture space junk, without it becoming just another piece of rubbish itself. The solution has finally been found, with a "Pac-Man"-style technology, EPFL announced Monday. After three years of research, engineers have come up with a new space cleanup device to be sent into orbit. It is expected to deploy a conical net to catch an old SwissCube satellite. The net will unfold and then close with a piece of space garbage trapped inside. Both objects will then combust in the atmosphere, scientists say. The "Pac-Man" satellite could be launched in 2018, EPFL said. The mission's objective is "to increase the awareness that orbital debris is a problem and we are doing something about it," said Muriel Richard, of the EPFL Space Engineering Center.The sheer volume of space junk around our planet – including such man-made objects as broken down satellites and spent rocket stages, is growing "at an alarming rate," EPFL scientists said in a statement Monday. Flying at a speed of 7 km (4.35 miles) per second, they pose "a serious threat to the devices and people working in space," they said, adding that NASA "carefully monitors every item larger than 10 cm (3.9 inches)."The SwissCube satellite, which is expected to be caught up with the new cleaning device after having spent over five years in orbit, is 10cm by 10cm in size. Detecting it in space will be the first challenge, as the object is constantly spinning, with its illumination changing. "These variations can perturb the visual approach system and thus also the estimates of its speed and distance," EPFL's PhD student Christophe Paccolat said. The next challenge will be to grasp the small satellite and hold it inside. "There will be an extra layer of carefulness that we will have to add in order not to have SwissCube bounce back before we have time to close," Muriel Richard said, adding that "so far that is one of the major issues." Clean Space One is just one of the projects that international researchers have been working on to eliminate the danger of debris piling up in orbit. In April, Japanese scientists have come up with a project suggesting space junk to be conquered by a laser mounted to the International Space Station (ISS). "Scientific studies have shown that there's a total of around 500,000 pieces of space debris in orbit that is between 1 cm and 10 cm in size, but too small to track regularly," Brian Weeden, technical advisor at the Secure World Foundation, told Via Satellite in June. He added that he estimates some 22,000 human-generated objects larger than 10 cm are tracked orbiting Earth by global organizations.There are already a number of countries pursuing space debris removal in the status quo. Oliver and Pugliese 15 - Stéphane Oliver and Antoine Pugliese, supervised by Victor Dos Santos Paulino (“Active Debris Removal: A Business Opportunity?” Toulouse Business School, Available Online at:

http://chaire-sirius.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Oliver-Pugliese-2015-Active-Debris-Removal-A-Business-Opportunity-Unknown.pdf, Accessed 7-2-2016, RJS)Promising industrial projects are being launched Industrial projects that are being launched prove that the development of space cleaning technologies is possible and promising. That is the case for a 280 million USD project initiated between MacDonald Dettwiler and Associates Corporation (MDA) and Intelsat. MDA, a satellite manufacturer, was to develop a satellite able to refuel and service other satellites already in orbit. Intelsat, the world’s largest satellite operator (with a fleet of 50 operating satellites) was then supposed to invest in this project. Even though the agreement was cancelled in 2012 for various reasons (Spacesafetymagazine.com, Joel Spark, january 20th, 2012.), this very serious proposal could have given birth to satellite servicing technologies that could have been used for deorbiting operations, proving that industrial actors could develop and launch such spacecraft. Other projects are on-going: Ecole Polytechnique de Lausanne and Andrews Space are developing two separate projects to launch cubesats that are to deorbit other cubesats in LEO. Furthermore, national space agencies are also working on technologies that could - directly or indirectly - be used for ODR. On the American side, various governmental projects could lead to an ODR capability. The NASA’s Robotic Refueling Mission experiment that aims to demonstrate robotic refueling, with as a final objective to kick-start in the US a commercial orbital servicing activity. A second project, being currently developed by the DARPA and named Phoenix program aims to develop a demonstrator spacecraft that would harvest parts of dead GEO satellites to reuse them on other systems. On the European side, the most promising project according to Paul Kallender-Umezu is a German work on an orbital servicing mission. In 2010, the German Space Agency DLR started to work on on-orbit servicing demonstration, called the Deutsche Orbital Servicing Mission (DEOS).Chinese attempts at removing space debris could become military threats. Chen 16 — Stephen Chen, writer for South China Morning Post, 6-28-2016 ("Is China militarising space? Experts say new junk collector could be used as anti-satellite weapon," South China Morning Post, 6-28-2016, Available Online at http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/1982526/china-militarising-space-experts-say-new-junk-collector, Accessed 7-2-2016, RJS)A small spacecraft sent into orbit by the Long March 7 rocket launched from Hainan in southern China on Saturday is tasked with cleaning up space junk, according to the government, but some analysts claim it may serve a military purpose. The Aolong-1, or Roaming Dragon, is equipped with a robotic arm to remove large debris such as old satellites. Tang Yagang, a senior satellite scientist with the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, said the Aolong-1 was the first in a series of craft that would be tasked with collecting man-made debris in space. For instance, it could collect a defunct Chinese satellite and bring it back to earth, crashing it safely into the ocean, he said. “China, as a responsible

big country, has committed to the control and reduction of space debris. In order to fulfil the obligations and responsibilities, our country is [working endlessly towards] achieving a technological breakthrough in space debris removal technology,” Tang says on the website of the China National Space Administration. But the question is: did China develop the cutting-edge technology only to clean up space junk? “It is unrealistic to remove all space debris with robots. There are hundreds of millions of pieces drifting out there,” said a researcher with the National Astronomical Observatories in Beijing. To the military, the robot had potential as an anti-satellite weapon, the researcher said. The Roaming Dragon is small, weighing only a few hundred kilos, so the prototype could be produced and launched in large numbers. During peacetime, the craft could patrol space and prevent defunct satellites from crashing into big cities such as Shanghai or New York. During wartime, they could be used as deterrents or directly against enemy assets in space, said the researcher. It was also a “clean” anti-satellite weapon, the researcher said. In 2007, China conducted an anti-satellite test which blew up a dead weather probe with a missile. The test prompted an international outcry because the explosion generated such a large volume of debris. “This time no one will point a finger [at China],” the researcher said. Another mainland space engineering scientist said the role of the craft to pick up space debris was a “bold experiment” with a high chance of failure. “It looks simple, but some enormous challenges lie ahead, some that no other nation has solved,” said the expert. The development of the technology was mainly supported by the military, and kept confidential, he said. The first challenge in such missions was to get close to a “non-cooperative target”, the scientist said. But China had conducted numerous such rendezvous flights, he said. During the docking of the Shenzhou manned spacecraft to the Tiangong space laboratory, for instance, the two vehicles constantly exchanged information. The Aolong-1, by contrast, would be trying to rendezvous with a piece of cold, unresponsive debris. It would need to search for and identify the target, then plan and adjust its own course of approach. Another challenge involves reaching out to any debris with Aolong’s robotic arm. To get a firm grip, the arm must aim for a specific target area – something that in space is likely to be constantly changing. Sensors and computers on Aolong will have to analyse the fast, irregular patterns of the tumbling target to guide its arm. Such challenges would test China’s technology to the limit, said the expert. China is not the only country developing the technology. The European Space Agency is expected to approve a similar project called e.deorbit later this year. The ESA was considering two different ways to capture the debris: one using a net and the other a robot arm. With a projected launch in 2023, the e.deorbit robot would “target a European derelict satellite in low orbit, capture it, then safely burn it up in a controlled atmospheric reentry,” the ESA says on its website. The ESA also claims the e.deorbit would be “the world’s first active debris removal mission”, though that is no longer true given the launch of Aolong-1. The United States Defence Advanced Research Projects Agency (Darpa) plans to launch a larger, more sophisticated craft for the US Air Force in 2020. The Phoenix in-orbit servicing programme had been scheduled for launch last year, but was delayed by technical

and cost concerns. Unlike the Aolong and e.deorbit, the Phoenix would also be able to carry out jobs such as repairing, upgrading and refuelling ageing satellites. It would even be able to “turn foreign satellites into US spy satellites”, according to the US air force. Chinese researchers with the 502 Institute at the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation said last year that China would launch a multi-tasking space robot similar to the Phoenix, also by about 2020. The China National Space Administration says the nation’s blueprint for its space robots spans missions ranging from low earth orbit to Mars.Sling-shot satellites solve debris. David 13 — Leonard David has been reporting on the space industry for more than five decades. He is former director of research for the National Commission on Space and a past editor-in-chief of the National Space Society's Ad Astra and Space World magazines, 3-1-2013 ("'Sling-Sat' Could Remove Space Junk on the Cheap," Space, 3-1-2013, Available Online at http://www.space.com/20024-space-junk-removal-sling-sat.html, Accessed 7-5-2016, RJS)A proposed space-junk removal system would hop from one piece of debris to the next without burning much fuel, potentially making a de-clutter mission economically feasible with current technology. The TAMU Space Sweeper with Sling-Sat, or 4S for short, would harness the momentum imparted by capturing and ejecting one object to slingshot on to the next chunk of space junk, its developers say. “The goal of this mission is to remove as many pieces of debris with the minimum amount of fuel,” said Daniele Mortari of Texas A&M University. A growing problem Earth is surrounded by a huge and ever-growing cloud of orbital debris — stuff like spent rocket bodies, dead spacecraft and the fragments generated when these objects collide. [The Expanding Danger of Space Junk (Video)] NASA estimates that about 500,000 pieces bigger than a marble and 22,000 as large as a softball whiz around Earth at fantastic speeds. And there are probably hundreds of millions of flecks at least 1 millimeter in diameter. This cloud of junk poses a threat to the satellites and spacecraft circling our planet, including the International Space Station, and many researchers say humanity must act soon to prevent the problem from really getting out of hand. “It is well understood that we are past the point of no return. Relying solely on improved tracking and avoidance is not enough … it is simply a technical form of sticking your head in the sand and crossing your fingers,” Texas A&M PhD student Jonathan Missel told SPACE.com. “We are at a point where the problem needs to be solved, with active removal, not just avoided.” A new idea Many ideas have been put forward over the years to combat the space-junk threat, including schemes that would blast debris with lasers or snare it in a giant net. “While they are interesting to think about, they are often threatening to operating satellites, or need technological advances that are decades out,” Missel said of some of the more ambitious offerings. The most technically and politically sound idea is a simple rendezvous mission, during which a clean-up craft would travel to and de-orbit debris objects one at a time, Missel said. But such a mission would burn loads of fuel to get between widely spaced targets, making it “fatally plagued by inefficiency,” he added. The 4S

system, which Missel and Mortari are developing, aims to correct this fatal flaw. It would snare debris at the end of a spinning satellite, then fling the object down to burn up in Earth's atmosphere. The spacecraft would harness the momentum exchanged during both of these actions to cruise over to the next piece of space junk on its list, minimizing fuel use and extending its operational life to the point that such a mission might be practical. Work on 4S this year includes looks at hardware options, Mortari said, and further optimization of the idea.Either NASA solves in the status quo or NASA will never solve. Werner 15 — Debra Werner is a correspondent for SpaceNews based in San Francisco. Debra earned a bachelor’s degree in communications from the University of California, Berkeley, and a master’s degree in Journalism from Northwestern University. She is a recipient of the 1989 Gerald Ford Prize for Distinguished Reporting on National Defense, 6-22-2015 ("NASA’s Interest in Debris Removal Limited to Tech Demos," SpaceNews, 6-22-2015, Available Online at http://spacenews.com/nasas-interest-in-removal-of-orbital-debris-limited-to-tech-demos/, Accessed 7-5-2016, RJS)

SAN FRANCISCO — NASA’s policy of paying companies to develop technology designed to eliminate orbital debris but not to pay for in-flight demonstrations has space companies searching for new backers. NASA adopted a policy in June 2014 to support development of orbital debris removal technology but not of operational systems. Specifically, the space agency backs projects with Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) 1 through 4, which means NASA’s support for projects ends once components or prototypes work in a laboratory setting. “At present, there is no viable technological or economically affordable approach that is sufficiently mature to justify technology demonstration,” NASA spokesman Joshua Buck said June 8 in an emailed response to a question about the policy. Some space industry officials counter that assessment. “The challenge of active debris removal requires capabilities for orbital rendezvous, capture of noncooperative objects and affordable disposal,” said Robert Hoyt, chief executive and chief scientist for Tethers Unlimited of Bothell, Washington. “The required propulsion and control technologies for orbital rendezvous capability have been demonstrated by many prior missions.” To capture spent rocket boosters or defunct satellites, Tethers Unlimited developed a deployable net technology called Grapple, Retrieve and Secure Payload, or GRASP. Through microgravity testing on commercial parabolic aircraft flights, GRASP is now at TRL-5, Hoyt said. TRL-5 means components or prototypes work in the appropriate environment. Busek Co. has another debris-capturing technology it calls Satellite on an Umbilical Line, or SOUL. Natick, Massachusetts-based Busek won a grant in April under NASA’s Small Business Innovative Research program to take SOUL, a 10-kilogram satellite equipped with a tool and linked by a 100-meter cord to a larger spacecraft, from TRL-4 to TRL-5. The U.S. Air Force and Navy funded early development of SOUL to retrieve space debris weighing approximately 1,000 kilograms and tow it to another orbit. NASA also is interested in SOUL’s ability to gather asteroid samples, inspect spacecraft and repair orbiting satellites. In addition, many companies are developing devices designed to be launched on small satellites or attached in orbit to debris to increase drag and speed its re-entry into Earth’s atmosphere. Tethers Unlimited sells the Terminator Tape, a $7,000 deorbit module for cubesats that includes a 250-meter-long conductive tape designed to unfurl at the conclusion of the mission and produce enough drag to lower the satellite’s orbit. Two orbiting cubesats are equipped with Terminator Tapes. When those cubesats complete their missions and deploy Terminator Tapes next

year, the technology will be at TRL-8, meaning the system has been tested, demonstrated and qualified for flight, Hoyt said. Similarly, two dragNET De-orbit Systems, produced by MMA Designs of Boulder, Colorado, are currently flying. In 2013, the U.S. Air Force launched two inflatable dragNET sails on the Space Test Program Satellite-3 and on the Minotaur 1 rocket upper stage that launched that satellite. The 14-square-meter dragNET on the Minotaur upper stage, the first to deploy, is expected to bring the rocket body into Earth’s upper atmosphere later this year. “We have demonstrated on-orbit success (TRL 9) so our technology is certainly viable and economically feasible to implement on every space vehicle immediately,” Mitchell Wiens, MMA’s president and chief operating officer, said by email. Given those examples of ongoing technology demonstrations, many NASA observers in industry and academia say a key reason the space agency is limiting its orbital debris removal work to research and development is concern among senior officials that successful flight demonstrations would push NASA into the role of space garbage collector. “No one wants to get saddled with the responsibility without the budget to back it up,” said Raymond Sedwick, director of the University of Maryland’s Center for Orbital Debris Education and Research. NASA’s Orbital Debris Remediation guidelines allude to those concerns. “NASA’s recognition of the importance of Orbital Debris Remediation technology coupled with limited resources provides the basis for guidance on Orbital Debris Remediation technology investments and activities,” reads a memo signed June 19, 2014, by Associate Administrator Robert M. Lightfoot. U.S. President Barack Obama’s National Space Policy published in 2010 does not specify which U.S. agency should take the lead in cleaning up orbital debris. It simply directs NASA and the Defense Department to “perform research and development of technologies and techniques … to mitigate and remove on-orbit debris, reduce hazards, and increase understanding of the current and future debris environment.” NASA has a robust strategy to perform those activities in coordination with other U.S. government agencies, international partners and international organizations, Buck said. “The problem of orbital debris is too large for any single agency or nation to solve alone,” he added. International organizations are preparing to demonstrate their ability to clean up space debris. Astroscale, a startup based in Singapore, is preparing to launch a dual-satellite Active Debris Removal System in 2017. The German Aerospace Center, DLR, plans to begin servicing spacecraft in orbit and removing debris through its Deutsche Orbital Servicing Mission scheduled to launch in 2018. In Switzerland, engineers at the École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne are designing Clean Space One, a spacecraft to catch a cubesat and move it to Earth’s atmosphere. International coordination would be required for any sustained effort to capture and remove debris because many nations have contributed to the problem and the United Nations 1967 Outer Space Treaty states that space-based objects, including spent rocket boosters and satellite fragments, belong to the nation or nations that launched them. Still, that should not be a deterrent to debris removal activities because U.S. agencies could begin testing new technology by capturing garbage left behind by U.S. government missions, Sedwick said. “We could spend years cleaning up our own stuff,” he said. “If we did that and the technology advanced, I think we would be permitted to bring down the junk of other countries.”

