ANNUAL REVIEW OF lobal Peace Operations · 2015-04-29 · Democratic Republic of the Congo) 231 7.10 UNAMSIL (UN Mission in Sierra Leone) 242 7.11 UNMIK (UN Interim Administration

Global Peace Operations

A N N U A L R E V I E W O F

2006

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This volume is a product of the Center on International Cooperation (CIC) Evolution of Multi-lateral Security Institutions project. The CIC is an independent institution housed at New YorkUniversity.

Project Team

VOLUME EDITOR AND LEAD SCHOLAR

Ian Johnstone

SERIES EDITOR

Bruce D. Jones

SERIES COORDINATOR

Richard Gowan

PUBLICATION CONSULTANT

Lisa Molinelli

CONTRIBUTORS

Rahul Chandran, Feryal Cherif, Craig Collins, Gillian Cull, Humayun Hamidzada, Kristina Jeffers, Carol McQueen, Barnett Rubin, Cornelia Schneider, Tomas Valasek

The project’s Advisory Board is composed of Lakhdar Brahimi, Jayantha Dhanapala, RosarioGreen, Funmi Olonisakin, John Ruggie, and Sir Rupert Smith. The CIC is grateful for theiradvice and support.

The Center on International Cooperation is solely responsible for the content of this publica-tion. Any errors of fact or interpretation, and any and all judgments and interpretations aboutmissions and operations discussed herein, are those of the CIC alone.

This project was undertaken at the request of and with the support of the Best Practices Sec-tion of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations.

Additional support for the project was provided by the International Peace Academy.

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Global Peace Operations

A N N U A L R E V I E W O F

A PROJECT OF THECenter on International Cooperation

2006

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Published in the United States of America in 2006 byLynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom byLynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.3 Henrietta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8LU

© 2006 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

ISBN: 1-58826-441-6

Printed and bound in Canada

The paper used in this publication meets the requirementsof the American National Standard for Permanence ofPaper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

5 4 3 2 1

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Foreword, Jean-Marie Guéhenno viiPreface, Bruce D. Jones ixMap of Peace Operations, 2005 xivList of Mission Acronyms xvi

1 Dilemmas of Robust Peace Operations, Ian Johnstone 1

2 Kosovo: In Search of a Public Order Strategy, Richard Gowan 19

3 Mission ReviewsReverse chronological order based on start date of operation 33

3.1 Sudan (UNMIS and AMIS) 343.2 Haiti (MINUSTAH) 413.3 Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI and Operation Licorne) 483.4 Liberia (UNMIL) 543.5 Timor-Leste (UNMISET/UNOTIL) 613.6 Afghanistan (ISAF and UNAMA) 673.7 Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) 73

4 Mission Notes 81Reverse chronological order based on start date of operation

4.1 Aceh, Indonesia (EU and ASEAN countries) 824.2 Mindanao, Philippines (IMT) 844.3 Burundi (ONUB) 864.4 Iraq (MNF-I, NTM-I) 894.5 Central African Republic (FOMUC) 924.6 Sri Lanka (SLMM) 954.7 Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 974.8 Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) 1004.9 Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) 1024.10 Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR, EUPM, OSCE, NATO HQ Sarajevo) 1054.11 Abkhazia-Georgia (UNOMIG, CIS) 1114.12 South Ossetia–Georgia (CIS) 1144.13 Moldova–Trans-Dniester (CIS) 1164.14 Western Sahara (MINURSO) 118

v

Contents

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4.15 Middle East, Non-UN Operations (MFO Sinai, TIPH 2) 1204.16 Cyprus (UNFICYP) 1224.17 India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) 1254.18 Middle East, UN Operations (UNTSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL) 127

5 Global Statistics on UN Missions 131

6 Global Statistics on Non-UN Missions 151

7 UN Mission-by-Mission Statistics 161Reverse chronological order based on start date of operation

7.1 UNOTIL (UN Office in Timor-Leste) 1657.2 UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan) 1737.3 ONUB (UN Operation in Burundi) 1817.4 MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti) 1897.5 UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire) 1967.6 UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia) 2047.7 UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan) 2157.8 UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea) 2217.9 MONUC (UN Organization Mission in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo) 2317.10 UNAMSIL (UN Mission in Sierra Leone) 2427.11 UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo) 2537.12 UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia) 2627.13 MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) 2687.14 UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon) 2757.15 UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus) 2837.16 UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force) 2917.17 UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan) 2997.18 UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization) 304

Index 311About the Book 317

vi • CONTENTS

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The past year has been an extraordinary one forUN peace operations. It has seen majorprogress in our collective efforts to roll backarmed conflict in the world, and to give peoplesemerging from war the chance to decide theirpolitical futures.

In Afghanistan, the United Nations sup-ported the country’s first-ever fully democraticparliamentary elections, marking another majorstep forward in the implementation of the BonnAgreement mediated by Lakhdar Brahimi in2001. In Burundi, UN peacekeepers presidedover both a constitutional referendum and fullelection, leading to the peaceful transfer ofpower to a new government. In Congo, withrobust support from UN peacekeepers, votersendorsed a constitution, opening the door to fullelection in 2006. In Liberia, peacekeepers over-saw elections that produced Africa’s first demo-cratically elected woman president.

Troops have been withdrawn from twomore operations, their work accomplished. Thelast UN troops left Timor-Leste in May, five-and-a-half years after Sergio Vieira de Melloestablished the Transitional Administration thatpreceded full independence. UN troops leftSierra Leone in November, having providedsecurity for two rounds of elections and anextensive program of disarmament, demobi-lization, and reintegration.

Yet despite these dramatic advances, con-cerns remain. The first is that many of the

countries in which we operate—even those inwhich operations have moved forward success-fully—remain potentially unstable, and somecould even relapse into conflict if we are notvigilant. The new Peacebuilding Commissionshould strengthen our efforts in this regard, if itreceives the support it needs to do its work.

Another concern is with the peacekeepingsystem itself. In 2004, it was marred by accusa-tions of sexual exploitation and abuse, and Ihave worked with member states in 2005 to putin place systems that should allow us to preventfurther abuse, and to identify and punish anyabuses that continue to occur. These effortshave produced some important results, butmore needs to be done to strengthen the institu-tion of peacekeeping and to ensure that anytype of abuse is dealt with effectively.

Both of these issues, although so distinct inmany ways, highlight the need for a betterinformed debate on peacekeeping and peace-building, on the need for greater transparency,and on the need for greater accountability. It istherefore a pleasure to welcome this first AnnualReview of Global Peace Operations as a majorcontribution to our understanding of this crucialarea in international affairs, and especially inputting detailed data on peacekeeping in thepublic domain. I look forward to future editionsof the review, and hope that they will bothrecord and contribute to the evolution of newapproaches to making and securing peace.

vii

Foreword

Jean-Marie GuéhennoUnder-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations

United Nations

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Why Peacekeeping Matters

The start of the twenty-first century has seenthe resurgence of peacekeeping as a strategictool. After a slump in the mid-1990s follow-ing failures in Bosnia and Rwanda, the Secu-rity Council authorized ambitious new mis-sions in Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Sierra Leone,and the Democratic Republic of Congo—thefirst in a new generation of operations thathave driven the expansion of the UN’s goalsand capacities. In 1998 the UN deployed14,000 peacekeepers worldwide—today over90,000 military and civilians are in the field.Meanwhile, NATO has deployed outsideEurope to lead an operation in Afghanistan,and the European Union has reached beyondits traditional role to mount missions in theBalkans, Africa, and Asia.

And while peacekeeping has sufferedmany setbacks, it has also scored strategicsuccesses: the end of violence in war-tornLiberia, the creation of a free and independentstate in Timor-Leste after thirty years of occu-pation, the consolidation of peace in SierraLeone after a decade of civil war, and the firstpeaceful transition in Burundi’s history afterviolence that claimed more than 200,000lives. Working together, the UN, NATO, andUS forces in Afghanistan have overseen theinstallation of a democratic government andthe ratification of a constitution after twodecades of war, collapse, and autocracy.

Thus, peace operations are evolving into apractical international policy tool for endingwar. When it works, peacekeeping saves livesand creates stability and the possibility of eco-

nomic recovery. It can generate, or at least facil-itate, democratic transformation. In 2005, mis-sions of the UN Department of PeacekeepingOperations oversaw or assisted in referendumsand elections in countries with populationstotaling over 100 million people. And as pollsfrom the Balkans to Iraq have demonstrated,this political dimension of peace operations canhelp resolve conflicts of global strategic impor-tance. In short, peacekeeping matters. But thisis frequently obscured by partial failures, ineffi-ciencies, and scandals.

That peace operations sometimes fail isbeyond question. Indeed, several of the UN’sgreatest failures have been in places wherepeacekeeping missions have been deployed—in Rwanda, in Angola, and elsewhere. But theUN has not been alone in experiencing trou-bles: the US failure in Somalia shaped thestrategic culture of the Clinton years, whileboth NATO and the EU have learned hardlessons in the Western Balkans—these oper-ations reveal weaknesses in organizationsostensibly more capable and certainly morepowerful than the UN.

Moreover, even when peace operationsrecord successes at a strategic level, they areoften marred by a variety of forms of ineffi-ciency and misbehavior. Most noxious hasbeen the exposure of apparently widespreadsexual exploitation by UN and other peace-keepers. Financial abuses and other misdeedshave marred past operations.

But whereas some critics have arguedthat such scandals and failures mean that weshould scrap multinational peace operations,a full examination of the record suggests a

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different conclusion: that making UN peace-keeping work well—work effectively, effi-ciently, and predictably—should be central tothe international security agenda.

Study after study has shown that theexpansion of peace operations in the 1990smade a vital contribution to the overalldecline in the level of war in the world. Asthe recent Human Security Report found,civil wars have declined by almost 40 percentsince the early 1990s, and UN peace opera-tions, along with regional operations, are animportant contributor to this trend.1 The UN’sHigh-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, andChange referred to the impact of UN media-tion and peacekeeping on the decline in thelevel of wars as “nothing less than a seachange in global governance.”2

If peacekeeping is of strategic value forthe international management of conflict,then it matters that it works, and works well.It matters that peacekeeping resources aredeployed effectively and efficiently to meetclear, credible policy objectives. This is allthe more important when we realize that cur-rent patterns in civil conflict mean that thereis every reason to believe that the demand foreffective peacekeeping will rise, not shrink,in the years ahead.

Indeed, the surge in UN peacekeepingfrom 1999—which has intensified since2002—is already straining the capacity of theorganization. It is striking to note that the UNis now the second largest mover of militarypersonnel in the world, after the US armedforces. Either peacekeeping capacity will bestrengthened, new peace operations will bemounted effectively, and wars will beresolved or averted, or we will fail thesetests, and lives will be lost, wars will spread,and regions will be destabilized.

* * *

The argument that peacekeeping is of strate-gic value and must be made to work welldoes not necessarily mean that UN peace-keeping alone must be bolstered. Indeed, as

the Center on International Cooperation(CIC) has argued elsewhere and as the UNHigh-level Panel stressed, it is likely that thedemand for peacekeeping will best be metthrough a strategic partnership between theUN and regional organizations.3 More andmore operations comprise so-called hybridmissions—part UN, part non-UN—and in2005 the African Union’s cooperation withthe UN, EU, and NATO in Darfur demon-strated how complex this can be. Earlier les-sons for hybrid missions are addressed inChapter 2, Richard Gowan’s analysis of theUN, NATO, and the alphabet soup of otherorganizations that collectively constitute theinternational presence in Kosovo.

But UN participation in hybrid peace-keeping is critical—and, contrary to conven-tional wisdom, rising in scale and scope. Timeand again we have seen that efforts to managecivil wars exclusively through regional or adhoc arrangements fall short on two counts:they are often no more efficient and no moreeffective than the UN alternative, and theyface major hurdles in the search for legitimacy.

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, US forceshave turned to the UN to assist in constitu-tional and electoral processes necessary to thesuccess of those missions. And in Africa,notwithstanding the new energy of the AfricanUnion, UN peace operations remain critical tothe maintenance of peace and security on thatcontinent. Globally, the numbers of peace-keeping troops fielded by the UN and otherinternational organizations have now con-verged to near parity (although their com-bined deployments still represent less thantwo-thirds of the multinational force in Iraq).

Irrespective, making peacekeeping workbetter, both at the UN and beyond, is animportant policy objective—not least becauseit is now a multibillion-dollar annual exercise,with approximately $5 billion a year beingspent through the UN alone.4 And to do so weneed to know as much as we can about whatmakes peacekeeping efficient and what makesit effective. These are to be the primarythemes of this series of annual reviews.

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If you want efficient peacekeeping, youhave to be concerned with nuts and bolts.Questions of logistics, of planning, and ofdeployment capacity matter critically to out-comes. These are not glamorous issues. Butas the world saw while watching its mostpowerful army struggle with supply-chainissues during the war in Iraq, logistics matter,planning matters, and deployment matters.

In September 2005, the UN World Sum-mit (covered in more detail on page 6) madesome progress in addressing such issues ofeffectiveness through three key policy initia-tives:

1. The establishment of a standingpolice capacity within the UN, able to assesspolice and public order dimensions of peaceoperations.

2. A ten-year project to build the capaci-ties of regional and subregional organizationsin Africa, and develop effective coordinationbetween them and the UN.

3. An ambiguous recognition of the needfor “rapidly deployable capacities” to rein-force peace operations—without a clear planfor their development.

None of these initiatives can be translatedin concrete successes without reference totechnical, strategic, and doctrinal issuesaddressed in this volume. The standing policecapacity will prove impotent unless it is sus-tained by planning cooperation and deploy-able personnel from member states. Politicalconsensus on the need to build African capac-ities must be supplemented with a portfolio ofprograms to ensure a high standard of techni-cal and doctrinal interoperability with the UN,NATO, and the EU.

Last, the recognition for the need forrapid deployable capacities must not beallowed to succumb to either inaction or fan-tasies of a “UN army.” Rather, it is in theinterest of both the UN and major contributorsthat states should hold some forces at readi-ness to insert or reinforce missions as quicklyas possible—48 hours to 1 week. The data

sections of this review offer insights into howdeployments have been rolled out in the past,and the types of units, troops, and matèrielmost required in the field.

If those countries that supply personneland financing to UN missions are to promotebetter technical cooperation in the future, theymay turn to this data for lessons. However,they should also make efforts to build mutualtransparency and trust over their own peace-keeping resources and doctrines.

Transparency and trust cannot be fosteredthrough better technical collaboration alone.No issue is more critical to the coherence andsuccess of a mission than consensus on theuse and nonuse of force. Whether in the con-text of military or unconventional threats, thequestion of how troops and police use theircapacity to deter or respond to threat remaincrucial to their effectiveness. This is thetheme of Chapter 1 of this volume, in whichIan Johnstone explores the dilemmas of robustpeace operations.

Annual Review Series

This volume—and the series it launches—has its genesis in a request from the UNDepartment of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO) to the CIC to study the history ofUN peacekeeping deployments. The issue ismore complex than first meets the eye.Deployment has many elements: How fast isa force commander appointed? How quicklydoes the first troop contingent arrive? Howmany days, weeks, or months after beingmandated does the force reach full strength?What are the differences in deployment timeframes for differently equipped forces, and indifferent regions?

What was striking at the outset of this proj-ect was how little of such data were publiclyavailable. In response, this volume presents, par-ticularly in its mission-by-mission data tables,more comprehensive data on current UN peace-keeping than has ever been made available.With these data tables, governments and ana-

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lysts will have a clearer picture of the multifac-eted challenge of UN peacekeeping deployment.

The present annual volume does not yetgive all of the data necessary to answer theDPKO’s original question. For this first publi-cation, we have focused on extracting data oncurrent UN peacekeeping operations. For datathat are comparatively easy to extract—namelyfor operations mandated since 1999—we haveprovided a significant amount on variousaspects of deployment. (Additional data will bemade available at the website for this series.)Over the next two years, we will work back-ward, toward compiling a full, comparable dataset for all UN missions from 1948 onward. Wewill also be working over the next two years toassemble data on non-UN operations. To judgeUN performance, it is not enough to judgeagainst its own past; we need also to compareUN and non-UN missions to measure their rel-ative performance. It is much harder, however,to extract data on non-UN missions—a notablefact, especially given the political pressure onthe UN to be more open and more transparent.Here, we have been very fortunate to receivethe support of the Stockholm InternationalPeace Research Institute (SIPRI), whose workin this area is well known. We hope to build onthis in future editions.

Credit for this must first be given to UNUnder-Secretary-General Jean Marie Guéhennoand his Director of Change Management (andat the project’s conception, Head of Best Prac-tices), David Harland. They have consistentlysupported the process of producing this reviewand facilitated our ability to do what in the pastwas not always intrinsic to UN Secretariat cul-ture: expose the workings of the system toopen analysis—because, over time, accounta-bility breeds better performance.

The importance of transparency andaccountability in UN operations was a centralmessage of the UN’s investigation into themanagement failures that arose in the contextof the oil-for-food program. The report of theVolcker Commission has as its second recom-mendation: “Relevant departments within theSecretariat should be encouraged to continue

development of ‘institutional knowledge’ and‘best practices’ as they relate to typical areasof United Nations involvement.”5 DPKO’ssupport of our annual review will constitutean important step toward meeting this chal-lenge.

What Follows

Though the data tables are the heart of thestory, this volume provides four things more. Itstarts with a chapter on the dilemmas of robustpeace operations—an issue of growing impor-tance and continued policy interest. It contin-ues with an examination of the difficultiesencountered by the hybrid international pres-ence in Kosovo, where even what must be con-sidered the most robust peacekeeping missionin recent history (crudely measured in terms ofmilitary punch per citizen and per square mile)had difficulty matching its military, police, andpolitical resources to the political and securitychallenges it confronted. Then come sevenstudies of missions of particular interest during2005—of interest either because they shedlight on the theme of robust peacekeeping, orbecause they were starting up, winding down,or being significantly transformed during thatyear. Finally, brief mission notes on all currentUN and non-UN missions are provided—thesenotes are in no way meant to be comprehen-sive, but collectively give the reader an over-view of the peacekeeping landscape.

A more comprehensive set of data tablesare available at http://www.cic.nyu.edu. Clickon “Annual review of global peace operations.”

Acknowledgments

The CIC would like to acknowledge the sup-port of a wide range of people who made thisvolume possible. First and foremost, ourthanks go to DPKO—particularly David Har-land, Fatemeh Ziai, Renata Dwan, Paul Keat-ing, Roxaneh Bazergan, Edward Rees, TaniaBelisle-Leclerc, Maitri Morarji, MichaelMesina, Jennifer Holt, and Edna Dela Cruz ofthe Peacekeeping Best Practices Section for

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PREFACE • xiii

their support and cooperation. Thanks are alsodue to Salman Ahmed and Nick Birnback inthe Office of the Under-Secretary-General.

We would not have been able to conductour research and bring together the data with-out the cooperation and goodwill of manymembers of DPKO’s Military Planning Ser-vice, Police Division, Office of Operations,and Office of Mission Support, who assistedwith maps and provided financial, logistical,and personnel information. Outside DPKO,we also received help from staff of the Peace-keeping Financing Division, the Contribu-tions Service, and the Peacekeeping AccountsSection, all within the Office of ProgrammePlanning, Budget and Accounts. All gavepatiently of their time, despite being tremen-dously overburdened (whereas NATO hasover 1,000 staff in its military planning divi-sion alone, the UN has 57 military plannerssupporting 18 operations).

The desk officers for Haiti and Kosovo—Andrew Grene, Marco Bianchini, Emma Shi-taka, and Dmitry Shlapachenko—generouslyfacilitated our field research on those mis-sions. Special thanks to Ayaka Suzuki in Port-au-Prince and Theresa Pirkl and EvlianaBerani in Pristina for their advice and assis-tance in making that research worthwhile.

We would also like to thank the team atthe International Peace Academy who sup-ported our project, particularly Ernst Felber-bauer, Amy Scott, and Jennifer Gregoire.

We are very grateful to Alyson Bailes of

SIPRI for her enthusiasm for sharing data withus, and to Sharon Wiharta for collecting it thor-oughly and promptly. Colonel Christopher Lang-ton of the IISS likewise responded positively andgenerously to our request for assistance.

A wide variety of colleagues commentedon our work, and thanks are due especially toShepard Forman, Catherine Bellamy, AndrewMack, Catherine Guicherd, Iain Smailes,Stephen Smith, Victoria Holt, Susan Finch,Stephen Dewer, Andrew Sherriff, RichardPonzio, Sébastien Falletti, Laura Sitea, SarahAtwood, and Benjamin Cary Tortolani.

We are particularly grateful to our funders.The Ford Foundation, which generously sup-ports CIC, continues to prove through itsefforts the value of research and independentpolicy analysis in promoting internationalpeace and security. The United Kingdom’sGlobal Conflict Prevention Pool, through theircommitment to the UN’s core mission andtheir support for our work, make it possible forus to ensure that our research and policy workis relevant and accessible to decisionmakers.

Last, I would like to extend my personalthanks to Ian Johnstone of the FletcherSchool of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts Univer-sity, who took part-time leave to join the CICas a visiting fellow and to shepherd this firstvolume from conception to completion. Hislong experience at the UN, combined with hisstrong academic credentials, was invaluable,and gave us the intellectual leadership to pro-duce this volume.

Notes1. See page 88 in this volume.2. “A More Secure World: Our Common Responsibility.” Report of the UN High-level Panel on

Threats, Challenges and Change. New York, 2004.3. Bruce Jones with Feryal Cherif, “Evolving Models of Peacekeeping” (UN Department of Peace-

keeping, Best Practices Unit, 2005).4. Figures for NATO and regional operations are hard to come by but almost certainly exceed the

UN figures.5. Independent Inquiry Committee into the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme, The Manage-

ment of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Programme: Volume IV—Report of Investigation, 7 September2005.

Bruce D. JonesCodirector, Center on International Cooperation

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Mission Acronyms

AMIS African Union Mission in the Sudan, Khartoum and Al FasherAMM EU Aceh Monitoring Mission, Banda AcehECP Enhanced Cooperation Program, Port Moresby (Government

of Australia)EUFOR Althea EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, SarajevoEUPM EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, SarajevoEUPOL Kinshasa EU Police Mission in KinshasaEUPOL Proxima EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, SkopjeFOMUC Force de Multinationale de la Cemac, Bangul (Central African

Monetary and Economic Community)IMT International Monitoring Team, Cotabato CityISAF International Security Assistance Force, Kabul (NATO)KFOR NATO Kosovo Force, PristinaMAPP Mission to Support the Peace Process in ColombiaMFO Multinational Force and Observers, Cairo and Tel AvivMINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara MINUSTAH UN Stabilization Mission in HaitiMNF-I Multinational Force in IraqMONUC UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the CongoNTM-I NATO Training Mission in Iraq, BaghdadONUB UN Operation in BurundiOSCE-BIH OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, SarajevoRAMSI Regional Assistance Mission to the Solomon Islands, Honaira

(Pacific Islands Forum)SLMM Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission, ColomboTIPH 2 Temporary International Presence in HebronUNAMA UN Assistance Mission in AfghanistanUNAMI UN Assistance Mission for IraqUNAMSIL UN Mission in Sierra LeoneUNDOF UN Disengagement Observer ForceUNFICYP UN Peacekeeping Force in CyprusUNIFIL UN Interim Force in LebanonUNIOSIL UN Integrated Office in Sierra LeoneUNMEE UN Mission in Ethiopia and EritreaUNMIK UN Interim Administration Mission in KosovoUNMIL UN Mission in LiberiaUNMIS UN Mission in the SudanUNMOGIP UN Military Observer Group in India and PakistanUNOCI UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire UNOMIG UN Observer Mission in GeorgiaUNOTIL UN Office in Timor-LesteUNTSO UN Truce Supervision Organization

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Dilemmas of RobustPeace OperationsIan Johnstone

1

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Peace operations have become more ro-bust in recent years. While the trend is apparentin UN and non-UN operations, the departure isboth less pronounced and more striking in theformer. It has not been linear, nor without con-troversy, but the Security Council has askedUN missions to use force for a range of pur-poses beyond self-defense, including the pro-tection of civilians and maintenance of publicsecurity.

Reflection on the challenges and dilem-mas thrown up by this new practice hasoccurred in the UN Secretariat, blue-ribbonpanels, and national capitals, but not in a sus-tained way at the intergovernmental level.1

Practitioners lack an agreed doctrine for robustpeace operations—an interpretive guide to helpmanage the dilemmas they regularly face in thefield. Lacking institutionalized guidance, theyimprovise. Creative improvisation has been ahallmark of peacekeeping from its earliestdays, and adaptability is often the key to suc-cess of an operation. But ad hoc responses canproduce incoherence and inconsistency withina mission, as well as uncertain expectationsamong the parties to a conflict, local popula-tion, and the multiple participants in complexoperations. The traditional principles of peace-keeping—consent, impartiality, and the use offorce only in self-defense—were developed inpart to manage those expectations. Theyemerged from practice in order to guide futurepractice. Given the scope and variety of con-temporary peace operations, the time is ripe forrenewed multinational attention to their con-ceptual and doctrinal foundations.

This chapter begins with brief descriptionsof four crises that illustrate the trend toward a

more robust approach. I then turn to two per-vasive functions of contemporary peace opera-tions—protecting civilians and providing publicsecurity—which raise a number of dilemmasthat implicate the guiding principles. Next is areview of the evolution of thinking in the UNabout the basic principles and the developmentof doctrine elsewhere. The proliferation ofapproaches and attendant risk of inconsistencyunderline the need for common understandingsat the multinational level. I suggest four areasthat warrant special attention in any effort to de-velop those common understandings as part ofan integrated approach to the complexities ofmodern peace operations.

The Trend Toward Robust Peace Operations

The period 2000–2005 is book-ended by fourcrises. The crises differ, both in nature and inmagnitude, but threads run through all ofthem to suggest they are part of a more gen-eral pattern associated with modern peaceoperations.

Sierra Leone, 2000The first was in Sierra Leone in 2000. TheUN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) hada Chapter VII mandate to use force to protectcivilians and, after the Economic Communityof West African States Cease-Fire MonitoringGroup (ECOMOG) withdrew, to provide secu-rity at designated locations for specified pur-poses, “within [the mission’s] capabilities andareas of deployment.”2 As UNAMSIL contin-gents began to deploy to diamond producingareas in early May 2000, the Revolutionary

2


United Front (RUF) tested the force first bydenying freedom of movement and then bytaking hostages. Determined not to withdraw,as the UN had done in Rwanda in 1994, theSecretary-General called for a further expan-sion of UNAMSIL and the deployment of arapid reaction force. The United Kingdom dis-patched 800 paratroopers (though not as arapid reaction force) and a substantial navalpresence offshore. This, along with UNAMSILand government counterattacks against theRUF, staved off a rebel assault on Freetownand deterred further provocations. It alsobought time until well-trained and well-equipped troops from Jordan and India couldarrive. Some of the UN hostages were re-leased through negotiations, but in July a 222-strong Indian unit plus others remained sur-rounded. UNAMSIL successfully launched arobust military operation to restore their free-dom of movement.

In August the Security Council ratcheted upthe pressure by authorizing UNAMSIL “to deterand, where necessary, decisively counter thethreat of the RUF by responding robustly to anyhostile actions or threat of imminent and directuse of force.”3 Not all the troop-contributingcountries supported this shift and indeed the de-cision of India and Jordan to withdraw later inthe year was due in part to differences over inter-pretation of the mandate.4 Other troop contribu-tors responded to the Secretary-General’s call for“a very strong military presence with the neces-sary force multipliers,”5 and by March 2001UNAMSIL was the UN’s largest peace opera-tion, with an authorized strength of 17,500, adeterrent capability, and a dominant presencethroughout the country. British marines remainedoffshore to add to the deterrent. This, combinedwith active political engagement with the RUF(after its leader Foday Sankoh was arrested) andgradual improvement in the capability of theSierra Leone army, resulted in voluntary disarma-ment by and successful elections in April 2002.

The UN’s Department of PeacekeepingOperations Best Practices Unit drew positivelessons from UNAMSIL’s shift to a more robustposture, but also highlighted the difficulties

in getting there, including uncertainty aboutthe mandate, confusion about rules of engage-ment, and command and control problems.6

As the mandate was augmented, consultationsbetween troop contributors and the SecurityCouncil were less than ideal, which causedparticular problems in view of the fact that nodeveloped countries were willing to providetroops to the mission directly. A Security Coun-cil mission to Sierra Leone acknowledged thatUNAMSIL’s mandate was imprecise and thatdifferences of interpretation had still not beenresolved by October 2000.7

East Timor, 2000Meanwhile, a smaller-scale crisis was occur-ring in East Timor. To bring an end to the vio-lence sparked by the Timorese vote on inde-pendence in August 1999, the Security Councilauthorized the deployment of the InternationalForce for East Timor (INTERFET) to restorepeace and security. Its functions were takenover by the UN Transitional Administration inEast Timor (UNTAET) in February 2000,which had a sweeping Chapter VII mandate toadminister the territory.

Despite the authority to use “all necessarymeans” to fulfill its mandate, the 8,000 well-armed soldiers of UNTAET initially operatedunder restrictive rules of engagement (ROEs).8

The mission was soon tested by militias infiltrat-ing from across the land border with West Timor,leading in one case to the displacement of up to3,000 East Timorese. A large militia group am-bushed a New Zealand contingent on 24 July,killing one soldier; a Nepalese soldier was killedin a well-planned attack on 10 August; and threeUN staff members were murdered in Atambua,West Timor, on 6 September. UNTAET sought arevision of its ROEs, citing language in SecurityCouncil Resolution 1319 (2000) that called on itto “respond robustly to the militia threat.” TheUN Department of Peacekeeping Operations(DPKO) approved an “amplified” concept ofself-defense, which became the basis for coer-cive action without warning if necessary. In anumber of operations, elements of the UNTAETforce were deployed in the southwestern sector

DILEMMAS OF ROBUST PEACE OPERATIONS • 3


4 • ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACE OPERATIONS

to disarm militias and restore security. Therewere significant militia casualties in operationsthrough the remainder of 2000, and the groupshad largely ceased their organized military cam-paign by early 2001.

Democratic Republic of Congo, 2004–2005As the temporary French-led, EU-blessedintervention in Bunia was coming to an endfollowing the crisis there in the summer of2003 (Operation Artemis), the Security Coun-cil adopted Resolution 1493 (2003), which gavethe UN Organization Mission in the Demo-cratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) two sep-arate Chapter VII mandates: one for theDemocratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as awhole, and one for Ituri and the Kivus, in theeast. The former included the authority “totake all necessary measures within the limitsof its capabilities and areas of deployment” toprotect civilians and humanitarian workers.The latter included the right to use “all neces-sary means to fulfill its mandate in the Ituri

district and, as it deems it within its capabili-ties, in North and South Kivu.” Thus fromJuly 2003, MONUC had Chapter VII author-ity for its entire mandate, full enforcementpower in Ituri, and limited enforcementpower “within its capabilities” for the protec-tion of civilians and in the Kivus.

The mission faced a serious crisis in May–June 2004 when Laurent Nkunda marched onthe town of Bukavu in support of Jules Mute-butsi, a suspended commander of the DRCarmed forces. The city fell and more than 100people died, provoking violent reactions inKinshasa and elsewhere. The UN’s Departmentof Peacekeeping Operations Best Practices re-port on the Bukavu crisis faulted MONUC onvarious grounds, some of which related to theguiding principles of peacekeeping: the sen-ior leadership appeared “to confuse impartial-ity with neutrality and was reluctant to con-front individuals or groups who were clearlyworking to undermine the transition process”;there were sharply divided opinions—and

Pakistani peacekeepers with MONUC keep watch over a Rwandan rebel camp they and government soldiers destroyed in South Kivu, July 2005, in their latest operation

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mixed public signals—about using force todisarm Mutebutsi and stop the advance ofNkunda; and there was confusion among dif-ferent MONUC contingents about the rules ofengagement. The result was a serious loss ofcredibility for MONUC and a damaging set-back for the fragile peace process.9

The Bukavu crisis ultimately led to a newmandate for MONUC, embodied in Resolution1565 (2004), more MONUC troops to Ituriand the Kivus, and the establishment of aneastern divisional headquarters. The more ro-bust approach signaled by these developmentswas put to the test in Ituri in early 2005. Inresponse to serious violence against civiliansin late January, MONUC launched several se-curity operations and itself came under directattack, resulting in the death of nine peace-keepers. The UN reacted with armed personnelcarriers and attack helicopters, killing 50 to 60 militia members in an intense exchange offire.10 Soon thereafter, 15,600 Ituri militiaslaid down their arms, leaving behind a diffusegroup of about 1,500.

Haiti, 2005The UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti(MINUSTAH) was established in mid-2004with a partial Chapter VII mandate. Its func-tions included the authority, “in support of theTransitional Government,” to ensure a secureenvironment and to assist with the restorationof public order in Haiti. This deft diplomaticdrafting was the product of compromise withinthe Security Council. It seemed to invite a ro-bust approach, but only in support of existinginstitutions—specifically, the Haitian NationalPolice (HNP), which was of questionable com-petence and legitimacy. There were differencesof opinion within the mission and the SecurityCouncil about how forcefully to act against the armed gangs that controlled the poorerdistricts of Port-au-Prince. Amid accusationsthat MINUSTAH was too passive, the SecurityCouncil signaled its approval of a more robustapproach in the report of a mission all fifteenmembers took to Haiti in April. This was rein-forced by Resolution 1608, adopted on 22 June

2005, which authorized an increase in the mis-sion’s strength and addition of a “rapid reactionforce.”

MINUSTAH had engaged in security oper-ations earlier, but the tide against armed gangsturned in late June and early July of 2005, whenjoint operations by the military and formedpolice units culminated in the death of gangleader “Dread” Wilme, who had been dominat-ing Cité Soleil. This was followed by the estab-lishment of a permanent security presence inBel Air, intensive mobile patrolling, cordon andsearch operations, and a warning that anyoneseen carrying a weapon would be shot. The re-sult was a relative return to normalcy in Bel Air,with signs of renewed economic life and the UNable to carry out civilian functions. Later in 2005,attention turned again to Cité Militaire, wheresimilar military tactics were employed. As theyear end approached, robust action was alsobeing contemplated for Cité Soleil, though em-bedded in civilian-led confidence-buildingmeasures aimed at winning the support of gangmembers and trust of the broader populationwithin the district.

Common ThreadsThree threads run through these quite differentcrises. First, in all four cases the SecurityCouncil provided a Chapter VII mandate andsome enforcement authority, but with enoughambiguity to leave room for differing inter-pretations as to when force should be usedand for what purposes. Second, when criseserupted (as in Sierra Leone and the DRC) orlong-standing problems boiled over (as inEast Timor and Haiti), there were argumentswithin the missions, the UN Secretariat, and/or the Security Council about how to re-spond. Third, in all cases the UN operationsstarted with a less forceful approach (eitherdue to a lack of capacity or will) and thenescalated as the crises expanded.

Contemporary Challenges

The threads are not confined to the four cases.Similar situations have arisen in UN and non-UN


operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Burundi,Côte d’Ivoire, and Darfur. And they are likelyto arise again as long as peace operations con-tinue to be tasked with performing two func-tions: protecting civilians and providing publicsecurity. These mandates create conceptual andoperational challenges for peacekeeping, withnot only military but also political, humanitar-ian, human rights, and normative implications.

Protection of CiviliansSince late 1999, no less than ten peace oper-ations—both UN and non-UN—have beenauthorized under Chapter VII “to protectcivilians under the imminent threat of physi-cal violence,” often qualified by the words,“within capabilities and areas of deployment.”11

This builds on practice that began in the earlypost–Cold War operations and gained mo-mentum after the tragedies of Rwanda andSrebrenica. While the term “protection of civil-ians” was not used for the earlier operations,

the mandate was implicit.12 Today, it is stan-dard language in every Security Council res-olution that authorizes an operation wherecivilian lives are likely to be in danger.

This mandate for protection of civilians ispart of a normative shift reflected in generalstatements by the Security Council13 and theSecretary-General.14 The Brahimi panel arguedthat “UN peacekeepers who witness violenceagainst civilians should be presumed to beauthorized to stop it, within their means, insupport of basic UN principles.”15 The norm-ative shift is also reflected in the report ofInternational Commission on Interventionand State Sovereignty, which introduced the “responsibility to protect” principle,16

later picked up by the High-level Panel in itsreport,17 and by the Secretary-General in his.18 The reference to a “responsibility toprotect” at the 2005 World Summit19 was animportant step in this evolution, marking thefirst time it was endorsed in a universal


The 2005 World Summit adopted (and in some cases adapted) a number of rec-ommendations made by the Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats,Challenges, and Change and by the Sec-retary-General himself in his report InLarger Freedom, which was designed tobuild on previous reforms of peacekeep-ing. Among the main conclusions of thesummit were:

• Recognition of the “vital role” playedby peacekeeping in helping parties toend conflict.

• The need to mount operations withadequate capacity to counter hostilitiesand fulfill effectively their mandates.

• Endorsement of the creation of an initialstanding policy capacity to provide co-herent, effective, and responsive startup

capability for the policing component ofUN peacekeeping missions.

• Support for the European Union andother regional entities’ efforts to de-velop capacities for rapid deploymentand standby arrangements.

• Support for the development and imple-mentation of a ten-year plan for capac-ity building with the African Union.

• A call on regional organizations with ca-pacity for the prevention of armed con-flict or peacekeeping to consider placingthese capacities in the framework of theUN Standby Arrangements System.

• A reaffirmation of the commitment tothe protection of children in situationsof armed conflict.

The summit did not adopt in wholethe High-level Panel’s recommendation

that the UN establish a strategic reservefor peacekeeping—an idea designed toaddress the recurrent problem of the needto bolster the defensive and offensivecapacity of peacekeeping forces in theface of hostility. The design of a strategicreserve is similar to that of “over-the-horizon” reserve forces commonly usedin national deployments. However, thesummit did urge further development of“enhanced rapidly deployable capacitiesto reinforce peacekeeping operations intimes of crisis.”

The summit also adopted a care-fully but strongly worded “responsibilityto protect populations from genocide,war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimesagainst humanity.”

Box 1.1 The 2005 World Summit and Peace Operations

Source: UN General Assembly, Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, NY: 20 September 2005.


forum. While there is no consensus on thepractical applications of the concept, the pro-tection of civilians in peace operations is away of putting the principle into practice, astep toward giving meaning and content to aninchoate norm.

Yet there is a large gap between the man-date given to peace operations and formalknowledge about how to execute it. In a carefulstudy, Victoria Holt found that even fully de-veloped national peace operation doctrines lackclear guidelines on how to go about protectingcivilians.20 Inevitably, responses are impro-vised. Thus senior officials of the AfricanUnion Mission in Burundi (AMIB) wrote rulesof engagement that gave their troops authorityto protect civilians, even though that was not in the mandate.21 MONUC failed to protectcivilians during the Bukavu crisis, after havingraised expectations that it would do so byannouncing formation of a new Kivus brigade.22

It subsequently did better in Ituri, but to thisday MONUC’s areas of operation are so largethat it cannot protect civilians wherever it isdeployed. The same is true for the UN Missionin Sudan (UNMIS), and the African Mission inSudan (AMIS), despite its force of almost7,000, is struggling to protect civilians in Dar-fur.23 The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire(UNOCI) and Operation Licorne can intervenein small-scale crises, but would have difficultydoing so in the face of systematic attempts atslaughter in ethnically divided areas. Even thelarge NATO military and UN police operationsin Kosovo have been inconsistent in carryingout their protection mandate—most notablyduring the riots of March 2004.

These improvised responses highlight anumber of dilemmas. First, a mandate withoutadequate capacity can generate expectations thatwill not be fulfilled. The qualifying words“within the limits of the mission’s capabilities”are aimed at lowering expectations, but is it rea-sonable to suppose that all concerned—includingvulnerable populations—will read the fine print?Removing civilian protection language from res-olutions altogether is no solution, because themere presence of a peace operation generates

expectations. After Rwanda and Srebrenica,peacekeepers cannot simply stand by as civiliansare massacred, claiming that action to protectthem is not in the mandate. On the other hand,if peacekeepers are to be held responsible forevery death they fail to prevent, the number ofcountries willing to contribute troops or policemay decline dramatically.

A second dilemma is that the qualifiedmandate could draw people to where peace-keepers are deployed in order to fall under theprotection umbrella. This can quickly over-whelm the capacity of a mission, and exposeit to manipulation by those who want either tosee the operation fail or to invite robust actionfrom the peacekeepers in the hope that it will towork to their advantage. A third dilemma ariseswhen protective action in one location leads toreprisals against civilians elsewhere, a deeplydisturbing pattern that is playing out in theDRC. A fourth dilemma relates to timing andscale. Should peacekeepers act pre-emptivelyto protect civilians, or is the use of forcealways a last resort? Taking on the spoilersonly after they have done their worst is nohelp to civilians who die while all other meas-ures are first exhausted. On the other hand,pre-emptive action can provoke a reaction,and there are limits to how far most peaceoperations can escalate. Even the internationalcoalition in Iraq and the NATO-led operationin Kosovo have struggled to seize and keepthe initiative throughout their areas of opera-tion. Is it reasonable to expect MONUC to doso in the DRC, UNOCI and Operation Licornein Côte d’Ivoire, AMIS and UNMIS in Sudan,or even MINUSTAH in relation to the lessersecurity threats it faces in Haiti?

All of the above highlight a deeper dilemma:the protection of civilians is a goal of both orderand justice. While military action can createorder quickly, achieving justice takes longer andrequires a more comprehensive approach.24

Viewing protection of civilians as a public ordertask may produce quick results, but can under-mine more long-term, multidimensional effortsto achieve justice. On the other hand, waitingfor those efforts to bear fruit while civilians die




can fatally undermine the legitimacy of a mis-sion and jeopardize the local and internationalsupport it needs to succeed.

Public Security GapA second challenge for contemporary peaceoperations that has raised difficult questionsabout roles, responsibilities, and expectationsis the so-called public security gap.25 The gaparises when there is a need to perform publicorder functions that fall between providing asecure environment (a typical military func-tion) and crime control, civil disturbances,and general lawlessness (typically viewed ascivilian police functions). It occurs when localsecurity forces are incapable of maintaininglaw and order, the military component of apeace operation is unwilling to do so, andmultinational civilian police forces are unableto do so, either because they are deployed ininsufficient numbers or because the magni-tude of the challenge exceeds police capabili-ties. The issue is sharpest in “executive polic-ing” operations, like Kosovo and East Timor,but it arises wherever the peacekeepers areexpected to help provide public security.

Specialized forces have been used to fillthe gap in a number of places. Variously called“formed police units,” “integrated police units,”

“constabularies,” “police with military status,”“gendarmerie-type forces,” “multinational spe-cialized units” and “special police units,” theseforces are designed for crowd and riot con-trol, high-end law enforcement, combatingorganized crime, and protecting key locationsand VIPs. In Haiti in the early 1990s, the pub-lic security gap was filled by military policeand special units who engaged in joint patrolswith Haitian security forces. These 920 inter-national police monitors from twenty-sixcountries carried sidearms, had arrest powers,and could use deadly force to prevent vio-lence.26 They were replaced by 870 UN civil-ian police who were also armed, including a150-person Argentinian SWAT team. The firstmultinational specialized unit (MSU) wasdeployed in Bosnia in 1998, as part of theNATO-led force, after a riot in Brcko demon-strated the limitations of the military for crowdcontrol.27 The lesson was applied in Kosovo,where both an MSU under Kosovo Force(KFOR) command and a special police unit(SPU) under UN Interim Administration Mis-sion in Kosovo (UNMIK) authority were de-ployed with mandates that included the han-dling of civil disturbances and threats to publicorder. Gendarmerie-type units were deployedin East Timor, and today there are formed

Table 1.1 Formed Police Units, as of December 2005

UNMIK UNMIL UNOCI MONUC MINUSTAH Total

Bangladesh — — 125 250 — 375China — — — — 125 125India — — — 250 — 250Jordan — 120 250 — 290 660Nepal — 250 — — 125 375Nigeria — 125 — — 125 250Pakistan 115 — — — 250 365Poland 115 — — — — 115Romania 115 — — — — 115Senegal — — — 250 85 335Ukraine 140 — — — — 140Total 585 495 375 750 1,000 3,345

Source: DPI (DPKO website).



police units in the UN missions in Haiti, theDRC, Kosovo, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia.

Reliance on these units has not been with-out controversy, pointing to a tension amongcontributing states about the respective roles ofmilitary, police, and constabulary forces. InBosnia, the MSU’s list of functions (publicorder and safety, intelligence-gathering, crowdcontrol, protection of returnees, security dur-ing elections, fighting organized crime, andstopping smuggling) was a “veritable smorgas-bord of all the issues SFOR and IPTF werestruggling with.”28 In Kosovo, the similar man-dates of the MSU and SPU revealed a lack ofclarity about the gap they were meant to fill,and the inadequacies of the response to theriots in March 2004 were partly a result of poorcoordination among the military and police.29

In Haiti, MINUSTAH military and police unitshave been engaging in joint security operationsin the slums of Port-au-Prince, but poor coordi-nation and misunderstandings about functionsprompted the Security Council to call for a newsector headquarters for the express purpose of

ensuring more efficient and better integratedoperations.30 MONUC’s authorized strengthwas enhanced by five formed police units (625officers) in 2005 partly to assist the nationalpolice in providing crowd control, but theirmain function will be to protect UN facilitiesand sites during the electoral period.

This history highlights some of the dilem-mas associated with the public security gap.First, security cannot be divided neatly be-tween “military” and “police” functions inpeace operations. Debate continues betweenthose who argue the military is not trained,equipped, or otherwise suited for postconflictpolicing, and those who argue it is an essen-tial part of the military’s security responsibil-ities.31 Constabulary forces may help to fillthe vacuum, but they are not a panacea be-cause numbers are limited and the ability todeploy quickly is constrained, although someinitiatives are under way to enhance globalcapacity.32 Moreover, there is no standardformed police unit. Formed police are trained,structured, and deployed to meet the domestic

Jordanian troops with MINUSTAH provide security in Cité Soleil, Port-au-Prince, February 2005

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security needs of their countries.33 They can-not simply be transplanted to a peace opera-tion and expected to perform any task deemedto fall in the “public security gap.”

The second dilemma arises where the gapcan only be filled by a mix of military, con-stabulary, and individual police forces. Coordi-nation is exceptionally difficult. The threetypes of forces often arrive with different oper-ating styles, rules of engagement, and attitudesabout the use of force. And it is precisely inthe operations where the use of force is mostlikely that coordination is most difficult.

A third dilemma follows from the second.If military and formed police units engage injoint operations, should they be under a mili-tary chain of command? This would seem tomake sense from an operational point of view,at least in high-intensity operations. But if thepolice units are seen as paramilitary, this canbe problematic in societies where such forceshave been part of the problem rather thansolution. Moreover, the ability of internationalcivilian police to do and teach “communitypolicing” may be compromised if their formedcounterparts are engaged in coercive actionunder a military chain of command.

The above dilemmas highlight the norma-tive dimension of public security and its connec-tion to the broader goal of rule of law promo-tion—an increasingly important but under-resourced aspect of modern peace operations. Toassume law and order responsibilities, eitherdirectly in an executive policing mandate or indi-rectly through support of local forces, is toassume one of the most basic state functions.Effective policing is based on a social contractbetween state authorities and the population,which requires a degree of respect and under-standing, if not trust. Foreign forces are not partof this social contract, but nevertheless transmitvalues in how they go about their work. Com-munity policing is such a value, as is respect forhuman rights. In postconflict environments, thepolice are often the most visible manifestation ofa transformed society—they are the face of bothorder and justice.34 Thus greater clarity about theroles of military, police, and constabularies not

only will contribute to public order, but can alsocontribute to the restoration of justice.

The Search for Conceptual Clarity

The traditional principles of peacekeeping—consent, impartiality, and the use of force onlyin self-defense—emerged from the first UNEmergency Force (UNEF I) in 1956 and under-standings about those principles have beenevolving ever since. Throughout the Cold Warera and with few exceptions, a sharp line wasdrawn between Chapter VI peacekeeping andChapter VII enforcement action. The changednature of the missions at the end of the Cold Warled to a blurring of the line between “peace-keeping” and “enforcement action,” highlightedby Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali’s Agendafor Peace of 1992, wherein he proposed “peaceenforcement units” to occupy a halfway housebetween the two.35 But failures in Bosnia,Somalia, and Rwanda prompted the Secretary-General to backtrack in his 1995 Supplement toan Agenda for Peace, in which he insisted that“peacekeeping and the use of force (other thanin self-defense)” were alternative techniquesand not adjacent points on a continuum.36 Inother words, there is no halfway house betweenpeacekeeping and enforcement, and the twoshould not be mixed.

The sharp line the supplement tried todraw was blurred again by the Brahimi Report,which was inspired by UN reports on the fallof Srebrenica and the genocide in Rwanda, aswell as an Organization of African Unity (OAU)report on Rwanda. The Brahimi Report affirmsthe “bedrock principles of peacekeeping,” butthen qualifies all three: consent is often unreli-able and subject to manipulation by the par-ties; impartiality does not mean neutrality, butrather “adherence to the principles of theCharter and to the objectives of a mandate thatis rooted in those Charter principles”; and UNoperations must be prepared to deal effectivelywith “spoilers,” with forces able to pose a cred-ible deterrent and “to project credible force.”37

The blurring of the line was forthrightly acknowl-edged by the High-level Panel in 2004 when it



stated that the distinction between Chapter VIpeacekeeping and Chapter VII peace enforce-ment is “misleading” and that the usual prac-tice is to give both types of operation a ChapterVII mandate, on the understanding that eventhe most benign environment can turn sour.38

The 2005 World Summit outcome documentsays little about the use of force by peacekeep-ers, other than to reaffirm that missions shouldhave “adequate capacity to counter hostilitiesand fulfill effectively their mandates”39—a hintat robustness, but without elaboration.

Thus the UN does not have a peacekeepingdoctrine beyond what is reflected in trainingmodules, standard directives, generic standardoperating procedures (SOPs), a “master list” ofrules of engagement, and publications like the2003 Handbook on United Nations Multidi-mensional Peacekeeping. An important initia-tive is currently under way in the UN Depart-ment of Peacekeeping Operations to launch a“guidance and policy management system” forthe conduct of operations. This represents a seri-ous effort to provide operational guidance topractitioners by assembling the various lessonslearned and relevant DPKO documents into amore coherent whole. It is not an effort to formu-late or declare new doctrine, but rather to buildon existing principles in offering flexible andcontinually evolving guidance on how to trainand prepare for missions and how to carry outmandated tasks. While this is an important exer-cise, it can only go so far without greater consen-sus at the intergovernmental level about the con-ceptual foundations of modern peace operations.

The development of multinational doctrineis difficult but not impossible, as the case ofNATO demonstrates.40 No other regional organ-ization has gone as far, but the African Unionand Economic Community of West AfricanStates (ECOWAS) have begun addressing doc-trinal issues in the context of the standby forceseach is establishing.41 At the national level, mostNATO countries have developed doctrines forpeace operations, some of which have gonethrough several iterations in the post–Cold Warera.42 Many of the leading troop contributorsfrom the developing world refer to peacekeeping

in their military doctrines. There is also diffu-sion of peacekeeping training centers wherebasic concepts and techniques are taught.

Doctrinal developments at the national levelinevitably affect multinational missions, often ina positive way. But the proliferation of approachescan be problematic. Clashes between nationalapproaches and those of the organization underwhich they operate, or among national approacheswithin a mission, can lead to an incoherent andineffective peace operation. Without common orat least congruent understandings about the basicprinciples, mandates will be interpreted, direc-tives and SOPs developed, rules of engagementdrafted, decisions made, and action taken eitherin a conceptual void43 or based on assumptionsthat find their way into peace operations throughthe back door (i.e., through influential contribu-tors to an operation or strong-willed individualswithin a mission).

Recent experience suggests that the time isripe for renewed multinational reflection on thefundamentals of peace operations. The ques-tion is not so much whether the core principlesof consent, impartiality, and the minimum useof force are still relevant, but whether practi-tioners need a more fully developed interpre-tive guide to ensure that those principles areapplied effectively. Four areas in particularwould benefit from greater conceptual clarity:the management of expectations, the meaningof consent and impartiality, the use of force,and the broader normative context in whichpeace operations occur.

First, the deployment of a peace opera-tion creates expectations at many levels. Themandating authority (e.g., the UN SecurityCouncil) expects the mandate to be fulfilled,the contributors to an operation expect theresources and political backing to fulfill it,the parties to a peace agreement expect reas-surance that the other parties will not cheat,and innocent civilians expect their physicalwell-being to be protected. Shared under-standings about the nature, objectives, andunderlying principles of an operation helpmanage those expectations—of ensuring thatthe parties know what steps the peacekeepers



will take to ensure compliance with the man-date, and that civilians know what the opera-tion will and will not do to protect them. Theeffective management of expectations requiresspecificity in a mandate, as well as consistencyand transparency in its execution. If force isused, it must be for understandable reasons; ifforce is not used, the reasons should be equallyunderstandable. This requires good publicinformation and effective communication withthe parties and the broader population aboutthe mission’s aims and operational activities.

As important, the contributors to a peaceoperation—military, police and civilian or-ganizations—must know what they are gettinginto. This requires overcoming the knowledgedeficit that plagues many missions, so troopand other contributors do not find themselvesin situations they did not expect. If they arelikely to take casualties, that should be under-stood from the outset. If the troops or policeare likely to inflict casualties, that also mustbe well understood—especially in chaotic en-vironments, where the line between combatants

and civilians is often hard to draw. Moreover,the actions of one component of a peace oper-ation impact the others: military action caninhibit or enable progress on the civilianfront, the imperatives of political or humani-tarian action may dictate a certain militaryposture, and so on. Shared understandings canhelp ensure harmony of effort among the var-ious components.

Second, there is a need for clarity aboutthe meaning of consent and impartiality. Theseprinciples have stood the test of time, but howthey play out in practice is far from self-evident. If there is consent to an operation, it isoften qualified in one of three ways: either itis (1) unreliable, (2) brought about under out-side pressure, rendering it something lessthan a pure act of volition, or (3) open-ended.No peace agreement implemented over anextended period can provide for every contin-gency, so even genuine consent, in effect, is agesture of faith that unforeseen problems canbe worked out on a consensual basis. Under-lying all these qualifications is the basic


Members of a Chinese formed police unit prepare for their mission in Haitiat a training camp on the outskirts of Beijing, China, September 2004

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question: Whose consent matters? Is it onlyor primarily the parties to the conflict, or isthe consent and cooperation of the broaderpopulation as important? Often local spoilersare supported by foreign backers; in manycircumstances, their “consent” to end thatsupport is critical to the success of a mission.

Impartiality, meanwhile, was defined inthe Brahimi Report to mean adherence to theprinciples of the Charter and objectives of amandate, a conception that is found in manynational peace operation doctrines. It assumes aclear enough mandate that all concerned knowwhat impartiality in its execution entails, whichrelates back to the need for transparency andgood communication. More broadly, consentand impartiality connect to the notion of legiti-macy. In modern operations, consent is animportant source of legitimacy, but may not bethe only source. A principled mandate from anauthoritative institution executed impartiallycan also bestow legitimacy.

Third, in its 2005 report, the UN’s SpecialCommittee on Peacekeeping Operations addedto its standard endorsement of the principle“non-use of force except in self-defense” a ref-erence to “defense of a mandate,” and it identi-fied the need for “an appropriately strong mili-tary and civilian police presence . . . in order todeter spoilers and establish the credibility ofthe United Nations.”44 The 2005 World Summitoutcome report states peacekeepers should have“adequate capacity to counter hostilities and ful-fill effectively their mandates.”45 Debate anddilemmas arise when the main protagonists to aconflict formally consent to an internationalsecurity presence and yet lesser armed groupsoppose that presence or threaten aspects of itsmandate. The dilemmas are especially acutewhen it is hard to tell whether these lesser groupsare acting as proxies for the main protagonists.This suggests that there is not necessarily aninverse relationship between the use of force onthe one hand and consent and impartiality on theother. The judicious use of force can enhance thecredibility of a mission and create conditions thatwill both induce overall consent and reinforce theperception of impartiality. There is no formula

for determining how much force is appropriateand indeed one of the fault lines of debate is whatconstitutes “proportionate” force. The BrahimiReport raised this issue squarely in venturing that“rules of engagement should not limit contin-gents to stroke-for-stroke responses but shouldallow ripostes sufficient to silence a source ofdeadly fire.”46 This raises the further question ofwhether the peacekeepers can ever shoot first.Did the generalized threat presented by the mili-tias in East Timor in the year 2000 justify the pre-emptive use of force against them? Can force beused against illegal armed groups in eastern DRCtoday because they pose a constant threat to civil-ians, or must the peacekeepers wait until a partic-ular incident has occurred before reacting?

A consensus is emerging that appropriateforce should be measured in relation to objec-tives sought rather than absolute terms. The ob-jectives may be achievable with a robust pres-ence, obviating the need to actually use force aslong as there is a credible threat that it will beused if necessary.47 However, there are limits onthe credibility of that threat based on the capacityof a peace operation to escalate and its ability togauge how far the cycle of escalation is likely togo. The danger of ratcheting up as crises getworse is that a mission’s limit may be reachedand the deterrent effect lost. The UN’s proposalfor a strategic reserve is designed to address thisproblem—an “over-the-horizon” arrangementavailable at short notice when a crisis escalatesbeyond the capacity of peacekeeping forces onthe ground.48 Conversely, the threat of over-whelming military force may not be credible ifthe security threat is of a lower order, such asstreet disturbances during an election period.This suggests that a flexible presence with arange of capabilities, involving military, con-stabulary, and police assets, can be more credi-ble than massive military firepower that is notlikely to be used.

In many operations, how robustly externalforces act turns on the stage of development ofnational forces. In Haiti and eastern DRC, thequestion is not simply how much forceMINUSTAH and MONUC should be using,but whether they should be leading, supporting,



or operating alongside the Haitian NationalPolice and Armed Forces of the DRC respec-tively. In the normal course, national forcesassume primary responsibility for security(internal and external) as soon as they havethe capacity—and legitimacy—to do so. Untilthen, sensitive decisions must be made abouthow the peacekeepers should associate withthose forces.

Fourth, peace operations do not occur ina normative vacuum, nor do decisions aboutthe protection of civilians and maintenance ofpublic order. If nothing else, expectations areaffected by these normative considerations.The basic norms that guide UN peace opera-tions are those embodied in the Charter. Sov-ereignty and nonintervention are among thoseprinciples, as are self-determination and re-spect for human rights. The constitutive actsof various regional and subregional organi-zations contain the same mix of norms.49 Con-cepts like the “responsibility to protect,” humansecurity, and the rule of law are starting toinfuse peace operations practice. They are con-troversial and expose deep divisions in under-standings about the nature of the enterprise. Isit fundamentally an instrument parties to aconflict use to help resolve their differences onthe basis of consent? Or, is it a more proactiveenterprise, in which external actors help torebuild war-torn states on the basis of inter-national norms and standards?50 That there is noglobal consensus on how to answer those ques-tions is not an excuse for ignoring the normativedimensions of any peace operation. Decisionsabout whether and how to protect civilians or

provide public security, or engage in any of themyriad other tasks peacekeepers are chargedwith, involve not only operational but also nor-mative choices. And acting on those decisionsshapes the normative climate in which similarchoices are confronted in the future.

Conclusion

Excessive guidance can smother creativeimprovisation in a peace operation, but adhoc responses to recurring challenges leavetoo much room for internal argument, inconsis-tency, and unmet expectations. The complexityof modern operations, the multiplicity of actors,and the range of partners involved dictate theneed for a comprehensive, multidisciplinarystrategy. While robust action is often necessary,a purely military approach is never adequate incontemporary peace missions, which by defini-tion are not about winning a war or defeatingan enemy but facilitating a peace process. Mil-itary action, if and when necessary, must be inthe service of a broader political strategy. Thatstrategy should in turn be guided by commonunderstandings, not only about the objectivesof the mission but also the principles thatunderlie decisions about how to achieve thoseobjectives. The principles have evolved andwill continue to evolve in light of experience.Sustained multinational reflection on that evo-lution is necessary if this valuable instrumentfor the maintenance of international peace andsecurity is to respond effectively to contempo-rary challenges.



NotesI am very grateful to a number of people for their thoughtful comments on drafts of this essay: RupertSmith, Lakhdar Brahimi, John Ruggie, Salman Ahmed, Bruce Jones, Paul Keating, Richard Gowan, andLaura Sitea. Many of their suggestions have been incorporated in the final text. Any errors in judgment,of course, are my own.

1. See United Nations, Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations (Brahimi Report), August2000. United Nations, Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change: Our SharedResponsibility, December 2004. The UN Secretariat has been developing training manuals and modules,generic directives and standard operating procedures, model rules of engagement, and other “guidance”documents that reflect the more threatening environment in which peacekeepers operate.

2. S/RES/1289, 7 February 2000.3. S/RES/1313, 4 August 2000.4. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, Lessons Learned

from UN Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone, September 2003, p. 41.5. S/2000/832, 24 August 2000.6. United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, Lessons Learned

from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone, September 2003. A DPKO assessmentmission to Sierra Leone in the midst of the crisis came to similar conclusions. United Nations, FifthReport of the Secretary-General on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, S/2000/455, 31 July 2000. Theproblems were exacerbated by a damaging public rift among the senior leadership. Trevor Findlay, TheUse of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 308.

7. United Nations, Report of the Security Council Mission to Sierra Leone, S/2000/992, 16 Octo-ber 2000.

8. Dale Stephens, The Use of Force in Peacekeeping Operations: The East Timor Experience(Melbourne: Asia-Pacific Centre for Military Law, 2005), pp. 51–52. Stephens was the legal adviser tothe UNTAET force commander.

9. United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, MONUC and theBukavu Crisis, March 2005.

10. S/2005/167, 15 March 2005, paras. 11–19.11. For UN operations, see Security Council Resolution 1270 on Sierra Leone (1999); Resolution

1291 on the Democratic Republic of Congo (2000); Resolution 1509 on Liberia (2003); Resolution1528 on Côte d’Ivoire (2004); Resolution 1542 on Haiti (2004); Resolution 1545 on Burundi (2004);and Resolution 1590 on Sudan (2005). For non-UN operations, see Security Council Resolution 1464on both the French-led Operation Licorne and ECOWAS in Côte d’Ivoire (2003); and Resolution 1564on the African Union in Darfur. A compilation of the precise language in these resolutions can be foundin Victoria Holt, The Responsibility to Protect: Considering the Operational Capacity for Civilian Pro-tection (revised), discussion paper (Washington, D.C.: Henry Stimson Center, January 2005).

12. For example, UNPROFOR, then IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia (Resolutions 836, 1031, and 1088);UNITAF and then UNOSOM II in Somalia (Resolutions 794 and 814); Operation Turquoise in Rwanda(Resolutions 925 and 929); KFOR in Kosovo (Resolution 1244); INTERFET and then UNTAET in EastTimor (Resolutions 1264 and 1272).

13. See Security Council Resolutions 1265 (1999) and 1296 (2000); S/PRST/2002/41, 20 Decem-ber 2002; and S/PRST/2003/27, 15 December 2003.

14. See, for example, Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection ofCivilians in Armed Conflict: S/1999/957, 8 September 1999. This report provides a detailed overview oftasks relating to protection of civilians that UN peacekeeping operations had engaged in, some of whichrequired a “coercive or enforcement role” though not always on the basis of clear mandates. The Secre-tary-General alludes to the possibility of military action to separate armed elements from civilians in ref-ugee and IDP camps, and to create “temporary security zones and safe corridors for the protection ofcivilians.” Paras. 35 and 39. Subsequent SG reports on protection of civilians shy away from that kindof language. See, for example, S/2002/1300 (26 November 2002) and S/2004/131 (28 May 2004).

15. Brahimi Report, para. 62. The Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional PeacekeepingOperations backs away from that position by stating, “in specific circumstances, the mandate of apeacekeeping operation may include the need to protect a vulnerable civilian population from immi-nent attack,” implying the obligations should not be presumed. United Nations, Department of Peace-keeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional PeacekeepingOperations, 2003, pp. 7–8.

16. International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Pro-tect, December 2001.



17. United Nations, Report of the High-Level Panel, para. 199–203.18. United Nations, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security, and Human Rights for All,

Report of the Secretary-General, A/59/2005, 21 March 2005, para. 132.19. UN General Assembly Resolution: 2005 World Summit Outcome. A/RES/60/1, 20 September

2005, para. 138.20. Holt, The Responsibility to Protect. It is not clear why this is the case. It may simply be because

the practice is too new. Or it could be because protection of civilians is so sensitive that national polit-ical authorities prefer to deal with the issue at the highest level on a case-by-case basis, rather thandeveloping a more standardized approach.

21. Kristina Powell, Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protectthe African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime, Monograph no. 119 (Ottawa Canada, TheNorth-South Institute, May 2005), p. 35.

22. United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices Unit, MONUC and theBukavu Crisis 2004, March 2005, p. 12.

23. “Darfur’s Despair,” The Economist, 15 October 2005, p. 47.24. See General Sir Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force (London: Allen Lane, 2005), pp. 377–387.25. See generally, Robert Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg, eds., Policing the

New World Disorder (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, Institute for NationalStrategic Studies, 1998); Alice Hills, “The Inherent Limits of Military Force in Policing Peace Opera-tions,” International Peacekeeping 8, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 79–98; Annika Hansen, Supporting the Ruleof Law in War-Torn Societies: Tasks and Comparative Advantages of Civilian and Military PoliceForces, FFI/RAPPORT no. 2005-02099, November 2005; Renata Dwan, ed., Executive Policing: En-forcing the Law in Peace Operations, SIPRI Research Report no. 16, 2002; and Robert Perito, WhereIs the Lone Ranger When We Need Him? America’s Search for a Postconflict Stability Force (Washing-ton, D.C.: US Institute of Peace Press, 2004).

26. Perito, Where Is the Lone Ranger, p. 110.27. Renata Dwan, Civilian Tasks and Capabilities in EU Peace Operations, paper commissioned by

the Study Group on Europe’s Security Capabilities, September 2004.28. Hansen, Supporting the Rule of Law, p. 17.29. For more on the UNMIK special police unit and KFOR multinational specialized unit, see

Chapter 2.30. S/RES/1608, 2005, para. 2(b).31. Dwan, Civilian Tasks and Capabilities, p. 4. See also Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Military Forces

and Public Security Challenges,” in Michael Pugh and Waheguru Pal Singh Sidhu, eds., The UnitedNations and Regional Security: The UN and Beyond (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003),pp. 137–153.

