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Anomalies and Frauds(?) in the Kenya 2017
Presidential Election∗
Walter R. Mebane, Jr.†
September 18, 2017
∗Thanks to Preston Due for assistance, and to many colleagues for helpful conversations.†Professor, Department of Political Science and Department of Statistics, University of
Michigan, Haven Hall, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1045 (E-mail: [email protected]).
1 Introduction
The Presidential election in Kenya on August 8, 2017, was annulled by the Supreme Court,
probably because of problems with the paper records that should have been the official
record of the votes cast in the election (Freytas-Tamura 2017; Opalo 2017). Evidently there
were constitutional and procedural problems, but were there worse problems (Epstein
2017)? Were there frauds?
Every expert on Kenya that I’ve talked to over the past couple of weeks avers that, yes,
everyone knows there were frauds, but most people didn’t expect the frauds to be large in
magnitude. I’ve heard stories about eligible voter frauds in which IDs are rented from
legitimate voters and given to people who are too young to vote so that they may vote for
the candidate favored by the voter buyers. Another story relates to a Twitter post by a
U.S. official stating the Kenyan officials regretted frauds they had ordered once they
realized they could win without them, fearing that their efforts to manipulate the election
would be detected. Various people have told me that various locales in Kenya are
notoriously corrupt. So the general belief seems to be: small frauds, yes; huge frauds, not
likely.
Inspection of polling station vote count and eligible voter count data from Kenya using
election forensics tools (Hicken and Mebane 2015; Mebane 2016; Rozenas 2017) produces
results compatible with the belief that widespread but small frauds occurred. This paper
briefly reviews the evidence.
Before getting to that evidence I should say that Kenya presents a very hard case for
election forensics analysis. As will become clear, voting in Kenya is extremely polarized.
The polarization aligns candidates with ethnicities, and ethnicities tend to be highly
concentrated in terms of their geographic distribution. Also Kenyan elections feature
coalitions and other features of political behavior that involve voters (and candidates)
acting strategically. Electors’ and voters’ actions are strategic when they depend at least in
part on accurate expections about what other electors or voters will do. Both strategic
1
behavior and the existence of important and geographically concentrated covariates (such
as ethnicity) can distort election forensics results. False positive indicators for anomalies
are an important threat, but the distortions may also mean that indications of genuine
frauds are masked.1
I very briefly describe how I came to be analyzing these data, which I’ve done on an
entirely voluntary basis. On August 14, 2017, I was contacted by someone working on
behalf of NASA, seeking assistance looking into alleged problems with the August 8
election. After a couple of conference calls with various people in the U.S., Kenya and
elsewhere, with help from a research assistant I scraped polling station vote count data
from an IEBC website.2 We scraped vote count data both on 18aug2017 and 23aug2017.
From a source in Kenya I obtained a spreadsheet containing polling station eligible voter
counts. These counts appear to be the same as those published in the Kenya Gazette on
June 30, 2017. I estimated almost all the statistics I will report with both the 18aug2017
and the 23aug2017 data, with very similar results, but here I’m reporting only the results
from the 23aug2017 version of the data.
2 Statistics
As originally downloaded, the 23aug2017 vote count data includes 40,830 polling station
observations. The eligible voter count data includes 40,884 polling stations. After merging
the two files and removing unmatched observations and observations with missing data,
including observations that have vote counts of zero for all candidates, we are left with
40,818 polling station observations. Table 1 reports the sums of all the numerical variables
in the merged data file.
1My ongoing research attempts to discover exactly how such threats to valid inferences affect various ofthe statistics used in election forensics and to develop methods for adjusting for such threats. To get a senseof the caution I think we should have when using current election forensics tools with data from Kenya, seethe discussion of the Kenya 2013 election in Mebane (2015).
2The IEBC website is https://public.rts.iebc.or.ke/enr/index.html#/Kenya_Elections_
Presidential/1.
2
*** Table 1 about here ***
The first results, reported in Table 2, are a selection of statistics from the Election
Forensics Toolkit treating data from across the entire country as a whole. For a description
of the Toolkit and of the individual statistics in Table 2 see Hicken and Mebane (2015) and
Mebane (2016). Hicken and Mebane (2015) suggest that if several of the statistics that
indicate anomalies are triggered for an election, then frauds are likely to have occurred in
that election. For the Kenya election every indicator of anomalies is triggered for the votes
for Kenyatta or Odinga. These statistically significant anomalies appear in red. For
Turnout no significant anomalies are apparent (the 2BL statistic is not meaningful for
voter turnout). So these statistics might suggest that frauds affect the vote counts.
*** Table 2 about here ***
Caution is called for because of the way voting in Kenya is polarized. The plots of
empirical densities based on polling station data in Figures 1–6 illustrate this. Empirical
densities for turnout, Kenyatta and Odinga vote proportions across all of Kenya, in Figure
1, show that turnout appears to have a roughly unimodal distribution, but the
distributions of the candidates’ vote proportions are at least bimodal. In many polling
stations Kenyatta or Odinga receive almost all the votes and in many polling stations they
receive almost none of the votes. If such patterns are produced by ethnically polarized
voting, then ignoring the ethnic polarization might well inflate the number of apparently
anomalous Toolkit statistics. Indeed, most of the empirical densities for the same variables
in each county (including Diaspora and Prisons), in Figures 2–6, show that turnout most
often remains unimodal, albeit with a modal value that moves around a bit, and the vote
proportions are usually less pronouncedly bimodal than they are when the country is
treated as a whole. Most densities do exhibit bumps in their tails, however, and it’s hard to
say whether these are merely artifacts of having relatively small numbers of observations or
something more interesting.
3
*** Figures 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 about here ***
In any case, the apparent diversity across counties motivates estimating the statistics
from the Toolkit separately for each county.3 Such results appear in Tables 3–8.4 Tables 3
and 4 show that the appearance of turnout not being manipulated persists when examined
separately for each county. Figures 5–8 show anomalies for the votes for both Kenyatta
and Odinga, although the appearance of anomalies is not as comprehensive as when the
country is analyzed as a whole. Anomalies are most frequent for the “P05s” statistic,
which may indicate that vote counts are being manipulated by the actions of multiple
agents who are either signaling that they did manipulate votes (Kalinin and Mebane 2011;
Kalinin 2017) or failing to disperse their efforts effectively due to coordination problems
(Rundlett and Svolik 2016). For several counties all or almost all of the statistics indicate
significant anomalies.
*** Tables 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 about here ***
Estimating the spikes test (Rozenas 2017) separately for each county shows small
percentages of frauds (in the sense of that model) in several counties. Figure 7, which
shows results from the spikes test being estimated for the whole country all together,
suggests that 1.4 percent of polling stations have “spikes frauds,” in particular an excess of
vote proportions of a certain value. Such excesses may be interpreted as symptoms of
excesses occurring due to coordination problems among agents manipulating votes, for
example through vote buying (Rundlett and Svolik 2016). The nationwide analysis of
Figure 7 suggests that such excesses involve excesses of vote proportions near zero or one,
but that impression is belied by running the test separately for each county. Figures 8–11
present these county-specific results. The following counties are estimated to have positive
percentages of polling stations with spikes frauds: Baringo, .40%; Bungoma, .29%; Busia,
3If I had data with which to observe ethnicities for each polling station, other forms of analysis would befeasible. Work to assemble such data or approximations to such data is underway.
4The Diaspora and Prisons “counties” are omitted because of the small numbers of observations in them.