Cant solve debrisPolitical issues make debris removal impossible. Oliver and Pugliese 15 - Stéphane Oliver and Antoine Pugliese, supervised by Victor Dos Santos Paulino (“Active Debris Removal: A Business Opportunity?” Toulouse Business School, Available Online at: http://chaire-sirius.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Oliver-Pugliese-2015-Active-Debris-Removal-A-Business-Opportunity-Unknown.pdf, Accessed 7-2-2016, RJS)Political Issues. As space activities are an extremely sensible matter on the international ground, since they involve military operations in sort of an unregulated space, there is no wonder that for the moment, space fairing nations never succeeded to reach an agreement on space debris. Several questions are pending on this matter. First of all, as we already mentioned it, space activities involve dealing with sensible and sometimes secret technologies. Earth observation satellites and communication satellites are sometimes used by states for military purposes. Some of them are not even declared as such, and it is not rare for a launch services company to send in orbit unidentified spacecraft. Thus it is easy to understand that states are not willing to see the development of technologies allowing a spacecraft to get close to another one and to manipulate it or worst – moving it from its current orbit. As a spacecraft designed for on-orbit services or for space cleaning could as well be designed for antisatellite operations, many countries are slowing down the development of such devices, and are reluctant to cooperate with other nations, fearing that this newly developed technology may one day be turned against them. For example, the US International Traffic in Arms Regulation, or ITAR, prevent any nation from manipulating any object with a potential military use without the agreement of the US government if this object or if one of its component is made from American technologies. In that case, it is easy to understand that ITAR regulations can reach a large part of the world’s on-orbit satellite fleet. As such, the ITAR regulations are considered as one of the main political obstacles for an effective orbital debris removal. Also, even if it seems that every nation wants to get rid of space debris, as they are disturbing their space activities, no nation yet declared to be willing to pay for what will be a costly ODR operation. For example, many small nations owning only few spacecraft (or even no spacecraft at all) are claiming that the big polluters, mainly the US, China and Russia, should pay for such cleaning. But on the other side, even a country with no satellites is benefiting from services issued by foreign companies, owning foreign satellites. As space appears as a common good, shouldn’t every nation pay? For the moment the question remains unanswered. In fact, space cleaning operations will be all the more costly as countries keep being reluctant to a common solution. As expressed by Liou and Johnson (2006), the lack of cooperation is leading to a cost inefficiency due to the uncertainty and complexity of the technology. ―International cooperation in space has rarely resulted in cost-effective or expedient solutions, especially in areas of uncertain technologies feasibility‖. Liou and Johnson, 2006.

Space debris control is too expensive. Oliver and Pugliese 15 - Stéphane Oliver and Antoine Pugliese, supervised by Victor Dos Santos Paulino (“Active Debris Removal: A Business Opportunity?” Toulouse Business School, Available Online at: http://chaire-sirius.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/Oliver-Pugliese-2015-Active-Debris-Removal-A-Business-Opportunity-Unknown.pdf, Accessed 7-2-2016, RJS)Economic obstacles Space is considered as a common good and is unfortunately overexploited by humans. It is the consequence of what Garrett Hardin called in 1963 the tragedy of the commons, a state of over-exploitation due to the impression that the resource is infinite. ‖Space suffers from the tragedy of the commons, a phenomenon that refers to the over-consumption of shared resources when there is no clear ownership over it‖. By this sentence, Megan Ansdell means that the natural tendency of space actors in power will likely be to do nothing until they absolutely must. Similarly to the case of global warming, space authorities tend to wait as much as possible before taking any action, waiting for the situation to become critical. Why that? Well, the development costs of space cleaning technologies are so high that most authorities will only be ready to spend this money when they are compelled to. According to NASA's Advanced Space Transportation Program, it costs around $10,000 per kilogram to launch anything to orbit. In fact, the contribution to implement a viable ODR is evaluated at a cost of $100-200 million per year according to some business cases. To put that figure into context, it represents less than 1% of the world annual public space budgets. However, Governments are still reluctant to spend this money that could preempt severe space collisions and generate billions of dollars of losses. As we just saw it, numerous obstacles are slowing down the efforts made to conceive an efficient ODR policy. However, several events prove that progress has been made on the path during the last decade.

ColonizationStephen Hawking says colonization takes too longBurgess 1/19/16 — Matt Burgess Staff writer, WIRED at Condé Nast International, 1-19-2016 ("Stephen Hawking: Space colonies won't exist for at least 100 years," WIRED UK, xx-xx-xxxx, Available Online at http://www.wired.co.uk/article/stephen-hawking-black-holes-space-colonies, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)Stephen Hawking has claimed humans won't be creating colonies on other planets for at least 100 years. The 74-year old Cambridge professor, speaking before giving a lecture on black holes, said that with nowhere else to live humanity needed to treat Earth with great care. Hawking said potential downfalls for humans on Earth include nuclear war, global warming and genetically-engineered viruses, according to the BBC. He said the chances of disaster happening on Earth were increasing and there was little anyone could do stop them. To help escape these problems Hawking said humans would eventually need to create space colonies -- but this won't happen in our lifetimes. "We will not establish self-sustaining colonies in space for at least the next hundred years, so we have to be very careful in this period," the physicist is reported to have said. "We are not going to stop making progress, or reverse it, so we must recognise the dangers and control them." Hawking's comments come in advance of the The Reith Lectures (broadcast on Radio 4 at 9am on 26 January and 2 February), where he will explain how black holes work. He is also expected to claim it would be possible to fall into a black hole and appear in another universe, if the conditions were correct. The lecture was postposed in November when Hawking became unwell. It's not the first time Hawking has warned about humanity's future on Earth. On multiple occasions he has spoken out about what will need to come next for the human race to survive. Nuclear destruction In 2012 he said the human race could become extinct but a disaster "such as a nuclear war" would "befall the Earth within a thousand years". At the time, answering questions on BBC Radio 4's Today programme, Hawking said that humans would eventually "spread beyond the Solar System".We will not establish self-sustaining colonies in space for at least the next hundred years, so we have to be very careful in this period Stephen Hawking Moon and Mars' colonies Hawking, whose speech software is open source and can be downloaded by anyone, said the Moon is the best place for humans to colonise first -- as it is "close by and relatively easy to reach". He then said it could provide a base to travel further into the Solar System with Mars an "obvious" next target. Alien life exists "To my mathematical brain, the numbers alone make thinking about aliens perfectly rational," Hawking said as he explained that aliens probably do exist. He said that as intelligent human life has developed it is entirely possible that alien life has developed but the "challenge" is working out what they may be like. Don't contact aliens After claiming that aliens probably are out there, Hawking said humans shouldn't try to contact them. "It would be very risky to attempt to communicate with an alien civilisation," he said. He likened the

situation to when Europeans arrived in America and how Native Americans were treated by settlers. Machines As well as aliens being a concern Hawking has also issued warnings about artificial intelligence posing a threat. He said that artificial intelligence could "outsmart us all" and said humans could be "superseded" by technology. "The risk is that computers develop intelligence and take over," he said.Space colonization will be slowDna Web Team 16 — Dna Web Team, 1-20-2016 ("Here's why Stephen Hawking said space colonies will take at least 100 years," dna, 1-20-2016, Available Online at http://www.dnaindia.com/scitech/report-here-s-why-stephen-hawking-said-space-colonies-will-take-at-least-100-years-2167855, Accessed 7-13-2016, RJS)With all the private companies launching satellites and manned missions to space these days, one can dream that it's only a matter of time before the human race is zipping across our star system, colonising inhabitable planets. And while that's a definite projection, and the eventual end-game, it might not be within our lifetime. Renowned theoretical physicist Stephen Hawking has now said, as reported by the Guardian, that human colonisation of other planets could take a while, so we should be taking more active care of Earth. “We will not establish self-sustaining colonies in space for at least the next hundred years, so we have to be very careful in this period,” he implored. It's not the first time Hawking has cautioned against the dangers we face on Earth. In 2012, he said that an extinction-level disaster, like a nuclear war, is likely to befall us in the next thousand years, and that possibility increases the closer we get to that deadline. So why does colonisation of other planets have to take that long? We're already landing rovers on comets, finding water on Mars, and even sending observational satellites out of our solar system. You see, even before we start to address what steps we have to take to make a planet livable, we have to question whether we should. As Elon Musk once said, the first hurdle to colonising Mars is that we have to warm it up. And that, of course, takes time. He did suggest, however, that there's a fast way to do that. Skip to 1:30 for the diabolical plan. Now, even leaving aside having to deal with all that pesky radiation once the planet is warm enough, there's another thing to consider; what are we doing to a possibly existing ecosystem? You see, scientists have just about discovered the evidence of flowing water on Mars. The discovery was made by Georgia University graduate student Lujendra Ojha, lead author of the paper detailing the findings his team unearthed. And just that discovery could mean a breakthrough for space exploration. But the fact of the matter is, we still don't know if that water on Mars supports life, only that there's a high probability it does. And if there IS life on the red planet, we don't want to destroy it. The reason such a monumental discovery has taken us so long, despite the Curiosity rover making it's landing on Mars in August 2012, is that there's some places it's just not allowed to go. Scientists don't know where they might find life on a celestial body, so they're unwilling to take rovers (and possibly Earth contaminants), to places they aren't absolutely sure are dead zones. And this may be a slightly lesser known detail, but there are governing bodies to make sure this

never happens. NASA's equivalent is the Office of Planetary Protection, which lays down guidelines for where manned-missions can land, where rovers can go, and the like. On a more global scale is the Committee on Space Research (COSPAR) which, under supervision from the International Council for Science (ICSU), makes sure national space research organisations share their findings, and also, according to their charter, looks to "ensure that nations capable of planetary exploration protect these pristine environments from human contamination". We don't want any Earthly contamination to destroy a Martian ecosystem the moment we find it, and we certainly don't want any extraterrestrial viruses, or the like, to reach Earth. As Ojha himself mentioned to us in a chat at TEDx last year, "We don't know how feasible (Musk's) idea is yet. We don't want to nuke the poles, only to arrive and find out there was life there we've now eradicated". So there goes that super-villainy "nuke Mars" plan. And unfortunately, there also go our chances of nailing down a "Home Sweet Home" sign on the planet anytime soon. It's more likely our grandchildren or great-grandchildren will see the red planet's surface in person; that is, once we're done greenhouse gassing, cloud seeding, and generally terra-forming it to make it habitable for human life.

NASANASA’s budget is growing now. Meyer 15 — Robinson Meyer is an associate editor at The Atlantic, where he covers technology, 12-17-2015 ("NASA's About to Have Its Biggest Budget in a Decade," Atlantic, 12-17-2015, Available Online at http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2015/12/nasa-budget-2016-mars-rover-europa-mission-planetary-science/420912/, Accessed 7-17-2016, RJS)If Congress passes the omnibus spending bill that it’s now considering, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration will enjoy a larger budget in 2016 than it has had in at least half a decade. NASA will be able to spend $19.3 billion next year, according to the budget, an increase of more than $1.3 billion over 2015 funding levels. That’s $700 million more than the funding requested by the White House. “Everyone who supports space should be very pleased with this, if it passes as is,” said Casey Dreier, the director of advocacy at the Planetary Society. “This is a great budget.” NASA did not return a request for comment. 2016 will be a busy year for the U.S. space agency. If all goes well, the geological mission InSight will land on the surface of Mars, the robotic orbiter Juno will reach Jupiter, and OSIRIS-REx will launch from Earth. OSIRIS aims to eventually touch down on the surface of the asteroid Bennu, spend almost two years there, then send a capsule home to this planet with asteroid samples. All three of these missions are planetary-science missions, housed in the only NASA division which visits worlds beyond our own. The New Horizons probe that visited Pluto this year was also a planetary-science mission. Dreier noted that the 2016 budget restores historically normal levels of funding to NASA planetary science, which had seen its budget sliced by 25 percent in the early part of this decade. Because of those cuts, no new planetary-science missions will fly from the end of 2016 to the beginning of 2020. Dreier said this was “the longest gap in planetary science in at least 20 years.” At the end of that period, as well, the one-year Juno mission at Jupiter and the 11-year-old Cassini-Huygens mission at Saturn will draw to a close. “For the first time since the early 1970s, the U.S. will not have a robotic presence in the giant planets of the outer solar system” at that time, said Dreier. After 2020, NASA is expected to launch new robotic missions to Mars and Europa, a moon of Jupiter believed to be more amenable to life than other worlds in the solar system. (A Congressional report attached to the 2016 budget encouraged NASA to make the Europa mission a rover, rather than a lander or an orbiter. Dreier said he was not sure whether NASA would obey the report.) Beyond planetary science, the coming years are likely to be busy for NASA. In 2017, the agency hopes to complete its commercial-crew development program with SpaceX and Boeing, which will once again launch allow crewed missions to fly to the International Space Station from American soil. It also hopes to advance its Space Launch System, the largest U.S. rocket system constructed since the Apollo era’s Saturn V. The Space Launch System will permit crewed missions to travel past the moon and robotic missions to reach gas giants and the outer solar system without using the gravity slingshot of Earth or Venus.

The commercial-crew development receives $1.2 billion, as much funding as it will ever need in one year, in the proposed 2016 budget. The Space Launch System will receive $2 billion. One of the few divisions of NASA to receive less funding than requested by the White House is Earth science. That field studies many parts of our home world, including its atmosphere, geology, and hydrology, and it also includes NASA’s climate division. Earth science will get $1.921 billion overall, an increase of $149 million from last year’s budget. Dreier said that despite being funded below President Obama’s request, 2016 would see the largest Earth science budget in at least five years. “NASA is perennially underfunded,” he told me. “People say it has 20 pounds of missions in a 10-pound bag. The nation asks it to do all its stuff and then gives it half the money that it needs.” Back in October, the Planetary Society, the world’s largest space-science advocacy group, put together the best NASA budget it could imagine. It dubbed this budget the “everybody wins” scenario. The NASA budget unveiled this week, Dreier said, contained the same amount of money as that fanciful October budget. “I don’t often do this with a smile on my face,” he said. He had one today.Link-turn – We’re funding more climate science now, planetary science trades off. Wendel 16 — Joanna Wendel a staff writer for Eos.org, started out as an AGU intern in 2014 after graduating from the University of Oregon with a bachelor’s degree in General Science. JoAnna covers the latest research in Earth and Space science. JoAnna occasionally contributes science comics to the AGU’s The Plainspoken Scientist blog. 2-15-2016 ("Proposed NASA Budget: Earth Science Up, Planetary Science Down," Eos, 2-15-2016, Available Online at https://eos.org/articles/proposed-nasa-budget-earth-science-up-planetary-science-down, Accessed 7-17-2016, RJS)President Barack Obama’s fiscal year (FY) 2017 budget proposal for NASA boosts Earth science funding and significantly cuts planetary science and education. Overall, the proposed FY 2017 NASA budget of $19.025 billion, which includes new line items to support commercial space flight, shrinks by 1.3% compared to the (FY) 2016 enacted budget of $19.285 billion. “The investments in the president’s FY 2017 budget proposal announced today will empower the people of NASA to improve our quality of life today,” Charles Bolden, NASA administrator, said in a statement last Tuesday, the day the Obama administration released its full federal budget proposal for the coming fiscal year. “While our future is unknown, we can say with a great deal of certainty that investments in NASA’s today are investments in our children’s and grandchildren’s tomorrow.” This year, the Obama administration began a new strategy of designating some funding for federal science agencies and programs as “mandatory” and therefore unaffected by budget caps set in 2015. In line with that approach, the overall NASA FY 2017 budget proposal includes $763 million of such mandatory funding, divided between science and other programs. Budget analysts say it’s likely Congress will reject this new strategy. Not counting the funding identified as “mandatory,” the NASA budget would decline to $18.26 billion, a 5.3% reduction. Earth Science Gets a