32. The Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) was established in Vicenza, Italy,in 2005 as part of the Group of Eight’s action plan for expanding global capability for peace and supportoperations. CoESPU is co-located with the recently established EU Gendarme Force headquarters, whichis developing concepts of operations and functions for what the EU refers to as “integrated police units.”

33. Hansen, “A Civil-Military Cooperation: The Military, Paramilitaries and Civilian Police inExecutive Policing,” in Renata Dwan, ed., Executive Policing: Enforcing Law in Peace Operations,SIPRI Research Report no. 16 (Oxford: Oxford University Press/SIPRI, 2002), at 71.

34. Rama Mani, “Contextualizing Police Reform: Security, the Rule of Law and Post-Conflict Peace-building” in The Cass Series on Peacekeeping: Peacebuilding and Police Reform (2000, Vol. 7), pp. 9–27.

35. A/47/277–S/24111: 17 June 1992, “An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemakingand Peace-keeping.” Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the SummitMeeting of the Security Council on 31 January 1992, para. 44.

36. Supplement, paras. 35–36.37. Brahimi Report, “Executive Summary” and paras. 21, 48, 50–51.38. United Nations, Report of the High-Level Panel, paras. 211–213.39. 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 92.40. NATO, Peace Support Operations, Unclassified Document no. AJP-3.4.1, 2002. NATO’s peace

support operations doctrine was crafted painstakingly over a period of years. NATO members presentedover 500 comments and amendments to the fourth draft of AJP-3.4.1. Henning A. Frantzen, NATOPeace Support Operations 1991–1999: Policies and Doctrines (New York: Frank Cass/Taylor & Fran-cis, 2005), p. 78. A new NATO peace operations doctrine has been drafted but had not been released asof the time of writing.

41. Current thinking in ECOWAS is reflected in ECOWAS Workshop, Lessons Learned fromECOWAS Peacekeeping Operations: 1990–2004, February 2005. East Africa has taken steps to establisha standby brigade for East Africa, and its “policy framework” states that its doctrine shall be consistent



with that of the UN. IGAD Secretariat, Policy Framework for the Establishment of the Eastern AfricaStandby Brigade (EASBRIG), 11 April 2005.

42. One of the most recent is UK Ministry of Defense, The Military Contribution to Peace Sup-port Operations, 2nd ed., Joint Warfare Publication (JWP) 3-50 (Swindon, UK: Ministry of Defense,June 2004).

43. For a prescient comment on the doctrinal void that existed in peace operations in the early1990s, see John Ruggie, “Wandering in the Void: Charting the UN’s New Strategic Role,” ForeignAffairs 72, no. 5 (Nov.–Dec. 1993): 26–31.

44. United Nations, Report of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping and Its Working Group at the2005 Substantive Session, A/59/19, 1 March 2005, paras. 30, 46.

45. 2005 World Summit Outcome, para. 92.46. Brahimi Report, at para. 49.47. There is a difference between using force to compel an action and using it to deter, and the

requirements are hard to gauge when more than one actor needs to be compelled or deterred. See JohnRuggie, “The UN and the Collective Use of Force: Whither or Whether,” International Peacekeeping 3,no. 4 (Winter 1996): 1–20.

48. The 2005 World Summit did not endorse the UN’s strategic reserve proposal per se, but it didurge development of “enhance rapidly deployable capacities to reinforce peacekeeping operations intimes of crisis.” UN General Assembly, Resolution 60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome, 20 September2005.

49. The Constitutive Act of the African Union endorses the principles of sovereignty and noninter-vention while granting the AU a right to intervene in a member state “in respect of grave circumstances,namely war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” and, since 2003, “a serious threat to legiti-mate order.” See Constitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(h); and Protocol Relating to the Estab-lishment of the Peace and Security Council, Article 4(j), as amended in February 2003.

50. Alex Bellamy, Paul Williams, and Stuart Griffin, eds., Understanding Peacekeeping (Cam-bridge, UK: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 11–33.




Kosovo: In Search ofa Public Order StrategyRichard Gowan

2

19


Through 2005, the international presence inKosovo prepared for a transformation of itsstructure and role. Policy reflected a growingconsensus that the province’s final status must benegotiated—and that while it has been underSerbian sovereignty and UN administration since1999, its Albanian majority does not wish toaccept either for much longer. Belgrade remainsopposed to Kosovar independence, but anOctober report by the UN Secretary-General’sSpecial Envoy Kai Eide recommended that sta-tus talks should begin. Kofi Annan and theSecurity Council accepted this proposal withalacrity, and November saw the appointment offormer Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari tooversee talks.

This represented a shift from the inter-national community’s previous concentrationon “standards before status,” which had em-phasized the development of the rule of lawand minority rights. While Eide reportedmixed progress on standards issues, the initialimpetus to move on status was influenced bya fear that the NATO-led Kosovo Force(KFOR) and the UN Interim AdministrationMission in Kosovo (UNMIK) had an uncer-tain hold on public order. This stemmed froman outburst of violence initiated by elementsof the Kosovo Albanian community in March2004, which saw rioting, the destruction ofSerb homes, and attacks on international per-sonnel, property, and vehicles.

Although this lasted for just three days, andcaused limited casualties (including nineteendead), KFOR’s performance was described byits next commander as a “defeat.”1 UNMIK, re-sponsible for policing the province, has also

received heavy criticism for its reaction to theviolence.2 Significant numbers of troops andinternational police officers retreated in theface of disorder, leaving local leaders to end theviolence.

This case study analyzes the factors thatleft KFOR and UNMIK unready for the Marchviolence, and their efforts to move to a crediblesecurity posture thereafter. Kosovo offersimportant lessons about the vulnerabilities ofpeace operations, having experienced dilem-mas increasingly common to other missions.These include the coordination of internationalorganizations in the field, the balance betweenmilitary and police in maintaining public order,and the search for local political consent.

That the international presence has strug-gled to resolve these issues in Kosovo is tell-ing, for it has had unusually expansive man-dates and resources. Even before the SecurityCouncil formally granted KFOR a ChapterVII mandate in Resolution 1244, NATO com-pleted an agreement with the Yugoslav armedforces giving it “the authority to take all neces-sary action to establish and maintain a secureenvironment for all citizens of Kosovo andotherwise carry out its mission.”3 At its peakin late 1999, KFOR fielded 50,000 troops—more than were then involved in all peaceoperations in Africa combined.

In security terms, UNMIK was also givenan unprecedented mandate for executive polic-ing, and while its civilian police arm has shrunksince 2003, it still accounted for 31 percent ofUN police personnel worldwide in November2005. That both UNMIK and KFOR havebeen unable to assert full control in Kosovo

20


raises questions about the implementation ofambitious mandates, and the extent to whichthey can survive friction in the field.

These questions are timely, for while talkson Kosovo’s future may alter the environmentin which the international presence operates,they will not mean its end. Although the UNhas indicated a desire to withdraw from Ko-sovo, both the European Union and the Orga-nization for Security and Cooperation in Europe(OSCE) have been partners in UNMIK (deal-ing with economic and governance issuesrespectively) and are willing to have a contin-ued role. EU membership is one key potentialpolitical incentive on offer to Kosovo. But theresidual international presence is also likely tohave a strong security element—internationaland local observers concur that KFOR (proba-bly supplemented by EU police) must remainfor perhaps a decade to guarantee the securityof Kosovo and of the Serbs who now represent5 percent of its population. How can the futureinternational presence ensure that this guaran-tee is credible?

This focus on security should not detractfrom other outstanding problems. Kosovo’s eco-nomic situation is dire. By late 2005, gross do-mestic product was falling and unemploymentwas above 60 percent.4 Criticism has been aimedat the EU’s stewardship of economic reformwithin UNMIK, especially as international aidflows have been diverted elsewhere.5 Surveysindicate that 70 percent of Kosovo’s overall pop-ulation is either “not satisfied” or “not satisfied atall” with current economic trends, almost twiceas many as are unhappy with political develop-ments (although this clearly reflects majorityAlbanian opinion).6

Some in the international community hopethat a political settlement would attract in-vestment and allow international financial in-stitutions to assist Kosovo as an officially des-ignated “low-income country under stress.”But any hopes for the economy based on Ko-sovo’s future status require that this status besecure—a sustainable and effective ongoingpeace operation in Kosovo must underpin itseconomic development.

Strategy and Reality, 1999–2004

Under Resolution 1244, KFOR and UNMIKwere tasked with Kosovo’s security and adminis-tration, and the latter was also charged with shap-ing “provisional institutions for democratic andautonomous self-government.” This implied asecurity strategy, although it was neither explicitnor detailed. Intended to deter Yugoslavia afterthe ethnic cleansing of the summer of 1999,KFOR had the additional role of “ensuring pub-lic safety and order until the international civilpresence can take responsibility for this task.”In turn, UNMIK’s projected responsibilities in-corporated “civil law and order, including

KOSOVO: IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC ORDER STRATEGY • 21


establishing local police forces and meanwhilethrough the deployment of international policepersonnel to serve in Kosovo.”

The international presence was thus de-ployed in the hope that it would oversee atransfer of security to domestic agencies, andthe training of the Kosovo Police Service wasduly launched in the fall of 1999. But thisstrategy foundered on two underlying secu-rity problems: the retreat of the residual Serbminority into enclaves, and the threat posedto the formation of Kosovar security forcesby tensions in the Albanian community.

As KFOR entered Kosovo, it encoun-tered a wave of attacks on Serbs and otherminorities. Around half the Serb populationfled, while the rest held on in a large contigu-ous area in the mountainous north of the

province or in scattered towns and villages,mainly in its south and east. Further violencein 2000 and individual attacks suggested thatAlbanian radicals were focused on destroyingor occupying Serb property (whereas Serbviolence centered on retaliation, protests, anddisruption). The international presence founditself responsible for the territorial defense ofthe Serb enclaves.

The Serb minority’s position also mili-tated against its inclusion in any domesticsecurity structures. Especially in northernKosovo, the community has been supportedby “parallel structures” financed by Belgrade,embracing not only education and healthcarebut also a court system and (by some estimates)up to 1,000 plainclothes security personnel.After early confrontations with UNMIK andKFOR—including attacks on UN vehicles andefforts to bar NATO troops from some en-claves—the Serbs developed an ambiguousrelationship with the international presence,requiring its defense but refusing to fullyaccept its administration.

Ambiguity likewise surrounded relationsbetween the international presence and Kos-ovo’s two main Albanian movements. TheKosovo Liberation Army (KLA) had foughtYugoslav forces, and claimed 28,000 mem-bers in 1999. It was central to, but not solelyresponsible for, the burst of violence againstSerbs. By contrast, the Democratic League ofKosovo (LDK) publicly eschewed force andhad developed a shadow government forKosovo in the 1990s. After 1999, politicalcompetition between these factions spilled intolow-level violence, including assassinations ofsenior LDK advisers.

UNMIK attempted to resolve this conflictthrough two forms of assimilation: an institu-tional bargain with the KLA and the develop-ment of political space for the LDK. In 1999,the KLA’s leader, Hashim Thaci, agreed todisband his paramilitaries in return for prom-ises that some 5,000 of them would be draftedinto the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC),ostensibly a nonmilitary formation intended torespond to civil emergencies. Others might


• Resolution passage 10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244)and date of effect (note: paragraph 19 of the resolution

states that international civil and securitypresences are established for an initialperiod of twelve months, to continuethereafter unless the Security Councildecides otherwise)

• SRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark)• Police Commissioner Kai Vittrup (Denmark)• Budget $264 million (June 2004–July 2005)• Strength as of Police: 2,186

31 October 2005 Military observers: 35International civilian staff: 629Local civilian staff: 2,393UN volunteers: 201

UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)

• Authorization date 10 June 1999 (UNSC Res. 1244)• Start date June 1999• Head of mission Lieutenant-General Giuseppe Valotto

(Italy)• Budget as of $29.8 million

30 September 2005• Strength as of Troops: 17,174

30 September 2005

NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)


enter the KPS. While UNMIK did not co-optLDK structures directly, it oversaw a series ofelections in which the party was able to buildon its popularity. In 2002, LDK leader IbrahimRugova became Kosovo’s first president. Hehad consistently refused to ally with Thaci’sDemocratic Party of Kosovo (PDK).

But if UNMIK’s tactics ostensibly hadoffered both the LDK and KLA leaderships’postconflict roles, this political settlementproved unstable. The KPC—with just under3,900 members at its formation—was associ-ated not only with organized crime but alsowith efforts to promote a “greater Albania.”7

From 2000 to 2003, and especially in 2001,Kosovo was affected by insurgencies in theneighboring Presevo valley in Serbia properand the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedo-nia (FYROM). Senior KPC officers weredirectly involved in these conflicts, leading toa 2002 crackdown on their activities.

Having attempted to assimilate the Alban-ian paramilitaries, the international communitywas therefore forced to contain the conse-quences. In 2001, NATO both helped broker acease-fire in the Presevo region and deployedtroops in FYROM—the latter mission wouldbe followed by EU military and police deploy-ments in 2003.8 Within Kosovo, containmentproved less easy: KLA associations of “warveterans” continued to promote a hard-linepolitical agenda, and former paramilitariesstaffed private security companies that grewincreasingly hostile to the international secu-rity presence and developing KPS after 2000.9

Both the LDK and the PDK also maintainedtheir own extralegal “intelligence services,”the activities of which only became subject ofopen public debate in 2005.

A Coordinated Operation?

Kosovo’s internal conflicts presented two chal-lenges to KFOR and UNMIK in implementingResolution 1244. First, the need to protect Serbenclaves raised operational questions about thetransfer from military to civilian security. Sec-ond, the potential for destabilization arising

from within the Albanian community prompteddoubts about the ultimate goal of that process:domestic policing. These problems were exac-erbated by the complexity of the internationalmechanisms established to implement Resolu-tion 1244.

While KFOR and UNMIK were institu-tionally separate, both were internally convo-luted. KFOR was hampered by differences be-tween national contingents, while police issueswere spread across UNMIK. In June 1999,after limited prior planning, it was agreed inNew York that UNMIK should have a “pil-lar” structure: the UN took responsibility forcivil administration and humanitarian affairs,the OSCE for governance issues, and the EUfor economic matters. After some disputeover the proper place of civil order, it wasdecided that the UN should provide executivepolicing and police training in the field, butthe OSCE would run UNMIK’s police schooland (as domestic institutions grew) handlequestions of political oversight.

While these organizations were not sub-ject to a detailed strategy, structures were putin place for close organizational cooperation.All UNMIK pillars were subject to the Spe-cial Representative of the Secretary-General,whose principal deputy headed an executivecommittee supported by a joint planning group.Relations between UNMIK and KFOR were tobe maintained through direct links between theSRSG and NATO field commander, comple-mented by UNMIK liaison officers throughoutKosovo. Numerous ad hoc coordinating com-mittees were formed as the mission continued.

These coordination mechanisms were ini-tially bolstered by close cooperation on securityissues—a matter of necessity. While UNMIKwas tasked with providing regular police and tenspecial police units to handle disorder, these werelargely deployed after the most intense violencein 1999. UNMIK police did not exceed 1,000until that September, only reaching 2,000 thenext February, by which time NATO had de-ployed gendarmerie units to compensate for theabsence of policing. Confronting recurrent dis-turbances, KFOR and UNMIK did not attempt a



smooth transition of duties, but shared responsi-bility for public order. In 2002, NATO proposedthat its force should be restructured to emphasizebetter cooperation with civilian police.

While structurally distinct, KFOR andUNMIK were therefore driven together bytheir security environment. But as that en-vironment improved after 2000, both high-level and field coordination declined—com-munication within UNMIK also worsened, asthe SRSG’s executive committee effectivelyceased to function. The international presenceallowed ad hoc cooperation to deteriorate,very far from the process envisaged in Resolu-tion 1244. This deterioration was exacerbatedby a decline in KFOR’s capabilities and slowprogress by UNMIK in shifting responsibilityto the KPS. Combined, these left the inter-

national presence with insufficient securityresources.

KFOR: From Defense to Deterrence?

KFOR’s security role was overshadowed bythe problem of the Serb enclaves, the protec-tion of which was neither a straightforwardmilitary task nor a civil order issue. Its trou-bled deployment complete, KFOR aimed tosecure Kosovo through establishing fixedpositions across the province, and especiallyaround Serb areas and Orthodox religioussites. This strategy of direct defense was cou-pled with protection of Serb convoys fromthe enclaves, coordinated with the UN HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). If thisposture was an obstacle to transferring secu-


The UN Interim Administration Mission inKosovo is often cited as the first exampleof the “integrated mission concept,” bywhich a variety of organizations and agen-cies answer to a single Special Representa-tive of the Secretary General (SRSG). Yetthe concept remains problematic. A May2005 report on integrated missions, com-missioned by the UN Executive Committeeon Humanitarian Affairs, found a “verygeneral assumption that integration is theway of the future,” but “little specific agree-ment about what comprises an integratedmission in practice.”

The report concentrated on how UNagencies should cooperate in helpingcountries and territories through politicaltransitions, and underlined the dilemmasinherent in maintaining interagency co-operation through these processes. Theseinclude the tensions between success-fully engaging in political affairs whilemaintaining the impartiality of humani-tarian and human rights activities. It alsonoted that, where UN agencies have been

in the field before the arrival of an SRSGor peace mission, there are risks of fric-tion, “parallel structures and in rare caseseven system dysfunction.”

Noting that the Secretary-Generalhas emphasized the primacy of the SRSGin such situations, the report made pro-posals for enhancing integration withinmissions, including:

• The Security Council and UN Secre-tariat should define a “center of grav-ity” for a mission—“the decisive param-eters that must be influenced to makeall the other activities possible”—anddraw up a “mission-specific profile” forthe SRSG on the basis of this strategicperspective.

• While existing UN Country Teamsshould recognize the leadership of theSRSG, they must be closely involvedin predeployment needs assessmentsand planning.

• Once in the field, the SRSG should forma “cabinet structure,” bringing together

representatives of all agencies to promotegreater coherence in the mission.

• The SRSG should be supported by astrategic planning capacity and a cellreporting on mission funding, as wellas a senior humanitarian coordinatorand human rights adviser.

• All UN agencies—and other actors asappropriate—should have access to ajoint operations center, and the mis-sion should sustain outreach to localactors.

While these proposals echo struc-tures put in place by UNMIK and otherUN missions, they have often provedfragile. The integrated missions reportemphasized the importance of a peace-building commission and support office,as approved by the World Summit, indeveloping new practices among mem-ber states and the UN Secretariat. It alsoheld that a doctrine must be developedto regulate the interaction of UN mili-tary and civilian staff.

Box 2.1 The Report on Integrated Missions

Source: Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, Karin von Hippel, Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectivesand Recommendations (Independent Study for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May 2005).


rity responsibilities to UNMIK, it was also agrowing strain on KFOR’s manpower.

KFOR began to shrink in an unplannedfashion almost as soon as the force had reachedfull strength. In February 2000, NATO officialscomplained that some troop contributors wereleaving “hollow battalions” in Kosovo, andthat others were supplying relatively small con-tingents that lacked the robust capabilities ofthe original force.10 Through that year, KFOR’saverage strength was approximately 20 percentbelow its 1999 peak of 50,000 (including 7,500troops in rear areas). Many contributors in-sisted on supplying their own support units,creating a high degree of duplication and re-ducing force flexibility.

While NATO initially tried to reversethese trends, they continued. By the winter of2003–2004, KFOR consisted of 18,500 troops,of which just 6,000 were combat troops. Itscommanders had attempted to reorient itsstrategy and posture to reflect its decreasingsize. In October 2001, KFOR launched an“unfixing strategy,” by which it began tomove toward more flexible patrolling, replacingdirect defense of Serb areas with the deterrent

of rapid response to any incident. It washoped that unfixing, meant to conclude inOctober 2002, might help Serb communitiesescape a siege mentality and accept policeprotection.

Unfixing was nonetheless opposed by Serbcommunities and delayed by specific acts of vio-lence—it was incomplete in March 2004. Reformproposals foundered on many troop contributors’disinclination to deploy their best forces in Kos-ovo. And there were operational obstacles to flex-ibility: KFOR’s posture was based on four multi-national brigades with distinct areas of operation.Many national contingents had major caveatsagainst their deployment beyond these—in2000, US forces effectively refused an orderfrom KFOR’s commander to reinforce embat-tled French units.11 Although KFOR maintaineda central reserve, its posture remained static andits capacity for deterrence limited by 2004.

UNMIK Police and KPS:A Stalled Transition?

While the military presence declined in a fasterand less organized fashion than originally


Year1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005

60,000

50,000

40,000

30,000

20,000

10,000

0

50,000

42,70039,000

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erof

Troo

ps

Figure 2.1 KFOR Force Strength, 1999–2005

Source: SIPRI Yearbooks 1999–2004 and SIPRI data in this volume.Note: Figures are for 31 December of each year, except 30 September 2005.


anticipated, both international and domesticpolice had difficulty handling the resultingtransfer of authority. UNMIK police werecredited with significantly improving the secu-rity situation as their deployment gatheredpace. But the force proved unwieldy, typicallyincluding officers from over fifty countries,with divergent traditions and limited local lan-guage skills.12 They shared little mutual re-spect with many NATO contingents.

UNMIK police were further hampered byresource problems and a troubled relationshipwith the nascent KPS. As there had been nodomestic police capacity in Kosovo in mid-1999, the mere existence of the KPS was asignal achievement for UNMIK. But whiledomestic officers started to serve with UNMIKpolice in late 1999, their training had beenbrief, and internationals were often inclined toignore or overrule them. In 2001 it was offi-cially projected that the KPS should take fullresponsibility for policing in 2006, but thisprocess only advanced after cuts to the budgetof UNMIK police in 2003.13

Even by 2004, when the KPS numbered5,000 officers, they largely held subordinateposts, and police stations were still underUNMIK command. Crucially, responding toserious public disorder remained an inter-national responsibility. The KPS lacked riot-trained units in 2004, and its officers were illequipped to support UNMIK’s special policeunits in this regard. Prior to March 2004,those units typically fielded just under 1,000personnel (marginally below their originalprojected strength), in addition to around 350KFOR gendarmes, involved in patrols andtargeting organized crime.

The Intelligence GapWhile the international operations’ securityresources were thus in decline before March2004, they were further reduced by anotherserious shortage: information. From 1999 on-ward, KFOR was responsible for collectingand distributing political intelligence, whileUNMIK field officers provided political report-ing—both they and the KPS were involved in


Peacekeepers step in to separate clashing ethnic Albanians and Serbs in Mitrovica, March 2004

AP

Pho

to/s

tr


monitoring criminal activity. The InternationalCrisis Group has claimed that both NATO andUNMIK had informal links with the LDK andPDK “intelligence services.”14 But internationalofficials consistently complain of the nearimpossibility of gathering evidence on politi-cally motivated crimes within the Albaniancommunity.

Whatever the quality of information gath-ered, its distribution proved problematic.KFOR was reportedly wary of supplying in-formation to UN officials for fear it might leak(possibly through the KPS). Within UNMIK,there was a widely recognized tendency tooveroptimistic reporting, and overall jointanalysis of material gathered was poor. Theinternational presence failed to predict theMarch 2004 events despite growing evidenceof potential unrest—the violence marked anintelligence failure.

March 2004Unable to either find a satisfactory solution todefense of the Serb enclaves or effectively

monitor and intervene in internal conflictswithin the Albanian community, KFOR andUNMIK proved highly vulnerable when vio-lence struck Kosovo on 17 March 2004.Exactly how well coordinated this uprisingwas remains disputed, but its roots are clear:in 2003, Kosovo’s economic growth hadslumped, and with progress toward a politicalsettlement conspicuously absent, Kofi Annanagain warned in October 2003 of “an increasein violent incidents aimed against UNMIKlaw enforcement personnel and property.” Bythe year’s end, public satisfaction with UNMIKwas below 30 percent.15

While the March rioting thus represented aresurgence of violence against the Serb minor-ity (with, as before, a particular focus on thedestruction of property), it was also a protestagainst the international presence in Kosovo.Over 100 UNMIK vehicles were burned. Asthe rioting unfolded, the flaws inherent inKFOR and UNMIK’s posture became clear:many NATO contingents refused to movebeyond their set areas of operation (although


Perc

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80%

70%

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50%

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0%Jan.–Apr.

2003May–Aug.

2003Sept.–Dec.

2003Jan.–Apr.

2004May–Aug.

2004Sept.–Dec.

2004Jan.–Apr.

2005May–Aug.

2005

Political Pessismism (”Notsatisfied” or “not satisfied atall” with current politicaltrends)

Economic Pessimism (”Notsatisfied” or “not satisfied at all” with current economic trends)

Satisfaction with UNMIK’sPerformance

Figure 2.2 Public Opinion in Kosovo, 2003–2005

Source: “Early Warning Report” Series (UNDP/USAID).


US forces were now an exception) and re-treated to barracks.

UNMIK police had no crisis managementstructure in place, and while officers adoptedad hoc procedures, its special police unitswere not deployed strategically. Those thatdid deploy in the flash point of Mitrovicawere outmaneuvered by rioters.

The long-standing failure to define secu-rity responsibilities translated into intensefriction between KFOR and UNMIK policein many locations, with some NATO troopsaccused of barring UN officers from actingassertively. While a significant number ofKPS members were prepared to engage therioters, they lacked backing and direction fromUNMIK, and their efforts remained incoher-ent. Having failed to foresee the violence,some KFOR contingents were confused by aninflow of unreliable, alarmist intelligence.

NATO partially compensated for thesefailings by transferring 3,000 troops from itssecurity force in Bosnia to Kosovo—includ-ing additional gendarmerie. But the Marchevents were proof of a troubled transition interms of the post-1999 security framework.KFOR and UNMIK were inflexible, and Res-olution 1244’s proposed shift from military tocivil security had been undermined by insuf-ficient resources and coordination.

From Violence to Final Status?

The violence over, KFOR attempted to pub-licize a renewed robustness: prior to assem-bly elections in October 2004, 360 Frenchparachutists dropped near Pristina. Yet theinternational presence recognized that newsecurity policies must be tolerable to theAlbanian majority. KFOR and UNMIK thusadopted a twin-track approach to security re-form. This combined a rapid transition to aKPS-centered security structure with a moreproactive political approach to tensions withinthe Albanian community.

In adopting this new political course, theinternational presence has enjoyed certain po-litical advantages. First, a new SRSG—Søren

Jessen-Petersen—arrived in June 2004, andhis emphasis on political progress has pro-moted acceptance of (if not affection for)UNMIK. In cooperation with KFOR’s incom-ing commander, Lieutenant-General Yves deKermabon, he restored high-level coordina-tion within the international community.

For a brief period, UNMIK also found adomestic political partner in Ramush Haradi-naj, an anti-PDK KLA veteran and leader of asmall party allied to the LDK. Haradinaj be-came prime minister under President Rugovain December 2004, adopting positive rhetoricand policies toward the Serb minority. How-ever, he was indicted for war crimes in March2005—his voluntary decision to give himselfup to the International Criminal Tribunal inThe Hague averted the possibility of renewedviolence. The year 2005 also saw the rise of anavowedly peaceful protest movement demand-ing “Independence, not Negotiations.” Overall,the number of violent crimes reported in thefirst nine months of 2005 stood at 671, only 10percent above the same period in 2003.16 None-theless, these included a March 2005 attempt toassassinate Rugova, and the last quarter of theyear saw a spate of paramilitary roadblocksand intimidation in the west of the province.

A New Security Framework

In late 2004, a memorandum of understandingwas drawn up recognizing that the KPS shouldhave primary responsibility for public order, withUNMIK in reserve and KFOR in the last resort.UNMIK has transferred command of police sta-tions to KPS since mid-2005 and developed KPSriot units, of which twenty-two will be func-tional by 2006 (supplemented by sixteen bor-der police units).17 Their training and planningemphasized rapid response—over 300 poten-tial targets for violence have been surveyed.

The KPS will expand its role further:some of its riot units are being trained asweapons specialist teams. However, UNMIKand the KPS have emphasized the need todefuse potential violence before it escalates,engaging with protest leaders so as to avoid



provocation. While this has been successfulto date, there have been complaints that theKPS has been slow to receive key equipment,including body armor, for budgetary reasons,and serious violence in 2005 would haveseverely damaged its credibility.

Increasingly a reserve force (in additionto taking a role in monitoring the KPS’s per-formance), UNMIK police shrank from 3,604officers in mid-2004 to 2,612 a year later.KFOR has maintained its strength at 17,000—increased by 2,000 for the October 2004 elec-tions—and has once again concentrated onflexibility. It has aimed to iron out nationalcaveats on issues such as deployment: oneofficial described this process as “90 percentcomplete” in September 2005. Structurally,KFOR is moving toward a system of five “taskforces” able to operate throughout Kosovo,with rationalized support units.

Concerns remain that a major crisis woulddivide national contingents anew. Efforts tolink the improvement in high-level communi-cation between KFOR and UNMIK with betterlower-level coordination are intensifying.Nonetheless, the relationship between thedomestic and international security forces maybroadly be described as an effort to achieve thetransfer of authority to the KPS that falteredbefore March 2004, combined with a more cre-ative approach to “unfixing.” It is not a newstrategy, but a more determined implementa-tion of the former concept.

A New Political Framework

It is the second track of activities that repre-sents a greater shift: a multitiered effort tobuild political consensus on security, whileimproving information-gathering. Since 2004,both KFOR and UNMIK have been readier toengage with local opinion than before. KFORhas used small groups of troops to gatherinformation on local problems. The OSCE pil-lar of UNMIK has reached out to hard-lineSerb and Albanian groups, such as the KLA“war veterans,” formerly excluded from polit-ical discussions.

A more formal consultation process hascentered on the preparation of the InternalSecurity Sector Review (ISSR), combinedwith efforts to give Kosovars ownership oversecurity issues through institutional and politi-cal mechanisms. These include new domesticministries of the interior and justice—for-mally proposed in June 2005—although effortsto start these up by 1 November 2005 failed.Critics have claimed that this institution-building preempts a decision on Kosovo’sstatus, but UNMIK officials will continue toretain most powers over security affairs in thenear term. A phased handover of responsi-bilities to the ministries through 2006 hasbeen mapped out, conditional on the latter’sproving their readiness.

There is public concern that these newbodies will become heavily politicized—withsignificant implications should they takeresponsibility for the courts and the KPS. Thedevelopment of the ministries arguably repre-sents a new phase in competition between theLDK and the PDK. Whereas the internationalcommunity was previously cut out of thatcompetition, the ministries represent a signif-icant prize. This has been underlined by dis-cussions over whether the interior ministrywill have responsibility for a domestic intelli-gence service, and the question of whether itcan and should co-opt members of the LDKand PDK’s extralegal intelligence arms. Theinternational community faces the dilemmaof bringing them into a legal frameworkwithout compromising its credibility.

The OSCE pillar of UNMIK has pro-moted two governance measures to buildpublic confidence in the reforms. Regardingthe KPS, it has proposed the creation of anindependent domestic police inspectorate, tobe developed in close collaboration withinternational monitors. Second, it has empha-sized the need for Kosovo’s assembly todebate and scrutinize the ministries, creatingspecific committees to track their work. Whilethese may permit transparency, there havebeen complaints that the OSCE pillar hasbeen poorly informed of the ministries’



development and reports of members of thecurrent government lobbying to maximizeministerial autonomy and authority.

These problems have come to overshadowthe future of the KPC, which while no longer acenter of destabilization, remains a politicalproblem. Although publicly perceived as anarmy-in-waiting, should Kosovo achieve sov-ereignty, the KPC’s roots in the KLA make itpolitically sensitive. The international com-munity would prefer to disband the KPC, andshift some of its personnel into a new de-fense force—although it may not be calledan “army,” as a gesture to Belgrade, and isunlikely to be more than lightly armed.

While there are thus significant institu-tional dilemmas to be resolved, UNMIK isalso attempting to create a strategic consen-sus around the institutions through the ISSR.This was launched in June 2005 to promoteconsultations on the internal security problemsKosovo faces, building domestic politicalcommitment to (and external donor confi-dence in) the arrangements made to tackle

them. It will involve not only political partiesbut also civil society—including members ofthe Serb community. But while the ISSR hasreceived considerable publicity, there havebeen problems in its funding, and some con-fusion as to how to its consultations and con-clusions will affect institutional change.

Despite these difficulties, UNMIK hasarguably shifted to a more holistic approachto Kosovo’s security. While there was previ-ously a lack of continuity between KFOR’sposture, the development of the KPS, and do-mestic politics, these have now been broughttogether through the empowerment of theKPS and the related political discussions. Yetconcerns remain that the Serb minority havestood apart from this process—and there arefears that its members in the north may turnto violence during the final status talks.

Conclusion

It is too early to say whether Kosovo’s newsecurity framework will succeed, and how it


French troops with KFOR parachute into Kosovo ahead of October 2004 elections

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will evolve after final status. Observers in-creasingly expect the EU, OSCE, and NATOto create a structure similar to that of theOffice of the High Representative in Bosniaand Herzegovina. This could both compensatefor a lack of domestic institutional capacityand allow continued international oversightof political developments. However, it mightcontinue to encounter significant problemsover security reform, as has the internationalpresence in Sarajevo. But the development ofKFOR and UNMIK to 2006 does offer broaderlessons for public order strategies.

Did the international presence’s “defeat”of 2004 derive from flaws in its security pos-ture, or from a political failure to understandand engage with Kosovo Albanian politics?The answer is both. KFOR and UNMIK didnot develop a joint posture aimed at the mostprobable threat after 1999: civil disorder aris-ing within the Albanian community.

In part, this reflected a growing diver-gence between their expansive mandates andthe overall decline in their resources. Buteven by March 2004, the international pres-ence still fielded a far greater pool of re-sources than most peace operations today. Itwas hampered by a lack of strategic coher-ence within either KFOR or UNMIK, and thedecline in communications between them.Kosovo demonstrated the need for hybridpeace missions to develop clear command

structures supported by effective contingencyplanning and intelligence-gathering and dis-tribution (a highly sensitive area for the UN).

In situations such as Kosovo—wherethreats emerge from irregular, not conventionalsources—such planning and intelligence effortsshould concentrate on the nexus of criminality,political violence, and potential civil disorder.This is less a matter of robust military activitythan an assertive approach to law and order.KFOR attempted to develop a system of mili-tary deterrence that was unsuited to a modu-lated response to public violence—UNMIKand the KPS did not evolve to fill the resultingpublic security gap. A strategy centered on lawenforcement should have been instituted torealize Resolution 1244.

As has been made clear since March 2004,such a strategy requires the involvement ofdomestic forces and political actors—theirprobity and loyalty may not always be guaran-teed. A more disciplined phased transfer ofsecurity responsibilities from the military tointernational and domestic police might havereduced these uncertainties and permitted theirmanagement. A combination of a tough publicorder framework with political engagementand intelligence activity should allow a peaceoperation to set the rules of the game for do-mestic players—and it is through those rulesthat peace can be maintained.



Notes1. “Kermabon: There Is No Chance for Another March,” Epoka e Re (Pristina), 21 December

2004.2. See, for example, International Crisis Group, Collapse in Kosovo (Brussels, 2004) and Human

Rights Watch, Failure to Protect: Anti-Minority Violence in Kosovo, March 2004 (New York, 2004).3. Military Technical Agreement Between the International Security Force (“KFOR”) and the

Governments of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, 9 June 1999.4. UNDP/USAID, Early Warning Report no. 10, 2005; Judy Batt, The Question of Serbia (Paris:

ISS-EU, 2005), p. 52.5. For a summary of economic problems, see John Bradley and Gerald Knaus, Towards a Kosovo

Development Plan (Pristina: ESPIG, 2004).6. UNDP/USAID, Early Warning Report no. 10.7. See Nicola Dahrendof et al. A Review of Peace Operations: A Case for Change (London: King’s

College, 2003).8. See p. 110 in this volume.9. Saferworld/International Alert, Small Arms and Light Weapons and Private Security Companies

in South East Europe: A Cause or Effect of Insecurity? (Belgrade: SEESAC, 2005).10. Elizabeth Becker, “Not Enough Troops in Kosovo, NATO Says,” New York Times, 26 February

2000.11. See RAND, Disjointed War: Military Operations in Kosovo, 1999 (Washington, D.C., 2002).12. Gordon Peake, Policing the Peace: Police Reform Experiences in Kosovo, Southern Serbia, and

Macedonia (London: Saferworld, 2004).13. Ibid.14. International Crisis Group, Kosovo After Haradinaj (Brussels, 2005).15. UNDP/USAID, Early Warning Report no. 7, 2004.16. UNDP/USAID, Early Warning Report no. 10.17. OSCE staff report that, by the end of November 2005, 1,655 KPS members had received civil

disorder training, including command-level officers.



MissionReviews3

33


The year 2005 was an extraordinary one forSudan. A comprehensive peace agreement(CPA), signed in January, brought to an endtwo and a half years of intensive negotiationsand a war that dates back to 1955. A major newUnited Nations operation, the UN Mission inSudan (UNMIS) was established to supportimplementation of that agreement. Meanwhile,the brutal conflict in Darfur led to the deploy-ment of the African Union’s second-ever peaceoperation. Established as an observer missionin 2004, the African Union Mission in Sudan(AMIS) grew to a major operation of almost7,000 by the end of October 2005, just as thesituation there took a significant turn for theworse. The challenge posed by the multipleconflicts in Sudan is a test of the ability of theUN, the AU, and a host of others to work cohe-sively to see a fragile and lengthy peaceprocess through to its conclusion.

Background

The conflict between north and south beganin 1955 and has continued for all but elevenof the forty-nine years of Sudan’s indepen-dence. For two decades, the Sudan People’sLiberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) foughtthe government over a range of issues: re-sources, power, national identity, and self-determination. Over 2 million people died, 4million were uprooted, and some 600,000people fled the country as refugees.

The Machakos Protocol of July 2002,brokered by the Inter-Governmental Authorityon Development (IGAD), set forth a frame-work for peace, culminating in a referendum

on self-determination for the south after asix-year interim period. That protocol wasfollowed by agreements on security arrange-ments, wealth-sharing, power-sharing, andresolution of the conflicts in Southern Kordo-fan, the Blue Nile States, and Abyei. In June2004, peace seemed to be just around the cor-ner, but it took until 9 January 2005 to final-ize the CPA.

The National Congress Party (NCP) gov-ernment of Sudan and the SPLM/A (twopolitical-military elites) saw the CPA as away out of a prolonged stalemate that wasgradually eroding their own political author-ity. Through the CPA, the south is granted asignificant degree of autonomy for the in-terim period, followed by the option of fullindependence, while the NCP retains its dom-inance in the national government and contin-ues to apply Islamic (Sharia) law in the north—at least until national elections that must beheld before 2009. However, many other polit-ical parties and armed groups were not part ofthe CPA negotiations. For the agreement tofully succeed, the legitimate demands of themarginalized peoples these groups claim torepresent (in Darfur, the east, and elsewhere)must be reconciled with the need to preservethe will of the elites within the CPA parties tosustain the process.

In Darfur, a violent conflict and humani-tarian crisis has been unfolding since February2003. A group called the Darfur LiberationFront (DLF) took up arms against governmentforces to protest against many years of politicaland economic marginalization. Rebranded theSudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A),

34

3.1

Sudan


the DLF announced the launch of an armedrebellion in March and was soon joined byother groups including the Justice and Equal-ity Movement (JEM) and the National Move-ment for Reform and Development (NMRD).The government of Sudan reacted by mobi-lizing tribal militias widely described as “jan-jaweed.” Resource disputes contributed to theescalation of the situation, with various groupsseeking to take advantage of the conflict byclaiming land or livestock of rival tribes.Tens of thousands were killed in fighting ordied from hunger and disease in Darfur. Bythe middle of 2005, almost 3.4 million of theregion’s 6 million inhabitants were “conflictaffected,” 1.8 million of whom were inter-nally displaced, mainly as a result of raids onvillages by the janjaweed militias.

The Security Council adopted a numberof resolutions on the situation in Darfur, in-cluding Resolution 1556 in July 2004, whichwelcomed a joint communiqué between thegovernment of Sudan and UN Secretary-Gen-eral that set out a number of steps the govern-ment was required to take. In September 2004the Security Council established an Inter-national Commission of Inquiry to determinewhether genocide was being committed inDarfur. In its January 2005 report, the com-mission concluded that the government hadnot pursued a policy of genocide, although “insome instances individuals . . . may commitacts with genocidal intent. Whether this wasthe case in Darfur, however, is a determinationthat only a competent court can make on acase by case basis.”1 The report added that thecrimes against humanity and war crimes thatwere committed may be “no less serious andheinous than genocide.” The commission gavethe Secretary-General a sealed file of names offifty-one people believed to be responsible,and recommended that the Security Councilrefer the matter to the International CriminalCourt (ICC). After some initial resistance bythe United States, Russia, and China, theCouncil did so on 31 March 2005, and theSecretary-General gave the list of names tothe prosecutor on 6 April. The Council also

adopted a sanctions regime under Resolution1591, targeted at individuals who impede thepeace process, commit atrocities, or violatethe arms embargo that had been imposed inmid-2004.

With UN support, the AU took the lead innegotiating a series of agreements, includingthe N’djamena Agreement of April 2004, theAddis Ababa Agreement of May 2004, andthe Abuja Protocols of November 2004.Together, they call for a halt to the violence,establishment of a cease-fire commission,and deployment of an AU observer mission.The Abuja Protocols set out a number ofbroad principles that became the basis for

SUDAN • 35


on-and-off talks between the parties over theyear in review, which resulted in a furtherdeclaration of principles in July 2005.

Mission Mandate and Deployment

UNMIS was established by the Security Coun-cil in March 2005 with a mandate to supportimplementation of the CPA by monitoring thecease-fire and redeployment of armed groups,assisting in the establishment of a disarma-ment, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)program, promoting political inclusiveness,assisting with restructuring police and rule oflaw institutions, monitoring human rights, sup-porting elections and referenda, and facilitatingthe return of refugees and internally displacedpersons (IDPs). The mandate is entirely underChapter VI, other than the standard language onthe protection of UN personnel and equipment,other international personnel, and civiliansunder imminent threat in its “areas of deploy-ment and as it deems within its capabilities,”which is under Chapter VII. The resolutionalso imposes the model status-of-forces agree-ment (SOFA), pending agreement on a spe-cific SOFA that had still not been signed bythe end of October 2005.

By the end of October, UNMIS hadreached about 35 percent of its authorizedstrength of almost 10,715 military and police.It was deployed throughout its area of opera-tions, though thinly in the south. The toptroop contributors were Bangladesh, Pakistan,India, Egypt, Nepal, Zambia, and Rwanda.About half of the civilian staff (internationaland national) were on the ground, performinga range of political, human rights, governance-related, and humanitarian tasks.

Planning for UNMIS benefited from the De-partment of Peacekeeping Operations’s (DPKO)participation in the political negotiations, a longlead time, the deployment of the UN AdvanceMission in Sudan (UNAMIS) in June 2004, andthe participation of the Standby High-ReadinessBrigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG).Nevertheless, the planning process ended in arushed final effort. Unexpected and extensiveresponsibilities in Darfur, combined with en-gagement in the sensitive north–south negotia-tions and planning for a major UN operation ina huge country, meant the mission was simplyspread too thin. Moreover the initial reluctanceof both parties to accept a large UN presencedelayed consultations with troop contributors for UNMIS, setting back the timetable fordeployment.

UNMIS is in essence a consent-based,multidimensional operation designed to assistthe parties on a wide range of military andcivilian tasks, but not to do the work of peaceand governance for them. It is led by SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)Jan Pronk, and aims to be a “unified mission”with common goals, an obligation to consultand share information, and common decision-making according to a specified chain ofcommand. Success in “unifying” the missionwas mixed, due partly to the lack of a corre-sponding unified approach between parts ofthe UN at the higher level.

The African Union Monitoring Mission inSudan (AUMIS) was originally deployed inJune 2004 as a mission of 60 observers and aprotection force of 300. In October of that year,reports of continued attacks on civilians and

36 • MISSION REVIEWS

• Resolution passage 24 March 2005 (UNSC Res. 1590)and date of effect

• SRSG Jan Pietar Pronk (Netherlands)• Force commander Major-General Fazle Elahi Akbar

(Bangladesh)• Police commissioner Glenn Gilbertson (United Kingdom)• Budget $956.81 million

(1 July 2005–30 June 2006)• Strength as of Troops: 3,519

31 October 2005 Military observers: 228Civilian police: 168International civilian staff: 496Local civilian staff: 881UN volunteers: 66

UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)


restrictions on the movement of humanitarianworkers prompted the AU Peace and SecurityCouncil to enhance the force to over 3,000 andgive it a stronger mandate. The expanded mis-sion (which by then was called AMIS) wasbased on plans drawn up in August with exten-sive assistance from the UN. Its new mandateincluded help to create “a secure environmentfor the delivery of humanitarian relief and,beyond that, the return of IDPs and refugees totheir homes.” The mission was also tasked withprotecting civilians “under imminent threat andin the immediate vicinity” within the limits ofits resources and capabilities. It was authorizedto deploy proactively to areas where troublewas expected, “in order to deter armed groupsfrom committing hostile acts against the pop-ulation,” and not just in response to reports ofviolations. The option of a mixed UN/AUprotection force was considered at the time,but AU determination to score a success inDarfur dovetailed with the government ofSudan’s opposition to non-African troops andthe unwillingness of Western countries tomake the necessary material and politicalcommitments. There were also genuine con-cerns about the technical feasibility of such anoperation.

Following an AU-led assessment missionin March 2005, AMIS was expanded again to

a total of 6,171 military personnel and 1,586civilian police. A later expansion of AMIS to12,300 troops in a third phase was contem-plated at the time, but less was heard of thatas the year wore on. The mission had reachedclose to its full strength by the end of Octo-ber. The largest troop-contributing countriesare Rwanda, Nigeria, and South Africa, withfurther contributions by Senegal, Gambia,and Kenya.

Key Developments and Challenges

Implementation of the CPA has made slowbut steady progress. On 9 March 2005 a gov-ernment–SPLM joint national transition teamwent to work in preparing for the establish-ment of governments at the national, south-ern-Sudan, and state/regional levels. In mid-April, a south–south dialogue was organizedto bring together political leaders and repre-sentatives of civil society. June saw a secondsouth–south dialogue, as well as an agreementby the National Democratic Alliance (an um-brella opposition group) to participate in im-plementation of the CPA. On 8 July, formerSPLM leader John Garang arrived in Khar-toum, to take up the position of first vicepresident under President Omar al-Bashir, withAli Osman Taha serving as second vice pres-ident. The interim national constitution wassigned the next day. Garang’s untimely death

SUDAN • 37

Young boy in front of an armored vehicle of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS),

Darfur, December 2004

• Authorization date 28 May 2004 (Agreement with Sudanese Parties)30 July 2004 (UNSC Res. 1556)

• Start date June 2004• Head of mission Baba Gana Kingibe (Nigeria)• Budget as of —


30 September 2005 Military observers: 650Civilian police: 1,222

African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)

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on 30 July precipitated a brief spasm of vio-lence, but the quick and relatively smoothsuccession of Salva Kiir to leadership of theSPLM and vice presidency enabled the cre-ation of a government of national unity on 23September, and the new legislature for SouthSudan was inaugurated on 30 September. TheSRSG and a cadre of advisers were activelyengaged on a political level and through goodoffices to support these developments.

Nevertheless, the Sudanese peace process isfragile. The challenge of political inclusivenessat the national level was graphically illustratedby the difficulties encountered in forming theNational Constitutional Review Commission inApril. The CPA formula for allocating seats hadto be altered to accommodate the main opposi-tion groups, who felt they were underrepresent-ed. Even then, most northern groups boycottedthe process, and the Darfur rebels and easternSudanese insurgents distanced themselves. Thelimited national consensus behind the new con-stitution was underlined by the formation inJune 2005 of a second opposition alliance, head-ed by the Umma Party and Popular Congress ofHassan el-Turabi.2

Meanwhile in the south, the establish-ment of governance institutions is proving tobe a major challenge, partly due to a woefullack of resources. Militias armed by the gov-ernment during the war and grouped underthe umbrella South Sudan Defense Force(SSDF) form a sizable military presence thatwas not involved in negotiating the CPA andhas considerable spoiler potential. The SPLM/A itself has a history of factionalism and hasfound it difficult to make the transition froman autocratic guerrilla army to a more inclu-sive political organization. The succession ofSalva Kiir galvanized the south–south dia-logue process intended to smooth divisions.But it remains to be seen whether he candeliver on high hopes for southern reconcilia-tion. Meanwhile, precisely what fuels hopesfor southern reconciliation—Kiir’s historicalposition in favor of secession—raises con-cerns in the north. Garang’s death may marka shift in the SPLM away from the “New

Sudan–make unity attractive” vision he cham-pioned, which has also prompted doubts abouthow helpful the SPLM could be in resolvingthe Darfur conflict.

Throughout the year, UNMIS struggled tobuild up the mission after a slow start. By Octo-ber 2005, military and civilian elements weredeployed throughout the south to monitor secu-rity elements of the CPA and in support of thefledgling government of South Sudan. Capacitybuilding in policing, rule of law, and humanrights gradually stepped up, while work in de-mining and returns was beginning to exhibitmore tangible dividends. Meanwhile, the mis-sion is providing good offices to facilitate con-flict resolution in Abyei and the east—two flashpoints and test cases for the government ofnational unity. And it supported AMIS and theAU, politically, operationally, and with a humanrights and humanitarian presence in Darfur.

UNMIS’s mandate allows for a robustapproach in the name of protecting civilians, inareas where it is deployed. However, its abilityto do more than deal with minor disturbancesin its immediate vicinity is questionable. Evenwhen the mission reaches full strength, it willhave neither the mandate nor the capacity todeal with a major breakdown in security. Thegamble is that the incentives for both the gov-ernment of Sudan and SPLM/A to implementthe CPA, combined with a substantial UNMISpresence and other forms of pressure, will beenough both to keep the main parties on boardand to bring in or neutralize the various groupswho might otherwise undermine the peaceprocess. The risks of such an approach are evi-dent; less evident is what the alternatives are.

While AMIS contributed to security and pro-tection of civilians in Darfur, the situation therefluctuated dramatically throughout the year.January 2005 saw a peak in violence, but eventhis was markedly down from mid-2004, and bylate summer there were fewer militia attacks, adecline in confirmed deaths, and greater human-itarian access. However, in October 2005 the UNSecretary-General reported an “alarming deterio-ration” in the security situation in all three Darfurstates.3 What had been a high level of banditry



and violence took on a more overtly politicalcharacter. Attacks and counterattacks by govern-ment forces, government-aligned militias, andthe armed rebel movements led to numerousdeaths, injuries, human rights violations, sexualviolence, abduction of children, and newly creat-ed IDPs. The Secretary-General was especiallytroubled by the government’s record. Never hav-ing made a serious effort to disarm the janjaweedand other armed outlaw groups, it now seemedgovernment forces had triggered some of theincidents and were supporting the militias in theirviolence. The SLM/A also initiated some of theattacks, suggesting that both sides were acting inblatant violation of their obligations. As disturb-ing, and also confusing the picture, attacks by thejanjaweed against government forces and agrowing divide within the SLM/A indicated ageneral descent into unrestrained violence. In hisNovember report, the Secretary-General describeda continuation of this trend, worrying that “thelooming threat of complete lawlessness andanarchy draws nearer, particularly in westernDarfur, as warlords, bandits and militia groupsgrow more aggressive.”4

The Darfur political process, meanwhile,proceeded haltingly. There were encouragingdevelopments in July 2005 when the AbujaDeclaration of Principles was signed to shapefuture negotiations on unity, religion, power-sharing, wealth-sharing, security arrangements,and land use and ownership. But the sixth andseventh rounds of Abuja talks, in September andNovember respectively, were hamstrung by splitsand internal power struggles within the partici-pating rebel groups.

AMIS itself did not have an easy time of itin 2005. NATO, the EU, and bilateral donorsprovided operational support, though institu-tional rivalries involving NATO, the EU, theUN, and the AU complicated the situation.Equipment shortages, combined with intelli-gence and communications problems, werean obstacle to operational efficiency. The mis-sion itself was a target of attacks in 2005, first

in March and April and then again in Septem-ber–October, when five African Union peace-keepers were killed, three wounded, and someforty taken hostage. There were also reportsof the government painting its military vehi-cles in the white colors of the AU’s cease-firemonitors during attacks in North Darfur. Ageneral increase in attacks on internationalaid workers prompted the UN to announce on13 October that all nonessential staff wouldbe withdrawn from the region.

Darfur represents an enormous challengefor the AU. While the international communitycontinues to hope for consent to its activities—through the Abuja talks and on the ground—the ferocious collapse of the situation in the fallof 2005 suggested that hope may be in vain.New forms of pressure began to build in Junethrough the start of ICC investigations and thework of the panel of experts set up under Res-olution 1591. AMIS has a mandate to act ro-bustly to provide security and protect civilians,and its presence and active patrolling in andaround IDP camps made a tangible differencein the summer. But events toward the end ofthe year raised questions about its capacity torespond to widespread and systematic violence.Maximizing the capabilities of the AMIS per-sonnel was seen as a necessary step. Beyondthat, serious consideration was being given tothe idea of the UN establishing a mission inDarfur sometime in the year 2006, perhaps tak-ing over from the AU.

As the year drew to a close, the inter-twined challenges facing UNMIS and AMISwere plentiful. They concerned foot-draggingby the National Congress Party on the “sharing”principles embodied in the CPA, how to dealwith marginalized opposition groups through-out the country, and the slow buildup of south-ern civic governance institutions. Meanwhile,questions about what the AU, the UN, and oth-ers could do to address the badly deterioratingsituation in Darfur had reached a new level ofurgency.

SUDAN • 39


Notes1. International Commission of Inquiry, Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Dar-

fur to the United Nations Secretary-General, 5 January 2005, para. 641.2. International Crisis Group, The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace, Africa

Report no. 96, 25 July 2005, p. 4.3. United Nations, Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, Sudan, S/2005/650, 14

October 2005.4. United Nations, Monthly Report of the Secretary-General on Darfur, Sudan S/2005/719, 16

November 2005.



41

Haiti had a difficult year in 2005, and the UNStabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) achallenging one. A fluctuating security situationsaw signs of improvement in the latter half of theyear, while elections were repeatedly delayed.MINUSTAH’s more robust approach openedgreater access to some of Port-au-Prince’s poor-est and most dangerous neighborhoods, but thelevel of political and criminal violence, includingalmost daily kidnappings, remained deeply dis-turbing. Little progress was made in reformingthe corrupt Haitian National Police and even lessin reforming the judiciary. At the start of the year,Haiti was described by many as a “failing state”;twelve months later it is a somewhat safer place,but one whose future is far from secure.

Background

MINUSTAH is the latest in a series of six UNpeace operations in Haiti, dating back to theUN Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in 1995,which succeeded the US-led multinationalforce that saw President Jean-Bertrand Aris-tide’s return to power in 1994. Between thenand 2000, the Haitian army was formallyabolished and a measure of democracy wasrestored, but owing to the continuing politicalcrisis and concomitant lack of stability in thecountry, self-sustaining institutions and eco-nomic development never took hold. Presi-dent Aristide claimed victory in delayed elec-tions in the year 2000, with a turnout of barely10 percent of the voters. The other parties con-tested the results and, when dialogue with thegovernment broke down in late 2003, a newlyunited opposition movement began calling forthe president’s resignation.

The political stalemate erupted in armedconflict in the city of Gonaïves in February2004. Insurgents took control of much of thenorthern part of the country, and threatened tomarch on the Haitian capital. Under pressurefrom the United States and France, PresidentAristide signed a letter of resignation on 29February, and left the country on a US-char-tered plane for the Central African Republicunder circumstances that remain a source oftension. In response to a request from theinterim president, the UN Security Councilauthorized a US-led Multinational InterimForce (MIF) in March and declared its readi-ness to establish a follow-on UN stabilizationforce three months later. A Haitian Council ofEminent Persons appointed Gerard Latortue

3.2

Haiti



prime minister of a transitional government. Heformed a thirteen-member government shortlythereafter, composed mainly of individualsfrom the private sector and nongovernmentalorganization (NGOs)—a supposedly “techno-cratic” body that excluded most political par-ties, including Fanmi Lavalas, the party ofAristide. The transitional government signed apact with most political parties (but not Lava-las), civil society groups, and the Council ofEminent Persons, setting out a series of steps tobe taken during the transitional period, whichwas to culminate with the installation of anewly elected president in February 2006.


MINUSTAH formally took over from the3,700-strong MIF on 1 June 2004. Rehattingthe Chilean and Canadian contingents facili-tated the handover and, while the latter with-drew at the end of July, the Chileans remainedpart of the new mission. Brazil took overcommand of the operation, supplying 1,200troops as well as the force commander. Sub-stantial contingents from Argentina, Uruguay,Sri Lanka, Jordan, and Nepal followed, aswell as smaller contingents from Peru, Spain,Morocco, the Philippines, Ecuador, and Guat-emala. Meanwhile, Jordan, Nepal, Pakistan,

the Philippines, and Senegal were supplyingformed police units at the end of 2005, andindividual police officers came from overthirty countries. Over one thousand inter-national and national civilians also staffMINUSTAH.

The pace of deployment of MINUSTAHwas slow. By mid-August 2004, less than halfof the authorized troops and a quarter of thepolice were on the ground. By November 2004the mission was able to deploy throughout thecountry, but it took until February 2005 for itto get close to full strength. The slow deploy-ment was exploited by the former Haitian mil-itary, who occupied abandoned police stationsin August and September and contributed toserious waves of violence and criminality thatdid not subside until the end of 2004.

A Security Council mission to Haiti in April2005 identified a need for additional police andmilitary resources. The Secretary-General rec-ommended and the Council approved an expan-sion of the military component to 7,500 and thepolice to 1,897. A new battalion joined the mis-sion in October and a “force commander’s re-serve”—designed to serve as a quick reactionforce—was expected before the end of the year,along with a new formed police unit and 200individual police officers.

MINUSTAH’s mandate is based on acombined reading of Resolutions 1542 (2004)and 1608 (2005). While detailed, it straddlesthe line between assigning a purely assistancerole to MINUSTAH and authorizing a moreproactive, interventionist approach. The am-bivalence is largely a result of difference ofopinion in the Security Council. The effect isto give the UN Secretariat and mission con-siderable discretion to interpret the mandatein a manner that strikes an appropriate bal-ance between deference to local authoritiesand taking independent action to ensure itsobjectives are achieved. That balance evolvedthroughout 2005, tipping toward the end ofthe year in the direction of a more proactiveapproach in view of Haiti’s dire security situ-ation, weak state institutions, and the unwill-ingness of the transitional government to act

• Resolution passage 30 April 2004 (UNSC Res. 1542)• Start date 1 June 2004• SRSG Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile)• Acting force commander General Aldunate Eduardo Herman

(Chile)• Police commissioner Richard Graham Muir (Canada)• Budget $506.15 million


31 October 2005 Civilian police: 1,594International civilian staff: 438Local civilian staff: 469UN volunteers: 160

UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH)


as a true partner to MINUSTAH in pushingthe peace process forward.

The operative words in Resolution 1542are largely facilitative, but the key securityprovision is under Chapter VII of the UNCharter. It mandates MINUSTAH to “sup-port” the transitional government in provid-ing a secure environment, and to “assist” withthe disarmament of armed groups and themaintenance of public safety and public order.MINUSTAH is also authorized to act force-fully to protect UN personnel, as well as civil-ians under imminent threat of physical vio-lence, “within the mission’s capabilities andareas of deployment, without prejudice to theresponsibilities of the Transitional Governmentand of police authorities.” With the abolition ofthe army, the only security institution in Haitifor MINUSTAH to support and assist in thesefunctions is the Haitian National Police, anotoriously ineffective body. Resolution 1608reaffirmed MINUSTAH’s authority to “vetand certify” the HNP, implying a more proac-tive role in reforming the institution.

Given Haiti’s turbulent history, the need toensure credible elections was a priority for themission, and occupied the Special Representa-tive of the Secretary General (SRSG) and civil-ian staff for much of the year. The Organiza-tion of American States (OAS) Special Missionfor Strengthening Democracy in Haiti is man-dated by the OAS General Assembly to assistin the preparation of elections, in cooperationwith MINUSTAH. A memorandum betweenthe two organizations assigns principal respon-sibility for voter registration to the OAS, whileMINUSTAH is tasked with supervising allaspects of the electoral process and with pro-viding security.

In addition, MINUSTAH was tasked byResolution 1542 with helping the transitionalgovernment to initiate a broad-based “na-tional dialogue” among civil society as wellas the political parties. And in collaborationwith UN Development Programme (UNDP)and bilateral donors, MINUSTAH assistedthe transitional government in extending stateauthority throughout Haiti and sought to foster

decentralization and good governance at alllevels of government.

The overarching goal of MINUSTAH’sjustice function is to promote human rightsand renovate justice institutions. Small teamsof human rights officers deployed in tenregions monitored the dismal human rights sit-uation, undertook investigations, and sought tobuild local capacity, both in official institu-tions and among NGOs. Resolution 1542 gaveMINUSTAH a rather weak mandate to “de-velop a strategy” for reform of the judiciary,which was upgraded by Resolution 1608 totake a more active role in rebuilding the dys-functional court and correctional systems.

Finally, MINUSTAH has humanitarianand development functions, on both an emer-gency and a more long-term basis. An “interimcooperation framework” was developed withthe transitional government and a range ofbilateral and multilateral donors, focusing onfour priority areas: strengthening politicalgovernance, strengthening economic gover-nance, promoting economic recovery, and im-proving access to basic services.


SecurityBroadly speaking, there were two types ofsecurity threats in Haiti in 2005—politicallymotivated violence and criminality. Drawing

HAITI • 43

• Authorization date 16 January 2002 (OAS PermanentCouncil Decision CP/Res. 806); 6–8June 2004 (OAS General Assembly,A/Res. 2058, amended)

• Start date June 2004• Head of mission Ambassador Denneth Modeste

(Grenada)• Budget as of $15 million

30 September 2005• Strength as of Civilian police: 6

30 September 2005 Civilian staff: 24

OAS Special Mission for Strengthening Democracy in Haiti



a sharp line between the two is impossible, aspolitical actors often used armed gangs fortheir purposes, who in turn benefited from thepolitical associations and instability their activ-ities create. Many of the gangs are embeddedin local communities or operate among civil-ians crowded into the poorest districts of Port-au-Prince. Adding to the complexity, some ofthe violence springs not from a desire to spoilthe peace process, but rather from the chronicpoverty and social deprivation that has afflictedHaiti for years.

Resolutions 1542 and 1608 stipulate thatMINUSTAH’s security functions are largely“in support of the Transitional Government,”which in practical terms means in support ofthe Haitian National Police. Yet the HNP wastoo small, unreliable, politicized, and corruptto function effectively as a law enforcementagency, and indeed elements of the HNP wereaccused of human rights violations and crim-inal violence. Thus a central dilemma forMINUSTAH was how to provide operational

support to the HNP, while trying to turn it into aprofessional, rights-respecting law enforcementagency. Joint operations and “co-location” wasone solution, but that exposed the mission tocriticism for being associated with improperacts by the HNP.

In the first half of 2005, there were sharpdifferences of opinion within the mission—and Security Council—as to how robustlyMINUSTAH should act. One significant secu-rity threat was neutralized early in the yearwhen the mission took action against the for-mer military (ex-FAd’H) who had illegallyoccupied the residence of Aristide and policestations outside Port-au-Prince. The threatcould reemerge during elections, but the deathof self-proclaimed leader Ravix Remissaintheon 9 April meant that the immediate threatfrom the ex-FAd’H had diminished.

In the summer of 2005, MINUSTAHadopted a robust approach in the slums of Port-au-Prince. A series of small actions in June cul-minated in a major operation in Cité Soleil on6 July that reportedly led to the death of Em-manuel (“Dread”) Wilme, a dominant gangleader. Hundreds of Brazilian, Jordanian, Peru-vian, and Uruguayan troops were involved, aswell as the Chinese formed police unit. Aroundthe same time, cordon and search operationsbegan in Bel Air, leading to the release of sev-eral kidnapped hostages. MINUSTAH thenestablished a permanent presence and conduct-ed highly visible mobile patrols, providingenough of a deterrent for a degree of normalcyto return to this once gang-dominated area.Voter registration and the delivery of some hu-manitarian and development assistance becamepossible. The security operations even had inci-dental benefits for the disarmament, demobi-lization, and reintegration (DDR) program—which made little progress throughout theyear—by intimidating a limited number of gangmembers into handing over their arms. In mid-November, similar tactics were employed inCité Militaire, and plans were in place to do thesame in Cité Soleil, though embedded in civil-ian confidence-building measures as describedbelow.

Brazilian forces with MINUSTAH, in Bel Air, Port-au-Prince with the Presidential Palace

in the background, February 2005.

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HAITI • 45

Many of the security operations werejoint MINUSTAH military–police undertak-ings, highlighting an issue that has arisen in anumber of peace operations in recent years andis addressed in the first chapter of this volume:Is the security work to be done fundamentally apolice or military job? If what begins as a mil-itary function can be taken over by the police,what are the appropriate conditions and modal-ities for such a takeover? MINUSTAH hasseven formed police units of about 125 eachwho straddle this divide. Arguably, an evenlarger police force could assume the entire bur-den in the Haitian countryside, at least after themilitary had established “umbrella” security.With more limited numbers, many securityfunctions are inevitably shared by the militaryand police, requiring a high degree of coordi-nation and a progressive transfer of responsi-bility. Accordingly, a sector headquarters wasset up in Port-au-Prince in October to ensurebetter-integrated operations. Nevertheless, di-vergent understandings about the respectiveroles of the two forces meant that poor coordi-nation continued to plague the mission as theend of the year approached.