4
.67%; Elgeyo/Marakwet, .36%; Embu, .41%; Isiolo, 1.45%; Kajiado, 1.14%; Kakamega,
.29%; Kisii, .55%; Kisumu, 5.67%; Kitui, .07%; Laikipia, .90%; Lamu, 2.27%; Machakos,
.14%; Mandera, .00%; Meru, .34%; Migori, 4.16%; Mombasa, .89%; Murang’a, .43%;
Nairobi City, .30%; Nandi, 1.09%; Narok, 1.30%; Nyamira, 1.26%; Nyandarua, 2.22%;
Nyeri, 1.45%; Samburu, 1.27%; Taita-Taveta, 1.03%; Tana River, 2.39%; Trans Nzoia,
.90%; Uasin Gishu, .63%; Vihiga, 1.28%; Wajir, 1.70%; West Pokot, 1.36%. The highest
percentages—greater than two percent—are for Kisimu, Migori, Tana River, Nyandarua
and Lamu counties. The number of votes for Kenyatta in polling stations with proportions
that are identified as spikes-fraudulently high is 444,102.5 Note that this model asserts that
the proportions of votes for Kenyatta in these polling stations is excessive, not that all the
votes in the polling stations are fraudulent. If the test is detecting genuine frauds, it is
likely that some votes were somehow added to sets of otherwise authentic votes.
*** Figures 7, 8, 9 and 10, 11 about here ***
I also estimate the spikes test separately for those polling stations in constituencies with
Forms 34B that NASA complained to the Supreme Court about (Epstein 2017).6 Figures
12–18 show these results. Spikes frauds are not generally more frequent in polling stations
included in problematic Forms 34B than they are in polling stations that do not have
problematic Forms 34B.
*** Figures 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 about here ***
Finally I estimate likelihood finite mixture models (Mebane 2016) that implement the
positive conception of frauds introduced by Klimek, Yegorov, Hanel and Thurner (2012).
Estimating the model for the country as a whole with Kenyatta specified to be the
candidate who may benefit from frauds gives an incremental fraud probability of fI = .030,
5This count was found by modifying the plot.out function in the spikes package (Rozenas 2016).6The constituencies that are the target of these complaints are listed in FORM 34C AND 34B VERIFICATION
REPORT.doc.
5
extreme fraud probability fE = 0 and α = .9. These estimates imply that incremental
frauds produced an expected 74,127 votes for Kenyatta. But in light of the serious
bimodality of the vote distribution (recall Figure 1) that we strongly believe stems
primarily from ethnic polarization, it is not appropriate to estimate the finite mixture
model for the whole country all at once. Instead estimates done separately for each county
are somewhat more plausible.
Estimates for the counties for which the model could be estimated appear in Table 9.7
Because it is plausible that both Kenyatta and Odinga benefitted from frauds, but models
that allow multiple candidates to benefit from frauds do not yet exist, I estimate the model
for each county twice: once with Kenyatta specified as the beneficiary of any frauds; and
once with Odinga specified as the beneficiary of any frauds.8 Extreme frauds are estimated
never to occur: always the estimate is fE = 0. When estimable the probability of
incremental fraud is usually positive. Often the positive fI estimate is less than .01, but
sometimes fI is larger than .02. This happens 18 times when Kenyatta is specified to
benefit from any frauds and 11 times when Odinga is specified to benefit from any frauds.
The largest value estimated for fI is fI = .327 for Kenyatta in Lamu county.
*** Table 9 about here ***
The large value for fI in Lamu county exemplifies the dilemma that remains because of
the extremity of ethnic polarization. In Figure 3 the distributions of vote proportions for
both Kenyatta and Odinga are clearly and substantially bimodal. Experts on Kenya tell
me the bimodality in the county—in which Odinga finished ahead of Kenyatta—stems
from the mix of ethnicities there. But some of these experts also tell me that, nonetheless,
the county has a reputation for corruption. The estimate of fI = .327 is surely too high,
but apparently ethnicities in Lamu county both mask any frauds the finite mixture model
7In the counties for which estimation failed, the program never managed to find starting values.8Such an approach is generally undesirable but it’s what I can do at the moment.
6
might detect there and are associated with the frauds we might like to detect.9
The estimated values of α suggest that sometimes votes are stolen from other
candidates (α < 1) and sometimes votes are manufactured from nonvoters (α > 1). The
instances where α is substantially less than 1.0—say .5 or less—all occur for Kenyatta: in
Bomet, Nairobi City, Nyandarua, Nyeri, Samburu and Tana River; Kenyatta received the
most votes in all these counties except Nairobi City and Tana River. Instances where α is
substantially greater than 1.0—say 2 or greater—occur frequently for both Kenyatta and
Odinga. Such results comport with the prevalence of ID-renting I’ve been told about.
Using the county- and candidate-specific estimates of the likelihood finite mixture
model to derive expected number of votes produced by incremental frauds suggests these
numbers are generally small. As Table 10 shows, the total number of votes due to
incremental frauds across the counties for which estimates could be produced is 36,907 for
Kenyatta and 25,093 for Odinga. Table 11 expresses these incremental fraud estimates for
each county as proportions of the valid votes in the county. Only in Lamu and Nairobi City
(for Kenyatta) and in Narok and Usain Gishu (for Odinga) is the number of votes due to
incremental frauds as large as one percent.
*** Tables 10 and 11 about here ***
3 Discussion
Election forensics analysis suggests that frauds may have been widespread throughout
Kenya in the August 8 presidential election but that the magnitude of the frauds was
small. Only a few percent of votes, at most, are likely to have been produced by frauds.
A complication is that I do not know whether the vote counts scraped from the IEBC
website correspond to counts actually produced by tallying votes at each polling station.
Some of the procedural defects the Supreme Court confronted may have produced
9Work continues on models that can include covariates (Ferrari and Mebane 2017), but such models arenot ready to use, yet.
7
deviations between the Forms 34A and the counts available at the website. Many of the
Forms 34A themselves are alleged to have deficiencies and may not contain accurate tallies.
Another major complication is that features of politics in Kenya, in particular the very
high degree of ethnic polarization, presents challenges that some of the statistics used to
conduct the election forensics analysis cannot or can barely deal with. Analyzing data
separately for each county mitigates the problems to some extent, but difficulties still
intrude: many counties are ethnically heterogeneous even as voting remains polarized. Also
analysis is not able, yet, to take the implications of coalition behavior fully into account.
With luck developments currently underway regarding these techniques will soon support
improved investigations.
8
References
Epstein, Helen. 2017. “Kenya: The Election & the Cover-Up.” New York
Review of Books . August 30, http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2017/08/30/
kenya-the-election-and-the-cover-up/.
Ferrari, Diogo and Walter R. Mebane, Jr. 2017. “Developments in Positive Empirical Mod-
els of Election Frauds.” Paper presented at the 2017 Summer Meeting of the Political
Methodology Society, Madison, WI, July 13–15, 2017.
Freytas-Tamura, Kimiko de. 2017. “Kenya Supreme Court Nullifies Presidential Elec-
tion.” New York Times . September 1, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/world/
africa/kenya-election-kenyatta-odinga.html?_r=1.
Hicken, Allen and Walter R. Mebane, Jr. 2015. “A Guide to Election Forensics.” Working pa-
per for IIE/USAID subaward #DFG-10-APS-UM, “Development of an Election Forensics
Toolkit: Using Subnational Data to Detect Anomalies.” URL: http://www-personal.
umich.edu/~wmebane/USAID15/guide.pdf.
Kalinin, Kirill. 2017. “The Essays on Election Fraud in Authoritarian Regimes.” PhD thesis,
University of Michigan.
Kalinin, Kirill and Walter R. Mebane, Jr. 2011. “Understanding Electoral Frauds through
Evolution of Russian Federalism: from “Bargaining Loyalty” to “Signaling Loyalty”.”
Paper presented at the 2011 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association,
Chicago, IL, March 31–April 2.
