Annotation Bail

8/17/2019 Annotation Bail

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§ I.

§ II.

a)

b)

§ III.

a)

b)

§ IV.

§ V.

a)

b)

c)

d)

e)

VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 161

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A N N O T A T I O N

BAIL

By

ROGELIO E. SUBONG*

______________

Introduction, p. 162

Brief History and Definitions, p. 163

A Brief History, p. 163

Definitions, p. 164

Rationale and Horns of a Dilemma, p. 165

Rationale, p. 165

Horns of a Dilemma, p. 167

Laws and Related Issuances on Bail, p. 168

Some of the Cases on Application for Bail

Decided by the Supreme Court, p. 169

Insular Gov’t. vs. Punzalan of 1907 to People vs.

Follantes, et al. of 1936, p. 169Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira of 1945 to People vs.

Hernandez of 1956, p. 171

Feliciano vs. Pasicolan of 1961 to People vs. San

Diego of 1968, p. 174

People vs. Bocar of 1969 to Bernardo vs. Mendoza of

1979, p. 177

People vs. Sola of 1981 to People vs. Calo of 1990, p.

181


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f)

g)

h)

§ VI.

§ VII.

§ VIII.

§ IX.

Carpio vs. Maglalang of 1991 to Pico vs. Combong of

1992, p. 185

_____________________

* A.B. ‘62 [UP] & LL.B. ‘66 [UP].

162

162 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bail

Medina vs. De Guia of 1993 to People vs. Nitcha of

1995, p. 188

Concerned Citizen vs. Elma of 1995 to Gimeno vs.

Arcueno of 1995, p. 191

The State of the Law and Jurisprudence, p.

194

The Case of Robin C. Padilla vs. CA And Its

Significance, p. 196

Steps in the Filing of Petition for Issuance of

Bail, p. 197

Conclusion, p. 206

_____________

§ I. Introduction

Bail may seem to be an innocuous matter but to those who

are under criminal prosecution, especially for capital

offenses, it is of crucial immediacy, since their liberty,

albeit temporary, depends upon it entirely. To the offended

parties and their families bail is also of grave concern forthey would rather that the offender or accused were not

granted bail or incarcerated and remained so during the

pendency of the case and after conviction. To those

connected with the administration of criminal justice, like

the police and the public prosecutors, bail is also of

particular concern for any mishandling of their duties in

this regard would subject them to possible sanctions. To

the trial judges, bail is of paramount importance in their

judicial functions because failure to strictly follow the


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guidelines set forth by the Constitution, the law and

prevailing jurisprudence for its grant or denial has either

resulted in stern warnings, hefty fines or even their

outright dismissals from the judiciary ( Pico vs. Combong,

Jr., 215 SCRA 421 [1992]; Lebarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA

48 [1991]; Mangalindan vs. CA, 246 SCRA 105 [1995];

Concerned Citizen vs. Elma, 241 SCRA 84 [1995]; and De

Los Santos vs. Montesa, Jr., 247 SCRA 85 [1995]).

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Hence, let us inquire once more into the laws and

jurisprudence on bail. The case of Robin Cariño Padilla vs.

Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines, G.R. No.121917 promulgated on July 31, 1996 provides the occasion

for inquiry. Many of course know about the fruitless plea

for freedom of this action star pending appeal of his case

with the appellate court. He was charged with illegal

possession of firearms and thereafter convicted. The

instant case pertains only to his petition for admission to

bail after conviction while pursuing his appeal before the

Supreme Court. However, before we discuss this case under

annotation, let us first inquire into pertinent principles,

decisions and other related matters on bail.

§ II. Brief History and Definitions

a) A Brief History —

The bail system as presently practiced in the United States

and which is adopted in our jurisdiction, according to an

extensive study on American criminal justice system, was

“developed during the first thousand years A.D. in

England.” The judges then were few with vast judicial

circuits to cover. Given the primitive means of travel

during the period, judicial visits to far-off circuits to hold

trials were either few and far between, even “several years

apart.” In the meantime, while awaiting arrival of these

roving judges to conduct trials, the prisoners remained in

the custody of the sheriffs of the place.