PoliticalIn April 2005 the Security Council mission toHaiti described the country as being in a stateof “deep political, social and economic crisis.”The establishment in that month of a twelve-member commission to prepare a nationaldialogue looked like a positive step, but it lednowhere and by the end of the year most ofthe political class remained as distant fromthe Haitian population as ever. Elections werescheduled for the last quarter of 2005 andimportant steps were taken early in the yearwith the reconstitution of the ProvisionalElectoral Council, but that body quickly be-came paralyzed. Prospects for credible elec-tions looked dim until August, when Lavalasjoined the process and put forward a presiden-tial candidate, Mark Bazin. Former Lavalaspresident Rene Preval also threw his hat in thering. This, combined with registration of someforty-five other political parties, more than

thirty presidential candidates, and 3.4 millionvoters, generated confidence that inclusiveelections could be held in early 2006, even ifthe original timetable was not met.

Unfortunately, the transitional governmentdid not take all the steps necessary for electionsto be held on time, despite a ministerial-levelmeeting of the core group designed to impressupon the government the importance of doingso. Elections were delayed four times, until adate of 8 January 2006 for presidential and leg-islative elections was agreed on, with run-offelections on 15 February. While this meant thatthe 7 February 2006 constitutional deadline forswearing in a new president would not be met,most observers—including many Haitians andthe UN—felt the brief delay was worthwhile ifit resulted in a credible process. However, theannouncement of a further delay in late De-cember risked provoking a crisis of confidencein the entire process. That the transition did notunravel entirely during the year was due in largemeasure to the active good offices of the SRSG,who worked hard to keep the process on trackby reaching out to all parties in Haiti as well asthe core group of supporting governments andinstitutions that have some leverage over thoseparties.

JusticeHaiti’s historical culture of impunity remainedpervasive throughout the year in review,marked by arbitrary arrest, wrongful deten-tion, inhumane prison conditions, and exces-sive use of force. Former prime minister YvonNeptune, arrested in June 2004, was still inprison at the end of October 2005, withouthaving been charged or brought before a judge.Elements of the HNP were involved in criminalviolence, including credible reports of sum-mary executions. Violence against children, in-cluding sexual violence, continued to be re-ported in the slums of Port-au-Prince.

Reform of the HNP saw little progressthroughout the year, although about 4,000 of theprojected need of 10,000 officers were on thestreets. The HNP was incapable of exercisingpublic security functions over the entire country,



owing to insufficient numbers and money, lackof adequate training and equipment, and corrup-tion. As the end of the year approached,MINUSTAH became more active in developinga reform plan, which would include a vettingand certification process, but by the end ofOctober 2005 the HNP was still a long wayfrom being a professional police force.

As for the judiciary, it lacked indepen-dence, magistrates often worked two jobs, pris-oners received no legal aid, and corruption waswidespread. The arrival of a new minister ofjustice in the middle of the year led to some pre-liminary attempts to address the problems, buttangible evidence of progress was hard to find.Resolution 1608 calls for MINUSTAH to play amore active role in rebuilding justice institu-tions, and an advisory team outlined a possiblestrategy for reform in an October 2005 report. Itwas apparent that real progress would requiregreater involvement of international personnelthroughout the system, working side-by-sidewith magistrates and other justice officials.

Economic RecoveryPoverty is among the root causes of much ofthe unrest and violence in Haiti. Pledged fundsfor economic recovery were slow to begin flow-ing, but the situation had improved by October2005. MINUSTAH approved ninety-eight quick-impact projects during the fiscal year 2004–2005. Moreover, the improved security situationcreated by MINUSTAH’s more robust approachopened windows of opportunity for humanitar-ian assistance and community developmentprojects, as well as small-scale DDR. Towardthe end of the year, plans were under way for aninitiative in Cité Soleil that would reinforce theinterrelationship between security and economicrecovery. Confidence-building measures bycivilian actors would be matched by a substan-tial security presence, which in turn would cre-ate space for more civilian activities, generatinga sense of hope among the population and isolat-ing the gangs. More broadly, the development ofan economic fiscal base that can sustain nation-al institutions remains an enormous challenge.

People wait in line to register to vote while a UN peacekeeper from Sri Lanka stands guard in Port-au-Prince, Haiti, July 2005

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* * *

MINUSTAH struggled over the course of theyear to coordinate its activities. An integratedapproach is especially important in a placelike Haiti, where security, politics, justice, anddevelopment are so closely intertwined. Rela-tively new peacekeeping countries like Braziland China are participating in the mission, andunprecedented relationships between the vari-ous components are being tested. Mission inte-gration improved toward the end of 2005 as

MINUSTAH established a joint operationscenter and a multidisciplinary joint missionanalysis cell to enhance the analytical basis onwhich policy decisions are made. A mandateimplementation plan was produced with theactive participation of all units in the mission,setting out strategic objectives, time-boundprograms, and benchmarks on how to achievethose objectives. If MINUSTAH were to takea more proactive, hands-on posture—in thesecurity, electoral, and justice areas—a tightlycoordinated approach would be essential.

In addition to its presence in Haiti, theOrganization of American States (OAS)has maintained a Mission to Support thePeace Process in Colombia (known byits Spanish acronym, MAPP) since Feb-ruary 2004. The MAPP was mandatedby the OAS Permanent Council to assistthe Colombian government’s efforts todemobilize and disarm the country’smain right-wing paramilitary force, theUnited Self-Defense Forces of Columbia(AUC). MAPP has been subjected to fre-quent criticism by local and internationalNGOs, and the OAS Secretary-Generaladmitted in October 2005 that “essen-tially because of scarce resources, theOrganization is not fulfilling all thecommitments it accepted.” Nonetheless,the mission has verified the disarmament

of over 8,000 paramilitaries, more thanhalf its preliminary target.

MAPP was set up after the AUC de-clared a cease-fire in December 2003.Although it reportedly breached this al-most immediately, the government agreedthat the AUC leadership should maintaina force of 400 men in a zone of locationin southwest Colombia. The MAPP hasoffices in the zone and four other regionalcenters in addition to its Bogotá head-quarters. But with an overall complementof 44 civilian personnel, most of itsoffices are typically staffed by only twoto four personnel. Although their mandateincludes not only verifying disarmamentbut working with ex-paramilitaries andaffected communities, they have focusedalmost entirely on the former.

From mid-2004 onward, this narrowinterpretation of the mandate has beencriticized by Colombian civil society,and the mission’s head has warned thatmany demobilized paramilitaries areslipping into crime. AUC cease-fire vio-lations have continued. While the OASSecretary-General has argued that theoperation’s staff should be more thandoubled to 100, it will continue to facebroad challenges deriving from politicalinstability and Colombia’s drug trade, inwhich the AUC has been a prominentplayer for over two decades.

Box 3.2.1 Colombia


Despite the efforts of a relatively large andactive United Nations peacekeeping operation,backed by France’s Security Council–author-ized Operation Licorne, the situation in Côted’Ivoire remains precarious. The year 2005 saw

a resurgence of violence, little progress in disar-mament, demobilization, and reintegration, andfailure to achieve political deadlines outlined inthe Linas-Marcoussis Agreement. The countryremains divided, the economy is in decline,human rights abuses are widespread, and theelections scheduled for 30 October 2005 havebeen postponed for up to a year. Against thisbackdrop of noncompliance and political frag-mentation, the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire(UNOCI) and Operation Licorne have accom-plished more than could reasonably be expected,yet less than needed and desired. In June 2005the Security Council extended the mandates ofboth operations through January 2006. Mean-while, intensive mediation efforts continued tohelp resolve the contentious issues blockingprogress in the peace process.

Background

Côte d’Ivoire, the world’s largest cocoa pro-ducer, under the leadership of Félix Houphouët-Boigny, saw prosperity from independence in1960 until a global downturn in commoditiesprices, and corruption and mismanagement,started an economic decline in the 1990s.Following the death of Houphouët-Boigny in1993, his handpicked successor, Henri KonanBédié, attempted to consolidate power by em-phasizing a concept of “Ivoirité” (Ivorian na-tionality), designed to target his rival AlassaneOuattara. This began to inflame tensions be-tween the significant, long-term emigrant pop-ulation from West African states, especiallyBurkina Faso and Mali, and the nativeIvorians.

48

Côte d’Ivoire

3.3


Bédié also systematically excluded themilitary from power, which led to a bloodlessmilitary coup in 1999 led by General RobertGuei. A low-turnout election following thecoup showed an early lead for Laurent Gbagbo,the candidate from the Front Populaire Ivoirien(FPI); General Guei promptly terminated theprocess and declared himself the winner, send-ing Gbagbo supporters to the streets of Abid-jan. The Supreme Court had previously dis-qualified Ouattara from this election, basing itsdecision on his Burkinabe nationality, whichled to clashes between Ouattara’s supporters—mainly from the north—and security forces.This process launched a cycle of violence thathas continued in Côte d’Ivoire to this day.

An attempted coup in 2001 was weath-ered by Gbagbo, who reengaged the inter-national community and held violence-freemunicipal elections. Steps toward the cre-ation of a government of national unity weretaken in 2002, but the temporary calm wasshattered on September 19, when soldierslaunched coordinated attacks in Abidjan,Bouaké, and Korhogo against government per-sonnel and facilities. In the ensuing clasheswith government forces, General Guei, theminister of interior, and several military offi-cers were killed. The rebels took control of thenorthern half of the country, under the umbrellaof the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire(MCPI), led by Guillaume Soro. The MCPIwas later joined by two new armed groups, theIvorian Popular Movement of the Great West(MPIGO) and the Movement for Justice andPeace (MJP), to form the Forces Nouvelles(FN).

In mid-October 2002, a cease-fire wassigned under the auspices of the Economic Com-munity of West African States (ECOWAS), set-ting the stage for negotiations on a politicalagreement. President Gbagbo requested Frenchprotection of internationals in Abidjan, as well asassistance with the cease-fire. The French forceswere already stationed in the country on the basisof a long-standing military assistance agreementbetween France and Côte d’Ivoire. France added2,500 troops to its forces after a December 2002

confrontation, and ECOWAS decided to deploya peacekeeping mission (ECOFORCE) of 1,500in January 2003.

Later that month, all parties signed theLinas-Marcoussis Agreement, providing forthe creation of a government of national rec-onciliation and various measures aimed ataddressing the root causes of the conflict. TheSecurity Council, through Resolution 1464 of4 February 2003, recognized the French andECOWAS deployments and authorized theirpresence for a further six months. The agree-ment also envisaged a UN role and, after acease-fire agreement between the armed forcesof Côte d’Ivoire (Forces Armées Nationalesde Côte d’Ivoire [FANCI]) and rebel groupsin May 2003, the Security Council established

CÔTE D’IVOIRE • 49

• Authorization date 27 February 2004 (UNSC Res. 1528,current authorization)

• Start date February 2003• Head of mission N/A• Budget as of $261.9 million


30 September 2005

Operation Licorne

• Resolution passage 27 February 2004 (UNSC Res. 1528) and date of effect 4 April 2004

• SRSG Pierre Schori (Sweden)• Force commander Major-General Abdoulaye Fall

(Senegal) • Police commissioner Yves Bouchard (Canada)• Budget $418.77 million



UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)



the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI)with a mandate to work with French andECOWAS forces to facilitate the implementa-tion of the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement.


MINUCI was replaced by UNOCI, which ab-sorbed ECOWAS forces in April 2004, on thebasis of Security Council Resolution 1528.That resolution also extended the authoriza-tion of Operation Licorne and called on theUN and French forces to coordinate theirefforts. UNOCI’s initial mandate was extendedand enhanced by Resolution 1609 of 24 June2005, resulting in a broad range of functions,including:

• Monitoring the cessation of hostilities andmovements of armed groups.

• Assisting the government in disarmament,demobilization, reintegration, repatriation,and resettlement, including disarmamentand dismantling of militias.

• Protecting United Nations personnel, insti-tutions, and civilians.

• Monitoring the arms embargo imposed byResolution 1572.

• Supporting humanitarian assistance, the re-deployment of state administration, and theorganization of open, free, and fair elections.

• Assisting in the field of human rights andmonitoring the mass media for incitementof hatred.

• Assisting in the restoration of law and order,the judiciary, and the rule of law throughoutthe territory of Côte d’Ivoire.

UNOCI’s Chapter VII mandate includes theauthority to “use all necessary means” tocarry out the mission, “within its capabilitiesand areas of deployment.” Meanwhile, Oper-ation Licorne is authorized to use all neces-sary means to support UNOCI in fulfillingthose multiple tasks.

By the end of October 2005, UNOCI hadalmost reached its authorized strength of nearly8,000, with the exception of the helicopter unit,for which a troop-contributing country was stillto be identified. The troops and military ob-servers were mainly deployed in the zone ofconfidence, a buffer zone that divides the coun-try, and where none of the Ivoirian armedforces are permitted. Additional deploymentsare concentrated around major cities includ-ing Abidjan, Korhogo, Daloa, and Bouaké. TheSecretary-General described UNOCI’s opera-tional approach in the zone of confidence as“robust mobile patrolling.”1 The peacekeepershave the authority to apprehend suspects in thezone of confidence and then hand them over tothe authorities on either side. Nearly 700 civilianpolice are present in major cities, including threeformed police units in Abidjan, Bouaké, andDaloa to protect UN personnel and facilities,UNOCI peacekeeping forces patrol in Duekoue, June 2005

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and for small-scale crowd control. A UNOCIspecial protection group of gendarmes pro-vides security to the opposition ministers ofthe government of national reconciliation.Throughout 2005, UNOCI also maintainedlinks with the UN Mission in Sierra Leone(UNAMSIL) and the UN Mission in Liberia(UNMIL), with particular cooperation on pre-venting cross-border movement of arms andcombatants. Meanwhile, a substantial civiliancomponent with an authorized strength of1,221 international and national staff is respon-sible for the broad range of political, electoral,humanitarian, and human rights functions inUNOCI’s mandate.

Operation Licorne consists of about 4,000troops divided into three task forces and sup-ported by two platoons of mobile gendarmes,seventeen helicopters, and two C-170 air-wings, currently based in Lomé, Togo. Its mainfunction is to support UNOCI and to providesecurity in the area of UN operations. UnderResolution 1609, French forces are also author-ized to intervene against belligerent actionsoutside the areas controlled by UNOCI, and toprotect civilians in their deployment areas.Operation Licorne is more mobile than UNOCIand has a quick reaction force to reinforceUNOCI contingents in volatile areas, althoughit is rarely called on. Throughout 2005, cooper-ation between the two operations was good,based on a well-understood division of laborfor patrolling, monitoring, and providing secu-rity, and on effective information-sharing andjoint crisis preparedness.


The year in review began with the countryeffectively divided and it remained that way asthe end of 2005 approached. The final monthsof 2004 were marred by an incident whoserepercussions were felt throughout 2005. Inearly November 2004, FANCI attacks on FNpositions across the zone of confidence southof Bouaké culminated in an air-raid on Frenchpeacekeepers, which killed nine and injuredtwenty-three. France responded by destroying

the Ivorian planes involved and seizing theairport in Abidjan, triggering massive publicprotests and riots. Tense standoffs betweenthe Young Patriots (supporters of PresidentGbagbo) and Licorne forces led to a numberof deaths and injuries. Public opinion souredagainst French forces after the incidents, andthere was consistent demand for French with-drawal from the airport in Abidjan.2

An AU mediation effort led by South Afri-can president Thabo Mbeki helped restore somecalm, but attempts to violate the zone of confi-dence continued. On 28 February more than100 armed individuals attacked an FN check-point in the zone, north of Bangolo. UNOCIresponded by rapidly deploying troops to thearea and successfully quelling the confronta-tion, with a Bangladeshi peacekeeper receivingserious injuries. On 1 March, when some 500additional individuals gathered around Bangoloand the FN announced it would reinforce itspositions, Licorne deployed its quick reactionforce to support UNOCI units.

On 6 April the Pretoria Agreement, medi-ated by President Mbeki, was signed, declar-ing an “immediate and final cessation of allhostilities” and affirming the need to holdelections in October 2005. Hopes that somesemblance of peace would be restored weredashed when an outbreak of violence in thewestern part of the country in late April lefttwenty-five dead, forty-one injured, and morethan nine thousand displaced. Another out-burst in late May resulted in the death of atleast seventy, with scores more injured. UNOCIwas the first to respond by deploying a Bang-ladeshi battalion, thereby preventing the situ-ation from deteriorating further. UNOCI andLicorne subsequently launched a joint sur-veillance operation in the region.

A declaration on the implementation of thePretoria Agreement was signed in late June2005 among the main Ivorian parties to the con-flict. However, its implementation suffered fur-ther delays, in particular regarding the disman-tling of militias, the adoption of laws envisagedin the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement, and disar-mament. The security situation deteriorated




with attacks on police stations in Anyama andAgboville, north of Abidjan, on 23 July, andwith repeated obstructions of the freedom ofmovement of UNOCI and Licorne forces inthe southern part of the country.

Resolution 1603 (2005) provided for theappointment of a High Representative for theelections, autonomous from UNOCI, to ver-ify all stages of the electoral process. In July,the Secretary-General appointed AntonioMonteiro to the post, on behalf of the inter-national community. Monteiro made his firstvisit to the country in August 2005. In Sep-tember, however, the UN and AU acknowl-edged that elections could not be held by theend of October as scheduled. At a meeting on14 September, the AU Peace and SecurityCouncil entrusted ECOWAS with determin-ing how to overcome the political impasse.ECOWAS met in an emergency session laterin the month, which was followed by an AUsummit in Addis Ababa on 6 October thatrecommended President Gbagbo remain inoffice beyond 30 October to avert a politicalcrisis. Elections were to be organized withina year.

The UN Security Council met on 13October 2005 to consider this and otherissues. The Council supported the AU Peaceand Security Council decision that Gbagboshould stay on until elections are held, nolater than October 2006. The Council alsosupported the appointment of a new, widelyacceptable, and more powerful prime minis-ter, through consultations led by PresidentThabo Mbeki of South Africa as the AU-appointed mediator, President Olusegun Oba-sanjo of Nigeria as chair of the AU, and Pres-ident Tandja Mamadou of Niger, as chair ofECOWAS. The FN was not assuaged and con-tinued to insist on the prime minister–ship forthemselves, leading to an impasse that wasfinally resolved on 5 December with theappointment of Charles Konan Banny. A newinternational working group, composed of along list of states and organizations, was givenresponsibility for preparing a “road map” for

the transition, culminating in elections. Sanc-tions have been threatened if deadlines arenot met. Steps to be taken along the wayinclude resolving the long-standing disputeover Ivorian identity—critical to the rebels—and disarmament in the north and south(which the FN insists should not occur beforeelections). It is also envisaged that a nationalforum will be launched to broaden the rangeof voices in the peace process.

In October 2005 the Security Council alsoexpressed its intention to review UNOCI’sstrength at the end of its mandate in January2006. The Secretary-General had been callingfor an expansion since the events of November2004. The Council balked then but, after thePretoria Agreement created new responsibilitiesfor UNOCI in June 2005, authorized the addi-tion of 850 military personnel and three formedpolice units totaling 375 officers.

Both UNOCI and Licorne have robustmandates, which they have put to use mainlyby establishing a large presence in the zoneof confidence to deter violations. However,the peace operations would have difficultydealing with more than two major crises at atime or protecting civilians in the face of sys-tematic attacks in ethnically divided areaslike the western part of the country and Abid-jan. A proposed solution, authorized in Reso-lution 1609, is the temporary redeploymentof troops from neighboring missions (UNMILand UNAMSIL). As the situation in Liberiastabilizes, that option may become more feasi-ble, but there are many operational, legal, andbudgetary issues that would first have to besorted out with troop contributors.3

The stalled political process and poor secu-rity situation inhibited progress in other areas.Little progress was made on disarmamentthroughout the year, the rule of law remainsweak and the legislative and judicial branchesare not effective. The human rights situationcontinues to deteriorate in both north andsouth, as reflected in the regular reports pub-lished by UNOCI’s small human rightscomponent. Humanitarian access to affected



populations declined and appeals frequentlygo unanswered.

As the end of 2005 approached, Côted’Ivoire remained a divided country in dangerof getting worse. Fundamental issues that mustbe addressed before credible elections can beorganized concern the dismantling of militias,the disarmament process, and the identifica-tion of eligible voters. The engagement of the

international community—as reflected in theSecurity Council and the host of participantsin the international working group—wasencouraging. But given the proliferation ofexternal actors and the lack of political willdisplayed by the Ivorian parties, it remains tobe seen whether the international communitywill be sufficiently cohesive to act effectively.

Notes1. United Nations, Sixth Progress Report to the Secretary General on the United Nations Operation

in Côte d’Ivoire, S/2005/604, 26 September 2005, para. 16.2. The uneasy relationship between France and its former colony suffered another blow in Novem-

ber 2005, when it was confirmed that French troops suffocated an Ivoirian prisoner in an armed vehi-cle in May. The force commander was suspended from duty as the investigation continued. Todd Pit-man, “In Ivory Coast, French Seek to Mend Image While Keeping the Peace,” The Boston Globe, 3November 2005.

3. For a description of the cooperation among the UN missions in West Africa, see Box 3.4.1 inMission Note 3.4 on Liberia. An existing example of this arrangement exists among UNTSO, UNIFILand UNDOF, as described in Mission Note 4.18.


The year 2005 was a watershed for the UNMission in Liberia (UNMIL). The main chal-lenge the peace operation faced was how totranslate security gains into meaningful politi-cal, economic, and social progress. The opera-tion accomplished a central goal by assistingthe political transition to an elected govern-ment, while continuing to provide securitythroughout the country. Innovative measures toimprove economic governance were agreed onwith international partners, though implemen-tation is not likely to be easy. Useful steps weretaken to improve integration within the mis-sion, and new forms of cooperation with neigh-boring UN peace operations were adopted. Theyear ended with a stable though fragile peace,as thoughts turned to how the internationalcommunity could best help to consolidate thegains made.

Background

UNMIL was deployed to oversee implemen-tation of the comprehensive peace agreement(CPA) of 18 August 2003, which brought toan end civil war between the government ofCharles Taylor and two rebel groups, Liberi-ans United for Reconciliation and Democracy(LURD) and the Movement for Democracy inLiberia (MODEL). LURD first emerged in1999 and, later joined by MODEL, demandedthe resignation of Taylor, whose election topower in 1997 ended seven years of civil war.Up to 250,000 people, out of a total populationthought to be 3 million, died in Liberia’sfourteen years of violence.1 Almost half thepopulation was displaced.

The conflict embroiled the subregion. Formany years, Taylor provided financial and othersupport to opposition rebels in Sierra Leone andGuinea, which led to the imposition of UN sanc-tions in 2001 and, from 2003, a travel ban ongovernment leaders. Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire,in turn, were alleged to have been backing Li-berian rebels financially and militarily. Up to300,000 of Liberia’s displaced fled to Guinea,Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone. The EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS)brokered peace talks in June 2003 betweenTaylor and the rebels, which were abruptly can-celed after Taylor was indicted for war crimes bythe Special Court for Sierra Leone. A cease-fireagreed on 17 June failed to prevent heavy fight-ing in the capital Monrovia and, amid a mount-ing humanitarian crisis, pressure increased forinternational intervention. The United States, inparticular, was called on to intervene, given itshistorical ties with Liberia, and the George W.Bush administration deployed three US war-ships near the coast in late July.

Taylor was finally persuaded to resign,and on 11 August 2003 took up Nigeria’soffer of asylum. This opened the way to theECOWAS-sponsored peace agreement, whichprovided for a transitional government andset in place the timetable for a transition to anelected administration in January 2006. Thenational transitional government of Liberia(NTGL) took over from an interim regime on14 October 2003.

Liberia is rich in mineral deposits includinggold, oil, and iron ore, with large timber andrubber resources and a long, accessible coast-line. Yet decades of graft and mismanagement

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left over 80 percent of the population belowthe poverty line. In 2003, unemployment isestimated to be around 85 percent, with highlevels of youth illiteracy.


The Security Council authorized the estab-lishment of an ECOWAS peacekeeping mis-sion on 1 August 2003 (Resolution 1497),after donor governments agreed to providethe financial resources for an interim periodpending establishment of a UN operation.The neighboring UN Mission in Sierra Leone(UNAMSIL) was tasked with providing logis-tical support to the ECOWAS force. On 19September the Security Council adopted Res-olution 1509, establishing UNMIL and author-izing the transfer of authority from ECOWASto the UN mission by 1 October 2003.

UNMIL was designed as a broad multi-dimensional UN operation deployed underChapter VII of the Charter. Its mandate isdivided into five broad areas: support forimplementation of the cease-fire agreement;protection of UN staff, facilities, and civilians;support for humanitarian and human rightsassistance; support for security sector reform;and support for implementation of the peaceprocess. The mandate and functions of the pre-vious UN Office in Liberia (UNOL) weretransferred to UNMIL.

Some of the mandated tasks fall within the“traditional” functions of multidimensionalUN peacekeeping: monitoring the cease-fire;implementing a comprehensive disarmament,demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation(DDRR) program; facilitating the provision ofhumanitarian assistance and promoting humanrights; helping to rebuild the Liberian policeforce; and assisting with national elections.Other functions reflected the evolution of UNpeacekeeping over the past decade, as well asrecognition that previous efforts of the inter-national community in Liberia had inade-quately addressed the causes and consequencesof a long civil war: the protection of civiliansunder imminent threat of physical violence;

“helping to establish the necessary securityconditions” for humanitarian assistance; pro-viding security at key government installations;assisting the transitional government to restoreproper administration of natural resources; andassisting with the establishment of state author-ity and a functioning administrative structure atthe national and local levels. Two especiallynoteworthy features of UNMIL’s mandate arethe comprehensive rule of law functions and

LIBERIA • 55

• Resolution passage 19 September 2003 (UNSC Res. 1509)and start date

• SRSG Alan Doss (United Kingdom)• Force commander Lieutenant-General Chikabidid

Obiakor (Nigeria)• Police commissioner Mohammed Al hassan (Ghana)• Budget $722.54 million


31 October 2005 Military observers: 199Civilian police: 1,101International civilian staff: 558Local civilian staff: 834UN volunteers: 435

UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)



the mission’s role in forming a restructuredLiberian military, as well as police force.

The rapid timeline for startup of the mis-sion meant UNMIL was a laboratory for UNrapid deployment efforts.2 Some of the initia-tives undertaken reflected lessons learnedfrom past operations; others represented afirst attempt to implement recommendationscontained in the Brahimi Report. The UNfinanced, for the first time, some elements oftroop-contributing country (TCC) predeploy-ment reconnaissance visits. The rehatting of3,500 ECOWAS troops facilitated rapid de-ployment, although the benefits were dimin-ished by the lack of sufficient equipment.Civilian deployment was assisted through thefirst use of a rapid deployment team roster ofprescreened and trained UN staff, although itwas more successful getting support thansubstantive civilian staff to the field. Theroster was not helpful in filling longer-termcivilian posts, and the incumbency rate wasless than 50 percent six months into the mis-sion, which delayed the setting in motion ofelements of UNMIL’s mandate, particularly

An important innovation since 2003 has been the emphasis on inter-mission and cross-border cooperation among UNpeacekeeping missions in West Africa:UNMIL, UNAMSIL, and the UN Opera-tion in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI). This waslargely a consequence of the regionalcontext of peace and stability in WestAfrica, reflected in the complex linkagesof the conflicts, refugee return, repatria-tion of ex-combatants, implementation ofDDR programs, arms transfers and cross-border smuggling, and humanitarianassistance. Security Council concern tomaximize efficiencies between neighbor-ing missions as a way of controlling ris-ing UN peacekeeping budgets also fac-tored into the consideration.

Consultation between the SpecialRepresentatives of the Secretary-Generalfor Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone,West Africa, and Guinea Bissau in-creased in 2005. An inter-mission work-ing group was established to developlong-term strategies for the peaceprocesses in the region and to coordinateactivities. At the operational level, ajoint early warning initiative was put inplace by the military components of the three missions. Liaison officers arein the three military headquarters. Cross-border cooperation, including jointpatrolling, is under discussion, but iscomplicated by the political and legalconsiderations that need to be addressedto enable military personnel from one

peacekeeping force to operate in morethan one mission area. Another issue underdiscussion is the possible establishment ofa subregional reserve force, based in onemission area but rapidly deployable toall three.

The impending closure of UNAMSIL,and the installation of a successful peace-building mission, led UNMIL to assumeresponsibility for security to the SpecialCourt for Sierra Leone on 1 December2005. In preparation, a company of 250UNMIL troops was deployed to the courton 15 November, with a small supportunit in Freetown. The UNMIL force com-mander has overall command of thesetroops.

Box 3.4.1 Inter-Mission Cooperation

Child soldiers disarm at a UN-run disarmamentcamp in northern Liberia, September 2004

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in relation to rule of law reform and politicalaffairs. Mission startup was also facilitated bythe establishment, within thirty days, of aninterim force headquarters for UNMIL throughthe deployment of the Standby High-ReadinessBrigade for UN Operations (SHIRBRIG). Pre–commitment mandate authority, recommendedin the Brahimi Report, provided early financ-ing for costs associated with technical assess-ment missions and strategic lift. And theStrategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) mechanismprovided UNMIL with equipment to launchthe mission.


Early ChallengesBy early 2004, UNMIL forces were deployedcountrywide and basic stability had beenachieved. Two weaknesses from UNMIL’s firstyear continued to be felt into 2005: poor inte-gration of the mission’s components, and a falsestart on DDRR. Some argued the first problemstemmed from a failure to fully incorporatehumanitarian and development partners in theinitial planning phase for the mission. Themultiple locations of UNMIL components inMonrovia did not help matters, nor did ten-sions between the military and humanitarianactors regarding security restrictions around thecountry. The existing UN Country Team inLiberia did not feel adequately consulted as thekey forum it is meant to be under the integratedmission concept.3 Cooperation between UNhumanitarian, development, and security com-ponents in Liberia improved with the appoint-ment of Alan Doss, a UN Development Pro-gramme (UNDP) career professional, as theSpecial Representative of the Secretary-Gen-eral in August 2005.

The initial—and in retrospect prema-ture—launch of the DDRR program in De-cember 2003 led to widespread riots, vio-lence, and looting across the capital, forcingUNMIL to suspend the DDRR program afterten days. The program was relaunched inApril 2004 with more success, and it came toa formal end in November of that year. As of

August 2005, a total of 37,500 demobilizedex-combatants were in rehabilitation andreintegration projects funded by bilateralpartners and a further 35,448 accommodatedin projects covered by the UNDP’s trust fundfor DDRR. Continued funding shortfallsmeant that 26,000 ex-combatants remainedoutside such programs. The volatility of dis-gruntled ex-combatants, many of them youngmen, was seen as the most significant threatto stability in Liberia.

Political Transition: ElectionsOne of UNMIL’s main functions in 2005 wasto assist the political transition through nationalelections, which according to the CPA had tobe held no later than October 2005. UNMIL’srole was to provide security, assist in the es-tablishment of electoral offices countrywide,and provide public information and votereducation training. The UNMIL ElectoralDivision provided technical assistance andcapacity-building support to the National Elec-tions Commission (NEC), and coordinatedother international assistance to enable the NECto meet its responsibilities. Notwithstandingallegations that former president Charles Tay-lor was trying to disrupt Liberian politics fromhis asylum in Nigeria, security remained stablethroughout the run-up to the elections. Thiswas due in part to UNMIL’s Chapter VII man-date, substantial presence (15,000 troops), cor-don and search operations to recover hiddenarms caches prior to the polls, and signals bythe SRSG in August that it would “reactrobustly” to any effort to destabilize the polls.4

The main challenges were logistic, notablyvoter registration and the organization of threelevels of elections in a single day during therainy season. Over 1.3 million voters wereregistered, although the decision not to regis-ter refugees in camps outside of Liberiaelicited wide debate among UN bodies inLiberia. The election campaign started officiallyon 15 August, with twenty-two presidentialcandidates and political parties involved. Alarge turnout voted on 11 October, with noincidents of violence reported at 3,070 pollingsites across the country. As no presidential



A Liberian woman casts her ballot during the presidential runoff election in the capital, Monrovia, 8 November 2005

The UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) hasset a precedent in the UN’s efforts to assessthe impact of its programs to address therisk of peacekeepers contracting or spread-ing HIV. It was the first operation to havean HIV/AIDS policy adviser from the startof a mission. In May and June 2005, theUN Department of Peacekeeping Opera-tions (DPKO), the Joint UN Programmeon HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), and the USCenters for Disease Control (CDC) collab-orated on an HIV/AIDS knowledge, atti-tude, and practice survey, interviewing667 UNMIL uniformed peacekeepers, in-cluding military observers, civilian police,and personnel from eight different contin-gents. The survey found:

• Eighty-eight percent of respondents stat-ed that they had been tested at somepoint in their lifetime; 80 percent hadbeen tested specifically in preparation fordeployment to Liberia, of which onlyhalf had received any counseling withthe test. Even within given contingents,differences were reported on whether the

test had been mandatory or voluntary. • Ninety-one percent had received pre-

deployment HIV/AIDS training and, ofpersonnel who had been deployed forat least a month, 88 percent had re-ceived training in the mission area.However, peer education programs werevery weak.

• Overall, 76 percent of respondentswere considered to have a comprehen-sive knowledge of HIV; this was deter-mined on their ability to correctlyidentify three ways to prevent thetransmission of HIV and also rejectthree misconceptions on transmission.

The need to address HIV/AIDS was orig-inally underlined in Security CouncilResolution 1308 of June 2000, whichfocused attention on the potential linksbetween the disease and instability. Thishas led to a wide variety of initiatives:

• In 2001, the UNAIDS and the DPKOsigned a collaboration framework to co-ordinate strategies and technical support;

and in 2003, the UNAIDS seconded anAIDS adviser to the DPKO headquarters.

• In 2005, the Fifth Committee of theGeneral Assembly approved a post foran AIDS policy adviser within theDPKO. All peacekeeping operationshave either AIDS advisers or, in thecase of smaller missions, focal points.

• HIV/AIDS is included in pre-deploy-ment training guidance and materialsand UNAIDS has developed a peereducation kit and provides HIV/AIDSawareness cards in twelve languages.

• Responses to HIV/AIDS are also beingmainstreamed into UN-mandated func-tions, such as disarmament, demobi-lization, and reintegration (DDR) pro-grams and training for national policeforces.

• In the past year, efforts have been madeto link increased awareness of sexualexploitation and abuse and HIV/AIDSeducation for peacekeepers.

Box 3.4.2 HIV/AIDS and Peacekeeping

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candidate scored the required absolute major-ity in the first round, a runoff between formerprofessional footballer George Weah and for-mer UN and World Bank official Ellen John-son Sirleaf was held on 8 November. JohnsonSirleaf won in the second round, garneringalmost 60 percent of the vote. When support-ers of Weah took to the streets in protest,SRSG Doss repeated his warning that UNMIL“would react robustly to any effort to disruptthe hard won peace that this country nowenjoys,”5 and made good on the threat twodays later when UN police fired tear gas todisperse a stone-throwing crowd. After inves-tigating allegations of electoral fraud, theNational Electoral Council proclaimed John-son Sirleaf the winner on 23 November.

Economic Recovery: GovernanceEconomic governance was a central issue forpeacebuilding in Liberia throughout 2005 andled in September to the initiation of a potentiallysignificant international oversight process forpostconflict countries. Decades of mismanage-ment of public finances, exploitation of naturalresources, and widespread graft played a largerole in Liberia’s conflicts, and the installation ofthe transitional government in 2003 did not breakthis pattern. European Commission–fundedaudits of the Central Bank of Liberia (CBL) andfive state-owned enterprises, International Mone-tary Fund consultations, and an investigation byECOWAS all revealed extensive corruption. TheUN’s Panel of Experts, reviewing the sanctionsin place since 2003, concluded in June 2005 thattransparent and accountable mechanisms for theoversight of the timber and diamond industrieswere still lacking and that current sanctions onLiberia should be maintained.

In May 2005, international partners, led bythe European Commission and the World Bank,and with some consultation with UN headquar-ters personnel, initiated an action plan for Liberiathat would have provided for international con-trol over Liberia’s revenue streams, budgeting,and expenditure management through theassignment of international experts with cosig-nature authority in the Central Bank, finance,and other key ministries. The NTGL objected to

the plan as tantamount to international trustee-ship and presented its own counterproposal, theGovernance and Economic Management Assist-ance Programme (GEMAP), on 19 July. A com-promise plan, retaining the key cosignatory ele-ment of the international plan, was hammeredout and presented to the NTGL on 10 August.However, the chairman of the transitional gov-ernment continued to withhold agreement, not-withstanding personal interventions from theUN Secretary-General, as well as threats by theEuropean Commission and the World Bank tosuspend assistance. On 9 September, just beforedeparting for the World Summit in New York,Chairman Bryant signed his government’sagreement to GEMAP.

The controversy surrounding GEMAP’snegotiation does not augur well for its imple-mentation, and the attitude of the newlyelected government remains to be seen. Coor-dinated international efforts and funding willbe required. UNMIL, which had actively par-ticipated in the negotiation of the GEMAP, isexpected to assist in efforts to establish ananticorruption commission, while the UNDPwill support efforts to ensure local governancecapacity building. UNMIL will serve on theapex Economic Governance Steering Com-mittee (EGSC), which monitors the imple-mentation of the GEMAP, as well as the tech-nical committees of the EGSC. The SecurityCouncil, in renewing UNMIL’s mandate on 19 September, requested the Secretary-General to include information on GEMAP’simplementation progress in his regular reportson UNMIL.

The year 2005 ended on a positive note inLiberia, with the completion of peaceful elec-tions. But difficulties encountered during theyear revealed the scale of the peacebuildingchallenge ahead. Hesitancy in charting newways to support institution building and gov-ernance reform illustrates the conceptual andoperational gaps that still exist betweenpeacekeeping and peacebuilding in UN peaceoperations. The installation of an elected gov-ernment provides UNMIL an opportunity todevelop a long-term postconflict strategy.



Notes1. Figure cited in International Crisis Group, Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils, Africa

Report no. 75, 30 January 2004.2. This section draws on United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, Best Practices

Unit, Lessons Learned Study on the Start Up Phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia, April2004, available online at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbpu/library/liberia%20lessons%20learned%20(final).pdf.

3. The initial experience of integration in Liberia was an incentive for the independent study ofintegrated missions carried out in 2004–2005 at the request of the UN Executive Committee on Human-itarian Affairs (ECHA). Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karen vonHippel, Report on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations, IndependentStudy for the Expanded UN ECHA Core Group, May 2005.

4. Nick Tattersall, “UN Force Plans Tough Action to Guard Liberia Polls,” Reuters, 25 August2005.

5. “Liberia: Sirleaf Heads for Victory as Authorities Study Weah’s Complaint,” IRIN, 10 Novem-ber 2005, IRINnews.org.


61

United Nations peacekeepers withdrew fromTimor-Leste during 2005, marking the end ofthe latest phase of the organization’s long, andsuccessful, engagement there. The UN Mis-sion of Support in East Timor (UNMISET)was succeeded by the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), a political mission with amandate to support the new government inbuilding state institutions and maintainingsecurity.

Background

UN involvement began in 1960, when theGeneral Assembly added Timor-Leste to itslist of non-self-governing territories. On 28November 1975, representatives of FrenteRevolucionária do Timor-Leste Independente(Fretilin) declared independence. This wasfollowed, on 7 December of the same year,by a military intervention and occupation byIndonesia. In July of the following yearIndonesia formally annexed Timor-Leste asits twenty-seventh province. This annexationwas rejected by the United Nations, whichcontinued to recognize Portugal as the admin-istering power. Security Council Resolutions384 (1975) and 389 (1976) called for thewithdrawal of Indonesian forces. AnnualGeneral Assembly resolutions, principallysupported by Portugal, kept the status ofTimor-Leste on the UN’s agenda for the fol-lowing two decades. From 1982, the Secre-tary-General was requested by the GeneralAssembly to hold talks with Indonesia andPortugal to resolve the status of the territory.Throughout the period of occupation armed

resistance continued, with substantial loss oflife.

In January 1999, Indonesia proposed thata referendum be held, offering the people ofTimor-Leste what amounted to a choice be-tween autonomy within Indonesia and inde-pendence. On 5 May 1999, Indonesia andPortugal signed an agreement in New Yorkrequesting the Secretary-General to organizeand conduct a “popular consultation” to deter-mine whether or not the people of Timor-Lestewould accept the Indonesian autonomy pro-posal. Indonesia undertook to provide a secureenvironment. On 11 June 1999, the SecurityCouncil created the UN Mission in East Timor(UNAMET), to carry out the consultation.After some delays due to security concerns,the consultation took place on 30 August 1999,with 78.5 percent of voters rejecting the Indo-nesian proposal. Pro-Indonesian militias im-mediately launched a campaign of violence,which was not contained by the Indonesianauthorities. In addition to a heavy loss of life,East Timor was physically devastated—muchof the housing stock was destroyed, as wereeconomic assets and key infrastructure. Indo-nesian administrators—including almost allpeople with higher skills and education—leftthe territory. This was a second exodus fromEast Timor, the first being the departure of aneducated group of Timorese after the Indone-sian invasion.

UNTAET and UNMISET

When the violence erupted, the Secretary-General, Security Council members, and others

3.5

Timor-Leste



engaged in intensive diplomatic efforts toconvince Indonesian authorities to accept aninternational security presence in Timor.After a Security Council mission to the island,backed by heavy pressure from the UnitedStates and the International Monetary Fund(IMF) as well as active telephone diplomacyby the Secretary-General, President B. J.Habibie relented and invited the UN in “as afriend” to help quell the violence. The Secu-rity Council authorized on 15 September 1999the establishment and deployment of the Aus-tralian-led International Force for East Timor(INTERFET), to restore peace and securityunder Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Thefirst elements of this force were deployedfive days later, after which the security situa-tion progressively improved. On 25 Octoberthe Security Council passed Resolution 1272,establishing the UN Transitional Administra-tion in East Timor and giving it a sweepingmandate to administer the territory, including“all legislative and executive authority, in-cluding the administration of justice.” UnderChapter VII, UNTAET was tasked with pro-viding security, maintaining law and order,establishing an effective administration,

assisting in the development of public serv-ices, coordinating humanitarian relief, buildingcapacity for self-government, and creatingthe conditions for sustainable development.In effect, it became the government of thedevastated territory for a transitional period.

Sergio Vieira de Mello was appointedtransitional administrator, taking up office inDili on 13 November. Humanitarian opera-tions were swiftly initiated, and were gradu-ally phased out during the first half of 2000.In February 2000, INTERFET withdrew,transferring authority to the UNTAET mili-tary component. Key INTERFET contribu-tors—including Australia—agreed to “rehat”forces deployed along the land border.

Despite its robust mandate and 8,000 well-armed soldiers, UNTAET’s military componentoperated under rules of engagement (ROEs)that were later deemed to be too restrictive.The mission faced a serious threat from or-ganized militia groups infiltrating from acrossthe land border with West Timor, leading inone case to the displacement of up to 3,000East Timorese. UNTAET was tested in re-peated firefights with the militias, leading toa number of casualties, including the death oftwo UN peacekeepers. Three UN staff mem-bers were murdered in Atambua, West Timor,on 6 September.

UNTAET concluded that its ROEs wereinsufficient for military engagement with adetermined, well-armed opposition. The Spe-cial Representative of the Secretary-General(SRSG) supported a request from the militarycommand for new rules of engagement, theneed for which was underlined by the Secu-rity Council in its Resolution 1319, callingfor UNTAET to respond robustly to the mili-tia threat. The DPKO approved an “ampli-fied” concept of self-defense. Offensive oper-ations were not authorized, but the warningrequirements were liberalized, such thathostile intent could reasonably be inferredfrom the behavior of particular militia mem-bers. Forceful action was taken on a numberof occasions to disarm and detain militias. By early 2001 it appeared that the militias


TIMOR-LESTE • 63

had largely ceased their organized militarycampaign.

UNTAET’s efforts in the area of gover-nance and public administration fell into twomain phases. From late 1999 to mid-2000 theUN mission directly assumed most adminis-trative and executive functions, with an em-phasis on laying the foundation for futuredevelopment. This included passing basicenabling legislation, including regulations onthe body of laws that would be applied, thebasic institutions that would administer theterritory, the currency that would be used,and the National Consultative Council. Alsoduring the first phase, UNTAET established acivilian mobile phone network, opened the

port and airport under civilian authority, andestablished a central fiscal authority and a cen-tral payments office, as precursors to a treas-ury and central bank. Proto-ministries wereestablished to support the reconstruction ofthe education and health systems and otherservices.

Partly in response to complaints about theslow pace of “Timorization,” during the secondphase of its administration, starting in mid-2000, the mission set up a series of power-shar-ing cabinets with the Timorese leadership, withauthority being progressively passed to thehosts. A broad effort to build capacity waslaunched, though progress was slow in somekey areas, such as in the judiciary. Support

April 2005 saw the publication of aninterim report of the Economic Impact ofPeacekeeping project, supported by thePeace Dividend Trust and the Best Prac-tices Section of the UN Department ofPeacekeeping Operations (DPKO). Re-calling earlier criticisms of the 1992–1993 UN Transitional Authority in Cam-bodia for unbalancing the local costs andwages through its heavy spending, thisreport analyzed the impact of UN Tran-sitional Administration in East Timor(UNTAET) and UNMISET on the econ-omy of Timor-Leste to the end of 2004.It argued that the missions had a numberof positive effects:

• The peace operations created a secureenvironment permitting basic eco-nomic activity and investment.

• Although the chaos of 1999 drove infla-tion up to 10 percent, it fell to 5 percentor below in 2000–2004, contrary to awidespread belief that the UN presencecreated inflationary pressures.

• UNTAET was the largest single employerduring a troubled period, with almost2,000 staff, whose experience now addsto the country’s human capital.

• The provision of services by UNTAETand UNMISET enhanced Timor-Leste’sproductive capacity, although it is diffi-cult to quantify this precisely.

• The services put in place for interna-tionals may provide the infrastructurefor a future tourist industry.

Nonetheless, the report also drew nega-tive conclusions, including:

• Of total mission procurement worth$35,052,000, only $4,767,000 was spenton local goods and services (althoughgreater local spending might have beeninflationary).

• In 1999 the UN set a minimum wagefor local staff of $85 per month, com-pared to a minimum in neighboringIndonesia of $40. While the nascentTimorese government set a competitive

wage, the resulting distortion was an obstacle to developing the privatesector.

• The best-educated workers gravitatedtoward UN posts, disadvantaging thegovernment and other employers.

• The finite nature of the UN presencemilitated against long-term planning,with most projects lasting only oneyear.

• While Timor-Leste’s electricity supplywas destroyed in 1999, UNTAET usedlarge portable generators rather thanconstruct a new power plant—result-ing in Asia’s most expensive powergeneration system.

The Economic Impact of Peacekeepingproject will produce further reports andrecommendations, building on these les-sons and covering other missions.

Box 3.5.1 The Economic Impact of UNTAET and UNMISET, 1999–2004

Source: M. Carnahan, S. Gilmore, and M. Rahman, Interim Report: Economic Impact of Peacekeeping—Phase I (New York: UnitedNations, DPKO Best Practices Unit, April 2005).



was also provided to the development of aconstitution and for the holding of elections.Timor-Leste became independent on 20 May2002, with independence leader Alejandro“Xanana” Gusmão sworn in as the first pres-ident of the new republic.

Following independence, UNTAET waswithdrawn, and was replaced by the UN Mis-sion of Support in East Timor. UNMISET’srole was threefold: to provide troops andpolice for the country’s external and internalsecurity; to further assist in the developmentof a Timor-Leste police service; and to pro-vide a broad range of “capacity building” andother forms of support to public administra-tion. Most of the UN’s executive functionswere handed over to the new Timorese gov-ernment, but UNMISET retained interim lawenforcement duties to deal with the crimeproblem pending establishment of a fullyfunctioning domestic police force. UNMISETalso maintained a substantial military pres-ence of 5,000 to deter continuing threats frommilitias based in West Timor. A new Timoresedefense force was created, but large numbersof Falantil—a disciplined and professionalfighting force—were demobilized and not in-corporated in the new army, creating a cadreof disaffected ex-combatants. By the end of2003, the Timorese civilian administrationhad assumed responsibility for managingday-to-day affairs, although the downsizingof UNMISET’s police and military com-ponents was delayed due to lingering securitythreats. The main challenges remaining at theend of 2004 related to the weak state of Timor’spublic administration, which became the focusof the mission’s exit strategy developed inconsultation with state authorities.

UNOTIL

In the run-up to the end of UNMISET’s man-date in May 2005, a division of opinion aroseamong UN member states as to the best wayforward. One group of countries—principallythe main donors to the UN peacekeepingbudget—felt that the United Nations had

completed its peacekeeping work in Timor-Leste, and that the time had come to bringthat level of engagement to an end. Thesecountries noted that incidents on the borderwere declining and that there was no evi-dence of further organized militia activity.

Led by the United Kingdom and theUnited States, these countries argued that,whatever follow-on arrangements were madefor UNMISET, there should be no militarycomponent to the mission. For the majordonors, this remains a point of ongoing con-cern, as missions with a military componentare normally financed at the United Nationspeacekeeping scale of assessments, whereasmissions without military components can befunded from the regular budget, which dis-tributes the financial burden somewhat morewidely. This issue, not limited to the missionin Timor-Leste, also informs a wider push formore discipline in developing and imple-menting “exit strategies.”

The government of Timor-Leste, supportedin the Security Council by Brazil and others,argued the contrary position. They claimed thatthe peace in Timor-Leste was not yet fullysecure and could benefit from a continuedsmall presence, principally deployed along theland border with Indonesia. They asserted thatthe regular liaison with the Indonesian forceson the other side of the border kept a usefuldegree of international attention on issues con-nected with the border—smuggling, securityincidents, allegations of activity by formermilitia members—and helped to resolve issueson the ground before they could escalate. Italso ensured a quick and professional flow ofinformation from the border area to UN head-quarters and capitals. Those in favor of a lim-ited extension of UN presence in Timor-Lestenoted that the North Atlantic powers had beencontent to keep much more substantial forcesin the Balkans under a UN mandate for adecade beyond the end of hostilities, whereas adifferent standard appeared to be applying toplaces outside of Europe.

Persuasive intervention from Timoreseforeign minister José Ramos Horta managed


TIMOR-LESTE • 65

to secure something of a compromise. TheSecurity Council agreed to replace UNMISETwith a scaled-down follow-on mission, theUN Office in Timor-Leste. Continuing awider trend, however, this new mission wasmandated only for a period of one year,hindering effective medium-term planning,already a weakness of United Nations peaceoperations.

UNOTIL was mandated to work in threemain areas:

• Support for the public administration andjustice system of Timor-Leste and for jus-tice in the area of serious crimes.

• Support for the development of law en-forcement in Timor-Leste.

• Support for the security and stability ofTimor-Leste.

The UN continues to confront the issueof accountability for serious crimes, a sourceof contention for years. Following the vio-lence associated with the vote on indepen-dence in 1999, there had been calls, bothinside the United Nations and outside, forthose principally responsible to be brought tojustice. Within Indonesia, an ad hoc humanrights tribunal was established, but that didnot quiet international demands for justice. InTimor-Leste a serious crimes unit was estab-lished, and eighty-seven defendants weretried by special panels, of whom eighty-fourwere convicted of crimes against humanityand other crimes. The most serious charges,however, were directed at individuals livingoutside of Timor-Leste, often in Indonesia.Without Indonesia’s cooperation in arrestingthose against whom charges had been laid,the process was perceived by many to beinadequate.

A Commission of Experts dispatched bythe Secretary-General recommended that aninternational tribunal be established to pursuethe matter. This, however, was not supportedby most member states. Moreover, the gov-ernments of Timor-Leste and Indonesiaagreed to establish a Commission on Truth

and Friendship, without powers of prosecu-tion, apparently signaling that efforts to bringto justice the main perpetrators of the 1999violence were at an end.

In the area of law enforcement, UNOTILadvisers have focused on strengthening thecapacity of the border patrol unit and otherspecialized units, building leadership skills ofthe national police in both administrative andoperational areas, and the management of thepolice headquarters. Some progress has beenmade, but skills remain weak in many areas,and allegations of corruption are widespread.In addition, relations between the police andarmed forces remain strained, and clasheshave occurred.

Security in the crucial border areas im-proved during the first half of 2005. In April,the governments of Timor-Leste and Indone-sia made a provisional agreement settling thedispute over some 96 percent of the border.The foreign ministers of the two countriesmarked the agreement by jointly laying thefirst border marker. In October, however, therewere renewed reports of infiltrations intoTimor-Leste by mobs and armed men, operat-ing in or near the disputed border areas.

Internally, security appeared to improveduring 2005. Local elections took place in anumber of areas, with few problems. A major

• Resolution passage 28 April 2005 (UNSC Res. 1599) • Start date 20 May 2005• SRSG Sukehiro Hasegawa (Japan)• Senior military adviser Colonel Fernando José Reis (Portugal)• Senior police adviser Malik Saif Ullah (Pakistan)• Budget $22.01 million

(21 May 2005–31 December 2005)• Strength as of Military observers: 15

31 October 2005 Police: 58(unless otherwise noted) International civilian staff: 131

(30 August 2005)Local civilian staff: 275 (30 August 2005)UN volunteers: 37 (30 September 2005)

UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL)



political dispute, ostensibly over the teachingof religion in state schools, pitted PrimeMinister Mari Alkatiri against a range of con-servative opponents, led by the dominantCatholic Church. Despite large public dem-onstrations in Dili, the protests ended with-out the violence that had followed civil unrestin 2004.

Prospects for the Future

Timor-Leste is rightly seen as a major UNsuccess story. Almost four years after inde-pendence, however, there is still some risk ofa renewal of violence. The country is poor—among the poorest countries in the world—with an annual per capita gross national prod-uct of about $400. Unemployment is amongthe highest in the region. The skills that areneeded to sustain a functioning state are stillweak, particularly in the area of rule of law,and corruption appears to be growing. Societyremains fragmented, and mechanisms for dis-pute resolution are weak. Across the border

with Indonesia, former members of the mili-tias that devastated the country in 1999 arestill present. While these no longer appearwell organized, and their activities may bemore criminal than political, they remain apotential problem.

UNOTIL’s presence undoubtedly con-tributes to the stability of Timor-Leste, and isalmost universally recognized as doing so bythe government and people of the country. Itsrole, however, is hampered by its impendingclosure, presently scheduled for May 2006.The incidents on the border in October rein-force the necessity of continued engagementby the United Nations as the country movesthrough its postwar transition and into thenew challenges that will be faced as oil andgas revenues come on stream in the latter partof the decade. UNOTIL is one of several mis-sions on the UN’s agenda that poses the chal-lenge of long-term attention to postconflictstabilization, a challenge to which the newlyapproved Peacebuilding Commission mayhave to respond.

Timor-Leste’s President Xanana Gusmão, left, inspects Timorese police force members during a celebration of the third anniversary of its independence in Dili, 20 May 2005

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67

In 2005 the final benchmarks of the BonnProcess were met, culminating in the estab-lishment of a government in the Islamic Re-public of Afghanistan. The UN AssistanceMission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) now facesthe challenge, together with the government,of identifying a new framework for ongoingsupport to build security, improve gover-nance, and promote development, while re-ducing the country’s dependence on illegalnarcotics and building closer ties with theregion. The International Security AssistanceForce (ISAF), whose mandate was originallysupposed to expire with the completion of theBonn Process, will expand its role both geo-graphically and functionally in support ofthese objectives.

Background

After the events of 11 September 2001, acoalition of international forces led by theUnited States attacked the Taliban regime andAl-Qaida in Afghanistan. By late Novemberof that year, the Taliban were effectivelyremoved from power, and Kabul fell toNorthern Alliance forces acting with intelli-gence and aerial support from the US mili-tary. After intense UN-facilitated negotiationsoutside Bonn, Germany, an interim adminis-tration headed by Hamid Karzai was selectedto assume power in Kabul.

The Bonn Process became the road mapfor Afghanistan’s emergence as a sovereign,self-governing state after more than twodecades of conflict, foreign invasion, and civilwar. The process provided for a six-month

interim administration that would prepare forthe convening of an Emergency Loya Jirga(ELJ) to elect/select a transitional administra-tion. The transitional administration would inturn prepare for a Constitutional Loya Jirga,ratify a new constitution, and hold nationalelections within two years. The interim andtransitional administrations would also pre-side over other key reforms in the fields ofpublic administration, justice, human rights,monetary policy, and public finance. Thefinal benchmark of the Bonn agreement waselection of a fully representative government,achieved with the 18 September 2005 elec-tions to the Wolesi Jirga (lower house of theNational Assembly) and provincial councils.On 9–11 November the provincial councilselected two-thirds of the members of theupper house (Mesharano Jirga); the rest of themembers were appointed by President Karzai.

An annex to the Bonn agreement requestedthe UN Security Council to authorize deploy-ment of a multinational force to assist the gov-ernment in providing security. Accordingly, theSecurity Council authorized the creation ofISAF on 20 December 2001, with a mandate tooperate within Kabul and its environs under theinitial command of the United Kingdom. ISAFdeployed alongside—but operationally distinctfrom—coalition forces under overall US com-mand, which continued to wage battle againstthe Taliban and Al-Qaida forces.

ISAF was created to address the secu-rity/military dimension of the Bonn agree-ment, in particular by providing securityagainst factional fighting in Kabul. To over-see and help implement the political side of

Afghanistan

3.6



the process, the Security Council on 28March 2002 established an integrated mis-sion. UNAMA, under the leadership of Spe-cial Representative of the Secretary-General(SRSG) Lakhdar Brahimi, was tasked withmonitoring and assisting the Afghan govern-ment in meeting the benchmarks of the BonnProcess.

ISAF: Mandate, Functions, and Challenges

Security Council Resolutions 1386, 1413, and1444 mandate ISAF under Chapter VII of the

UN Charter to assist in the maintenance ofsecurity in support of a succession of post-Bonn Afghan governments and the UN. NATOtook over command and control of the mis-sion in August 2003. A detailed military tech-nical agreement between the ISAF commanderand the interim authority of Afghanistan pro-vides the framework for ISAF operations. Onthe basis of those provisions, ISAF was toexist only until the successful conclusion ofthe Bonn Process, that is, until the generalelections in 2005. But NATO’s Secretary-General and other allied officials subsequentlypledged that the mission would remain inAfghanistan until peace and stability wererestored.

The initial role of ISAF was to assistAfghanistan in providing a safe and secureenvironment within Kabul and surroundingareas. In carrying out this mission, ISAF con-ducted patrols throughout sixteen police dis-tricts, either alone or jointly with the KabulCity Police. ISAF also runs civil–militarycooperation (CIMIC) projects throughout thecity, focusing on the provision of basic humanneeds such as fresh water, electric power, andshelter.

After repeated calls by Hamid Karzai,UN Special Representative Lakhdar Brahimiand nongovernmental organizations, NATOleaders, acting on Security Council Resolu-tion 1510 (2003), finally agreed to expand thereach of ISAF beyond Kabul. Germany tookover a provincial reconstruction team (PRT)in Kunduz in September 2003 and trans-formed it into the largest PRT in the country.These are relatively small, civil–military or-ganizations, under the authority of eitherNATO or coalition forces. Although the mod-els differ, they are all broadly involved insecurity, governance, and reconstruction. Asof the end of November 2005 there weretwenty-three PRTs across the country, ofwhich ISAF directed nine. ISAF coordinatesits activities with the Afghan governmentthrough various high- and field-level forumssuch as the PRT Executive Committee, chairedby the Afghan minister of interior, as well as

• Authorization date 20 December 2001 (UNSC Res. 1386)13 September 2005 (UNSC Res. 1623,current authorization)

• Start date December 2001• Head of mission Lieutenant-General Mauro Del Vecchio

(Italy)• Budget as of $78.5 million


30 September 2005

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan


through embedded Afghan military officers ateach PRT.

ISAF was involved in security sectorreform (SSR) and in training the first units ofthe new Afghan National Army and NationalPolice. The mission continued to operate andcontrol Kabul International Airport’s militaryand civilian air traffic (some 3,000 flights permonth). In late 2004, ISAF helped equip theairport with night vision equipment allowingit to airlift Afghan pilgrims to Saudi Arabiaduring the Hajj season on a twenty-four-hourbasis. ISAF also supported the disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration of over58,000 former combatants, which ended inJuly 2005. It is also assisting the governmentof Afghanistan in the disarmament of an esti-mated 120,000 persons belonging to illegallyarmed groups, who will eventually return tocivilian life.

ISAF commands a degree of credibilityafter assisting the Afghan forces and coalitionin providing security for the Emergency LoyaJirga in June 2002, Constitutional Loya Jirga

from December 2003 to January 2004, presi-dential elections in October 2004, and elec-tions to the National Assembly and provincialcouncils in September 2005. The size of themission increased from its initial level of8,000 troops to 12,000 during the period ofthe recent elections. According to the UKDefense Secretary and NATO Secretary-Gen-eral, as many as 20,000 extra soldiers couldbe deployed, mainly to stabilize the south,still a center of insurgent activity.

Nevertheless, ISAF faced significant chal-lenges as 2005 drew to a close. The scope ofthe mission and the security needs of the coun-try are far greater than the resources providedto it. Most PRTs are underresourced and under-staffed, especially the civilian political andassistance personnel. Although there are stan-dardized terms of reference for the PRTsagreed upon by NATO and the coalition forces,each team has a degree of leeway in choosingthe activities it deems most appropriate. In gen-eral, the ISAF PRTs’ peace support activitiesinclude vehicular patrols, coordination with

AFGHANISTAN • 69

A Canadian soldier from the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) patrols Mirza Abdul Qadir village west of Kabul, June 2004

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local authorities, and provision of reconstruc-tion assistance.

In response to a recent increase of violence,particularly in the south, ISAF is strengtheningits posture and presence in Afghanistan. UnderNATO command, it has taken over a largenumber of PRTs and is expected to eventuallytake control of all provinces in a counterclock-wise order, except the eastern region, where thecoalition forces will control the porous borderarea with Pakistan. NATO and the coalitionagreed on a four-phase process involving thenortheast, west, south, and southeast respective-ly. During the first and second phases, ISAFestablished PRTs in areas where there was littleantigovernment insurgency. In 2005, it beganmoving to the south where conditions are lesssecure. As ISAF begins to constitute a largerportion of the total international security pres-ence in Afghanistan, it becomes even moreurgent that contributing countries operate undera common set of rules and a common command,with fewer national caveats.

The cultivation, processing, and traffickingof narcotics in 2004–2005 complicated thesecurity environment in Afghanistan. TheNATO-written ISAF mission statement re-quires specific authorization from the ISAFcommander for any participation in counternar-cotic operations. An example of the problemthis can create: the German parliament prohib-ited German troops in Afghanistan from par-ticipating in any counternarcotics activities, yetISAF PRTs currently operate in locationswhere their local Afghan partners, includingsubnational officials, are either involved in thedrug trade or indirectly benefit from it.

Moreover, the initial division of labor be-tween ISAF and coalition forces placed ISAFin largely secure areas in the northern half ofthe country. Now that ISAF is expanding tomore hostile environments, such as Kanda-har, it risks losing the higher degree of credi-bility it enjoys with development actors rela-tive to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).It may have to adopt more aggressive forceprotection methods that could potentiallyalienate local communities.

There are competing visions for thefuture of the mission following the officialend of the Bonn Process. The United States ispushing for the unification of command ofOEF and ISAF, which would entail an even-tual takeover of combat operations by NATO.Some ISAF troop contributors thus far refuseto engage in a war-fighting mission.

UNAMA: Mandate, Functions, and Challenges

Established in early 2002 by Resolution 1401for an initial period of twelve months,UNAMA’s mandate is to assist Afghans to:

• Create political legitimacy through democ-ratization.

• Maintain peace and stability by negotiatingdisputes with the help of the UN Secretary-General’s good offices.

• Monitor and report on the human rightssituation.

• Advise on the development of institutionsand assist in coordinating external supportto the reconstruction process.

To support these functions, the mission isdivided into two primary “pillars,” or compo-nents, each headed by a Deputy SRSG. Oneis responsible for relief, recovery, and recon-struction (RRR). The other is responsible forthe electoral process, disarmament, demobi-lization, and reintegration (DDR), and the ver-ification of political and other human rights.The mission has special advisers on humanrights, gender, drugs, rule of law, police, mil-itary and demobilization, and legal issues, tocomplement the primary pillars.

UNAMA’s contribution to stabilizationand transition in Afghanistan has been signif-icant. It successfully managed presidentialelections in October 2004—the first in thecountry’s history—and parliamentary elec-tions in September 2005. Voter registrationwas a major challenge, including help in thedrafting of laws governing political partiesand the elections process. UNAMA was also



responsible for convening two Loya Jirgas,which involved complex political negotia-tions and logistical arrangements.

UNAMA initially focused on institutionsin the capital, but due to the spread of violenceand power struggles across the country, it alsoestablished and then strengthened field officesto address destabilizing factors at the locallevel. Soon after its creation, it deployed humanrights officers to register complaints and recom-mend corrective action where appropriate. Theyremain present throughout the country,although nongovernmental organizations havecomplained that the number of officers is toofew. The Independent Afghan Human RightsCommission presented its report A Call forJustice to President Karzai in January 2005,claiming that violations by power holders andlocal officials were still common practice.

UNAMA helped with strategic aid coordi-nation, shifting operational coordination to thegovernment. It also helped convene the AfghanDevelopment Forum, and has led the currentdiscussions of a post-Bonn conference to be

held in London early in 2006. It also workedclosely with the Afghan government in moni-toring various reform programs (over whichUNAMA does not have direct control), suchas judicial reform, public administration re-form, and security sector reform.

AFGHANISTAN • 71

Election workers sort the ballot papers at a counting center in Kabul, 18 October 2004

• Resolution passage 28 March 2002 (UNSC Res. 1401) and start date

• SRSG Jean Arnault (France)• Budget $63.6 million (1 January 2005–

31 December 2005)• Strength as of Military observers: 12

31 October 2005 Civilian police: 6(unless otherwise noted) (30 August 2005)

International civilian staff: 198(30 August 2005)

Local civilian staff: 688 (30 August 2005)

UN volunteers: 43(30 September 2005)

UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

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In other sectors, such as DDR, UNAMA’srole was largely that of policymaker, provid-ing secretariat support and some technicaladvice. There have been uneven results inDDR, but somewhat better results in trainingthe Afghan National Army. The reform andtraining of the Afghan National Police isviewed as painfully slow. The least successfulreform attempts, however, have been in thejudicial system and in counternarcotics.