Klimek, Peter, Yuri Yegorov, Rudolf Hanel and Stefan Thurner. 2012. “Statistical Detection
of Systematic Election Irregularities.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
109(41):16469–16473.
Mebane, Jr., Walter R. 2015. “Election Forensics Toolkit DRG Center Working Pa-
per.” Working paper for IIE/USAID subaward #DFG-10-APS-UM, “Development of
an Election Forensics Toolkit: Using Subnational Data to Detect Anomalies.” URL:
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~wmebane/USAID15/report.pdf.
9
Mebane, Jr., Walter R. 2016. “Election Forensics: Frauds Tests and Observation-level Frauds
Probabilities.” Paper presented at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Sci-
ence Association, Chicago, April 7–10, 2016.
Opalo, Ken. 2017. “Kenya’s Supreme Court just declared the Aug. 8 elections
invalid. Here’s what this means.” Monkey Cage, Washington Post . Septem-
ber 5, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/09/05/
kenyas-supreme-court-just-declared-the-aug-8-elections-invalid-heres-what-this-means/
?utm_term=.7a023cbfea91&wpisrc=nl_cage&wpmm=1.
Rozenas, Arturas. 2016. spikes: Detecting Election Fraud from Irregularities in Vote-Share
Distributions. R package version 1.1.
Rozenas, Arturas. 2017. “Detecting Election Fraud from Irregularities in Vote-Share Distri-
butions.” Political Analysis 25(1):41–56.
Rundlett, Ashlea and Milan W. Svolik. 2016. “Deliver the Vote! Micromotives and Mac-
robehavior in Electoral Fraud.” American Political Science Review 110(1):180–197.
10
Table 1: Sums in Merged Polling Station Data
ValidVotes DisputedVotes RejectedVotes objectedVotes15164124 5189 403416 2812
Kenyatta Odinga Nyagah Dida8212671 6816240 37985 37964
Aukot Kaluyu Jirongo Mwaura27376 11749 11268 8856
VOTERS19588995
Note: sums for listed variables across n = 40818 polling stations in the 23aug2017 data. Allvariables except “VOTERS” come from scraped data. “VOTERS” comes from the eligiblevoter data.
Table 2: Distribution and Digit Tests, Kenya 2017 Presidential
Name 2BL LastC P05s C05s DipT ObsTurnout 4.439 4.515 .201 .202 .945 40818
(4.412, 4.468) (4.487, 4.541) (.197, .205) (.198, .206) −−Kenyatta 4.302 4.297 .231 .214 0 40818
(4.272, 4.331) (4.268, 4.325) (.227, .235) (.21, .217) −−Odinga 4.278 4.29 .24 .206 0 40818
(4.25, 4.31) (4.261, 4.318) (.235, .244) (.202, .21) −−
Note: “2BL,” second-digit mean; “LastC,” last-digit mean; “C05s,” mean of variableindicating whether the last digit of the vote count is zero or five; “P05s,” mean of variableindicating whether the last digit of the rounded percentage of votes for the referent partyor candidate is zero or five; “DipT,” p-value from test of unimodality; “Obs,” number ofpolling station observations. Values in parentheses are nonparametric bootstrap confidenceintervals. Estimates that differ significantly from values expected if there are no anomoliesare shown in red.
Table 3: Distribution and Digit Tests, Kenya 2017 Presidential, Counties
County Name 2BL LastC P05s C05s DipT Obs
BARINGO Turnout 4.144 4.612 .192 .196 .99 892(3.94, 4.333) (4.42, 4.81) (.165, .217) (.168, .225) −−
BOMET Turnout 4.184 4.432 .209 .198 .997 727(3.985, 4.392) (4.21, 4.645) (.177, .238) (.169, .226) −−
BUNGOMA Turnout 4.717 4.594 .197 .192 .995 1185(4.557, 4.883) (4.425, 4.753) (.174, .219) (.17, .214) −−
BUSIA Turnout 4.34 4.393 .192 .196 .981 759(4.127, 4.537) (4.196, 4.593) (.162, .22) (.167, .225) −−
ELGEYO/MARAKWET Turnout 4.432 4.36 .195 .195 .886 528(4.172, 4.669) (4.133, 4.606) (.163, .231) (.161, .227) −−
EMBU Turnout 4.392 4.556 .224 .183 .997 709(4.166, 4.606) (4.351, 4.763) (.195, .254) (.154, .212) −−
GARISSA Turnout 4.495 4.318 .239 .226 .842 380(4.203, 4.766) (4.021, 4.608) (.192, .287) (.184, .268) −−
HOMA BAY Turnout 4.188 4.525 .217 .209 .992 1061(4.013, 4.36) (4.355, 4.684) (.191, .241) (.185, .235) −−
ISIOLO Turnout 4.389 4.428 .196 .201 .914 194(4.014, 4.741) (4.036, 4.845) (.134, .252) (.144, .258) −−
KAJIADO Turnout 4.489 4.445 .208 .224 .134 795(4.278, 4.691) (4.244, 4.655) (.177, .236) (.194, .253) −−
KAKAMEGA Turnout 4.692 4.394 .21 .199 .992 1496(4.544, 4.841) (4.255, 4.541) (.191, .231) (.178, .219) −−
KERICHO Turnout 4.503 4.49 .195 .186 .985 774(4.306, 4.71) (4.28, 4.703) (.168, .224) (.156, .212) −−
KIAMBU Turnout 4.398 4.528 .217 .202 .999 1962(4.274, 4.515) (4.403, 4.657) (.198, .235) (.185, .221) −−
KILIFI Turnout 4.53 4.457 .2 .22 .979 987(4.351, 4.715) (4.28, 4.643) (.172, .223) (.194, .243) −−
KIRINYAGA Turnout 4.46 4.52 .198 .225 .998 658(4.248, 4.673) (4.307, 4.755) (.167, .228) (.193, .257) −−
KISII Turnout 4.684 4.458 .219 .223 1 1125(4.509, 4.849) (4.285, 4.613) (.194, .244) (.198, .246) −−
KISUMU Turnout 4.447 4.495 .195 .196 .895 1026(4.28, 4.627) (4.322, 4.683) (.172, .219) (.171, .221) −−
KITUI Turnout 4.401 4.583 .191 .196 .992 1452(4.267, 4.545) (4.438, 4.732) (.17, .211) (.174, .216) −−
KWALE Turnout 4.203 4.692 .191 .196 .992 611(3.953, 4.431) (4.458, 4.908) (.16, .223) (.162, .227) −−