Prison conditions then as now were described as


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“atrocious.” Hence, prisoners often escaped. So the practice

of entrusting the prisoners to the custody of sureties, who

were relatives and friends of the accused was evolved. At

first when the prisoners escaped or failed to appear during

the trials of their case, the sureties were the ones tried

instead. Over time, in the event the prisoner escaped

during trial, the sureties were no longer “seized bodily” or

made personally answerable. Instead, they were merelyordered to pay money for their failure to produce the

accused during trials. Thus “this liability of the surety for

the appearance of the defendant, and the

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ability to discharge the liability by the payment of a sum of

money remain the basis of our present system of bail.”

(John Kaplan, Criminal Justice, 1978 ed., p. 314).

b) Definitions —

What is the basic concept of bail? “Bail is the law’s

pragmatic method of compromise between the principle

that a man is innocent until proven guilty and the obvious

fact that a large portion of the defendants in criminalproceedings are well on the way to being convicted” (John

Kaplan, op. cit., p. 312). Its technical definition is provided

in Section 1, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court: “Bail is the

security given for the release of a person in the custody of

the law furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon

his appearance before any court as required under the

conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the

form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit or

recognizance.”

The word “bail” as used in the prohibition againstexcessive bail is “inadequately translated by the word

‘ fianza’ as bail implies a particular kind of bond—that is to

say, a bond given to secure the personal liberty of one held

in restraint upon a criminal or quasi criminal charge”

(Insular Gov’t. vs. Punzalan, 7 Phil. 546).

Ballentine’s Law Dictionary defines bail as—“The means

of procuring the release from custody of a person charged

with a criminal offense or with debt by assuring his future


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appearance in court and compelling him to remain within

the jurisdiction. (Manning vs. State, 190 Okla. 65, 120 P2d

980). The security given for the defendant’s appearance in

court in cash, bond, or undertaking.” (p. 119, 3rd Edition).

Black’s Law Dictionary defines bail—

—as a verb: “To procure release of one charged with an offense by

insuring his future attendance in court and compelling him to

remain within jurisdiction of the court. To deliver the defendant

to persons who, in the manner prescribed by law, become security

for his appearance in court.”

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—as a noun: “The surety or sureties who procure the release of a

person under arrest, by becoming responsible for his appearance

at the time and place designated. Those persons who become

sureties for the appearance of the defendant in court.” (p. 73,

Abridged 5th Edition)

On the other hand, “a bail bond is an obligation given by

the accused with one or more sureties, with the condition to

be void upon the performance by the accused of such acts

as he may legally be required to perform.” ( People vs. Abner, 87 Phil. 566).

A bail bond has also been defined as “a bond given as

security for the purpose of obtaining release of a person in

custody” (Ballentine’s Law Dictionary, p. 119, 3rd Edition).

Another definition is that a bail bond is “a written

undertaking, executed by the defendant to one or more

sureties, that the defendant will render himself amenable

to orders and processes of the court.” (Black’s Law

Dictionary, p. 73, Abridged 5th Edition).

The right to bail has also included the right to

recognizance. A recognizance is “an obligation undertaken

by a person, generally a defendant in a criminal case, to

appear in court on a particular day or to keep the peace”

(Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 661, Abridged 5th Edition). Sec.

12, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides. “Whenever

allowed pursuant to law or these Rules, the court may

release a person on his own recognizance or that of a

responsible person.”


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People vs. Abner, 87 Phil. 566, explained that—“A

recognizance is an obligation of record, entered into before

some court or magistrate duly authorized to take it with

the condition to do some particular act, the most usual in

criminal cases being the appearance of the accused for

trial.”