In terms of the parliamentary elections,all Bonn benchmarks were met more or lesson schedule, credit for which is owed in partto UNAMA. As 2005 drew to a close, thefuture of the mission was the subject of debateabout the kind of advice, monitoring, and sup-port the nascent democracy in Afghanistanwould need. Discussions currently center on athree-year mandate focused on security, gov-ernance, and economic benchmarks, and onjoint Afghan–UN monitoring of both theAfghan government and donors. The plan isfor the new mandate to come from an inter-national declaration at a conference in Lon-don in January 2006, to be confirmed by theSecurity Council.

* * *

Afghanistan has been a truly multilateralproject of international counterterrorism, statebuilding, and economic cooperation. The rela-tive success of the mission, culminating inpresidential elections at the end of 2004 andparliamentary and local elections in late 2005,had a great deal to do with the local popula-tion’s acceptance of the international pres-ence. If the strains caused by the internationalpresence throughout Afghanistan grow, thatrelationship could change.

The year 2005 was marked by major de-velopments for ISAF—expanding its size andgeographic coverage by taking over morePRTs and venturing into more challengingenvironments—and by the conclusion of theBonn Process. But these events do not war-rant declaring “mission accomplished” andscaling down military and economic assis-tance. In October 2005 the UN was leadingdiscussions with the Afghan government anddonors over a post-Bonn agreement, known asthe Kabul Agenda. Continued internationalsecurity and political support to the Afghangovernment will undoubtedly be needed toconsolidate gains to date.


Democratic Republic of Congo

2.4

73

From October 2004 to October 2005 the UNOrganization Mission in the Democratic Re-public of Congo (MONUC) saw its authorizedstrength increase from 10,800 to 17,042 per-sonnel, with the further addition of 300 troopsauthorized in late October 2005. Its mandatewas also expanded, in terms of both the tasksit was to accomplish and its ability to useforce to accomplish them. A three-phase mil-itary campaign plan was launched in the east-ern region of the Democratic Republic ofCongo (DRC) in March 2005, starting with theprovince of Ituri and then moving southward tothe Kivus. As the end of the year approached,significant military operations by Congolesetroops and MONUC peacekeepers were under-way in the east, along with other forms ofpressure to get the militias to disarm, demobi-lize, and, in the case of foreign armed ele-ments, to repatriate, following expiration at theend of September of a deadline for all foreigntroops to leave the country. MONUC also tookon an ever-widening range of tasks related tothe DRC’s political, economic, and social tran-sition. A successful program of voter registra-tion was undertaken throughout the country, inanticipation of a constitutional referendum atthe end of 2005 and elections scheduled forJune 2006.

Background

Laurent-Desiré Kabila seized the presidencyof the DRC in 1997, after a year-long insur-gency supported by regional actors. Follow-ing a brief period of stability, war resumed,pitting government forces supported by Angola,

Namibia, and Zimbabwe against multiplerebels backed by Uganda and Rwanda. Acease-fire agreement was signed in 1999 by allsix governments and two rebel movements—the Movement for the Liberation of the Congo(MLC) and the Congolese Rally for Democ-racy (RCD)—that called for deployment of aUN force to monitor and assist its implementa-tion. While the UN Security Council approvedan initial peacekeeping mission, hostilitiescontinued.

In January 2001, Laurent Kabila was shotand his son Joseph took over the presidency.The Inter-Congolese Dialogue opened laterthat year. In 2002, both Rwanda and Ugandastruck deals with the DRC to withdraw theirforces from the east. and by the end of theyear, most forces of the five neighboringstates involved in the conflict were out of thecountry, although Uganda only formallywithdrew in the spring of 2003.

In December 2002, the Global and All-Inclusive Accord between the governmentand main rebel groups was signed in Pretoria,South Africa, formally putting an end to thecivil war in the DRC. A transitional govern-ment was established, with Joseph Kabila aspresident and representatives of the presi-dent’s party, the RCD-Goma, the MLC, andthe unarmed opposition and civil society asfour vice presidents. The Government ofNational Unity and Transition was launchedin June 2003, and a two-year timeline wasagreed to for the holding of elections, involv-ing a referendum on the constitution, fol-lowed by legislative and presidential elec-tions. Given that the accord allowed for two

3.7


possible six-month extensions of the transi-tion, the ultimate cutoff date for the transi-tional period was envisaged to be 30 June2006.

Insecurity in eastern parts of the countryalso continued to destabilize the transition. A crisis in Bunia in the spring of 2003 led tothe temporary deployment of an EU-man-dated, French-led emergency force (OperationArtemis), with a mandate to provide security

for a three-month period pending reinforce-ment of the UN presence in the area. An evenmore serious challenge to the DRC’s peaceprocess came in May–June 2004, when twogroups of dissidents led by Laurent Nkundaand Jules Mutebutsi overran the town ofBukavu in South Kivu. MONUC’s inability toprevent this takeover led to riots and seriousviolence throughout the DRC, some directedat MONUC. The dissidents withdrew in June,but the loss of credibility of the peace opera-tion and the transitional government led to anincrease in MONUC’s strength and a morerobust mandate.


The UN’s initial mandate of 6 August 1999 inthe DRC was limited, and only ninety mili-tary liaison personnel were deployed to im-plement it. They were later incorporated intoMONUC when the mission was establishedby the Security Council in November 1999.By Resolution 1291 of 24 February 2000,MONUC’s mandate was expanded to includemonitoring the cease-fire agreement, develop-ing an action plan for overall implementationof the agreement, verifying the disengagementand redeployment of forces, facilitating hu-manitarian assistance and human rights moni-toring, and, under Chapter VII, taking the nec-essary action “in the areas of deployment of itsbattalion and as it deems it within its capabili-ties” to protect civilians under imminent threatof physical violence. The Security Councilauthorized the deployment of 5,537 militarypersonnel. MONUC grew incrementally overthe years to reach an authorized strength of17,841 at the end of October 2005, the largestpeace operation under UN command. Over2,500 civilian staff and UN volunteers are alsopart of the mission.

Thus MONUC started as a small liaisonmission and grew to a major multidimen-sional operation with significant responsibil-ities to support a complex transitional processin a highly volatile environment. Its political


• Resolution passage 30 November 1999 (UNSC Res. 1279)and start date

• SRSG William Lacy Swing (United States)• Force commander Lieutenant General Babacar Gaye

(Senegal)• Police commissioner Daniel Cure (France)• Budget $1,133.67 million


31 October 2005 Military observers: 724Civilian police: 300International civilian staff: 811Local civilian staff: 1,373UN volunteers: 470

UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC)


and civilian tasks range from supporting thetransitional government and helping to runcredible elections, to facilitating the return ofhundreds of thousands of refugees and in-ternally displaced persons, and monitoringhuman rights. MONUC is deeply involved inthe disarmament, demobilization, and reinte-gration (DDR) process, as well as broad-basedsecurity sector reform of both the militaryand police.1

The prevailing insecurity in the countrymeant the mission was given a more robustChapter VII mandate as it progressed. Resolu-tion 1493, adopted in the aftermath of the cri-sis in Ituri in April/May 2003, delineated a setof purposes for which force could be used: inself-defense; to protect United Nations per-sonnel, facilities, installations, and equipment;to ensure the security and freedom of move-ment of its personnel; to protect civilians andhumanitarian workers under imminent threatof physical violence; and to contribute to theimprovement of the security conditions inwhich humanitarian assistance is provided.These specific mandated tasks were followedby the more generic authorization of MONUC“to use all necessary means to fulfill its man-date in the Ituri district and, as it deemswithin its capabilities, in North and SouthKivu.” Thus MONUC had Chapter VIIauthority for its entire mandate, full enforce-ment power in Ituri, and limited enforcementpower “within its capabilities” for the protec-tion of civilians and in the Kivus.

Security Council Resolution 1565 (2004)—adopted in the aftermath of the Bukavu crisis—expanded MONUC’s enforcement powers toinclude maintaining a presence in volatile areas,deterring the use of force that threatened thepolitical process, discouraging cross bordermovements of combatants between the DRCand Burundi, and seizing arms that violated theembargo imposed in resolution 1493. In addi-tion, it was tasked with supporting the transi-tional government in maintaining order in strate-gic areas, disarming foreign combatants, con-tributing to the disarmament portion of thenational DDR program, and providing a secure

environment for free, transparent, and peacefulelections. The increase in troop strength by 5,900personnel allowed for the deployment of anIndian brigade to North Kivu and a Pakistanibrigade to South Kivu, both equipped with forcemultipliers such as attack and surveillance heli-copters. This also allowed MONUC to create amobile reserve force from its remaining contin-gents, which could be moved to different loca-tions in the east, depending on requirements. Inthis manner, MONUC had at its disposition threefull brigades in the east (Ituri, North Kivu, andSouth Kivu), as well as a reserve force.

In an innovative step to improve com-mand and control over forces operating in acomplex environment, MONUC created adivisional headquarters led by a two-star gen-eral. The divisional headquarters, renderedoperational on 14 February 2005 and situatedin Kisangani, is responsible for tactical oper-ations in eastern DRC, commanding and co-ordinating the day-to-day activities of thethree eastern brigades. It initially chose Iturias its main effort, conducting frequent, mobile,and temporary operations with the aim of dis-arming the Ituri armed groups. In July 2005the main effort switched to South Kivu andthen to North Kivu later in the year.

MONUC’s increasingly robust posturefrom 2003 onward reflects the Security Coun-cil’s determination to bring the DRC peaceprocess to a successful conclusion, whichwould not be possible without the creation ofa secure environment for the holding of credi-ble elections. Resolutions 1493 and 1565 formthe basis for robust measures against Iturimilitia groups and foreign armed combatantsin support of the FARDC, particularly the ex-FAR/Interahamwe. This was reinforced byresolution 1649 adopted on 21 December2005, as was MONUC’s authority to use forceto deter armed groups from threatening thepolitical process and to protect civilians,which had been interpreted to allow for pre-emptive action when necessary. Impartialityhas been understood to mean adherence to theobjectives of the mandate: force can be usedagainst parties that fail to comply with agree-

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO • 75



ments and Security Council resolutions, par-ticularly when civilian lives are at risk. Giventhat the Ituri armed groups failed to respecttheir commitments under the Acte d’Engage-ment of May 2004 and continued to pose aserious threat to the civilian population, themission was prepared to engage in theirforcible disarmament. The relatively strongconsensual framework between the main par-ties of the transition has relegated smallergroups such as the Ituri militias to the statusof unlawful bandits, allowing force to be used

against them without undermining the transi-tion as a whole (see below).


Important revisions to the mandate at the endof 2004 and an increase in MONUC’s militarystrength enhanced the mission’s capacity tohelp the transition move forward. It assumed awider range of tasks in the political, eco-nomic, and social spheres and became deeplyinvolved in elections, “essential legislation,”

In 2004 there was considerable coverage ofallegations of sexual exploitation andabuse (SEA) by UN peacekeeping missionstaff in the DRC. As the UN attempted toimprove its complaints mechanism, therewas a sharp increase in reports of SEA.Whereas the UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) had investi-gated allegations of SEA against five staffand nineteen military personnel in 2003worldwide, MONUC received seventycomplaints from May to September 2004alone. The UN Office of Internal OversightServices (OIOS) reported sexual favorsbeing bought with food—as little as twoeggs—and the exploitation of orphans.

Further to a request from the UNGeneral Assembly’s Special Committee onPeacekeeping Operations, the Secretary-General invited Prince Zeid, permanentrepresentative of Jordan to the UnitedNations, to conduct a comprehensiveanalysis on SEA by peacekeeping person-nel. Released in March 2005, the studyidentified five principal challenges:

• The diverse categories of personnelemployed in each peace operation aregoverned by different legal systems.

• A lack of specialized investigativeexpertise limits the capacity for thor-ough reviews of allegations.

• There is a need to raise awareness ofSEA and establish organizational, mana-gerial, and command responsibility forthe problem.

• There is a need for compliance meas-ures and individual disciplinary, finan-cial, and criminal accountability forSEA.

• While UN personnel have immunity intheir countries of deployment, this canbe waived, but local judicial systemsmay be insufficient to assure fair trial.

In response to this analysis and policyproposals by Prince Zeid, the UN hasimplemented and planned a variety ofmeasures to prevent SEA, including:

• Amending the legal agreements withtroop-contributing countries and con-tracts with all categories of peace-keeping personnel to include prohibi-tions on SEA.

• Investigating allegations of SEA abusein ten missions, and establishing con-duct and discipline units in eight.

• Briefing personnel at all levels on theproblem, developing interagency net-works to coordinate responses in thefield, and creating a database to trackmisconduct in all missions.

• Developing compliance measures inmissions, including the designation of“off-limits premises” and requiringmilitary personnel to remain in uni-form when off-base.

• Designing a policy on victim assistanceand focal points on SEA within mis-sions to work with local populationsand facilitate the receipt of complaints.

• Handing over investigations into alle-gations to OIOS, which is also con-ducting a global review of the state ofdiscipline in peace operations.

• Establishing a Group of Legal Expertsto study means of strengthening crim-inal accountability of UN staff forcrimes committed while serving inpeacekeeping operations.

As of November 2005 these policies hadresulted in 221 investigations of SEA, ofwhich nearly half had resulted in the re-patriation of military personnel or sack-ing of civilian staff.

Box 3.7.1 Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in UN Peace Operations

Source: United Nations, Measures Implemented in 2004–2005 in Peacekeeping Operations to Address Sexual Exploitation and Abuse(New York: Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit/DPKO, 28 July 2005); UN News Center, “UN Refugee Official Sentenced to Three Year’s Jailfor Underage Sex” (1 November 2005).


and security sector reform. The primary mech-anism for involvement in these fields is thedevice of the joint commission, three of whichwere established.

The joint commission on essential legisla-tion worked to move the legislative agendaforward and to ensure that the promulgatedlaws conform to international legal and demo-cratic standards. The transitional governmentpromulgated twelve laws in the last year, in-cluding the law on voter registration and adraft constitution in May 2005. A draft elec-toral law—adopted by the Council of Minis-ters on 25 October—went to the NationalAssembly on 7 November but had not beenadopted by the end of November.

The joint commission on elections wasinstrumental in helping the IndependentElectoral Commission (IEC) establish anelectoral budget and a plan of action for thevoter registration process. With the help ofUNDP, MONUC, and international donors,the IEC succeeded in opening officesthroughout the DRC and in completing thevoter registration process in a country thesize of Western Europe with no road infra-structure. As of 21 November, 22.3 millionpeople had registered out of an estimatedelectorate of 22–28 million. The referendumon the draft constitution, originally sched-uled to take place on 27 November was post-poned to 18 December 2005.

Although initially less productive thanthe other joint commissions, mainly due tolack of political will on the part of formerbelligerents keen to maintain a military powerbase, the joint commission on security sectorreform became more active in the latter partof the year. The transitional government,faced with strong international pressure, cre-ated ten DDR orientation centers and fivebrassage centers for the disarmament of com-batants, followed by integration for soldierswanting to remain within the Forces Arméesde la République Démocratique du Congo(FARDC). With the assistance of Belgium,Angola, South Africa, the EU, and MONUC,six integrated brigades, currently deployed in

Ituri and North and South Kivu, were formed,although their deployment was complicatedby irregular salary payments, as well as inad-equate supply of equipment and basic re-sources by the transitional government. A planwas established to deploy twelve more inte-grated brigades by March 2006. All issuespertaining to DDR and police reform are alsodiscussed in this joint commission, and exten-sive police training is underway by MONUC’scivilian police personnel as well as the EU.

The need to address issues of good gov-ernance and sound economic managementwas actively considered in the latter part of2005. As a first step, it was agreed that theseissues would be discussed in biweekly meet-ings between the International Committee inSupport of the Transition (ICST) and espacepresidential. While an ad hoc committee ofexperts would provide background analysis, ajoint commission was not formed because ofconcerns within the DRC government and onthe Security Council about undue interfer-ence in sovereign affairs.

In response to continued insecurity ineastern DRC and in the context of the forth-coming elections, the newly strengthenedMONUC imposed a deadline of 1 April 2005for voluntary disarmament in Ituri, stepping upits cordon and search operations. In a strongdisplay of force, MONUC dismantled theFront Nationaliste Intégrioniste (FNI) head-quarters in Loga, killing almost sixty militiamembers in the exchange of fire. This growingrobustness on the part of the mission was notwithout risk: on 25 February 2005, nine Bang-ladeshi peacekeepers were killed in an ambushas they carried out a foot patrol near a dis-placed persons camp. However, the use offorce convinced most Ituri militias to lay downtheir arms: 15,600 had disarmed by 25 June2005, leaving behind a recalcitrant group ofabout 1,500 (according to MONUC) who con-tinued to receive military and financial assis-tance from neighboring states. In November,MONUC stepped up, with some success, mil-itary efforts to deal once and for all with thesediehard remnants. Meanwhile, incursions of



elements of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)prompted the FARDC to deploy two battalionsto the border with Sudan, alongside a MONUCmilitary observer team and company.

Having stabilized Ituri to a considerabledegree, MONUC switched its main militaryeffort to the Kivus. The mission worked in con-junction with the FARDC to weaken and repa-triate the ADF/Nalu (1,500–2,000 Ugandancombatants in North Kivu) and the FDLR(10,000–12,000 former Rwandan combatantsin North and South Kivu, some but not all ofwhom were involved in the 1994 genocide).Following the failure of the Rome Sant’Egidiomediation process to result in any significantvoluntary demobilization of the FDLR, despitethe promise on 31 March to lay down arms andreturn to Rwanda, MONUC and the FARDCcommenced joint-operations to disrupt anddestabilize them. During these operations,MONUC and the FARDC destroyed six emptycamps on 14 July 2005, after having first givenwarnings to the FDLR to leave. A deadline forvoluntary repatriation of 30 September wasissued to the FDLR by the Tripartite Plus JointCommittee, a US-sponsored confidence-build-ing mechanism comprising the DRC, Rwanda,Uganda, and Burundi. Further robust action byMONUC and the FARDC began on 31 Octo-ber, which included the use of UN attack heli-copters, heliborn troops, and armored person-nel carriers in an attempt to rid North Kivu’sVirunga National Park of FDLR fighters andrenegade Mayi-Mayi elements. An importantgoal of such operations is to take advantage ofa growing split within the FDLR.

The “protection of civilians” mandategives MONUC the authority to act forcefullyin the Kivus, although there were concernsabout reprisals against civilians and theimpact robust action would have on voter reg-istration. Some FDLR-perpetrated attacksagainst Congolese civilians did occur as aresult of the more robust posture, and thoseresponsible threatened further attacks. Never-theless, voter registration proceeded smoothlyin both North and South Kivu. It is still toosoon to tell whether or not this military pres-

sure on the FDLR will lead to their wholesalerepatriation to Rwanda, but these hardenedfighters proved to be more resilient than theIturi militias.

Most MONUC operations were under-taken jointly with the FARDC. A question thatconcerned the mission throughout 2005 waswhether it should hold off on robust opera-tions until the FARDC had sufficient capacityto take the lead. Under resolution 1565,MONUC has a mandate to support FARDC-led operations to disarm foreign combatants.The Tripartite Plus Joint Committee proposedthat the mandate be changed to give MONUCthe authority to take the lead in these opera-tions—an issue that was being discussed inthe Security Council in the latter part of theyear. To some, the impending elections lent asense of urgency to this and a closely relatedquestion: could the UN operate jointly withthe FARDC without simultaneously taking onresponsibility for training the Congolese army,which itself was a source of insecurity andhuman rights abuses in some areas?

Efforts to improve regional relations werealso actively pursued during 2005. Rwanda’srenewed threat in late November 2004 toundertake military operations in the DRC ifsomething were not done against the FDLR,and Uganda’s very vocal criticisms about theDRC’s incapacity to deal with either theADF/Nalu problem or the Lord’s ResistanceArmy incursion, indicated the fragile natureof these relations. However, progress wasmade on a number of fronts, most notably onthe creation of an “intelligence fusion cell” toassist the three governments in generatingactionable intelligence on armed groups. Inaddition to its ongoing logistical and secre-tariat support to the joint verification mecha-nism, which allows the DRC and Rwanda toverify each other’s claims regarding FDLRpositions and alleged Rwandan Defense Forcesincursions into the DRC, MONUC providesassistance to the fusion cell.

Although MONUC’s strength and capac-ity to use force has increased markedlythrough-out the year, the large size of the



DRC, the complexity of its peace process,and the country’s very poor infrastructurerender the provision of security for credibleelections difficult. In this connection, theSecretary-General identified two sources ofinsecurity: the continued existence of armedgroups who might try to disrupt or delay elec-tions and law and order problems associatedwith tensions between political parties in themajor urban centers. MONUC has no troopsin large parts of the country and even whereit has substantial deployments, it is impossi-ble to secure all towns and villages at thesame time. The Security Council’s response tothe Secretary-General’s request for an addi-tional brigade to help provide security for theelections in Katanga province was to author-ize a personnel increase of 300. It also author-ized five additional formed police units, for atotal of 750 officers, to be deployed in majorcities with a mandate to support the nationalpolice in crowd control and to protect UNfacilities. Two of these units had beendeployed by 15 November.

The intertwined political, security, human-itarian, and human rights challenges promptedMONUC to adopt an “integrated mission con-cept,”2 which is designed to ensure that theUN system as a whole shares an overall strate-gic objective for the peace process and coordi-nates its responses and activities in an effec-tive manner. This coordinated approach isespecially important in the east where disar-mament and demobilization must be followedby swift reintegration of ex-combatants andmore broad-based reconstruction.

* * *

The challenges ahead for MONUC are sub-stantial. The shift toward a more robustapproach met with considerable success inthe Ituri region in the east; whether a similarsuccess can be achieved in the Kivus remainedto be seen as 2005 drew to a close. The pres-ence of foreign armed groups in the DRC wascertainly a threat to regional security, but theprimary responsibility for disarming and


South African peacekeepers with MONUC patrol in the sunset, 25 December 2004, at the outskirts of Kirumba, after they established a buffer zone to stop clashes between rival army factions

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repatriating them rested with the FARDC,which would require more government anddonor support if it was to acquire the capacityto do so. The successful registration cam-paign and consitutional reform bode well for

the prospect of elections in 2006, but thefragility of the DRC peace process and thecomplexity of subregional dynamics suggestthere is no reason to be sanguine.


Notes1. A range of bilateral and institutional partners are assisting with security sector reform, including

a European Union police training mission (EUPOL), based in Kinshasa.2. See Espen Barth Eide, Anja Therese Kaspersen, Randolph Kent, and Karen von Hippel, Report

on Integrated Missions: Practical Perspectives and Recommendations, Independent Study for theExpanded UN ECHA Core Group, May 2005, p. 27.


MissionNotes4

81


The December 2004 tsunami offered an unex-pected political opportunity for peacemaking inthe Indonesian province of Aceh, site of a long-running insurgency. The need to cooperate on alarge-scale humanitarian operation broughtabout tentative reconciliation between the gov-ernment of Indonesia and the separatist FreeAceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka[GAM]). A memorandum of understandingsigned on 15 August 2005 outlined steps in thatdirection, including demilitarization and Indo-nesian troop withdrawal. The European Unionand five members of the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) deployed the 250-strong Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) to ob-serve its implementation, which became opera-tional on 15 September 2005. While the AMM’smandate is limited, it is the EU’s first in Asia andthe first such collaboration between the EU andASEAN countries.

Aceh has been a center of resistance tothe Indonesian government since the countrygained independence from the Netherlands in

1945. Formed in 1976, the GAM, developedinto a de facto government of the provincewith its own tax system and armed forces.But from 1990 to 1998 the Indonesian armyand paramilitary forces mounted counterin-surgency operations, reportedly claiming onethousand lives. The 1998 fall of PresidentHaji Mohamed Suharto offered an opportu-nity for peace—in 2001 Megawati Sukarno-putri gained the presidency on a platform thatincluded peace in Aceh.

In December 2002, Indonesia and GAMsigned a framework agreement on the cessa-tion of hostilities, which included provisionsfor third-party monitoring. After prolongednegotiations failed to achieve progress onAceh’s political status, President Megawatiauthorized new military operations against theGAM in May 2003. But violence never re-turned to pre-2002 levels and even before thetsunami there was a new impetus for peace. TheInternational Crisis Group (ICG) has claimedthat in October 2004 the new Indonesian gov-ernment of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoy-ono reached a secret agreement with exiledGAM leaders on the cessation of hostilities.

The tsunami provided both sides with theopportunity to make difficult public politicalchoices. Immediately following the tragedy,GAM declared a unilateral cease-fire so as toallow humanitarian aid to be delivered. It alsosent representatives to talks in Helsinki, mod-erated by an independent nongovernmentalorganization, the Crisis Management Initiative(CMI), founded by former Finnish presidentMartti Ahtisaari. Five rounds of talks producedthe August Memorandum, which formally

82

4.1

Aceh, Indonesia

• Authorization date 9 September 2005 (Joint CouncilAction 2005/643/CFSP)

• Start date September 2005• Head of mission Pieter Feith (Netherlands)• Budget as of $18.1 million (2005)

30 September 2005• Strength as of Military observers: 216

30 September 2005

EU Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM)


ended the violence, offered an amnesty toimprisoned GAM members, and prompted thedeployment of the AMM.

The AMM’s main purpose is to observeimplementation of the August Memorandum.Formally, it has acted on the invitation of theIndonesian government and with the full sup-port of the GAM. Its tasks include monitoringdemobilization of the GAM, assisting in thedecommissioning of its arms, as well as thewithdrawal of Indonesian forces, the mainte-nance of human rights, and the developmentof new legislation affecting the province.While it has the right to rule on disputedamnesty cases, the AMM is not empoweredto take on the role of facilitator or negotiator,which remain the prerogative of the CMI.

The European Union’s Political and Secu-rity Committee (PSC) is responsible for theAMM’s political control and strategic guid-ance, under overall authority of the Council ofthe EU. The head of the mission is a seniorCouncil official, Pieter Feith, supported by aprincipal deputy from Thailand, LieutenantGeneral Nipat Thonglek, and two EU deputies.The initial mandate was six months. Disarma-ment and troop withdrawals in Aceh werescheduled to be completed by 31 December,with the mission scheduled to end on 15March 2006.

The AMM is a fully integrated operationunder EU leadership, with 130 personnel fromthe EU, plus Norway and Switzerland. Anotherninety-six staff are supplied by five “ASEANcontributing countries”—Brunei, Malaysia,Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand—whichare involved in the mission in their own rightrather than representing ASEAN. The missionheadquarters are in the regional capital ofBanda Aceh, with monitoring cells located inten district offices across the province. These

are complemented by mobile decommissioningteams. While the mission includes a number offormer military personnel, it is an unarmedcivilian force—the Indonesian governmentbears responsibility for its security.

By the end of September 2005 the AMMhad overseen the first stage of withdrawal ofIndonesian troops and the destruction of thefirst batch of weapons surrendered by theGAM. In this period, 6,671 Indonesian militaryand around 1,300 police moved out of Aceh,and a total of 243 arms were handed over bythe GAM. The next phase was launched theday before its 15 October deadline and con-cluded in ten days. With all parties apparentlykeen to keep up this pace, military and policewithdrawals concluded on 29 December and 5January, respectively. The only IndonesianSecurity personnel left in the province werenative to it.

Nonetheless, some difficulties arose inthe amnesty process. By early October 2005,the GAM was concerned that around a hun-dred of its members had not yet been releasedby the Indonesian government. AmbassadorFeith declared his determination to pursuethis issue, and was optimistic that a solutionwould be found by the mission’s conclusion.The delivery of assistance to former GAMmembers, organized by the InternationalOrganization for Migration (IOM) and moni-tored by the AMM, also encountered difficul-ties, as the GAM refused to reveal their namesfor security reasons.

As the demobilization process continued,the focus of the AMM began to shift towardmonitoring human rights. Human right expertswere scheduled to gradually replace arms spe-cialists within the mission. A decision on extend-ing the AMM beyond its six-month mandatewas scheduled to be made by January 2006.

ACEH, INDONESIA • 83


During 2005, the Moro Insurgency in thesouthern Philippines and the central govern-ment in Manila moved closer to resolvingtheir three-decade conflict, due in part to theengagement of the International MonitoringTeam (IMT) deployed to Mindanao in No-vember 2004. Progress toward resolution hasbeen bolstered by a military stalemate reachedduring the past year, and by political transitionwithin the Moro Islamic Liberation Front(MILF) due to the death of its chairman,Hashim Salamat, in July 2003. Additionally,the Philippine central government’s mountingconcern that the war zone has become a havenfor terrorists, the financial burden of its con-tinued military campaign, and the MILF’sworries that the United States might expandits military role in the south have encouragedboth parties to return to the negotiating table.

In 1996, the secular nationalist Moro Na-tional Liberation Front (MNLF) signed a peaceagreement with the Manila government underwhich the Autonomous Region of MuslimMindanao (ARMM) was established as an

initial step toward Moro self-government.Despite this progress, however, the more radi-cal Moro Islamic Liberation Front continued itsarmed struggle for the establishment of anindependent Muslim state. The Philippine gov-ernment and the MILF first forged a cease-firepact in 1998, but the agreement collapsed whenthen-president Joseph Estrada ordered a fullassault against the rebel groups’ headquartersand camp in Mindanao. In 2001, Malaysiahosted a renewed effort to come to a peacefulagreement. These efforts similarly collapsed inFebruary 2003 when clashes on the groundflared up over allegations that the MILF wasbuilding its strength and providing safe havenfor alleged terrorists.

In February 2004, a significant break-through occurred when Manila and the MILFagreed to resume peace talks brokered byMalaysia on behalf of the Organization of theIslamic Conference (OIC). In July 2004, theMILF agreed to cooperate with the Philippinearmed forces against Jemaah Islamiah (JI),the mainly Indonesian-based, pan–SoutheastAsian terrorist network with alleged ties toAl-Qaida and to kidnapping gangs that werebelieved to have found sanctuary in rebel-controlled areas. In return for this collabora-tion, Manila dropped its criminal chargesagainst MILF personnel over alleged bombingscarried out in 2003.

In an environment in which both sideswere making concessions and the cease-firewas generally holding, the IMT was given aone-year mandate. The sixty-member team iscomposed of fifty Malaysian military observ-ers, ten Bruneians, and four Libyans. IMT

84

• Authorization and start date November 2004• Head of mission Major-General Dato ‘Zulkifeli bin

Mohd Zin (Malaysia)• Budget as of $2.7 million (2005)


30 September 2005

International Monitoring Team (IMT)

4.2

Mindanao, Philippines


members are sponsored by their respectivegovernments, although operational costs areborne by the Philippine government. The teammembers wear their official military uniformbut do not carry any firearms in the conduct of their mission. Based in Cotabato City, theIMT has satellite offices in locations withheavy MILF concentrations. Agreed betweenthe MILF and the Philippine government inManila, the IMT’s terms of reference are tomonitor the cessation of hostilities, and to en-sure that the peace process progresses to a stagein which the conflict-affected areas can berehabilitated, reconstructed, and redeveloped.

The IMT’s presence helps to create condi-tions conducive to peace negotiations betweenthe MILF and the Philippine government.While the parties to the conflict have set upmechanisms for cooperating with the IMT andensuring its freedom of movement, the moni-tors are escorted by security from the Philip-pine government and the MILF at all times.

Throughout 2004, the MILF and thePhilippine government accused each other ofcommitting cease-fire violations, and continuedto mount attacks against army outposts andrebel-controlled territory respectively. In April2005 they were able to return to the negotiat-ing table in Port Dickson, Malaysia. Followingthree days of negotiations, Manila and theMILF agreed that a “breakthrough” had beenachieved on key issues relating to Moro peo-ples’ ancestral homeland. Although they wereable to reach broad consensus on a number ofissues, the most crucial and difficult elementswere tabled for discussion at the June 2005

round of talks. These included matters that gobeyond the 1996 agreement with the MNLF,such as Moro aspirations for political self-determination.

A meeting in April 2005, which broughttogether senior figures from the MILF andMNLF may constitute a step toward so-lidifying their 2001 “unity agreement.” Theneed to build a common political platform isimperative to addressing the continued alle-gations that, although MILF leaders are en-gaged in peace negotiations and deny any tiesto JI, local commanders have operational andtraining links with the organization. A politi-cal format that provides greater autonomyand builds on the steps already taken towardregional self-management could not onlyform the basis for a political solution, butalso reduce the climate of lawlessness.

At the end of October, an environment of optimism prevailed, with the head of thePhilippine government negotiating panel, Sil-vestre Afable, stating that he was hopeful anagreement could be signed within the first sixmonths of 2006. He added that the govern-ment had agreed in principle to share rev-enues from ancestral lands in Mindanao withthe MILF as part of a proposed peace agree-ment, and that the government was consider-ing offering federal state status for MILFterritories or Muslim-dominated areas in Min-danao. In early November, the MILF disman-tled a newly built camp, in compliance withthe IMT’s earlier ruling that the constructionwas in violation of a 2003 agreement signedby both sides.

MINDANAO, PHILIPPINES • 85


In 2005, the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)supported the country in a challenging periodof transition in which it sought to ensure secu-rity during the national election process aswell as support disarmament, demobilization,reintegration (DDR) efforts. The threat posedby a potential spoiler remains, and violent con-frontations afflicted the western provinces ofthe country throughout the year. Nevertheless,the installation of a democratically-electedgovernment created a sufficiently stable envi-ronment by the end of 2005 that discussions inthe UN turned to consideration of establishinga “partners” forum to consolidate the transitionto lasting peace.

After years of violent conflict, the ArushaAgreement was signed in August 2000 by

seventeen political parties, the government,and the National Assembly, but not by themain rebel groups—the Conseil National pourla Defense de la Democratie–Forces pour laDefence de la Democratie (CNDD-FDD) andthe Peuple Hutu–Forces Nationales de Libera-tion (Palipehutu-FNL). In November 2003,the CNDD-FDD signed a cease-fire agree-ment and joined the transitional government.The FNL agreed to a cease-fire in May 2005,but despite strenuous efforts, remained out-side the peace process as of November.

The African Union sent a mission to Bur-undi (AMIB) in 2003—the first-ever peace-keeping operation under the auspices of thenewly formed AU. Staffed by contingents fromEthiopia, Mozambique, and South Africa, andmilitary observers from other African coun-tries, the mission was deployed on the under-standing that the UN would take over aftertwelve months. Widely regarded as a success-ful mission (though not every aspect of its ambi-tious mandate was fulfilled), AMIB’s forceswere integrated into ONUB on 1 June 2004,in a smooth transition.

ONUB has a broad Chapter VII mandate,including the right to use “all necessarymeans” within its capacity and areas of de-ployment to achieve its objectives. Over 6,000military, police, and civilian personnel weredeployed across Burundi throughout most ofthe year.

ONUB was mandated to oversee the dis-armament and demobilization of militias andrebel groups; monitor borders, with particularattention to the illegal arms trade; coordi-nate with the UN Mission in the Democratic

86

• Resolution passage 21 May 2004 (UNSC Res. 1545)• Date of effect 1 June 2004• SRSG Carolyn McAskie (Canada)• Force commander Major-General Derrick Mbuyiselo

Mgwebi (South Africa)• Police commissioner Ibrahima Diallo (Mali)• Budget $292.27 million



UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB)

4.3

Burundi


Republic of the Congo; create a safe environ-ment for refugees; and assist with free and fairelections. It played a significant role in human-itarian efforts, providing security to UN agen-cies working in difficult areas, and through aseries of quick-impact projects.

Communal elections were held in June,which were relatively peaceful in all but fivecommunes in Rural Bujumbura and Bubanzaprovinces, both FNL-infiltrated areas. A SouthAfrican peacekeeper was shot, and there werenumerous civilian injuries and fatalities, butturnout was high and the elections were widelyconsidered a success. They provided a majorvictory for candidates allied with the mainHutu political party turned rebel movement,the CNDD-FDD. Despite a steady cycle ofisolated incidents of violence by FNL rebelsin subsequent months, relatively peaceful elec-tions were held for the legislature and the sen-ate in July. On 19 August, Pierre Nkurunziza,the leader of CNDD-FDD, was elected presi-dent of Burundi by parliament. This electoralprocess marked the first peaceful transition inBurundi’s history as an independent state.

Meanwhile, the DDR program has contin-ued, with almost 20,000 former combatants beexpected to be demobilized by the end of De-cember 2005. Police integration and trainingproceeded reasonably well throughout the year.Co-deployment of ONUB officers alongsidetheir Burundian counterparts proved particu-larly useful during the constitutional referen-dum, when ONUB police offered assistance tothe local police to strengthen security measuresbefore, during, and after the voting process.

Securing a stable cease-fire with the FNLremained a significant challenge for Burundi.The election of President Nkurunziza saw asharp increase in FNL activity in strongholdprovinces. The continuing military confronta-tion has had serious consequences for the civil-ian population. The problem of impunity is yetto be addressed, although the adoption of Secu-rity Council Resolution 1606—which requeststhe Secretary-General to initiate negotiationswith the Burundian government on setting up

a truth commission and special chamber—isa positive step in that direction.

In September 2005, on the basis of exten-sive consultations with other external actors,the Secretary-General recommended the es-tablishment of an “international support mech-anism” that could possibly be linked with theUN Peacebuilding Commission (once estab-lished) to support the new government as itproceeds with consolidating peace in the coun-try. With the window of opportunity providedby the election, the central challenge in 2006will be to lay the foundation for a more sus-tainable peace. This will require tackling keypeacebuilding challenges while ensuring thatcontinuing tensions with the FNL and complexregional dynamics do not undermine the cur-rently fragile stability.

BURUNDI • 87

An ONUB soldier is seen under a flag of Burundi,while patrolling in the streets of Bujumbura

to prevent incidents two days before the parliamentary elections, 2 July 2005

JOSE

CEN

DO

N/A

FP/G

etty

Imag

es


88 • MISSION NOTES

October 2005 saw the first edition of theHuman Security Report, produced by theHuman Security Centre at the Universityof British Columbia. This aims to give“a comprehensive and evidence-basedportrait of global security” with specificreference to violence against individu-als. Its overall message is a positive one:contrary to conventional wisdom, sincethe end of the Cold War, “civil wars,genocides and international crises haveall declined sharply.” It notes that:

• The total number of armed conflictshas declined by over 40 percent sincethe early 1990s.

• In 2004 there were twenty-five ongo-ing secessionist conflicts—the lowestannual rate since 1976.

• Between 1988 and 2000 there was an80 percent decline in the number ofgenocides and politicides.

• Wars, on average, are growing lessdeadly: in 2002 the average armed

conflict claimed 600 lives, comparedwith 38,000 in 1950.

The report argues that one majorfactor in promoting security has been asurge in peacekeeping, by the UN inparticular. The number of UN peaceoperations has more than doubled since1988, when there were just seven, andthere has been an even greater prolifera-tion in preventive diplomacy and peace-making activities. The report notes arecent RAND study that found that two-thirds of UN nation-building operationscan be judged a success, but that onlyhalf of US missions reached the samelevel.

It also demonstrates a number oflong-term trends that may shape the needfor, and types of, future operations:

• By the beginning of the twenty-firstcentury, wars in sub-Saharan Africawere claiming more lives than all those

in the rest of the world: battle deathsin the region were close to zero in1950, but have now risen to an annualaverage of 100,000.

• There is a clear correlation betweenpoverty and war: a state with an annualper capita gross domestic product(GDP) of $250 has a 15 percent chanceof collapsing into war within a five-year period. In contrast, where percapita GDP is $2,500, the probabilityis two percent.

• Nonetheless, both economic and ethnicdiscrimination are in decline world-wide: in 1950, 45 percent of govern-ments practiced some sort of ethnic dis-crimination compared to 25 percent in2002.

While emphasizing positive themes,the report states that there is “no room forcomplacency” and urges a continuation inthe “international activism” it identifiesas the key driver for peace in the 1990s.

Box 4.3.1 The Human Security Report

Source: Andrew Mack et al., The Human Security Report (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).


In 2005, the security situation in Iraq re-mained volatile while an elected Iraqi gov-ernment gained power and a new constitutionwas approved by referendum. While the newgovernment requested that the US-led Multi-national Force in Iraq (MNF-I) remain for atleast another year, US forces passed the do-mestically significant mark of 2,000 fielddeaths, and twelve other troop contributorswithdrew their contingents in 2005. The de-velopment of a domestic security force hasbeen slow, but the reemergence of the Iraqistate offered some political space for them togrow further.

From May 2003 to June 2004, Iraq wasgoverned by the Coalition Provisional Author-ity (CPA), led by the United States under itsobligations as an occupying force. An interimgovernment reestablished Iraqi sovereigntyon 28 June 2004. On 30 January 2005, multi-party elections were held in Iraq for the firsttime in over half a century. Despite electionboycotts from the Turkmen minority in Kur-distan and a low voter turnout among Sunnis,the elections were generally held to be a suc-cess, and a National Assembly (Majlis Watani)was formed. The December 15 elections onIraq’s first full-term Parliament were rela-tively peaceful and turnout was over 70%.

The current mandate for the MNF-I forcesin Iraq derives from Security Council Reso-lution 1546, passed on 8 June 2004. Thisstemmed from an exchange of letters betweenIraqi interim prime minister Ayad Allawi andthen US secretary of state Colin Powell,attached to the resolution, in which the interimgovernment formally requested the force’s

support. On 8 November 2005 the SecurityCouncil adopted Resolution 1637 extendingthe mandate of the MNF-I until the end of2006. The extension was requested by Iraqiprime minister Ibrahim Jaafari in a letter to theCouncil. MNF-I forces have remained widelydeployed across Iraq, with troop and policeconcentrations changing in accordance withmilitary operations and insurgency intensity.In 2005, the predominately Sunni western re-gion of the country experienced the most in-tense combat.

MNF-I works alongside not only domesticpolice and security forces, but the UN Assis-tance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and theNATO Training Mission Iraq (NTM-I). Afterthe 19 August 2003 bombing of UNAMI head-quarters in Baghdad, which killed Special Rep-resentative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)Sergio Vieira de Mello and twenty-one otherUN staff members, most international UN

4.4

Iraq

89

• Authorization date 16 October 2003 (UNSC Res. 1511)8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546,modified)

• Start date October 2003• Head of mission General George W. Casey Jr.

(United States)• Budget as of $67 million (2005)


30 September 2005 Civilian police: 1,051

Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I)


personnel were withdrawn to a regional head-quarters in Amman. UNAMI nevertheless con-tinued to play a significant role, bolstered bySpecial Envoy Lakdhar Brahimi, who helpedto broker transitional arrangements during thisfragile period.

In 2005, a reduced UNAMI operated fromBaghdad’s secure Green Zone, the Ammanheadquarters, and subregional offices in Iraq.It provided technical assistance in the run-upto the January elections, and the first meetingof the transitional National Assembly inMarch. After the transitional government wassworn in, UNAMI was closely involved inproviding legal assistance and facilitating thecreation of the new constitution. The poll onthe constitution proved relatively calm, andwas approved by a three-quarters majority,

although this result was again marred by Sunniopposition. In addition to humanitarian activi-ties, the UN faced the difficult task of offeringneutral assistance to the Iraqi governmentwhile monitoring its human rights perform-ance, particularly concerning trials of mem-bers of the former regime.

In security terms, the development of anIraqi force capable of maintaining security hasbeen slow. The MNF-I claims that there arenow 75,000 troops in the army, 190 in the airforce, and 110 in the navy, but widespreaddoubts exist as to the capability and loyalty ofthese troops—doubts often acknowledged bythe MNF-I’s commanders. A counterterroristforce and a commando battalion have con-ducted numerous high-profile operations, butquestions of human rights observance andabuses have emerged.

Similar questions remain over the police.By June 2005, the government claimed tohave over 61,000 trained and equipped regu-lar police and 31,000 officers in police com-mando, public order, and mechanized policebattalions. The independence, loyalty, andefficacy of these units have been tested andquestioned frequently. In both the militaryand police forces, the challenges appear tostem from insurgent penetration as well prob-lems of training and equipment: 35,000police officers were trained in seven months,with over 22,000 receiving eight weeks ofbasic training; the course has been extendedto ten weeks, and seven basic police acade-mies are graduating over 3,500 officers eachmonth.

Support for training Iraqi security forceshas been provided by NATO since 2003. TheNATO Training Implementation Mission inIraq (NTIM-I) was deployed on 14 August2003, in response to a request from InterimPrime Minister Allawi for assistance with de-veloping Iraqi security forces. The missionwas tasked with identifying training oppor-tunities. In December 2004 NTIM-I was re-placed by NTM-I, which had a broader man-date, including the reestablishment of Iraq’shigher-level military training institutions and


• Authorization date 8 June 2004 (UNSC Res. 1546)30 July 2004 (establishment of NATO

Training Implementation Mission in Iraq [NTIM-I])

16 December 2004 (modified into full-fledged training mission)

• Start date August 2004• Head of mission Lieutenant-General Martin E. Dempsey

(United States)• Budget as of $11.7 million

30 September 2005• Strength as of Troops: 155

30 September 2005

NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I)

• Resolution passage 14 August 2003 (UNSC Res. 1500)and start date (Security Council Resolution 1500)

• SRSG Ashraf Jehagir Qazi (Pakistan)• Budget $144 million (2005)• Strength UN guard unit: 134

Military advisers: 5International civilian staff: 221

UN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)


an Iraqi training command. Also tasked withcoordinating national contributions of militaryequipment, NTM-I has overseen a majorinflux of matériel ranging from 306 millionrounds of ammunition to 24,000 radios.

Although responsibility for Iraqi securitycontinues to lie with MNF-I, in 2005 it received

both political and practical support from theUN and NATO. Progress toward the broadergoal of Iraqi self-reliance in security and stabil-ity was modest at best.

IRAQ • 91


In 2005, the CEMAC Multinational Force inthe Central African Republic (FOMUC) sawnot only an extension of its mandate, but alsoan increase in the challenges it faces. Theseincluded urban rioting and a serious deteriora-tion of the security situation in the northernregion of the country, which borders Chad andSudan. Nonetheless, FOMUC has brought adegree of stability to the capital, Bangui, andother cities, contributing to Central AfricanRepublic’s (CAR) first free and fair electionssince 1993.

FOMUC was established at the LibrevilleSummit of the Central African Economic andMonetary Community (CEMAC) in Decem-ber 2002. It was a response to an attemptedcoup that October against President Ange-Felix Patassé by General François Bozizé,army chief of staff and a former ally accusedof complicity in another attempted putsch in

2001. Originally 200 strong, the mission, pri-marily consisting of Gabonese troops, focusedon securing Bangui and protecting Patassé.On paper, its mandate included protecting theborder with Chad, initiating disarmament, andrestructuring the military.

General Bozizé gained asylum in France,but he soon returned to Chad, which hadallegedly supported an ongoing rebellion byhis supporters in the north of CAR. Theregional dimension of the conflict was under-lined by the presence of Congolese rebels andLibyan forces fighting for Patassé, havingcome to his aid in 2001. FOMUC was estab-lished to facilitate the Libyans’ departure, andduly left soon after France’s deployment. Thebroader elements of its mandate were un-achievable given the continued violence, andFOMUC’s troop strength grew to approxi-mately 350 to handle its more limited tasks.

On 17 February 2003, soldiers loyal toBozizé seized Bangui, causing three FOMUCfatalities. Patassé was abroad, and the generalformed a transitional government, promisingelections. While his forces had originally beenfighting FOMUC, he now called for its presenceto be increased. The former colonial power,France, also deployed 300 troops to Bangui toevacuate foreign citizens and help restore order.

While the African Union called for sanc-tions in response to the coup, General Bozizéreached out to Congo and Gabon. On 21March, CEMAC held an emergency summitand chose to extend FOMUC’s mandate, andto expand it to include securing the cities ofBouar, Sibu, and Carnot, as well as the northernregion of the country. Its authority to reorgan-

92

• Authorization date 2 October 2002 (Libreville Summit)21 March 2003 (Libreville Summit,

Amended)• Start date December 2002• Head of mission Brigadier-General Auguste Roger

Bibayi Itandas (Gabon)• Budget as of $9.6 million (2005)


30 September 2005

CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC)

4.5

Central African Republic


ize CAR armed forces and disarm others wasexpanded, and its strength was formally raisedto 380.

FOMUC was able to contribute to somemilitary reform, but disturbances often threat-ened to outstrip the progress made. In 2003,ongoing banditry, poaching, and fears of anew insurrection led General Bozizé to re-quest further support from France, which pro-vided 200 more troops for professional train-ing of CAR armed forces. By early 2004 aFrench-trained CAR mixed-intervention bat-talion was able to carry out a reasonably suc-cessful mission in the north, and in MarchFrance agreed to train and equip three morebattalions and thirty gendarmerie units.

The UN Peacebuilding Support Office inCAR (BONUCA; established by the Secretary-General in February 2000) has assisted FOMUCand France in overhauling the security sector.Its contributions have included support to anational committee on good governance, helpin drafting a military justice code, and a civil-ian police component that had trained 110police officers and 286 gendarmes by June2005. More broadly, BONUCA has supportedthe work of specialized UN agencies in CAR.

By December 2004, there was sufficientstability for a new constitution to be acceptedby referendum, although the run-up to thevote was marred by violence in the north. Theensuing March 2005 elections, also assistedby BONUCA, were pluralistic and widelyaccepted as fair, and put President Bozizé inthe lead for a runoff to be held in May. Butbefore that could be held, violence escalatedin April as self-described “former liberators”blockaded the main highway from Bangui tothe north, demanding “bonuses promised.”

CAR and FOMUC forces responded ro-bustly, leaving ten dead and fifteen injured—including four FOMUC wounded. Negotia-tions involving the Special Representative of the Secretary-General Lamine Cissé, Bozizé ,FOMUC’s force commander, and Chad’s ambas-sador in Bangui defused the situation. Bozizéwent on to win the runoff with two-thirds of

votes cast, but the security situation in thenorth began to deteriorate in June, driving11,000 refugees into Chad. These refugees re-ported unidentified gunmen indulging in loot-ing and random violence.

FOMUC’s mandate was renewed to theend of 2005 by CEMAC on 2 June, with theexpectation of further renewals. Its interpre-tation of the mandate has altered: in lateAugust it declared that it would leave a resid-ual presence in Bangui but concentrate itsresources in support of CAR forces in thenorth. In accordance with this new interpreta-tion of the mandate, one hundred troops weredeployed in the northeastern town of Bria inOctober to combat banditry. While this taskfalls within its 2003 mandate, it raises majoroperational challenges: the FOMUC forcecommander announced that its primary centerof operations would be 500 kilometers fromthe capital.

While the mission is thus shifting from de-fending the center of government to establish-ing law and order in the field, there is no clearpolitical solution to the long-standing violencein the north. The International Monetary Fund(IMF) has argued that the basic cause of CAR’sinstability is a lack of funds to pay civil servantsand soldiers. In October, civil servants began tostrike in response to the government’s failure topay workers. Moreover, while the AU lifted itssanctions in 2004, and the EU promised 100million euros to CAR, the economic outlookremains troubled. The discovery of diamondmines in the southwestern region of the countrymay offer a solution, but CAR has been identi-fied as a center for smuggling conflict dia-monds, including those from the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo. The new mines mayprove a flash point in the future.

With drug smuggling also on the increase,and HIV levels rising, FOMUC’s relativelysmall force and its partners face major chal-lenges in stabilizing CAR—a significant geo-graphical and political link in the interwovenconflicts of central Africa.

CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC • 93



Peace Operations in Africa


The assassination of Foreign Minister Laksh-man Kadirgamar on 12 August 2005 cast theNorwegian-supported peace process in SriLanka into doubt and raised public questionsover the role of the Sri Lanka MonitoringMission (SLMM). The assassination markedthe nadir of a year of steadily increasing ten-sion. Meanwhile, the SLMM operated with-out enforcement authority in an environmentwhere agreements are flagrantly violated.

After almost two decades of civil warbetween the Sri Lankan government and theLiberation Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE)—astruggle over both Sinhalese-Tamil ethnicityand the governance of the Jaffna peninsula—in 2000, the LTTE began to explore peacetalks and announced a unilateral cease-firejust before the end of the year. The ceasefirelapsed in April 2001, but was redeclared afterthe general election in December of that year.The government reciprocated with its ownunilateral cease-fire offer, formalized in amemorandum of understanding in February2002 and mediated by Norway and otherNordic countries. While talks broke down in2003, the ceasefire to date has largely held.

The SLMM was established on 22 Febru-ary 2002 when the government of Sri Lankaand the LTTE signed a ceasefire agreement.Based on the agreement, Norway and SriLanka concluded a status-of-mission agree-ment that, among other things, sets out theprivileges and immunities of SLMM and itsmembers. The SLMM comprises membersfrom the five Nordic countries—Norway, Swe-den, Finland, Denmark, and Iceland—and ismandated to oversee the CFA, which calls for a

cessation of military operations, conditions forthe separation of forces, and the free move-ment of personnel and nonmilitary goods.

The SLMM is headquartered in Colomboand maintains six district offices and a liaisonoffice in Killinochchi, as well as points of con-tact in various locations in the north and east.District offices operate mobile units and patrolin their areas of responsibility. The SLMM hasthe authority to inquire into complaints any-where in Sri Lanka, but must rely on the good-will of relevant parties to provide access andinformation, and to ensure safe conduct.

The year 2005 saw continual tension anda great deal of investigative work for theSLMM. In the period between 1 January and31 October, more than 1,200 complaints wererecorded against both parties in a ratio ofmore than four to one against the LTTE. Themission must investigate and rule on each ofthese complaints.

In December 2004, Sri Lanka was badlyaffected by the Indian Ocean tsunami. As in

4.6

Sri Lanka

95

• Authorization date 22 February 2002 (Government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation TamilTigers Eelam [LTTE])

• Start date February 2002• Head of mission Hagrup Haukland (Norway)• Budget as of $2.1 million (2005)


30 September 2005

Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM)


the case of Aceh, there were initial hopes thatthe impact of the natural disaster would helpto overcome divisions and create the potentialfor a breakthrough in the stalemated peaceprocess. The government and LTTE did agreeon a joint mechanism for allocating relieffunds, but the agreement was challenged inthe Supreme Court and not implemented.Jockeying over control of the funds began,with the LTTE accusing the Sri Lankan gov-ernment of deliberately failing to direct aid toTamils and refusing to allow a visit by theUN Secretary-General to LTTE-held regionsin January 2005. In February, the assassina-tion of a senior LTTE leader launched a fur-ther cycle of violence, marked by widespreadkillings and reprisals in Batticola and Thanna-munai in April through early May. The deteri-oration of conditions in the east has beendescribed by commentators as a shadow war.The assassination of Minister Kadirgamar isalternatively seen as a last straw proving thefailure of the cease-fire agreement, or a stepthat will force both parties to seek real conces-sions to avoid full-scale war.

The relevance of the SLMM has beenchallenged by these events. Polls have shownmixed attitudes—a loss of faith in the SLMMby those who believe that more violence isinevitable, and the recognition of the neces-sary and vital role for monitoring by thosewho still hope for peace. Escalating violenceat the end of the year generated real concernsabout a return to full-scale civil war.

Presidential elections held on 17 Novem-ber 2005 were won by Mahinda Rajapakse,who appointed Ratnasiri Wickremanayake ashis prime minister. Both have taken a hardline toward the LTTE in the past, and the newpresident once expressed the need to “re-view” the CFA, although he later invited Nor-way to continue its observer role. Meanwhile,Mr. Jayantha Dhanapala, the Secretary-General of the Secretariat for the Coordina-tion of the Peace Process, resigned before theelections but continues to serve as an adviserto the process.



The year 2005 saw a return to stability in theSolomon Islands, attributable largely to thepresence and efforts of the regional assistancemission RAMSI. While rebuilding the chiefinstitutions of governance will take sometime, as will economic recovery, law and orderhave been restored and the country is clearlyon the rebound.

In 1998, an outbreak of intercommunal vio-lence on the main island of Guadalcanal dis-placed nearly 20,000 Malaitians. An Australian-brokered peace agreement in October 2000led to elections in late 2001, but a general cli-mate of instability and insecurity prevailed.The next two years witnessed sharp economicdecline, high unemployment, and a lack ofbasic services for the majority of the popula-tion. Conflict fueled by a variety of factors ledto new violence in the summer of 2003. A cam-paign of intimidation began, led by militantsunder the banner of the Guadalcanal Libera-tion Front (GLF) and the command of HaroldKeke, a Guadalcanalese rebel who had re-fused to sign the Townsville Peace Agreementin 2000. In Honiara, the capital, the govern-ment and citizenry were threatened by formermilitants who had been part of the MalaitaEagle Force (MEF), the Malaitan opposition tothe GLF. Further weakening the government,many of these militiamen had been integratedinto the special constables unit and were com-mitting crimes in uniform. Faced with thesedifficulties, Prime Minister Sir Alan Kemakezarequested support from Australia. The govern-ments of the Solomon Islands, Australia, andNew Zealand then took the matter to thePacific Islands Forum (PIF). The PIF notified

the UN Security Council on 22 July 2003 andRAMSI was deployed on 24 July of that year.

The initial 2,000-strong contingent, led byAustralia, with contributions from Fiji, NewZealand, Papua New Guinea, and Tonga, wasgranted a mandate by the Solomon Islands’parliament “to reinforce and uphold the legiti-mate institutions and authorities in SolomonIslands, and ensure respect for the Constitutionand implementation of the laws.” RAMSI’sdeployment produced immediate results interms of security. Harold Keke surrenderedon 13 August 2003, and forty of his GLFfighters laid down their weapons. SeniorMEF commanders, including Jimmy “Rasta”Lusibaea, surrendered their guns and ammu-nition to RAMSI shortly thereafter. Almostall internally displaced persons had returnedby the middle of August 2003, and by the endof that year, almost 4,000 firearms had beencollected and destroyed, nearly 3,000 arrestshad been made, and 15 police posts had beenestablished throughout the country. Over 400

2.4

97

4.7

Solomon Islands

• Authorization date 23–30 October 2000 (Pacific IslandsForum Communiqué 2000)

• Start date July 2003• Head of mission James Batley (Australia)• Budget as of $171.3 million (2005)


30 September 2005 Civilian police: 300Civilian staff: 120

Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands (RAMSI)



police officers (about one-third of the activepolice service) were dismissed, stood down,or retired. Many more were arrested and puton trial.

In 2003, RAMSI reduced its troop pres-ence and began to focus on economic reform,the machinery of government, accountability,and law and justice (with support from theUN, donors, and international financial insti-tutions). By 2005, in addition to Australia,New Zealand, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, andTonga, four other Pacific Island countries,(Cook Islands, Kiribati, Samoa, and Vanu-atu), each contributed a handful of police per-sonnel to RAMSI. Australia continues to playa dominant role, providing the majority of theParticipating Police Force (PPF) and non-police staff. RAMSI has a presence in everyprovince through the PPF, which has seven-teen police posts outside of Honiara. Approx-imately a hundred civilian advisers, secondedto various ministries, as well as a continuedpresence of one hundred soldiers supportingand protecting the civilian and police missioncomponents, complement the PPF presence.

Over the past twelve months, the SolomonIslands have remained mostly peaceful. On 22December 2004, however, an Australian Fed-eral Police Protective Service officer servingwith RAMSI was shot and killed. This led tothe immediate redeployment of an Australianinfantry company, to perform rapid responsecapability out of Townsville. The conviction ofHarold Keke on 18 March 2005 passed with-out incident.

In 2004 the Solomon Islands saw an eco-nomic growth rate of 5.5 percent—the highest

among any PIF nation, though low for post-conflict countries on the rebound. An increasein fiscal revenue of over 40 percent has alsohelped restore budgetary stability. Perhapsmore importantly, foreign investment has begunto return; a palm-oil plantation has recentlyreopened in the Guadalcanal plains, and thereis discussion about reopening the Gold RidgeMine.

The challenges facing RAMSI in 2006are the challenges facing Solomon Islanders.Law and order have been successfully restored,and signs of economic growth are encourag-ing; there is a continued risk, however, ofausterity measures and aid-conditioned re-structuring alienating the population. Also ofconcern is the dual structure of the police,with a real risk of the PPF undermining theRoyal Solomon Islands Police. The May2005 PIF “Eminent Persons Group Report”on RAMSI identified additional key chal-lenges facing the country: battling corruption,improving the working culture in the publicservice, creating a business-friendly environ-ment, giving opportunities to the majority ofthe population living in the villages, encour-aging development in all parts of the country,and supporting infrastructure development.

For RAMSI, this means helping to man-age the transition from an emergency situa-tion to transitional recovery and long-termdevelopment. The accomplishments to datesuggest that there is cause for hope. However,in order to ensure that the gains made thus faroutlast RAMSI, it is essential for the missionto continue to build local capacity.


SOLOMON ISLANDS • 99

A Papua New Guinea (PNG) SupremeCourt ruling derailed Australia’s firstpost-RAMSI attempt at further interven-tion in the Pacific region, six monthsafter Australian federal police beganpatrolling their former colony.

Signed in June 2004, Australia’sfive-year, nearly AUD$1 billion (US$744million) enhanced cooperation program(ECP) stipulated the deployment—whichcommenced in December—of 210 Aus-tralian police officers and 64 public ser-vants to bolster the PNG state againstservice delivery breakdowns, a growinglaw and order crisis, and endemic cor-ruption in politics, business, and the pub-lic service. In May 2005 the PNG Su-preme Court declared unconstitutional atreaty clause granting Australian officers

immunity from prosecution. The policewere then promptly withdrawn.

Like RAMSI, the ECP established inresponse to Canberra’s concern over ‘failedstates’ in the Pacific—which are potentialthreats to Australia’s security. The programalso reflects new thinking around enhanc-ing the effectiveness of aid to PNG and sug-gests post-RAMSI confidence in the posi-tive potential of intervention in the region.Its aim is to transfer skills to local counter-parts by (1) empowering Australian policeto exercise the functions of the Royal PNGConstabulary, including the power ofarrest; (2) giving Australian officials posi-tions in police headquarters, criminal in-vestigations, prosecutions, and other areas;(3) placing Australian public servants inmentoring and supervisory roles in strategic,

in-line PNG government positions; and (4)integrating Australian judges and legal offi-cials into the judicial system.

At the time of writing, the principalchallenge facing the ECP is how to rede-ploy the police. A compromise arrange-ment may accomplish this, but in vastlyreduced numbers and not on the front lineof law enforcement activities—with per-haps forty Australian officers in resource-rich provinces to build capacity amongprovincial police and station commanders.If approved, the ECP still faces importantquestions about sovereignty and account-ability, given that the degree of direct con-trol envisioned for the Australians is a sig-nificant departure from the traditional roleof consultants and contractors.

Box 4.7.1 Enhanced Cooperation Programme: Australian Police in Papua New Guinea


On 7 December 2005, Eritrea ordered theexpulsion of Canadian, European, and USpersonnel from the UN Mission in Ethiopiaand Eritrea, capping a period of sharply esca-lating tension in the region. Eritrea’s earlierflight ban on UN helicopters remained inplace, as did its restrictions on the movementof UNMEE staff and vehicles in the tempo-rary security zone (TSZ). In late November,Ethiopia and Eritrea’s deployment of troops tothe border region prompted the SecurityCouncil to adopt Resolution 1640 demandingthat Ethiopia accept the boundary commis-sion’s 2002 decision that awarded a disputedtown to Eritrea, that Eritrea reverse its ban onUN helicopter flights and other restrictionson UNMEE, and that both parties return totheir December 2004 levels of troop deploy-ment within thirty days. Thus, the last monthsof 2005 saw continued stalemate over theboundary demarcation, threats to the security

of UNMEE staff, and severe curtailments onthe operational capacity of the mission.

UNMEE was established in July 2000 tomonitor a cessation of hostilities agreement(the Algiers Agreement) between Ethiopiaand Eritrea signed the month before. Thatagreement was followed in December 2000by a comprehensive peace agreement (CPA)between the two countries, the core feature ofwhich was the establishment of an agreedprocess leading to demarcation of the bound-ary. While both agreements were negotiatedunder the auspices of the Organization ofAfrican Unity (OAU), the UN was called on to assist in their implementation. The mis-sion is headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), LegwailaJoseph Legwaila, who maintains close con-tact with the political and military leadershipof Ethiopia and Eritrea, as well as with theOAU. Although initially limited to 100 mili-tary observers and civilian support staff,UNMEE has grown to a mission of over 3,000personnel.

UNMEE’s principal tasks are to monitorthe cessation of hostilities, the redeploymentof Ethiopian forces, and the position of Eri-trean troops, who are to remain twenty-fivekilometers from their Ethiopian counterparts,creating the TSZ. The mission also coordinateshuman rights, mine action, and other humani-tarian activities in and around the TSZ. Itchairs the Military Coordination Commission(MCC), which is composed of representativesof the parties, and is tasked with resolving issuesrelated to the implementation of UNMEE’smandate.

100

2.44.8

Ethiopia and Eritrea

• Resolution passage 31 July 2000 (UNSC Res. 1312) and start date

• SRSG Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (Botswana)• Force commander Major-General Rajender Singh (India)• Budget $176.64 million


31 October 2005 Military observers: 205International civilian staff: 191Local civilian staff: 244UN volunteers: 74

UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)


ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA • 101

An independent boundary commissionset up pursuant to the CPA rendered its rulingon the demarcation in April 2002. Althoughdecisions of the commission were meant tobe “final and binding,” Ethiopia rejected theruling on the grounds that it was “not in theinterest of peace” between the two countriesor in the subregion, and called for direct talksbetween the two neighbors. Eritrea, for itspart, insisted that the commission’s decisionwas binding and that any further dialoguewith Ethiopia was contingent upon its fullimplementation.

In November 2004, the Ethiopian govern-ment announced a five-point proposal thataccepted the boundary commission’s decisionin principle. Eritrea dismissed the proposal,claiming that it failed to signal Ethiopia’s un-conditional respect for the work of the com-mission. Meanwhile, Eritrea has been unwill-ing to engage with the Secretary-General’sSpecial Envoy for Ethiopia and Eritrea, LloydAxworthy, fearing that doing so would openthe door to renegotiating the commission’sdecision. The boundary commission itself hasbeen frustrated by Ethiopia’s repeated obstruc-tion of efforts to implement the decision, despitethe government’s professed acceptance of it.