LAIKIPIA Turnout 4.406 4.651 .189 .181 .928 530(4.165, 4.692) (4.406, 4.898) (.157, .223) (.147, .215) −−
LAMU Turnout 4.584 4.578 .211 .157 .26 166(4.157, 5.054) (4.133, 5) (.151, .271) (.102, .211) −−
MACHAKOS Turnout 4.476 4.625 .177 .204 .988 1331(4.319, 4.613) (4.47, 4.768) (.157, .197) (.183, .224) −−
MAKUENI Turnout 4.33 4.56 .198 .192 .997 1058(4.149, 4.503) (4.392, 4.729) (.173, .222) (.168, .217) −−
Table 4: Distribution and Digit Tests, Kenya 2017 Presidential, Counties
County Name 2BL LastC P05s C05s DipT Obs
MANDERA Turnout 4.246 4.393 .222 .162 .936 400(3.931, 4.541) (4.1, 4.665) (.182, .265) (.125, .2) −−
MARSABIT Turnout 4.646 4.596 .202 .199 .819 381(4.375, 4.921) (4.325, 4.895) (.16, .241) (.155, .239) −−
MERU Turnout 4.539 4.525 .2 .205 .991 1471(4.4, 4.692) (4.374, 4.668) (.178, .22) (.184, .225) −−
MIGORI Turnout 4.332 4.442 .213 .193 .991 825(4.13, 4.51) (4.255, 4.632) (.183, .24) (.167, .218) −−
MOMBASA Turnout 4.509 4.311 .209 .218 .985 933(4.323, 4.706) (4.116, 4.51) (.184, .236) (.192, .244) −−
MURANG’A Turnout 4.467 4.514 .198 .211 .725 1130(4.293, 4.633) (4.35, 4.673) (.175, .22) (.187, .235) −−
NAIROBI CITY Turnout 4.395 4.43 .208 .2 .352 3377(4.285, 4.497) (4.342, 4.524) (.195, .221) (.186, .213) −−
NAKURU Turnout 4.536 4.618 .194 .191 .992 1805(4.402, 4.662) (4.48, 4.766) (.177, .211) (.173, .211) −−
NANDI Turnout 4.337 4.502 .208 .196 .996 795(4.121, 4.548) (4.311, 4.699) (.177, .236) (.167, .224) −−
NAROK Turnout 4.298 4.692 .167 .195 .903 749(4.097, 4.512) (4.466, 4.888) (.14, .194) (.168, .222) −−
NYAMIRA Turnout 4.672 4.672 .205 .187 .859 552(4.44, 4.924) (4.428, 4.938) (.169, .237) (.152, .217) −−
NYANDARUA Turnout 4.547 4.475 .196 .193 .994 653(4.345, 4.76) (4.248, 4.691) (.165, .225) (.162, .222) −−
NYERI Turnout 4.215 4.447 .191 .214 .996 916(4.032, 4.392) (4.248, 4.643) (.164, .217) (.189, .241) −−
SAMBURU Turnout 4.415 4.41 .219 .226 .269 283(4.074, 4.738) (4.071, 4.763) (.17, .265) (.173, .276) −−
SIAYA Turnout 4.442 4.398 .183 .201 .991 915(4.258, 4.633) (4.187, 4.573) (.157, .205) (.175, .227) −−
TAITA TAVETA Turnout 4.482 4.49 .187 .195 .663 353(4.181, 4.782) (4.173, 4.81) (.144, .221) (.156, .238) −−
TANA RIVER Turnout 4.266 4.359 .219 .193 .999 306(3.94, 4.574) (4.013, 4.689) (.17, .265) (.147, .235) −−
THARAKA - NITHI Turnout 4.345 4.63 .192 .229 .931 624(4.121, 4.57) (4.405, 4.859) (.162, .223) (.197, .26) −−
TRANS NZOIA Turnout 4.429 4.455 .196 .23 .959 638(4.202, 4.658) (4.23, 4.683) (.165, .226) (.198, .262) −−
TURKANA Turnout 4.418 4.787 .192 .187 .733 642(4.194, 4.649) (4.559, 5.026) (.16, .224) (.157, .217) −−
UASIN GISHU Turnout 4.484 4.468 .186 .208 .992 866(4.293, 4.667) (4.275, 4.654) (.158, .21) (.182, .234) −−
VIHIGA Turnout 4.669 4.592 .212 .218 .836 547(4.399, 4.93) (4.364, 4.826) (.176, .245) (.183, .25) −−
WAJIR Turnout 4.506 4.764 .206 .16 .969 432(4.235, 4.803) (4.5, 5.051) (.167, .243) (.123, .194) −−
WEST POKOT Turnout 4.305 4.643 .204 .25 .98 711(4.103, 4.512) (4.432, 4.856) (.174, .235) (.218, .283) −−
Table 5: Distribution and Digit Tests, Kenya 2017 Presidential, Counties
County Name 2BL LastC P05s C05s DipT Obs
BARINGO Kenyatta 4.151 4.635 .161 .209 .188 892(3.962, 4.341) (4.457, 4.818) (.135, .185) (.181, .232) −−
BOMET Kenyatta 4.664 4.406 .199 .231 .967 727(4.457, 4.867) (4.189, 4.612) (.169, .227) (.201, .263) −−
BUNGOMA Kenyatta 4.018 4.558 .196 .206 0 1185(3.849, 4.185) (4.397, 4.723) (.176, .217) (.181, .228) −−
BUSIA Kenyatta 4.143 4.51 .192 .223 .994 759(3.935, 4.372) (4.311, 4.713) (.165, .22) (.191, .253) −−
ELGEYO/MARAKWET Kenyatta 4.307 4.392 .172 .229 .766 528(4.066, 4.549) (4.148, 4.634) (.138, .205) (.193, .265) −−
EMBU Kenyatta 4.507 4.362 .147 .202 .992 709(4.285, 4.709) (4.157, 4.573) (.121, .172) (.173, .23) −−
GARISSA Kenyatta 4.011 4.426 .187 .232 .022 380(3.722, 4.288) (4.126, 4.713) (.145, .224) (.189, .274) −−
HOMA BAY Kenyatta 2.833 1.566 .664 .4 0 1061(1.719, 3.961) (1.459, 1.674) (.637, .692) (.37, .429) −−
ISIOLO Kenyatta 4.449 4.34 .206 .175 .669 194(4.021, 4.869) (3.928, 4.768) (.144, .263) (.119, .227) −−
KAJIADO Kenyatta 4.442 4.296 .204 .213 .942 795(4.249, 4.635) (4.088, 4.484) (.176, .233) (.182, .24) −−
KAKAMEGA Kenyatta 4.42 4.564 .202 .2 .995 1496(4.261, 4.564) (4.414, 4.708) (.182, .223) (.18, .221) −−
KERICHO Kenyatta 4.533 4.521 .15 .207 .991 774(4.305, 4.727) (4.314, 4.709) (.124, .176) (.176, .236) −−
KIAMBU Kenyatta 4.462 4.529 .208 .189 .1 1962(4.336, 4.586) (4.401, 4.662) (.191, .226) (.171, .205) −−
KILIFI Kenyatta 4.13 4.509 .195 .22 .992 987(3.93, 4.335) (4.331, 4.696) (.168, .218) (.195, .244) −−
KIRINYAGA Kenyatta 4.304 4.763 .157 .184 .594 658(4.096, 4.526) (4.538, 4.98) (.129, .184) (.155, .213) −−
KISII Kenyatta 4.128 4.386 .198 .188 .676 1125(3.972, 4.281) (4.224, 4.556) (.173, .221) (.164, .21) −−
KISUMU Kenyatta 3.943 2.739 .472 .268 0 1026(3.582, 4.28) (2.57, 2.891) (.441, .499) (.242, .295) −−
KITUI Kenyatta 4.153 4.461 .207 .219 .994 1452(3.982, 4.31) (4.302, 4.607) (.187, .229) (.198, .24) −−