§ III. Rationale and Horns of the Dilemma

a) Rationale —

The rationale of bail is nothing more but to guarantee the

appearance of the accused when so required, especially

during

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hearings of the case wherein this bail was granted. While

there is usually the private individual as the offended

party, the legal fiction is that it is the State or the People of

the Philippines which is the aggrieved party. Any criminal

deed or offense is a disturbance or threat upon the order

and integrity of the community so much so that theoffender in a sense is waging “war” against the People or

the State. The State is entitled to exercise its inherent

right to self-defense. So the People or the State has to fight

back and exact penalty or retribution against the offender

or accused. Hence, the case is filed in the name of the

People of the Philippines, as public plaintiff, versus the

offender. The private plaintiff appears to be a “secondary

party” although the latter suffered the immediate damage

or injury.

It is settled that once the case is filed, the prosecution is

under the full control and supervision of the fiscal or public

prosecutor. In other words, it becomes the People’s fight

and being so it must insure the appearance of the accused

during hearings through the system of bail. Apart from this

consideration, the accused is also entitled to the

presumption of innocence until proven guilty. Accordingly,

in light of this Constitutional presumption of innocence, he

should not be incarcerated unless the charge is for a capital


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offense or the penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. When the

charge is for a capital offense and evidence of guilt is

strong, the presumption of innocence could not take

precedence anymore because the presumption has been

effectively destroyed by the strong evidence of guilt. And

besides, there are practical considerations for the

immediate detention of the accused in this situation, e.g.,the likelihood of flight considering the gravity of the

penalty or the possibility of harassment of the offended

party or prosecution witnesses if only to avoid prosecution

or gain acquittal, among others.

In any case, the basic rationale of bail “is to relieve an

accused from the rigors of imprisonment until his

conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial”

( Paderanga vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 741). Then in

Almeda vs. Villaluz, etc., et

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al., 66 SCRA 38, which was cited in Paderanga vs. CA,

supra., the High Court clarified that bail is neither a

penalty or a revenue raising measure: “The sole purpose of

bail is to insure the attendance of the accused when

required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of

penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part

of the government.” Thus when in this case the trial court

insisted on a cash bond instead of a surety bond, the High

Court rejected this for being “abhorrent to the nature of

bail and transgresses our law on the matter.” Finally,

Black’s Law Dictionary states that the object of bail in

criminal cases “is to secure appearance of principal before

the court when his presence is needed” (p. 73, Abridged 5thEdition).

b) Horns of the Dilemma —

Some legal scholars have raised misgivings about the logic

and practicality of the purpose for which bail has been

devised. Is bail really an effective guarantee for the

appearance of the accused in a criminal case? It is argued

that if the charges were for lesser offenses with minor


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penalties, perhaps, bail would be generally effective. But if

the charge were for capital offenses or for offenses calling

for the death penalty, reclusion perpetua, life

imprisonment, or even any stretch of jail term which to the

accused would be unbearable, bail may prove to be

ineffective as insurer that the accused will not jump-bail,

so to speak.

Thus, it was observed that—

“Although bail has obvious uses in preventing an accused criminal

who cannot provide bail from repeating his presumed

transgression, in theory the only purpose of bail is to guarantee

the appearance of the accused at the proceedings against him.

The thought is that having posted the amount of cash or collateral

named in the bail bond, he will appear in court, rather than

forfeit his money or property. As applied to a defendant, such as

Jack Ruby (the televised killer of Lee Harvey Oswald, the accused

assassin of Pres. John F. Kennedy) who was threatened withdeath penalty, there is an obvious fallacy in this reasoning. It is

difficult to envision

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a bail so large as to guarantee a man’s returning for a trial whichhe has reason to believe will result in his death or lengthy

imprisonment. The horns of the dilemma are that (a) if a man has

enough money to put up bail, the chances are that his bond will

not guarantee his appearance at trial; and (b) if he does not have

the money, the setting of bail will be irrelevant to his appearance

since he will not be able to make bail at all.” (John Kaplan, op.

cit., p. 312)

§ IV. Laws and Related Issuances on Bail

The paramount legal basis for the granting or withholding

of bail is naturally the fundamental law of the land. The

basic provision is reproduced hereunder:

“Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,

shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be


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released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to

bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of habeas

corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.” (Art.