Although neither Ethiopia nor Eritreahave called for renewed conflict, increasingincidents of violence in the border region andtroop incursions into the neutral zone occurredover the course of the past year and becamemore frequent in November. In December2004, Ethiopia redeployed troops south of theTSZ, in what Eritrea viewed as a provocation.Restrictions were placed on UNMEE’s mili-tary police in Asmara, direct flights betweenAddis Ababa and Asmara were suspended, andEritrea closed the mission’s main supply routeto its contingent in Sector West, citing unex-plained “illegal” activities by UN personnel.

In early October 2005, Eritrea banned UNhelicopter flights in its airspace forcing peace-keepers to abandon eighteen out of a total offorty small posts along the border and to end

demining activities. The helicopter restric-tions curtailed UNMEE’s operational effi-ciency and reconnaissance along the borderregion by more than half. In November,Ethiopian prime minister Meles Zenawi con-firmed that he had moved thousands of troopsto the north of the country, stating that themove intended to prevent an invasion byEritrea. However, in response to the SecurityCouncil’s demand, Ethiopia redeployed itsforces away from the border to pre-December2004 levels by December 2005.

At the end of October 2005, Eritrea im-posed further restrictions on UNMEE’s oper-ational capabilities by limiting night groundoperations and restricting land patrols to mainroads. Applying to the central and westernsector of the buffer zone in Eritrean territory,these restrictions prevented UNMEE from op-erating in nearly 60 percent of the area, andfrom reporting with certainty on military activ-ities on the Eritrean side of the border. InNovember, the security zone along the borderwas declared off-limits to all UN staff exceptpeacekeeping troops. Eritrea repeatedly deniedrequests to either explain or withdraw its banon helicopter flights and restrictions on groundpatrols. It also repeatedly warned of loomingconflict due to Ethiopia’s refusal to accept the2002 border demarcation decision.

In his capacity as chair of the WorkingGroup on Peacekeeping Operations, Ambas-sador Kenzo Oshima (Japan) visited the re-gion to meet with local officials and UNMEEtroops to convey the Security Council’s con-tinued support for their presence on theground. The Council condemned the expul-sion of UNMEE personnel in early Decem-ber, but agreed to relocate them temporarilyto Ethiopia. The year ended with serious con-cerns about the possible outbreak of war, andoptions being weighed for the future of themission, ranging from the status quo, to com-plete withdrawal, to converting UNMEE intoa preventative force.


Closed at the end of 2005 after more than sixyears, the UN Mission in Sierre Leone(UNAMSIL) is now widely regarded as a suc-cess despite its troubled beginning. Yet whilerelative peace exists in the country, manysources of instability remain, which will taketime and sustained investment to address. Theyear 2005 was one of transition, balancing aphased drawdown with increases in localcapacity, while agreeing on the shape andmandate of a successor UN mission.

UNAMSIL was established in October1999 to support the implementation of theLomé Agreement, signed by the governmentof Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary UnitedFront (RUF) following eight years of war,

human rights atrocities, misrule, coups, andfailed peace agreements. Originally designedto monitor a cease-fire and support peace-building in an environment secured by themore robust Economic Community of WestAfrican States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group(ECOMOG), UNAMSIL’s mandate was hur-riedly expanded in early 2000 as ECOMOGwithdrew. The ensuing chaotic handover cre-ated a security vacuum that RUF fightersquickly exploited. This culminated in the cri-sis of May 2000, in which some 500 UNpeacekeepers were taken hostage. Securitywas restored when UNAMSIL stood itsground and was reinforced by a small butpotent United Kingdom force under nationalcommand, backed by an offshore naval pres-ence. Shortly thereafter, the UN mission wasexpanded to 17,500 troops with a more robustmandate.

In May 2001, a new round of politicaltalks produced the Abidjan Accords whichput the peace process back on track. Disarma-ment proceeded as envisaged and successfulelections were held in April 2002. UNAMSILbegan a process of “gradual, phased and de-liberate” drawdown, linked to five key bench-marks: capacity building for the army andpolice; reintegration of ex-combatants; restora-tion of government control over diamond min-ing; consolidation of state authority; andprogress toward ending the conflict in Liberia.In June 2005, UNAMSIL’s mandate was ex-tended for a final six months to the end of theyear.

Since the Sierra Leonean governmentassumed primary responsibility for security

102

2.44.9

Sierra Leone

• Resolution passage 22 October 1999 (UNSC Res. 1270)and start date

• SRSG Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago(Tanzania)

• Force commander Major-General Sajjad Akram(Pakistan)

• Police commissioner Commissioner Hudson Benzu(Zambia)

• Budget $107.54 million (1 July 2005–30 June 2006)

• Strength as of Troops: 1,39631 October 2005 Military observers: 78

Civilian police: 56International civilian staff: 218Local civilian staff: 399UN volunteers: 83

UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL)


SIERRA LEONE • 103

across the country in September 2004, therehave been no reported security incidents re-quiring UNAMSIL assistance. The army con-tinues to receive training from a UK-led advi-sory team. Meanwhile, UNAMSIL civilianpolice supported development of the SierraLeonean police force, which reached 9,500by December 2005. Worrying concerns re-main, however, about inadequate accommo-dation, transport, and equipment available tothe national police and armed forces.

The official program for disarmament,demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) ofex-combatants ended in June 2004. Reintegra-tion efforts continue, however, and are nowfocused on employment opportunities not justfor former fighters but for youth in general.

Progress has been made in extending gov-ernment control over Sierra Leone’s diamondresources, whose illegal exploitation fundedmuch of the conflict. Implementation of theKimberley Process contributed to a substan-tial increase in legal exports of diamonds in2004, and a comprehensive minerals policywas launched in December of that year.

Consolidation of state authority remainsa long-term challenge. The centerpiece of thegovernment’s strategy is to decentralize powerto local councils. Local elections in May2004 passed off peacefully, and in September2005 the UN Secretary-General reported thatformerly tense relations between local coun-cils and tribal chiefdoms were “evolving sat-isfactorily.” Concerns remain, however, aboutlack of capacity in the local councils, andparticularly the absence of mechanisms toensure financial accountability.

Security improvements in Liberia, culmi-nating in the peaceful elections of October2005, are grounds for optimism in SierraLeone. The border with Guinea, however, re-mains tense. In March 2005, a group ofUNAMSIL military observers were detainedby Guinean forces and held for several hoursnear the disputed village of Yenga.

The human rights situation in Sierra Leonehas improved and should progress furtherwith the implementation of institutional re-forms, including those recommended by theTruth and Reconciliation Commission, whosereport was published in August 2005. Trialsof those deemed most responsible for humanrights violations during the war are underway at the Special Court for Sierra Leone.UNAMSIL forces responsible for the court’ssecurity were transferred to the command ofthe UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL).1

These are remarkable developments. Yetas UNAMSIL prepares to withdraw, manypotential sources of tension remain, includingpoverty, regional instability, corruption in themanagement of state revenues, youth unem-ployment, weaknesses in the rule of law, andlow capacity for public service delivery. Thereare fears that progress may stagnate as interna-tional attention turns to other crises. Economicgrowth is expected to slow, and a public opin-ion survey found that around half the respon-dents feared some decline in security andaccountability after the mission withdraws.

UNAMSIL’s successor, the UN IntegratedOffice in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), is intendedto address these concerns and to ensure acohesive approach among UN agencies.UNIOSIL is a first—a Security Council man-dated follow-on mission that combines thefeatures of a special political mission and anintegrated country team. With an initial man-date of twelve months, it will work on gover-nance, human rights and rule of law, policeand military assistance, development, andpublic information. But the drawdown expe-rience has already shown that it is hard toattract resources, human and financial, to yes-terday’s crisis. UNOSIL’s primary challengewill be to sustain the international attentionnecessary to consolidate a peace that hasbeen six years in the making.



In January and February 2005, JeanKrasno conducted a public opinion sur-vey in Sierra Leone to assess perceptionsof UNAMSIL. Based on 872 question-naire responses, the survey is intended togive “a glimpse of what the people ofSierra Leone are thinking at a giventime.” Results included:

• Almost all respondents, 98 percent, be-lieved that the security situation had im-proved since UNAMSIL’s deployment.

• Four-fifths rated the disarmament pro-cess as “good” or “very good.”

• Only half thought that UNAMSIL per-sonnel “always” treated the local popu-lation with respect, although 45 percentbelieved that it “sometimes” did so.

• Four-fifths felt that UNAMSIL per-sonnel had attempted to resolve com-munities’ problems. Of these, 65 per-cent found UNAMSIL personnel “veryhelpful” and only 6 percent foundthem unhelpful.

• While 73 percent were glad that ECO-MOG had intervened in Sierra Leone,respondents were evenly divided onwhether peacekeeping should be car-ried out solely by the UN, or also byother actors.

• Asked who should launch a mission incases where the UN would not or couldnot, 36 percent preferred a West Africanforce, and 48 percent preferred an all-African force. Three-quarters felt thatAfrican missions should “always” be

followed up by “full-blown” UN peace-keeping operations.

While 41 respondents did not haveany complaints against UNAMSIL, 201referred to sexual exploitation issues.While this represents only 23 percent ofthose surveyed, it is noted that criticalrespondents were concentrated in the cap-ital, Freetown, and in the western town ofPort Loko. Other negative issues con-cerning UNAMSIL raised by respondentsincluded reckless driving, and fears forthe employment prospects of local staffafter the mission’s departure.

Box 4.9.1 Public Perceptions of Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone

Source: Jean Krasno, Public Opinion Survey of UNAMSIL’s Work in Sierra Leone (New York: United Nations, DPKO Best Practices Unit,2005).

Note1. For a description of the cooperation among UN missions in West Africa, see the box in Mission

Review 3.4 on Liberia.


A decade after the Dayton Accords broughtpeace to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), itremains divided into Serb and Croat-Bosniakentities and organized crime is widespread.The country has become a test for the Euro-pean Union’s external policies. In December2004, NATO’s Stabilization Force (SFOR) wasreplaced by a European force (EUFOR)—whichat 7,000 personnel is the largest EU deploymentto date. The year 2005 was also the third andlast year of the mandate of the EU Police Mis-sion (EUPM), its biggest civilian operation.While both the Organization for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE) and NATOcontinue to have missions in BiH, the interna-tional presence there is not only about statebuilding but also about offering the prospect ofEU membership.

The EU has been involved in BiH sincethe outbreak of war there, and it has main-tained a monitoring mission throughout theformer Yugoslavia since 1993 (covered in thedata on non-UN missions in this volume). Butthe prospect of membership has becomeexplicit since the European Council’s 2002decision to “double-hat” the internationalcommunity’s High Representative in BiH,Lord Ashdown, as EU Special Representative(EUSR). While Ashdown has continued topress domestic politicians to proceed down the“road to Europe,” 2005 saw temporary set-backs as Bosnian Serb leaders blocked signif-icant police reforms. While these difficultieswere overcome by year’s end, they led to crit-icism of EUPM’s role in facilitating change.

In the meantime, EUFOR has successfullymanaged a complex operational relationship with

NATO, which maintains a small headquartersin Sarajevo. EUFOR has also been proactive intackling certain aspects of organized crime.Both EU missions were mandated to cooperatewith the European and international agenciesoverseeing Bosnia’s reconstruction—theirwork raises policy questions over how peaceoperations can continue to contribute to long-term political transformations.

The EUPM was launched in January 2003to replace the UN’s International Police TaskForce (IPTF). It had no direct responsibilityfor law and order. Rather, it advised andmonitored institutionally separate BosnianSerb and Croat-Bosniak forces, an arrange-ment that reflected BiH’s complex postwarpolitical structure. Although reduced fromtheir wartime levels—during which they wereeffectively paramilitaries—the BiH forcesremained overstaffed. The EUPM’s primarygoal was to help them “develop a profes-sional, politically neutral and ethnically unbi-ased law-enforcement system,” with the key

2.4

105

4.10

Bosnia and Herzegovina

• Authorization date 11 March 2002 (Council Joint Action2002/210/CFSP)

• Start date January 2003• Head of mission Kevin Carty (Irish)• Budget $21.1 million• Current strength Civilian police: 367

Civilian staff: 53

European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM)


political objective being the formation of sin-gle, statewide police.

The EUPM’s scale and activities repre-sented a reduction from those of the IPTF,which was formed in 1996 after Dayton andshifted from limited oversight of the domesticpolice to include their democratization andmodernization. The EUPM’s mandate wasless expansive, and whereas the IPTF fielded1,527 police officers in mid-2002, its successorhas typically deployed just over 400 policeofficers, supported by approximately 50 inter-national and 300 local civilian staff. It departedfrom the IPTF’s strategy of co-location, bywhich officers were present in all Bosnianpolice stations. EUPM members were placedin “medium-high level” offices only, and themission concentrated on training and overallreform.

The EUPM’s advising and monitoringfunction precluded “executive powers or thedeployment of an armed component.” Its pub-

lic security role was confined to liaison withdomestic police and EUFOR “in extremis.”Its authority rested on the right to request thesacking of “noncompliant” domestic officersby the High Representative. Since its incep-tion, observers have criticized the EUPM fornot using this authority more—it has madeone request to date—and in tackling politicalobstruction more broadly. There is consider-able anecdotal evidence of problems in theearly phase of operations, including uncer-tainty over goals and local sensitivities.

Once established, the EUPM worked closelywith the office of Lord Ashdown to create theState Investigation and Protection Agency topursue war crimes and terrorist suspects. Whileit also succeeded in developing a single SerbBorder Service, the impact of its training on thequality and effectiveness of rank-and-file policehas been limited.

Progress toward the unification of theSerb and Croat-Bosniak police forces proveduneasy, and the EUPM’s contribution uncer-tain. Unification was a prerequisite for BiH’sprogress toward a stabilization and associa-tion agreement (SAA) with the EU—widelyinterpreted as a step toward membership. TheEUPM played a relatively small role in theactivities of the Police Restructuring Com-mission (PRC), which set out a program ofrationalization and unification at the close of2004. Talks on implementing this broke downin May 2005, with Bosnian Serb leaders re-jecting a unified police structure.

With a 15 September deadline to meet con-ditions for SAA talks, the EUPM publicly en-couraged a renewed effort to break the dead-lock, although it was temporarily distractedby a highly critical report on its performancefrom the International Crisis Group (ICG).When, on 5 October, the Bosnian Serb parlia-ment belatedly voted to accept a unifiedpolice service, observers attributed the volteface to high-level political pressure, possiblylinked to the EU’s decision to negotiate anSAA with Serbia and Montenegro.

Yet the move helped open the way forEU leaders to offer Bosnia SAA talks on 21


German Army peacekeeper gets the new EUFORsign attached to his uniform sleeve

by an officer at the German military baseRajlovac, near Sarajevo on 30 November 2004

AP

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November. Two days later, the country’sleaders agreed to subordinate their politicalstructures to a single presidency, replacingthe Dayton system by which three presidentsrepresenting Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs hadparticipated in a rotating presidency. Thisconstitutional shift was welcomed as the mostsignificant step yet to political stability.

As the successor to NATO’s StabilizationForce, EUFOR’s mandate in BiH derives fromthe Dayton Accords. After taking over fromthe original Implementation Force in Decem-ber 1996, SFOR gradually reduced from 60,000troops to 7,000, as stability grew. In parallelwith this reduction, the percentage of UStroops in SFOR declined from a third in 1996to 12 percent in 2004, fueling discussions ofthe possibility of its transformation into anEU mission. These were slowed by doubtsover European capabilities, exacerbated bypolitical differences arising from the Iraqcrisis.

EUFOR was finally authorized by theEuropean Council in July 2004. UN SecurityCouncil Resolution 1575 confirmed the mis-sion’s Chapter VII mandate. On 2 December,EUFOR duly replaced SFOR. OperationAlthea is open-ended, to be terminated at theEuropean Council’s discretion. Whereas sen-ior US officials had argued that EUFORwould essentially “police” Bosnia, the EUhas underlined the mission’s continuity withSFOR as a “deterrent” force, maintainingtroop levels at approximately 7,000. Whileanalysts think this number is higher thanstrictly necessary in military terms, EUFORhas also assumed the role of regional reservefor NATO’s Kosovo Force (KFOR).

EUFOR’s formal relations with NATOare labyrinthine, as the EU lacks autonomouscommand structures of its own. While itsforce commander is an EU officer, he isanswerable to EU cells at NATO headquartersin Italy and Belgium. The operation com-mander is thus NATO’s Deputy SupremeAllied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). Butin issues regarding Althea, DSACEUR reportssolely to EU bodies in Brussels, which in turn

inform NATO of developments. Surprisingly,this structure has worked well in practice, andrelations between the two organizations haveproved effective in the field.

Non-EU nations are permitted to con-tribute troops to the mission, and 15 percentof EUFOR’s manpower comes from outsidethe European Union, most notably fromBulgaria, Canada, and Turkey. While there is no residual US presence in the mission,there have been significant public informa-tion efforts to emphasize the continuity fromSFOR. EUFOR’s approval rating among allBosnian citizens in the wake of the transferwas just over 44 percent, roughly on a parwith other international organizations and itspredecessor.

To maintain deterrence, EUFOR units aredeployed throughout Bosnia in a pattern sim-ilar to that employed by SFOR. Additionally,a 500-strong integrated police unit (IPU) isbased in Sarajevo, to be deployed as gen-darmerie to handle civil crises. EUFOR hasyet to face an outbreak of disorder, but exer-cises have been conducted through 2005 todemonstrate the IPU’s readiness and robust-ness. The larger Operation Rehearsal was heldin January to simulate a NATO reinforcement,emphasizing the possibility of its interventionin any future crisis. EUFOR has also contin-ued SFOR’s Harvest operations, targeting ille-gal weapons in collaboration with localauthorities and police. It has been closelyinvolved in intelligence-gathering against war

BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA • 107

• Authorization date 12 July 2004 (EU Council Joint Action2004/570/CFSP)9 July 2004 (UNSC Res. 1551)

• Start date December 2004• Head of mission Major General David Leakey (Britain)• Budget as of $86.3 million (2005)


30 September 2005

EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)


crimes suspects and in operations against or-ganized crime, from drug smuggling to illegallogging.

EUFOR’s force commander has also exer-cised statutory powers over Bosnia’s military,which, like the police, has remained dividedon ethnic lines since Dayton. These powerswere of particular relevance in April 2005,when Bosnian Serb recruits swore allegianceto the Bosnian Serb entity rather than the stateat an induction ceremony. EUFOR required

the Serb entity to suspend all recruit and con-script training at the base involved, removing asenior officer deemed to be responsible forfailing to handle the incident satisfactorily.This incident was treated as further proof ofEUFOR’s expansive interpretation of a strongmandate, contrasted with self-imposed limita-tions on the EUPM.

While EUFOR maintains security in BiH,NATO has a headquarters in Sarajevo. TheUS senior military representative in charge ofthis mission also commands US forces basedin northeastern BiH, maintained under abilateral agreement between Washington andthe Bosnian government. These troops can bedeployed in the pursuit of war crimes sus-pects, for which NATO headquarters sharesresponsibility with EUFOR.1

Politically, NATO headquarters also assistsand monitors BiH’s efforts to enter NATO’sPartnership for Peace (PfP) program, a goalapproved by the Defense Reform Commissionin September 2005. The military corollary ofthe SAA, this would require unification of


• Authorization date 28 June 2004 (Communiqué of NATOIstanbul Summit)22 November 2004 (UNSC Res. 1575)

• Start date 2 December 2004• Head of mission Senior Military Representative,

Brigadier-General Louis Weber (United States)

NATO Headquarters Sarajevo


BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA • 109

post-Dayton structures, as the Serb and Croat-Bosniak militaries have remained divided.Progress toward a single Bosnian army hasbeen uneven but real: while Croat and Bosniakpoliticians approved the transition in January2005, their Serb counterparts only did so inSeptember. NATO headquarters also becameinvolved in the induction ceremony incident,collaborating with EUFOR in censuring thoseinvolved.

In June 2005, NATO troops raided thehouse of the fugitive war crimes suspect, formerBosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic, and inAugust it temporarily detained his son. ButKaradzic remains at large (and is thought tomove between Serbia and Montenegro andBiH), as does the former military commanderRatko Mladic. The long-term success of NATOheadquarters and EUFOR is tied to their capture,a condition for BiH’s progress toward the EUand PfP.

Also involved in BiH’s security and po-litical reform is the OSCE Mission to Bosniaand Herzegovina, which both assisted the De-fense Reform Commission and has supportedthe collection and destruction of small arms incoordination with EUFOR. Mandated underDayton, this mission is autonomous of theOffice of the High Representative, and while itcontinues to maintain field offices across thecountry, is gradually reducing its role. In 2005the OSCE mission declared that it would no

longer involve itself in electoral procedures,formerly one of its main areas of responsibil-ity. Nonetheless, it maintains a Department forSecurity Cooperation that is engaged in assist-ing BiH forces to comply with not only inter-national standards, but also intelligence reformand political oversight of security affairs.

While both the OSCE and NATO continueto be proactive in maintaining peace in Bosnia,the Office of the High Representative may bewound down as early as 2006, with the EUSRformally becoming the principal internationalpost in BiH. This may coincide with the end ofLord Ashdown’s tenure, expected in early2006. While this process is not yet confirmed,and may be affected by the EU’s own uncer-tain political evolution, the Europeanization ofBosnia’s security continues.

• Authorization date 8 December 1995 (Fifth Meeting of theMinisterial Council)

• Start date December 1995• Head of mission Douglas Alexander Davidson

(United States)• Budget as of $20.1 million (2005)

30 September 2005• Strength as of Civilian staff: 119

30 September 2005

OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina



While expanding its role in BiH and con-tinuing its involvement in Kosovo withinthe UN Interim Administration Missionin Kosovo (UNMIK), the EU has alsomaintained a police mission (the EUPolice Mission in the Former YugoslavRepublic of Macedonia [EUPOL Prox-ima]) in the former Yugoslav republic ofMacedonia (FYROM). Launched in 2003to operate until December 2004, its man-date was extended for one year as ten-sions grew around the country’s Alban-ian minority. But these tensions havedissipated, and the EU mission has con-centrated on police and border servicereforms in a largely stable environment.

The situation in FYROM has been asource of concern to the internationalcommunity since it withdrew from Yugo-slavia in 1991. Separatist aspirationsamong segments of the Albanian commu-nity (25 percent of the population) wereexacerbated by limitations on their mi-nority rights. From 1992 to 1999 the UNmaintained a preventive deployment forcethere, complemented by an OSCE “spill-over mission” from Kosovo, which is stillin place. Tensions mounted after Yugo-slavia’s withdrawal from Kosovo, whichencouraged ethnic Albanian radicals tobecome increasingly assertive in FYROM,taking control of the northwestern regionof the country in 2001.

With Kosovo Albanians contribut-ing to this insurgency, NATO deployed3,500 troops to FYROM at the govern-ment’s request in August 2001. NATOmaintained operations there until March2003, when it was replaced by the EU’sfirst military mission—known as Con-cordia. This ran until December 2003

and its departure coincided with thedeployment of Proxima. NATO has re-tained a headquarters in the capital,Skopje, a rear base for its Kosovo force.It also provides security sector assis-tance, as FYROM had the advantage of

joining NATO’s Partnership for Peaceprogram as early as 1995.

Like the EUPM in Bosnia, EUPOLProxima has no executive authority, butprioritizes training activities. These cen-ter on border security, public order, andorganized crime. They also contribute toFYROM’s overall policy of decentral-ization, intended to give the Albaniancommunity increased autonomy. In policeterms, this involves a considerable devo-lution of authority to regional centers,and EUPOL personnel are located in boththese and smaller stations, while fourteams work alongside border police andwithin the interior ministry. While themission originally focused on Albanian-majority areas, it has expanded its activities

to promote police reform throughout thecountry.

The year in review began with ques-tions about FYROM’s commitment tominority rights. In November 2004 thedecentralization process received popular

approval through a referendum, but dis-putes over the rights issue within the gov-erning coalition led to the prime minister’sresignation. While elections in February2005 saw minor violence, this did not es-calate and the government has remainedrelatively stable since.

In this improved political environ-ment, EU Ministers offered Macedoniamembership talks in December 2005,and decided to replace Proxima with asecurity sector reform mission of approx-imately 30 staff. Additionally, the OSCEmission has been and will remain in-volved in police affairs. Nonetheless,critics have suggested that EUPOL hasnot had time institute a new police cul-ture, especially within the border police.

Box 4.10.1 The EU in Macedonia

• Authorization date 29 September 2003 (EU Council JointAction 2003/681/CFSP)

• Start date December 2003• Head of mission Brigadier-General Jürgen Scholtz

(Germany)• Budget as of $13.2 million (2005)

30 September 2005• Strength as of Civilian police: 128


EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia(EUPOL Proxima)

Note1. The headquarters is not usually defined as a peace operation and is thus not included in the non-

UN data in this volume. However, its continued involvement in Bosnian political affairs leads to its cov-erage here.


During 2005 the UN Observer Mission inGeorgia (UNOMIG) witnessed a series ofpromising developments in the region, al-though a mutually acceptable settlement onAbkhazia’s status within Georgia remainedelusive. Following an eight-month hiatus incontact between the two parties, a UN-hostedmeeting in April 2005 signaled a resumptionof the formal peace process. The Georgianleadership affirmed its commitment to apeaceful solution and its readiness to engagewith the new Abkhaz leadership, elected inJanuary 2005. However, Abkhazia questionedthis commitment in view of Georgia’s in-creased military expenditure and its closure ofthe Abkhaz portion of the Black Sea to inter-national maritime traffic. Strains between theparties and between the Georgian governmentand Russia culminated in a vote by the Geor-gian parliament in October that called for awithdrawal of the CIS peacekeeping force(CISPKF).

UNOMIG was established in August 1993with an initial mandate to verify compliancewith a cease-fire agreed by the government ofGeorgia and the Abkhaz authorities. After aperiod of resumed fighting, the two partiessigned an agreement on a cease-fire and sepa-ration of forces (the Moscow Agreement) inMay 1994, mediated by the Russian Federa-tion. On the basis of that agreement, theCISPKF was established to observe the cease-fire, conduct joint patrols with UNOMIG in theKodori Valley, maintain a “security zone” freeof armed forces and heavy military equip-ment, and through its presence “promote thesafe return of refugees and displaced persons,

especially in the Gali district.” The CISPKFwas initially composed of 3,000 peacekeepers,but later reduced to 1,200. Although originallyenvisaged as a multinational force, the reluc-tance of other states to contribute troops underRussian command resulted in a solely Russianforce. The UN Security Council adopted Reso-lution 937 in July 1994, expanding UNOMIG’smandate to include observation of the CISforce, monitoring of the cease-fire, verificationof troop withdrawals from the security zone,and oversight of the withdrawal of Georgiantroops from the Kodori Valley.

Humanitarian and human rights concerns inthe conflict zone posed a major challenge forUNOMIG throughout 2005. The missionworked with a range of organizations to provideassistance to vulnerable groups affected by theconflict. Human rights protection and promo-tion has been a core activity of UNOMIG

2.4

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4.11

Abkhazia-Georgia

• Resolution passage 24 August 1993 (UNSC Res. 858)and start date

• SRSG Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland)• Chief military observer Niaz Muhammad Khan Khattak

(Pakistan)• Senior police adviser Colonel Jozsef Boda (Hungary)• Budget $34.56 million

(1 July 2005–30 June 2006)• Strength as of Military observers: 120

31 October 2005 Civilian police: 12International civilian staff: 102Local civilian staff: 184

UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)


since 1996, when a joint UNOMIG–Office ofthe High Commissioner for Human Rightsoffice was established in Sukhumi. Althoughthe reporting and capacity-building functionsof the office proceeded well in 2005, theunwillingness of Abkhaz authorities to permitthe opening of a human rights suboffice inthe Georgian-populated Gali district was asetback. With a new political leadership inSukhumi that has sought to exert its auton-omy, human rights will likely remain a criti-cal function for UNOMIG.

UNOMIG’s civilian component contin-ued to work closely with local law enforce-ment agencies. Although Abkhaz authoritieshave been relatively open to collaborationwith the UN civilian police force, they havebeen reluctant to permit UNOMIG to deploypolice advisers on the Gali side of the cease-fire line. This has limited the mission’s capac-ity to address crime. In a continued effort tobuild local capacity, UNOMIG hosted a train-ing course on human rights, law enforcement,and community policing for the Georgianpolice force.

The lack of security in the region re-mained a core concern throughout the year. Inthe Gali district, armed robberies, shootings,abductions, detentions, and explosions werereported. Similar incidents were documented inother areas, where local populations have re-ported threats by the Georgian armed forcesand by Abkhazis, and violence prompted bycriminal activity such as smuggling. In responseto these incidents, and to the robbery of eleven

UNOMIG military observers and two inter-preters, the mission increased the securitylevel for its personnel operating in the lowerGali district. The Georgian government reactedto increased levels of crime by tightening itsborder with Abkhazia.

The deteriorating security situation promptedthe Special Representative of the Secretary-General to convene a meeting on 12 May2005 between the Georgian and Abkhaz sidesat UNOMIG’s Gali headquarters, also attendedby the force commander of CISPKF. The dis-cussion concluded with the signing of a proto-col to the Moscow Agreement by both parties,UNOMIG and the CISPKF. The parties com-mitted to making force strength figures trans-parent in the conflict zone, enhancing com-munication by law enforcement agencies,maintaining a minimum distance between thepositions of law enforcement agencies and thecease-fire line, exchanging information oncriminal activities, and ensuring the continuedsafety of the staff of international organiza-tions in the region. Despite these commit-ments made in May, the situation failed toimprove in the months that followed. In earlyNovember, UNOMIG expressed concern thatthe security situation in Gali had deteriorated,and maintained its offer to establish a humanrights office and to deploy a UN police forcein the area.

UNOMIG and the CISPKF continued tocooperate on security matters. Regular meet-ings between the chief military observer ofUNOMIG and the CISPKF force commanderas well as respective liaison teams helped toimprove working relations between the mis-sions, which over the years had been strainedby the issue of compliance with UN normsregarding rules of engagement and codes ofconduct.

Nevertheless, the presence of CISPKF inthe region remains a source of tension. TheGeorgian government has long held that Rus-sia’s dominating role has complicated itsefforts to reestablish authority in the Abkhazregion. Although Russia officially recognizesGeorgian sovereignty in Abkhazia, Tbilisi


• Authorization date 14 May 199421 July 1994 (UNSC Res. 937)

• Start date June 1994• Head of mission Sergey Chaban (Russia)• Budget as of —


30 September 2005

CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia, Abkhazia


ABKHAZIA-GEORGIA • 113

accuses Moscow of backing, arming, and fi-nancing the rebels, and for supporting Ab-khazia in the 1992–1993 civil war. Moreover,the provisions of the Moscow Agreement per-taining to the repatriation of approximately200,000 displaced Georgians, most of whomcontinue to be housed in the Zugdidi regionclose to the conflict zone and Tbilisi, havenot been fulfilled, which remains one of thesingle largest issues for the Georgian govern-ment. Return of internally displaced personswas one of the UN’s core functions; in Octo-ber 2005 it hosted a meeting of Georgian andAbkhaz officials to discuss the issue.

The interposition of peacekeepers hasplayed a constructive short-term role in sepa-rating opposing forces, stabilizing cease-firelines, and creating an environment conduciveto the provision of humanitarian assistance.However, the UN and CIS’s effort to sharesecurity tasks in Abkhazia has been deeplyaffected by regional and geopolitical strains. InOctober 2005, the Georgian parliament voted toplan for a possible withdrawal of the Russian-led CISPKF on the grounds that it had notbeen able to provide adequate security. Soonthereafter, Russian president Vladimir Putinstated that the Russian Federation would

remove its forces from Abkhazia if the Geor-gian government made a clear request. Al-though CISPKF remained in Georgia throughthe end of November, the Georgian govern-ment continued to argue that the presence ofRussian peacekeepers in Abkhazia posed athreat to its national security due to their en-gagement in criminal activities and support ofthe Abkhaz “separatist” government.

The Abkhaz conflict and tension regardingthe role of the CISPKF in Abkhazia is only onepiece of the troubled Russian–Georgian rela-tionship. In the past year, Tbilisi has repeatedlyaccused Moscow of providing military assis-tance to separatists in both Abkhazia and SouthOssetia. On the Russian side, Moscow insiststhat Tbilisi is enabling Chechen separatists toseek shelter in the isolated Pankisi Gorge innorthern Georgia. Russian media reports allegethat elements of the Georgian military andpolitical leadership have joined forces withChechen separatists in an alliance against theRussian Federation. It remains to be seen whatimpact these geopolitical tensions will have onthe future of UNOMIG and the CISPKF, whichremain mutually dependent in both structureand function.


Following significant fighting in summer 2004,the situation in South Ossetia has stabilizedsomewhat in the past year, and the Joint Peace-keeping Forces (JPKF) have been relativelysuccessful in maintaining a cease-fire. Yet mor-tar attacks in the latter part of 2005, an unau-thorized military parade in the South Ossetianadministrative center of Tskhinvali, and aGeorgian initiative to change the structure ofthe Joint Control Commission (JCC) have in-jected a great degree of uncertainty into thepeacekeeping environment.

The active phase of the conflict in SouthOssetia lasted from January 1991 to June 1992and displaced almost 100,000 people. Likemany of the conflicts that broke out in theimmediate aftermath of the Soviet collapse, theSouth Ossetian conflict has its roots in Sovietethnicity policy and the desire for autonomy. InNovember 1989, with the breakup of the SovietUnion looming and Georgian nationalism onthe rise, the South Ossetian regional govern-ment sought to upgrade its status from an

autonomous region (oblast) to an autonomousrepublic within Georgia. The Georgian gov-ernment refused and retaliated with a lawabolishing South Ossetia’s status as an oblastin winter 1990. In January 1991 several thou-sand Georgian troops marched on Tskhinvali,ushering in a year of violent clashes andurban fighting. In May 1992, the deaths of areported thirty-six South Ossetian civilians,including women and children, threatened toexpand the conflict beyond the two parties—that is, to involve the Russian Federationdirectly.

The severity of the May 1992 incidentled to negotiation of the Sochi Agreement, onthe settlement of the Ossetian–Georgian con-flict (June 1992), and to the establishment ofthe JPKF, composed of Russian, Georgian,and Ossetian units. The agreement also calledfor a cease-fire, a demilitarized security zone,the return of refugees and displaced persons,and the commencement of a political processunder the auspices of the JCC, made up ofGeorgian, Russian, and North and South Osset-ian representatives, with participation from theOrganization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE). The JCC coordinates theactivities of the JPKF, whose principal man-date is to separate combatants, prevent aresumption of hostilities, and stem the flow ofarms into the region. Although the Georgiangovernment would have liked the JCC andJPKF to compel South Ossetia back underTbilisi’s control, the South Ossetians wereable to establish their own state’s institutions,including a presidency, parliament, cabinet,and national guard.

114

2.44.12

South Ossetia–Georgia

• Authorization date 24 June 1992 (Georgia and Russia)

• Start date July 1992• Head of mission Marat Kulakhmetow (Russia)• Budget —• Strength as of Troops: 586

30 September 2005 Military observers: 40

South Ossetia–Georgia Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF)


SOUTH OSSETIA–GEORGIA • 115

Violence broke out once again in summer2004, after newly elected Georgian presidentMikhail Saakashvili ordered the destructionof the Ergneti Market, notorious for the avail-ability of weapons and illicit drugs, as part ofa ramped-up countersmuggling campaign.Saakashvili moved a significant number ofGeorgian troops into the conflict zone andordered them to prepare for a “protracted,full-scale war.” A tense summer culminatedin a series of bloody clashes between Geor-gian troops and South Ossetian militias inAugust that left more than twenty dead. Anew cease-fire was signed on 18 August bythe JCC cochairs and Georgian prime minis-ter Zurab Zhvania.

The 2004 hostilities strained the alreadytense relationship between Georgia, SouthOssetia, and Russia. It also illuminated thelack of trust that has marked the peacekeepingand diplomacy efforts thus far. Since then,there have been numerous small flare-ups inviolence, including a two-week exchange offire between Georgian and South Ossetianpeacekeepers in November 2004, and the kid-napping of four Georgian civilians in June2005.

There is a marked lack of trust betweenGeorgian and Russian participants in theJPKF and the JCC, and a lack of faith in thepeacekeeping arrangement. On 13 SeptemberSouth Ossetia formally expressed concernover the appointment of the new commanderof the Georgian peacekeeping forces (becauseof his role in the summer 2004 campaign). On20 September the South Ossetian administra-tion staged a military parade in Tskhinvali,raising great concern on the Georgian sideabout the meaning of demilitarization anddemilitarized zones as specified in the SochiAgreement and the Document on Demilita-rization (2004). That night, mortar shells ofunidentified origin fell on Tskhinvali, injuringseven civilians.

Simultaneously, the JCC has come underattack for its lack of efficacy and perceivedbias. The South Ossetians have demanded anincrease in their status on the commission,while Georgia has threatened to leave theJCC altogether, arguing that they cannot pos-sibly have an equal voice in a body composedof Russia, North Ossetia (loyal to the RussianFederation), and South Ossetia. Recent eventsreveal how difficult it will be to resolve theunderlying political issues within the currentframework.

Russian peacekeepers with the JointPeacekeeping Forces in South Ossetia deployedon a hill near the village of Eredvi, August 2004

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The year 2005 saw rising tensions but littleovert violence in Moldova–Trans-Dniester.The Joint Control Commission (JCC) and itsjoint peacekeeping forces have, in essence,maintained a fourteen-year stalemate, withrelative peace but little movement on a polit-ical strategy that could facilitate resolution ofthe Trans-Dniestran question. A promisingdevelopment occurred on 22 April, whenUkrainian president Viktor Yushchenko pro-posed a peace plan. Unfortunately, that planappears to have been imperiled by the eventsof 19 July, described below.

Tensions between the government inChisinau and Trans-Dniester emerged withthe collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1989,Moldova, which had been carved out ofRomania and Ukraine at the end of WorldWar II, declared Moldovan to be the sole offi-cial language of the country. This had a dra-matic impact on the population living to theeast of the Dniester River, the bulk of whom

were Russian and Ukrainian speakers. In 1990,Trans-Dniester unilaterally seceded from Mol-dova, and by late 1991, the two sides wereembroiled in a full-scale war, in which Russ-ian forces (stationed in Trans-Dniester as partof the typical Soviet deployment pattern) werealso implicated. In total, the conflict producednearly 700 deaths, 1,250 injuries, and 100,000refugees.

Moldovan–Trans-Dniestran hostilities endedwith the signing of a cease-fire agreement, ne-gotiated by Russia, on 21 July 1992. The Yeltsin–Sneuger Agreement provided for the creationof a ten-kilometer security zone on both sidesof the Dniester River, and a Russian-dominated,tripartite peacekeeping force composed ofRussian, Moldovan, and Trans-Dniestran units.It also created the JCC, composed of Moldo-van, Trans-Dniestran, Russian, Ukrainian, andOrganization for Security and Cooperation inEurope (OSCE) participants, to serve as thepolitical mechanism for the resolution of theconflict and to supervise the peacekeeping op-eration. Finally, the cease-fire agreement de-manded the return of refugees, the removal ofthe economic blockade, special status for thecity of Bendery, and the “strict neutrality” ofthe Soviet Fourteenth Army. The cease-fire hasheld in recent years, but full implementation ofthe agreement has been hampered by questionsabout the impartiality of the Russian-led peace-keeping forces and the perceived ineffective-ness of the JCC.

Trans-Dniester has experienced escalatingtensions since mid-2004, including economicblockades, the obstruction of diplomatic visitsby Chisinau, and the forcible closure of several

116

2.44.13

Moldova–Trans-Dniester

• Authorization date 21 July 1992 (Moldova and Russia)• Start date July 1992• Head of mission —• Budget as of —


30 September 2005

Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Forces


MOLDOVA-TRANS-DNIESTER • 117

Moldovan-language schools. This tensionerupted in violence on 19 July 2005, whenRussian peacekeepers fired into the air inorder to subdue a brawl near the conflict zone.The brawl had been precipitated when Russianpeacekeepers demanded that a visiting USlawyer destroy photographs he had taken of abridge over the Dniester River.

The events of July threatened to derail the so-called Yushchenko Plan, a Ukrainian-sponsored seven-step strategy for peace. Thisstrategy includes the adoption of a law on theautonomous status of Trans-Dniester as well asthe holding of democratic elections in the sep-aratist republic under the supervision of inter-national monitors. Support for the plan hadbeen seen both in Tiraspol and in Chisinau,

but the status of the initiative remained stalledat the end of October 2005.

In November 2004 the OSCE missionhead in Moldova went so far as to say that thepresent peacekeeping structure “has outlivedits usefulness.” The Moldovans have with-drawn from negotiations at least twice in thelast year, leaving the JCC in April. The OSCEhas recently taken a more active role in theresolution of the conflict. This, plus recentpolitical changes in Ukraine, may help toovercome the current stalemate, but the mostdifficult questions of the Trans-Dniestran con-flict—how long peacekeepers will stay andwhat the final status of Trans-Dniester willbe—remain unanswered.


The United Nations Mission for the Referen-dum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) under-went a moderate restructuring in the course of2005, in the context of deteriorating compli-ance with agreements reached by Morocco andthe Frente Popular para la Liberación deSaguia el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Polisario).Meanwhile, the political stalemate over thefuture of Western Sahara continued. In October2005, the Secretary-General appointed PeterVan Walsum as his Personal Envoy in a neweffort to break the deadlock.

MINURSO was established in 1991 inaccordance with “settlement proposals” thatcalled for a cease-fire and the holding of areferendum on self-determination. In 1988,both the government of Morocco and thePolisario agreed to the plan in principle. In March 1997, following numerous failed

efforts to implement the referendum proposal,the Secretary-General appointed former USsecretary of state James Baker as his PersonalEnvoy. Baker was asked to work with the par-ties to the conflict to assess whether the settle-ment plan could be implemented in its exist-ing form, or whether adjustments could bemade to make it acceptable to both Moroccoand Polisario.

Following a number of initiatives aimed atbreaking the deadlock, Baker presented in Janu-ary 2003 the “Peace Plan for Self-Determinationof the People of Western Sahara.” The Planprovided for a five-year interim period duringwhich governance responsibilities would beshared between Morocco and Polisario, fol-lowed by a choice of integration, autonomy, orindependence. Both parties initially rejectedthe proposal, but Polisario accepted it in July2003. Morocco rejected essential aspects of theplan, indicating that any solution would have tobe within the framework of Moroccan sover-eignty. Polisario, for its part, was unwilling todiscuss implementation of the Baker Planunless independence remained on the table.Seventeen years have passed since the settle-ment proposals, but MINURSO’s mandate tohold a referendum remains unfulfilled. Bakerresigned in June 2004 after seven years as Per-sonal Envoy and was replaced by Van Walsumin October 2005.

Despite the political stalemate during theyear in review, MINURSO continued to moni-tor the cease-fire, foster overall security in theregion, and help build confidence between thetwo parties. The mission worked with a numberof other actors, including the International

118

2.44.14

Western Sahara

• Resolution passage 29 April 1991 (UNSC Res. 690)and start date

• SRSG Francesco Bastagli (Italy)• Force commander Brigadier-General Kurt Mosgaard

(Denmark)• Budget $48.66 million

(1 July 2005–30 June 2006)• Strength as of Troops: 47

31 October 2005 Military observers: 202Civilian police: 6International civilian staff: 131Local civilian staff: 97

UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)


WESTERN SAHARA • 119

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on theexchange of prisoners of war, and the UN HighCommissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in theimplementation of confidence-building meas-ures, including the exchange of family visitsbetween the territory and refugee camps. Afterbeing suspended for a period, the family visitsresumed in November. Long-standing tensionsover the status of prisoners of war (POWs)were alleviated on 18 August 2005, when thePolisario released all of the remaining 404Moroccan POWs. MINURSO welcomed thisdevelopment and urged continued cooperationbetween the parties and with the ICRC toaccount for those that are still missing in rela-tion to the conflict.

At the same time, both parties continuedto accuse each other of violations. Since May,violent demonstrations in the territory, cou-pled with allegations of human rights abuses,were indications that the situation could bedeteriorating. In March 2005, MINURSO com-pleted an assessment of the state of compliancewith Military Agreement Number 1, and found

a deterioration had been taking place progres-sively, including installation and upgrading ofradar and surveillance capabilities as well asrestrictions on the movement of both civilianand military UN personnel.

In the summer of 2005 the UN conducteda review of MINURSO’s military, adminis-trative, and civilian components. Aimed atstrengthening the mission’s capacity to mon-itor the cease-fire and military agreements,the review resulted in the launch of a restruc-turing exercise, which entailed the closure ofsector headquarters to enable MINURSO todeploy more observers to the nine militaryobserver team sites, and the establishment ofa civilian–military joint mission analysis cell.In October, a new concept of operations re-flecting these changes was approved. A fur-ther adjustment of the mission’s administra-tive and civilian component—a net reductionof thirty-nine posts while creating twenty-four UN volunteer positions—was recom-mended. If approved, it will be implementedin a phased manner through mid-2006.

Western Sahara family visits to refugee camps in Tindouf, Algeria, June 2004

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The Multinational Force and Observers Sinai(MFO Sinai) was established on the basis of a protocol appended to the Camp DavidAccords of 26 March 1979, which markedthe formal cessation of war between Israeland Egypt. The Camp David Accords con-templated creation of a UN peacekeepingmission, but Arab opposition to the accordsmeant it proved difficult to gain agreementon such a force. In the interim, verificationfunctions were carried out by the US SinaiField Mission (SFM). In 1981 the presidentof the Security Council announced that theUN could not provide a peacekeeping force,leading to efforts by the United States tosecure an arrangement outside the UnitedNations framework.

The mandate of MFO Sinai is tripartite: toobserve compliance with the security arrange-ments of the peace treaty through the opera-tion of checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols,and observation posts; to verify and report on

the implementation of the provisions of theannex to the Treaty of Peace at least twice permonth and upon request from either party;and to protect the Strait of Tiran and ensurefreedom of navigation.

After two decades of quietly and success-fully fulfilling its mission, and contributing tostability along the Israel–Egypt border in anotherwise fraught region, 2005 brought a sig-nificant new development: the Israeli with-drawal from Gaza. In negotiations in advanceof the withdrawal, Egypt agreed to deployadditional security forces and police along its border with Gaza to help guarantee secu-rity, especially regarding the smuggling ofweaponry via tunnels—a recurring problem inpast years. In the first expansion of MFOSinai’s mandate since its inception, the spon-soring parties agreed to monitor the deploy-ment of Egyptian border guards. The multina-tional observers are tasked with verifying thatthe deployment is consistent with the termsagreed between Egypt and Israel. They are tomaintain permanent, temporary, and mobilesites in the area where the border guard forceis deployed, and verify the number and charac-teristics of personnel, weapons, equipment,and infrastructure of the border guard force. InNovember 2005, the European Union agreedto deploy observers to the Gaza-Egypt border.

This new element of MFO Sinai’s man-date, combined with the EU’s planned deploy-ment, could have ramifications beyond theimmediate area of operations. In a fraughtregion, creative peacekeeping configurationsmay help to untangle the ongoing Israeli–Palestinian conflict.

120

2.44.15

Middle East, Non-UN Operations (MFO Sinai, TIPH 2)

• Authorization date 3 August 1981 (Protocol to the Treaty of Peace)

• Start date March 1982• Head of mission James A. Larocco (United States)• Budget as of $51 million

30 September 2005 (estimated budget for 2005) • Strength as of Military observers: 1,686


Multinational Force and Observers (MFO Sinai)


MIDDLE EAST, NON-UN OPERATIONS (MFO SINAI, TIPH 2) • 121

The Temporary International Presence inHebron (TIPH) was established in the after-math of a political crisis that arose after anIsraeli resident of the Kiryat Arba Settlementon 25 February 1994 opened fire on Palestinianworshippers during Friday dawn prayers at theMosque of Ibrahim, killing twenty-nine. TheSecurity Council condemned the massacre andcalled for a temporary international presence toguarantee the safety and protection of thePalestinians, as required by Annex II of theOslo Accords (the Declaration of Principles).The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)also withdrew from further peace negotiationspending the agreement of Israel to internationalobservers in Hebron. Following Norwegianmediation, on 31 March 1994, the PLO andIsrael signed an agreement to create TIPH.

The function of TIPH—which was with-drawn in August 1994 and reestablished in1996—is to provide the Palestinian residentsof Hebron with a sense of security, to promotestability through monitoring and reporting,and to conduct various assistance activities.Despite its broad mandate, TIPH is a verysmall mission of seventy-two personnel fromDenmark, Italy, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-land, and Turkey, armed only with pistols forself-defense. Its reports are strictly confiden-tial and are shared only with Israel, the Pales-tinian Authority, and the six member countries.TIPH operates on a strict nonintervention pol-icy, using digital cameras and notebooks torecord incidents.

The TIPH has had a difficult history inHebron, especially since the outbreak of the

second intifada in 2000. In 2002, two TIPHobservers were killed by a Palestinian gun-man, who was eventually arrested by Israelipolice. Relationships with settlers have oftenbeen troubled, with frequent incidents of stone-throwing, causing minor injuries to TIPH staff.The past year, in particular, has seen manymoments of tension and small incidents ofstone-throwing or harassment, though fortu-nately the situation has not exploded as manyfeared. Regional political developments in2005, including the Israeli withdrawal fromGaza, did not affect TIPH directly. If and whenthe question of full or partial Israeli withdrawalfrom the West Bank is engaged, the question ofHebron—and thus TIPH’s mandate—will be athorny issue.

• Authorization date 15 January 1997 (Protocol Concerningthe Redeployment in Hebron); 21 January 1997 (Agreement on the Temporary International Presence in Hebron)

• Start date January 1997• Head of mission Arnstein Øverkil (Norway)• Budget as of $1.5 million (2005)


30 September 2005 Civilian police: 26Civilian staff: 40

Temporary International Presence in Hebron 2 (TIPH 2)


Cyprus

During 2005, the UN Peacekeeping Force inCyprus (UNFICYP) continued to monitor thecease-fire, sought to encourage the resump-tion of normal civilian activities in the bufferzone, and engaged in humanitarian activities.Although the overall situation in Cyprusremained stable, official contact between theparties has not resumed, and the Greek Cypriotside has decided to conduct military exercisesfor the first time in four years. Turkish forcesare likely to conduct their own exercises inNovember. Meanwhile, in an effort to gainGreek Cypriot agreement with his 2003 set-tlement plan, the UN Secretary-General metwith Turkish and Greek heads of state in May2005 to discuss the possibility of resumingnegotiations. It remains to be seen what im-pact the mission’s implementation of a new

concept of operations, aimed at reducing itsoverall troop strength, ensuring greatermobility, and strengthening its civil affairsand civilian police component, will have onthe security environment.

UNFICYP was established on 4 March1964 to prevent further fighting between theGreek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communi-ties and to help maintain law and order. Fol-lowing the resurgence of hostilities that led toTurkey’s military intervention and the estab-lishment of a de facto cease-fire in 1974, itsresponsibilities were expanded to includesupervision of the cease-fire, maintenance ofa buffer zone, and engagement in humanitar-ian activities. In the absence of a political set-tlement on the underlying conflict, the SecurityCouncil has continually extended UNFICYP’smandate in six-month intervals.

After the events of 1974, the SecurityCouncil requested the Secretary-General touse his good offices to find a formula forreunification of the island acceptable to bothGreek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Vari-ous efforts in succeeding years foundered.An intensive effort was undertaken between1999 and early 2003 by the Secretary-General’s envoy Alvaro de Soto, culminatingin a comprehensive settlement proposal. InMarch 2003, the proposal was submitted tothe parties by the Secretary-General. Al-though it did not prove possible to reach agree-ment at that time, talks resumed in early 2004and simultaneous referenda were held. Thesettlement plan was approved by the TurkishCypriot electorate but rejected by the GreekCypriots.

122

2.44.16

• Resolution passage 4 March 1964 (UNSC Res. 186)and start date

• SRSG Michael Møller (Denmark)• Force commander Major-General Herbert Joaquin Figoli

Almandos (Uruguay)• Budget $45.62 million (including voluntary

contributions of a one-third share fromCyprus and $6.5 million from Greece)(1 July 2005–30 June 2006)

• Strength as of Troops: 84231 October 2005 Civilian police: 69

International civilian staff: 38Local civilian staff: 110

UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)


In this evolving context, UNFICYP con-tinues to fulfill its monitoring tasks by inves-tigating hundreds of alleged cease-fire viola-tions and buffer zone infringements eachyear. It typically responds by deploying troops,issuing verbal or written protests, and con-ducting follow-up action to ensure that theviolation has been rectified. A new concept of operations was proposed in September2004 and adopted in February 2005, increas-ing UNFICYP’s civilian police componentfrom 45 to 69, and reducing its overall troopstrength from 1,224 to 860. UNFICYP addeda military observation group, but reduced the number of operational sites where it isdeployed.

A joint review of UNFICYP carried outby the mission and UN headquarters in May2005 revealed that the overall environmenton the island was stable and the cease-fireline relatively calm. A decrease in the numberof incidents in the mission signified that thestrength reduction had not led to a deteriora-tion of the security situation, but incidents in

a few sensitive locations increased, particu-larly where Greek and Turkish Cypriots arein close proximity, such as Nicosia. Cited as aserious concern by UNFICYP, this surge inincidents in the buffer zone is a developmentthat will be closely monitored in the comingmonths. The Turkish Cypriot side’s 19 May2005 lifting of the restrictions that it hadimposed on UNFICYP in July 2000 enabledthe mission to restore its operational capabil-ities in and around the buffer zone.

Another function entrusted to UNFICYP isto encourage the resumption of normal civilianactivity in the buffer zone. To this end, it facil-itates farming, ensures a smooth supply ofelectricity and water, provides emergency med-ical services, and encourages bicommunal con-tacts. In cooperation with the UN DevelopmentProgramme (UNDP), UNFICYP also dis-charges various humanitarian functions. Sincethe opening of the civilian passages in 2003,Greek and Turkish Cypriots have continuedto cross to the north and south at significantrates, with few incidents of violence. The

CYPRUS • 123

A specialized member of the EU-funded UN demining project works in UNFICYP-patrolled buffer zone near Nicosia, Cyprus, in May 2005

AP

Pho

to/U

NFI

CY

P



absence of official contacts between the sideshas highlighted the useful role UNFICYPplays in enabling the two parties to maintaincontact. Sensitive humanitarian and othermeetings occur under UN auspices, includingsome that involve political parties from thenorth and the south.

The process of accession to the EuropeanUnion has served both to provide incentivesin the peace process and to add further com-plexity to efforts to resolve the conflict be-tween the two parties. On 1 May 2004, Cyprusacceded to the EU. While this developmenthas had significant benefits, it has created new

sources of tension associated with Turkey’sreluctance—in the absence of the comprehen-sive settlement—to formally recognize theRepublic of Cyprus, as well as a surge in liti-gation in the European Court of HumanRights over property claims. These issueshave increased tension between the two par-ties and made the possibility of developing apolitical solution that is acceptable to bothparties appear more remote. Meanwhile,UNFICYP will continue to play its historicalrole of helping to maintain stability until suchtime as there is a resolution of the conflict.


India and Pakistan

As one of the UN’s oldest peacekeeping oper-ations, the UN Military Observer Group inIndia and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was estab-lished in 1949 and has consisted for manyyears of approximately forty-five militaryobservers deployed to supervise the cease-firebetween Indian and Pakistani forces, based onthe Karachi Agreement of 27 July 1949. Large-scale military hostilities broke out again in1965–1966 and in 1971, after which a cease-fire was secured and included in the SimlaAgreement. However, from 1989 until 2003,firing along the line of control (LoC) betweenthe two armies was commonplace and therewere frequent incidents of violence in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir. In recentyears, political relations between the twocountries have improved, including tentativecooperation to deal with the aftermath of the devastating earthquake in October 2005.Despite India’s official position that UNMOGIPhas no operational role to play since the SimlaAgreement of 1972, UNMOGIP continues toperform the limited function of monitoring thecease-fire along the LoC, pending settlementof the underlying dispute over Jammu andKashmir.

The LoC that was established in 1972 fol-lows, with minor deviations, the cease-fire linethat had been established under the 1949 KarachiAgreement. However, India and Pakistanretained divergent positions on UNMOGIP’scontinued role. India took the position that themandate of UNMOGIP had lapsed, as it relatedspecifically to the cease-fire line under theKarachi Agreement. Pakistan disagreed withthis position and continued to lodge complaints

of cease-fire violations with UNMOGIP. InNovember 2003, the government of Pakistandeclared a unilateral cease-fire covering theinternational border between the two countries,the LoC and the working boundary betweenPakistan and Jammu and Kashmir.

Without a Security Council decision tomake a change, UNMOGIP has continued tofulfill its mandate established in 1949 with vir-tually the same administrative arrangements.Its task is to monitor the cease-fire along theLoC and report to the Secretary-General ondevelopments that affect the observance of thecease-fire. It investigates complaints and re-ports on them to United Nations headquarters.India has somewhat restricted the activitiesand movement of UN personnel on its side ofthe LoC by requiring the UN military observ-ers to travel in Indian army convoys, and hasrejected proposals that the UN take a mediat-ing role in the conflict. However, both govern-ments have continued to provide UNMOGIPwith accommodation, transportation, security,and other support.

2.4

125

4.17

• Start date January 1949• Chief military observer Major-General Dragutin Repinc

(Croatia)• Budget $8.37 million (appropriation for 2005)• Strength as of Military observers: 44

31 October 2005 International civilian staff: 21Local civilian staff: 47

UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)



Political relations between India and Pak-istan have fluctuated over the years, but tooka turn for the better in January 2004, when anagreement was reached to commence a bilat-eral “composite dialogue” on an agreed rangeof issues, including Jammu and Kashmir.Numerous confidence-building measures wereinstigated and further progress was made inApril 2005, when the two states held a mini-summit to discuss the fate of Jammu andKashmir. In September 2005, India announcedthat it would reduce its troop levels in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, pending anend to alleged infiltration of militants fromacross the LoC.

Although India has yet to follow throughon this reduction, diplomatic developmentsare encouraging. However, concerns havebeen raised by representatives of civil societyon both sides of the LoC that public engage-ment on the fate of Jammu and Kashmir hasbeen limited and fails to address fully theconcerns of the local population. During thepast year, the Secretary-General has sup-ported the composite dialogue and the confi-dence-building measures undertaken by thegovernments of India and Pakistan, includingthe introduction of a bus service between Mu-zafarrabad and Srinagar, across the LoC.

On 8 October 2005, the region suffered adevastating earthquake, killing more than an

estimated 73,000 people and leaving some 3million homeless, primarily on the Pakistan-administered side of the LoC. There werealso UNMOGIP casualties. The two govern-ments cautiously sought to cooperate in pro-viding assistance to the victims of the earth-quake. In the immediate aftermath, Indiastated that it would permit Pakistani helicop-ters to operate over the LoC. Similarly, Pres-ident Pervez Musharraf offered to open theLoC to enable earthquake survivors and theirfamilies to cross, and to help with relief andreconstruction efforts. In November, the twocountries opened five crossing points initiallyto facilitate the movement of relief supplies,and eventually of civilians.

Despite these goodwill gestures, violencein the region persists, including continuedattacks by suspected militants and counter-insurgency activities by the Indian military. Inthe week following the earthquake, the Indianarmy killed twenty-nine suspected militants,and Ghulam Nabi Lone, the education minis-ter in Indian-administered Jammu and Kash-mir, was assassinated. UNMOGIP’s narrowmandate and India’s thus far unchanged posi-tion on its status mean that the mission’scapacity to contribute to a further easing oftensions remains limited.


Middle East, UN Operations (UNTSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL)

2.4

127

Every one of Israel’s borders with an Arabneighbor has, at some point since 1945, beenmonitored or protected by a UN or otherinternational peace operation. All these oper-ations are integrally linked to the broaderArab–Israeli peace process. This was true in1948, when the UN Truce and SupervisionOperation (UNTSO) was established as theUN’s first-ever and longest-running operationand is as true today, as the broader peaceprocess and regional dynamics continue to setpolitical and operational challenges for UNpeacekeeping.

UNTSO was established by Security Coun-cil Resolution 50 to monitor cease-fire linesnegotiated in 1948 between the fledgling stateof Israel and the Arab governments withwhich it was then at war. Currently, UNTSO’sprimary function is to provide observers andlogistical support to the UN Interim Force inLebanon (UNIFIL) (through Observer GroupLebanon) and the UN Disengagement ObserverForce (UNDOF) (discussed below). Periodicreviews by troop contributors have confirmedthat having UNTSO provide centralized, read-ily available observers to these missions ismore efficient than providing the same serv-ices separately through UNIFIL and UNDOF.As such, it provides an interesting model ofcentralized operational support to multiplemissions in a small subregion.

On Israel’s southern border with Egypt,the Multinational Force and Observers Sinai(MFO Sinai) is the major non-UN operationin the region, and it is discussed separately inChapter 4.15.

On Israel’s border with Syria, UNDOFfunctions as a paradigmatic example of a UNinterpositional disengagement force, one ofonly a handful of such missions still deployed.Established by Security Council Resolution350 in 1974, its deployment was called for inan armistice agreement which, still in effect,defined the terms of Israel’s withdrawal fromterritory it occupied during the 1973 war.UNDOF was established to create a bufferbetween Syrian and Israeli forces in themountainous Golan Heights. For all of the vit-riol that sometimes passes between thesetense neighbors, the buffer between them hasbeen absolutely quiet since it was formed, andUNDOF has helped to ensure that this seg-ment of the broader regional conflict hasremained stable.

UNDOF has no mandate to help resolvethe impasse between Israel and Syria, its rolebeing limited to observation and reporting of

4.18

• Resolution passage 29 May 1948 (UNSC Res. 50)and start date

• Chief of staff Brigadier-General Clive Lilley (New Zealand)

• Budget $29.04 million (appropriations for 2005)

• Strength as of Military observers: 15131 October 2005 International civilian staff: 101

Local civilian staff: 117

UN Troop Supervision Organization (UNTSO)


violations of the line of disengagement. Evenwhen Israel and Lebanon were engaged intense negotiations over Israel’s withdrawalfrom southern Lebanon in 2000, and notwith-standing the fact that territory borderingLebanon and Syria (the Shab’a farms) becameentangled in these negotiations, UNDOF’soperational line was never in question. Indeed,its existence helped determine the line behindwhich Israel had to withdraw. UNDOF isunlikely to see any changes to its mandate oroperating conditions unless there is a majorescalation between these neighbors or, morehopefully, a resolution of the remaining con-tentious issues in this track of the regionalpeace process. The broader political contextin which UNDOF exists was affected by thepassage in late 2004 of Security Council Res-olution 1559, calling for Syrian withdrawalfrom Lebanon. However, to date, rising ten-sions within Syria and mounting internationalpressure on its government have not affectedUNDOF’s operations.

The same cannot be said of the UN InterimForce in Lebanon. Established in 1978 bySecurity Council Resolutions 425 and 426 toassist in the provision of security in southernLebanon following Israel’s invasion of thearea, UNIFIL was given a three-part mandate:to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, torestore international peace and security, and toassist the government of Lebanon in ensuringthe return of its effective authority in the area.

In the first twenty-two years of its exis-tence, the basic political conditions underwhich UNIFIL was supposed to implementits mandate—namely full cooperation of allparties in a context of Israeli withdrawal—were never established. Following Israel’spartial withdrawal from southern Lebanon in1985, UNIFIL’s area of operations became anunstable, de facto buffer zone between Israeliand unofficial Lebanese forces.

The first real opportunity to implementUNIFIL’s mandate came in 2000, when Israelwithdrew its forces behind a “Blue Line”identified by the UN, which the SecurityCouncil confirmed was in accordance withResolution 425. UNIFIL’s mandate was re-newed and the mission was redeployed—andlater augmented to include an infantry battal-ion—to undertake more active monitoring ofthe Blue Line. Using observation posts (staffedby UNTSO-supplied observers) along theBlue Line itself, as well as helicopter patrols,UNIFIL has monitored land and air violationsby Lebanese armed groups and the Israeli de-fense force and has reported these violationsto the Security Council. A flare-up of theseviolations in November 2005 led to UN andother international efforts to restore relativecalm.

By the end of November 2005, a criticalelement of Resolution 425—the restoration ofLebanese government authority in the south—remained unfulfilled. In the aftermath of theIsraeli withdrawal, the government of Lebanonclearly has responsibility for the restoration oforder. Some of UNIFIL’s critics believe itspresence in southern Lebanon serves as anexcuse for the government not to act, especiallyin terms of confronting Hezbollah. Others,however, argue that so long as Syria maintainedits presence in Lebanon, it was unrealistic tobelieve that the Lebanese government couldrestore its authority in the south, and thatUNIFIL still had a calming effect (includingby making a significant contribution to theeconomy of the south). On 29 July 2005 theSecurity Council extended UNIFIL’s mandate,but pointedly called on the government to


• Resolution passage 31 May 1974 (UNSC Res. 350)and start date

• Force commander Major-General Bala Nanda Sharma(Nepal)


• Strength as of Troops: 1,03031 October 2005 International civilian staff: 37


UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)


MIDDLE EAST, UN OPERATIONS (UNTSO, UNDOF, UNIFIL) • 129

fulfill its responsibilities under Resolution425, “including through the deployment ofsufficient numbers of Lebanese armed andsecurity forces, to ensure a calm environmentthroughout the area, including along the BlueLine, and to exert control and monopoly overthe use of force on its entire territory and toprevent attacks from Lebanon across the BlueLine.” Resolution 1559 also called specifi-cally for “the disbanding and disarmament ofall Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.”These Security Council statements add urgencyto the issue of the unfulfilled element ofUNIFIL’s mandate.

Moreover, the UN’s demand in SecurityCouncil Resolution 1559 that Syria withdrawfrom Lebanon, and Syria’s official compli-ance some months later, created a new inter-nal dynamic in Lebanon. The launching of aUN investigation into the assassination offormer Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri,and the rising tensions associated with thatevent and the international pressure surround-ing it, generated unease within UNIFIL’s areaof operations.

All this leaves the thorny question of whatrole, if any, UNIFIL should play in assistingthe government of Lebanon in fulfilling its re-sponsibilities under Resolution 425, and in thecontext of Resolution 1559 with respect to“militias”—a coded reference to Hezbollah andPalestinian armed groups. Until those questionsare resolved, UNIFIL will continue to functionin a complex political and operational environ-ment, one fraught with risks to the UN and tothe continued viability of the mission.