KWALE Kenyatta 4.062 4.245 .206 .187 .802 611(3.837, 4.28) (4.031, 4.47) (.173, .237) (.155, .218) −−
LAIKIPIA Kenyatta 4.306 4.343 .185 .221 .961 530(4.055, 4.552) (4.119, 4.57) (.153, .217) (.183, .257) −−
LAMU Kenyatta 4.412 4.404 .223 .223 0 166(3.928, 4.897) (3.988, 4.855) (.157, .289) (.163, .289) −−
MACHAKOS Kenyatta 4.174 4.623 .215 .183 .993 1331(4.011, 4.33) (4.462, 4.771) (.193, .238) (.161, .203) −−
MAKUENI Kenyatta 4.249 4.523 .201 .198 .995 1058(4.05, 4.44) (4.343, 4.707) (.178, .225) (.174, .223) −−
Table 6: Distribution and Digit Tests, Kenya 2017 Presidential, Counties
County Name 2BL LastC P05s C05s DipT Obs
MANDERA Kenyatta 4.367 4.327 .208 .198 .997 400(4.065, 4.653) (4.05, 4.617) (.167, .245) (.16, .237) −−
MARSABIT Kenyatta 4.424 4.504 .228 .186 .536 381(4.132, 4.703) (4.234, 4.793) (.184, .268) (.147, .223) −−
MERU Kenyatta 4.489 4.455 .195 .215 .874 1471(4.326, 4.645) (4.309, 4.599) (.174, .216) (.196, .236) −−
MIGORI Kenyatta 4.171 2.697 .527 .366 0 825(3.868, 4.511) (2.514, 2.88) (.496, .56) (.335, .398) −−
MOMBASA Kenyatta 3.652 4.397 .219 .193 .996 933(3.465, 3.824) (4.21, 4.573) (.19, .245) (.167, .22) −−
MURANG’A Kenyatta 4.477 4.468 .265 .23 0 1130(4.308, 4.647) (4.3, 4.638) (.241, .289) (.204, .257) −−
NAIROBI CITY Kenyatta 4.344 4.512 .207 .2 .906 3377(4.256, 4.44) (4.411, 4.607) (.193, .22) (.187, .213) −−
NAKURU Kenyatta 4.494 4.671 .183 .19 .994 1805(4.37, 4.628) (4.543, 4.809) (.164, .199) (.171, .207) −−
NANDI Kenyatta 4.47 4.516 .131 .201 .941 795(4.26, 4.659) (4.312, 4.713) (.108, .153) (.175, .229) −−
NAROK Kenyatta 4.413 4.367 .202 .211 0 749(4.202, 4.625) (4.172, 4.571) (.172, .228) (.182, .238) −−
NYAMIRA Kenyatta 4.397 4.656 .181 .207 .992 552(4.151, 4.631) (4.412, 4.909) (.149, .214) (.169, .239) −−
NYANDARUA Kenyatta 4.588 4.629 .345 .184 0 653(4.378, 4.787) (4.386, 4.833) (.308, .381) (.153, .211) −−
NYERI Kenyatta 4.261 4.529 .19 .203 .006 916(4.086, 4.443) (4.342, 4.709) (.164, .213) (.177, .229) −−
SAMBURU Kenyatta 4.225 4.551 .184 .155 .593 283(3.867, 4.575) (4.223, 4.869) (.134, .23) (.11, .198) −−
SIAYA Kenyatta 1.821 2.449 .492 .244 0 915(.916, 2.606) (2.31, 2.59) (.459, .523) (.214, .271) −−
TAITA TAVETA Kenyatta 4.174 4.799 .232 .195 .92 353(3.892, 4.478) (4.504, 5.099) (.187, .278) (.153, .235) −−
TANA RIVER Kenyatta 3.936 4.497 .196 .222 .001 306(3.602, 4.26) (4.164, 4.833) (.15, .239) (.176, .271) −−
THARAKA - NITHI Kenyatta 4.345 4.538 .189 .194 .991 624(4.121, 4.57) (4.303, 4.774) (.157, .22) (.162, .224) −−
TRANS NZOIA Kenyatta 4.113 4.447 .18 .185 .903 638(3.908, 4.32) (4.232, 4.674) (.15, .208) (.155, .213) −−
TURKANA Kenyatta 4.118 4.511 .213 .192 .994 642(3.883, 4.358) (4.283, 4.735) (.179, .245) (.16, .221) −−
UASIN GISHU Kenyatta 4.684 4.514 .174 .2 .402 866(4.477, 4.887) (4.323, 4.699) (.149, .201) (.172, .225) −−
VIHIGA Kenyatta 4.099 4.461 .181 .205 .993 547(3.835, 4.353) (4.216, 4.697) (.148, .212) (.172, .238) −−
WAJIR Kenyatta 4.472 4.477 .211 .245 .814 432(4.21, 4.736) (4.199, 4.762) (.171, .248) (.204, .285) −−
WEST POKOT Kenyatta 3.987 4.387 .184 .198 .818 711(3.777, 4.186) (4.174, 4.581) (.155, .214) (.17, .226) −−
Table 7: Distribution and Digit Tests, Kenya 2017 Presidential, Counties
County Name 2BL LastC P05s C05s DipT Obs
BARINGO Odinga 3.85 4.03 .168 .195 .007 892(3.565, 4.112) (3.859, 4.214) (.143, .193) (.169, .222) −−
BOMET Odinga 4.456 4.696 .201 .183 .993 727(4.222, 4.672) (4.473, 4.912) (.171, .228) (.154, .208) −−
BUNGOMA Odinga 4.351 4.47 .203 .193 0 1185(4.172, 4.518) (4.306, 4.628) (.181, .225) (.171, .216) −−
BUSIA Odinga 4.569 4.51 .183 .221 .865 759(4.363, 4.785) (4.286, 4.713) (.154, .211) (.191, .252) −−
ELGEYO/MARAKWET Odinga 3.607 4.223 .199 .218 .17 528(3.246, 3.907) (3.977, 4.449) (.163, .233) (.184, .252) −−
EMBU Odinga 3.678 4.553 .12 .168 .968 709(3.425, 3.954) (4.353, 4.755) (.096, .144) (.141, .195) −−
GARISSA Odinga 4.396 4.274 .179 .203 .044 380(4.089, 4.738) (4.003, 4.555) (.139, .218) (.161, .242) −−
HOMA BAY Odinga 4.171 4.602 .525 .199 0 1061(3.997, 4.339) (4.435, 4.766) (.496, .555) (.174, .224) −−
ISIOLO Odinga 4.587 4.907 .196 .186 .428 194(4.168, 5.016) (4.521, 5.299) (.139, .253) (.129, .242) −−
KAJIADO Odinga 4.367 4.395 .215 .218 .989 795(4.165, 4.577) (4.192, 4.582) (.186, .242) (.19, .249) −−
KAKAMEGA Odinga 4.516 4.553 .195 .201 .992 1496(4.371, 4.664) (4.404, 4.686) (.174, .216) (.18, .221) −−
KERICHO Odinga 3.75 4.355 .165 .22 .995 774(3.484, 4.003) (4.164, 4.577) (.138, .191) (.19, .248) −−
KIAMBU Odinga 4.077 3.958 .257 .199 0 1962(3.901, 4.244) (3.824, 4.086) (.237, .276) (.181, .216) −−
KILIFI Odinga 4.418 4.498 .222 .181 .956 987(4.242, 4.609) (4.306, 4.686) (.197, .246) (.156, .205) −−
KIRINYAGA Odinga 3.414 3.271 .34 .193 0 658(2.88, 3.963) (3.097, 3.426) (.305, .375) (.161, .222) −−
KISII Odinga 4.288 4.543 .196 .198 .629 1125(4.12, 4.447) (4.363, 4.701) (.174, .22) (.175, .22) −−
KISUMU Odinga 4.506 4.486 .352 .196 0 1026(4.319, 4.669) (4.316, 4.656) (.326, .382) (.172, .219) −−