III—Bill of Rights, The Constitution of 1987)

Then there are the provisions on bail in the Rules of Court

specifically the entire Rule 114. This Rule in the Rules of

Court provides a comprehensive coverage of all possible

principles that should govern the granting and denial of

applications for bail. Then too, some of the provisions

embodied therein important decisions of the Supreme

Court that were found to be useful for our criminal justice

system, e.g., the guidelines in the fixing of bail under

Section 6 (see Villaseñor vs. Abaño, 21 SCRA 312 [1967]),

the provision that hearing on bail application may be

deemed automatically reproduced in the trial, the court

must give reasonable notice to the prosecutor of the bail

hearing, or require him to submit his recommendation, etc.There are also the circulars of the Department of Justice

particularly Dept. Circular No. 36 and its addenda and of

the Supreme Court particularly, Administrative Circular

No. 2-92.

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§ V. Some of the Cases on Applications for Bail

Decided by the Supreme Court

a) Insular Gov’t. vs. Punzalan, 7 Phil. 546 of 1907 to People

vs. Follantes, et al. of 1936 —

About the first case on bail bond in our jurisdiction appearsto be Insular Gov’t. vs. Punzalan, 7 Phil. 546 (1907). This

case pertains to an action upon a bond of P2000 executed

by the defendants in favor of the government to secure the

safekeeping of some 20 rifles which were thereafter stolen

by a band of brigands. Condemned to pay on the bond, one

of the errors the defendants raised on appeal was that the

bond violated Section 5 of the Philippine Bill of 1902

against excessive bonds. The High Court ruled that this

provision prohibiting excessive bonds does not apply to this


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kind of bonds. “The word ‘bail’ as used in that portion of

Section 5 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which

provides that ‘excessive bail shall not be re-quired’ is

inadequately translated by the word ‘fianza’ as bail implies

a particular kind of bond—that is to say, a bond given to

secure the personal liberty of one held in restraint upon a

criminal or quasi criminal charge.”

Then there was Montalbo vs. Santamaria, 54 Phil. 595(1930) wherein a petition for mandamus was filed against a

trial judge to compel him to decide whether or not evidence

of guilt of the accused charged with murder is strong with a

view to determine whether the offense charged was

bailable. The High Court issued the writ of mandamus. The

first question of law raised was whether Section 3 of Jones

Law (“That all persons shall before conviction be bailable

by sufficient sureties, except for capital offenses.”) was

repealed by Section 63 of General Orders No. 58 (“All

prisoners shall be bailable before conviction, except thosecharged with the commission of capital offense when proof

of guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong”).

The Court held that there was no repeal. It declared that:

“As is well known, General Orders No. 58 was promulgated by the

United States Military Government in the Philippine Islands on

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April 23, 1900, and Section 63 thereof conferred jurisdiction upon

judges to admit persons accused of capital offenses to bail, except

when the proof of guilt was evident or the presumption of guilt

strong. And the Jones Law far from revoking this power,

expressly recognized it in Section 26. This is in effect the ruling of

this Court in United States vs. Babasa (19 Phil. 198) where it was

held that Courts of First Instance have jurisdiction and authority

to admit defendants to bail in a criminal case before conviction

although charged with a capital offense x x x.”

As to whether mandamus would lie as set forth above, the

Court ruled in the affirmative. The High Court cited a US case

which held that “although the exercise of discretion will not be

controlled by mandamus, yet writ will lie to compel the person or

the body in whom the discretion is lodged to proceed to its

exercise.”


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In Payao vs. Lesaca, 63 Phil. 210 (1936) the accused sought

also the issuance of a writ of mandamus to compel the

judge to decide on the strength of the proof of guilt against

her with a view to determining whether the offense

charged is bailable. It appears that in this case, the accused

was charged with murder with the information filed before

the justice of the peace court who provisionally released her

upon filing a bond therein. Before the Court of FirstInstance, the bond was canceled and accused recommitted

to jail. The petition for mandamus as mentioned above was

then filed with the High Court which denied the same. The

petitioner relied upon Montalbo vs. Santamaria, supra, to

support her view that a judicial investigation should have

been conducted by the judge to assess the evidence of guilt

of the accused. The High Court ruled that there was

already a showing by the provincial fiscal of the results of

the preliminary investigation and what was shown was a

strong evidence of guilt.The High Court further declared that:

“Article III, Section 1, paragraph 16, of the Constitution of the

Philippines provides:

“All persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient

sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when evidence

of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not be required.”