• Resolution passage 19 March 1978 (UNSC Res. 425/426)and start date

• Force commander Major-General Alain Pellegrini and chief of mission (France)


• Strength as of Troops: 2,00931 October 2005 International civilian staff: 101


UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

A UNIFIL armored vehicle patrols the border with Israel in Kfar Kila village

in south Lebanon, June 2005

©K

AR

AM

ALL

AH

DA

HER

/Reu

ters

/Co

rbis



Global Statisticson UN Missions5

131


The data in this chapter covers all UN mis-sions in the period running from 1 July 2004to the third quarter of 2005. While a numberof exceptions are noted, this coverage reflectsthe UN’s 2004/05 budgetary year (which con-cluded on 30 June 2005) in addition to infor-

mation available on later months. In almostall cases, the data presented here is aggre-gated from the mission-by-mission materialin Chapter 7. Where other sources have beenused, they are indicated in the footnotes.

132

Tota

lNu

mb

ero

fTr

oo

ps

65,000

60,000

55,000

50,000

45,000

40,000

July

‘04

Au

g’0

4

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5


5.1 Total Troops, July 2004–September 2005


GLOBAL STATISTICS ON UN MISSIONS • 133

10,000

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

9,317

8,682

6,337

3,4033,089 2,960

2,421 2,391 2,330 2,292

1,7051,403 1,356 1,225

966 957 867620 578 544

Paki

stan

Ban

gla

des

h

Ind

ia

Eth

iop

ia

Nig

eria

Nep

al

Uru

gu

ay

Gh

ana

Jord

an

Sou

thA

fric

a

Mo

rocc

o

Sen

egal

Ken

ya

Bra

zil

Arg

enti

na

SriL

anka

Nam

ibia

Ch

ina

Pola

nd

Ch

ile

Nu

mb

ero

fTr

oo

ps


5.2 Top Twenty Troop Contributors to UN Missions, 30 September 2005

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

MO

NU

C

UN

MIL

MIN

UST

AH

UN

OC

I

ON

UB

UN

MEE

UN

MIS

UN

AM

SIL

UN

IFIL

UN

DO

F

UN

FIC

YP

MIN

UR

SO

UN

AM

A

UN

MIK

UN

MO

GIP

UN

OM

IG

UN

OTI

L

UN

TSO

Nu

mb

ero

fTr

oo

ps

9491,031

6,595

00000027

15,369

6,244

2,3602,4913,081

1,993

5,400

14,674


5.3 Troops Deployed, by UN Mission, 30 September 2005



Tota

lNu

mb

ero

fM

ilita

ryO

bse

rver

s

2,200

2,150

2,100

2,050

2,000

1,950

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5


5.4 Total Military Observers, July 2004–September 2005

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

103

Ru

ssia

Ban

gla

des

h

Nig

eria

Paki

stan

Gh

ana

Ind

ia

Ken

ya

Jord

an

Ch

ina

Uru

gu

ay

Egyp

t

Zam

bia

Mal

aysi

a

Ro

man

ia

Mal

i

Para

gu

ay

Nep

al

Tun

isia

Ben

in

Mal

awi

Nu

mb

ero

fM

ilita

ryO

bse

rver

s

49555860616162

868690

3434383941424344

48


5.5 Top Twenty Military Observer Contributors to UN Missions, 30 September 2005



600

500

400

300

200

100

0

MO

NU

C

UN

MIL

UN

MEE

MIN

UR

SO

UN

OC

I

ON

UB

UN

MIS

UN

TSO

UN

OM

IG

UN

AM

SIL

UN

MO

GIP

UN

MIK

UN

OTI

L

UN

AM

A

MIN

UST

AH

UN

DO

F

UN

FIC

YP

UN

IFIL

Nu

mb

ero

fM

ilita

ryO

bse

rver

s

45

99

206207

00001215

35

524

198

119

150167168187


5.6 Military Observers Deployed, by UN Mission, 30 September 2005

Tota

lNu

mb

ero

fPo

lice

7,500

7,000

6,500

6,000

5,500

5,000

4,500

July

‘04

Au

g’0

4

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5


5.7 Total Police, July 2004–September 2005



800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

783

Jord

an

Nep

al

Paki

stan

USA

Nig

eria

Ger

man

y

Turk

ey

Ro

man

ia

Ch

ina

Ukr

ain

e

Ban

gla

des

h

Fran

ce

Sen

egal

Pola

nd

Phill

ipin

es

Cam

ero

on

Ru

ssia

Can

ada

Gh

ana

Ind

ia

Nu

mb

ero

fPo

lice

164184193201

232249

324327

399421

107109112115118122126138158


5.8 Top Twenty Police Contributors to UN Missions, 30 September 2005

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

UN

MIK

MIN

UST

AH

UN

MIL

UN

OC

I

MO

NU

C

UN

MIS

ON

UB

UN

FIC

YP

UN

AM

SIL

UN

OTI

L

UN

OM

IG

UN

AM

A

MIN

UR

SO

UN

DO

F

UN

IFIL

UN

MEE

UN

MO

GIP

UN

TSO

Nu

mb

ero

fPo

lice

11480000067

2,233

582

599710156

365

1,509

1,093


5.9 Police Deployed, by UN Mission, 30 September 2005



5.10 Contributions of Military Personnel by Region, 30 September 2005

Central and South America9.7%

Europe7.0%

Middle East3.9%

Central and South Asia45.8%

East Asia and the Pacific2.5%

Africa30.6%

North America0.4%

Region Troops/Military Observers Percentage of Total

Africa 19,104 30.6%East Asia and the Pacific 1,583 2.5%Central and South Asia 28,547 45.8%Middle East 2,409 3.9%Europe 4,387 7.0%Central and South America 6,067 9.7%North America 249 0.4%TOTAL 62,346

Source: DPI (DPKO website).Note: The regions used here and in the tables below are defined as follows: Africa: all members of

the African Union and Morocco (but see Middle East below). Central and South Asia: all members of theSouth Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (including Afghanistan, which joined the organizationduring 2005) and all members of the Commonwealth of Independent States to the east of the CaspianSea, other than Russia. East Asia and the Pacific: all states in or bordering on the Pacific, the states ofSouth-East Asia and Mongolia. Central and South America: all members of the Organization of AmericanStates other than Canada, Mexico, and the United States. Europe: all states to the north of the Mediter-ranean, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Georgia, Malta, Russia, and Turkey. Middle East: all members of theGulf Cooperation Council, Lebanon, Iraq, Iran, Israel, Jordan, Syria, and Yemen (while Egypt is includedunder Africa as a member of the AU, the contingent of UNTSO stationed on the Suez Canal is countedunder the Middle East deployment section to reflect its line of command). North America: Canada, Mex-ico, and the United States.



5.11 Deployment of Military Staff Within Regions, 30 September 2005


Europe1.8%

Middle East5.1%


Africa82.4%

Region Troops/Military Observers Percentage of Total

Africa 51,402 82.4%East Asia and the Pacific 15 0%a

Central and South Asia 57 0.1%Middle East 3,174 5.1%Europe 1,103 1.8%Central and South America 6,595 10.6%North America — —TOTAL 62,346

Source: DPI (DPKO website).Note: a. This figure rounds to zero percent and thus does not appear in the pie chart above.



5.12 Contributions of Police by Region, 30 September 2005


Europe28.9%

Middle East12.8%



Africa24.2%

North America7.1%

Region Police Percentage of Total

Africa 1,494 24.2%East Asia and the Pacific 423 6.9%Central and South Asia 1,132 1.8%Middle East 791 12.8%Europe 1,780 28.9%Central and South America 108 1.8%North America 439 7.1%TOTAL 6,167




Tota

lCiv

ilian

Staf

f

16,000

15,000

14,000

13,000

12,000

11,000

10,000

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Source: PKFD; UNV Programme; DPKO PMSS.

5.14 Total Civilian Staff (international, national, and UNVs), July 2004–August 2005

5.13 Deployment of Police Within Regions, 30 September 2005


Europe37.3%



Africa37.3%

Region Police Percentage of Total

Africa 2,300 37.3%East Asia and the Pacific 48 0.8%Central and South Asia 7 0.1%Middle East — —Europe 2,303 37.3%Central and South America 1,509 24.5%North America — —TOTAL 6,167




UN Missions UN MissionsInternational Professional and General Svc Staff National Professional and General Svc Staff

Total International Staff in missions = 5083 Total National Staff in missions = 8984

Number of Percentage Number of Percentage Rank Country Intl’l Staff Intl’l Staff Rank Mission National Staff National Staff

1 United States 328 6% 1 UNMIK 2511 28%2 Canada 287 6% 2 MONUC 1323 15%3 Kenya 212 4% 3 UNMIL 754 8%4 United Kingdom 207 4% 4 UNMIS 699 8%5 France 185 4% 5 UNAMA 688 8%6 Philippines 182 4% 6 MINUSTAH 448 5%7 India 140 3% 7 UNAMSIL 420 5%8 Ghana 124 2% 8 ONUB 384 4%9 Ethiopia 111 2% 9 UNOCI 290 3%

10 Australia 100 2% 10 UNIFIL 287 3%11 Nigeria 89 2% 11 UNOTIL 275 3%12 Pakistan 80 2% 12 UNMEE 246 3%13 Germany 79 2% 13 UNOMIG 186 2%14 Croatia 77 2% 14 UNTSO 119 1%15 Fiji 71 1% 15 UNFICYP 109 1%16 Lebanon 68 1% 16 UNDOF 100 1%17 Italy 66 1% 17 MINURSO 98 1%

18–19 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 18 UNMOGIP 47 1%Sierra Leone 65 each 1% each

20 Tanzania 63 1%

Source: PKFD.

5.15 Highest Representation of Nationalities Among Civilian Staff(as of June 2005)

DPKO HQ Staff Total HQ Staff = 556

Rank Country Number of Staff Percentage of Total HQ Staff

1 United States 122 22%2 Philippines 39 7%3 United Kingdom 23 4%4 India 21 4%5 Australia 16 3%

6–8 Canada, France, Russia 15 each 3% each9 Germany 12 2%

10–11 Japan, New Zealand 11 each 2% each12–14 Kenya, Myanmar, Uruguay 10 each 2% each15–16 Ghana, Ireland 9 each 2% each17–18 Italy, Trinidad and Tobago 8 each 1% each19–21 Guyana, Pakistan, Republic of Korea 7 each 1% each

Sources: DPKO PMSS; DPKO Executive Office.Note: DPKO missions include UNLB. DPKO HQ excludes staff on contracts of less than one year.

5.16 Highest Representation of Nationalities in UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (as of 30 June 2005)



5.17 UN Peacekeeping Personnel, 30 September 2005

Military International NationalTroops Observers Policea Staff Staff UNVs Total

MINURSO 27 198 6 129 98 — 458MINUSTAH 6,595 — 1,509 418 453 161 9,136MONUC 15,369 524 365 803 1359 460 18,880ONUB 5,400 168 97 322 388 155 6,530UNAMA — 12 7 198b 688b 41 946UNAMSIL 2,360 99 56 218 410 82 3,225UNDOF 1,031 — — 37 102 — 1,170UNFICYP 949 — 59 37 109 — 1,154UNIFIL 1,993 — — 103 287 — 2,383UNMEE 3,081 206 — 193 245 72 3,797UNMIK — 35 2,233 631 2,405 200 5,504UNMIL 14,674 207 1,093 556 826 442 17,798UNMIS 2,491 167 101 406 735 63 3,963UNMOGIP — 45 — 24 47 — 116UNOCI 6,244 187 582 337 375 190 7,915UNOMIG — 119 11 101 180 — 411UNOTIL — 15 48 131b 275b 37 506UNTSO — 150 — 100 118 — 368TOTAL 60,214 2,132 6,167 4,744 9,100 1,903 84,260

Sources: DPI (DPKO website); PKFD; UNV Programme; PMSS.Notes: a. Police figures include formed police units.b. International and national staff data for UNOTIL and UNAMA as of 30 August 2005.



5.18 UN Civilian Staff by Type, 30 June 2005

UN Missions DPKO HQ

Political and Civilian Affairs 1,328 10% 53 10%Humanitarian Affairs and Development 194 1% 63 11%Administration and Mission Support 12,102 89% 440 79%TOTAL 13,624 556

Sources: DPKO PMSS; DPKO Executive Office.Note: DPKO missions include UNLB. DPKO HQ excludes staff on contracts of less than one year.

Nu

mb

ero

fFa

talit

ies

18

16

14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Oct

.’05

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

5.19 Total Peacekeeping Fatalities, July 2004–October 2005



5.20 Fatalities by Mission, July 2004–October 2005

Number of Fatalities Percentage of Fatalities

MINURSO 1 1%MINUSTAH 10 7%MONUC 22 16%ONUB 16 12%UNAMA 0 0%UNAMSIL 16 12%UNDOF 1 1%UNFICYP 1 1%UNIFIL 1 1%UNMEE 2 1%UNMIK 9 7%UNMIL 41 30%UNMIS 0 0%UNMOGIP 1 1%UNOCI 8 6%UNOMIG 1 1%UNMISET/UNOTIL 3 2%UNTSO 3 2%TOTAL 136

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.

Hostile Act19 (14%)

Self-Inflicted4 (3%)

Accident31 (23%)

Illness65 (48%)

Other17 (12%)


5.21 Fatalities by Type, July 2004–October 2005



Budgeted Expenditures BudgetedJuly 2004–June 2005 July 2004–June 2005 July 2005–June 2006

MINURSO 44,005 45,283 48,659MINUSTAH 379,047 377,051 506,368MONUC 957,833 903,997 1,133,672ONUB 329,714 303,793 292,272UNAMSIL 285,227 259,929 107,539UNDOF 40,902 40,820 41,521UNFICYP 50,692 50,206 45,616UNIFIL 92,960 89,254 94,253UNMEE 198,332 180,330 176,664UNMIK 294,625 294,497 239,890UNMIL 822,106 741,086 722,542UNMIS 222,032 218,866 956,807UNMISET 85,214 81,000 1,662UNOCI 378,473 336,721 418,777UNOMIG 31,927 31,001 34,562UNLB 28,422 28,185 31,513Support Account 80,624 79,775 146,935TOTAL 4,241,510 4,061,793 4,999,253

Sources: UN Documents: A/C.5/59/34, A/60/541, A/C.5/60/L.8, A/C.5/60/L.7, A60/540 DPKO FMSS; DPKOExecutive Office.

5.22 UN Peacekeeping Budgets and Expenditures (in thousands of US dollars)

5.23 Estimated Expenses, January–December 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Estimated RequirementsJanuary–December 2005

UNAMA 63,583UNOTIL 22,028UNMOGIP 8,370UNTSO 29,040Peacekeeping Operations 8,464TOTAL 131,485

Source: DPKO FMSS.Notes: The figures in this table represent funding for peace operations out

of the UN regular budget; estimated expenditures for UNOTIL are for 21 May2005–31 December 2005.



Perc

enta

ge

of

Ass

esse

dC

on

trib

uti

on

30%

25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

USA

Jap

an

Ger

man

y

UK

Fran

ce

Ital

y

Can

ada

Spai

n

Ch

ina

Rep

ub

lico

fK

ore

a

Net

her

lan

ds

Au

stra

lia

Ru

ssia

Swit

zerl

and

Bel

giu

m

Swed

en

Au

stri

a

Den

mar

k

No

rway

Fin

lan

d

26%

19%

9%7% 7%

5%

2%3%3%2%2%2%

1%1%1%1%1%1%1%1%

Source: PFD.

5.24 2005 Assessed Contributions to Peacekeeping Budget

Perc

enta

ge

of

Ass

esse

dC

on

trib

uti

on 25%

20%

15%

10%

5%

0%

USA

Jap

an

Ger

man

y

UK

Fran

ce

Ital

y

Can

ada

Spai

n

Ch

ina

Mex

ico

Rep

ub

lico

fK

ore

a

Net

her

lan

ds

Au

stra

lia

Bra

zil

Swit

zerl

and

Ru

ssia

Bel

giu

m

Swed

en

Arg

enti

na

Au

stri

a

22%

19%

9%

6% 6%5%

2%3%3%

2%2%2%1%1%1%1%1%1%

2% 2%

Source: PFD.

5.25 2005 Assessed Contributions to Regular Budget



2005 Outstanding Collections OutstandingEffective Contributions Assessments Received/ Credits Contributions

Member Assessment as at 31 Issued in Adjustments in Utilitized in as at 30 State Rate December 2004 2005 2005 2005a September 2005

United States 26.48% 722,527.60 898,596.50 969,032.30 44,584.90 607,506.90Japan 19.47% 758,554.40 640,746.20 792,806.20 30,852.50 575,641.90Germany 8.66% 103,250.70 285,090.60 333,181.00 13,142.20 42,018.10UK 7.38% 26,104.70 243,149.40 217,355.10 11,364.80 40,534.30France 7.26% 108,994.00 239,300.00 227,934.30 11,184.90 109,174.90Italy 4.89% 99,427.90 160,779.00 201,092.30 7,469.40 51,645.10Canada 2.81% 9,945.80 92,583.70 84,616.10 4,268.00 13,645.40Spain 2.52% 47,155.00 82,940.20 70,142.70 3,853.20 56,099.30China 2.47% 108,480.50 81,473.10 116,691.80 4,227.60 69,034.20Republic of Korea 1.80% 70,306.70 56,965.70 36,088.20 2,560.70 88,623.50Netherlands 1.69% 5,946.60 55,622.60 49,727.60 2,584.10 9,257.50Australia 1.59% 5,603.20 52,397.20 47,843.60 2,434.20 7,722.60Russia 1.32% 4,650.30 43,653.40 39,833.10 2,023.80 6,446.90Switzerland 1.20% 14,406.40 39,396.60 35,042.50 1,830.30 16,930.20Belgium 1.07% 27,142.80 35,183.80 39,643.10 1,634.60 21,048.90Sweden 1.00% 3,511.60 32,847.00 29,991.40 1,526.00 4,841.10Austria 0.86% 14,893.50 28,272.10 37,146.70 1,313.50 4,705.40Denmark 0.72% 4,484.00 23,631.40 23,534.60 1,097.90 3,482.90Norway 0.68% 2,396.60 22,347.80 19,986.70 1,038.20 3,719.50Finland 0.53% 1,879.20 17,542.50 16,027.50 808.7 2,585.50

Source: Contributions Service, OPPBA.Note: a. These amounts are derived from unencumbered balance of appropriations and other income for peacekeeping opera-

tions, utilized at the time that assessments for the same peacekeeping operations were issued.

5.26 Top Twenty Assessed Financial Contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations, 30 September 2005 (In thousands of US dollars)



UNMISET/UNOTIL

UNAMIS/UNMIS

ONUB

MINUSTAH

UNOCI

UNMIL

UNAMA

UNMEE

MONUC

UNAMSIL

UNMIK

UNOMIG

MINURSO

UNDOF

UNIFIL

UNFICYP

UNMOGIP

UNTSO

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.’0

4

Oct

.‘04

No

v.’0

4

Dec

.‘04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Oct

.’05

No

v.‘0

5

Dec

.’05

Jan

.‘06

6 months 6 months

6 months6 months

6 months6 months

6 months

6 months6 months6 months

6 months

6 months6 months

6 months



6 months6 months

6 months 6 months 6 months

Ongoing until Security Council decides otherwise

12 months

9 months

12 months 12 months

12 months

12 months12 months

12 mo 2 mo 6 months

6 months

3 months3 months

1 mo 1 mo20 days

6 months7 days 7 days

6 mo 6 months

24 days8 months

7 months

3 months

6 mo

6 months

6 months

6 months

6 months

6 months

12 months

6 mos

1.5 mo

S



6 mo

6 mos

Source: UNSC resolutions.

5.27 Mandate Duration and Renewal, July 2004–December 2005



UN

Mis

sio

nan

dLo

cati

on

1945 1950 1955 1960 1965 20052000199519901985198019751970

Duration

UNTSO (Middle East)

UNEF II (Egypt)

DOMREP (Dominican Republic)UNFICYP (Cyprus)

UNYOM (Yemen)UNSF (West New Guinea)

ONUC (Congo)UNOGIL (Lebanon)UNEF (Egypt)

UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan)

UNIPOM (India/Pakistan)

UNDOF (Golan Heights)

ONUSAL (El Salvador)UNAVEM II (Angola)

UNIKOM (Iraq/Kuwait)ONUCA (Central America)

UNTAG (Namibia)UNAVEM I (Angola)UNIMOG (Iran/Iraq)

UNGOMAP (Afghanistan’/Pakistan)UNIFIL (Lebanon)

UNMIH (Haiti)UNOMIG (Georgia)

UNOMOR (Uganda/Rwanda)UNOSOM II (Somalia)

ONUMOZ (Mozambique)UNOSOM I (Somalia)UNPROFOR (Balkans)UNTAC (Cambodia)

UNAMIC (Cambodia)MINURSO (Western Sahara)

UNMOP (Previaka)UNTAES (E.Slavonia, Baranja, W. Sirmium)

UNMIBH (Bosnia and Herzegovina)UNPREDEP (Macedonia)

UNCRO (Croatia)UNAVEM III (Angola)

UNMOT (Tajikistan)UNASOG (Chad/Libya)UNAMIR (Rwanda)

UNOMIL (Liberia)

UNTAET (East Timor)UNMIK (Kosovo)

UNOMSIL (Sierra Leone)MINURCA (Central African Republic)

UNPSG (Croatia)UNTMIH (Haiti)

MONUA (Angola)MIPONUH (Haiti)

MINUGUA (Guatemala)UNSMIH (Haiti)

UNMIS (Sudan)ONUB (Burundi)

UNOCI (Cote d’Ivoire)MINUSTAH (Haiti)UNMIL (Liberia)

UNMISET (Timor Leste )UNAMA (Afghanistan)

UNMEE (Ethiopia/Eritrea)MONUC (Dem. Republic of Congo)

UNAMSIL (Sierra Leone)

UNOTIL (Timor Leste)

Source: UNSC resolutions

Source: UNSC resolutions.

5.28 UN Operations Timeline, 1945–2005



Global Statisticson Non-UN Missions6

151


This chapter presents data on peace opera-tions conducted under the authority of regionalorganizations and nonstanding coalitions ofstates; these data are compiled by the Stock-holm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI).

* * *

Listed here are twenty-five non-UN multi-lateral peace operations that started, wereongoing, or terminated in 2005. This chapterlists only operations conducted by regionalorganizations or ad hoc coalitions of stateswith the stated intention to (a) serve as aninstrument to facilitate the implementation ofpeace agreements already in place, (b) sup-port a peace process, or (c) assist conflict pre-vention and/or peacebuilding efforts.

SIPRI uses the UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO) description ofpeacekeeping as a mechanism to assist conflict-ridden countries to create conditions for sustain-able peace. This may include monitoring andobserving cease-fire agreements; undertakingconfidence-building measures; protecting thedelivery of humanitarian assistance; assistingwith demobilization and reintegration processes;strengthening institutional capacities in theareas of judiciary and the rule of law (includingpenal institutions); policing and human rights;electoral support; and economic and socialdevelopment. This chapter thus covers a broadrange of peace missions to reflect the growingcomplexity of mandates of peace operationsand the potential for operations to change over

the course of their mandate. This chapter doesnot include good offices, fact-finding, or elec-toral assistance missions.

The operations are divided into two looselydefined categories: those with military andobserver functions (Table 6.1), and those withprimarily policing and other civilian func-tions (Table 6.2). Legal instruments underly-ing the establishment of an operation—UNSecurity Council resolutions or formal deci-sions by regional organizations—are cited inthe third column. The start dates for the oper-ations refer to dates of first deployments. Thelists of participating states presented in thisvolume are not comprehensive and refer onlyto the main contributors to a mission. For acomplete list of countries participating ineach mission, consult the SIPRI Yearbook.

Mission fatalities are recorded as a totalfrom the beginning of the mission until thelast reported date for 2005, and as a total for2005. Where possible, information on causeof death is included. Unless otherwise stated,all figures are as of 30 September 2005.

Data on multilateral peace operations areobtained from the following categories ofopen sources: (a) official information pro-vided by the secretariat of the authorizingorganization; (b) information from the missionon the ground, either in official publications orin responses to annual SIPRI questionnaires;and (c) information from national govern-ments contributing to the mission in question.These primary sources are supplemented witha wide selection of publicly available second-ary sources, consisting of specialist journals,research reports, news agencies, and inter-national, regional, and local newspapers.

152


Table 6.3 lists the estimated declared costsof the peace operations under way in 2005.Budget figures are given in millions of USdollars; conversions from budgets set in othercurrencies are based on 30 September 2005market exchange rates. The issue of financingpeace operations is a complicated one andwarrants a brief explanation on the differentways in which peacekeeping budgets are cal-culated and how they are financed.

Mission Costs

Unlike UN budgets (discussed on p. 164),figures for operations conducted by regionalorganizations such as the EU and NATO donot cover all operational costs, but only com-mon costs. These largely consist of the runningcosts of EU and NATO headquarters (the costsof civilian personnel and operations and main-tenance) and investments the infrastructurenecessary to support the operation. The costsof deploying personnel are borne by individ-ual sending states and do not appear in thebudget figures given here.

Most EU missions are financed in one oftwo ways, depending on whether they are

civilian or military missions. Civilian mis-sions are funded through the CommunityBudget, while military missions or missionswith military components are funded throughthe ATHENA mechanism, to which only theparticipating member states contribute. Inmissions by other organizations, such as theOAS Mission in Haiti and in general the adhoc missions, budget figures for missions maycover the implementation of programs suchdisarmament, demobilization, and reintegra-tion (DDR).

For these reasons, budget figures pre-sented in Table 6.3 are best viewed as esti-mates, and the budgets for different missionsshould not be compared. There are certainlimitations to the data, partially due to vary-ing definitions of what constitutes the totalcost of an operation. The coverage of officialdata varies significantly between operations;sometimes a budget is an estimate, while inother cases it is actual expenditure. Last, thetime period covered for financial data variesfrom mission to mission.

GLOBAL STATISTICS ON NON-UN MISSIONS • 153


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2003

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illn

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ver

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erY

ug

osl

av18

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tem

ber

1992

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tem

ber

——

—A

ust

ria,

Civ

ilian

—M

issi

on

toSk

op

jeR

epu

blic

of

(16t

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mit

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man

y,st

aff:

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aced

on

iao

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nio

rO

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ials

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aly,

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gd

om

,U

nit

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ates

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issi

on

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snia

and

8D

ecem

ber

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emb

er19

95—

——

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stri

a,C

ivili

an—

toB

osn

iaan

dH

erze

go

vin

a(5

thM

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of

the

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rial

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nit

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m,

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es

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on

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vo,

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ia1

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1999

——

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ulg

aria

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ivili

an3

Ko

sovo

(OM

iK)

and

Mo

nte

neg

ro(P

C.D

EC/2

96)

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man

y,It

aly,

staf

f:22

5U

nit

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do

m,

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ited

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es

Tab

le6.

2C

on

tin

ued


160 • ANNUAL REVIEW OF GLOBAL PEACEKEEPING

Table 6.3 Cost of Non-UN Military, Observer, Civilian Police, and Civilian Missions

Cost ($m) Name Location 2005/Unpaid

Non-UN Military and Observer MissionsAfrican Mission in Sudan (AMIS) Darfur, Sudan —a

CEMAC Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC) Central African Republic 9.6

Joint Control Commission Peacekeeping Force Moldova-Transdniester —South Ossetia Joint Force South Ossetia–Georgia —CIS Peacekeeping Forces in Georgia Abkhazia, Georgia —EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) Western Balkans 5.0EU Military Operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina

(EUFOR ALTHEA) Bosnia and Herzegovina 86.3EU Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM) Aceh, Indonesia 18.1NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro 29.8International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Afghanistan 78.5NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) Iraq 11.7Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) Sinai, Egypt 51.0Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH-2) Hebron 1.5Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM) Sri Lanka 2.1Operation Licorne Côte d’Ivoire 261.9Regional Assistance Mission in the

Solomon Islands (RAMSI) Solomon Islands 171.3Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I) Iraq 67,800.8International Monitoring Team (IMT) Philippines 2.7

Non-UN Civilian Police and Civilian MissionsEU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUPM) Bosnia and Herzegovina 21.1EU Police Mission in the Former Yugoslav

Republic of Macedonia (EUPOL PROXIMA) Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 13.2EU Police Mission in Kinshasa (EUPOL Kinshasa) Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo 5.2OAS Special Mission for Strengthening

Democracy in Haiti Haiti 15.0OSCE Spillover Mission to Skopje Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 13.5OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina Bosnia and Herzegovina 20.1OSCE Mission in Kosovo (OMiK) Kosovo, Serbia and Montenegro 40.4

Note: a. While a figure for the AMIS budget for the year in review was not available for this study, it is reported that "the AUadvised the European Commission in August 2005 that its estimated cash requirements for a year of AMIS operation (1 July 2005-30June 2006) at a projected personnel level of 7,936 was 52,405,835." (International Crisis Group, The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: NotYet a Winning Combination, Brussels, October 2005).


UN Mission-by-MissionStatistics7

161

Peacekeeping_7(1)_v21.qxd 2/2/06 5:10 PM Page 161

This chapter contains data on all currentmissions of the UN Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO). It is based onpublic UN documents and sources, combinedwith data provided by DPKO and other UNdepartments (those noted below are withinDPKO unless otherwise stated). As missionsare budgeted for in a variety of ways, anddepartments report on similar issues in differ-ent formats, no one format can be applied to allmissions. Notes are supplied within the data toexplain discrepancies in addition to those iden-tified here.

The most obvious discrepancy within eachdataset is that of dates. As of early November2005, data were typically available up to theend of August or September, but not univer-sally so. Variations in types of data sources andreporting dates between missions are often aresult of differences in the reporting and fund-ing mechanisms for three types of UN peace-keeping missions:

• Peacekeeping missions funded by the bien-nial UN budget, which runs from Januaryin even years to December of odd years(UNMOGIP and UNTSO).

• Department of Political Affairs (DPA) spe-cial political missions with a peacekeepingcomponent supported by the DPKO andfunded through extrabudgetary resources,which runs on a single calendar-year basis(UNAMA and UNOTIL).

• All other peacekeeping missions funded by the General Assembly on the basis of a financial period, which runs from 1 July of the first year until June 30 of thefollowing.

The features of our datasets are outlined below.

Key FactsNotes on mandates and key personnel.

Personnel: First Year of OperationSeparating out the data in the deploymenttimelines, these show the month-by-monthnumbers of personnel in the mission in itsfirst year relative to authorized levels.

Mission Deployment TimelineThese graphs show the key developments in thefirst phase of each mission, defined as its firstyear of operations and the planning and politicaldecisions in the months leading up to its launch.These data have only been readily available forthose missions launched in or after 1999, and wedo not supply timelines for older operations.

The graphs show the number of troopsand other UN personnel through the mission’slaunch relative to their authorized strength—which is often raised as the mission evolves.Additionally, markers show major events dur-ing the deployment phase. While these varyfrom mission to mission, they typically—butnot exclusively—include:

1. The Secretary-General’s report to theSecurity Council—this normally precedesresolution and makes recommendationson mission establishment, structure, andconcepts of operation.

2. UN Security Council resolution dates—for mandate establishment and renewal,and the expansion of the mission.

3. The first assessment mission (technical,multidisciplinary).

4. Approval of the first mission budget bythe General Assembly.

5. The first report by the Secretary-Generalto the Security Council following theestablishment of the mandate

6. The date of the appointment of the SpecialRepresentative of the Secretary-General(SRSG).

7. The “entry on duty” (EOD) of the SRSG—his or her assumption of responsibilities.

8. The arrival of the SRSG in the field.9. Comparable dates for a force commander

(FC) or police commissioner (PC).10. The first meeting of troop-contributing

countries relating to the mission.11. The issuance of a concept of operations.12. The issuance of directives to the FC (the

“handover” of operational responsibilityto the field).

The authorized levels for military andpolice personnel are based on the relevantSecurity Council resolutions. Authorized levels

162


of international and local civilian staff arederived from financial and budgetary reportsand in certain cases from data provided by thePeacekeeping Financing Division (PFD)—partof the UN’s Office of Program Planning, Bud-get, and Accounts, which is outside DPKO—and other UN public sources where necessary.The PFD also provided details on authorizedlevels of UN volunteers (UNVs).

Actual military and police strengths to late2000 was provided by the Force GenerationService and the Police Division—later data areavailable at the DPKO’s website, which is main-tained by the Department of Public Information(DPI). The Personnel Management and SupportService (PMSS) provided data on civilian staff,with the PKD providing the most recent figures.Figures for UNVs were supplied by the UNVProgramme office in Bonn.

Personnel: Since 1999Focusing on the last five years (up to June2005), these show force levels on an annualbasis. For years prior to the 2004—2005financial year, the actual personnel levels arethe average for the given year, while author-ized levels are typically those stated in theofficial budgetary and financial reports cov-ering that year (the same set of sources usedfor the deployment timeline). For the 2004—2005 financial year, average actual and author-ized personnel levels were calculated based ondata collected from Security Council resolu-tions (for authorized military and police lev-els), the DPKO website (for actual military andpolice levels), and the PFD and UNV Pro-gramme (for actual civilian strength levels).

Exceptions to this rule include UNMOGIPand UNTSO, where the authorized strength is derived from the UN’s biannual ProposedProgram Budget for the Biennium (PPBB),through which they are funded. Actual andauthorized levels of UNAMA staff are derivedfrom the Secretary-General’s report to the Gen-eral Assembly and Security Council, as itfunded as a special political mission.

Personnel: July 2004—September 2005These graphs cover personnel trends throughthe last UN financial year and the first quar-

ter of the 2005—2006 financial year on amonth-by-month basis. They are usually basedon authorized strengths in Security Councilresolutions and PFD documents. Actual civil-ian strengths are based on PFD documents andthe PMSS, while actual military and policestrengths were derived from the DPKO website.Again, authorized personnel information onUNTSO and UNMOGIP was derived from thePPBB; information on UNAMA and UNOTILderives from the Secretary-General’s reports onthese as special political missions. Authorizedmilitary and police strengths for UNAMSILand UNMIK are based on drawdown plans forthese missions.

Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005These data show all contributors to the mis-sion on 30 August and are derived from theDPKO website. In the case of UNMIS, theextent to which the mission had grown by 31October has led us to include a special tableon its state at that date.

Military Units: 30 August 2005These data show units in the field on the day inquestion by their type and country of origin. Itbased on information provided by the FGS. Inobserver and political missions—and theobserver elements of larger missions—militarystaff are not formed into traditional units, andthese personnel are not recorded here. A specialtable for UNMIS as of 31 October is also pro-vided here.

Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005These data break down civilian staff into threebroad categories (political and civil affairs,humanitarian affairs and development, andadministration and mission support). They arebased on information provided by the PMSS.There are some inconsistencies between thisinformation and that from the PFD on staff,reflecting different reporting methods; there-fore the reader should exercise due caution.

Fatalities: Inception—October 2005These data are provided by the DPKO SituationCentre—there may be certain discrepancieswith equivalent data on the DPKO website,

UN MISSION-BY-MISSION STATISTICS • 163


but the Situation Centre’s information is moreup-to-date on this issue.

Vehicles: 30 August 2005These data cover both UN-owned vehicles inthe field on 30 August (provided by the Sur-face Transport Section) and those vehiclesowned by national contingents serving in themission (from a database managed by theContingent Owned Equipment and Manage-ment Section).

Aircraft: 30 August 2005These data have been provided by the AirTransport Section and identify aircraft bytheir type (fixed-wing or helicopter) and sup-plier (contractors or [named] governments).

The financial mission expenditure tablesare broken down into the three following cat-egories, although there was some variation insubcategories in 2000–2001:

1. Military and police personnel. Includesmission subsistence allowance, travel onemplacement, rotation and repatriation, deathand disability compensation, rations, and cloth-ing allowances for military observers and police.This section also includes expenditures on majorcontingent-owned equipment, and freight anddeployment of contingent-owned equipment.

2. Civilian personnel. Covers salaries, staffassessment, common staff costs, hazardous dutystations allowances, and overtime for inter-national and national staff. Also covers costsassociated with United Nations Volunteers.

3. Operational costs. Costs associated withgeneral temporary assistance (salaries, com-mon staff costs, staff assessment), government-provided personnel and civilian electoral ob-servers (allowances and travel), consultants,official travel of civilian personnel, facilitiesand infrastructure, as well as self-sustainmentcosts of contingent-owed equipment. Also in-cluded are costs associated with ground, air,and naval transportation costs in mission, com-munications, IT, medical, special equipment,

other supplies, services and equipment, andquick impact projects.

Mission Expenditures: August 1999—June 2004Covering the five financial years prior to themost recent, this overview of expenditures hastypically been derived from mission financingreports, financial performance reports, andreports on mission budgets. Information onUNTSO, UNMOGIP, and UNAMA has beenprovided by the Financial Management andSupport Services (FMSS).*

Financial Performance: July 2004—June 2005The data for the last financial year were pro-vided by the FMSS. They show both esti-mated requirements and actual expenditures.Estimated requirements on UNAMA andUNOTIL have been derived from estimatesregarding the special political missions pub-lished by the Secretary-General.

Expenditure Summary: July 2004—June 2005This breaks the expenditures shown in thefinancial performance data into the three broadcategories used for expenditures since 1999above.

Expenditures on Contingent OwnedEquipment: July 2004—June 2005These data, supplied by the FMSS, cover con-tingents’ expenditures on major equipment(for which they can be reimbursed by the UN)as well as self-sustainment (rations, etc.).

Voluntary Contributors: July 2004—June 2005These data cover those countries supplying offinancial support to missions other thanthrough assessed contributions. They are pro-vided by the Accounts Division, OPPBA. Dif-ferences in reporting cycles mean that thereare some discrepancies between these figuresand those in the Financial Performance tables.


* Prior to the July 2001–June 2002 financial year, “Staff Assessment” was reported as an additionalline item in “Gross Expenditures” for each mission. Since then, staff assessment has been included as partof the “Civilian Personnel” line. For the sake of consistency, figures for the 1999–2000 and 2000–2001 finan-cial years are shown using the current financial reporting method and include staff assessment expendi-tures as part of civilian personnel expenditures. For those years civilian personnel expenditures will thusappear to be higher than in the official UN financial reports.


7.1 UNOTIL (UN Office in Timor-Leste)*

165

Latest mandates 28 April 2005 (date of issue), 20 May 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1599 (twelve-month duration) (first mandate)

SRSG Sukehiro Hasegawa (first SRSG Japan)SG letter of appointment: 27 May 2005; effective 21 May 2005

Senior military adviser Colonel Fernando José Reis (Portugal); appointed on21 May 2005

Senior police adviser Superintendent Malik Saif Ullah (Pakistan)Entry on duty: 21 May 2005

UNOTIL Key Facts

Military Observers Police International Staff National Staff UNVs

Date Actual Authorized Actual Authorized Actual Authorized Actual Authorized Actual Authorized

May 05 15 15 51 60 126 244 428 535 62 107June 05 15 15 51 60 126 150 426 398 59 56July 05 15 15 41 60 126 100 294 233 40 56Aug. 05 15 15 41 60 131 100 275 233 39 37Sept. 05 15 15 48 60 N/A 100 N/A 233 37 37Oct. 05 15 15 58 60 95 100 228 233 34 37Nov. 05 15 15 56 60 92 100 228 233 35 37

Sources: UN Documents: A/59/290, A/60/425; DPI (DPKO website); DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme; PKD.

*Some of the data in this section relates to UNOTIL’s predecessors, the United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNMISET) and theUnited Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET).

UNOTIL Personnel: First Months of UNOTIL Operation



Troops

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Auth. Troops Auth. Nat’l Staff Auth. Int’l Staff

Military Obs.

Auth. Military Obs. Auth. UNVs

Police Int’l StaffUNVs Nat’l Staff

Auth. Police

Feb.18: SG reportrecommendsmission

Apr.28: Councilresolutionestablishes mandatefor 20 May 2005

May13: Con Ops issued16: UNMISET TCCmeeting20: End of UNMISETmandate; official start of UNOTIL mandate21: SRSG EOD; EODSenior Police Advisor27: SRSG appointed

June23: Directives to FC issued

Aug.18: SG mission report

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1599, S/2005/99, S/2005/356, A/RES/58/27, S/2005/533, S/RES/1410, S/2002/432, A/59/290, A/60/425; DPI(DPKO website); DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

Notes: Actual and authorized personnel levels prior to May 2005 are figures for UNMISET. SRSG arrives July 2002 as Resident Coor-dinator; appointed to SRSG 21 May 2004. UNOTIL initially funded under General Assembly Resolution 58/27 for “unforeseen andextraordinary expenses.”

UNOTIL Mission Deployment Time


UNOTIL (TIMOR-LESTE) • 167

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

10,000

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

Dec. 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

TroopsAuth. Troops

Sources: UN Documents A/55/925, A/56/922, A/57/666, A/58/636, A/59/655; DPKO FGS; PFD.

UNOTIL/UNMISET/UNTAET Personnel: Since 1999

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

2,200

2,000

1,800

1,600

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

Dec. 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Auth. Nat’l Staff Auth. Int’l Staff

Military Obs.



Auth. Police



UNOTIL Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t

Fixed Wing Aircraft 1 —Helicopters 2 —Total 3 —

Source: DPKO Air Transport Section.

Contributing Military Country Troops Observers Police Total

China — — 7 7Australia — 2 4 6Philippines — 2 4 6 Portugal — 3 3 6 Malaysia — 3 2 5 Brazil — 2 2 4 Pakistan — 1 3 4 Spain — — 4 4 Jordan — 1 2 3 Samoa — — 3 3Bangladesh — — 2 2 Turkey — — 2 2 Croatia — — 1 1 New Zealand — 1 — 1 Russia — — 1 1 Sri Lanka — — 1 1 TOTAL — 15 41 56


UNOTIL Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005

UNOTIL Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005

Type Percentage Staff

Political and Civil Affairs 8%Humanitarian Affairs and Development 1%Administration and Mission Support 91%

Source: DPKO PMSS.



UNOTIL/UNMISET/UNTAET Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

UNOTIL Vehicles: 30 August 2005

Contingent Owned Vehicles UN Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type Quantity Vehicle Type Quantity

Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 16 4x4 Vehicles 182Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 9 Ambulances 3

Automobiles 2Buses 15Material Handling Equipment 10Trucks 18

Total 25 Total 230

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equipment and Property Manage-ment Section.

Appointment Type

Time Period Total Troop MilOb Police Intl Staff Natl Staff Othera

UNTAET (1999–2002) 21 16 1 2 1 1 —

UNMISET (2002–2005) 13 9 2 — — 1 1

UNOTIL (2005–) 0May-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October — — — — — —

Total Fatalities 34 25 3 2 1 2 1

Incident Type

Time Period Total Hostile Act Illness Accident Self-Inflicted Otherb

UNTAET (1999–2002) 21 2 6 10 — 3

UNMISET (2002–2005) 13 2 3 5 — 3

UNOTIL (2005–) 0May-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October — — — — —

Total Fatalities 34 4 9 15 0 6

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.Notes: Discrepancies may exist between these data and those available at the DPI DPKO website, as

the DPI DPKO website is still under review and may contain omissions or errors.a. “Other” refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.



Dec 99– Jul 00– Jul 01– Jul 02– Jul 03–Category Jun 00 Jun 01 Jun 02 Jun 03 May 04

Military and police personnel 98,689.6 231,072.3 190,461.0 131,110.2 81,434.6Civilian personnel 67,009.5 184,879.5 122,647.0 64,806.2 51,785.4Operational requirements 125,699.5 109,079.6 140,950.0 92,024.7 62,787.6Other 611.4 2,556.5 — — —

Gross requirements 292,010.0 527,587.9 454,058.0 287,941.1 196,007.6Staff assessment income 4,041.8 14,444.0 13,109.4 8,232.9 6,946.4

Net requirements 287,968.2 513,143.9 440,948.6 279,708.2 189,061.2Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) — 60.0 60.0 60.0 60.0

Total requirements 292,101.0 527,647.9 454,118.0 288,001.1 196,067.6

Sources: UN Documents: A/55/925, A/56/922, A/57/666, A/58/636, A/59/655.Notes: UNTAET expenditures December 1999–June 2002; UNMISET expenditures July 2002–June 2004.

UNMISET/UNTAET Mission Expenditures: December 1999–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)

VarianceCategory Approved Actual Variance %

Military observers 1,354.5 1,481.9 (127.4) (9.4)Military contingents 11,059.3 12,863.9 (1,804.6) (16.3)Civilian police 5,063.2 5,153.5 (90.3) (1.8)Formed police units — — — —International staff 29,475.1 26,573.4 2,901.7 9.8 National staff 2,653.0 2,573.0 80.0 3.0 United Nations Volunteers 3,812.2 4,168.2 (356.0) (9.3)General temporary assistance 7,339.8 6,935.9 403.9 5.5 Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants 117.6 43.5 74.1 63.0 Official travel 484.5 465.2 19.3 4.0 Facilities and infrastructure 6,031.6 5,390.9 640.7 10.6 Ground transportation 2,336.4 2,010.6 325.8 13.9 Air transportation 10,209.1 9,334.2 874.9 8.6 Naval transportation — — — —Communications and IT 2,698.4 2,105.6 592.8 50.0 Supplies, services and equipment 2,519.0 1,900.8 618.2 10.8 Quick-impact projects — — — —

Gross requirements 85,153.7 81,000.5 4,153.2 4.9 Staff assessment income 5,762.0 4,905.0 857.0 14.9

Net requirements 79,391.7 76,095.5 3,296.2 4.2 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) 60.0 — 60.0 100.0

Total requirements 85,213.7 81,000.5 4,213.2 4.9

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMISET Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



UNOTIL Estimated Requirements: 21 May–31 December 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

EstimatedCategory Requirements

Military observers 444.6Military contingents —Civilian police 1,658.4 Formed police units —International staff 6,885.0 National staff 1,102.6 United Nations Volunteers 833.6 General temporary assistance 3,050.8 Government-provided personnel —Civilian electoral observers —Consultants 190.4Official travel 211.6 Facilities and infrastructure 2,392.7 Ground transportation 560.7 Air transportation 2,568.6 Naval transportation —Communications and IT 1,261.4 Supplies, services and equipment 769.3 Public information programme 98.0 Total estimated requirements 22,027.7

Source: UN Document: A/60/425.Notes: Estimates are as of 11 October 2005, as per A/60/425. The ongoing operation of UNOTIL is

being funded partly through the utilization of savings realized under the UN Advance Mission inSudan (UNAMIS) and partly through the use of commitments granted by the Advisory Committee onResolution 58/273 of 23 December 2003.



UNMISET Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2004–June 2005

(in thousands of US dollars)

Major equipment 1,286.9Self-sustainment 1,681.1

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMISET Voluntary Contributors: July 2004–July 2005(contributions in thousands of US dollars)

Contributions Contributions Contributionsin kind in kind in cash

Contributor (budgeted) (non-budgeted) (budgeted) Total

Australia 60 — — 60Total 60 — — 60

Source: Accounts Division, OPPBA.

UNMISET Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Civilian Personnel41%

Military andPolice Personnel24%

Operational Costs35%

Source: DPKO FMSSSource: DPKO FMSS.


173

7.2 UNMIS (UN Mission in the Sudan)

Latest mandates 23 September 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1627 (six-month duration)

24 March 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1590 (six-month duration)

First mandate 24 March 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1590 (six-month duration)

SRSG Jan Pronk (first SRSG, Netherlands)SG letter of appointment: 17 June 2004;

effective 1 August 2004a

Force commander Major-General Fazle Elahi Akbar (first commander, Bangladesh)

Entry on duty: 4 September 2004Police commissioner Commissioner Glenn Gilbertson (United Kingdom)

Entry on duty: 2 October 2004

Note: a. Mr. Pronk was appointed SRSG of the United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS),which was established as a special political mission by Security Council Resolution 1547 of 11 June 2004.

UNMIS Key Facts

Troops Military Observers Police

Date Actual Authorized Actual Authorized Actual Authorized

Mar. 05 30 9,250 0 750 8 715Apr. 05 57 9,250 0 750 12 715May 05 350 9,250 82 750 26 715June 05 960 9,250 141 750 26 715July 05 1,204 9,250 145 750 70 715Aug. 05 1,708 9,250 148 750 70 715Sept. 05 2,491 9,250 167 750 101 715Oct. 05 3,519 9,250 168 750 228 715Nov. 05 3,638 9,250 362 750 222 715

International Staff National Staff UNVs


Mar. 05 91 1,018 85 2,623 12 214Apr. 05 224 1,018 312 2,623 20 214May 05 262 1,018 401 2,623 25 214June 05 306 1,018 520 2,623 33 214July 05 365 1,018 606 2,623 48 214Aug. 05 398 1,018 699 2,623 52 214Sept. 05 406 1,018 735 2,623 63 214Oct. 05 496 1,018 881 2,623 66 214Nov. 05 N/A 1,018 N/A 2,623 N/A 214

Sources: UN Document S/RES/1590; DPI (DPKO website); DPKO PMSS; PFD; UNV Programme.

UNMIS Personnel: First Months of Operation



10,000

9,000

8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

Jan.31: SG recommendsestablishment of mission

Troops

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Mar.24: Council resolutionauthorizes mission

Apr.1: Directives to FC issued21: GA approves budget29: Con Ops issued

May8: Military HQ ready27: SG visits Sudan

June23: SG mission report30: SG appointsPanel of ExpertsConcerning Sudan

Sept.21: TCC meeting23: Mandate renewed


Military Obs.


PoliceInt’l Staff UNVsNat’l Staff

Auth. Police

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Oct

.’05

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1590, S/RES/1627, S/2005/57, S/2004/503, S/2005/57, S/2004/763, S/2004/453, A/RES/59/292, S/2005/411,S/2005/428; PI (DPKO website); DPKO PMSS; PKD; UNV Programme; DPKO Military Division; UN Security Council website (“Meetings”page).

Notes: Secretary General’s SRSG appointment letter issued 18 June 2004; SRSG EOD 1 August 2004; Chief military advisor EOD 4September 2004; Chief police advisor EOD 2 October 2004; UN technical advisors deployed late April 2004. United Nations AdvanceMission in Sudan (UNAMIS) established 11 June 2004 (Res 1547).

UNMIS Mission Deployment Timeline


UNMIS (SUDAN) • 175

Contributing Military Contributing MilitaryCountry Troops Observers Police Total Country Troops Observers Police Total

Bangladesh 691 13 1 705 Austria 5 — — 5India 332 5 2 339 Cambodia — 5 — 5Nepal 228 — 4 232 El Salvador — 5 — 5Italy 216 — — 216 Finland 3 — 2 5Egypt 98 2 — 100 Kyrgyzstan — 5 — 5Denmark 41 — — 41 Uganda — 4 1 5Norway 15 6 2 23 Benin — 4 — 4Pakistan 10 8 — 18 Fiji — 2 2 4China 7 — 8 15 Ghana — — 4 4Zambia 6 9 — 15 Indonesia — 4 — 4Nigeria — 10 2 12 Kenya 3 — 1 4Russia — 5 7 12 Romania 4 — — 4Zimbabwe — 4 8 12 United Kingdom 3 — 1 4Sweden 7 1 3 11 Croatia 3 — — 3Canada 10 — — 10 Malaysia 2 — 1 3Australia 3 6 — 9 Spain 3 — — 3Jordan 5 3 1 9 Greece 2 — — 2Peru — 8 — 8 Jamaica — — 2 2Brazil — 7 — 7 Mongolia — 2 — 2Germany 5 2 — 7 Namibia — 2 — 2Turkey 3 — 4 7 Poland 2 — — 2Argentina — — 6 6 Moldova — 1 — 1Guatemala — 6 — 6 Mozambique — 1 — 1Malawi — 6 — 6 Sri Lanka — — 1 1Paraguay — 6 — 6 Switzerland 1 — — 1Philippines — — 6 6 Tanzania — — 1 1Rwanda — 6 — 6 TOTAL 1,708 148 70 1,926


UNMIS Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005



UNMIS Military and Police Contributors: 31 October 2005

Number Unit Type Country

1 + 2 Partial Engineering Construction Company Bangladesh, Egypt (partial), India (partial)1 Headquarters Company Rwanda1 Headquarters Signal Unit India and Pakistan2 Partial Infantry Battalion Bangladesh (partial), India (partial)1 Infantry Company Nepal2 Partial Level II Medical Units Bangladesh (partial), India (partial)1 Military Police Unit Bangladesh1 Petroleum Platoon Bangladesh

Source: DPKO FGS.Note: Military headquarter staff and military observers not included.

UNMIS Military Units: 30 August 2005


India 941 10 19 970 Sweden — 3 3 6 Bangladesh 724 13 15 752 Belgium — 5 — 5 Egypt 632 7 — 639 Ecuador — 5 — 5 Pakistan 384 8 — 392 El Salvador — 5 — 5 Zambia 296 8 — 304 Yemen — 5 — 5 Nepal 226 2 15 243 Austria 4 — — 4 Italy 211 — — 211 Benin — 4 — 4 Denmark 32 — — 32 Bolivia — 4 — 4 Norway 15 11 2 28 Cambodia — 4 — 4 Canada 7 15 — 22 Fiji — 2 2 4 Zimbabwe — 13 8 21 Finland 2 — 2 4 China 8 — 12 20 Ghana — — 4 4 Russia — 5 14 19 Indonesia — 4 — 4 Sri Lanka — — 19 19 Krygystan — 4 — 4 Philippines — — 16 16 Malaysia 3 — 1 4 Jordan 4 8 2 14 United Kingdom 3 — 1 4 Brazil — 9 3 12 Croatia 3 — — 3 Nigeria — 10 2 12 Namibia — 2 1 3 Turkey 3 — 9 12 Romania 3 — — 3 Australia 5 6 — 11 Jamaica — — 2 2 Uganda — 3 8 11 Moldova — 2 — 2 Kenya 3 5 1 9 Mongolia — 2 — 2 Peru — 8 — 8 New Zealand — 2 — 2 Germany 5 2 — 7 Spain 2 — — 2 Malawi — 7 — 7 Mozambique — 1 — 1 Argentina — — 6 6 Samoa — — 1 1 Greece 2 4 — 6 Switzerland 1 — — 1 Guatemala — 6 — 6 Tanzania — — 1 1 Paraguay — 6 — 6 United States — — 1 1 Rwanda — 6 — 6 TOTAL 3,519 226 170 3,915





1+ 3 Partial Engineering Construction Company Bangladesh, Egypt (partial), India (partial), Pakistan (partial)

1 Engineering Platoon Zambia1 Headquarters Company Rwanda1 Headquarters Signal Unit India and Pakistan3 Partial Infantry Battalions Bangladesh (partial), India (partial),

Pakistan (partial)2 + 1 Partial Infantry Companies Egypt (partial), Nepal, Zambia3 Partial Level II Medical Units Bangladesh (partial), India (partial),

Pakistan (partial)1 Military Police Unit Bangladesh1 Petroleum Platoon Bangladesh1 Riverine Unit Bangladesh1 Partial Transport Platoon Zambia (partial)


UNMIS Military Units: 31 October 2005

UNMIS Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.



UNMIS Vehicles: 30 August 2005

Contingent Owned Vehicles

Vehicle Type Quantity

Combat Vehicles 4Support Vehicles

(Commercial Pattern) 5Support Vehicles

(Military Pattern) 27Trailers 8Total 44

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKOContingent Owned Equipment and Property Man-agement Section.

UNMIS Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t



UNMIS Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

Appointment Type


2005 0March–May — — — — — —June–September — — — — — —October — — — — — —

Total Fatalities 0 — — — — — —

Incident Type


2005 0March–May — — — — —June–September — — — — —October — — — — —

Total Fatalities 0 — — — — —

Source: DPKO Situation Centre.Notes: Discrepancies may exist between these data and those available on the DPI DPKO website, as





Military observers 870.1 1,486.1 (616.0) (70.8)Military contingents 21,051.9 13,091.0 7,960.9 37.8 Civilian police 365.3 591.5 (226.2) (61.9)Formed police units — — — —International staff 15,036.3 15,530.0 (493.7) (3.3)National staff 1,529.3 1,141.1 388.2 25.4 United Nations Volunteers 348.0 682.2 (334.2) (96.0)General temporary assistance 244.1 72.6 171.5 70.3 Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants 40.5 262.3 (221.8) (547.7)Official travel 2,887.0 2,008.7 878.3 30.4 Facilities and infrastructure 48,983.0 57,518.7 (8,535.7) (17.4)Ground transportation 48,335.2 51,941.4 (3,606.2) (7.5)Air transportation 29,605.6 25,459.9 4,145.7 14.0 Naval transportation — — — —Communications and IT 31,707.8 30,914.3 793.4 (17.6)Supplies, services and equipment 20,927.6 18,165.9 2,761.7 150.8 Quick-impact projects 100.0 - 100.0 100.0


Net requirements 219,718.6 216,775.6 2,942.9 1.3 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) — — — —


Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMIS Financial Performance: March–June 2005(in thousands of US dollars)





None — — — —


UNMIS Expenditures on Contingent OwnedEquipment: July 2004–June 2005


Major equipment 388.4Self-sustainment 450.8

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMIS Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.


Military and Police Personnel10%


S

UNMIS Voluntary Contributors


181

Latest mandates 21 December 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1650 (six-month, ten-day duration)

30 November 2005 (date of issue), 1 December 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1641 (one-and-one-half-month duration)

31 May 2005 (date of issue), 1 June 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1602 (six-month duration)

1 December 2004 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1577 (six-month duration)

First mandate 21 May 2004 (date of issue), 1 June 2004 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1545 (six-month duration)

SRSG Carolyn McAskie (first SRSG, Canada)SG letter of appointment: 24 May 2004;

effective 1 June 2004Force commander Major-General Derrick Mbuyiselo Mgwebi

(first force commander, South Africa)Entry on duty: 16 June 2004

Police commissioner Commissioner Ibrahima Diallo (Mali)Entry on duty: 26 June 2004

ONUB Key Facts



June 04 2,415 5,450 57 200 0 120July 04 2,561 5,450 98 200 0 120Aug. 04 3,183 5,450 139 200 0 120Sept. 04 4,324 5,450 183 200 52 120Oct. 04 5,262 5,450 184 200 79 120Nov. 04 5,291 5,450 184 200 82 120Dec. 04 5,190 5,450 182 200 82 120Jan. 05 5,188 5,450 190 200 82 120Feb. 05 5,174 5,450 186 200 85 120Mar. 05 5,169 5,450 191 200 86 120Apr. 05 5,186 5,450 192 200 102 120May 05 5,168 5,450 195 200 106 120

continues

ONUB Personnel: First Year of Operation

7.3 ONUB (UN Operation in Burundi)





June 04 87 264 34 417 0 61July 04 144 403 37 423 28 172Aug. 04 204 403 37 423 57 172Sept. 04 238 403 72 423 69 172Oct. 04 264 403 158 423 77 172Nov. 04 278 403 205 423 95 172Dec. 04 289 403 208 423 114 172Jan. 05 310 403 210 423 115 172Feb. 05 318 403 216 423 127 172Mar. 05 322 403 217 423 139 172Apr. 05 322 403 327 423 145 172May 05 324 403 335 423 142 172

Sources: UN Document: S/RES/1545; DPI (DPKO website); DPKO PMSS; PKD; UNV Programme.

ONUB Personnel: First Year of Operation continued


ONUB (BURUNDI) • 183

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

Feb.16–27: Multi-disicplinary assessment team

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Mar.16: SG report recommendsestablishment of mission

Apr.4: PC EOD

May21: Council resolutionauthorizes missionfor June 124: SRSG appointed

June1: Official start of mandate;AMIB forces re-hatted1: Directives issued to FC16: SRSG EOD18: GA approves budget22: Con Ops Issued25: SRSG arrival

July16: FC appointed;FC EOD

Aug.25: SG mission report

Nov.24: TCC meeting

Dec.1: Mandate renewed

May31: SC renews mandate

Troops


Military Obs.



Auth. Police

Feb

.‘04

Mar

.’04

Ap

r.‘0

4

May

‘04

Jun

e’0

4

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.’05

Feb

.‘05

Mar

.’05

Ap

r.‘0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1545, S/2004/210, S/2004/433, S/2004/682, S/2004/583, S/2004/210, A/RES/58/312; DPI (DPKO website);DPKO PMSS; PKD; UNV Programme; DPKO Military Division; UN Security Council website (“Meetings” page).

ONUB Mission Deployment Timeline




Pakistan 1,190 5 — 1,195 China — 3 — 3Kenya 1,005 1 — 1,006 Malaysia — 3 — 3Nepal 937 6 — 943 Namibia — 3 — 3South Africa 913 5 — 918 Paraguay — 3 — 3Ethiopia 853 7 — 860 Peru — 3 — 3Mozambique 184 3 — 187 Philippines — 3 — 3Thailand 177 3 — 180 Romania — 3 — 3Jordan 62 5 — 67 Uruguay — 3 — 3Mali 2 17 17 36 Bangladesh — 2 — 2Burkina Faso 2 13 18 33 Belgium — 2 — 2Senegal 5 6 11 22 Cote d’Ivoire — — 2 2Niger — 1 14 15 Egypt — 2 — 2Tunisia 3 12 — 15 Gambia — 2 — 2Cameroon — — 13 13 Ghana — 2 — 2Guinea — 2 11 13 Portugal — 2 — 2Togo 3 10 — 13 Republic of Korea — 2 — 2Benin — 2 9 11 Turkey — — 2 2India 2 7 — 9 Zambia — 2 — 2Russia 1 8 — 9 Kyrgyzstan — 1 — 1Gabon — 5 — 5 Madagascar — — 1 1Guatemala 1 4 — 5 Malawi — 1 — 1Nigeria 1 2 2 5 Netherlands 1 — — 1Yemen — 5 — 5 Serbia & Montenegro — 1 — 1Chad — 1 3 4 Sri Lanka — 1 — 1Algeria 2 1 — 3 TOTAL 5,344 178 103 5,625Bolivia — 3 — 3


ONUB Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005

Number Unit Type Countries

2 Aviation Units Pakistan, South Africa2 Engineering Companies Pakistan, Thailand1 Headquarters Company Kenya5 Infantry Battalions Ethiopia, Kenya, Nepal, Pakistan,

South Africa1 Infantry Company Mozambique2 Level II Medical Units Jordan, Pakistan1 Maritime Unit South Africa1 Special Forces Company Nepal


ONUB Military Units: 30 August 2005



Appointment Type


2004 6January-March — — — — — —April-June — — — — — —July-September 3 — — — — —October-December 2 — — — 1 —

2005 10January-March 3 — — — — —April-June 4 — — — — —July-September 2 — — — — —October — — 1 — — —

Total Fatalities 16 14 — 1 — 1 —

continues

ONUB Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

ONUB Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.



Incident Type


2004 6January-March — — — — —April-June — — — — —July-September — 2 1 — —October-December — 2 1 — —

2005 10January-March — 1 2 — —April-June — 1 3 — —July-September — 1 — — 1October — 1 — — —

Total Fatalities 16 — 8 7 — 1



ONUB Fatalities: Inception–October 2005 continued



Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 7 4x4 Vehicles 427Combat Vehicles 90 Ambulances 4Communications Vehicles 5 Automobiles 7Engineering Vehicles 40 Buses 53Material Handling Equipment 7 Engineering Vehicles 2Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 132 Material Handling Equipment 16Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 425 Trucks 45Trailers 148Naval Vessels 5Total 859 554


ONUB Vehicles: 30 August 2005



ONUB Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t

Fixed Wing Aircraft 1 —Helicopters 6 4 (Russia)Total 7 4


ONUB Mission Expenditures: April 2004–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Apr 04–Jun 04

Military and police personnel 11,696.8Civilian personnel 1,316.6Operational requirements 27,232.7Other —

Gross requirements 40,246.1Staff assessment income 115.5

Net requirements 40,130.6Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) —

Total requirements 40,246.1

Source: UN Document: A/59/748.


Military observers 9,057.2 8,952.1 105.1 1.2 Military contingents 129,404.9 116,604.4 12,800.5 9.9 Civilian police 4,835.2 3,652.8 1,182.4 24.5 Formed police units — — — —International staff 41,123.7 40,911.3 212.4 0.5 National staff 4,305.3 3,354.8 950.5 22.1 United Nations Volunteers 5,159.9 4,863.0 296.9 5.8 General temporary assistance 441.2 438.9 2.3 —Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants 505.6 415.7 89.9 17.8 Official travel 1,685.4 1,628.4 57.0 3.4 Facilities and infrastructure 66,348.7 60,385.3 5,963.4 9.0 Ground transportation 16,623.5 15,630.0 993.5 6.0 Air transportation 13,730.4 7,785.0 5,945.4 43.3 Naval transportation 408.1 111.3 296.8 72.7 Communications and IT 24,768.1 24,462.8 305.3 (10.5)Supplies, services and equipment 10,317.2 13,598.1 (3,280.9) (72.1)Quick-impact projects 1,000.0 998.9 1.1 0.1




Source: DPKO FMSS.

ONUB Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



ONUB Expenditures on Contingent OwnedEquipment: July 2004–June 2005



Source: DPKO FMSS.

ONUB Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.




S



None — — — —


ONUB Voluntary Contributors


189

Latest mandates 22 June 2005 (date of issue), 24 June 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1608 (seven-month, three-week duration)

31 May 2005 (date of issue), 1 June 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1601 (twenty-four-day duration)

29 November 2004 (date of issue), 1 December 2004 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1576 (six-month duration)

First mandate 30 April 2004 (date of issue), 1 June 2004 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1542 (six-month duration)

SRSG Juan Gabriel Valdés (Chile)SG letter of appointment 12 July 2004,

effective 17 August 2004 Force commander General Urano Teixeira Da Matta Bacellar (Brazil)a

Entry on duty: 20 August 2005First force commander Augusto H. Ribeiro Pereira (Brazil)Police commissioner Commissioner Richard Graham Muir (Canada)

Entry on duty: 16 August 2005

Note: a. General Bacellar died on 7 January 2006. General Aldunate Eduardo Herman of Chile wasappointed Acting Force Commander on that day.