Boost As presented, the agency’s proposed budget for FY 2017 sets aside $2.032 billion for Earth sciences (see Table 1)—a $111 million (5.8%) increase from the FY 2016 enacted budget—out of its total of $5.6 billion for science. The increase in Earth sciences would help to accelerate the joint NASA–U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) Landsat 9 satellite mission, which will continue to provide measurements of the Earth’s land cover. The proposed budget could move up Landsat 9’s launch date, which was originally set for 2023, to 2021. “An FY 2021 launch for Landsat 9 allows for the possibility of replacing Landsat 7 before its fuel is depleted,” Virginia Burkett, USGS associate director for climate and land use change, told Eos. “Landsat 9 will be an improved version of the highly successful Landsat 8 mission, and will sustain the Landsat series of measurements into the 2030s.” “An FY 2021 launch for Landsat 9 allows for the possibility of replacing Landsat 7 before its fuel is depleted.” The Earth science budget request “supports and indeed expands vigorous research and analysis programs that advance our knowledge of the Earth as an integrated system,” Michael Freilich, director of NASA’s Earth Science Division at NASA Goddard, told Eos. It “invests in the technologies that will enable future cutting-edge Earth-observing satellite missions.” Planetary Cuts In planetary sciences, the FY 2017 budget proposal includes $1.519 billion, a 6.9% reduction from the $1.631 billion in the FY 2016 enacted budget—marking the fifth year in a row that cuts were made to planetary sciences, noted Casey Dreier, director of space policy at The Planetary Society, in a blog post. “While every other science division at NASA would receive a funding boost in this budget, planetary science, the year after flying by Pluto and confirming flowing water on Mars, earns a [$112] million cut,” Dreier wrote. “The fact of the matter is that [the planetary science] program has been underfunded for years.”The proposed FY 2017 budget provides $46.9 million for a robotic mission to Europa, a significant cut from FY 2016’s enacted level of $175 million, but a launch in the 2020s is still anticipated. The proposed FY 2017 budget also maintains several existing missions, including Mars Curiosity and Opportunity. “But the fact of the matter is that [the planetary science] program has been underfunded for years and needs to rebuild,” Dreier wrote. Space Flight, Education, and Other Directives This year, the FY 2017 budget proposal includes “space transportation”—an entirely new line item—which would receive $2.8 billion to continue NASA’s partnership with commercial spaceflight companies such as SpaceX and decrease the nation’s dependence on Russian spaceflight capabilities for crew transportation. The Asteroid Redirect Mission, wherein NASA hopes to capture an asteroid and direct it into orbit around the moon for exploration purposes, would receive a portion of the $477 million allocated for exploration research and development. Funding for education takes a hit in the FY 2017 proposed budget—down to $100 million from $115 million (a 13% decrease) in the FY 2016 enacted budget.No impact to warming – extinction rates have gone down by 96%Gosselin 7-8-16 — Pierre L. Gosselin received an Associate Degree in Civil Engineering at Vermont Technical College and a Bachelor of Science in Mechanical Engineering at the University of Arizona in Tucson, 7-8-2016 ("Species

Extinction Rate Plummets Whopping 96% During Warming, Elevated CO2," No Publication, xx-xx-xxxx, Available Online at http://notrickszone.com/2016/07/08/species-extinction-rate-plummets-whopping-96-during-warming-elevated-co2/#sthash.exrgoLFq.dpbs, Accessed 7-17-2016, RJS)Last month, National Geographic and other news organizations ran the disheartening headline “First Mammal Species Goes Extinct Due to Climate Change“1. The small rat, whose only habitat was “a single island off Australia,” hasn’t been spotted since 2009. When scientists set up traps for the rodent in late 2014 to assess how many were left, they were unsuccessful in trapping any. Therefore, the conclusion is that the Melomys rubicola species is “likely” extinct. It is claimed to be the first mammalian casualty of human-caused global warming. Scientists warn there will be more. Many more. Many, many more. Forecast: One million extinct species by 2050 It was only 12 years ago (2004) that National Geographic was alarming the public with the headline, “By 2050 Warming to Doom Million Species, Study Says”2. According to the article: By 2050, rising temperatures exacerbated by human-induced belches of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases could send more than a million of Earth’s land-dwelling plants and animals down the road to extinction, according to a recent study.” The referenced recent study projecting more than one million species extinctions by the year 2050 was a paper published in the journal Nature by Thomas et al. (2003) entitled “Extinction risk from climate change“3. The authors based their conclusions on a species sample size of 1,103 in their study, claiming that between 15 and 35 percent of those species will be facing extinction by 2050 due to warming, which was extrapolated to over a million species disappearing on a global scale by the mid-21st century. Consider that to reach one million species die-offs between 2003 and 2050, as the Thomas et al. (2003) authors projected, there would need to be about 200,000 species extinctions per decade, or about 20,000 species extinctions per year. An extinction rate that high would certainly be alarming — and catastrophic. Forecasts of doom vs. observations Interestingly, a single revelation from the Thomas et al. (2003) paper seems to undermine or even contradict the authors’ forecasts of biospheric doom. The very first sentence of the paper’s abstract says this: Climate change over the past ~30 years has produced numerous shifts in the distributions and abundances of species and has been implicated in one species-level extinction.” One species extinction in the previous 30 years, or since the early 1970s. One species extinction. Between the early 1970s and the early 2000s, instrumental datasets indicate that surface temperatures warmed by about 0.5°C. So the same authors projecting more than 200,000 species extinctions per decade during the next 4 or 5 decades have acknowledged that global warming only produced one species extinction in the previous 3 decades. But it gets worse. In 2012, BBC News published an article (“Biodiversity loss: How accurate are the numbers?“4) indicating that only one species extinction – a mollusc – had occurred since 2000 (through 2012): According to IUCN [International Union for Conservation of Nature] data, only one animal has been

definitely identified as having gone extinct since 2000. It was a mollusc.” So with the addition of the small rat species claimed to have disappeared, there have been a total of perhaps 3 species that have been lost in the last ~45 years. To reach one million species losses by 2050, the rate of extinction will now need to accelerate from less than one species loss per decade to about 300,000 species losses per decade during the next 34 years. That’s 30,000 extinctions per year, or 82 extinctions per day, between now and 2050. Question: Does doubting the conclusion that we shall see an average of 30,000 species extinctions each year for the next 34 years qualify as “denying” peer-reviewed climate science if only 3 species may have disappeared in the last 4 or 5 decades? Dramatically declining extinction rates with warming, high CO2 And it gets even worse for those peddling alarm. The same BBC News article had this to say about the recorded extinction rate since 1500: It is possible to count the number of species known to be extinct. The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) does just that. It has listed 801 animal and plant species (mostly animal) known to have gone extinct since 1500.” So that’s a few more than 800 species extinctions since 1500. Of those, just 3 have occurred since rapid global warming resumed in the 1970s (following the 1940s to 1970s cooling period), or since CO2 concentrations have risen from about 325 ppm (1970s) to over 400 ppm (2016). Analyzing these IUCN figures further, this would imply that during the 470 years between 1500 and 1970, when much of the globe was experiencing the coldest temperatures of the last 10,000 years (i.e., the 1500 -1900 A.D. Little Ice Age), and CO2 ranged between a “safe” 280 ppm and 325 ppm, there were an average of 17 extinctions per decade, or 1.7 extinctions per year. 1500 to 1970 = 800 extinctions, or 17 extinctions per decade, 1.7 extinctions per year 1970 to 2016 = 3 extinctions, or 0.7 extinctions per decade, 0.07 extinctions per year We can conclude, then, that the species extinction rate has been 96% lower in the last approx. 45 years — when global warming has been rapid and CO2 concentrations have supposedly reached “dangerous” levels — than it was in the 470 years prior to 1970, when temperatures and CO2 were at cooler, “safer” levels. It is doubtful, however, that National Geographic would ever run the headline: “Dramatic reduction in species extinction rates with global warming”, as this admission does not fit the doomsday narrative.

SolvencyChina not key – India and US are working together Jain 16 — B. M. Jain, is a former Senior Fellow at the Indian Council of Social Sciences Research (ICSSR, New Delhi) in India, and was Visiting Professor in the Departments of Political Science at both Cleveland State University and Binghamton University, USA. Previously he was Professor of Political Science at the University of Rajasthan at Jaipur, India, and Editor-in-Chief of the Indian Journal of Asian Affairs. He has been a visiting scholar at numerous universities and research institutes in the USA, Europe and Asia, 4-20-2016 ("India-US Relations in the Age of Uncertainty : B. M. Jain," Taylor and Francis, Book source, Accessed 6-25-2016, RJS)Since then, space cooperation between India and the United States has been expanding in myriad areas such as space science, earth observation, satellite navigation, Microwave Remote Sensing (MR8), and disaster management.'-3 They pursued civil space cooperation under the framework of the Joint Working Group on Civil Space in the early twenty-first century. America has demonstrated interest in India's Chandrayan mission. India launched the Mars Orbiter Mission in 2013. Moreover, it created history when the Indian Mangalyaan, launched in September 2014, entered the Mars orbit successfully in the first attempt. As reported, "With this, India has become the first nation in the world to have entered the Mars orbit in the first attempt. |SRO's MOM is also the cheapest such mission till now."" NASA provided deep space navigation and tracking support services to the mission. India's earlier Moon mission, Chandrayaan-1, had two instruments from the United States: the Mini Synthetic Aperture Radar from the Johns Hopkins University's Applied Physics Laboratory and the Moon Mineralogy Mapper, an imaging spectrometer from Brown University and JPL. The Moon Mineralogy Mapper sensor was used in determining the existence of water molecules on the lunar surface." Further, the space agencies of India and the United States are collaborating on several projects, including the launching of L- and S-band synthetic aperture radar satellites to better understand earth's ecosystems to identify earthquake fault-lines, and dormant volcanoes. NASA has already recognized the accomplished skills of India's space scientists. It is willing to collaborate with India in space research. Many Indians have been drafted into various research programmes on space security. It must also be noted that space collaboration between the two countries has a strategic content, prodding both countries to chalk out a long-term strategy to ensure space security vis-a-vis China's space projects. Also, India. America, and Japan have undertaken a collaborative venture to monitor China's space projects to ensure that space can be made safe. This is a gigantic task before the like-minded nations, as China's space surveillance activities are on the increase. with global ramifications." However, India and the United States have both the talent and the scope to collaborate in space research to protect the interests of the international community in a safe and secure space.

China and Russia refuse to cooperate, no agreed-upon way to negotiate and limit weapons. Krepon 16 — Michael Krepon is co-founder of the Stimson Center in Washington, DC., 2-10-2016 ("Why we need a code of conduct for outer space," World Economic Forum, 2-10-2016, Available Online at https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/02/why-we-need-a-code-of-conduct-for-outer-space/, Accessed 6-28-2016, RJS)With China, Russia, and the United States fine-tuning anti-satellite (ASAT) warfare capabilities, the third round of competition to “seize the high ground” of space is well underway. This round is distinctive, because it has three contestants, whereas the first and second rounds, which occurred during the Cold War, had only two. But, like its predecessors, today’s space race poses the risks of quick escalation and intensification of conflict among major powers. A set of common-sense rules could help defuse and prevent conflict in space. Unfortunately, Russia and China seem uninterested in negotiating a code of conduct for responsible space-faring countries. The first space race began in 1957, when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik, the first artificial Earth satellite. US President Dwight Eisenhower’s administration opted to leave Sputnik and its successors alone, recognizing that the US could outpace Soviet space programs and had more to gain from not destroying them. Eisenhower’s successor, John F. Kennedy, arrived at the same conclusion. But he went a step further, joining with the Soviet Union to champion a United Nations resolution on cooperation in space. Kennedy’s eyes had been opened by a July 1962 US atmospheric nuclear test that inadvertently destroyed at least six satellites, including some belonging to the USSR. A few months later, the Cuban missile crisis spurred agreement on a ban on atmospheric testing. In 1967, US President Lyndon Johnson and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev turned UN resolutions into the Outer Space Treaty, which marked the end of the first military space competition. The second round of competition emerged in the mid-1970s. Brezhnev’s Soviet Union tested a new type of ASAT weapon, and President Gerald Ford’s administration decided to respond in kind. Under President Jimmy Carter, the US tried diplomacy to limit ASAT programs, but the superpowers couldn’t begin to agree on how to define a space weapon. Then, in 1983, President Ronald Reagan’s administration launched its Strategic Defense Initiative, which ratcheted up the competition. The second wave of competition ebbed in 1987, when Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev agreed to a treaty eliminating intermediate-range missiles, and ended when the Soviet Union dissolved. The latest round of military competition in space began in 2001, when the US, under President George W. Bush, withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and demonstrated advanced space-enabled military targeting in its war in Iraq. At that time, Russia was in no position to compete. But the Kremlin gradually boosted investment in “counter-space” capabilities. China did the same, demonstrating a new “hit-to-kill” ASAT weapon system in 2007. China’s test, like the US atmospheric nuclear test in 1962, was highly damaging to the space environment, creating a vast, indiscriminate, and lethal debris field. In 2008, the US used a specially adapted sea-based

interceptor missile to shoot down a malfunctioning US intelligence satellite just before its reentry into the atmosphere. The US now uses an unmanned miniature version of the space shuttle to practice “proximity operations”: approaching other satellites without harming them. Russia has launched three satellites for proximity operations. Chinese ASAT tests have succeeded to the point that they are now designed to miss their targets. The third round of military competition in space remains less intense than the first two, but it is gathering momentum. The question is how to defuse it. Russia and China support an international treaty to prevent the weaponization of space. But their proposal has significant drawbacks, including the same old difficulty of agreeing on what constitutes a space weapon. Most space-related capabilities, like lasers and proximity operations, have both peaceful and military applications. Monitoring and verifying compliance is another challenge. And even if provisions could be agreed, ratifying and implementing a treaty could take decades, as with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. A simpler – though by no means easy – approach would be to agree on a code of conduct for space. The good news is that the framework for such an international code – conceptualized by the Stimson Center (which I co-founded) in 2002 – already exists, drafted in detail by the European Union. The bad news is that China and Russia, along with many developing countries, have voiced strong objections. Developing countries disapprove of the EU’s attempt to avoid a UN-based drafting process. And they have balked at the draft code’s affirmation of a national and collective right to self-defense – a right enshrined in the UN Charter. China and Russia would like to limit the code to civilian and commercial space activities – even though military space programs are the crux of the problem and the main impetus for developing a code in the first place. The draft treaty supported by Russia and China would constrain only weapons in space, not their ground-based ASAT programs. Russia and China are clearly not ready to curtail their ASAT capabilities; and the US is ramping up its own. Transparency and confidence-building measures can help. So can guidelines for the sustainable use of outer space, which may emerge from the UN’s Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. But the third round of space competition will not end until all major powers are ready to endorse a code of conduct for responsible behavior.

DeterrenceCooperation with China allows for the Chinese to steal US tech, turns case. Zane 13 – Kris Zane, 3-12-2013 (“Obama Lets China Steal Top Secret NASA Technology,” Western Journalism, 3-12-2013, Availalble Online at http://www.westernjournalism.com/obama-lets-china-steal-top-secret-nasa-technology/, Accessed: 6-23-2016, RJS)At 2 a.m, on June 17, 1972, five men dressed in business suits and wearing surgical gloves were in the process of bugging the Democratic headquarters at the Watergate office complex. Caught in the act, they were later identified as Nixon’s “Plumbers,” part of a nationwide operation to ensure Nixon’s reelection that included wiretapping, burglary, private investigators, and mafia-like shakedowns. Nixon put a halt to the Watergate investigation, giving marching orders to the Plumbers to keep quiet and told his cronies in the CIA and Department of Justice to stall the FBI investigation. Last month, we found out that two NASA facilities—Langley Research Center in Hampton, Virginia, and Ames Research Center near San Francisco, California-were gorged with Chinese national engineers, who had access to top secret defense technology, who then took this information back to their handlers in communist China. Congressman Frank R. Wolf, through information gathered from whistleblowers, not only found that secret defense information was stolen, but that the Obama administration, including DOJ, may have shut down the investigation. According to a whistleblower speaking to Aviation Week, the Chinese nationals obtained high-level, cutting edge technology, including:… Missile defense technology…High-performance rocket engines, fuel and oxidizer tanks from an “ASAT” (anti-satellite weapon), guidance and terrain-mapping systems from the Tomahawk cruise missile and a radar altimeter from the F-35…Upon allegations that defense secrets at the Ames facility were breached, an FBI investigation was launched and completed, the information then being turned over to Assistant U.S. Attorney Gary Fry. Fry began to prepare indictments and convened a secret grand jury. However, literally minutes before Fry was to begin the proceedings, and without explanation, he was replaced by Assistant U.S. Attorney Elise Becker, and the investigation suddenly stalled. According to Congressman Wolf, Department of Justice and White House officials intervened in the investigation to shut it down. Congressman Wolf and other members of Congress put together a confidential report, Destruction of NASA from the Inside: A Summary Report of Criminal and Political Activity, delivered to the Inspector General, Michael Horowitz, which states that NASA has been hemorrhaging top secret technology not only China, but Saudi Arabia as well. Eric Holder has of course denied that they quashed the investigation, but Congressman Wolf’s probe puts the DOJ right in the middle of what could be the biggest loss of U.S. technology since the Rosenbergs funneled information about the atomic bomb to the Soviet Union. Nixon shut down the Watergate investigation to ensure his reelection. The Obama administration is alleged to have shut down the NASA

investigation to ensure that the funneling of top secret defense technology to communist China continues. Impeachment for “high crimes and misdemeanors” would be only the beginning…