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Section 63, General Orders No. 58, also provides as follows:

‘All prisoners shall be bailable before conviction, except those

charged with the commission of capital offenses when proof of

guilt is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong.’

The High Court made the conclusion that has been

unchanged up to the present:

“It is evident from the foregoing that the accused in a criminal

case is entitled to bail as a matter of right before conviction except

in capital offenses when the evidence of guilt is strong.”

The next case of People vs. Follantes & Jacinto, 63 Phil.

474 (1936) is about similar to the Robin Padilla case. There


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was an attempt by the accused to secure bail after

conviction of the crime of murder with the sentence of

reclusion perpetua. The High Court denied the Petition. It

ruled that:

“Persons convicted of the crime punishable by death, as murder,

are not bailable, as the law recognizes such right in a person

accused of said crime, before conviction, only when the evidence of

his guilt is not strong (Art. III, Sec. 1, No. 16, of the Constitution

of the Philippines).”

“Under the law, persons convicted of non-capital crimes, who

appeal from a judgment sentencing them to penalties other than

death have no absolute right to bail except when said penalties

are imposed upon them by the justice of the peace courts, as the

right to bail after conviction is not authorized by the Constitution

and is, as a general rule, not recognized. x x x.”

b) Herras Teehankee vs. Rovira of 1945 to People vs.

Hernandez of 1956 —

After the war, we have the case of Herras Teehankee vs.

Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945) which dealt with offenses

committed during the war years. The High Court held that

the basic rule on bail under the Constitution also applies in

treason cases. Here a person accused of treason before the

People’s Court asked to be admitted to bail. The High

Court held that

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Art. III, Sec. 1(16) of the Constitution applies in this case.

“The Constitutional mandate refers to all persons xxx xxx

xxx the general rule is that any person, before being

convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, except

when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence

of his guilt is strong. Of course, only those persons who

have been arrested, detained or otherwise deprived of their

liberty will ever have occasion to seek the benefits of said

provision.” It further ruled that upon the filing of an

application for bail, “a hearing, summary or otherwise,

should be held with due notice to the prosecution and the

accused.”


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The case that followed, Ocampo vs. Bernabe, 77 Phil. 55

(1946) pertained to a petition for certiorari filed by the

defendant accused of treason before the People’s Court to

set aside the Order denying his application for bail. The

most serious charge was his having reported to the

Japanese a fellow Filipino as guerilla for which the latter

was shot to death. During the bail hearing the prosecutor

merely read the contents of an affidavit which did nottouch on his alleged role in the death of that fellow Filipino

and only manifested that he had 27 more affidavits. The

defendant testified denying this charge and also claimed

that “mere recital is not evidence and that evidence cannot

be considered strong which has not been subjected to the

test of cross-examination.” Held: The High Court ruled that

there was abuse of discretion in denying bail because “no

proof was offered by the prosecution to show that the

evidence of guilt is strong.”

Another legacy of the war years was De la Rama vs. People’s Court, 77 Phil. 461 (1946) a decision cited in this

case under annotation. The accused petitioned the

People’s Court for the second time for the grant of bail

alleging therein that as per Medical Report of Quezon

Institute, he was suffering from tuberculosis. Said Report

recommended his stay in the sanitarium for regular

treatment. The People’s Court issued an order granting

confinement to the Quezon Institute but this was assailed

by the accused as abuse of discretion since he insisted onbail so that he could be treated at home as he could not

afford staying in the hospital. The High Court sus-

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tained the plea of the accused and ordered the People’sCourt to grant bail. The ruling of the People’s Court which

ordered confinement of the accused in the hospital “does

not in any way modify or qualify the denial so as to meet or

accomplish the humanitarian purpose or reason underlying

the doctrine adopted by modern trend of court decisions

which permit bail to prisoners, irrespective of the nature

and merits of the charge against them, if their continuous

confinement during the pendency of their case would be

injurious to their health or endanger their life.”