MINUSTAH Key Facts

Troops Police International Staff National Staff UNVs


June 04 2,081 6,700 67 1,622 106 482 0 549 0 153July 04 2,259 6,700 224 1,622 145 482 0 549 19 153Aug. 04 2,765 6,700 224 1,622 191 482 0 549 45 153Sept. 04 3,092 6,700 583 1,622 232 482 0 549 59 153Oct. 04 3,769 6,700 963 1,622 247 482 0 549 76 153Nov. 04 4,790 6,700 1,270 1,622 270 482 0 549 89 153Dec. 04 6,008 6,700 1,398 1,622 291 482 0 549 104 153Jan. 05 5,994 6,700 1,398 1,622 320 482 137 549 103 153Feb. 05 6,012 6,700 1,401 1,622 358 482 209 549 120 153Mar. 05 6,210 6,700 1,398 1,622 379 482 357 549 128 153Apr. 05 6,207 6,700 1,288 1,622 400 482 351 549 134 153May 05 6,207 6,700 1,437 1,622 410 482 381 549 139 153

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1542, S/RES/1608, A/59/736, A/60/386; DPI (DPKO website); DPKO PMSS, PFD.

MINUSTAH Personnel: First Year of Operation

7.4 MINUSTAH (UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti)



8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Mar.11: Multidisciplinary assessment teamarrives

Apr.16: SG reportrecommendsestablishment of mandate29: PC EOD30: Councilresolutionauthorizes missionfor 1 June 2004

May27: FC appointed31: FC assumes functions

June1: Official start ofmandate; Directives issued to FC

July12: SRSG appointed18: GA approves budget

Aug.17: SRSG assumesresponsibilities20: SRSG EOD30: SG mission report

Nov.1: Con Ops issued29: Mandate renewed

May31: Mandaterenewed

June22: Mandate renewed

Troops

Auth. Troops Auth. Nat’l Staff Auth. Int’l Staff Auth. UNVs

Police Int’l Staff UNVsNat’l Staff

Auth. Police

Mar

.’04

Ap

r.‘0

4

May

‘04

Jun

e’0

4

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.’05

Feb

.‘05

Mar

.’05

Ap

r.‘0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1542, S/2004/300, S/2004/565, S/2004/698, S/2004/439, A/RES/58/311, S/RES/1542, S/RES/1608, A/59/736,A/60/386; DPI (DPKO website); DPKO PMSS; DPKO Military Division.

MINUSTAH Mission Deployment Timeline


MINUSTAH (HAITI) • 191


Brazil 1,213 — 3 1,216 Ghana — — 27 27Jordan 757 — 293 1,050 Chad — — 19 19Nepal 758 — 133 891 Egypt — — 14 14Uruguay 778 — 8 786 Mali — — 14 14Sri Lanka 755 — 3 758 Zambia — — 13 13Chile 541 — 38 579 Bosnia & Herzegovina — — 12 12Argentina 557 — 5 562 Niger — — 11 11Pakistan — — 248 248 Nigeria — — 10 10Spain 202 — 27 229 Sierra Leone — — 7 7Peru 210 — — 210 Turkey — — 6 6Philippines 157 — 20 177 Bolivia 4 — — 4Morocco 167 — — 167 El Salvador — — 4 4China — — 134 134 Romania — — 4 4Canada 3 — 81 84 Togo — — 4 4Guatemala 83 — — 83 Paraguay 3 — — 3France 2 — 79 81 Yemen — — 3 3Ecuador 67 — — 67 Mauritius — — 2 2Burkina Faso — — 50 50 Croatia 1 — — 1Cameroon — — 43 43 Malaysia 1 — — 1Guinea — — 31 31 Senegal — — 1 1Benin — — 29 29 TOTAL 6,263 — 1,401 7,664United States 4 — 25 29

Source: DPI (DPKO website).Note: Police figures include formed police provided by China (125), Jordan (290), Nepal (125), and Pakistan (248).

MINUSTAH Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005


2 Aviation Units Argentina, Chile2 Engineering Companies Brazil, Chile-Ecuador Composite1 Headquarters Company Philippines9 Infantry Battalions Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Jordan (2), Morocco-

Spain Composite, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Uruguay1 Infantry Company Peru1 Level II Hospital Argentina1 Military Police Unit Guatemala

Source: DPKO FGS.Note: Military headquarter staff and staff officers (138) not included.

MINUSTAH Military Units: 30 August 2005



Appointment Type


2004 0May-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October-December — — — — — —

2005 10January-March 4 — — — — —April-June 2 — 1 — — —July-September — 1 — — — —October 2 — — — — —

Total Fatalities 10 8 — 1 1 — —

continues

MINUSTAH Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

MINUSTAH Civilian Staff: 30 August 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.



Incident Type


2004 0May-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October-December — — — — —

2005 10January-March 2 1 1 — —April-June 1 — 2 — —July-September — — — — 1October 1 — — 1 —



the DPI DPKO website is still under review and may contain omissions or errors.a. “Other” refers to consultants, UNVs, etc. b. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.

MINUSTAH Fatalities: Inception–October 2005 continued



Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 13 4x4 Vehicles 586Combat Vehicles 144 Ambulances 4Engineering Vehicles 86 Buses 36Material Handling Equipment 25 Engineering Vehicles 1Support Vehicles (Commerical Pattern) 435 Material Handling Equipment 12Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 517 Trucks 39Trailers 364Total 1,584 678


MINUSTAH Ground Transportation: 30 August 2005



MINUSTAH Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t

Fixed Wing Aircraft 1 —Helicopters 2 9 (2

Argentina,7 Chile)

Total 3 9



Military observers — — — — Military contingents 148,375.5 141,327.5 7,048.0 4.8 Civilian police 26,136.7 28,881.3 (2,744.6) (10.5)Formed police units 16,766.5 22,641.3 (5,874.8) (35.0)International staff 50,030.0 46,684.1 3,345.9 6.7 National staff 4,631.3 4,638.4 (7.1) (0.2)United Nations Volunteers 4,448.9 4,728.1 (279.2) (6.3)General temporary assistance 240.0 906.2 (666.2) (277.6)Government-provided personnel — — — — Civilian electoral observers — — — — Consultants 150.0 42.8 107.2 71.5 Official travel 1,001.8 1,539.2 (537.4) (53.6)Facilities and infrastructure 54,076.4 54,408.0 (331.6) (0.6)Ground transportation 17,435.5 19,166.3 (1,730.8) (9.9)Air transportation 20,112.5 17,088.5 3,024.0 15.0 Naval transportation 395.1 244.3 150.8 38.2 Communications and IT 25,819.9 25,106.4 713.5 (2.0)Supplies, services and equipment 8,456.7 8,680.1 (223.4) (33.6)Quick-impact projects 970.0 968.6 1.4 0.1




Source: DPKO FMSS.

MINUSTAH Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

MINUSTAH Mission Expenditures: May–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category May 04–Jun 04

Military and police personnel 7,159.3 Civilian personnel 1,246.5 Operational requirements 26,150.3 Other —

Gross requirements 34,556.1 Staff assessment income 60.7

Net requirements 34,495.4 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) —





MINUSTAH Expenditures on ContingentOwned Equipment: July 2004–June 2005a



Source: DPKO FMSS.Notes: a. Includes Major equipment and Self-

sustainment for formed police units.

MINUSTAH Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Civilian Performance15%



S



None — — — —


MINUSTAH Voluntary Contributors


Latest mandates 24 June 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1609 (seven-month duration)

3 June 2005 (date of issue), 4 June 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1603 (20 days duration)

4 May 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1600 (seven-month duration)

4 April 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1594 (one-month duration)

First mandate 27 February 2004 (date of issue), 4 April 2004 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1528 (twelve-month duration)

SRSG Pierre Schori (Sweden)SG letter of appointment: 25 February 2005,

effective 1 April 2005First SRSG Albert Tevoedjre (Benin)Force commander Major-General Abdoulaye Fall

(first force commander, Senegal)Entry on duty: 4 April 2004

Police commissioner Commissioner Yves Bouchard (Canada)Entry on duty: 4 April 2004

UNOCI Key Facts

7.5 UNOCI (UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire)

196


UNOCI (COTE D’IVOIRE) • 197



Apr. 04 1,572 6,040 123 200 6 350May 04 2,915 6,040 121 200 60 350June 04 3,360 6,040 134 200 85 350July 04 4,735 6,040 148 200 133 350Aug. 04 5,844 6,040 164 200 133 350Sept. 04 5,843 6,040 166 200 212 350Oct. 04 5,834 6,040 168 200 216 350Nov. 04 5,842 6,040 153 200 213 350Dec. 04 5,846 6,040 154 200 215 350Jan. 05 5,843 6,040 166 200 215 350Feb. 05 5,848 6,040 171 200 218 350Mar. 05 5,850 6,040 188 200 218 350



Apr. 04 90 384 90 404 7 227May 04 124 384 123 404 8 215June 04 156 384 168 404 21 215July 04 187 384 173 404 37 215Aug. 04 204 384 205 404 49 215Sept. 04 216 384 231 404 64 215Oct. 04 225 384 241 404 77 215Nov. 04 228 384 241 404 70 215Dec. 04 241 384 249 404 62 215Jan. 05 257 384 270 404 70 215Feb. 05 268 384 293 404 84 215Mar. 05 274 384 307 404 91 215

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1528, S/RES/1609; DPI (DPKO website); DPKO PMSS; PKD; UNV Programme.

UNOCI Personnel: First Year of Operation



8,000

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

Troops

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0


Military Obs.



Auth. Police

May13: Councilauthorizesinclusion of MLofficers in MINUCI

Dec.3–11: Assessment mission Jan.

6: SG reportrecommendsestablishment ofmissionFeb.

27: Council resolutionauthorizes mission asof 4 April 2004

Mar.25: FC appointed (from ECONUCI)-Month end: PC on the ground

Apr.4: Official start ofmandate; FC EOD;PC EOD; SRSG EOD5: Con Ops issued

July30: GA approvesbudget; Arrivalof technical teamto assess policenecessities

May4: Mandate renewed

June1: Directives toFC issued2: SG mission report

Apr.1: New SRSG EOD4: Mandate renewed

June3: Mandate renewed24: Mandate renewed

May

‘03

Jun

e’0

3

July

‘03

Au

g.’

03

Sep

t.‘0

3

Oct

.’03

No

v.‘0

3

Dec

.’03

Jan

.’04

Feb

.‘04

Mar

.’04

Ap

r.‘0

4

May

‘04

Jun

e’0

4

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.’05

Feb

.‘05

Mar

.’05

Ap

r.‘0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Feb.25: New SRSGappointed

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1528, S/RES/1594, S/RES/1600, S/RES/1603, S/RES/1609, S/RES/1479, S/2004/3, S/2003/168, S/2004/267,S/2004/443, A/RES/58/310, A/60/420; DPI (DPKO website); DPKO PMSS; PKD; UNV Programme; DPKO Military Division; UN Security Coun-cil website (“Meetings” page).

Notes: July–September 2005 authorized civilian staff based on requested amount as per A/60/420. A TCC meeting takes place 24March 2005.

UNOCI Mission Deployment Time




Bangladesh 3,026 10 1 3,037 Romania — 5 — 5Morocco 734 1 — 735 Yemen — 5 — 5Ghana 403 6 1 410 Dominican Republic — 4 — 4Pakistan 375 8 — 383 Moldova — 4 — 4Niger 367 6 3 376 Philippines 1 3 — 4Senegal 323 8 22 353 Uganda 2 2 — 4Benin 309 6 16 331 Argentina — — 3 3Togo 296 6 1 303 Bolivia — 3 — 3Jordan 210 7 2 219 Central African Republic — — 3 3France 188 2 10 200 Croatia — 3 — 3Cameroon — — 50 50 El Salvador — 3 — 3Nigeria — 5 22 27 Guinea — 3 — 3Djibouti — — 24 24 Namibia — 3 — 3Turkey — — 24 24 Nepal — 3 — 3Uruguay 1 1 11 13 Peru — 3 — 3Paraguay 2 9 — 11 Serbia & Montenegro — 3 — 3Russia — 11 — 11 Tunisia 1 2 — 3Canada — — 9 9 Ecuador — 2 — 2Kenya 4 5 — 9 Ireland — 2 — 2Brazil 3 4 — 7 Lebanon — — 2 2Chad — 3 4 7 Poland — 2 — 2China — 7 — 7 Zambia — 2 — 2India — 7 — 7 Portugal — — 1 1Gambia 1 5 — 6 Sri Lanka — — 1 1Congo — 5 — 5 TOTAL 6,246 184 210 6,640Guatemala — 5 — 5

Source: DPI (DPKO website).Note: Police figures include two formed police provided by Jordan.

UNOCI Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005


1 Close Protection Unit Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, Togo3 Engineering Companies Bangladesh, France, Pakistan1 Gendarme Security Company Ghana-Niger-Senegal-Togo Composite1 Headquarters Company Bangladesh

10 Infantry Battalions Bangladesh (4), Morocco, Benin, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, Togo

2 Level II Hospitals Bangladesh, Ghana1 Signal Company Bangladesh1 Special Forces Company Jordan1 Transport Company Pakistan


UNOCI Military Units: 30 August 2005



UNOCI Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

Appointment Type


2004 0April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October-December — — — — — —

2005 8January-March 3 — — — — —April-June 1 — — — 1 —July-September 2 — — — — —October — — — 1 — —

Total Fatalities 8 6 — — 1 1 —

Incident Type


2004 0April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October-December — — — — —

2005 8January-March — 2 — — 1April-June — 1 1 — —July-September 1 1 — — —October — — — — 1

Total Fatalities 8 1 4 1 — 2



UNOCI Civilian Staff: 30 August 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.





Combat Vehicles 75 4x4 Vehicles 580Communications Vehicles 4 Airfield Suport 16Engineering Vehicles 78 Ambulances 8Material Handling Equipment 4 Automobiles 7Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 137 Buses 67Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 639 Engineering Vehicles 6Trailers 245 Material Handling Equipment 14

Trucks 81Total 1182 779


UNOCI Vehicles: 30 August 2005

UNOCI Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t



UNOCI Expenditures: April–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Apr 04–Jun 04


Gross requirements 83,063.2 Staff assessment income 547.3

Net requirements 82,515.9Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) —






Military observers 8,909.4 8,629.7 279.7 3.1 Military contingents 139,548.3 134,575.8 4,972.5 3.6 Civilian police 12,801.1 9,568.1 3,233.0 25.3 Formed police units — — — —International staff 37,621.0 37,158.5 462.5 1.2 National staff 7,630.1 5,026.4 2,603.7 34.1 United Nations Volunteers 5,466.4 3,605.8 1,860.6 34.0 General temporary assistance — — — —Government-provided personnel 362.6 53.5 309.1 85.2 Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants 224.0 99.4 124.6 55.6 Official travel 1,720.2 1,832.4 (112.2) (6.5)Facilities and infrastructure 54,354.3 46,699.9 7,654.4 14.1 Ground transportation 27,782.6 22,442.8 5,339.8 19.2 Air transportation 30,683.7 22,599.4 8,084.3 26.3 Naval transportation — — — —Communications and IT 33,842.8 31,258.6 2,584.2 14.7 Supplies, services and equipment 16,726.3 12,394.4 4,331.9 62.7 Quick-impact projects 800.0 776.3 23.7 3.0

Gross requirements 378,472.8 336,721.0 41,751.8 11.0 Staff assessment income 6,343.2 4,906.3 1,436.9 22.7



Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNOCI Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



UNOCI Expenditures on Contingent OwnedEquipment: July 2004–June 2005

in thousands of US dollars


Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNOCI Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.






None — — — —


UNOCI Voluntary Contributors


204

7.6 UNMIL (UN Mission in Liberia)

Latest mandates 19 September 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1626 (six-month, twelve-day duration)17 September 2004 (date of issue), 19 September 2004 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1561 (twelve-month duration)

First mandate 19 September 2003 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1509 (twelve-month duration)

SRSG Alan Doss (United Kingdom)SG letter of appointment: 13 July 2005;

effective 15 August 2005First SRSG Jacques Klein (United States)Force commander Lieutenent-General Chikadibia Obiakor (Nigeria)

effective as of 1 January 2006First force commander Lieutenant-General Daniel Ishmael Opande (Kenya)Police commissioner Commissioner Mohammed Ahmed Alhassan (Ghana)

Entry on duty: 15 March 2005

UNMIL Key Facts



Oct. 03 4,481 14,785 6 215 0 1,115Nov. 03 5,455 14,785 73 215 41 1,115Dec. 03 8,387 14,785 107 215 312 1,115Jan. 04 10,903 14,785 108 215 442 1,115Feb. 04 11,527 14,785 107 215 518 1,115Mar. 04 13,808 14,785 137 215 551 1,115Apr. 04 13,938 14,785 169 215 632 1,115May 04 14,649 14,785 184 215 791 1,115June 04 13,375 14,785 192 215 1,049 1,115July 04 13,881 14,785 202 215 1,091 1,115Aug. 04 14,468 14,785 204 215 1,091 1,115Sept. 04 14,363 14,785 201 215 1,089 1,115

continues

UNMIL Personnel: First Year of Operation


UNMIL (LIBERIA) • 205



Oct. 03 117 607 44 768 1 286Nov. 03 168 607 104 768 12 286Dec. 03 160 607 125 768 24 286Jan. 04 199 607 145 768 72 286Feb. 04 227 607 153 768 92 286Mar. 04 262 607 170 768 111 286Apr. 04 301 607 343 768 128 286May 04 340 607 430 768 147 286June 04 382 607 454 768 160 286July 04 401 635 535 798 174 431Aug. 04 421 635 543 798 195 431Sept. 04 444 635 541 798 207 431

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1509, A/59/624, A/59/736; DPI (DPKO website); PFD; UNV Programme.

UNMIL Personnel: First Year of Operation continued



16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

Troops

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0


Military Obs.



Auth. Police

July8: SRSG appointed 14: SRSG EOD

Aug.1: Council authorizesmultinationalstabilization force21: Arrival of multi-disciplinary assessment mission

Sept.11: SG report recommends UNtroop deployment15: TCC meeting19: Council resolutionauthorizes mission asof 1 October-Directives to FCissued September(no date specified)

Oct.1: Official start of mandateand take-over of ECOMIL;FC appointment and EOD28: Con Ops issued

Nov.1: Permanent HQoperational2: PC EOD

Dec.15: SG mission report23: GA approves budget

June18: GA adjusts budget

Sept.19: Mandate renewed

July

‘03

Au

g.’

03

Sep

t.‘0

3

Oct

.’03

No

v.‘0

3

Dec

.’03

Jan

.‘04

Feb

.’04

Mar

.‘04

Ap

r.’0

4

May

‘04

Jun

e’0

4

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1509, A/59/624, A/59/736, S/RES/1497, S/2003/875, S/2003/695, S/2003/926, A/RES/58/261A, A/RES/58/261B, S/2003/1175; DPI (DPKO website); DPKO PFD; UNV Programme; DPKO Military Division; UN Security Council website (“Meetings”page).

Note: Actual UNV strength for October 2003—March 2004 unavailable.

UNMIL Mission Deployment Time



Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

Aug. 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

TroopsAuth. Troops

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Sources: UN Document A/59/624; PKD; DPI (DPKO website).

UNMIL Personnel: Since 2003

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0Aug. 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04 July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05


Military Obs.



Auth. Police



Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

15,000

14,800

14,600

14,400

14,200

14,000

13,800

13,600

13,400

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

TroopsAuth. Troops

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1509, A/59/736; DPI (DPKO website); PFD; DPKO PMSS.Note: S/RES/1509 (2003) authorized 15,000 military personnel, including up to 250 military observers. It was subsequently decided

to maintain the military observer strengths at or below 215, therefore allowing a maximum authorized troop strength of 14,750.

UNMIL Personnel: July 2004–September 2005

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5


Military Obs.



Auth. Police



UNMIL Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005


Bangladesh 3,196 17 30 3,243 Egypt — 8 — 8Pakistan 2,750 16 21 2,787 Czech Republic — 3 3 6Ethiopia 2,547 17 — 2,564 Mali 2 4 — 6 Nigeria 1,966 19 166 2,151 Niger — 3 3 6 Ghana 856 11 40 907 Norway — — 6 6 Namibia 864 3 6 873 Peru 2 3 — 5 Senegal 604 3 10 617 Austria 5 — — 5China 567 5 25 597 Poland — 2 3 5 Ireland 426 — — 426 Bolivia 1 3 — 4 Ukraine 301 3 11 315 Ecuador 1 3 — 4 Nepal 42 3 256 301 Moldova 1 3 — 4 Jordan 124 7 140 271 Paraguay 1 3 — 4 Sweden 229 — 10 239 Yemen — — 4 4 Philippines 172 3 31 206 Benin 1 2 — 3 Gambia — 5 30 35 Croatia 3 — — 3 Zimbabwe — — 32 32 El Salvador — 3 — 3 Kenya 4 3 24 31 Indonesia — 3 — 3 Turkey — — 31 31 Kyrgzstan — 3 — 3 Zambia — 3 28 31 Romania — 3 — 3 Fiji — — 29 29 Togo 1 2 — 3 United States 6 7 16 29 United Kingdom 3 — — 3 Russia — 6 20 26 Argentina — — 2 2 Malawi 2 — 20 22 Bulgaria — 2 — 2 Samoa — — 21 21 Finland 2 — — 2 Uganda — — 20 20 Republic of Korea 1 1 — 2Germany 15 — 2 17 Uruguay — — 2 2 Serbia & Montenegro — 6 8 14 Brazil 1 — — 1 Bosnia & Herzegovina — — 12 12 Denmark — 1 — 1Jamaica — — 11 11 France 1 — — 1Sri Lanka — — 11 11 TOTAL 14,692 202 1,084 15,978Malaysia — 10 — 10

Source: DPI (DPKO website).Note: Police figures include formed police units provided by Jordan (120), Nepal (250), and Nigeria (125).




12 Infantry Battalions Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Ghana, Nigeria,Namibia, Pakistan

3 Level II Hospitals Bangladesh, China, Pakistan4 Engineering Units Bangladesh, China, Pakistan (2)1 Level III Hospital Jordan


UNMIL Military Units: 30 August 2005

UNMIL Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.



Appointment Type


2003 5 5 — — — — —2004 29

January-March 10 1 1 — — —April-June 5 — 1 — — —July-September 4 — — — 1 —October-December 4 — 1 — 1 —

2005 30January-March 4 — 2 2 — —April-June 8 — — — 1 —July-September 4 — — — — —October 6 — 1 1 1 —

Total Fatalities 64 50 1 6 3 4 —

Incident Type


2003 5 — 1 4 — —2004 29

January-March — 9 2 — 1April-June — 6 — — —July-September — — 2 1 2October-December — 5 1 — —

2005 30January-March — 5 2 — 1April-June — 8 — — 1July-September — 3 1 — —October — 4 3 — 2

Total Fatalities 64 — 41 15 1 7



UNMIL Fatalities: Inception–October 2005



UNMIL Vehicles: 30 August 2005



Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 4

Combat Vehicles 326Communications Vehicles 2Engineering Vehicles 137Material Handling Equipment 26Support Vehicles

(Commercial Pattern) 435Support Vehicles

(Military Pattern) 1,200Trailers 488Total 2,618

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKOContingent Owned Equipment and Property Man-agement Section.

UNMIL Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t

Fixed Wing Aircraft 3 —Helicopters 8 14

(Ukraine)Total 11 14


UNMIL Mission Expenditures: August 2003–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Aug 03–Jun 04


Gross requirements 548,178.7 Staff assessment income 3,113.1

Net requirements 545,065.6 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) 100.0






Military observers 11,445.8 11,337.8 108.0 0.9 Military contingents 355,738.8 340,018.8 15,720.0 4.4 Civilian police 35,984.6 32,758.2 3,226.4 9.0 Formed police units 11,634.5 9,152.8 2,481.7 21.3 International staff 87,323.7 76,896.2 10,427.5 11.9 National staff 6,121.2 8,757.7 (2,636.5) (43.1)United Nations Volunteers 17,763.7 12,965.1 4,798.6 27.0 General temporary assistance 1,468.8 1,630.3 (161.5) (11.0)Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants 565.3 353.8 211.5 37.4 Official travel 1,976.9 1,840.5 136.4 6.9 Facilities and infrastructure 100,338.8 90,774.8 9,564.0 9.5 Ground transportation 25,600.6 18,345.3 7,255.3 28.3 Air transportation 74,228.1 54,689.9 19,538.2 26.3 Naval transportation 2,730.0 2,581.3 148.7 5.4 Communications and IT 40,826.5 35,321.9 5,504.6 19.2 Supplies, services and equipment 47,238.7 42,540.9 4,697.8 29.2 Quick-impact projects 1,000.0 1,000.0 — —


Net requirements 811,901.1 731,197.4 80,703.7 9.9 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) 120.0 120.0 — —


Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMIL Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



UNMIL Expenditure Summary: July 2004–2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.




S

UNMIL Expenditures on Contingent OwnedEquipment: July 2004–June 2005a



Source: DPKO FMSS.Notes: a. Includes Major equipment and Self-

sustainment for formed police units.

UNMIL Voluntary Contributors: July 2004–June 2005(contributions in thousands of US dollars)



Germany 120 — — 120Total 120 — — 120



215

UNAMA Key Facts

7.7 UNAMA (UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan)

Latest mandates 24 March 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1589 (twelve-month duration)

First mandate 28 March 2002 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1401 (twelve-month duration)

SRSG Jean Arnault (France)a

SG letter of appointment: 6 February 2004; effective 6 February 2004

First SRSG Lakhdar Brahimi (Algeria)Senior Military Adviser Brigadier Karl-Alexander Wohlgemuth (Austria)

Entry on duty: 18 June 2004

Note: a. On 16 December 2005, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that Tom Koenigs(Germany) will replace Jean Arnault in February 2006.



Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f 14

12

10

8

6

4

2

0

Apr. 1 ‘02–Dec. 31 ’02

Military Advisers

Auth. Military Advisers

Police

Auth. Police

Jan. 1 ‘03–Dec. 31 ’03 Jan. 1 ‘04–Dec. 31 ’04 Jan. 1 ‘05–Sept. 30 ’05

Sources: UN Documents A/C.5/56/25/Add.4, A/59/534/Add.1, A/C.5/57/23, A/C.5/58/20; DPI (DPKO web-site); UNV Programme; DPKO PMSS.

UNAMA Personnel Since 2002

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f 1,000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Apr. 1 ‘02–Dec. 31 ’02 Jan. 1 ‘03–Dec. 31 ’03 Jan. 1 ‘04–Dec. 31 ’04 Jan. 1 ‘05–Sept. 30 ’05


Int’l StaffNat’l Staff


UNAMA (AFGHANISTAN) • 217

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Military Advisers

Auth. Military Advisers Auth. UNVs

Police UNVs

Auth. Police

Sources: UN Documents A/C.5/58/20, A/59/534/Add.1; DPI (DPKO website); DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNAMA Personnel: July 2004–September 2005

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

1,000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05






Austria — 2 — 2 Romania — 2 — 2 Sweden — 1 1 2 Australia — 1 — 1 Bangladesh — 1 — 1 Canada — — 1 1 China — — 1 1 Denmark — 1 — 1 Germany — 1 — 1 Jordan — — 1 1 Nepal — — 1 1New Zealand — 1 — 1 Nigeria — — 1 1 Philippines — — 1 1 Poland — 1 — 1 Republic of Korea — 1 — 1Uruguay — 1 — 1 TOTAL — 13 7 20


UNAMA Military and Police Contributors: August 2005

UNAMA Aircraft

Commerical Gov’t



UNAMA Civilian Staff: June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNAMA Ground Transportation



4x4 On-Off Road 151Ambulances 25Automobiles 6Buses 71Material Handling Equipment 8Trucks 17Total 278

Sources: DPKO Surface Transport Section; DPKO Contingent Owned Equip-ment and Property Management Section.


UNAMA (AFGHANISTAN) • 219

Appointment Type


2002 1 — — — — 1 —2003 1 — — — — 1 —2004 2

January-March — — — — 1 —April-June — — — — 1 —July-September — — — — — —October-December — — — — — —

2005 0January-March — — — — — —April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October — — — — — —

Total Fatalities 4 — — — — 4 —

Incident Type


2002 1 — — 1 — —2003 1 — 1 — — —2004 2 — — — — —

January-March — 1 — — —April-June — 1 — — —July-September — — — — —October-December — — — — —

2005 0January-March — — — — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October — — — — —

Total Fatalities 4 — 3 1 — —



UNAMA Fatalities: Inception–September 2005



UNAMA Mission Expenditures: 2002–2004 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Estimated Expenses

Military advisers/liaison officers 527.8Civilian police advisers 324.8Staff 38,082.6UNVs 1,698.5Official travel 711.8Operational costs 21,556.5Information and training programs 681.3Total net requirements 63,583.3

Source: UN Document A/59/534/Add.1.Note: a. Estimates are as of November 2004.

UNAMA Estimated Resource Requirements: 1 January 2005–31 December 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)a

Category 2002–2003 2004

Military observers 298.8 417.2 Civilian police 206.0 261.9 Posts 39,022.2 33,245.8 United Nations Volunteers 1,474.7 1,654.2 Consultants 893.0 206.2 Official Travel 1,561.6 641.7 Facilities and infrastructure 9,606.4 5,539.6 Ground Transportation 4,143.0 3,618.8 Air Transportation 9,340.4 6,059.5 Communications 4,549.3 2,453.9 Information Technology 3,546.6 1,086.3 Medical 160.4 466.0 Other supplies, services and equipment 5,047.6 1,313.0 Public Information Program 210.4 131.7 Training — 503.3 Total 80,060.5 57,599.1

Source: IMIS report ACLDGB52; UN Document A/59/534/Add.1.


221

Latest mandates 13 September 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 622 (six-month duration)


14 September 2004 (date of issue), 15 September 2004 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1560 (six-month duration)

First mandate 31 July 2000 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1312 (six-week duration)

SRSG Legwaila Joseph Legwaila (first SRSG, Botswana)SG letter of appointment: 29 September 2000;

effective 1 November 2000Force commander Major-General Rajender Singh (India)

Entry on duty: 19 July 2004First force commander Major-General Patrick Cammaert (Netherlands)

UNMEE Key Facts

Troops Military Observers International Staff National Staff UNVs


July 00 0 0 2 100 1 106 0 82 0 0Aug. 00 0 0 10 100 14 106 0 82 0 0Sept. 00 0 3980 58 220 49 282 4 322 0 15Oct. 00 0 3980 100 220 42 282 9 322 0 15Nov. 00 289 3980 137 220 105 282 51 322 0 15Dec. 00 1633 3980 144 220 119 282 64 322 0 15Jan. 01 2654 3980 189 220 141 282 90 322 0 15Feb. 01 3357 3980 214 220 157 282 109 322 0 15Mar. 01 3659 3980 219 220 178 282 118 322 0 15Apr. 01 3652 3980 218 220 199 282 162 322 0 15May 01 3992 3980 217 220 219 282 217 322 6 15June 01 3643 3980 216 220 219 282 237 322 6 15

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1320, A/56/840, A/57/672; DPI (DPKO website); DPKO PMSS; DPKO FGS.

UNMEE Personnel: First Year of Operation

7.8 UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea)



4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

Troops

300

250

200

150

100

50

0


Military Obs.


Int’l StaffUNVs Nat’l Staff

June30: SG reportrecommendsdeployment of MLofficers July

14–18: Multidisciplinaryreconnaissance mission31: Council authorizesdeployment of militaryobservers

Aug.9: SG reportrecommends troopdeployment

Sept.15: Council authorizesdeployment of troops andexpansion of mandate18: SG mission report29: SRSG appointed

Oct.25: FC appointed

Nov.1: SRSG EOD, SRSG arrivesearly Nov.; FC assumes duties; FC EOD

Dec.23: GA approves budget

Jan.1: Directives to FC issued12: SG mission report

Mar.15: Mandate renewed

Jun

e’0

0

July

‘00

Au

g.’

00

Sep

t.‘0

0

Oct

.’00

No

v.‘0

0

Dec

.’00

Jan

.’01

Feb

.‘01

Mar

.’01

Ap

r.‘0

1

May

‘01

Jun

e’0

1

July

‘01

Au

g.’

01

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1312, S/RES/1320, S/2000/643, S/2000/785, S/2000/947, S/2001/45, S/2000/1037, A/RES/55/237, A/RES/55/252A,S/2000/879, A/56/840, A/57/672; DPI (DPKO website); DPKO PMSS; DPKO FGS; DPKO Military Division.

Note: Actual UNV strength for July 2001–September 2001 unavailable.

UNMEE Mission Deployment Time


UNMEE (ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA) • 223

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

July 31 ‘00–June 30 ’01

TroopsAuth. Troops

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Sources: UN Documents A/56/840, A/57/672, A/58/633, A/59/616; PKD; DPI (DPKO website).

UNMEE Personnel: Since 2000

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

300

250

200

150

100

50

0


Military Obs.



July 31 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05



Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

TroopsAuth. Troops

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Sources: DPI (DPKO website); PKD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

UNMEE Personnel: July 2004–September 2005

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5


Military Obs.





UNMEE Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005


India 1,556 8 — 1,564 Poland — 6 — 6Jordan 963 7 — 970 Russia — 6 — 6Kenya 325 10 — 335 Nepal — 5 — 5Bangladesh 174 7 — 181 Norway — 5 — 5Uruguay 36 5 — 41 South Africa — 5 — 5Ghana 4 10 — 14 Sweden — 5 — 5Zambia 3 10 — 13 Tunisia 3 2 — 5Tanzania 3 8 — 11 Spain 1 3 — 4Malaysia 3 7 — 10 Austria 1 2 — 3Bosnia & Herzegovina — 9 — 9 Denmark — 3 — 3Nigeria 3 6 — 9 Greece — 3 — 3Algeria — 8 — 9 Iran — 3 — 3Bulgaria 2 5 — 8 Paraguay — 3 — 3China — 7 — 7 Switzerland — 3 — 3Croatia — 7 — 7 Czech Republic — 2 — 2Finland — 7 — 7 Germany — 2 — 2Romania — 7 — 7 Peru — 2 — 2Ukraine — 7 — 7 France 1 — — 1United States — 7 — 7 Italy 1 — — 1Gambia 2 4 — 6 TOTAL 3,083 210 — 3,293Namibia 2 4 — 6

Source: DPI (DPKO website).Note: Police figures include formed police units provided by Jordan (120), Nepal (250), and Nigeria (125).




1 Construction Engineering Company India, Jordan2 Engineering Demining Company Bangladesh, Kenya1 Force Reserve Company India, Jordan1 Headquarters Support Company Kenya1 Helicopter Unit Uruguay2 Infantry Battalions India, Jordan1 Levell II Medical Unit Jordan1 Military Police Unit Italy


UNMEE Military Units: 30 August 2005

UNMEE Civilian Staff: 30 August 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.



Appointment Type


2001 2 2 — — — — —2002 2 1 — — — 1 —2003 4 2 — — 1 1 —2004 2

January-March 2 — — — — —April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October-December — — — — — —

2005 2January-March — — — — — —April-June — — — 1 — —July-September 1 — — — — —October — — — — — —

Total Fatalities 12 8 — — 2 2 —

Incident Type


2001 2 — 1 1 — —2002 2 — 1 1 — —2003 4 — 4 — — —2004 2

January-March — 2 — — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October-December — — — — —

2005 2January-March — — — — —April-June — 1 — — —July-September — — 1 — —October — — — — —




UNMEE Fatalities: Inception–31 October 2005



UNMEE Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t

Fixed Wing Aircraft 1 1(France)

Helicopters 6 3(1 France,

2 Uruguay)Total 7 4




Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 3 4x4 Vehicles 352Combat Vehicles 56 Ambulances 2Communication Vehicles 1 Automobiles 6Engineering Vehicles 42 Buses 54Material Handling Equipment 2 Material Handling Equipment 13Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 110 Trucks 76Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 295Trailers 38Total 547 503


UNMEE Vehicles: 30 August 2005



Jul 00– Jul 01– Jul 02– Jul 03–Category Jun 01 Jun 02 Jun 03 Jun 04

Military and police personnel 58,852.8 83,695.9 102,877.7 94,115.2Civilian personnel 14,331.1 27,756.2 31,042.2 34,311.3Operational requirements 80,993.8 73,555.6 75,699.2 55,173.7Other 9,928.3 — — —

Gross requirements 164,106.0 185,007.7 209,619.1 183,600.2Staff assessment income 1,902.0 3,507.9 4,010.3 4,577.3

Net requirements 162,204.0 181,499.8 205,608.8 179,022.9Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) — — — —

Total requirements 164,106.0 185,007.7 209,619.1 183,600.2

Sources: UN Documents A/56/840, A/57/672, A/58/633, A/59/616.

UNMEE Mission Expenditures: July 2000–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)

VarianceCategory Approveda Actual Variance %

Military observers 7,222.6 7,428.3 (205.7) (2.8)Military contingents 90,327.8 78,122.0 12,205.8 13.5 Civilian police — — — — Formed police units — — — —International staff 27,620.3 27,003.5 616.8 2.2 National staff 1,321.0 1,190.8 130.2 9.9 United Nations Volunteers 2,815.8 2,917.8 (102.0) (3.6)General temporary assistance — — — —Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants — — — —Official travel 850.0 637.3 212.7 25.0 Facilities and infrastructure 21,335.3 18,213.1 3,122.2 14.6 Ground transportation 6,088.2 5,215.5 872.7 14.3 Air transportation 21,402.9 18,715.7 2,687.2 12.6 Naval transportation — — — —Communications and IT 9,532.8 7,998.0 1,534.8 27.9 Supplies, services and equipment 9,814.9 12,887.9 (3,073.0) (45.6)Quick-impact projects — — — —




Source: DPKO FMSS.Note: a. An additional $7 million was approved for the July 2004–June 2005 financial year for the strengthening of the safety and

security of staff and premises of the mission. There were no expenditures incurred against this amount.

UNMEE Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



UNMEE Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.


Military andPolice Personnel48%


S

UNMEE Expenditures on Contingent OwnedEquipment: July 2004–June 2005



Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMEE Voluntary Contributors



None — — — —



231

Latest mandates 28 October 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1635 (eleven-month duration)

30 September 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1628 (one-month duration)

6 September 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1621 (troop increase only)


1 October 2004 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1565 (six-month duration)

First mandate 30 November 1999 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1279 (three-month duration)

SRSG William Lacy Swing (United States)SG letter of appointment: 16 May 2003;

effective 1 July 2003First SRSG Kamel Morjane (Tunisia)Force commander Lieutenant-General Babacar Gaye (Senegal)

Entry on duty: 23 March 2005First force commander Mountaga Diallo (Senegal)Police commissioner Commissioner Daniel Cure (France)

Entry on duty: 3 January 2005

MONUC Key Facts

7.9 MONUC (UN Organization Mission in theDemocratic Republic of the Congo)

Troops Military Observers International Staff National Staff

Date Actual Authorized Actual Authorized Actual Authorized Actual Authorized

Dec. 99 0 0 78 90 25 32 6 40Jan. 00 0 0 79 90 33 84 8 50Feb. 00 0 5,037 83 500 46 84 9 50Mar. 00 0 5,037 107 500 72 84 12 50Apr. 00 0 5,037 126 500 92 198 20 145May 00 0 5,037 225 500 111 198 24 145June 00 0 5,037 258 500 128 199 33 145July 00 102 5,037 164 500 153 338 154 325Aug. 00 99 5,037 163 500 165 338 164 325Sept. 00 91 5,037 159 500 175 338 180 325Oct. 00 89 5,037 158 500 184 338 264 325Nov. 00 86 5,037 138 500 191 338 196 325

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1509, A/59/624, A/59/736; DPI (DPKO website); PKD; UNV Programme.

MONUC Personnel: First Year of Operation



6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

Military Liaison/Obs.

Auth. Military Liaison/Obs.

500

400

300

200

100

0

July15: SG reportrecommendsdeployment ofmilitary liaison(ML) personnel

Aug.6: Resolutionauthorizes deployment of ML personnel

Sept.Advance militaryHQ established

Oct.17: Arrival of technical survey team

Nov.1: SG report recommends troop deployment13: SRSG appointed 30: Council resolutionauthorizes troopdeployment

Dec.29: Directives issed to chief ML officer

Jan.1: SRSG EOD17: SG report recommendsexpansion of mission

Feb.24: Mandate renewed28: FC appointed

Apr.4: FC assumes duties7: GA approves budget18: SG mission report21: FC EOD

May26: Directives to FC

June15: GA reducesapproved budget

Aug.23: Mandate renewed

Troops

Auth. Troops Auth. Nat’l Staff Auth. Int’l StaffAuth. UNVs


Auth. Police

July

‘99

Au

g.’

99

Sep

t.‘9

9

Oct

.’99

No

v.‘9

9

Dec

.’99

Jan

.’00

Feb

.‘00

Mar

.’00

Ap

r.‘0

0

May

‘00

Jun

e’0

0

July

‘00

Au

g.’

00

Sep

t.‘0

0

Oct

.’00

No

v.‘0

0

Dec

.’00

Jan

.’01

Feb

.‘01

Mar

.’01

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1291, A/56/825, S/RES/1258, A/55/935, S/RES/1279, S/RES/1361, S/RES/1258, S/RES/1273, S/1999/1116,S/1999/790, S/1999/1171, S/2000/172, S/2000/330, S/1999/1116, A/RES/54/260A, A/RES/54/260B, S/2000/30; DPKO FGS; DPI (DPKO website);DPKO PMSS; DPKO Military Division.

Note: The graph above reflects MONUC’s first year of operations. Since then, the operation has undergone several substantial trans-formations, especially following Security Council Resolution 1493 of 23 July 2003.

MONUC Mission Deployment Time


MONUC (DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO) • 233

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

Feb. 24 ‘00–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Troops Auth. Troops

Sources: UN Documents A/55/935, A/56/825, A/57/682, A/58/684, A/59/657; DPKO FGS; DPI (DPKO web-site); DPKO PMSS.

MONUC Personnel: Since 1999A

vera

ge

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Aug. 6–Nov. 30 ‘99

Dec. 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Military Obs.Auth. Military Obs.



Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

Aug. 6 ‘99–Jan. 6 ’00

Jan. 7 ‘00–Apr. 12 ’00

Apr. 13 ‘00–June 14 ’00

June 14 ‘00–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04



July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Sources: UN Documents A/58/701, A/59/707; DPI (DPKO website); PFD; DPKO PMSS.Note: Discrepancies in the authorized troop and police strengths may be seen between the figures

shown here and those seen in other UN sources. This may be a result of a certain lack of clarity in Secu-rity Council Resolution 1565 (2004), given that formed police units (gendarmes) were not specificallyauthorized but drawn by MONUC from within authorized military contingents. The authorized staffingfigures above are provided by the Peackeeping Finance Division in the UN Office of Programme Planning,Budget, and Accounts, and are used for mission planning and budgeting purposes.

MONUC Personnel: Since 1999

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Auth. UNVs

Police UNVs

Auth. Police



Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.‘05

Mar

.’05

Ap

r.‘0

5

May

’05

Jun

e‘0

5

July

’05

Au

g.‘

05

Sep

t.’0

5

TroopsAuth. Troops

Sources: DPI (DPKO website); PKD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.

MONUC Personnel: July 2004–September 2005

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

1,500

1,250

1,000

750

500

250

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.‘05

Mar

.’05

Ap

r.‘0

5

May

’05

Jun

e‘0

5

July

’05

Au

g.‘

05

Sep

t.’0

5


Military Obs.



Auth. Police




Pakistan 3,769 26 — 3,795 Paraguay — 17 — 17India 3,510 36 — 3,546 Cameroon 1 3 9 13Uruguay 1,544 27 — 1,571 Ukraine 1 12 — 13South Africa 1,394 3 — 1,397 Sweden — 5 7 12Bangladesh 1,302 15 — 1,317 Algeria — 8 — 8Nepal 1,119 19 — 1,138 Belgium 8 — — 8Morocco 804 1 — 805 Canada 8 — — 8Senegal 473 8 19 500 Central African Republic — — 8 8Ghana 462 21 — 483 Côte d’Ivoire — — 7 7Bolivia 221 4 — 225 United Kingdom 7 — — 7Tunisia 168 23 — 191 Serbia & Montenegro 6 — — 6Indonesia 179 9 — 188 Bosnia & Herzegovina — 5 — 5Nigeria 1 29 128 158 Peru — 5 — 5Guatemala 106 4 — 110 Portugal — — 5 5China 45 10 — 55 Chad — — 4 4Niger 2 18 32 52 Czech Republic — 3 — 3Kenya 12 29 — 41 Ireland — 3 — 3Mali — 26 14 40 Madagascar — — 3 3Guinea — — 36 36 Poland — 3 — 3Benin — 18 12 30 Argentina — — 2 2Jordan 6 19 5 30 Denmark 1 1 — 2Burkina Faso — 12 15 27 Mongolia — 2 — 2Russia — 23 4 27 Spain — 2 — 2Malawi — 26 — 26 Sri Lanka — 2 — 2Egypt 15 8 — 23 Switzerland 2 — — 2Romania — 22 1 23 Turkey — — 2 2Zambia 4 18 — 22 Mozambique — 1 — 1France 8 1 11 20 Netherlands 1 — — 1Malaysia 12 5 — 17 TOTAL 15,191 532 324 16,047


MONUC Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005




4 Engineering Companies China, Indonesia, Nepal, South Africa4 Helicopter Units Bangladesh, India (3)2 Level II Medical Units China, Morocco1 Partial Level III Medical Unit India (partial)

15 Infantry Battalions Bangladesh, Ghana, India (3), Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan (4), Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia, Uruguay

2 Infantry Guard Companies Bolivia, Uruguay2 Military Police Companies Bangladesh, South Africa1 Special Forces Company Guatemala

Source: DPKO FGS.Note: Military headquarter staff, military observers, and thirty-five level-I medical units not included.

MONUC Military Units: 30 August 2005

MONUC Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.



Appointment Type


2001 6 4 1 — 1 — —2002 8 3 2 — 1 2 —2003 14 8 3 — 2 1 —2004 22

January-March 4 1 — — — —April-June 14 1 — — — —July-September — — — — 2 —October-December — — — — — —

2005 20January-March 10 — — — — —April-June 6 — — — — —July-September 4 — — — — —October — — — — — —

Total Fatalities 70 53 8 — 4 5 —

Incident Type


2001 6 — 4 — 1 12002 8 — 4 3 — 12003 14 3 7 4 — —2004 22

January-March 2 1 1 — 1April-June 1 4 10 — —July-September — 2 — — —October-December — — — — —

2005 20January-March 9 1 — — —April-June 3 1 2 — —July-September — 1 2 — 1October — — — — —




MONUC Fatalities: Inception–October 2005



MONUC Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t

Fixed Wing Aircraft 22 —Helicopters 15 28

(5 Bangladesh,23 India)

Total 37 28




Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 63 4x4 Vehicles 1023Airfield Support 7 Airfield Support 175Combat Vehicles 303 Ambulances 22Communication Vehicles 6 Automobiles 3Engineering Vehicles 178 Buses 295Material Handling Equipment 48 Engineering Vehicles 12Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 237 Material Handling Equipment 88Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 1296 Trucks 225Trailers 437Naval Vessels 22Total 2597 1843


MONUC Vehicles: 30 August 2005



Aug 99– Jul 00– Jul 01– Jul 02– Jul 03–Category Jun 00 Jun 01 Jun 02 Jun 03 Jun 04

Military and police personnel 6,003.8 29,656.1 97,177.0 156,973.6 262,734.7Civilian personnel 6,627.9 31,093.7 68,491.0 93,521.5 112,562.7Operational requirements 42,633.4 185,247.6 223,159.0 229,456.9 261,188.0Other 6.3 474.6 — — —

Gross requirements 55,271.4 246,472.0 388,827.0 479,952.0 636,485.4Staff assessment income 435.7 3,013.7 6,777.6 10,037.6 12,114.2

Net requirements 54,835.7 243,458.3 382,049.4 469,914.4 624,371.2Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) — — — 1,780.2 2,345.8


Sources: UN Documents A/55/935, A/56/825/, A/57/682, A/58/684, A/59/657.

MONUC Mission Expenditures: August 1999–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)


Military observers 41,540.8 41,713.7 (172.9) (0.4)Military contingents 332,976.8 329,197.6 3,779.2 1.1 Civilian police 9,302.6 8,852.1 450.5 4.8 Formed police units — — — —International staff 115,538.8 106,052.6 9,486.2 8.2 National staff 15,657.2 15,281.8 375.4 2.4 United Nations Volunteer 18,040.2 19,528.2 (1,488.0) (8.2)General temporary assistance — 9.0 (9.0) —Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants 51.9 51.6 0.3 0.6 Official travel 4,910.1 6,014.6 (1,104.5) (22.5)Facilities and infrastructure 91,804.7 89,812.2 1,992.5 2.2 Ground transportation 33,140.0 29,966.4 3,173.6 9.6 Air transportation 194,901.7 163,037.4 31,864.3 16.3 Naval transportation 3,772.6 3,029.7 742.9 19.7 Communications and IT 61,258.2 57,707.1 3,551.1 11.6 Supplies, services and equipment 30,870.5 29,631.3 1,239.2 3.1 Quick-impact projects 1,000.0 999.3 0.7 0.1

Gross requirements 954,766.1 900,884.6 53,881.5 48.5 Staff assessment income 17,523.3 14,878.7 2,644.6 15.1

Net requirements 937,242.8 886,005.9 51,236.9 33.4 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) 3,067.1 3,105.0 (37.9) (1.2)


Source: DPKO FMSS.

MONUC Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



MONUC Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.

Civilian Personnel 16%



MONUC Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2004–June 2005



Source: DPKO FMSS.

MONUC Voluntary Contributors(contributions in thousands of US dollars)



Fondation Hirondelle 3,105 — — 3,105 Total 3,105 — — 3,105



242

Latest mandates 30 June 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1610 (six-month duration)

17 September 2004 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1562 (nine-month and two-week duration)

First mandate 22 October 1999 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1270 (six-month duration)

SRSG Daudi Ngelautwa Mwakawago (Tanzania)SG letter of appointment: 28 November 2003;

effective 21 December 2003First SRSG Oluyemi Adeniji (Nigeria)Force commander Major-General Sajjad Akram (Pakistan)

Entry on duty: 1 October 2003; departed September 2005First force commander Major-General Vijay Kumar Jetley (India)Police commissioner Commissioner Hudson Benzu (Zambia)

Entry on duty: 13 March 2003; departed September 2005

UNAMSIL Key Facts



Oct. 99 15 5,800 192 260 0 6Nov. 99 15 5,800 200 260 0 6Dec. 99 4,297 5,800 208 260 4 6Jan. 00 4,601 5,800 243 260 4 6Feb. 00 4,652 10,840 252 260 6 60Mar. 00 7,216 10,840 260 260 9 60Apr. 00 8,158 10,840 260 260 19 60May 00 11,436 12,740 260 260 24 60June 00 12,476 12,740 260 260 37 60July 00 12,187 12,740 260 260 34 60Aug. 00 12,183 12,740 260 260 34 60Sept. 00 12,262 12,740 260 260 34 60

continues

UNAMSIL Personnel: First Year of Operation

7.10 UNAMSIL (UN Mission in Sierra Leone)*

*UNAMSIL terminated on 31 December 2005. It was succeeded by the United Nations Integrated Officein Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), established for an initial period of twelve months beginning on 1 January 2006.The Executive Representative of UNIOSIL is Victor da Silva Angolo.


UNAMSIL (SIERRA LEONE) • 243



Oct. 99 26 228 47 282 N/A 72Nov. 99 47 228 48 282 N/A 72Dec. 99 64 228 52 282 N/A 72Jan. 00 84 228 54 282 N/A 72Feb. 00 120 245 57 306 N/A 72Mar. 00 139 245 69 306 N/A N/AApr. 00 153 245 90 306 N/A N/AMay 00 165 245 120 306 N/A 79June 00 178 245 143 306 N/A 79July 00 194 245 168 306 N/A 79Aug. 00 201 245 181 306 N/A 79Sept. 00 210 245 215 306 N/A 79

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1270, S/RES/1289, S/RES/1299, A/55/853, A/55/833; DPKO FGS; DPKOPMSS.

Notes: DPKO FGS reports show 340 military observers for November 1999 and 1,039 military observersfor February 2000; given the probability of incorrect data entry for these months, it has been decided toshow an average of the preceding and following months for those two data points. Actual UNV strengthnot shown because monthly data are not available; for time period averages of UNV staff in the first yearof the mission, see graph “Personnel: Since 1999.”

UNAMSIL Personnel: First Year of Operation continued



14,000

12,000

10,00

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

Troops

300

250

200

150

100

50

0


Military Obs.



July8: SG visits Freetown30: SG report recommendsexpansion ofUNOMSIL

Sept.28: SG recommendsestablishment ofmission

Oct.22: Councilresolution authorizes mission

Nov.16: SRSG appointed17: Directives issued to FC22: FC appointed

Dec.3: FC EOD6: SG mission report7: FC assumes functions11: SRSG assumes functions12: SRSG EOD23: GA approves budget

Feb.7: Mandate renewedand expanded

May19: Mandate expanded

June15: GA reduces budget

Aug.4: Mandate renewed18: Con Ops issued

Police

Auth. Police

July

‘99

Au

g.’

99

Sep

t.‘9

9

Oct

.’99

No

v.‘9

9

Dec

.’99

Jan

.’00

Feb

.‘00

Mar

.’00

Ap

r.‘0

0

May

‘00

Jun

e’0

0

July

‘00

Au

g.’

00

Sep

t.‘0

0

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1270, S/RES/1289, S/RES/1299, A/55/853, A/55/833, S/RES/1509, S/RES/1289, S/RES/1299, S/RES/1313,S/1999/1003, S/1999/836, S/1999/1186, S/1999/1223, S/2000/13, A/RES/54/241, A/RES/54/241B; DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS; DPKO MilitaryDivision.

Notes: See notes to table at p. 243 above.

UNAMSIL Mission Deployment Time



UNAMSIL Personnel: Since 1999

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

20,000

18,000

16,000

14,000

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4,000

2,000

0

May 19 ‘00–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Feb. 7 ‘00–May 19 ’00

Oct. 22 ‘99–Feb. 7 ’00

July 1 ‘00–Mar. 31 ’01

TroopsAuth. Troops

Apr. 1 ‘01–June 30 ’01

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

Oct. 22 ‘99–Feb. 1 ’00

July 1 ‘00–Mar. 31 ’01

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 1 ’05

Aug. 20 ‘99–Oct. 22 ’99

July 1 ‘99–Aug. 19 ’99

Feb. 7 ‘00–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

Apr. 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01



Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

Oct. 23 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Aug. 20 ‘99–Oct. 22 ’99

July 1 ‘99–Aug. 19 ’99

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01


continues



Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

PoliceAuth. Police

Oct. 22 ‘99–Feb. 2 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Aug. 20 ‘99–Oct. 22 ’99

July 1 ‘99–Aug. 19 ’99

Feb. 2 ‘00–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

Sources: UN Documents A/55/853, A/56/833, A/57/680, A/58/660, A/59/635; DPKO FGS; PKD.

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

July 1 ‘00–Mar. 30 ’01

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 1 ’05

May 19 ‘00–June 30 ’00

Oct. 22 ‘99–Feb. 7 ’00

Apr. 1 ‘01–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

Auth. UNVs UNVs

UNAMSIL Personnel: Since 1999 continued



Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

12,000

10,000

8,000

6,000

4.000

2,000

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

TroopsAuth. Troops

Sources: DPI (DPKO website); PFD; DPKO PMSS; UNV Programme.Note: Authorized strengths shown above are planned drawdown strengths provided by the PKD. The

budget (A/57/681) issued on 20 August 2004 for the 2004—2005 financial year was prepared in accordancewith the plan for downsizing of the military component of the mission as outlined by the Secretary-Gen-eral in his report to the Security Council (S/2004/228), which was endorsed by Security Council Resolution1537 (2004). During the period, the mission commenced a faster pace of drawdown and withdrawal of themilitary force as described in the reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (S/2004/724,S/2004/965, and S/2005/135).

UNAMSIL Personnel: July 2004–September 2005

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5


Military Obs.



Auth. Police




Pakistan 1,264 8 2 1,274 Sweden 1 1 3 5Ghana 762 4 5 771 Tanzania — 5 — 5Nigeria 752 6 4 762 Turkey — — 5 5Bangladesh 240 8 1 249 Uruguay — 5 — 5Russia 109 6 2 117 Kyrgyzstan — 4 — 4Jordan 72 3 2 77 Malaysia — 3 1 4Kenya 7 6 6 19 Sri Lanka — — 4 4United Kingdom 5 8 2 15 Bolivia — 3 — 3Nepal 2 5 5 12 Norway — — 3 3Gambia — 8 2 10 Thailand — 3 — 3Zambia 1 3 6 10 Ukraine — 3 — 3Germany 8 — — 8 Czech Republic — 2 — 2Croatia — 6 — 6 Malawi — — 2 2Indonesia — 6 — 6 Mauritius — — 2 2Zimbabwe — — 6 6 Namibia — — 2 2Egypt — 5 — 5 China — 1 — 1Guinea — 5 — 5 Slovakia — 1 — 1India — — 5 5 TOTAL 3,223 118 70 3,411


UNAMSIL Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005


1 Aviation Unit Russia1 Engineering Company Pakistan1 Guard and Signal Company Bangladesh3 Infantry Battalions Ghana, Nigeria, Pakistan2 Level II Hospitals Jordan and Pakistan1 Logistics Company Pakistan1 Provost Unit Pakistan


UNAMSIL Military Units: 30 August 2005




UNAMSIL Civilian Staff: June 2005



Personnel Type


2000 26 26 — — — — —2001 41 37 2 — — — 22002 44 39 — — 1 4 —2003 36 29 — — 1 6 —2004 33

January-March 6 — — — 1 —April-June 16 — — — — —July-September 3 — — — 1 —October-December 3 — 1 — 2 —

2005 6January-March — — — — — —April-June 3 — — — 2 —July-September 1 — — — — —October — — — — — —


Incident Type


2000 26 12 8 2 — 42001 41 — 18 18 2 32002 44 — 19 19 1 52003 36 — 19 15 1 12004 33

January-March — 5 2 — —April-June — 1 15 — —July-September — 2 1 1 —October-December — 3 1 — 2

2005 6January-March — — — — —April-June — 4 1 — —July-September — 1 — — —October — — — — —




UNAMSIL Fatalities



UNAMSIL Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t

Fixed Wing Aircraft 1 —Helicopters 6 4 (Russia)Total 7 4




Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 1 4x4 Vehicles 339Combat Vehicles 36 Airfield Support 7Engineering Vehicles 23 Ambulances 4Material Handling Equipment 2 Automobiles 4Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 95 Buses 57Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 290 Engineering Vehicles 5Trailers 48 Material Handling Equipment 33

Motorcycles 7Trucks 124

Total 495 580


UNAMSIL Vehicles: 30 August 2005



Jul 99– Jul 00– Jul 01– Jul 02– Jul 03–Category Jun 00 Jun 01 Jun 02 Jun 03 Jun 04

Military and police personnel 132,054.2 329,817.6 352,927.3 371,634.2 266,566.3Civilian personnel 15,484.3 43,160.6 47,264.0 49,426.3 54,102.1Operational requirements 115,703.5 124,031.8 217,455.1 182,025.0 128,066.0Other 96.2 23,724.3 — — —

Gross requirements 263,338.2 520,734.3 617,646.4 603,085.5 448,734.4Staff assessment income 1,303.0 7,535.4 4,720.5 5,579.3 6,039.2

Net requirements 262,035.2 513,198.9 612,925.9 597,506.2 442,695.2Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) 1,550.0 1,350.1 — — —


Sources: UN Documents A/55/853, A/56/833, A/57/680, A/58/660, A/59/635.

UNAMSIL Mission Expenditures: July 1999–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)


Military observers 8,164.6 8,387.3 (222.7) (2.7)Military contingents 130,458.6 127,836.7 2,621.9 2.0Civilian police 4,805.0 4,486.3 318.7 6.6Formed police units — — — —International staff 43,835.7 36,781.8 7,053.9 16.1National staff 2,721.8 2,983.1 (261.3) —United Nations Volunteers 3,855.6 4,561.0 (705.4) (18.3)General temporary assistance — 4.5 (4.5) —Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants 25.2 131.1 (105.9) (420.2)Official travel 811.3 813.3 (2.0) (0.2)Facilities and infrastructure 21,482.0 21,148.2 333.8 1.6Ground transportation 3,519.3 4,577.3 (1,058.0) (30.1)Air transportation 49,866.2 35,340.5 14,525.7 29.1Naval transportation — — — —Communications and IT 10,835.5 9,306.5 1,529.0 18.3Supplies, services and equipment 10,954.8 8,340.1 2,614.7 56.2Quick-impact projects 268.0 267.6 0.4 0.2

Gross requirements 291,603.6 264,965.2 26,638.4 0.1Staff assessment income 6,377.1 5,036.6 1,340.5 0.2

Net requirements 285,226.5 259,928.6 25,297.9 0.1Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) — — — —


Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNAMSIL Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



UNAMSIL Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.




S

UNAMSIL Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2004–June 2005



Source: DPKO FMSS.



None — — — —


UNAMSIL Voluntary Contributors


253

Latest mandates 10 June 1999 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1244 (twelve-month duration)(note: paragraph 19 of the Resolution states that international civil and security presences are established for an initial period of twelve months, to continue thereafter unless the Security Council decides otherwise)

First mandate See above noteSRSG Søren Jessen-Petersen (Denmark)

SG letter of appointment: 16 June 2004, effective 1 August 2004

First SRSG Bernard Kouchner (France)Police commissioner Kai Vittrup (Denmark)

Entry on duty: 27 September 2004

UNMIK Key Facts

7.11 UNMIK (UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo)

Military Observers Police International Staff National Staff UNVs


June 99 8 38 37 4,718 66 1,269 107 3,584 N/A 203July 99 30 38 368 4,718 131 1,269 439 3,584 N/A 203Aug. 99 34 38 897 4,718 241 1,269 639 3,584 N/A 203Sept. 99 34 38 1,552 4,718 339 1,269 860 3,584 N/A 203Oct. 99 34 38 1,728 4,718 429 1,269 1,434 3,584 N/A 203Nov. 99 34 38 1,818 4,718 475 1,269 1,726 3,584 N/A 203Dec. 99 35 38 1,972 4,718 478 1,269 1,831 3,584 N/A 203Jan. 00 35 38 1,971 4,718 525 1,269 1,925 3,584 N/A 203Feb. 00 37 38 2,360 4,718 553 1,269 2,134 3,584 N/A 203Mar. 00 37 38 2,813 4,718 562 1,269 2,362 3,584 N/A 203Apr. 00 37 38 3,154 4,718 576 1,269 2,501 3,584 N/A 203May 00 37 38 3,633 4,718 627 1,269 2,597 3,584 N/A 203

Sources: UN Documents A/54/494, A/55/724; DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS.Note: Actual UNV strength is not shown because monthly data are not available. For time period averages of UNV staff in the first

year of the mission, see graph “Personnel: Since 1999.”

UNMIK Personnel: First Year of Operation



5,000

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

Auth. Int’l Staff

Int’l Staff

Auth. Nat’l Staff

Military Obs.


UNVs Nat’l Staff Police

Auth. Police

June10: Council authorizesestablishment ofmandate12: SG report laysout operationalconcept13: Advance teambegins arriving

July2: SRSG appointed7: SRSG EOD; PC EOD28: GA approves budget

Sept.16: SG mission report

Dec.23: GA approves budget

Jun

e’9

9

July

‘99

Au

g.’

99

Sep

t.‘9

9

Oct

.’99

No

v.‘9

9

Dec

.’99

Jan

.’00

Feb

.‘00

Mar

.’00

Ap

r.‘0

0

May

‘00

Jun

e’0

0

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1244, S/1999/672, S/1999/748, S/1999/779, A/RES/53/241, A/RES/54/245A, A/54/494, A/55/724;DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS.

Note: Actual UNV strength is not shown because monthly data are not available. For time period averages of UNV staff inthe first year of the mission, see graph “Personnel: Since 1999.”

UNMIK Mission Deployment Time


UNMIK (KOSOVO) • 255

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

5,000

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0


Police Int’l StaffNat’l Staff

Auth. Police

June 10 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Sources: UN Documents A/55/724, A/56/763, A/57/678, A/58/634, A/59/623, A/58/638; DPKO FGS; PKD.

UNMIK Personnel: Since 1999A

vera

ge

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

300

250

200

150

100

50

0June 10 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Military Obs.


UNVs



Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

4,500

4,000

3,500

3,000

2,500

2,000

1,500

1,000

500

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Auth. Nat’l Staff

Police Nat’l Staff

Auth. Police

Sources: DPI (DPKO website); PKD; UNV Programme.Note: Monthly authorized strengths are shown according to the PKD and planned drawdown of mission.

UNMIK Personnel: July 2004—September 2005

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

1,000

900

800

700

600

500

400

300

200

100

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Auth. Int’l Staff

Military Obs.


Int’l StaffUNVs



UNMIK Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005


United States — — 274 274 Denmark — 1 21 22Germany — — 240 240 Egypt — — 21 21India — — 194 194 Norway — 1 20 21Romania — 1 177 178 China — 1 18 19Ukraine — 2 175 177 Fiji — — 19 19Turkey — — 167 167 Spain — 2 14 16Pakistan — — 161 161 Greece — — 15 15Argentina — 1 130 131 Malaysia — 1 12 13Poland — 1 124 125 Slovenia — — 13 13Russia — 2 86 88 Czech Republic — 1 9 10Jordan — 2 83 85 Finland — 2 7 9United Kingdom — 1 75 76 Hungary — 1 8 9Bangladesh — 1 60 61 Malawi — 1 8 9Philippines — — 59 59 Lithuania — — 8 8France — — 57 57 Portugal — 2 6 8Bulgaria — 1 50 51 Switzerland — — 6 6Italy — 1 36 37 Tunisia — — 5 5Ghana — — 35 35 Ireland — 4 — 4Zimbabwe — — 35 35 Kyrgyzstan — — 4 4Nepal — 2 32 34 Brazil — — 3 3Nigeria — — 34 34 Croatia — — 2 2Sweden — — 34 34 Bolivia — 1 — 1Kenya — 1 28 29 Netherlands — — 1 1Austria — — 24 24 New Zealand — 1 — 1Zambia — 1 22 23 TOTAL — 36 2,612 2,648

Source: DPI (DPKO website).Note: Police figures include formed police provided by Pakistan (115), Poland (115), Romania (115), and Ukraine (140).

UNMIK Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.