Offcase

Cap Link!Space colonization is an escape for the rich to leave the poor on Earth with their problems. Maney 15 — Kevin Maney, 12-14-2015 ("'Star Wars’ Class Wars," Newsweek, 12-14-2015, Available Online at http://www.newsweek.com/2015/12/25/mars-colonies-rich-people-404681.html, Accessed 7-13-2016, RJS)While many dream of escaping earth to settle on Mars, billionaires like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos are working to make it possible. But finding a new home on the red planet will likely only be for the rich, leaving the poor to suffer as earth's environment collapses and conflict breaks out.The world sucks right now. Terrorism. Climate change. Political acrimony . Nonstop Justin Bieber songs.It’s nice to know Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos have a plan. They will help the richest people in the world go to Mars and start over, leaving the other 99 percent to suffer on a dying, warring planet. The only solace for those of us left here will be that the Biebs should be prosperous enough to go with them.This is the unspoken flip side of Musk’s SpaceX and Bezos’s Blue Origin. The space travel companies say they are creating a way for the human species to endure by populating other planets. But the bottom line is that only the wealthy will have the means to move to Mars. Musk’s target ticket price is $500,000 a person in 2015 dollars, and that’s just to get there. Imagine the new outfits you’ll have to buy to go with that space helmet. Try Newsweek for only $1.25 per week So you can picture a scenario that’s something like the 1970s white flight from inner cities, when the wealthier classes moved to freshly built suburbs, leaving the declining neighborhoods to the lower classes. In fact, the fleeing upper classes sped up the decrepitude of that era’s older cities by relocating their money and clout with them. Today, we’re seeing a similar situation in Syria, as the wealthiest and most educated people escape to the West, which will make the country even harder to stabilize and rebuild.Related: An Entertaining Theory: NASA Finds Buddha Statue on MarsSuch a dynamic could apply to the whole world in about 40 years. Maybe historians and scientists, charting Earth’s degeneration will trace a direct link back to this month’s climate talks in Paris. Couldn’t make a deal stick, they’ll say. Environment spun out of control. Drought. Upheaval. Anarchy. And then Wall Street bankers, tech titans, CEOs and Jay Z’s entourage decided to get the hell out and build McMansions in Martian space bubbles.All this might sound crazy—except it’s not. Last month, Blue Origin advanced the technology of space flight by another important notch. The secretive company launched a rocket 62 miles into space and then landed it upright, like you might see in a sci-fi movie, just a few feet from the rocket’s launchpad. It’s a step toward making reusable rockets, and reusable rockets are absolutely essential to getting the cost of a Mars flight low enough to expand the target market beyond the Forbes 400.For comparison’s sake, NASA space shuttle missions cost about $200 million per astronaut, and those flights went only into orbit. Compared with going to Mars, orbit is like

putting a toe in the Atlantic versus sailing from Europe to the New World. And the shuttle, by the way, was not a reusable rocket—it was a reusable passenger compartment. No one had previously made a reusable rocket, which is a big reason space cost so much. The economics were as bad as if you had to buy a new engine for every car trip.Blue Origin is now ginning up a real space race with SpaceX, which will help drive innovation and lower costs. Musk got a head start and has guided SpaceX into the business of launching satellites as a way to practice for human space travel. Bezos opened Blue Origin—a little side project when he’s not running Amazon.com—specifically to carry people to other planets, and it got its first rocket off the ground in April.Also in the mix are Richard Branson with his Virgin Galactic and Microsoft co-founder Paul Allen, who funded the nerdily named Stratolaunch Systems. Space is turning into a billionaire-athon. If Donald Trump doesn’t become president, you just know there has to be a Trump Spaceship in his future.Of course, launching a few rockets and saying you’re going to Mars is like writing a haiku and saying you’re going to become the next John Updike. But these guys are serious. “Our ultimate vision is millions of people living and working in space,” Bezos told reporters after the Blue Origin landing. Musk makes even grander statements. “We need to be laser-focused on becoming a multi-planet civilization,” he’s said. “That’s the next step.”At least in some circles, building colonies on Mars has entered the realm of the possible. Some writers and scientists think the first brave souls will make the six-month journey to Mars within 10 years, and that’s Musk’s prediction. Not long after the technology is proven, regular flights of supplies and people will begin. The pioneers will have to build habitable indoor spaces and, later, domed communities. As this year’s hit movie The Martian showed us, once on Mars it’s possible to grow food, make breathable air and harvest energy from solar panels. Musk calls Mars “a fixer-upper of a planet,” but by 2040, he says, there should be a thriving colonial Martiantown.That time frame is sobering—just 25 years from now. Think how fast 25 years can whip by. If you go back to 1990, Bill Clinton was eyeing his first run for the presidency, and Tim Berners-Lee was proposing the World Wide Web.The real migration will start post-2040. Volume will drive down flight prices from tens of millions of dollars a person to $500,000. People will start companies on Mars. They’ll take their families. “It’s not going to be a vacation jaunt,” Musk said in interviews. “It’s going to be saving up all your money and selling all your stuff, like when people moved to the early American colonies.” His goal, which he believes is achievable, is to get Mars up to a population of 1 million, which Musk says “is the critical threshold for us as a civilization to not join the potentially large number of one-planet dead civilizations out there.”And that comment gets to the point about who goes and why. Some will go to seek opportunity, but the quiet assumption is that many will go out of self-preservation. The sad calculus is that the Mars business looks better the worse things get on Earth. And if that’s the case, it’s actually not like moving from Europe to the American colonies in 1700, when things were OK in Europe. It sounds more like escaping a ravaged land to go

somewhere safe and start over.Related: Jeff Bezos’s Company Blue Origin Launches and Lands a RocketWho will do that? The cost of the flight and setting up on another planet will hover well past the means of almost anyone but the superrich. Where will these wealthy people come from? Most of the space travel companies so far are American. What if those companies take mostly Americans? Will we start a human colony on Mars or an American colony?Maybe later Mars will rebel and sign its Declaration of Independence from Earth. Maybe it will shut its borders and refuse any more refugees from that hot, horrible, hungry origin planet. We’re the exceptional people, the Martians might say, and all of you Earthlings just keep screwing up your home, so we don’t want you.They might even send Bieber back. Wouldn’t that teach us a lesson?

Alliance DA

1NC ShellChina-Russia relationship growing now, but it’s tense and fragile. Courtney, and Sedney, 15 — William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at the RAND Corporation and executive director of the RAND Business Leaders Forum, as well as president of the U.S.-Kazakhstan Business Association. In 2014 he retired from Computer Sciences Corporation as senior principal for federal policy strategy; from 2000 to 2003 he was senior vice president for national security programs at DynCorp (bought by CSC in 2003). From 1972 through 1999, Courtney was a career foreign service officer in the U.S. Department of State. He co-chaired the U.S. delegation to the review conference that prepared for the 1999 Summit in Istanbul of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. He advised on the reorganization of U.S. foreign affairs agencies, mandated by the Foreign Affairs Reform Act of 1999. Earlier in his career, he was special assistant to the President for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia; Ambassador to Georgia, Kazakhstan, and the U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Consultative Commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty; and deputy U.S. negotiator in U.S.-Soviet defense and space (missile defense) talks. He served abroad in Brasilia, Moscow, Geneva, Almaty, and Tbilisi. Courtney is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, where he was an international affairs fellow. He belongs to the board of directors of the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C., and the advisory council of the Eurasia Foundation. He graduated from West Virginia University with a B.A. and Brown University with a Ph.D. in economics., and David Sedney is Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs. Mr. Sedney came to the Office of the Secretary of Defense from the United States Embassy in Beijing, China where he was Deputy Chief of Mission from 2004-2007. He was Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan from July 2003 to June 2004 during which time he was Charge d’Affaires for an extended period. Mr. Sedney also served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Kabul in 2002 after the re-opening of the Embassy. Mr. Sedney was Director for Afghanistan at the National Security Council (2003), Senior Advisor in the State Department’s Office of e-Diplomacy (2002), Senior Advisor to John Negroponte, United States Ambassador to the United Nations (2001-2002), Deputy Director of the State Department’s Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs (1999-2001), and Special Assistant to Stephen Sestanovich, Ambassador-at-Large and Special Representative for the Newly Independent States (1997-1998). Mr. Sedney was Deputy Chief of Mission at the United States Embassy in Baku, Azerbaijan (1995-1997), Political-Military Officer at the United States Embassy in Beijing, China (1991-1994) and served as a Political Officer, Refugee Officer and Consular Officer at the United States Embassy in Bucharest, Romania (1985-1987). He also served as a Watch Officer at the State Department’s Operations Center (1987-1988) and as a Duty Officer and Senior Duty Officer at the White House Situation Room (1988-1989). Mr. Sedney is a graduate of Princeton University (1975) and Suffolk University School of Law (1981). He attended Louisiana State University’s School of Law (1980-1981) where he studied Law of the Sea and International Law. Mr. Sedney is a distinguished graduate of the National War College (1998). He speaks Romanian, Chinese and Azerbaijani. Mr. Sedney has received the Department of State’s Superior Honor Award six times and the Meritorious Honor Award twice. David S. Sedney Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asia and Pacific Security Affairs United States Department of Defense., 5-13-2015 ("How durable is the China-Russia ‘friendship?’," Reuters, 5-13-2015, Available Online at http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2015/05/12/how-durable-are-china-russia-relations/, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)This week’s joint naval exercise between Russia and China in the Black and Mediterranean Seas, along with President Xi Jinping’s visit to Moscow last week, highlight the growing ties between Eurasia’s two great powers. Though they share key economic interests and oppose what they claim to be a U.S.-dominated world order, the two nations’ relationship over time promises to be uneven and tense. One crucial source of discord is that China is a rising power and Russia is not. Moscow may not be willing to accept a junior partnership with China, nor is China likely to treat Russia with the respect Moscow would assume as its right. There is no doubt, however, that Sino-Russian ties are growing. Trade between the two countries is about $100 billion a year (about one-tenth of Russia’s trade with the world, and one-fortieth of China’s). As part of China’s Silk Road initiative that Xi touted last week during his meeting with Russian President Vladimir Putin, China

may invest in Russian infrastructure that could improve transport of Chinese goods across Russia to Europe and the Middle East. Moscow and Beijing have also agreed to pursue two huge projects that would bring Siberian gas to China, which would enable Beijing to supplant Europe as Russia’s largest natural-gas buyer. Russia's President Putin and China's President Xi attend documents signing ceremony during their meeting at Kremlin in Moscow Russian President Vladimir Putin (R) and China’s President Xi Jinping at a documents signing ceremony during their meeting at the Kremlin in Moscow, Russia, May 8, 2015. REUTERS/Sergei Karpukhin But there are uncertainties: The projects will be costly, China is driving a hard bargain as Russia loses gas-market share in Europe and China sees Russia as a risky investment. Moscow no longer expects that Chinese financing will replace Western capital markets, which Russia has less access to since sanctions were imposed because of Russian-supported armed intervention in Ukraine. Fearful of reverse engineering, Russia had been reluctant to sell advanced military technology to China. Now in tighter straits, Moscow has agreed to offer its most advanced air-defense system. The S-400 would enable China to strike targets over Taiwan and even key parts of India. China and Russia are sponsoring new regional institutions that could help or hurt their future ties. The Chinese-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization seeks to counter terrorism, extremism and separatism, mainly across Central Asia. All its members, including Russia, fear infiltration of extremist fighters from Afghanistan and the Middle East. The Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union builds on a prior customs union and binds Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia. The group’s high external-tariff walls will concern China. With more Chinese industry moving to the interior, overland exports across the Eurasian union will become more important. The China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is a major attraction in Eurasia, and as a founding member, Russia will hope for major financing. Beijing and Moscow are also linked by a commitment to authoritarian political systems, backed by increasingly shrill nationalist rhetoric. Putin and Xi are unhappy with Washington’s championing of more open political systems. This was reflected in Beijing’s angry reaction to student demonstrations in Hong Kong, and in Moscow’s claim that outside powers have manipulated Ukrainian politics to foster hostility toward Russia. China's President Xi Jinping gestures as he meets Russia's President Vladimir Putin, in traditional Chinese-style outfit, during the APEC Welcome Banquet, at Beijing National Aquatics Center, or the Water Cube in Beijing China’s President Xi Jinping with Russian President Vladimir Putin (L), in traditional Chinese-style outfit at Beijing National Aquatics Center in Beijing, November 10, 2014. REUTERS/Kim Kyung-Hoon Despite their shared interests, long-term prospects for cooperation between Beijing and Moscow are less promising, as a quick look at history reveals. During the three decades of Sino-Soviet rift, from the mid-1950s to the late 1980s, ideological, political and leadership differences threatened serious hostilities. About 30 years ago, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping had the shared wisdom to reverse those earlier trends. But Russia’s diminished economic prospects weaken its ability to deal with China on an equal plane. China’s economy is more than four times larger than Russia’s, and the gap

continues to widen. The collapse of energy prices, Western sanctions and statist control severely burden Russia’s economy. Population trends in Russia’s far east also bode poorly for stable relations with China. Beijing long insisted that its border with Russia was unfairly delineated because of “unequal treaties” from the 19th century and earlier. The population inequity is evident in the presence of a few? million Chinese “guest workers” in Russia’s far east, backed by a population of hundreds of millions more in the northeast of China. Compare those numbers to the roughly six million Russians on Moscow’s side of the border. China and Russia face a “middle-income trap.” To escape it, their economies must rely more on innovation and higher productivity and less on natural resources and inexpensive labor. If one or the other is unable to accommodate rising popular hopes that accompany higher income levels, the resulting unrest could spill across their border. Both China and Russia are entering into less stable periods in dealing with their other neighbors. Putin has used force against Ukraine and Georgia, and is seeking to intimidate Europeans around the Baltic Sea. China is pushing territorial claims in the East and South China Seas. These moves are causing a reinvigoration of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and are leading most of Asia to seek added U.S. military support. Russia and China will seek to avoid impinging on each other’s strategic priorities, but there are risks. Beijing sees little benefit in injecting itself into the Ukraine conflict, though Russia’s actions contradict China’s self-interest in the inviolability of internationally recognized borders and noninterference in internal affairs. For China, these are pillars that underpin Beijing’s stances on Tibet, Taiwan and the Chinese region of Xinjiang. They are also the basis of the new nationalism that Xi is building under his “China Dream” rubric. Russia has fewer interests in the East and South China Seas and will give China a bye there. The West has no interest in fueling enmity between China and Russia. Expanded energy ties will diversify global sources of supply, and cooperative trade arrangements will boost economic opportunity. At the same time, the West has a strong interest in China and Russia not coercing smaller neighbors. Russian pressure on Ukraine and Chinese in the East and South China Seas are spurring the West to strengthen defenses and intensify diplomacy to avert conflict. The United States has long sought constructive ties with China and Russia, despite their many differences. This should continue, even as Washington and its allies and friends take steps to resist coercion. America has an interest in a strong NATO and in being an Asian-Pacific power with a web of close bilateral and multilateral links, including the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a major trade deal now in final negotiation. If Russia cannot find new sources of economic growth, it will lose its claim as a great power. Through pragmatism, especially in energy and trade, China and Russia have options to forge an essentially cooperative relationship. At the same time, limits to their partnership could grow over time given the two nations’ differing trajectories and historical grievances. Moscow and Beijing have key decisions to make. Anti-U.S. posturing does not help either nation achieve its most important national goals.