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Thereafter the decision in People vs. Abner, 87 Phil. 566

(1950) was promulgated by the High Court. This was an

appeal of the Order canceling the bond of the accused for

the crime of Robbery in Band with Rape for failure to

appear during hearings of his case. Appellants also assailed

the bond as being void for not having been signed by Abner

as principal. The High Court disregarded this pretense and

affirmed the order by arguing that the bond secured was arecognizance which need not be signed by the accused. It

also clarified that under the Rules, there are two (2) modes

of taking bail: “(1) by bail bond and by recognizance. A bail

bond is an obligation given by the accused with one or more

sureties, with the condition to be void upon the

performance by the accused of such acts as he may legally

be required to perform. A recognizance is an obligation of

record, entered into before some court or magistrate duly

authorized to take it with the condition to do some

particular act, the most usual in criminal cases being theappearance of the accused for trial.”

Then we have the famous case of People vs. Hernandez,

99 Phil. 515 (1956), involving noted poet and labor leader

Amado V. Hernandez who was charged and convicted with

the crime of Rebellion Complex With Murder, Arson, etc.

On appeal to the Supreme Court, he also filed a Motion for

issuance of bail. It ruled that murder, arson, and other

related crimes are mere ingredients of the charge and that

the actual crime charged should be simple rebellion whichcarries the maximum imposable penalty of not exceeding

12 years of Prision Mayor and a fine of P20,000. Not being

a capital offense any-

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more, bail should be granted. Citing Montano vs. Ocampo,

G.R. No. 6352 dated January 29, 1953, the Court further

ruled that in denying bail it is not enough that evidence of

guilt is strong but also that upon conviction the liability of

accused would probably call for capital punishment. As to

the claim of threat to public safety if accused were granted

bail, the High Court dismissed such fears. “Furthermore,

individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and

vital to a republican state, like ours, to be denied upon


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mere general principles and abstract consideration of

public safety.” It concluded that “the preservation of liberty

is such a major preoccupation of our political system” so

much so that the bill of rights has numerous provisions

guaranteeing its enjoyment.

c) Feliciano vs. Pasicolan of 1961 to People vs. San Diego of

1968 —

In the sixties, the High Tribunal promulgated Feliciano vs.

Pasicolan, 2 SCRA 888 (1961) which ruled on the question

of whether a person not under detention can be admitted to

bail. Here, the accused was one of those charged with

kidnapping and a warrant of arrest was issued against

him. Without surrendering himself he asked for bail. This

was not acted upon so he filed a Petition for mandamus to

compel the judge to rule on his Motion for bail. The High

Court denied the Petition for being premature since the law

requires that for bail to issue the subject should be under

detention. It declared that “the person applying for

admission to bail should be in the custody of the law, or

otherwise deprived of liberty.” The High Court also

declared that: “it would be incongruous to grant bail to one

who is free.”

The case of Ong See Hang vs. Commissioner of

Immigration, 4 SCRA 442 (1962) addressed the issue of

whether bail could be granted to aliens under detention

pending deportation. In this case, certain Chinesenationals from Amoy, China who were held in our

Immigration Bureau pending deportation proceedings were

released on bail by the court. This order was questioned

before the Supreme Court in a Petition for

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Certiorari. The High Court held that “the right to bail

guaranteed by the Constitution may not be invoked in

favor of petitioners-appellees, considering the deportation

proceedings do not constitute a criminal action x x x x and

the order of deportation is not a punishment for a crime x x

x x it is merely for the return to his country of an alien who

has broken the conditions upon which he could continue to

reside within our borders.”