KITUI Odinga 4.162 4.468 .196 .187 .994 1452(4.017, 4.31) (4.32, 4.615) (.175, .216) (.165, .207) −−
KWALE Odinga 4.559 4.563 .182 .203 .812 611(4.345, 4.778) (4.332, 4.799) (.151, .213) (.172, .232) −−
LAIKIPIA Odinga 3.954 4.013 .221 .209 .201 530(3.633, 4.3) (3.774, 4.255) (.187, .258) (.174, .243) −−
LAMU Odinga 4.209 4.536 .217 .193 0 166(3.787, 4.646) (4.114, 4.946) (.151, .277) (.133, .247) −−
MACHAKOS Odinga 4.493 4.527 .196 .204 .996 1331(4.339, 4.656) (4.361, 4.687) (.174, .216) (.182, .225) −−
MAKUENI Odinga 4.647 4.457 .201 .215 1 1058(4.479, 4.819) (4.272, 4.635) (.177, .224) (.189, .238) −−
Table 8: Distribution and Digit Tests, Kenya 2017 Presidential, Counties
County Name 2BL LastC P05s C05s DipT Obs
MANDERA Odinga 4.104 4.18 .182 .232 .715 400(3.805, 4.441) (3.91, 4.47) (.145, .218) (.19, .272) −−
MARSABIT Odinga 4.281 4.223 .236 .22 .178 381(3.936, 4.601) (3.932, 4.509) (.194, .276) (.178, .262) −−
MERU Odinga 4.378 4.533 .201 .194 .992 1471(4.235, 4.525) (4.391, 4.676) (.181, .221) (.174, .215) −−
MIGORI Odinga 4.273 4.384 .439 .211 0 825(4.07, 4.456) (4.194, 4.589) (.405, .473) (.184, .241) −−
MOMBASA Odinga 4.886 4.418 .212 .19 .996 933(4.695, 5.08) (4.238, 4.602) (.186, .239) (.166, .213) −−
MURANG’A Odinga 3.824 2.69 .476 .25 0 1130(3.41, 4.228) (2.552, 2.827) (.447, .504) (.223, .273) −−
NAIROBI CITY Odinga 4.259 4.515 .204 .213 .908 3377(4.165, 4.362) (4.414, 4.61) (.19, .217) (.2, .227) −−
NAKURU Odinga 3.991 4.171 .216 .21 .154 1805(3.84, 4.148) (4.04, 4.302) (.196, .233) (.192, .23) −−
NANDI Odinga 3.888 4.348 .158 .228 .993 795(3.642, 4.097) (4.156, 4.519) (.132, .185) (.196, .255) −−
NAROK Odinga 4.272 4.503 .174 .218 0 749(4.058, 4.48) (4.304, 4.704) (.148, .2) (.187, .246) −−
NYAMIRA Odinga 4.288 4.491 .205 .181 .983 552(4.042, 4.518) (4.232, 4.716) (.172, .239) (.147, .214) −−
NYANDARUA Odinga 2.714 2.381 .533 .292 0 653(1.95, 3.336) (2.202, 2.55) (.499, .568) (.257, .328) −−
NYERI Odinga 3.587 2.91 .388 .226 0 916(3.134, 4.063) (2.753, 3.059) (.356, .421) (.199, .252) −−
SAMBURU Odinga 4.39 4.562 .219 .226 .795 283(4.043, 4.73) (4.202, 4.89) (.17, .265) (.173, .276) −−
SIAYA Odinga 4.348 4.605 .339 .208 0 915(4.157, 4.532) (4.406, 4.8) (.309, .369) (.18, .234) −−
TAITA TAVETA Odinga 4.547 4.739 .187 .21 .993 353(4.213, 4.884) (4.448, 5.059) (.147, .227) (.167, .255) −−
TANA RIVER Odinga 3.812 4.248 .229 .196 0 306(3.475, 4.165) (3.902, 4.569) (.183, .275) (.15, .242) −−
THARAKA - NITHI Odinga 4.127 4.502 .189 .197 .862 624(3.829, 4.414) (4.276, 4.718) (.157, .223) (.165, .228) −−
TRANS NZOIA Odinga 3.917 4.401 .221 .212 .712 638(3.695, 4.115) (4.174, 4.618) (.19, .254) (.18, .243) −−
TURKANA Odinga 4.393 4.607 .204 .184 .992 642(4.178, 4.598) (4.365, 4.813) (.17, .238) (.153, .213) −−
UASIN GISHU Odinga 4.127 4.5 .164 .18 .261 866(3.919, 4.35) (4.319, 4.697) (.139, .188) (.155, .206) −−
VIHIGA Odinga 4.437 4.781 .203 .185 .993 547(4.194, 4.662) (4.556, 5.022) (.168, .234) (.152, .219) −−
WAJIR Odinga 4.252 4.273 .227 .208 .668 432(3.993, 4.528) (4.021, 4.56) (.188, .269) (.169, .245) −−
WEST POKOT Odinga 4.041 4.231 .174 .236 .57 711(3.829, 4.256) (4.01, 4.446) (.148, .203) (.205, .264) −−
Table 9: Candidates and “Incremental Fraud” Estimates by County
Kenyatta Odinga Kenyatta OdingaCounty p fI α fI α County p fI α fI αBaringo .85 K .003 7.4 Marsabit .84 K .014 1.7 .178 13.Bomet .87 K .000 .1 .162 11.9 Meru .89 K .000 1.3 .014 13.Bungoma .68 O .091 1.7 .014 .7 Migori .85 O .002 .5Busia .87 O .171 9.0 .008 .8 Mombasa .70 O .005 2.9 .011 3.1Elgeyo/Marakwet .95 K .002 .9 .047 12. Murang’a .98 K 0 —Embu .92 K .003 8.8 Nairobi City .51 O .053 .5 0 —Garissa .48 K .008 .9 .08 1.1 Nakuru .85 K .044 .6 .237 6.7Homa Bay .99 O .006 1.7 Nandi .87 K .000 5.1Isiolo .49 K .013 1.1 .077 10.0 Narok .53 K .001 4.9 .065 .6Kajiado .57 K .004 .8 .004 1.7 Nyamira .52 K .005 1.5 .008 1.6Kakamega .87 O .044 5.6 .002 1.6 Nyandarua .99 K .001 .5Kericho .93 K 0 — Nyeri .98 K .002 .3Kiambu .93 K .001 .9 .251 14. Samburu .50 K .006 .2 .014 1.1Kilifi .84 O .101 7.8 .012 3.2 Siaya .99 OKirinyaga .99 K 0 — Taita Taveta .71 O .027 3.7 .012 1.7Kisii .55 O .005 1.2 .006 1.4 Tana River .52 O .026 .1 0 —Kisumu .98 O .002 .8 Tharaka - Nithi .93 K .000 1.4 .037 13.Kitui .80 O .124 10. .003 4.4 Trans Nzoia .54 O .135 .8 .004 2.7Kwale .75 O .145 4.2 .005 1.6 Turkana .54 O .052 1.3 .026 .9Laikipia .89 K .004 2.0 Uasin Gishu .78 K .026 .6 .354 6.6Lamu .49 O .327 4.5 .014 .7 Vihiga .90 O .100 4.3 .015 1.1Machakos .81 O .047 3.2 .002 .8 Wajir .51 K .030 1.2 .014 1.7Makueni .91 O .042 9.3 .001 2.0 West Pokot .65 K .001 13. .001 13.Mandera .83 K 0 — .098 10. Prisons .54 O 0 — .000 1.4
Note: n = 40818 polling stations. County- and candidate-specific estimates of parameters(fI and α) of the finite mixture model (Mebane 2016). p reports the proportion of votes forthe candidate with the most votes in each county and identifies that county-leader byinitital (“K” for “Kenyatta” and “O” for “Odinga”). Blank parameters could not beestimted.