Increased cooperation with the US causes China to leave Russia. Bodner 14 — Matthew Bodner, Foreign Affairs, Defense and Space Correspondent at The Moscow Times / Defense News Moscow Correspondent 5-19-2014 ("Russia, China Sign Space Exploration Agreement," Moscow Times, Available Online at http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/russia-china-sign-space-exploration-agreement/500463.html, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)With a summit meeting between the Russian and Chinese presidents due to begin Tuesday, Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Rogozin has followed last week's rhetorical bombshell — that Russia was not interested in extending operation of the International Space Station, or ISS, beyond 2020 — by trumpeting a future of increased cooperation with the emerging Chinese National Space Agency. Meeting with his Chinese counterpart, Deputy Prime Minister Wang Yang, in Beijing on Monday, Rogozin announced on Twitter that he had signed "a protocol on establishing a control group for the implementation of eight strategic projects." In a later Facebook post, he said "cooperation in space and in the market for space navigation" were among the projects. Rogozin and Wang agreed to hold a meeting between the heads of their respective agencies "in the near future," so that Beijing and Moscow could sow the seeds of a potential space partnership. Federal Space Agency chief Oleg Ostapanko wants to allow "Chinese colleagues participate in some of the most interesting projects that can replace the ISS," Rogozin said, adding that they would also discuss "projects such as cooperation in the field of rocket engine development," and cooperation in the growing market of space applications services — which primarily applies to the development of the Chinese Beidou satellite navigation system and Russia's Glonass navigation system, both rivals to the U.S.' GPS. However, analysts doubted Russia's ability to be a reliable and fruitful partner to China beyond 2020, as Russian capabilities in space have drastically withered in the 20 years since the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the Russian space program lacks clear direction or goals. Bleak Prospects "The purpose of any cooperation between states in space is to minimize the costs of complex projects and the development of science and technology," Pavel Luzin, a researcher at the Russian Academy of Science's Institute for World Economy and International Relations told the Moscow Times Monday. By this measure, Luzin sees little point in a Russia-China space partnership. China needs Russia only for "technologies they have not yet developed," and Russia lacks both a long-term vision for its space program and an industry capable of supporting it. Aside from the failed Phobos-Grunt scientific mission to one of the Martian moons in 2011, the history of Russian-Chinese cooperation in space amounts to little more than technology transfer. "In particular, the Chinese manned space program — spacecraft, spacesuits, etc. — is largely built on borrowed Soviet and Russian technology," Luzin said, and "such cooperation should not be exaggerated." China does not need Russia as a genuine partner in space, Luzin thinks. Having been barred by the U.S. from the International Space Station program — a $100 billion international scientific project involving 15 nations — China has unilaterally pursued an ambitious exploration program in recent years, convinced that a great

power must have a commanding presence in space. James Oberg, an expert on the Russian space program and NASA mission control veteran, rated China's progress highly. "China's program has moved from methodical recapitulation of Western stages into some breathtakingly innovative new mission designs, such as its asteroid fly-by mission ... [which] shows Beijing's intention to pioneer space exploration in the decade ahead." In 2003, China became the third nation to independently put a man in space, and in 2011 it deployed its first small, single-module space station — Tiangong. By 2023 it hopes to build a multi-module space station, resembling Russia's Mir space station. China may therefore be interested in using Russia to master the required technology and techniques, but beyond that there is little reason for China to be interested in Russia as a partner, according to Luzin. Aside from expertise in space station construction, Russia could share expertise on reusable spacecraft and rocket engine technology. Engines are one of Russia's greatest contribution to Western space efforts — U.S. spacecraft manufacturers have been big buyers of Russia's powerful RD-180 and NK-33 engines. "But here too, cooperation cannot be long term. It will end after the transfer of technology has been completed," Luzin said. The Price of a Pivot Were Russia to turn its back on its U.S. partners in space to focus on cooperation with China, it would lose more than it would gain: "It is obvious that without cooperation with the West that Russia would lose in the competition in science and technology," Luzin said. With a history of cooperation dating back to 1975, the U.S. and Russia have cultivated an intimate partnership in the field of space exploration over the 20 years since the fall of the Soviet Union, a relationship solidified on the ISS joint project. Representatives of both countries' space agencies are present in Mission Control Moscow and Houston at all times to support each other's operations on the ISS, and scientific collaborations are constant. This relationship has given Moscow a reputation as a reliable and generous partner in large-scale technology projects — Russia has been giving U.S. astronauts rides to the ISS aboard its Soyuz launch vehicle following the retirement of the U.S. Space Shuttle fleet — as well as insight in to advanced Western space technology and science. "Throwing both away for spite is more than foolish, it is reverting to a doomed path of space development that will harm Russia most, since Russia remains critically dependent on Western technology imports," NASA's Oberg said. Luzin hit back at that notion — the scientific value of Russia's participation in the ISS program is marginal, he said, and presents little value beyond 2020, since "Russia is not doing anything new on ISS compared to what it was doing aboard the Mir space station between 1986 and 2001." To Boldly Go Currently, the Russian space program is entirely tied to the ISS, which Luzin said "receives the lion's share of spending on civil space exploration." This is a product of its integration with the Western aerospace community through the ISS program, which was consciously fostered to address the problem of modernizing the Soviet-era space industry and its integration into the global economy. Unfortunately, none of these problems were appropriately addressed, said Luzin, and any discussion of Russia's future in space beyond 2020 "rests on the need for deep structural reforms, which not only Rogozin is unprepared for, but the entire Putin team. Moreover, there is no

understanding in government of where and how we can and must develop in space." Oberg was blunt — Russia's main gain in courting Chinese space cooperation is in "fanning nostalgia for obsolete anti-U.S. alliances," he said. The strategic alliance is important for Eurasian economic integration. Escobar 16 — Pepe Escobar born in Brazil, is the roving correspondent for Hong Kong/Thailand-based Asia Times and analyst for Toronto/Washington-based The Real News. Since the mid-1980s, he has lived and worked as a foreign correspondent in London, Paris, Milan, Los Angeles and Singapore/Bangkok. Since 9/11 he has extensively covered Pakistan, Afghanistan, Central Asia, China, Iran, Iraq and the wider Middle East. He is the author of Globalistan: How the Globalized World is Dissolving into Liquid War [Nimble Books, 2007]; Red Zone Blues: a Snapshot of Baghdad during the Surge [Nimble Books, 2007]; and Obama does Globalistan [Nimble Books, 2009]. He was contributing editor to The Empire and the Crescent; Tutto in Vendita; and Shia Power: Next Target Iran? and is associated with the Paris-based European Academy of Geopolitics. , 6-23-2016 ("The Unstoppable Breakneck-speed Expansion of the Great Eurasian Corridor," Covert Geopolitics, 6-23-2016, Available Online at https://geopolitics.co/2016/06/23/the-unstoppable-breakneck-speed-expansion-of-the-great-eurasian-corridor/, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)The key takeaway of the 20th St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) – 30 ministers from 21 nations and 880 CEOs attending – predictably was all about the key socioeconomic story of the 21st century: Eurasia integration. President Putin put it quite mildly, actually, when he said that, «with our partners, we believe the Eurasian Economic Union may be one of the centers of broader integration [with Asia]». The EEU, as we speak, unites Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, with Tajikistan as a prospective member. But then came the kicker: «We are suggesting the creation of a larger Eurasian partnership involving the Eurasian Economic Union and countries with which we have already had a close relationship: China, India, Pakistan, Iran». That accounts for no less than the intersection of the EEU with the Chinese-driven One Belt, One Road (OBOR); the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO); the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB); the BRICS’s New Development Bank (NDB); and of course all this part of the Big Picture footprint of the Russia-China strategic partnership. It naturally mergers the desire expressed by Putin years ago of a free trade zone «from Lisbon to Vladivostok» with the Chinese vision of OBOR as total Eurasia integration. The West’s competing project, meanwhile, barely ventures beyond NATO expansion; make fear, not business. So Putin once again was forced to repeat the obvious; NATO «needs a foreign enemy, otherwise what would be the reason for the existence of such an organization». The facts are on the table concerning the relentless advance of a Beltway-deployed Hybrid War against Russia. Apart, and beyond, an eventual Russian counterpunch, what really matters is business. Thus Putin’s pledge to support «Russian export-orientated companies, strengthening our positions in the international market». Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev added, «disintegration and economic isolationism will not

solve any internal problems; it will be only a self-deception. The Eurasian Economic Union is interested in an efficient and stable European Union… Similarly, it’s advantageous for a United Europe to cooperate with our union». Meanwhile, cooperation inside the SCO is also advancing. India and Pakistan are joining as full members, and Iran’s turn is practically certain in 2017. Nazarbayev: «This organization that will unite three billion people is becoming very powerful. Isn’t it profitable to anyone to cooperate with such an organization?» The OBOR-EEU-SCO interpenetration, on an economic level, portends the development of an astonishingly ample economic bloc that will position itself as a counterpoint to the Obama administration-peddled Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). Moscow is not only driving the EEU closer to all SCO members but also is keen to expand it to the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Putin framed the initial phase of the partnership as based on investment protection; trade facilitation; joint development of standards for the production of next-generation technology; and better access to services and capital markets. Business as usual On the Western front Italy, via Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, made it clear the continued automatic extension of EU sanctions on Russia is counterproductive. Italian and Russian companies clinched $1.7 billion in deals at SPIEF. Royal Dutch/Shell signed a deal with Gazprom to be part of a $10 billion LNG project on the Baltic Sea. Rosneft and BP signed a binding deal for a joint venture, Ermak Neftegaz, exploring oil in Siberia. All this happened even after Washington applied trademark relentless pressure over a string of European governments trying to block businessmen from attending SPIEF. Compare it to Gazprombank’s First Vice President, Oleg Vaksman, noting that foreign investors badly want to buy Russian stocks and bonds, but not enough are available. Any CEO with sound judgment across the eurozone knows that Moscow is not exactly desperate for Western investment. They just need to look at the myriad aspects of the Russia-China partnership. China will be extremely active improving Russian connectivity for years to come. The key example concerns the superfast Hyperloop technology – high-speed in tubes with capsules propelled by linear induction motors and air compressors. Hyperloop is projected to be in use along a 70-kilometer strip of Russia’s first super high-speed transport system to its Pacific port of Zarubino, in the Far East. Chinese investors will inevitably come up with the up to $600 million financing. The high-speed rail project between Moscow and Kazan is also advancing. These projects are of course closely tied with OBOR – the categorical imperative of building myriad land bridges across Eurasia. And that also ties in with internal BRICS cooperation. Three months ago Rosneft sold stakes in two top eastern Siberian oil fields to three Indian companies. India’s Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) signed an agreement to buy a 23.9 percent stake in the Vankor oil field in East Siberia (Russia’s second largest by production) from Rosneft for about $2.1 billion. ONGC signed deals worth $5 billion during SPIEF. Investment funds from the United Arab Emirates are also creeping in, having done business through the Russian Direct Investment Fund, particularly in agriculture. And Middle East investment funds are also about to access the Russian military-industrial complex. In a two-way street mode, Moscow’s strategy relies on boosting all sorts of Russian exports – energy,

engineering, educational, medical and tourist services – to the whole Asia-Pacific. And Putin wants Russia to become the world’s biggest exporter of non-GMO food. Why are you enduring this? So what will happen with those EU sanctions? Putin made it clear that Russia might even unilaterally lift its own sanctions; «If at some stage we see that almost everything [to solve the Ukrainian crisis] has been fulfilled, then we will be ready to make the first step, including [sorting out] various restrictions in the sphere of trade and economics». But there’s got to be reciprocity; or, in Putin’s words, «this cannot be a one-way street». Renzi promised he will urge the EU to «thoroughly discuss» their next move. European CEOs for their part now openly discuss the need of a new Ostpolitik. At the same time, they well know that what really matters are US sanctions, and these are not going anywhere. It was left to Putin to joke about it with Renzi: «Matteo, why? Why are you enduring this?» And that brings us to the by now famous admission by Putin – with a key conditionality: «The US is the only superpower and we accept that fact. The world needs a country as strong as the US but we don’t need them to interfere in our affairs, to instruct us how to live, to prevent Europe to work with us». As there are no signs this state of affairs is about to change amid the dying embers of the Obama administration, what’s certain is that Russia will be far from «isolated». Shell companies not listed by the sanctions mechanism will continue to do business with Europe. And in another facet of the Russia-China strategic partnership, China’s Union Pay credit card system as well as its Russian equivalent will be even more ubiquitous. Sanctions are downright silly. Sanctions could not and will not corner Iran or Russia. Washington’s leverage is minimal; at best it extends to coercing European nations to bend to its foreign policy designs. The breakneck-speed expansion of the Great Eurasian Corridor is unstoppable. And with Russia matching its land and wealth of natural resources with China’s population and virtually unlimited funds, there’s nothing Hybrid Wars can do to divert Russia’s own pivot to Asia. http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/06/23/its-all-about-eurasia-integration.html Russia is also joining China in one of the biggest projects in Latin America, i.e. the Nicaragua Canal, to bypass the Panama Canal that has long been controlled by Western plutocrats. Workers look at the pipes as they flood the Panama Canal Expansion project on outskirts of Colon City June 11, 2015 https://i2.wp.com/cdn.havanatimes.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/area-de-impacto-canal.jpg Global forces such as the rising economic strength of China and the expanding number of mega-ships that can’t cross through the Panama Canal are in favor of the construction of the Nicaraguan 170-mile inter-oceanic canal. The Nicaraguan canal, being built by a Chinese firm, will connect the Atlantic and Pacific oceans and would rival the century-old Panama Canal. Nicaragua began building the $50-billion dollar canal on December 22, 2014. The private Hong Kong Nicaragua Canal Development (HKCD) Group was commissioned to complete the ambitious project within five years.

Eurasian integration key to Russia-Turkey relationship – solves terrorism.Akulov 16 — Andrei Akulov, Colonel, retired, Moscow-based expert on international security issues, 7-7-2016 ("Russia and Turkey to Join Together in War on Terrorists," No Publication, 7-7-2016, Available Online at http://www.strategic-culture.org/news/2016/07/07/russia-turkey-join-together-war-terrorists.html, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)On July 4, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said in comments broadcast live on television that Turkey wanted to cooperate with Moscow in combating Islamic State in Syria. «This is certainly a serious statement that has yet to be analyzed from a military and political point of view», Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters in Moscow on July 4. Peskov also said that last week’s attack on Istanbul airport showed that it was «crucial» for Turkey and Russia to uphold an exchange of information on terrorists and react to terrorist threats together. According to him, Russia was looking to «revive» the sharing of information with Turkey in the fight against Islamic State. «Channels to exchange information with Turkey have not been working lately. We now have to revive and relaunch them», the spokesman said. Ankara’s offer of cooperation over IS comes as Turkey and Russia have pledged to rebuild relations after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan last week expressed regret for the death of a Russian pilot after Turkey shot down a Russian warplane in November 2015 during a disputed incursion into Turkish territory. On June 29, the presidents of Russia and Turkey had a phone conversation to reiterate their commitment to reinvigorate bilateral relations and fight terrorism together. The two leaders agreed to remain in contact and meet in person. Turkey’s push for cooperation with Russia is gaining momentum after the June 28 suicide bomb attack on Istanbul’s main international airport that killed 43 people. Turkey’s FM Mevlut Cavusoglu met with his Russian counterpart Sergey Lavrov in the city of Sochi in Southern Russia on July 1. The talks put an end to more than six months of political discord. Russia and Turkey reached common understanding on the Syrian crisis, including fighting al-Nusra Front militants. During the meeting Cavusoglu said that Ankara considers not only the IS group but also al-Nusra Front as terrorists. Russia and Turkey agreed that opposition groups should withdraw from the territories controlled by the militants. This agreement could be a breakthrough in the fight with terrorism in Syria. Russia has long been insisting on the exclusion of al-Nusra Front from the Syrian talks. Previously, Turkey and Russia have supported opposing sides in the Syrian conflict since the civil war broke out in 2011. Ankara backed al-Nusra Front. It allowed al-Nusra militants to use its territory for preparing attacks in Syria. Moreover, Ankara long opposed international efforts to put al-Nusra Front on the terrorist list. Now Turkey has accepted the new rules of the game in Syria. If moderate opposition forces do not leave the areas controlled by the terrorists, they will be considered as terrorists’ accomplices. This change of position lays a foundation for cooperation with Russia. Theodore Karasik from the Washington-based think-tank Gulf State Analytics said, it is very important for Turkey to agree with Russia on al-Nusra

Front to «correct its own mistakes». «Providing coordination and cooperation between the security forces of Turkey and Russia is important to avoid the occurrence of accidents and unnecessary developments. Re-establishing this dialogue is also important for the future of Syria», Cavusoglu told reporters in Sochi. The normalization of relations with Russia would help Ankara to focus on domestic issues. In the long run, the Turkish-Russian rapprochement could serve to bring a sustainable ceasefire and stability to Syria, which would also slow the influx of refugees into Turkey and Europe. But it’s not about the joint fight against terrorism only. There are greater strategic calculations related to the thaw between Moscow and Ankara. Turkey is a major Eurasian power. Its closer integration into the Eurasian system despite the country’s NATO membership is a natural thing. For example, Turkey already has an observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and is showing increasing interest in the Eurasian Economic Union. It is also a key participant in the Chinese Silk Road project. A restoration in relations between Turkey and Russia may lead to resumption of the dialogue between the Eurasian powers and Turkey in order to integrate it with the Eurasian institutions. It will strengthen its position with regard to the West. This is important for Ankara in the face of its growing disputes with the US (mainly on the issue of the Syrian Kurds) and the EU (cooperation on migration issues and the process of integration with the EU in the light of the state of democracy and policy towards the Kurds). The Russia-Turkey rapprochement is part of a bigger picture. The US has recently made a game changing proposal that could lead to greater cooperation with Russia in Syria. The proposed agreement was transmitted to the Russian government on June 27. The US is ready to work together with the Russian Aerospace Forces sharing targeting data and coordinating an expanded bombing campaign against Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria, which is primarily fighting the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The plan requires the opposition forces covered by the Geneva cessation of hostilities accord to disentangle themselves from the al-Nusra group and move into identifiable areas where they would not be vulnerable to government and Russian air attacks. If the agreement is in force, Russia and the US-led anti-IS coalition of over 60 nations and partner organizations will be coordinating activities in their anti-IS effort. At the same time, Russia and Turkey will cooperate on a bilateral basis to attack common enemies. The US and Turkey have drastically changed their stances. Both are reaching out to Moscow. Both have concluded that Russia is indispensable for finding a solution to the Syria crisis. Russia’s growing clout spurs diplomatic initiatives on the part of other actors aimed at increased cooperation. This trend defines the current situation in Syria.