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In Bernardez vs. Valera, 4 SCRA 911 (1962) the accused

was charged with murder and frustrated murder. During

pendency of the case before the trial court, accused filed a

motion for bail to which the prosecution objected. Hearings

were held on this incident and the prosecution presented

evidence in opposition thereto. The judge thereafter denied

the motion and on a petition for certiorari, the High Court

ruled to reverse. It held that the affidavits presented wereof persons who did not see the actual shooting and there

was no sufficient proof of premeditation or alevosia as for

the offense to amount to murder. It declared that: “It must

be observed in this connection that a person charged with a

criminal offense will not be entitled to bail even before

conviction only if the charge against him is a capital offense

and the evidence of his guilt of said offense is strong.” Then

in Pareja vs. Gomez, 5 SCRA 830 (1962) the petitioner was

one of those accused in the murder of Antonio Abad Tormis,

a lawyer and civic crusader in Cebu. Upon being arrestedand detained, he filed a Motion for Bail claiming among

others that the evidence against him was merely

circumstantial. After the trial court denied the motion,

accused filed a petition for certiorari assailing the order but

the High Court sustained the court a quo. It ruled that “to

forfeit the constitutional right to bail in capital offense, it is

enough that the evidence of guilt be ‘strong.’” It found there

was sufficient basis for the judge to deny the motion, e.g.,

the murder weapon having been found in one of the safes inhis office as City Treasurer of Cebu City, and accordingly

declared that he did not “abuse his discretion, much less

gravely, in issuing the orders complained of.”

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Magno vs. Abbas, 13 SCRA 232 (1965) is another case

involving plea for bail before the trial court of accused

charged with Kidnapping with Rape. After due hearing on

the incident, the trial court denied the motion stating in

the order that “the proof of the guilt of the accused is

presumptively strong.” The accused questioned this finding

since the law specifically requires that the “evidence of

guilt is strong.” The High Court rejected this pretense since

the evidence presented during the bail hearing showed


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evidence of strong evidence of guilt as the accused

“participated in the commission of the offense.” In the

following case entitled, Villaseñor vs. Abaño, 21 SCRA 312

(1967), the accused who was charged with the murder of a

police sergeant (Direct Assault upon an agent of a person in

authority with murder) filed a motion for bail which was

granted but in the amount of P60,000 which he found to be

excessive. He questioned this order of the trial judge beforethe Supreme Court which saw “no abuse of discretion given

the facts and the law.” It further declared that in the fixing

of bail, “the principal factor considered, to which most other

factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of

the accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment.” It also

set the guidelines in bail fixing: (1) ability of the accused to

give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for the

offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the

accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and

strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accusedappearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether

the accused was fugitive from justice when arrested; and,

(10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial in

other cases” (Now, Sec. 6, Rule 114).

In the oft-cited case of People vs. San Diego, 26 SCRA

522 (1968) the accused were charged with the murder of

action star Jess Lapid inside the then Lanai Restaurant

along Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. The prosecution and

defense agreed that the motions for bail for the defendantswould be considered during the course of the trial instead

of the court holding a summary proceeding for the purpose.

After the presentation of 8 witnesses the trial court issued

orders granting bail de-

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spite the objection of the prosecution which was still

presenting witnesses. On certiorari, the Supreme Court set

aside the bail orders by ruling that the prosecution was

denied procedural due process. It held that: “the

prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,

within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may

desire to introduce before the court should resolve the

motion for bail.” The High Court further ruled that: “The


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court’s discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be

exercised in the light of a summary of the evidence

presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be

uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence,

the court’s order granting or refusing bail must contain a

summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its

conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.” It

then set aside the orders since they were defective in formand substance for not containing a summary of the

evidence of the prosecution, but only conclusion that guilt

was not strong.

d) People vs. Bocar of 1969 to Bernardo vs. Mendoza of 1979

—

People vs. Bocar, 27 SCRA 512 (1969) is an interesting case

of a student charged with murder in conspiracy with

others. He moved for the issuance of bail before the trial

court for his provisional release. During the bail hearing,

he presented his examination paper accomplished by him

during the time of the crime. His professor and his

assistant testified that it is not possible to have this

examination paper without having taken the said

examination. This naturally controverted the ante mortem

statement of the deceased that accused was present during

the attack. Then there was the claim of prosecution

witnesses that accused was not the triggerman. The trial

judge granted bail and this order was challenged by thefiscal before the Supreme Court. It held that “under our

regime of laws, and concomitant with the legal

presumption of innocence before conviction, an accused is

entitled to provisional liberty on bail, the only exception

being when he is charged with a capital offense and the

evidence of his guilt is strong.” The High Court sustained

the trial judge’s finding that evi-

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dence of the prosecution did not meet the standard of