Table 10: Estimated Numbers of Votes Due to “Incremental Fraud”
County Kenyatta Odinga County Kenyatta OdingaBaringo 17 — Marsabit 79 810Bomet 0 1537 Meru 0 221Bungoma 1456 362 Migori — 73Busia 1573 101 Mombasa 56 297Elgeyo/Marakwet 0 491 Murang’a 0 —Embu 36 — Nairobi City 17601 0Garissa 918 896 Nakuru 2966 3602Homa Bay — 26 Nandi 0 —Isiolo 1 238 Narok 6 3706Kajiado 155 139 Nyamira 56 144Kakamega 583 24 Nyandarua 2 —Kericho 0 — Nyeri 0 —Kiambu 0 6327 Samburu 136 127Kilifi 1517 277 Siaya — —Kirinyaga 0 — Taita Taveta 165 56Kisii 91 86 Tana River 779 0Kisumu — 0 Tharaka - Nithi 0 273Kitui 1110 16 Trans Nzoia 1810 39Kwale 1550 598 Turkana 490 372Laikipia 0 — Uasin Gishu 347 3421Lamu 1987 89 Vihiga 451 0Machakos 248 0 Wajir 417 184Makueni 284 5 West Pokot 18 19Mandera 0 534 Prisons 0 1
Total 36907 25093
Note: expected counts of votes in each county due to “incremental fraud” based on county-and candidate-specific estimates of the finite mixture model (Mebane 2016). Estimates forthe candidate with the most votes in each county is highlighted in grey. “—” indicates avalue that could not be calculated because the model could not be estimated.
Table 11: Vote Proportions and “Incremental Fraud”Vote Proportions
Votes “Frauds” Votes “Frauds”County Keny. Odin. Keny. Odin. County Keny. Odin. Keny. Odin.
Baringo .849 .146 .00009 — Marsabit .836 .145 .00071 .00742Bomet .870 .121 .00000 .00586 Meru .889 .103 .00000 .00041Bungoma .302 .681 .00342 .00085 Migori .142 .853 — .00023Busia .124 .868 .00573 .00036 Mombasa .291 .699 .00016 .00087Elgeyo/Marakwet .947 .048 .00000 .00325 Murang’a .979 .018 .00000 —Embu .922 .070 .00014 — Nairobi City .485 .510 .01075 .00000Garissa .483 .483 .00810 .00795 Nakuru .848 .148 .00392 .00476Homa Bay .005 .993 — .00006 Nandi .868 .126 .00000 —Isiolo .493 .350 .00002 .00456 Narok .531 .461 .00002 .01309Kajiado .571 .425 .00048 .00043 Nyamira .521 .465 .00027 .00071Kakamega .115 .874 .00105 .00004 Nyandarua .990 .008 .00001 —Kericho .928 .065 .00000 — Nyeri .984 .012 .00000 —Kiambu .927 .070 .00000 .00641 Samburu .496 .495 .00212 .00202Kilifi .152 .836 .00465 .00085 Siaya .007 .991 — —Kirinyaga .986 .010 .00000 — Taita Taveta .277 .710 .00151 .00052Kisii .432 .554 .00023 .00021 Tana River .462 .521 .00899 .00000Kisumu .018 .979 — .00000 Tharaka - Nithi .932 .059 .00000 .00156Kitui .180 .799 .00311 .00004 Trans Nzoia .445 .544 .00734 .00015Kwale .237 .750 .00842 .00321 Turkana .449 .541 .00375 .00283Laikipia .891 .105 .00000 — Uasin Gishu .782 .212 .00101 .01000Lamu .490 .493 .03967 .00183 Vihiga .091 .896 .00226 .00000Machakos .176 .809 .00052 .00000 Wajir .511 .443 .00349 .00155Makueni .083 .906 .00086 .00002 West Pokot .648 .344 .00013 .00012Mandera .830 .133 .00000 .00391 Prisons .457 .536 .00000 .00029
Note: proportion of valid votes for each candidate and expected votes in each county due to“incremental fraud” expressed as proportions of the valid votes in each county. “—” indicates avalue that could not be calculated because the model could not be estimated.
Figure 1: Turnout and Kenyatta and Odinga Vote Proportions: Empirical Densities
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
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Kenya 2017
proportion
dens
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Legend: solid black line, turnout; blue dashed line, Kenyatta; red dotted line, Odinga.Note: empirical densities using 40,818 polling stations from across Kenya. Vote count datascraped from ... on August 23, 2017. Eligible voter data from ....
Figure 2: Turnout and Kenyatta and Odinga Vote Proportions: Empirical Densities
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Kenya 2017: BARINGO 030
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Kenya 2017: BOMET 036
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Kenya 2017: BUNGOMA 039
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Kenya 2017: BUSIA 040
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Kenya 2017: ELGEYO/MARAKWET 028
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Kenya 2017: EMBU 014
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Kenya 2017: GARISSA 007
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Kenya 2017: HOMA BAY 043
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Kenya 2017: ISIOLO 011
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Kenya 2017: KAJIADO 034
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Kenya 2017: KAKAMEGA 037
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Kenya 2017: KERICHO 035
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Figure 3: Turnout and Kenyatta and Odinga Vote Proportions: Empirical Densities
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
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Kenya 2017: KIAMBU 022
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Kenya 2017: KILIFI 003
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Kenya 2017: KIRINYAGA 020
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Kenya 2017: KISII 045
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ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
010
2030
4050
Kenya 2017: KISUMU 042
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
8
Kenya 2017: KITUI 015
proportionde
nsity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
45
67
Kenya 2017: KWALE 002
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
8
Kenya 2017: LAIKIPIA 031
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
4
Kenya 2017: LAMU 005
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
8
Kenya 2017: MACHAKOS 016
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
810
Kenya 2017: MAKUENI 017
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
45
Kenya 2017: MANDERA 009
proportion
dens
ity
Figure 4: Turnout and Kenyatta and Odinga Vote Proportions: Empirical Densities
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
45
Kenya 2017: MARSABIT 010
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
8
Kenya 2017: MERU 012
proportion
dens
ity0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
810
Kenya 2017: MIGORI 044
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
45
67
Kenya 2017: MOMBASA 001
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
020
4060
Kenya 2017: MURANG'A 021
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
45
67
Kenya 2017: NAIROBI CITY 047
proportionde
nsity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
45
67
Kenya 2017: NAKURU 032
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
810
12
Kenya 2017: NANDI 029
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
45
Kenya 2017: NAROK 033
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
8
Kenya 2017: NYAMIRA 046
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
020
4060
80
Kenya 2017: NYANDARUA 018
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
010
2030
4050
60
Kenya 2017: NYERI 019
proportion
dens
ity
Figure 5: Turnout and Kenyatta and Odinga Vote Proportions: Empirical Densities
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
4
Kenya 2017: SAMBURU 025
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
020
4060
80
Kenya 2017: SIAYA 041
proportion
dens
ity0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
Kenya 2017: TAITA TAVETA 006
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
4
Kenya 2017: TANA RIVER 004
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
810
12
Kenya 2017: THARAKA − NITHI 013
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
8
Kenya 2017: TRANS NZOIA 026
proportionde
nsity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
Kenya 2017: TURKANA 023
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
45
67
Kenya 2017: UASIN GISHU 027
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
810
Kenya 2017: VIHIGA 038
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
01
23
4
Kenya 2017: WAJIR 008
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
02
46
Kenya 2017: WEST POKOT 024
proportion
dens
ity
Figure 6: Turnout and Kenyatta and Odinga Vote Proportions: Empirical Densities
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
05
1015
2025
Kenya 2017: DIASPORA 048
proportion
dens
ity
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
Kenya 2017: PRISONS 049
proportion
dens
ity
Figure 7: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.40
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017. n = 40818 polling stations.
Figure 8: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test0
500
1000
1500
Kenya 2017: BARINGO
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.40
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
0
Kenya 2017: BOMET
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
200
250
300
Kenya 2017: BUNGOMA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.29
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: BUSIA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.67
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
0012
00
Kenya 2017: ELGEYO/MARAKWET
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.36
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: EMBU
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.41
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: GARISSA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
0040
0060
0080
0012
000
Kenya 2017: HOMA BAY
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: ISIOLO
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.45
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
200
250
Kenya 2017: KAJIADO
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.14
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: KAKAMEGA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.29
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: KERICHO
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017.