UNMIK Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

Appointment Type


1999 6 — — 4 1 — 12000 6 — — 1 1 3 12001 1 — — — 1 — —2002 7 — — 3 — 3 12003 6 — — 3 1 2 —2004 8

January-March — — 1 — — —April-June — — 4 — — —July-September — — — 1 2 —October-December — — — — — —

2005 6January-March — — 3 — — —April-June — — — — 1 —July-September — — 1 — 1 —October — — — — — —

Total Fatalities 40 — — 20 5 12 3

Incident Type

Time Period Total Hostile Act Illness Accident Self-Inflicted Crimeb Otherc

1999 6 1 — 5 — — —2000 6 — 3 1 1 — 12001 1 — 1 — — — —2002 7 — 3 — 1 — 32003 6 1 2 — 1 — 22004 8

January-March 1 — — — — —April-June — — — 1 3 —July-September — 2 1 — — —October-December — — — — — —

2005 6January-March 1 2 — — — —April-June — 1 — — — —July-September — — — — — 2October — — — — — —



the DPI DPKO website is still under review and may contain omissions or errors.a. “Other” refers to consultants, UNVs, etc.b. In 2004, the category “Crime” was added to the Fatalities Classification System, at the time of pub-

lication, UNMIK was the only mission with fatalities in this category.c. Incident type is unknown, uncertain, or under investigation.



UNMIK Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t

Fixed Wing Aircraft — —Helicopters 1 —Total 1 —


UNMIK Vehicles: 30 August 2005



Combat Vehicles 16 4x4 Vehicles 1912Support Vehicles 52 Airfield Support 2

(Commercial Pattern) Ambulances 9Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 79 Automobiles 8

Buses 211Engineering Vehicles 15Material Handling Equipment 25Oversnows 6Trucks 71

Total 147 2259





Military and police personnel 3,934.1 5,918.4 125,532.0 115,208.7 106,598.1 Civilian personnel 167,731.2 302,888.5 184,775.0 170,595.0 163,458.9 Operational requirements 188,546.1 73,816.0 49,941.0 44,164.1 45,452.2 Other 1,578.4 839.1 — — —

Gross requirements 361,789.8 383,462.0 360,248.0 329,967.8 315,509.2 Staff assessment income 9,558.4 22,775.0 25,989.0 25,082.5 23,467.6

Net requirements 352,231.4 360,687.0 334,259.0 304,885.3 292,041.6 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) 585.5 — — — —



UNMIK Mission Expenditures: June 1999–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)


Military observers 1,453.3 1,282.5 170.8 11.8 Military contingents — — — —Civilian police 85,158.8 87,033.0 (1,874.2) (2.2)Formed police units 17,481.2 17,937.8 (456.6) (2.6)International staff 95,458.1 96,830.0 (1,371.9) (1.4)National staff 48,200.4 51,673.9 (3,473.5) (7.2)United Nations Volunteers 8,666.6 7,658.3 1,008.3 11.6 General temporary assistance 105.6 234.2 (128.6) (121.8)Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants — 211.8 (211.8) —Official travel 1,449.4 1,259.2 190.2 13.1 Facilities and infrastructure 16,109.3 14,601.5 1,507.8 9.4 Ground transportation 6,282.0 5,184.6 1,097.4 17.5 Air transportation 1,904.6 1,502.5 402.1 21.1 Naval transportation — — — —Communications and IT 9,371.7 6,857.0 2,514.7 53.0 Supplies, services and equipment 2,984.2 2,230.6 753.6 5.5 Quick-impact projects — — — —

Gross requirements 294,625.2 294,496.9 128.3 — Staff assessment income 22,636.4 22,720.5 (84.1) (0.4)

Net requirements 271,988.8 271,776.4 212.4 0.1 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) — — — —

Total requirements 294,625.2 294,496.9 128.2 —

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMIK Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



UNMIK Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.




UNMIK Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2004–June 2005a


Major equipment 2,824.2Self-sustainment 848.2

Source: DPKO FMSS.Note: a. For formed police units.



None — — — —


UNMIK Voluntary Contributors


262

Latest mandates 29 July 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1615 (six-month duration)

28 January 2005 (date of issue), 31 January 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1582 (six-month duration)

29 July 2004 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1554 (six-month duration)

First mandate 24 August 1993 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 858 (six-month duration)

SRSG Heidi Tagliavini (Switzerland)SG letter of appointment: 23 May 2002; effective 1 July 2002

First special envoy Edouard Brunner (Switzerland)Chief military observer Niaz Muhammad Khan Khattak (Pakistan)

Entry on duty: 6 August 2005First chief military observer Brigadier-General John Hvidergaard (Denmark)Senior police adviser Colonel Jozsef Boda (Hungary)

Entry on duty: 10 November 2004

UNOMIG Key Facts

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

200

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0July 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05


Military Obs.

Auth. Military Obs.


Auth. Police

Sources: UN Documents A/55/682, A/56/721, A/57/676, A/58/639, A/59/622, S/RES/1494, S/RES/937; PKD; DPI (DPKO website).

UNOMIG Personnel: Since 1999

7.12 UNOMIG (UN Observer Mission in Georgia)


UNOMIG (GEORGIA) • 263

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

200

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0


Military Obs.

Auth. Military Obs.


Auth. Police

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Sources: UN Documents S/RES/1494, S/RES/937; DPI (DPKO website); PKD; DPKO PMSS.

UNOMIG Personnel: July 2004–September 2005


Germany — 11 4 15 Ukraine — 5 — 5 Jordan — 9 — 9 Egypt — 4 — 4 Pakistan — 9 — 9 Indonesia — 4 — 4 Hungary — 7 1 8 Albania — 3 — 3 Bangladesh — 7 — 7 France — 3 — 3 Republic of Korea — 7 — 7 Sweden — 3 — 3 Switzerland — 4 3 7 Uruguay — 3 — 3United Kingdom — 7 — 7 Austria — 2 — 2Poland — 5 1 6 United States — 2 — 2Czech Republic — 5 — 5 Croatia — 1 — 1 Denmark — 5 — 5 India — — 1 1Greece — 5 — 5 Romania — 1 — 1 Russia — 3 2 5 TOTAL — 120 12 132 Turkey — 5 — 5


UNOMIG Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005



Appointment Type


1995–1998 3 — 2 — 1 — —1999 0 — — — — — —2000 0 — — — — — —2001 4 4 — — — — —2002 0 — — — — — —2003 0 — — — — — —2004 0

January-March — — — — — —April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October-December — — — — — —

2005 1 — — — — — —January-March — — — — — —April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — 1 —October — — — — — —


continues

UNOMIG Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

UNOMIG Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.



Incident Type


1995-–1998 3 2 — 1 — —1999 0 — — — — —2000 0 — — — — —2001 4 4 — — — —2002 0 — — — — —2003 0 — — — — —2004 0

January-March — — — — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October-December — — — — —

2005 1January-March — — — — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — 1October — — — — —

Total Fatalities 8 6 — 1 — 1



UNOMIG Fatalities: Inception–October 2005 continued

UNOMIG Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t



UNOMIG Vehicles: 30 August 2005

UN Owned Vehicles


4x4 On-Off Road 140Ambulances 3a

Automobiles 4Buses 15Engineering Vehicle 1Material Handling Equipment 6Trucks 15Total 184

Source: DPKO Surface Transport Section.Note: a. As of 30 August 2005, there were also

two contingent-owned ambulances in UNOMIG.




Military and police personnel 3,861.3 3,701.8 3,466.6 3,345.0 3,670.6 Civilian personnel 11,034.5 12,522.0 13,581.4 14,595.1 15,941.0 Operational requirements 8,233.9 8,285.7 8,236.6 10,881.6 10,866.3 Other 1,874.3 1,491.5 — — —


Net requirements 23,729.8 24,249.0 23,535.5 26,901.4 28,338.1 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) — — — — —



UNOMIG Mission Expenditures: July 1999–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)


Military observers 3,378.7 3,555.6 (176.9) (5.2)Military contingents 64.3 64.3 — —Civilian police 488.0 267.8 220.2 45.1 Formed police units — — — —International staff 14,090.7 14,085.3 5.4 0.0 National staff 2,232.2 2,567.8 (335.6) (15.0)United Nations Volunteers — — — —General temporary assistance 157.4 38.1 119.3 75.8 Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants — — — —Official travel 690.5 587.0 103.5 15.0 Facilities and infrastructure 2,209.8 2,138.6 71.2 3.2 Ground transportation 2,619.0 1,796.4 822.6 31.4 Air transportation 2,588.8 2,801.3 (212.5) (8.2)Naval transportation — — — —Communications and IT 2,589.1 2,416.2 172.9 9.3 Supplies, services and equipment 818.2 683.0 135.2 10.6 Quick-impact projects — — — —

Gross requirements 31,926.6 31,001.4 925.2 2.9 Staff assessment income 2,124.1 2,161.6 (37.5) (1.8)

Net requirements 29,802.5 28,839.8 962.7 3.2 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) — — — —

Total requirements 31,926.6 31,001.4 925.2 2.9

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNOMIG Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



UNOMIG Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.




Source: DPKO FMSS

UNOMIG Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2004–June 2005



Source: DPKO FMSS.



Switzerland — 13 — 13 Total — 13 — 13


UNOMIG Voluntary Contributors(contributions in thousands of US dollars)


268

Latest mandates 28 October 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1634 (six-month duration)

28 April 2005 (date of issue), 30 April 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1598 (six-month duration)

28 October 2004 (date of issue), 30 October 2004 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1570 (six-month duration)

First mandate 29 April 1991 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 690 (no determined duration)

SRSG Francesco Bastagli (Italy)SG letter of appointment: 4 August 2005;

effective 1 September 2005 First SRSG Johannes Manz (Switzerland)Force commander Brigadier-General Kurt Mosgaard (Denmark);

effective 12 September 2005First force commander Armand Roy (Canada)

MINURSO Key Facts

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

250

200

150

100

50

0

July 31 ‘00–June 30 ’01

TroopsAuth. Troops

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05


PoliceAuth. Police

June 10 ‘99–June 30 ’00

continues

MINURSO Personnel: Since 1999

7.13 MINURSO (UN Mission for the Referendumin Western Sahara)


MINURSO (WESTERN SAHARA) • 269

Sources: DPI (DPKO website); PFD; DPKO PMSS.Notes: Figures do not include government provided personnel. Police deployment has been suspended.

MINURSO Personnel: Since 1999 continuedA

vera

ge

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Sept. 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00



July 1 ‘99–Aug. 31 ’99

Sources: UN Documents A/55/764, A/56/818, A/58/642, A/59/619; PFD; DPI (DPKO website).

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

250

200

150

100

50

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5


Military Obs.

Auth. Military Obs. Auth. Troops

Police Int’l StaffTroops Nat’l Staff

Auth. Police

MINURSO Personnel: July 2004–September 2005



MINURSO Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005


Egypt — 21 4 25 Nigeria — 6 — 6France — 25 — 25 Hungary — 5 — 5Russia — 25 — 25 Italy — 5 — 5China — 19 — 19 Ireland — 4 — 4Republic of Korea 18 — — 18 Guinea — 3 — 3Ghana 7 10 — 17 Mongolia — 3 — 3Malaysia — 14 — 14 Austria — 2 — 2Honduras — 12 — 12 Croatia — 2 — 2Kenya — 10 — 10 Sri Lanka — 2 — 2Uruguay — 8 — 8 Argentina — 1 — 1Bangladesh — 7 — 7 Greece — 1 — 1El Salvador — 5 2 7 Poland — 1 — 1Pakistan — 7 — 7 TOTAL 25 198 6 229


MINURSO Military Units: 30 August 2005


1 Medical Unit Korea

Source: DPI (DPKO website).Note: Military headquarter staff, staff officers,

and military observers not included.

MINURSO Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.



MINURSO Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

Appointment Type


1992–1998 9 4 1 1 2 1 —1999 1 1 — — — — —2000 0 — — — — — —2001 0 — — — — — —2002 0 — — — — — —2003 0 — — — — — —2004 1

January-March — — — — 1 —April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October-December — — — — — —

2005 1January-March — — — — — —April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — 1 —October — — — — — —

Total Fatalities 12 5 1 1 2 3 —

Incident Type


1992–1998 9 — 1 8 — —1999 1 — 1 — — —2000 0 — — — — —2001 0 — — — — —2002 0 — — — — —2003 0 — — — — —2004 1

January-March — — 1 — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October-December — — — — —

2005 1January-March — — — — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — 1 — —October — — — — —






MINURSO Vehicles: 30 August 2005 MINURSO Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t



UN Owned Vehicles


4x4 On-Off Road 254Airfield Support 7Ambulances 4Automobiles 6Buses 14Engineering Vehicle 6Material Handling Equipment 17Trucks 23Total 331

Source: DPKO Surface Transport Section.

MINURSO Mission Expenditures:July 1999–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)




Net requirements 45,860.5 42,215.9 36,339.2 35,772.8 36,408.0 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) 6,498.5 3,670.7 1,806.1 2,567.4 3,084.0


Sources: UN Documents A/55/764, A/56/818, A/58/642, A/59/619.




Military observers 5,408.1 5,490.7 (82.6) (1.5)Military contingents 642.6 778.4 (135.8) (21.1)Civilian police — 104.3 (104.3) — Formed police units — — — —International staff 16,695.8 14,423.6 2,272.2 13.6 National staff 2,005.2 1,738.9 266.3 13.3 United Nations Volunteers — — — — General temporary assistance — — — —Government-provided personnel 119.7 32.1 87.6 73.2 Civilian electoral observers — — — — Consultants 10.0 26.2 (16.2) (162.0)Official travel 416.0 443.5 (27.5) (6.6)Facilities and infrastructure 2,093.9 2,197.6 (103.7) (5.0)Ground transportation 2,900.0 2,649.6 250.4 8.6 Air transportation 7,253.5 9,666.1 (2,412.6) (33.3)Naval transportation — — — —Communications and IT 3,276.1 2,882.3 393.8 10.3 Supplies, services and equipment 1,039.1 964.6 74.5 26.8 Quick-impact projects — — — —

Gross requirements 41,860.0 41,398.0 462.0 1.1 Staff assessment income 2,908.9 2,311.9 597.0 20.5

Net requirements 38,951.1 39,086.1 (135.0) (0.3)Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) 2,144.7 3,885.2 (1,740.5) (81.2)

Total requirements 44,004.7 45,283.2 (1,278.5) (2.9)

Source: DPKO FMSS.

MINURSO Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



MINURSO Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2004–June 2005



Source: DPKO FMSS.

MINURSO Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.




Source: DPKO FMSS



Morroco 3,277 — — 3,277Algeria 408 — — 408Frente Polisario 200 — — 200Total 3,885 — — 3,885


MINURSO Voluntary Contributors(contributions in thousands of US dollars)


275

UNIFIL Key Facts

Ave

rae

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

7,000

6,000

5,000

4,000

3,000

2,000

1,000

0

July 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

TroopsAuth. Troops

continues

UNIFIL Personnel: Since 1999

Latest mandates 29 July 2005 (date of issue), 1 August 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1614 (six-month duration)

28 January 2005 (date of issue), 1 February 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1583 (six-month duration)

29 July 2004 (date of issue), 31 July 2004 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1553 (six-month duration)

First mandate 19 March 1978 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 425/426 (six-month duration)

Force commander and Major-General Alain Pellegrini (France)chief of mission Entry on duty: 18 February 2004

First force commander Lieutenant-General Emmanuel A. Erskine (Ghana)

7.14 UNIFIL (UN Interim Force in Lebanon)



UNIFIL Personnel: Since 1999 continued

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0July 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05



Sources: UN Documents A/55/757, A/56/822, A/57/662, A/58/637, A/59/626; PKD; DPI (DPKO website).

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

2,080

2,060

2,040

2,020

2,000

1,980

1,960

1,940

TroopsAuth. Troops

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

continues

UNIFIL Personnel: July 2004–September 2005


UNIFIL (LEBANON) • 277

UNIFIL Military and Police Staff Contributors: 30 August 2005

UNIFIL Personnel: July 2004–September 2005 continuedN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0



July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Sources: DPI (DPKO website); PKD; FGS.


Ghana 650 — — 650India 649 — — 649Poland 236 — — 236France 209 — — 209Ukraine 197 — — 197Italy 52 — — 52Ireland 5 — — 5TOTAL 1,998 — — 1,998




UNIFIL Military Units: 30 August 2005

UNIFIL Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.


1 Helicopter Unit Italy1 Headquarter Company France1 Engineering Battalion Ukraine1 Force Mobile Reserve Ghana-India Composite2 Infantry Battalions Ghana, India1 Logistics Battalion Poland1 Maintenance Company Poland1 Level I Hospital Poland1 Military Police Company Ghana-India-Italy-Poland-Ukraine

Composite

Source: DPI (DPKO website).Note: Military headquarter staff and staff officers not included.



Appointment Type


1978–1998 227 223 1 — 2 1 —1999 6 6 — — — — —2000 6 6 — — — — —2001 4 3 1 — — — —2002 6 3 — — — 3 —2003 1 1 — — — — —2004 3

January-March 2 — — — — —April-June — — — — — —July-September 1 — — — — —October-December — — — — — —

2005 0January-March — — — — — —April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October — — — — — —


Incident Type


1978–1998 227 82 42 93 10 —1999 6 1 2 2 — 12000 6 — — 5 — 12001 4 — 2 2 — —2002 6 — 3 3 — —2003 1 — 1 — — —2004 3

January-March — — 2 — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October-December — — — — —

2005 0January-March — — — — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October — — — — —




UNIFIL Fatalities: Inception–October 2005



UNIFIL Aircraft: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t

Fixed Wing Aircraft — —Helicopters — 4

(Italy)Total — 4




Aircraft/Airfield Support Equipment 7 4x4 Vehicles 372Combat Vehicles 5 Airfield Support 1Engineering Vehicles 16 Ambulances 19Support Vehicles (Commerical Pattern) 1 Armored Personnel Carriers 45Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 43 Automobiles 7Trailers 18 Buses 56

Engineering Vehicles 17Material Handling Equipment 32Oversnows 2Trucks 145

Total 90 696


UNIFIL Vehicles: 30 August 2005






Net requirements 146,146.1 179,058.9 126,679.2 103,076.5 85,555.7 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) 135.0 180.0 201.2 — —



UNIFIL Mission Expenditures: July 1999–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)

UNIFIL Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)


Military observers — — — —Military contingents 40,637.0 40,509.1 127.9 0.3 Civilian police — — — —Formed police units — — — —International staff 18,099.5 17,069.4 1,030.1 5.7 National staff 13,847.1 13,382.6 464.5 3.4 United Nations Volunteers — — — —General temporary assistance 48.0 30.7 17.3 36.1 Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —√Consultants — — — —Official travel 376.1 312.1 64.0 17.0 Facilities and infrastructure 7,264.5 7,224.4 40.1 0.6 Ground transportation 5,485.0 4,028.7 1,456.3 26.6 Air transportation 1,521.6 1,635.6 (114.0) (7.5)Naval transportation — — — —Communications and IT 2,587.4 2,551.1 36.3 0.3 Supplies, services and equipment 3,094.1 2,510.7 583.4 47.6 Quick-impact projects — — — —




Source: DPKO FMSS.



UNIFIL Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.




S

UNIFIL Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2004–June 2005



Source: DPKO FMSS.



None — — — —


UNIFIL Voluntary Contributors


283

Latest mandates 14 December 2005 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 1642 (six-month duration)

15 June 2005 (date of issue), 17 June 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1604 (six-month duration)

22 October 2004 (date of issue), 15 December 2004 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1568 (six-month duration)

First mandate 4 March 1964 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 186 (three-month duration)

SRSG Michael Møller (Denmark)SG letter of appointment: 10 September 2005;

effective 1 January 2006First SRSG Carlos Alfredo Bernardes (Brazil)Force commander Major-General Herbert Joaquin Figoli Almandos (Uruguay)

Entry on duty: 16 December 2003First force commander Lieutenant-General P. S. Gyani (India)

UNFICYP Key Facts

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0July 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

TroopsAuth. Troops

continues

UNFICYP Personnel: Since 1999

7.15 UNFICYP (UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus)



UNFICYP Personnel: Since 1999 continued

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

July 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

Police

Auth. Police Auth. Int’l Staff

Int’l Staff


Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

1,400

1,200

1,000

800

600

400

200

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

TroopsAuth. Troops

continues

UNFICYP Personnel: July 2004–September 2005


UNFICYP (CYPRUS) • 285

UNFICYP Personnel: July 2004–September 2005 continuedN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

120

100

80

60

40

20

0

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5



Auth. Police

Sources: DPI (DPKO website); PKD.



UNFICYP Military Units: 30 August 2005

UNFICYP Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005

UNFICYP Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.


Argentina 297 — 4 301United Kingdom 272 — — 272Slovakia 204 — — 204Hungary 83 — — 83Ireland — — 18 18Australia — — 15 15India — — 7 7Austria 5 — — 5Netherlands — — 5 5Croatia — — 2 2Canada 1 — — 1Uruguay 1 — — 1TOTAL 863 — 51 914



1 Aviation Unit Argentina1 Force Engineers Unit Slovakia1 Force Military Police Unit Argentina-Hungary-Slovakia-

United Kingdom Composite3 Infantry Units Argentina, Hungary-Slovakia

Composite, United Kingdom1 Mobile Force Reserve Unit Argentina-Hungary-Slovakia-

United Kingdom Composite




UNFICYP Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

Appointment Type


1964–1998 168 162 — 3 3 — —1999 1 1 — — — — —2000 1 1 — — — — —2001 0 — — — — — —2002 0 — — — — — —2003 2 2 — — — — —2004 2

January-March — — — — — —April-June 1 — — — 1 —July-September — — — — — —October-December — — — — — —

2005 1January-March — — — 1 — —April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October — — — — — —

Total Fatalities 175 167 — 3 4 1 —

Incident Type


1964–1998 168 15 40 91 20 21999 1 — 1 — — —2000 1 — — — — 12001 0 — — — — —2002 0 — — — — —2003 2 — — 2 — —2004 2

January-March — — — — —April-June — — 2 — —July-September — — — — —October-December — — — — —

2005 1January-March — 1 — — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October — — — — —






UNFICYP Aircraft: 30 August 2005

UNFICYP Vehicles: 30 August 2005

Commerical Gov’t

Fixed Wing Aircraft — —Helicopters — 2

(Argentina)Total — 2




Combat Vehicles 9 4x4 Vehicles 9Engineering Vehicles 4 Airfield Support 1Material Handling Equipment 1 Ambulances 2Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 4 Engineering Vehicles 13Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 22 Material Handling Equipment 6Trailers 6 Trucks 27Total 46 58




UNFICYP Mission Expenditures: July 1999–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)

UNFICYP Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)




Net requirements 43,388.4 40,445.8 38,799.4 41,922.4 43,598.9 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) — — 1,356.1 1,271.2 1,707.1




Military observers — — — —Military contingents 23,034.7 21,016.3 2,018.4 8.8Civilian police 444.7 669.2 (224.5) (50.5)Formed police units — — — —International staff 6,505.3 6,133.9 371.4 5.7National staff 5,343.1 6,028.7 (685.6) (12.8)United Nations Volunteers — — — —General temporary assistance 50.0 124.6 (74.6) (149.1)Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants — — — —Official travel 233.9 197.5 36.4 15.6Facilities and infrastructure 7,897.7 8,289.2 (391.5) (5.0)Ground transportation 2,003.0 2,300.7 (297.7) (14.9)Air transportation 1,497.9 1,457.6 40.3 2.7Naval transportation — — — —Communications and IT 1,699.8 1,662.2 37.6 3.8Supplies, services and equipment 707.2 745.3 (38.1) 36.6Quick-impact projects — — — —

Gross requirements 49,417.3 48,625.0 792.3 1.6Staff assessment income 2,323.8 1,984.8 339.0 14.6

Net requirements 47,093.5 46,640.2 453.3 1.0Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) 1,274.4 1,355.8 (81.4) (6.4)


Source: DPKO FMSS.Note: A total of $23.45 million in voluntary contributions in cash were received for UNFICYP for the July 2004–June 2005 finan-

cial year. Source PFD.



UNFICYP Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.




S urce: DPKO FMSS

UNFICYP Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2004–June 2005


Major equipment 1,462.9Self-sustainment 290.7

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNFICYP Voluntary Contributors(contributions in thousands of US dollars)



Cyprus 1,343 — 16,946 18,289 Greece — — 6,500 6,500 United Kingdom 13 — — 13 Total 1,356 — 23,446 24,802



291

UNDOF Key Facts

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

1,060

1,050

1,040

1,030

1,020

1,010

1,000

990

980

July 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05

TroopsAuth. Troops

continues

UNDOF Personnel: Since 1999

7.16 UNDOF (UN Disengagement Observer Force)

Latest mandates 21 December 2005 (date of issue); 1 January 2006 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1648 (six-month duration)

17 June 2005 (date of issue); 1 July 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1605 (six-month duration)

15 December 2004 (date of issue); 1 July 2005 (date of effect)UNSC Res. 1578 (six-month duration)

First mandate 31 May 1974 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 350 (six-month duration)

Force commander Major-General Bala Nanda Sharma (Nepal)SG letter of appointment: 18 January 2004

First force commander Brigadier-General Gonzalo Briceno Zevallos (Peru)



UNDOF Personnel: Since 1999 continued

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0July 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05




Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

1,050

1,045

1,040

1,035

1,030

1,025

1,020

1,015

1,010

1,005

1,000

TroopsAuth. Troops

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

continues

UNDOF Personnel: July 2004–September 2005


UNDOF (MIDDLE EAST) • 293

UNDOF Personnel: July 2004–September 2005 continuedN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

120

100

80

60

40

20

0



July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Sources: DPI (DPKO website); PKD; DPKO PMSS.



UNDOF Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005

UNDOF Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.

UNDOF Military Units: 30 August 2005


2 Infantry Battalions Australia-Slovakia Composite, Poland1 Logistics Battalion Canada-Japan Composite

Source: DPI (DPKO website).Note: Military headquarter staff not included.


Austria 375 — — 375 Poland 342 — — 342 Canada 191 — — 191 Slovakia 95 — — 95 Japan 30 — — 30 Nepal 3 — — 3 TOTAL 1,036 — — 1,036




UNDOF Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

Appointment Type


1974–1998 40 38 — — — 2 —1999 0 — — — — — —2000 0 — — — — — —2001 0 — — — — — —2002 0 — — — — — —2003 0 — — — — — —2004 0


2005 1January-March — — — — — —April-June — — — — — —July-September 1 — — — — —October — — — — — —

Total Fatalities 41 39 — — — 2 —

Incident Type


1974–1998 40 7 6 20 7 —1999 0 — — — — —2000 0 — — — — —2001 0 — — — — —2002 0 — — — — —2003 0 — — — — —2004 0


2005 1January-March — — — — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — — 1 —October — — — — —

Total Fatalities 41 7 6 20 8 —





UNDOF Vehicles: 30 August 2005

UNDOF Mission Expenditures: July 1999–June 2004 (in thousands of US dollars)



Engineering Vehicle 1 4x4 Vehicles 226Excavator 1 Ambulances 9Material Handling Equipment 1 Armored Personnel Carriers 18Support Vehicles (Commercial Pattern) 10 Automobiles 1Support Vehicles (Military Pattern) 1 Buses 51Trailers 1 Engineering Vehicles 6

Material Handling Equipment 9Oversnows 3Trucks 59

Total 15 382


Jul 99– Jul 00– Jul 01– Jul 02– Jul 03–Category Jun 00a Jun 01 Jun 02 Jun 03 Jun 04


Gross requirements 35,026.4 36,400.3 34,422.9 38,975.7 39,743.8 Staff assessment income 705.7 1,131.6 958.2 1,006.4 1,087.2

Net requirements 34,320.7 35,268.7 33,464.7 37,969.3 38,656.6 Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) — — — — —


Sources: UN Documents A/55/747, A/56/813, A/57/668, A/58/641, A/59/625.Note: a. 1999–2000 UNDOF total expenditures differ from official financial performance report A/55/747. The above figures cal-

culate total expenditures by summing gross requirements and budgeted voluntary contributions in kind, as per future UNDOF per-formance reports as well as 1999–2005 financial reports for all other missions funded by the peacekeeping budget. In A/55/747, totalexpenditures were calculated by summing net requirements and voluntary contributions.

2000–2001 total requirement figures above differ from official financial performance report A/56/813 due to the exclusion of non-budgeted voluntary contributions in kind of $400,000, which were included in summary financial statements in 1999–2000 and2000–2001. For the sake of consistency with later years, non-budgeted contributions in kind are excluded from the historical expen-diture tables.



UNDOF Financial Performance: July 2004–June 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)


Military observers — — — —Military contingents 19,326.8 19,397.8 (71.0) (0.4)Civilian police — — — —Formed police units — — — —International staff 6,825.1 5,287.6 1,537.5 22.5National staff 1,853.0 1,878.5 (25.5) (1.4)United Nations Volunteers — — — —General temporary assistance 193.9 224.3 (30.4) (15.7)Government-provided personnel — — — —Civilian electoral observers — — — —Consultants — — — —Official travel 300.7 217.8 82.9 27.6Facilities and infrastructure 5,573.9 6,564.4 (990.5) (17.8)Ground transportation 2,986.5 3,507.4 (520.9) (17.4)Air transportation — — — —Naval transportation — — — —Communications and IT 2,728.4 2,768.8 (40.4) (7.2)Supplies, services and equipment 1,113.8 973.3 140.5 61.8Quick-impact projects — — — —

Gross requirements 40,902.1 40,819.9 82.2 0.2Staff assessment income 1,175.4 1,073.9 101.5 8.6

Net requirements 39,726.7 39,746.0 (19.3) (0.0)Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted) — — — —


Source: DPKO FMSS.



UNDOF Expenditure Summary: July 2004–June 2005

Source: DPKO FMSS.




S e: DPKO FMSS

UNDOF Expenditures on Contingent Owned Equipment: July 2004–June 2005



Source: DPKO FMSS.



None — — — —


UNDOF Voluntary Contributors


299

Latest mandates 21 December 1971 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 307

First mandate 1 January 1949Chief military observer Major-General Dragutin Repinc

SG letter of appointment: 2 December 2005First chief military observer Brigadier H. H. Angle (Canada)

UNMOGIP Key Facts

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f 60

50

40

30

20

10

0July 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05


Int’l StaffNat’l StaffMilitary Obs.

Auth. Military Obs.

Sources: UN Documents A/54/6 (Sect.5), A/56/6 (Sect.5), A/58/6 (Sect.5), A/60/6 (Sect.5); DPKO FGS; DPI (DPKO website).

UNMOGIP Personnel: Since 1999

7.17 UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group inIndia and Pakistan)



Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5

0


Int’l StaffNat’l StaffMilitary Obs.

Auth. Military Obs.

July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Sources: UN Document A/60/6 (Sect.5); DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS, DPI (DPKO website).

UNMOGIP Personnel: July 2004–September 2005

UNMOGIP Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005

Contributing MilitaryCountry Troops Observers Police Total

Republic of Korea — 9 — 9 Italy — 7 — 7Croatia — 6 — 6Sweden — 6 — 6Denmark — 5 — 5Finland — 5 — 5Chile — 2 — 2Belgium — 1 — 1Uruguay — 1 — 1TOTAL — 42 — 42

Source: DPKO FGS.


UNMOGIP (INDIA AND PAKISTAN) • 301

Appointment Type


1949–1998 9 5 1 — 1 2 —1999 0 — — — — — —2000 0 — — — — — —2001 0 — — — — — —2002 1 — — — — 1 —2003 02004 0


2005 1January-March — — — — — —April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October — — — 1 — —


continues

UNMOGIP Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

UNMOGIP Civilian Staff: 30 August 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.



Incident Type


1949–1998 9 — 1 8 — —1999 0 — — — — —2000 0 — — — — —2001 0 — — — — —2002 1 — 1 — — —2003 02004 0


2005 1January-March — — — — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October — — — — 1

Total Fatalities 11 — 2 8 — 1



UNMOGIP Fatalities: Inception–October 2005 continued

UNMOGIP Vehicles: 30 August 2005

UN Owned Vehicles


4x4 On-Off Road 35Ambulance 1Automobiles 3Buses 12Material Handling Equipment 1Trucks 2Total 54



UNMOGIP (INDIA AND PAKISTAN) • 303

Category 2004–2005 Appropriation

Posts 7,107.3Other staff costs 2,696.1Travel of staff 1,028.6Contractual services —General operating expenses 2,838.9Hospitality 2.3Supplies & materials 884.0Furniture & equipment 2,204.5Grants & contributions —Total 16,761.7

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNMOGIP Appropriations: January 2004–December 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)

UNMOGIP Mission Expenditures: January 2000–December 2003 (in thousands of US dollars)

Category Jan 00–Dec 01 Jan 02–Dec 03

Posts 5,574.1 6,370.9Other staff costs 1,593.5 1,983.8Travel of staff 865.9 1,247.5Contractual services — 38.9General operating expenses 1,772.6 1,174.3Hospitality 2.3 2.5Supplies & materials 1,022.4 800.1Furniture & equipment 1,332.0 1,107.6Total requirements 12,162.8 12,725.6

Source: DPKO FMSS.


304

UNTSO Key Facts

Ave

rag

eN

um

ber

of

Staf

f

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0July 1 ‘99–June 30 ’00

July 1 ‘00–June 30 ’01

July 1 ‘01–June 30 ’02

July 1 ‘02–June 30 ’03

July 1 ‘03–June 30 ’04

July 1 ‘04–June 30 ’05


Military Obs.

Auth. Military Obs.


Sources: UN Documents A/54/6 (Sect.5), A/56/6 (Sect.5), A/58/6 (Sect.5), A/60/6 (Sect.5); DPKO FGS; DPI (DPKO website).

UNTSO Personnel: Since 1999

7.18 UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization)

Latest mandates 23 October 1973 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 339 (to continue thereafter, until the Security Council decides otherwise)

First mandate 29 May 1948 (date of issue and effect)UNSC Res. 50 (no duration determined)

Chief of staff Brigadier-General Clive Lilley (New Zealand)SG letter of appointment: 5 October 2004;

effective 5 November 2004First chief of staff Lieutenant-General Count Thord Bonde (Sweden)


UNTSO (MIDDLE EAST) • 305

Nu

mb

ero

fSt

aff

180

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20

0


Military Obs.

Auth. Military Obs.


July

‘04

Au

g.’

04

Sep

t.‘0

4

Oct

.’04

No

v.‘0

4

Dec

.’04

Jan

.‘05

Feb

.’05

Mar

.‘05

Ap

r.’0

5

May

‘05

Jun

e’0

5

July

‘05

Au

g.’

05

Sep

t.‘0

5

Sources: UN Document: A/60/6 (Sect.5); DPKO FGS; DPKO PMSS, DPI (DPKO website).

UNTSO Personnel: July 2004–September 2005



UNTSO Military and Police Contributors: 30 August 2005

UNTSO Civilian Staff: 30 June 2005



Source: DPKO PMSS.


Finland — 13 — 13 Belgium — 4 — 4Ireland — 13 — 13 China — 4 — 4Australia — 12 — 12 Russia — 4 — 4Norway — 12 — 12 Argentina — 3 — 3Denmark — 11 — 11 Chile — 3 — 3Netherlands — 11 — 11 France — 3 — 3Switzerland — 10 — 10 United States — 3 — 3Canada — 8 — 8 Estonia — 2 — 2New Zealand — 8 — 8 Nepal — 2 — 2Italy — 7 — 7 Slovakia — 2 — 2Sweden — 6 — 6 Slovenia — 2 — 2Austria — 5 — 5 TOTAL — 148 — 148




UNTSO Fatalities: Inception–October 2005

Appointment Type


1948–1998 38 17 12 — 5 4 —1999 0 — — — — — —2000 0 — — — — — —2001 0 — — — — — —2002 0 — — — — — —2003 1 — — — — 1 —2004 2

January-March — 1 — — — —April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October-December — — — 1 — —

2005 2January-March — 1 — 1 — —April-June — — — — — —July-September — — — — — —October — — — — — —


Incident Type


1948–1998 38 24 5 8 1 —1999 0 — — — — —2000 0 — — — — —2001 0 — — — — —2002 0 — — — — —2003 1 — 1 — — —2004 2

January-March — — — — 1April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October-December — 1 — — —

2005 2January-March 1 1 — — —April-June — — — — —July-September — — — — —October — — — — —






UNTSO Vehicles: 30 August 2005

UN Owned Vehicles


4x4 On-Off Road 131Automobiles 11Buses 24Material Handling Equipment 3Trucks 15Total 184


Category Jan 00–Dec 01 Jan 02–Dec 03

Posts 30,532.2 31,679.1Other staff costs 8,547.1 9,588.0Travel of staff 1,793.3 2,658.2Contractual services — 49.5General operating expenses 2,538.2 3,422.8Hospitality — 7.8Supplies & materials 1,117.1 982.0Furniture & equipment 1,614.5 1,498.4Total requirements 46,142.4 49,885.8

Sources: A/58/6 (sect.5); DPKO FMSS.

UNTSO Mission Expenditures: January 2000–December 2003 (in thousands of US dollars)



Category 2004–2005 Appropriation

Posts 39,011.6 Other staff costs 9,774.1 Travel of staff 2,114.4 Contractual services —General operating expenses 4,226.9 Hospitality 9.7 Supplies & materials 1,030.7 Furniture & equipment 2,626.1 Grants & contributions 21.1 Total 58,814.6

Source: DPKO FMSS.

UNTSO Appropriations: January 2004–December 2005 (in thousands of US dollars)



Abidjan Accords (2001), 102Abkhazia (Georgia), 152. See also UN Observer Mission

in GeorgiaAbuja Declaration of Principles (2005), 39Abuja Protocols (2004), 35–36Aceh Monitoring Mission (AMM), 82–83, 153Addis Ababa Agreement (2004), 35Afghan Development Forum, 71Afghan Human Rights Commission, 71Afghanistan, 5, 154. See also UN Assistance Mission in

AfghanistanAfrican Union (AU): African Mission in Sudan, 7, 34, 36,

37, 39, 152; African Union Mission in Burundi, 7, 86;Central African Republic, 92; Côte d’Ivoire, 52; trooptotals in peacekeeping missions, 158

Agenda for Peace (Boutros-Ghali), 10Ahtisaari, Martti, 20, 82AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome), 58Albanian community in Kosovo, 20. See also European

Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo Force; UNInterim Administration Mission in Kosovo

Alkatiri, Mari, 66Al-Qaida, 67Angola, 73Annan, Kofi, 27Arab-Israeli peace process, 120–121, 127–129, 154Argentina, 8, 42Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 41Arusha Agreement (2000), 86Ashdown, Lord Paddy, 105, 106, 109Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 82, 83Australia, 97–99Australian-led International Force for East Timor

(INTERFET), 62Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), 84Axworthy, Lloyd, 101

Bangladesh, 36Bazin, Mark, 45Bédié, Henri K., 48, 49Bonn Process (2001), 67, 68, 72Bosnia, 6–9, 153, 156, 157. See also European Force in

Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo Force; UN InterimAdministration Mission in Kosovo

Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 10Bozizé, Francois, 92–93Brahimi, Lakhdar, 68Brahimi Report, 6, 10, 55Brazil, 42, 44, 47Bulgaria, 107Burkina Faso, 48Burundi, 6, 7, 78, 86. See also UN Operation in BurundiBush, George W., 54

Call for Justice, A, 71Camp David Accords (1979), 120Canada, 42, 107CEMAC. See Central African Economic and Monetary

CommunityCenters for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), U.S.,

58Central African Economic and Monetary Community

(CEMAC), 92–93, 152Central African Republic, 41, 92–93, 152Central Bank of Liberia (CBL), 58Chile, 42China, 35, 36, 44, 47Cissé, Lamine, 93Civilians, the protection of, 6–8Cold War, 10Colombia, 47Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Force

(CISPKF), 111–113, 152, 158

Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 49, 52,54–55, 58

Congo, Democratic Republic of, 4–5, 7, 92. See also UN Organization Mission in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo

Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), 73Conseil National pour la Defense de la Democratie-Forces

pour la Defence de la Democratie (CNDD-FDD) inBurundi, 86, 87

Consent, need for clarity about meaning of impartialityand, 12–13

Cook Islands, 98Côte d’Ivoire, 6, 7, 155. See also UN Operation

in Côte d’IvoireCrime control/civil disturbances, 8–10Crisis Management Initiative (CMI), 82Croatia/Croatians. See European Force in Bosnia

and Herzegovina; Kosovo Force; UN InterimAdministration Mission in Kosovo

Cyprus, 122–124. See also UN Peacekeeping Force inCyprus

Darfur Liberation Front (DLF), 34–35Darfur (Sudan), 6. See also UN Mission in SudanDayton Accords (1995), 105, 106De Kermabon, Yves, 28Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK), 22–23, 29Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), 23, 28–30Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), 4–5, 7, 92. See UN

Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic ofCongo

Dhanapala, Jayanha, 96Dilemmas/challenges of robust peace operations: civilians,

protection of, 6–8; common threads, 5; crisis situations

311

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312 • INDEX

during years 2000–2005, 2–5; doctrine, lack of anagreed, 2, 7, 10–14; public security gap, 8–10;summary/conclusions, 14

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR)program: Afghanistan, 69, 70–72; Burundi, 86;Democratic Republic of Congo, 75, 77; Haiti, 44, 46;Liberia, 55, 57; Sierra Leone, 102, 103

Doctrine for robust peace operations, lack of an agreed, 2,7, 10–14

Doss, Alan, 57

East Timor: Australian-led International Force for East Timor, 62; background, 61; economic impact ofmissions, 63; future, prospects for the, 66; patternsassociated with modern peace practices, 3–4; publicadministration, 63–64; rules of engagement, 62, 63; UNMission in East Timor, 61–64; UN TransitionalAdministration in East Timor, 62–64. See also UNMission of Support in East Timor; UN Office in Timor Leste

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS),11

Economic Community of West African States MonitoringGroup (ECOMOG), 2, 102, 104

Economic Governance Steering Committee (EGSC), 58Ecuador, 42Egypt, 36, 120, 127, 154Eide, Kai, 20Enforcement plans, blurring of lines between peacekeeping

and, 10–11Eritrea, 100–101. See also UN Mission in Ethiopia and

EritreaEthiopia, 100–101. See also UN Mission in Ethiopia and

EritreaEU Police Mission (EUPM), 105–106, 110, 156European Force (EUFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina:

Dayton Accords (1995), mandate derived from, 106;military, statutory powers over Bosnia’s, 107–108;NATO, operational relationship with, 105, 107,108–109; non-EU nations in the mission, 107; policeforces, 105–107; public perception in Bosnia, 107;readiness exercises, 107; stabilization and associationagreement, 106

European Union (EU): Aceh (Indonesia), 82–83; Bosniaand Herzegovina, 105–106, 153, 156; civilianpolice/staff in non-UN missions, 158; Cyprus, 124;Democratic Republic of Congo, 74; Egypt and Israel,120; Liberia, 58; Macedonia, the Former YugoslavRepublic of, 110; Sudan, 39

Expectations, the management of, 11–12

Fanmi Lavalas Party in Haiti, 42, 45Feith, Pieter, 83Fiji, 98Force, debate on what constitutes proportionate, 13–14Force Multinationale de la CEMAC (FOMUC), 92–93,

152Forces Armées Nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI), 49,

51Forces Democratiques de Liberation du Rwanda (FDLR),

78Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo (FARDC).

See UN Organization Mission in the DemocraticRepublic of Congo

France, 4, 41, 74, 93. See also UN Operation in Côted’Ivoire

Free Aceh Movement (GAM), 82–83Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguia el-Hamra y de

Río de Oro (POLIS-ARIO) in Western Sahara, 118–119

Frente Revolucionária do Timor Leste Independente(Fretilin), 61

Front Nationaliste Intégrioniste (FNI) in DemocraticRepublic of Congo, 77

Gabon, 92Gambia, 37Garang, John, 37, 38Gbagbo, Laurent, 49, 52Georgia (South Ossetia), 114–115. See also UN Observer

Mission in GeorgiaGermany, 68, 70Global and All-Inclusive Accord (2002), 73Governance and Economic Management Assistance

Programme (GEMAP) in Liberia, 58Greece, 122–124Guadalcanal Liberation Front (GLF) in Solomon Islands,

97Guatemala, 42Guei, General Robert, 50Guinea, 54, 103Guinea Bissau, 55

Habibie, B. J., 62Haiti, 5, 8, 156. See also UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti

(MINUSTAH)Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional

Peacekeeping (2003), 11Haradjnaj, Ramush, 29Hassan el-Turabi, 38Hebron, 121, 154Herzegovina, 9, 153, 156, 157. See also European Force in

Bosnia and HerzegovinaHezbollah, 128High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR),

25, 119HIV (human immunodeficiency virus), 58Holt, Victoria, 7Horta, Ramos, 65Houphouët-Boigny, Félix, 48Human Security Centre, 88Human Security Report, 88

Impartiality, need for clarity about meaning of consentand, 12–13

Improvisation as hallmark of peacemaking, creative, 2, 7Inconsistency within peace missions, ad hoc responses

creating, 2, 7, 10–14India, 3, 36, 125–126. See also UN Military Observer

Group in India and PakistanIndonesia, 82–83, 153. See also East Timor; UN Mission

of Support in East Timor; UN Office in Timor LesteIn Larger Freedom, 6Integrated mission concept, 2, 24, 51, 55, 79, 86–87Inter-Congolese Dialogue (2002), 73Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), 34Internally displaced persons (IDPs), 36, 37, 39, 97International Commission on Intervention and State

Sovereignty, 6–7International Committee in Support of the Transition

(ICST) in Democratic Republic of Congo, 77International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 119International Criminal Court (ICC), 35, 39International Criminal Tribunal in The Hague, 29International Crisis Group (ICG), 27, 82, 106International Force for East Timor (INTERFET), 3International Monetary Fund (IMF), 62, 93International Monitoring Team (IMT) in Philippines,

84–85, 155International Organization for Migration (IOM), 83


INDEX • 313

International Police Task Force (IPTF), UN’s, 9, 105–106International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 67–70, 72,

154Iraq, 7, 89–91, 154, 155Islamic law (Sharia), 34Israel, 120–121, 127–129, 154Ivorian Popular Movement of the Great West (MPIGO), 49

Jaafari, Ibrahim, 89Jemaah Islamiah (JI) in Philippines, 84Jessen-Petersen, Søren, 29Johnson Simleaf, Ellen S., 58Joint Control Commission (JCC) and Moldova-Trans-

Dniestra, 116–117, 152Joint Control Council (JCC) in Georgia, 114Jordan, 3, 42, 44Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in Sudan, 35

Kabila, Joseph, 73Kabila, Laurent D., 73Kadirgamar, Lakshman, 95Karachi Agreement (1949), 125Karadzic, Radovan, 109Karzai, Hamid, 67, 68, 71Keke, Harold, 97, 98Kemakeza, Alan, 97Kenya, 36Kiir, Salva, 38Kimberley Process (2002/2003), 103Kiribati Samoa, 98Kosovo, 5, 7, 19–32, 157. See also European Force in

Bosnia and Herzegovina; UN Interim AdministrationMission in Kosovo

Kosovo Force (KFOR): background, 20–22; coordinationissues, 23–25; deterrence, from defense to, 25–26; finalstatus, from violence to, 28–29; intelligence gap, 27;overview, 20–22; police forces, 22–23, 29, 31; politicalframework, a new, 30–31; public opinion in Kosovo, 28;public security gap, 8; security framework, a new,29–30; strategy/reality (1999–2004), 22–23;summary/conclusions, 32–33, 153

Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), 23

Lakshman Kadirgamar, 95Latortue, Gerard, 42Lebanon, 127–129Liberation Tamil Tigers Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka,

95–96Liberia, National Transitional Government of (NTGL), 54.

See also UN Mission in LiberiaLiberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy

(LURD), 54Libreville Summit (2003), 92Linas-Marcoussis Agreement (2003), 48, 49, 52Lone, Ghulam N., 126Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in Democratic Republic of

Congo, 77Lusibaea, Jimmy “Rasta,” 97

Macedonia, the former Yugoslav republic of (FYROM), 23, 110, 156, 157. See also EuropeanForce in Bosnia and Herzegovina; Kosovo Force; UNInterim Administration Mission in Kosovo

Machakos Protocol (2002), 34Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) in Solomon Islands, 97Malaysia, 84Mali, 48Mbeki, Thabo, 51, 52Middle East, non-UN Operations in, 120–121Middle East, UN Operations in the, 127–129

Mindanao (Philippines), 84–85MINURSO. See UN Mission for the Referendum in

Western SaharaMINUSTAH. See UN Stabilization Mission in HaitiMissions, peace. See Dilemmas/challenges of robust peace

operations; Non-UN Missions, global statistics on;Statistics, UN Mission-by-Mission; individual missions

Mission to Support the Peace Process in Colombia(MAPP), 47

Moldova, 116–117, 152Montenegro, 106, 157. See also European Force in Bosnia


MONUC. See UN Organization Mission in the DemocraticRepublic of the Congo

Morocco, 42, 118–119. See also UN Mission for theReferendum in Western Sahara

Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Philippines,84–85

Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in Philippines, 84Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL), 54Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP) in Côte d’Ivoire,

49Movement for the Liberation of the Congo (MLC), 73Multinational Force and Observers (MFO Sinai), 120, 127,

154Multinational Force in Iraq (MNF-I), 89–91, 155Multinational Interim Forces (MIFs), 41Multinational specialized unit (MSU), 8Musharraf, Pervez, 126Mutebutsi, Jules, 4–5, 74

Namibia, 73National Congress Party (NCP) in Sudan, 34National Constitutional Review Commission in Sudan, 38National Democratic Alliance in Sudan, 37National Elections Commission (NEC) in Liberia,

57, 58National Movement for Reform and Development

(NMRD) in Sudan, 35N’djamena Agreement (2004), 35Nepal, 36, 42Neptune, Yvon, 45Netherlands, 82New Zealand, 98Nigeria, 37, 54Nkunda, Laurent, 4–5, 74Nkurunziza, Pierre, 87Non-UN Missions, global statistics on: financial costs,

160; military and observer missions, 152–155; overview,150–151; policing and other civilian functions, 154–155;region of deployment, 158–159

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO): Bosnia andHerzegovina, 8, 105, 107, 108–109; civilians,protecting, 7; Iraq, 89–91, 154; Sudan, 39; troop/civiliantotals in non-UN missions, 159. See also Kosovo Force

Norway, 121

Obasanjo, Olusegun, 52ONUB. See UN Operation in BurundiOperation Artemis in Democratic Republic of Congo, 74Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan, 70Operation Licorne in Côte d’Ivoire, 7, 48–52, 155Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

(OSCE): Bosnia and Herzegovina, 105, 109, 157;civilian staff in non-UN missions, 159; Kosovo, 21, 24,30, 31, 157; Macedonia, the former Yugoslav republicof, 157; Moldova-Trans-Dniestra, 116, 117; SouthOssetia (Georgia), 114

Organization of African Unity (OAU), 10, 100


314 • INDEX

Organization of American States (OAS), 42, 42, 47, 156,159

Oshima, Kenzo, 101Oslo Accords (1993), 121Ouattara, Alassane, 48

Pacific Islands Forum (PIF), 97Pakistan, 36, 42, 75, 125–126. See also UN Military

Observer Group in India and PakistanPalestinian-Israeli conflict, 120–121, 154Panel of Experts, UN’s, 58Papua New Guinea (PNG), 98, 99Patassé, Felix, 92Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MCPI), 49Peace operations, robust. See Dilemmas/

challenges of robust peace operations; Non-UNMissions, global statistics on; Statistics, UN Mission-by-Mission; individual missions/countries

Peru, 42, 44Peuple Hutu-Forces Nationales de Liberation (Palipehutu-

FNL) in Burundi, 86Philippines, 42, 84–85, 155Police units and public security gap, 8–10Portugal, 61Pretoria Agreement (2005), 51, 52Preval, Rene, 45Pronk, Jan, 37Proportionate force, debate about what constitutes, 13–14Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs), 68–70Public security gap, 8–10

Rajapakse, Mahinda, 96Regional Assistance Mission in the Solomon Islands

(RAMSI), 97–98, 155Revolutionary United Front (RUF) in Sierra Leone, 2–3,

102Rugova, Ibrahim, 23, 29Rules of engagement (ROEs), 3, 62, 63Russia: Abkhazia (Georgia), 111–113; Moldova-Trans-

Dniestra, 116–117; South Ossetia (Georgia), 114–115;Sudan, 35. See also UN Observer Mission in Georgia

Rwanda, 3, 6–7, 10, 37, 73

Saakashvili, Mikhail, 115Sahara, people of Western, 118–119. See also UN Mission

for the Referendum in Western SaharaSalamat, Hashim, 84Sankoh, Foday, 3Saudi Arabia, 69Security Council/Resolutions, UN, 2, 3, 6. See also

individual missions/countriesSenegal, 37, 42September 11, 2001, events of, 67Serbia/Serbs, 20, 157. See also European Force in Bosnia


Sexual exploitation/abuse in UN peace operations, 76

Sharia (Islamic law), 34Sierra Leone, 2–3, 54. See also UN Mission in Sierra

LeoneSimla Agreement (1972), 125Sinai Field Mission, US (SFM), 120Sochi Agreement (1992), 114, 115Solomon Islands, 97–98, 155Soro, Guillaume, 49South Africa, 37, 51South Ossetia-Georgia Joint Peacekeeping Forces (JPKF),

114–115, 152South Sudan Defense Force (SSDF), 38

Spain, 42Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG)

and integrated mission concept, 24, 25Srebrenica (Bosnia), 6, 7Sri Lanka, 42Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), 95–96, 155Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 9Standard operating procedures (SOPs), 11Standby-High-Readiness Brigade for UN Operations

(SHIRBRIG), 36, 57Statistics, UN Mission-by-Mission: aircraft, 164; civilian

staff, 164; expenditures, mission, 164; fatalities, 164;financial performance, 164; military and policecontributors, 163; military units, 164; personnel: firstyear of operation, 163; personnel trends after first year,163; timeline, mission deployment, 162–163; vehicles,164; voluntary contributors, 164. See also UN Missions,global statistics on, Non-UN Missions, global statisticson; specific missions

Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), 36Strategic Deployment Stocks (SDS) mechanism, 57Sudan, 6, 7, 152. See also UN Mission in SudanSudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A),

34–35, 37–39Suharto, 82Sukarnoputri, Megawati, 82Syria, 127, 128

Tandja, Mamadou, 52Taylor, Charles, 54, 57Temporary International Presence in Hebron (TIPH), 121,

154Thaci, Hashim, 23Timor, East. See East Timor; UN Mission of Support in

East Timor; UN Office in Timor LesteTonga, 98Trans-Dniestra, 116–117, 152Troop-contributing country (TCC) predeployment

reconnaissance visits, 55el-Turabi, Hassan, 38Turkey, 107, 122–124

Uganda, 73, 78Ukraine, 116Umma Party in Sudan, 38UNAMA. See UN Assistance Mission in AfghanistanUNAMSIL. See UN Mission in Sierra LeoneUN Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 89–90UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA): aid

coordination, 71; aircraft, 218; background, 67–68;civilian staff, 218; disarmament/demobilization/reintegration, 71–72; elections, 70–72;Emergency Loya Jirga, 67, 69; expenditures, mission,220; fatalities, 219; human rights, 71; InternationalSecurity Assistance Force, 67, 68–70; key facts, 215;mandate, 70, 72; military and police contributors, 218;personnel: since launch, 216; personnel 2004–2005, 217;provincial reconstruction teams, 68–70; resourcerequirements, estimated, 220; success of the mission, 72;vehicles, 220

Uncertainty within peace missions, ad hoc responsescreating, 2, 7, 10–14

UN Commission on Peacebuilding, 87UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO):

Democratic Republic of Congo, 76; East Timor, 3;guidance and policy management system, 11; Liberia,58; Sudan, 36. See also Statistics, UN Mission-byMission; specific missions

UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), 127–128;civilian staff, 294; expenditures, mission, 296, 298;


INDEX • 315

fatalities, 295; financial performance, 297; key facts,291; military and police contributors, 294; personnel2004–2005, 292–293; personnel since 1999, 291–292;vehicles, 296; voluntary contributors, 298

UNDOF. See UN Disengagement Observer ForceUN Emergency Force (UNEF), 10UNFICYP. See UN Peacekeeping Force in CyprusUNIFIL See UN Interim Force in LebanonUN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK):

aircraft, 259; background, 20–22; civilian staff, 257;coordination issues, 23–25; expenditures, mission, 260,261; fatalities, 258; final status, from violence to,28–29; financial performance, 260; intelligence gap, 27;key facts, 253; military and police contributors, 257;overview, 20–22; personnel: first year of operation, 253;personnel trends after first year, 255–256; police forces,22–23, 26–29, 31; political framework, a new, 30–31;public opinion in Kosovo, 28; public security gap, 8;security framework, a new, 29–30; strategy/reality (1999–2004), 22–23; summary/conclusions, 32–33, 153; timeline, mission deployment,259; vehicles, 259; voluntary contributors, 261

UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), 127, 128–129;aircraft, 280; civilian staff, 278; expenditures, mission,281, 282; fatalities, 279; financial performance, 281; key facts, 275; military and police contributors, 277–278; personnel, 276–278; personnel since 1999, 275–276; vehicles, 280; voluntary contributors,282

United Kingdom, 3, 102United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 42, 58United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia

(AUC), 47United States: Afghanistan, 67; East Timor, 62; Egypt and

Israel, 120; Haiti, 41; Iraq, 89–91; Sudan, 35UNMEE. See UN Mission in Ethiopia and EritreaUNMIK. See UN Interim Administration Mission in

KosovoUNMIL. See UN Mission in Liberia UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan

(UNMOGIP): appropriations, 287; background,125–126; civilian staff, 285; expenditures, mission, 287;fatalities, 285–286; key facts, 283; military and police contributors,284; personnel since 1999, 283–284; vehicles, 286

UNMIS. See UN Mission in SudanUNMISET. See UN Mission of Support in

East TimorUN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara

(MINURSO): aircraft, 272; background, 118–119;civilian staff, 270; expenditures, mission, 272, 274;fatalities, 271; financial performance, 273; key facts,268; military and police contributors, 270; militaryunits, 270; personnel since 1999, 268–269; vehicles,272; voluntary contributors, 274

UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET), 61–64UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE): aircraft,

228; background, 100–101; civilian staff, 226;expenditures, mission, 229, 230; fatalities, 227; financialperformance, 229; key facts, 221; military and policecontributors, 225; military units, 226; personnel: firstyear of operation, 221; personnel trends after first year,223–224; timeline, mission deployment, 222; vehicles,228; voluntary contributors, 230

UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL): aircraft, 212;background, 54; civilian staff, 210; comprehensivepeace agreement, 54; drawdown, gradual/phased, 102;early challenges, 57; economic recovery: governance,58–60; expenditures, mission, 212, 214; fatalities, 211;

financial performance, 213; HIV/AIDS, 58; humanrights, 103; integrated mission concept, 51, 55; keyfacts, 204; mandate and deployment, 55–57; militaryand police contributors, 209; military units, 210;personnel: first year of operation, 204–205; personneltrends after first year, 207–208; political transitions:elections, 57, 59; timeline, mission deployment, 206;troop-contributing country predeploymentreconnaissance visits, 56; vehicles, 212; voluntarycontributors, 214

UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL): aircraft, 250;background, 102; expenditures, mission, 251, 252;fatalities, 249; financial performance, 251; humanrights, 103; integrated mission concept, 51, 56; keyfacts, 242; Kimberley Process (2002/2003), 103;mandate and deployment, 2–3; military and policecontributors, 248; military units, 248; personnel: firstyear of operation, 242–244; personnel trends after firstyear, 245–247; police forces, 103; public perception inSierra Leone, 103; timeline, mission deployment, 243;UN Office in Sierra Leone, 103; vehicles, 250;voluntary contributors, 252

UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS): aircraft, 178; background,34–36; civilians, failure to protect, 7; civilian staff, 177;comprehensive peace agreement, implementation of the,37–39; developments/challenges, key, 37–39;expenditures, mission, 179–180; fatalities, 178; financial performance, 179; key facts, 173; mandate and deployment, mission, 36–37; military and police contributors, 175–176;military units, 176–177; personnel: first year ofoperation, 173; timeline, mission deployment, 174;vehicles, 178; voluntary contributors, 180

UN Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISET):aircraft, 169; background, 61; civilian staff, 168; economic impact, 63;expenditures, mission, 170, 172; fatalities, 169; financial performance, 170; key facts, 165; mandate and deployment, 64–65; military andpolice contributors, 168; personnel: first year ofoperation, 165; personnel trends after first year, 167;resource requirements, estimated, 171; timeline, missiondeployment, 166; vehicles, 169; voluntary contributors,172

UN Missions (2004–2005), global statistics on:budgets/expenditures/expenses, 144–145; civilian staff,139–141; fatalities, 142–144; financial contributions,145–146; mandated durations/renewals, 147; militarystaff contributions/deployment, 137, 139; observers,military, 134–135; personnel totals, peacekeeping, 142;police totals/contributors, 135–136, 138; timelines, 148;troop totals/contributors, 132–133

UNMOGIP. See UN Military Observer Group in India andPakistan

UN Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG): aircraft,265; background, 111–113; civilian staff, 264;expenditures, mission, 266, 267; fatalities, 264–265;financial performance, 266; key facts, 262; military andpolice contributors, 263; personnel trends since 1999,262–263; vehicles, 265; voluntary contributors, 267

UNOCI. See UN Operation in Côte d’IvoireUN Office in Liberia (UNOL), 55UN Office in Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL), 103UN Office in Timor Leste (UNOTIL): aircraft, 169;

background, 61, 65–66; civilian staff, 168; expenditures,mission, 170, 172; fatalities, 169; financial performance,170; key facts, 165; military and police contributors,168; personnel: first year of operation, 165; personneltrends after first year, 167; resource requirements,


316 • INDEX

estimated, 171; timeline, mission deployment, 166;vehicles, 169; voluntary contributors, 172

UN Office of Internal Oversight Services, 76UNOMIG. See UN Observer Mission in GeorgiaUN Operation in Burundi (ONUB): aircraft, 201;

background, 86–87; civilian staff, 185; expenditures,mission, 201, 202, 188; fatalities, 185–186; financialperformance, 202, 203; key facts, 181; military andpolice contributors, 184; military units, 184; personnel:first year of operation, 181–182; timeline, mission deployment,183; vehicles, 201; voluntary contributors, 203

UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI): aircraft, 194;background, 48–50; civilians, protecting, 7; civilianstaff, 200; developments/challenges, key, 51–53;expenditures, mission, 195–196; fatalities, 200;integrated mission concept, 51, 56; key facts, 196;mandate and deployment, 50–51; military and policecontributors, 199; personnel: first year of operation, 197;Pretoria Agreement (2005), 51, 52; timeline, missiondeployment, 198; vehicles, 194; voluntary contributors,196

UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic ofCongo (MONUC): aircraft, 239; background, 73–74;civilians, failure to protect, 7; civilian staff, 237;elections, 77; expenditures, mission, 240, 241; fatalities,238; financial performance, 240; integrated missionconcept, 79, 86–87; joint commissions, 76–78; keyfacts, 231; mandate and deployment, 74–76; militaryand police contributors, 236; military units, 237;patterns associated with modern peace practices, 4–5;personnel: first year of operation, 231; personnel trendsafter first year, 233–235; police units and public securitygap, 9; proportionate force, debate about whatconstitutes, 14; sexual exploitation/abuse in UN peaceoperations, 76; timeline, mission deployment, 232;vehicles, 239; voluntary contributors, 241

UNOTIL. See UN Office in Timor LesteUN Peacebuilding Support Office in Central African

Republic (BONUCA), 93UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP): aircraft,

288; background, 122–124; civilian staff, 286;expenditures, mission, 289, 290; fatalities, 287; financialperformance, 289; key facts, 283; military and policecontributors, 286; military units, 286; personnel since1999, 283–

285; vehicles, 288; voluntary contributors, 290UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH): aircraft,

194; assistance vs. interventionist approach, 43;background, 41–42; civilian staff, 192; economy,developments/challenges for the, 46–47; expenditures,mission, 194, 195; fatalities, 192–193; financialperformance, 194; justice system:developments/challenges, 45–46; key facts, 189;mandate and deployment, 42–43; military and policecontributors, 191; military units, 191; patterns associatedwith modern peace practices, 5; personnel: first year ofoperation, 189; police forces, 9, 45–46; politicaldevelopments/challenges, 45; proportionate force,debate about what constitutes, 14; public security gap, 9;security developments/challenges, 43–45; timeline, mission deployment, 190;vehicles, 193; voluntary contributors, 195

UN Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET),3–4, 62–64

UN Truce and Supervision Operation (UNTSO), 127, 128;appropriations, 309; civilian staff, 306; expenditures,mission, 308; fatalities, 307; key facts, 304; military andpolice contributors, 306; personnel trends since 1999,304–305; vehicles, 308

UNTSO. See UN Truce and Supervision Operation Uruguay, 42

Vanuatu, 98Van Walsum, Peter, 118Vieira de Mello, Sergio, 62, 89Virunga National Park, 78

Weah, George, 59West Timor, 3. See also East TimorWickremanayake, Ratnasiri, 96Wilme, Emmanuel “Dread,” 5, 44World Bank, 59World Summit (2005), 6–7, 13

Yeltsin-Sneuger Agreement (1992), 116Yudhoyono, Susilo Bambang, 82Yushchenko, Viktor, 116, 117

Zhyania, Zurab, 115Zimbabwe, 73


The world now spends close to $5 billionannually on United Nations peace operationsstaffed by more than 80,000 military and civil-ian personnel, and commitments to comparableoperations outside the UN command structureare on an even greater scale. The Annual Reviewof Global Peace Operations is the first compre-hensive source of information on this crucialtopic, designed for students, scholars, and prac-titioners alike.

Unique in its breadth and depth of cover-age, the Review presents the most detailedcollection of data on peace operations, thoselaunched by the UN, by regional organiza-tions, by coalitions, and by individual nations,that is available. Features of the inauguralvolume include:

• an introductory essay on peace opera-tions doctrine

• incisive analyses of all peacekeepingmissions on the ground in 2005 in-depth explorations of key missions andtrends, focusing on those operationsthat have faced significant challenges orundergone major developments duringthe year

• extensive illustrative graphs, charts, tables,and photographs

The editorially independent Review hasbeen launched by the Center on InternationalCooperation at New York University, with thesupport of the Peacekeeping Best PracticesSection of the UN’s Department of Peacekeep-ing Operations, and in cooperation with theInternational Peace Academy.

317

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