Extra CardsRussia and China are cooperating with space technology, as well as on foreign policy and trade issues. Mercouris 7/5/2016 — Alexander Mercouris is a London-based writer on international affairs with a special interest in Russia and law. He has written extensively on the legal aspects of NSA spying and events in Ukraine in terms of human rights, constitutionality and international law, being a frequent commentator on television and speaker at conferences. He worked for 12 years in the Royal Courts of Justice in London as a lawyer, specializing in human rights and constitutional law, 7/5/2016 ("Putin in China: The Russian-Chinese Alliance,” The Duran, Available Online at http://theduran.com/putin-china-russian-chinese-alliance/, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)Though it has received minimal attention in the West, last week Putin completed his 15th visit to China where he held intensive talks with the Chinese leadership led by Chinese President Xi Jinping. This came directly after Putin met Xi Jinping at the immediately preceding Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit in Tashkent. According to Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang, whom Putin also met in Beijing, Xi Jinping has met Putin more often than he has met any other foreign leader. On the Russian side the talks between Putin and the Chinese leadership in Beijing did not involve Putin alone. Putin’s meeting with Xi Jinping in Beijing started as a one-to-one meeting with just the two leaders and their interpreters present. It was then expanded to include top officials and ministers of both the Russian and Chinese governments. Whilst we do not know the details of the topics which were discussed – and Putin and Xi Jinping avoided discussing them in open press conferences – the information we have suggests that the talks were very detailed and very wide-ranging: “Documents signed include a declaration between Russia and China on raising the role of international law, intergovernmental agreements on cooperation on joint implementation of a programme to develop, produce, commercialise and organise after-sales service of a wide-bodied, long-haul plane and development of further models based on this plane, cooperation on a programme to build a heavy helicopter, cooperation on technology protection measures related to work together on exploring and using outer space for peaceful purposes and developing and operating launch systems and ground-based space infrastructure, and an appendix to an agreement on cooperation on building a nuclear power plant on Chinese territory and on Russia according China a state loan. Other agreements concern coordination of joint efforts within international groups and organisations, cooperation in the forestry sector, innovation sector, securities market regulation, insurance, cooperation on localising production of high-speed rolling stock and railway equipment on Russian territory, cooperation in the oil and gas sector, cooperation between the two countries’ media outlets, and sports sector cooperation. Also signed was a joint declaration between the Eurasian Economic Union Commission and the Chinese Ministry of Commerce on the official start of talks on an agreement on trade and economic cooperation

between the Eurasian Economic Union and the People’s Republic of China.” The last paragraph makes clear that the Chinese not only received Putin as the President of Russia. They also received him as the de facto leader of the Eurasian Economic Union, an organisation the Western media never reports about and which as far as the Western media is concerned might as well not exist. The official communiques say nothing about defence and foreign policy discussions but we can sure they took place and that the full range of international relations – Ukraine, Syria, North Korea, the South China Sea, arms control, defence etc – were discussed, as were the various projects for building a new global financial architecture independent of the US and the dollar, which the Chinese especially are pressing ahead with. Almost certainly the reason why the Russian and Chinese leaders did not engage with the international media following their discussions is because they did not want to be asked questions about the discussions they had on these topics. I do not know of cooperation between any two other Great Powers in the world today which is so close. Contrary to what is often said, cooperation between Russia and China today at a political and military-strategic level is very much closer today than it was in the days of their formal alliance in the 1950s, when meetings between Soviet and Chinese leaders were infrequent and frequently tense. Whilst economic and technological relations between the two countries are still lagging, they are – as the communiques show – developing rapidly. By way of example and contrary to some media claims, the two countries are forging ahead with their pipeline projects, which are in active construction. Claims by some Western and pro-Western Russian liberal commentators that they will never be built are wishful thinking. Beyond these bilateral questions there are the greater plans which Putin discussed at SPIEF 2016 for the Eurasian Economic Union and China to conclude free trade agreements with each other, with Russia and China working to merge the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union and the Chinese-led Silk Road Project into a single whole as part of their joint “Greater Eurasia” project in which they ultimately want to involve Europe too. All this is only the visible tip of the iceberg of Russian-Chinese relations. As I have discussed previously, there are certain to be scores of secret agreements between the Chinese and the Russians we know nothing about: to share intelligence (including for example signals intelligence and data from satellites) and to coordinate foreign policy and for defence cooperation including technology sharing. We know for example that the Russians and the Chinese have representatives at each others’ command headquarters and that recently they carried out in Moscow a joint command exercise involving joint operation of their respective anti-ballistic missile defences, something the US would never do at such a level with any of its allies. Though we know little about some of these agreements, it is possible to make educated guesses about some of them. In terms of defence technology cooperation the Chinese for example are known to rely heavily on Russian liquid fuel technology for their rocket engines both for their ballistic missiles and for their space programme, which in general appears to rely heavily on Russian technology, even for design of space vehicles. As it happens, the information from the latest summit meeting in Beijing suggests that the Russians and the Chinese could even

be taking their first steps towards merging their respective space programmes. The Chinese also seem to depend heavily on the Russians for their gas turbine technology including for their military aircraft engines. In fact there are rumours – always denied – that Chinese military aircraft projects draw heavily on Russian technical advice. The Russians for their part are said to rely on the Chinese increasingly for electronic subcomponents for some of their systems and there are persistent rumours – also always denied – that they have looked to the Chinese for help with development of their aerial drones. In foreign policy coordination it seems fairly clear that there are agreements for Russia to take the lead in the Syrian conflict and for China to take the lead in any matter concerning North Korea, with the two countries however always supporting each other’s positions in each conflict. It is a certainty – and Putin has recently confirmed as much – that the Russians and the Chinese also talk to each continuously about all other international questions and take care to coordinate their positions in respect of them. They have certainly done so for example in relation to such questions as the Ukrainian conflict (where China has quietly recognised Crimea as a part of Russia), the Iranian nuclear agreement, the conflict between China and the US in the South China Sea (where Russia backs China) and China’s claim for unification with Taiwan (ditto). Importantly, we do not know the identities of the individuals in the Russian and Chinese governments who on a day to day basis conduct these contacts, though obviously the embassies of the two countries in each others’ capitals are heavily involved. However it is striking that the two countries’ foreign ministers – Sergey Lavrov and Wang Yi – do not appear to be involved. They scarcely ever meet with each other or visit each other’s countries, which suggests that the two countries’ leaderships have, quite intentionally, assigned them the task of dealing with relations with third countries and not with anything to do with the relationship Russia and China have forged with each other. Apparently this is dealt with at a different and more senior level. The best guess is that in the Russian case the official who has day to day management of Russia’s relations with China is Sergey Ivanov, Putin’s powerful Chief of Staff and head of Russia’s Presidential Administration, who appears to have frequent meetings with Chinese officials. In all essentials this is an extremely close alliance between two Great Powers. It is sometimes said that because it is not underpinned by ideology but rests purely on self-interest that somehow makes it brittle. My own view on the contrary is that the fact that the alliance is based purely on self-interest and not on ideology or sentiment – so that the two allies have no illusions about each other – makes it deeper and stronger.Russia-China alliance brings stabilitySiqi 6/27/16 — Cao Siqi, 6-27-2016 ("China, Russia to strengthen global stability," Global Times, Available Online at http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/990624.shtml, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)China and Russia have vowed to strengthen global strategic stability in a joint statement signed by Chinese President Xi Jinping and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin on Saturday, which experts say showed their wide consensus

against US "hegemony." In the joint statement, the two sides voiced concern over increasing "negative factors" affecting global strategic stability, the Xinhua News Agency reported. Some countries and military-political alliances seek decisive advantage in military and relevant technology, so as to serve their own interests through the use of force or threat to use force in international affairs. Such a policy has resulted in an out-of-control growth of military power and has shaken the global strategic stability system, the joint statement said. Wu Enyuan, a research fellow at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times that the "it shows that Russia understands our core interests and it is very important for China to gain support from such an influential country." "Moreover, China's support also provides timely help for Russia, as its economic and trade development face serious difficulties," said Wu. Wu added that it is meaningless to discuss whether China and Russia has formed an ally. The US has formed a gang to block us in terms of politics, economy and culture. "Facing such situation, we need seek help. Attention should be paid to the mutual support of the two countries on their core interests," added Wu. Wang Haiyun, a former military attaché at the Chinese embassy to Russia, told the Global Times that "the joint statement shows that China and Russia have reached a wide consensus on maintaining global strategic stability against US hegemony." As China's strategic coordination partner, Putin called for more cooperation in trade, energy, high technology, security and people-to-people exchanges, as well as synergizing the construction of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Belt and Road initiative. Xi and Putin also witnessed the signing of 30-plus cooperation deals, covering such areas as economy and trade, foreign affairs, infrastructure, technology and innovation, agriculture, finance, energy, media, the Internet and sports. "Political cooperation between the two countries is good, but economic and trade cooperation is less than satisfactory," Xia Yishan, a research fellow of Central Asian studies at the China Institutes of International Studies, told the Global Times. Xia added that economic and trade cooperation between the two countries has just begun. "In the future, the two will deepen their cooperation on oil refining and high-speed rail construction," said XiaThe alliance creates a bipolar system. Mercouris 7/5/2016 — Alexander Mercouris is a London-based writer on international affairs with a special interest in Russia and law. He has written extensively on the legal aspects of NSA spying and events in Ukraine in terms of human rights, constitutionality and international law, being a frequent commentator on television and speaker at conferences. He worked for 12 years in the Royal Courts of Justice in London as a lawyer, specializing in human rights and constitutional law, 7/5/2016 ("Putin in China: The Russian-Chinese Alliance,” The Duran, Available Online at http://theduran.com/putin-china-russian-chinese-alliance/, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)It is a common trope that the world today is moving from a unipolar world dominated by one superpower – the US – towards a multipolar world, where there will be a more complex interchange between rival centres of power. Whilst with the rise of India I think that is basically true, I do not think the terms unipolar or

multipolar properly describe the world as it is now. Rather I think the world today is basically bipolar, just as it was during the Cold War, with two great international alliances facing off against each other just as they did then. Whereas during the Cold War it was the US and the Western alliance which faced off against the USSR and its Warsaw Pact allies, today it is the US and the Western alliance versus the Eurasian alliance that has crystallised around Russia and China, which also includes certain Central Asian states that were formerly part of the USSR and which may shortly also include Iran. That the dual between these two great alliances, unlike the Cold War, is being conducted mainly in the shadows and without the ideological dimension that marked the Cold War does not mean it is any less real. On the contrary it is not only real but is taking place all the time and as it is happening it is reshaping our world.Secrecy means that the US won’t take pre-emptive action in the status quo.Mercouris 7/5/2016 — Alexander Mercouris is a London-based writer on international affairs with a special interest in Russia and law. He has written extensively on the legal aspects of NSA spying and events in Ukraine in terms of human rights, constitutionality and international law, being a frequent commentator on television and speaker at conferences. He worked for 12 years in the Royal Courts of Justice in London as a lawyer, specializing in human rights and constitutional law, 7/5/2016 ("Putin in China: The Russian-Chinese Alliance,” The Duran, Available Online at http://theduran.com/putin-china-russian-chinese-alliance/, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS) The alliance does however have one special feature which in the modern world makes it unique. Most countries when they forge alliances with other countries go out of their way to publicise the fact. By contrast the reason why the alliance between Russia and China is not widely recognised for what it is, is because of the extraordinary lengths to which both Great Powers go to deny the fact of its existence. The reason for this is not difficult to see. Alliances tend to get defined by their enemies. The Russian-Chinese alliance is clearly pitted against the other great alliance system of the modern world: that of the US and its allies. Both the Russians and the Chinese however want to maintain at least for the moment the fiction that they and the US and its allies are not enemies or even adversaries but are “partners”. Though with the crises in Ukraine and the South Sea China Sea this fiction is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain, it remains important to both the Russians and the Chinese to preserve it so that they can maintain a political dialogue not just with the US but also with the US’s allies, especially Germany and Japan, as well as a place in the international institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF which have been historically dominated by the US. It is precisely for this reason that neocon hardliners in the US like Senator McCain, who want to preserve the US’s geostrategic dominance, want on the contrary to tear down all pretences and to define Russia and China openly and clearly as the US’s enemies. That way they hope to reimpose tighter block discipline within the

Western alliance and end any prospect of US allies becoming involved in Russian and Chinese projects like China’s Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank or the Russian/Chinese “Greater Eurasia” and Silk Road projects. They also hope that way to minimise or even exclude Russian and Chinese influence from US dominated international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank. Of course defining China as a US enemy also plays into the hands of protectionists in the US like Donald Drumpf, who would like to use that as an excuse to close the US market to Chinese goods. Beyond the very complex relations Russia and China have with the West – which for the moment it is in their interest to keep complex – the Russians and the Chinese also have to consider the effect the public acknowledgement of their alliance would have on third powers such as India, Pakistan, Vietnam, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and Iran, which have had a history of conflicts with either Russia or China. By concealing the fact of their alliance the Russians and the Chinese can each preserve their historic relations with old friends – in Russia’s case with India, South Korea and Vietnam, in China’s case with Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran – which might otherwise become alarmed at the public announcement that a country they had always assumed was a friend had now formally become an ally of a former foe with whom they might still have a prickly relationship. Last but not least, concealing the fact of their alliance for the Russians and the Chinese comes with the added dividend that influential US analysts and commentators such as former US ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul can remain in denial about it. A Russian-Chinese alliance being for such people a possibility too horrible to contemplate, the fact the Russians and the Chinese don’t announce it means that such people can continue to deny it even as evidence for it piles up around them. That suits the Russians and the Chinese perfectly, since it ensures that these people won’t try to mobilise US opinion against them. The result is that though Russian and Chinese officials occasionally let slip that they see each other as allies – as Putin did the other day – in general they try to conceal the fact, pretending that their countries are not formal allies at all even though that is in fact precisely what they are. Thus in place of “alliance” they prefer to use the euphemism of “strategic partnership” or increasingly “grand strategic partnership” to describe their relationship. It is also partly to conceal the fact of their alliance that the Russians and the Chinese have weaved a complex web of organisations around their alliance of which the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the BRICS are just two. Such organisations enable the Russians and the Chinese to create institutions like the BRICS Bank or the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank as multilateral ventures which are not targeted at the West, as it would not be possible for them to do if they were openly allied to each other. These organisations also enable the Russians and the Chinese to engage countries like Brazil, India, Iran and Pakistan in a friendly way, treating them as equal partners, as they seek to extend the influence of their alliance into places like southern Africa and Latin America where it might not otherwise reach.