Figure 9: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Kenya 2017: KIAMBU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
0
Kenya 2017: KILIFI
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
0020
00
Kenya 2017: KIRINYAGA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
200
250
Kenya 2017: KISII
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.55
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
0040
0060
0080
00
Kenya 2017: KISUMU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 5.67
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
200
250
300
Kenya 2017: KITUI
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.07
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: KWALE
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
00
Kenya 2017: LAIKIPIA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.90
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: LAMU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 2.27
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
200
250
300
Kenya 2017: MACHAKOS
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.14
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
0
Kenya 2017: MAKUENI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: MANDERA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017.
Figure 10: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test0
500
1000
1500
Kenya 2017: MARSABIT
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
0
Kenya 2017: MERU
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.34
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
0040
0060
0080
0010
000
Kenya 2017: MIGORI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 4.16
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
200
250
300
Kenya 2017: MOMBASA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.89
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
0020
0030
00
Kenya 2017: MURANG'A
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.43
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
4060
8010
012
0
Kenya 2017: NAIROBI CITY
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.30
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: NAKURU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
060
070
0
Kenya 2017: NANDI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.09
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
200
250
300
Kenya 2017: NAROK
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.30
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: NYAMIRA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.26
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
0020
0030
0040
0050
00
Kenya 2017: NYANDARUA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 2.22
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
0020
0025
0030
00
Kenya 2017: NYERI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.45
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017.
Figure 11: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test0
100
200
300
400
500
Kenya 2017: SAMBURU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.27
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
0040
0060
00
Kenya 2017: SIAYA
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
0
Kenya 2017: TAITA TAVETA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.03
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
00
Kenya 2017: TANA RIVER
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 2.39
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
00
Kenya 2017: THARAKA − NITHI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
200
250
300
350
Kenya 2017: TRANS NZOIA
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.90
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
060
070
0
Kenya 2017: TURKANA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: UASIN GISHU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.63
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
060
070
0
Kenya 2017: VIHIGA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.28
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: WAJIR
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.70
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
0
Kenya 2017: WEST POKOT
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.36
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017.
Figure 12: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test, Unproblematic Form 34B0
500
1000
1500
Kenya 2017: BARINGO
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.34
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: BOMET
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
0
Kenya 2017: BUNGOMA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.60
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
060
0
Kenya 2017: BUSIA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.21
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
0012
0014
00
Kenya 2017: ELGEYO/MARAKWET
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
00
Kenya 2017: EMBU
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.24
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: GARISSA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
0040
0060
0080
0012
000
Kenya 2017: HOMA BAY
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
00
Kenya 2017: ISIOLO
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: KAJIADO
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.19
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
060
0
Kenya 2017: KAKAMEGA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: KERICHO
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.28
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017. Using polling stations not in a constituency with a problematic form 34B.
Figure 13: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test, Unproblematic Form 34B0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
Kenya 2017: KIAMBU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.07
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: KILIFI
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 1.27
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
00
Kenya 2017: KIRINYAGA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
200
Kenya 2017: KISII
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.56
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
0040
0060
0080
0010
000
Kenya 2017: KISUMU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: KITUI
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: KWALE
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
00
Kenya 2017: LAIKIPIA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.90
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
00
Kenya 2017: LAMU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 2.40
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
200
250
300
Kenya 2017: MACHAKOS
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.32
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
060
0
Kenya 2017: MAKUENI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
0012
00
Kenya 2017: MANDERA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017. Using polling stations not in a constituency with a problematic form 34B.
Figure 14: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test, Unproblematic Form 34B0
500
1000
1500
Kenya 2017: MARSABIT
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: MERU
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.09
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
0040
0060
0080
0010
000
1200
0
Kenya 2017: MIGORI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 2.24
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: MOMBASA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.22
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
0020
0025
0030
00
Kenya 2017: MURANG'A
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.17
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
Kenya 2017: NAIROBI CITY
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: NAKURU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: NANDI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.05
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
200
250
Kenya 2017: NAROK
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.30
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
060
0
Kenya 2017: NYAMIRA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 3.14
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
0020
0030
0040
0050
00
Kenya 2017: NYANDARUA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
0020
0025
00
Kenya 2017: NYERI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.23
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017. Using polling stations not in a constituency with a problematic form 34B.
Figure 15: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test, Unproblematic Form 34B0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
Kenya 2017: SAMBURU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.01
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
0040
0060
0080
00
Kenya 2017: SIAYA
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
0
Kenya 2017: TAITA TAVETA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
00
Kenya 2017: TANA RIVER
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: THARAKA − NITHI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: TRANS NZOIA
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.48
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: TURKANA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.60
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
060
0
Kenya 2017: UASIN GISHU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.24
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
060
070
0
Kenya 2017: VIHIGA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.28
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
00
Kenya 2017: WAJIR
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 2.91
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: WEST POKOT
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.22
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
0020
0030
0040
0050
00
Kenya 2017: PRISONS
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 4.97
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017. Using polling stations not in a constituency with a problematic form 34B.
Figure 16: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test, Problematic Form 34B0
500
1000
1500
Kenya 2017: BARINGO
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: BOMET
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
0
Kenya 2017: BUNGOMA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.64
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
0
Kenya 2017: BUSIA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.56
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
0012
0014
00
Kenya 2017: EMBU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
0040
0060
0080
0010
000
Kenya 2017: HOMA BAY
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
0
Kenya 2017: KAJIADO
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
0
Kenya 2017: KAKAMEGA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.26
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
0020
00
Kenya 2017: KERICHO
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
0020
00
Kenya 2017: KIAMBU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 2.67
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
0012
00
Kenya 2017: KILIFI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
0020
0030
0040
0050
00
Kenya 2017: KISUMU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.42
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017. Using polling stations in a constituency with a problematic form 34B.
Figure 17: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test, Problematic Form 34B0
200
400
600
800
1000
Kenya 2017: KITUI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: KWALE
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
0020
0025
00
Kenya 2017: LAMU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 2.26
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
0012
0014
00
Kenya 2017: MACHAKOS
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.60
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: MAKUENI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.24
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
0012
00
Kenya 2017: MANDERA
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: MERU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.89
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
0012
00
Kenya 2017: MIGORI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 2.32
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
0
Kenya 2017: MOMBASA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 2.88
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
100
150
Kenya 2017: NAIROBI CITY
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.74
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
00
Kenya 2017: NAKURU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
0012
0014
00
Kenya 2017: NANDI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017. Using polling stations in a constituency with a problematic form 34B.
Figure 18: Kenyatta Vote Percentages: Spikes Test, Problematic Form 34B0
100
200
300
400
500
Kenya 2017: NYAMIRA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
0040
0060
0080
00
Kenya 2017: NYANDARUA
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
0020
0030
0040
0050
00
Kenya 2017: NYERI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
040
060
080
010
0012
00
Kenya 2017: SAMBURU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
020
0040
0060
0080
00
Kenya 2017: SIAYA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
00
Kenya 2017: TANA RIVER
Vote−shareD
ensi
ty
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
050
010
0015
00
Kenya 2017: THARAKA − NITHI
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
0
Kenya 2017: TRANS NZOIA
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.65
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
060
0
Kenya 2017: UASIN GISHU
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
050
0
Kenya 2017: WAJIR
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 1.90
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
010
020
030
040
0
Kenya 2017: WEST POKOT
Vote−share
Den
sity
F = 0.00
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
Note: Vote shares are the proportion of valid votes for Kenyatta. Vote count data scrapedon 23aug2017. Using polling stations in a constituency with a problematic form 34B.