Appeasement DA linkWE CAN’T APPEASE THE CHINESE, especially in space. Stone 7 —Christopher Stone is a former member of the National Space Society Board of Directors. Christopher Stone (B.A., M.A.) is a senior space professional and Flight Commander with the 222nd Command and Control Squadron supporting National Security Space Operations. In his civilian capacity he is Senior Space Analyst (Policy Integration) with the DoD Executive Agent for Space Staff, Pentagon, through Falcon Research, Inc, a space strategic consulting company. He assumed role of corporate Vice President of Falcon Research in 2010. Stone began his space career when he entered the Air Force in 2004 as a graduate of the University of Missouri. He has served in various assignments, including space policy, strategy, legislative, space operations and international affairs. He has served as a space strategist supporting the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC), Pacific Air Forces as well as serving as Chief of Staff for the Space and Cyberspace Division at Headquarters Air Force-Office of International Affairs. Prior to assuming his current position, Stone was the Space Strategy Planner with the 157th Air Operations Group (PACAF), Missouri Air National Guard supporting the 613th Air and Space Operations Center Strategy Division. In his civilian career, he has served on the staffs of two United States Senators, Executive Director of a Chamber of Commerce, as a space industrial base, science and technology and future concepts analyst and planner with the National Security Space Office, and National Guard Bureau Secretariat of the Joint Staff and Joint Actions Control Office. A few examples of work regarding American and International space efforts include: Space Export Control Reform, International Space Cooperation Roadmap development, strategic planning and space policy integration across the US Government and space technology roadmaps and concept development. In addition to his service on the NSS Board of Directors, Chris has been an active member of the Policy Committee of the National Space Society as Secretary and a developer of numerous policy engagement strategies and papers for the furtherance of space power and space development., 8-13-2007 ("The Space Review: Chinese intentions and American preparedness," No Publication, 8-13-2007, Available Online at http://www.thespacereview.com/article/930/1, Accessed 7-17-2016, RJS)On January 11, 2007 the Chinese launched a missile from a mobile transporter-erector launcher (TEL) armed with a kinetic kill vehicle and destroyed the Fengyun-1C weather satellite. This satellite was orbiting the earth in a low, polar orbit. This missile was launched with no advanced warning from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, and they didn’t respond to the test until much later. According to Air Force Space Command, 700 spacecraft in low Earth orbit are now at risk due to the debris cloud created. I would say in addition to the debris cloud, all of our satellites and manned spacecraft, within range of these weapons, are endangered and the Chinese ASAT interceptor program should be taken seriously. While some people find the intentions of the Chinese ASAT test an “enigma”, I find it hard to understand what is so difficult for them to understand. Finding these answers are easier than some think. Any person who takes the time to read the open source materials alone can get a firm grasp of what Chinese military leaders and government officials are advocating through their ASAT and space weapons programs. Concerns about this ASAT program are not new. The Department of Defense has been publicly stating since 1998 that the Chinese were developing this capability. These assertions were unfortunately doubted by many, as is historically the case regarding threats to the security of the United States. These weapons endanger not only intelligence and military satellites that are critical to providing tracking and targeting for rapid reaction of our armed forces during a conflict, but civilian networks as well. This, as we will see later, is precisely the reason they have been developing and testing these weapons, to counter the United States military and as Chinese Colonel Yuan Zelu stated, “bring the opponent to its

knees.” Any person who takes the time to read the open source materials alone can get a firm grasp of what Chinese military leaders and government officials are advocating through their ASAT and space weapons programs. According to some, the intentions and reasons for conducting this test are elusive. These “experts” are in a state of denial. If anyone wanted to know what the Japanese were planning to do in the 1930s, all they had to do was read their plans and training documents. These plans were then being executed across the Asia-Pacific region. Many in America viewed claims about the increasing threat of the Japanese military as preposterous because they were committed to a peaceful rise. The Chinese are claiming a peaceful rise as well, coupled with a large increase in their armed forces and weapons. All that is needed now, as then, is to take a hard look at the policy and doctrine of the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) with respect to our nation’s space capabilities and armed forces and what they plan to do, which is counter our space superiority. Admiral Timothy Keating, commander of US Pacific Command has stated, “An anti-satellite weapon is not necessarily a clear indication of a desire for peaceful utilization of space… it’s a confusing signal shall we say for a country who desires, in China’s words, a peaceful rise.” In a recently published paper from SAIC’s Strategic Assessment Center, Chinese military documents advocate the covert deployment and use of ground- and space-based ASAT weaponry. The Chinese state that they view our space systems as the “lynchpin” of American power with respect to C4ISR (Command and Control, Communications, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance) and, to address it one step further, key to the precision targeting of our weapons. Chris Lay, one of the paper’s authors, stated, “The capability to negate US space based C4ISR is very important to China if they are to deter, dissuade and /or defeat US power projection into their region. The ASAT capability probably fits with their concept of ‘assassin’s mace’. My view is that they will deploy.” The “Assassin’s Mace” concept is a form of space warfare devised by Colonel Jia Junming in his book Integrated Space Campaigns and is studied at the various Chinese war colleges. It is a term used for a two-phased approach where space combat support in space is first, followed by the covert deployment of space weapons and a “limited space deterrence”. Some examples of the goals of the Chinese in this approach, with respect to the American space systems, can be best summed up by Colonel Li Daguang’s book Space Warfare: “Destroy or temporarily incapacitate all enemy satellites above our territory, [deploy] land based and space based ASAT weapons, counter US missile defense systems, maintain our good international image [by covert deployment], space strike weapons concealed and launched only in time of crisis.” Colonel Daguang’s position in his book is “one of space control using space weaponry, equipment and systems to achieve this control, and use space based assets to coordinate all other subsequent military operations.” Many of these recommendations and plans have been predicted by space officers and analysts for many years, yet have been dismissed by groups who are opposed to space-based weapons or defenses. I can agree with them that in an ideal world, space should be a sanctuary from war, however it just isn’t the reality of the situation. Throughout history, all areas that have been explored or utilized by mankind (land, sea, air)

have eventually seen conflict. Due to the dependency of the Western world—especially the United States—on space-based assets, an enemy can “crush” us by taking out our space-based networks. There are many questions that people are asking with regards to the reason the Chinese tested this ASAT and what to do in response. First, do we need more military-to-military dialogue with the Chinese? While this is a good thing, note that Chinese ASAT and some other space weapons experts of the PLA are off-limits to the United States with our current military exchange program. They have never been a part of the program and due to the sensitive nature of the Chinese space program militarily, I cannot see why they would allow those experts to be added if requested. Would you want to tell your enemy what your intentions were with respect to achieving victory over them in a future conflict? I think not. That would give the enemy a chance to build countermeasures and negate the military advantage gained by such a program. Second, was the Chinese responding to the Bush Administration’s new National Space Policy? No. According to a recent article in Defense News, the Chinese had conducted two or more tests of this weapon prior to the issuance of the new policy. Our policy is aimed at defense and exploration, not conquest. The fact that this kind of technology can be produced by the Chinese and exported to nations such as North Korea, Iran, or even well-funded global terrorist groups, makes it clear that this is a threat that cannot be wished away by hopes alone. Third, should we take this as a hint to kowtow to the Chinese ability to threaten our space capabilities? No. President Bush is correct: capitulating to such arms agreements, such as Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space (PAROS) or a space code of conduct, in a position of weakness, wouldn’t change the situation. After all, the weapon test launched by the Chinese was ground-based, not space-based, and would get around current and many proposed space treaties. Furthermore, Chinese plans indicate a push to eventually deploy weapons in space. As Chris Lay stated, “I suspect that they have plans (including development and test plans) for more sophisticated and advanced ASAT capability that could include high-orbit and/or GEO capable systems.” Even though space warfare hasn’t truly happened yet, is it really wise to dismiss the open source documents from the Chinese military colleges and doctrine centers just because we haven’t seen mass attacks on our GPS constellations or other spacecraft? The experts who have put together sound analysis of the situation don’t think so and neither does this author. The advocates of engaging in arms control agreements due to the test are pursuing a course of appeasement that, in the age of light-speed information and short-notice weapons, is unwise. Many people who have commented on the test consider the weapons to be a “primitive system”. However, as Desmond Ball from the Australian National University stated, “it is the sort of capability available to any country with a store of MRBM/IRBM (Medium Range Ballistic Missiles/Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles) or satellite launch vehicles, and a long range radar system, such as Japan, India, Pakistan, Iran and even North Korea. American satellites are lucrative targets in the Chinese strategy of asymmetric warfare.” Regardless of the primitive nature of the technology used, the fact that this kind of technology can be produced by the Chinese and exported to nations such as North Korea, Iran, or

even well-funded global terrorist groups, makes it clear that this is a threat that cannot be wished away by hopes alone. I feel that we must prepare at least a sound counterspace system, ground based at first, then space based to counter this threat. The system could become layered as the missile defense program will become. There are many ideas out there—political, diplomatic, and military—to address this situation. However, one thing is certain: the era of just writing about counterspace and space control doctrine is over. The time to act is now, before we lose crucial space situational awareness and the functionality of our space system, military or civilian, in a surprise attack by a future space aggressor.

India DA linksIndia is heavily invested in its space program.World Politics Review 6/29/16 — Author, 6-29-2016 ("India Seeks to Capitalize on Its Recent Space Success," World Politics Review, Available Online at http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/19223/india-seeks-to-capitalize-on-its-recent-space-success, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)Last week, India successfully launched 20 satellites in a single mission, a major success for the Indian Space Research Organization that positions India as a key player in the international commercial space market. In an email interview, Joan Johnson-Freese, a professor of national security affairs at the Naval War College who writes in a personal capacity, discusses the state of India’s space program. WPR: What are India’s space capabilities—in terms of launch vehicles, space exploration, satellites and space-industrial complex—and who are its major international partners, in terms of space diplomacy and commercial ties? Joan Johnson-Freese: India’s primary space partners coincide with the development of its space capabilities. Though India has its own space-launch vehicles, heavy-lift launch vehicles traditionally were a problem because it lacked the cryogenic engine technology—the ability to store gaseous fuel at an extremely low temperature so it maintains a liquid state and can be used in space. Therefore, France launched most of India’s heavy payloads. Since 2014, however, India has increasingly demonstrated its mastery of cryogenic engines necessary for heavy-lift. India has also worked extensively with Israel on advanced imagery and reconnaissance satellites, especially since the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attack. India and Israel jointly developed a dual-use, synthetic aperture radar satellite called RISAT-2, to be used as a day-night and all-weather radar-imaging satellite capable of monitoring India’s border areas, as well as providing weather, agricultural and disaster-management data. India has also worked with NASA on space science programs, including India’s Chandrayaan-1 lunar mission in 2008 and its Mars Mangalyaan mission in 2014. India and the United States have also worked together on Space Situational Awareness—the ability to detect, predict and assess the physical location of natural and human-made objects in orbit around the Earth, with the objective of avoiding collisions—and discussed cooperation on dual-use missile-defense technology. Though India has historically worked with Russia on defense programs, including India’s purchase of Russian aircraft and air defense systems, its space cooperation with Russia has been limited recently, due in large part to the complicated dynamics of Chinese-Russian-U.S.-Indian relations, regional rivalries, and the largely dual-use nature of space technology. Internationally, India has voiced support for transparency and confidence-building measures being developed through the United Nations, but with reservations. India specifically rejected the European Union’s attempts in 2011 and 2012 to develop a nonbinding Code of Conduct for space. India prefers legally binding mechanisms unlikely to get the support of the U.S. WPR: What have the major priorities of India’s space program been historically, and how are those changing?

Johnson-Freese: India’s decades-old space program once specifically rejected human spaceflight and instead focused on projects with direct applications for its development goals, including disaster warning and mitigation; tele-medicine and tele-education; communications, especially to rural areas; and remote sensing and weather data collection. India, for example, pioneered using satellite imagery to locate areas of heavy groundwater, which are habitats of disease-carrying mosquitos, for spraying and eradication. But India’s outlook and space priorities have changed dramatically over the past decade. While still including development-focused goals, India’s space agenda now includes planetary exploration, human spaceflight, and the development of a heavy-lift launcher and reusable launch vehicles. This change is partly evolutionary and partly due to pressure on India to not be surpassed technically by China’s successful human, robotic and military space programs. Regional competition between Indian and China was most prominently displayed in September 2014, when the Indian spacecraft Mangalyaan began orbiting Mars. With this milestone, India became the fourth country to orbit Mars, the first Asian country to reach Mars, and the first country to orbit Mars on its first attempt. Only the U.S., the Soviet Union and the European Union had previously reached Mars. With Mangalyaan, India made it into the space record books. Whereas China had been the primary Asian beneficiary of the prestige and corresponding regional and geostrategic influence that accompanies space achievements, with Mangalyaan, India got its due. WPR: How big of a political priority is the space program to India’s government, and how does it fit into India’s defense, foreign policy and technology development priorities? Johnson-Freese: Though development applications were India’s initial space priority, the national security value of space assets have been long recognized, especially after the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test in 2007. Consequently, officials at India’s Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) began talking about developing ASAT capabilities soon thereafter, and in 2011 the head of DRDO said India had achieved the capability to neutralize adversaries’ satellites using ballistic missile technology. That system, however, has never been tested and therefore is seen by some analysts as a “paper tiger.” Whether India will proceed to test that system at some point is an open, and important, technical and geostrategic issue. More generally, India created an Integrated Space Cell (ISC) in 2008, operated jointly by the military, Indian Space Research Organization and DRDO. The ISC is considered a stepping-stone to a long-sought Indian military space command. The dominance of the Indian army in the ISC has made the development of that command difficult bureaucratically by blocking efforts that would potentially take control of programs—and therefore funding—out of the army’s hands. Better integration of space technologies into military operations could help break the bureaucratic gridlock. India has launched two dedicated defense satellites since 2013, the first one for the navy, the second for the armed forces generally. Regional geostrategic issues will likely compel India to not just keep up, but accelerate the development of its military space capabilities. That is especially true given India’s maritime priorities and challenges. India knows it cannot be left

behind in space development, for overlapping political, economic, military and development reasons.The US has empirically supported India’s space militarization. The plan is a reversal. Johnson-Freese and Hoey 10 — Joan Johnson-Freese is Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and Matthew Hoey is the director of the Military Space Transparency Project., 11-3-2010 ("India: Militarizing Space with U.S. Help," Foreign Policy In Focus, 11-3-2010, Available Online at http://fpif.org/india_militarizing_space_with_us_help/, Accessed 7-8-2016, RJS)U.S. President Barack Obama and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh have a meeting scheduled in Delhi on November 8. Certain to be on the agenda is the removal of the last remaining export controls on U.S. dual-use technology and military hardware to India, including technology appropriate for development of space weapons. Since President Obama pledged in 2009 to seek a ban on space weapons, the United States should not be helping other countries develop these weapons, especially in dangerous regions that have nuclear weapons on hair-trigger alert. But with the final hurdles of export control removed, Washington could be doing just that for India, with so far little or no objection. The relationship between the United States and India has been extraordinarily close since 2001. The United States views India as a rising democracy and ally in the fight against radical Islamic fundamentalism. Ten days after 9/11, Washington began to lift sanctions in place against India since its 1998 nuclear tests. Subsequently in 2001 the number of Indian companies on the Commerce Department’s Entity List was reduced to just two from 159. Additionally, the U.S. licensing policy with India for nuclear- and missile- related technology changed from “policy of denial” to case-by-case review. Since 2006, delegations from the U.S. defense industry, including large numbers of retired high-ranking military officers, have flocked to India to prospect the $32 billion that has been allocated for defense procurement in 2010-11, with $13 billion of that figure set aside for the acquisition of new weapons systems. These defense industry representatives and retired military officials have served as an informal lobbying firm that continues to actively encourage the U.S. government to drop remaining export restrictions on India organizations like the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) and the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO).In July 2010, the investment firm Deloitte estimated that India will “spend nearly US$80 billion over the next five years on defense related capital expenditure.” India is using space development as a way to advance a stronger geostrategic position in the region and globally. The U.S. defense industry is facilitating this military expansion with its aggressive move in to South Asian markets to supplement reductions in their Pentagon contracts. The potential long-term ramifications of both moves have been neglected in favor of short-term, understandable, gains. Nevertheless, the U.S. arms control community, by failing to address this dangerous situation, is asleep at the wheel. India’s “Peaceful” Space Program India, not surprisingly, says that its space program is

for “peaceful” purposes only. The parallels between India’s nuclear program development and its current space program development, however, suggest otherwise. Former Indian President Abdul Kalam was a key developer and explicator of India’s nuclear and missile programs, as well as its current space vision. His definition of “peaceful” provides India considerable latitude. Kalam once stated that, “In the 3,000-year history of India, barring 600 years, the country has been ruled by others. If you need development, the country should witness peace, and peace is ensured by strength. Missiles were developed to strengthen the country.” This philosophy of peace through strength also provides the rationale for developing a wide range of new and emerging space technologies with far-reaching military applications. India considered its nuclear program peaceful right up to and including its 1974 test. Now, India considers its expanding space program peaceful as well. Despite contrary indications, Washington is apparently also willing to do so. India’s space program dates back to the launching of its first sounding rocket in 1963. Recently, however, the character of the Indian program has changed dramatically from utilitarian to more far-reaching. India is developing capabilities, including human exploration of space and expanded utilization of many dual-use technologies, to enhance its geostrategic position. This dual-use space technology can be used not just for military force enhancement but potentially for space weapons as well. Though most Indian politicians profess that India is not pursuing space weapons, some blur the lines. In February 2007, for example, Indian Defense Minister A.K Antony stated that, “It may be difficult to demarcate distinctly between peaceful and military uses. However, we have always advocated peaceful use of technology. Thus, we are of the view that weaponization of space must be discouraged.” The Indian military is not so circumspect and in fact at times directly contradicts the politicians. An alarming 2000 report titled “Military Dimensions in the Future of the Indian Presence in Space” caused waves within official circles but drew little international attention, probably due to its lack of availability outside of India. Perhaps most controversial was its suggestion that India could deploy a directed-energy weapon, such as a particle beam weapon, in space by 2010. At the time of publication, the paper’s author, V. Siddhartha, was an officer on special duty in the secretariat of the scientific advisor to the defense minister. The paper is testament to, at the very least, a longstanding interest within the Indian military of deploying not only a space-based laser, but also a kinetic anti-satellite (ASAT) system. Although India clearly has not deployed an ASAT system that utilizes directed energy technology to date, Siddhartha’s forecast of India having the potential to develop an ASAT system still appears officially supported. In January of 2010 Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO) Director General V K Saraswat stated at the 97th Indian Science Congress that, “India is putting together building blocks of technology that could be used to neutralize enemy satellites.” All the while Indian officials continue to heavily lobby the United States to remove export restrictions on DRDO and ISRO, with a continuingly favorable reaction from the United States. Perhaps most clearly and most recently, the Indian ministry of defense published a document that serves as a technological roadmap for the Indian military’s future to the year

2015. This Technology Perspective and Capability Roadmap confirms the pursuit of a formal anti-satellite program, stating “development of ASAT for electronic or physical destruction of satellites in both LEO and GEO-synchronous orbits” as a goal for 2015. Not only is the United States not speaking out against such Indian efforts, it has become more accommodating in providing the technology to accomplish them. Meanwhile, international attention continues to focus on China’s military space activities and, given China’s overt ASAT test in 2007, rightfully so. But shortly after China’s satellite shoot-down, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and then-Russian President Vladimir Putin convened a joint press conference where Singh declared; “Our position is similar in that we are not in favor of the weaponization of outer space.” This was just one day after then-Indian Air Force (IAF) chief Shashi Tyagi had stated, “As the reach of our air force is expanding, it has become extremely important that we exploit space, and for it you need space assets.” India’s contradictory intentions concerning its space program are hard to miss, yet Washington seems intent on doing so.

NASA CPCounterplan Text: The United States federal government should pass the Space Leadership Preservation Act.The counterplan effectively revitalizes NASA, specifically key to budget allocation. Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 2/15/2016 – (“The Space Leadership Preservation Act and the Need for Stability at NASA,” U.S. House of Representatives, Available Online at: https://science.house.gov/sites/republicans.science.house.gov/files/documents/HHRG-114-SY-20160225-SD001.pdf, Accessed: 7-17-2016, RJS)On February 27, 2013, the Committee held a hearing titled “A Review of the Space Leadership Preservation Act.” The bill’s cosponsors, Reps. Frank Wolf and John Culberson testified along with Mr. Tom Young, who testified on his own behalf, and Mr. Elliott Pulham, Chief Executive Officer of the Space Foundation. Prior to this hearing, the Space Foundation issued a report in December 2012 titled Pioneering: Sustaining U.S. Leadership in Space. The report noted that, “…[a]s the space program has evolved, we have witnessed frequent redirection and constantly shifting priorities at NASA, mixed signals from Congress and the 2 administration, organizational conflicts, and the lack of a singular purpose, resulting in a space agency without a clear, stable direction.” 1 The report went on to find that, “…NASA needs to embrace a singular, unambiguous purpose that leverages its core strengths and provides a clear direction for prioritizing tasks and assigning resources.”2 A more recent report from the National Research Council titled Pathways to Exploration: Rationales and Approaches for a U.S. Program of Human Space Exploration (June 2014), stated: “…the human spaceflight program in the United States had experienced considerable programmatic turbulence, with frequent and dramatic changes in program goals and mission plans in response to changes in national policies. The changes had a high cost in program resources and opportunities and imposed what many feared was an intolerable burden on already constrained human exploration budgets.” 3 On October 28, 2015, NASA Administrator Charles Bolden gave a speech before the Center for American Progress and stated that NASA needs a “constancy of purpose” that stretches across multiple administrations. The Administrator stated, “…[w]e’ve got to stay focused. If we change our minds at any time in the next three or four years, which always is a risk when you go through a government transition, my belief is that we’re doomed.”4 The Aerospace Safety Advisory Panel (ASAP), established by Congress to report to NASA and Congress on safety issues affecting NASA, stated in their recent report last January, “NASA faces another challenge that has historically led to disruption and inefficiency and arguably has impact on safety and good systems engineering. This is the challenge of starting over with new programs and directions following Administration change. As in prior reports, the ASAP urges constancy of purpose. Failing to stay the course with current programs

of record will make it an even longer, costlier, and potentially less safe trip to Mars.” 5 As the House Science, Space, and Technology Committee continues to advocate for the need to legislatively reauthorize NASA, this hearing will take a comprehensive look at how the agency functions, and consider legislative proposals, such as The Space Leadership Preservation Act (H.R. 2093), to improve NASA’s management structure and accountability. The Space Leadership Preservation Act proposes a number of changes to the management structure of NASA and its procurement authority to address the issue of constancy of purpose. The bill includes the following provisions: 10 Year Term for the NASA Administrator: The bill establishes a 10-year term for the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The Administrator shall be chosen from a list provided by a new “Board of Directors”. Establish a Board of Directors: The bill establishes a “Board of Directors.” It provides the manner of the selection and appointment as well as the criteria to qualify for the board and the length of each member’s term. This section empowers the board to provide to the President and Congress a proposed budget for NASA; to provide a list of nominees to the President for appointment to Administrator, Deputy Administrator, and Chief Financial Officer, all Senate confirmed appointments; to provide reports on specific policy matters deemed important by Congress; to review current space programs and future space exploration plans; and to provide a recommendation to Congress and President for the removal of the Administrator for cause. Budget Deliberation Review: The bill directs NASA to provide the “Board of Directors” with the budget they send to the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB), thereby allowing them to see any differences between what NASA asked for in a budget and what the Administration formally requested for NASA. The bill also requires the President to provide an explanation of any discrepancy in the budget proposal provided by the “Board of Directors.” Long-Term Procurement: The bill provides NASA with the capability to enter into contracts for rocket propulsion systems and manned and unmanned space transportation vehicles and payloads, including expendable launch vehicles, and any other infrastructure intended for placement or operation in space or on celestial bodies, and services related thereto for periods in excess of the period for which funds are otherwise available for obligation under certain conditions.

CP SolvesThe CP is key to solve – it depoliticizes NASA and improves management. Messier 16 — Doug Messier, is a communications expert with more than a decade of experience with entrepreneurial startups. A skilled analyst with superb written communication skills, he has broad knowledge of the aerospace, Internet, education, and environmental fields. He is an expert in translating scientific and technical concepts for lay audiences and in helping individuals and organizations craft their messages in print and online. Douglas is Managing Editor of Parabolic Arc . Offering “Space Tourism…and Much More,” this popular blog provides daily coverage of space tourism, commercialization, human spaceflight, and other key areas in humanity’s conquest of the final frontier. Parabolic Arc’s combination of up-to-date news and insightful analysis has made this website a must read for anyone who wants to stay informed about the new era of commercial spaceflight. Douglas is a Co-owner of SpaceJobs.com – the world’s largest online career site for the aerospace, defense and aviation industries. He has helped to forge business strategy as member of the Board of Directors and collaborated on web designs and advertising. He helped to found the Earth and Space Foundation, a non-profit focused on connecting the environmental and space communities. The foundation funds expeditions that use space technologies to help protect Earth’s environment. It also funds scientists who study extreme environments to help us better understand conditions on other worlds. Douglas worked for five years in relevance analysis for Yahoo!, helping to greatly improve the company’s search results. He worked with engineers to devise relevance tests, wrote test guidelines and procedures, and trained more than 150 analysts. This work gave him an intuitive understanding of search marketing and online branding. It also honed his analytical skills, giving him the ability to quickly analyze large amounts of information. He has worked extensively in the education area and served as Publications Director and Distance Education Manager at the University of Management & Technology in Arlington, Virginia. This start-up, for-profit university – led by project management guru J. Davidson Frame – offers high quality management programs worldwide and has pioneered graduate management education in China. He worked for five years as an Associate Editor at the National Science Teachers Association, where he collaborated with authors to develop curriculum. One of the projects was Views of the Solar System, a CD-ROM tour of the planets and moons. Other projects focused on global climate change and the environment. Douglas has written everything from technical documentation to magazine and newspaper articles to movie and television spec scripts. He pitched stories to three different Star Trek series – an opportunity that arose by submitting an unsolicited spec script. Douglas is the author of "Carl: The Biography of William Carl Condie". This 220-page private biography is the story of a Salt Lake City man who lived from 1909-2003. This private work – commissioned by one of Carl’s grandsons – was distributed to family and friends. Thomas Monson, the president of the Mormon Church, said he “couldn’t put down” the account of his cousin Carl’s life. Douglas holds a master’s degree in Science, Technology and Public Policy from The George Washington University, where he studied at the Space Policy Institute. He is a graduate of the International Space University and holds a B.A. in Journalism from Rider University. 2-26-2016 ("Why the Space Leadership Preservation Act is Necessary at Parabolic Arc," Parabolic Arc, 2-26-2016, Available Online at http://www.parabolicarc.com/2016/02/26/space-leadership-preservation-act/, Accessed 7-17-2016, RJS)WASHINGTON, D.C. – The House Science, Space, and Technology Committee today held a hearing on The Space Leadership Preservation Act and the need for stability at NASA. The hearing featured input from former astronaut and first female Space Shuttle pilot and commander, Eileen Collins, former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin, and Rep. John Culberson, author of the Space Leadership Preservation Act. Chairman Lamar Smith: “Presidential transitions often have provided a challenge to NASA programs that require continuity and budget stability. But few have been as rocky as the administration change we experienced seven years ago. “The 2005, 2008 and 2010 NASA Authorization Acts are consistent in their direction to NASA. NASA needs the same certainty from the Executive Branch that it receives from Congress. Today we are discussing how to provide that stability to NASA once again as we look toward a presidential transition in less than a year.” Rep. Culberson is the author of The Space

Leadership Preservation Act and serves as the chairman of the Commerce, Justice, Science (CJS) Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. The bill is intended to bring stability to NASA despite changing presidential administrations. Congressman Culberson: “Over the last 30 years, NASA programs have been cancelled due to cost-overruns, mismanagement or abrupt program changes at the start of each new administration. In the past 20 years alone, 27 programs have been cancelled resulting in over $20 billion wasted on uncompleted programs. That is unacceptable. Our space program is too important to continue on this path. “The Space Leadership Preservation Act will improve our space program and improve morale at NASA centers by ensuring that we take the politics out of science and provide NASA with clear direction and guidance that outlasts the political whims of any one presidential administration – and the political whims of Congress.” Witnesses testified to the challenges NASA has faced due to abrupt changes with presidential transitions. Colonel Eileen Collins stated, “I believe program cancellation decisions that are made by bureaucracies, behind closed doors, and without input by the people, are divisive, damaging, cowardly, and many times more expensive in the long run.” And former NASA Administrator Michael Griffin lamented that “the space policy changes wrought in 2010 were not proffered to or discussed with Congress, our international partners, the various stakeholders in the domestic space community, or even senior officials at NASA.”

Resiliency CPCounterplan Text: The United States federal government should pursue increased satellite resilience through diversification, distribution, and protection. Resiliency requires diversification, distribution, and protection. Cowen-Hirsch 5-12-16 — Rebecca M. Cowen-Hirsch is Inmarsat’s Senior Vice President for Government Strategy and Policy in the United States Government Business Unit, based in Washington, D.C. 5-12-2016 ("Op-ed," SpaceNews, 5-12-2016, Available Online at http://spacenews.com/op-ed-paving-a-pathway-to-resilient-satellite-operations/, Accessed 7-17-2016, RJS)There has been much discussion in Washington and across the Department of Defense about the need for heightened resiliency in space. Specifically, the conversations — which have inspired notable legislation — are framed around the increasing challenges placed upon DoD mission-supporting satellite systems from electromagnetic interference, either intentional or accidental, as well as other increased risks of operating through a contested space environment. These disruptions threaten the performance and safety of DoD military units as they conduct the full spectrum of military and humanitarian operations. Depending on the type and the severity of the interference, their satellites may be jeopardized as well. Therefore, it is very encouraging to see the U.S. government’s leadership engage on the following developments: • The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015 included a section that supported “fully-developed, multi-faceted” approaches in deterring and defeating adversary-launched acts of aggression in space. The act directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to the congressional defense committees in which the Secretary would assess the ability of the DoD to deter and defeat the attacks. The act also stipulated that the Secretary produce a detailed study to propose alternative defense and deterrent strategies in response to these threats. • A House Armed Services Committee report prepared as part of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 recognized the importance of secured satellite communications. The committee backed efforts to leverage existing military and commercial satellites to ensure the safeguarding of military units. Such efforts included the establishment of protected tactical waveforms for commercial satellites and Wideband Global Satellite Communications (WGS), as well as a cost-benefit analysis of options to counter electromagnetic interference. “The committee believes in the importance of a robust ability for the warfighter to monitor, detect, characterize, geolocate and report sources of radio frequency interference on U.S. military and commercial satellites that are in direct support of combatant commanders,” according to the report. “The committee is concerned that the Department has not developed a clear strategy to meet the related warfighter requirements.” • A September 2015 white paper from the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Global Security titled “Space Domain Mission Assurance: A Resilience

Taxonomy” revealed that a lack of robustness within space architectures must be overcome through “a single term, resilience.” The paper cites a DoD definition of resilience as the “ability of an architecture to support the functions necessary for mission success with higher probability, shorter periods of reduced capability, and across a wider range of scenarios, conditions, and threats, in spite of hostile action or adverse conditions.” Resilience, the paper notes, must exist at the forefront of any space planning or architecture analysis. “Unfortunately, the National Security Space community lacks both an agreed-upon taxonomy for discussing resilience, and a quantitative method for measuring it,” according to the paper. Three Essentials of Resiliency To overcome the lack of cohesion and progress, the paper recommends what can be called the essential characteristics of resilience. It is critical for U.S. government leadership, agencies and industry to consistently work together to strengthen each characteristic, especially the following three: 1. Diversification. The value of architectural diversity within the satellite communications (SATCOM) environment cannot be understated. Commercial SATCOM systems, designed with the goal of seamlessly augmenting and complementing military satellite communications (MILSATCOM) capabilities, diversify the range of communication paths while also complicating the targeting solution of would-be adversaries. With this, U.S. commanders maintain the option of strictly using MILSATCOM or relevant commercial systems — or a combination of the two — for diverse capabilities and operational flexibility. If an adversary impacts MILSATCOM space installations, commercial global constellations are nearby, interoperable and readily available on the orbital belt. This permits DoD users to continue with their missions uninterrupted, even when their owned assets may be targeted or compromised. In addition, commitment to SATCOM diversity extends a protected state for all. Because commercial satellites serve both public and private sector interests, they “muddle the picture” with respect to being an obvious target for adversaries. Thus, you could argue that adversaries are less likely to devote their resources to an attempted compromise of commercial systems. 2. Distribution. Users should take full advantage of the vast range of space assets made available to them (including those belonging to industry), so they have seamless access to robust commercial SATCOM capability where and when they must execute their missions. A distribution of assets across the orbital belt, ground segment and even across frequency bands increases the robustness of the operational options. That is why it is advantageous to distribute traffic across all commercial and military assets, to allow operations to proceed to the greatest extent possible, regardless of which satellites may be subject to a degradation or threat. 3. Protection. Innovative and strong commercial SATCOM service providers invest in a wide range of technologies to enhance their satellites, offering improved protection necessary to create a wideband environment with increased resistance to jamming and other forms of interference. Satellite design, command encryption and a vigilant mission assurance posture are core to their operational profiles. As a result, government users are better positioned to operate through many congested and contended scenarios. Commercial operators have also successfully demonstrated the use of Protected Tactical Waveform (PTW) commercial satellites.

For example, in 2015 Inmarsat and its partners demonstrated PTW across the largest bandwidth to date, bolstering the government’s ability to communicate using Inmarsat Global Xpress satellites as a viable complement to their own WGS constellation even in the event of a heavily contested environment. The diversity, distribution and protection of orbital assets are essential attributes of resiliency that enhance the government’s integrated SATCOM architecture, ensuring the government can operate in all environments, even when contested. With the best of breed from industry available to minimize disruptions, the government benefits from enhanced robustness in space combined with ground assets to complement and extend military capabilities. Government operations may proceed with confidence, knowing that interference contested environment — whether intentional or otherwise — will not prevent mission success.