“strong evidence” to warrant the denial of the motion for

bail. Besides, the judge “did not rule on the admissibility

and probative value of the evidence. It merely held that

with the issue of the whereabouts of the accused when the


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crime was committed having thus become contentious, the

evidence of guilt of the accused (so far presented) can not

be considered strong.”

In De la Camara vs. Enage, 41 SCRA 1 (1971) the High

Court resolved the issue of excessive bail imposed by the

trial court. In this case, a municipal mayor of Magsaysay,

Misamis Oriental was charged with multiple murder and

frustrated murder. Prior to presentation of his evidence, hefiled a Motion for admission to bail. The trial court allowed

bail but fixed the same at P1,195,200.00 in his Order of

August 20, 1970. When challenged before the Supreme

Court, it opted not to rule on the plea to nullify the order

because the accused escaped in the meantime. However,

speaking through then Justice Enrique Fernando, the High

Tribunal declared that: “What respondent judge did,

however, does call for repudiation from the Court.” It then

reaffirmed a settled jurisprudence: “2. Where, however, the

right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory byrequiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution

commands. It is understandable why. If there is no such

prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless.” This

holding was reiterated in another decision regarding bail

claimed by the accused also as excessive which was also

penned by then Justice Enrique Fernando in Vituoso, Jr.

vs. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191 (1978).

The High Court then in Siozon vs. Presiding Judge of

CCC , 42 SCRA 184 (1971) which is a prosecution formurder, addressed the issue, among others, of whether the

proceedings for issuance of bail is summary in nature. In

this case the prosecution already took 3 months to present

27 witnesses. When directed by the trial court to present a

particular witness otherwise the court would declare the

evidence already presented closed, the prosecution

questioned this order before the High Court. It however

sustained the trial court because application for bail is

summary in nature and to allow a “full-

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dress trial on the merits would defeat the purpose of the

proceedings.” It also reiterated the settled doctrine as to

when an accused is bailable as well as the proper area of


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inquiry for bail hearings: “the court does not sit to try the

merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight

that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against

accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or

on what further evidence may be therein offered and

admitted. (8 C.J.S. 93, 94).”

Then in the case of Mendoza vs. CFI , 51 SCRA 369

(1973), the bail granted to the accused by the municipalcourt was revoked by the Court of First Instance for which

he brought certiorari action before the High Court. But this

was unavailing. It found out that when bail was granted by

the municipal court, the accused was not even under

custody and “what is worse, the prosecution was never

given a chance to present its evidence.” The Supreme Court

also reiterated the settled jurisprudence on bail, e.g., that

writ of habeas corpus will not issue if detention is based on

valid warrant of arrest; right to bail presupposes accused is

under legal custody; and accused is entitled to bail exceptin capital offenses wherein the evidence of guilt is strong;

and that citing People vs. San Diego, supra, the prosecution

should be given a chance to be heard on the motion for

issuance of bail, otherwise, there would be violation of

procedural due process.

Hadhirl Tahil vs. Eisma, 64 SCRA 378 (1975) is an

administrative case against a judge who admitted in the

course thereof that he granted bail in a murder case to an

“accused upon the request of a congressman, despite hisbelief that the evidence of guilt against the accused was

strong.” The High Court reiterated the usual principle that

the accused is entitled to bail before conviction except when

charged with capital offenses and the evidence of guilt is

strong. In this case, he was specifically charged in this

regard, the High Court also declared that the actuation of

the judge in granting bail, “is indeed reprehensible.”

In Almeda vs. Villaluz, 66 SCRA 38 (1975) the High

Court addressed the question of whether the court can

impose strictly cash bond instead of surety bond for theprovisional

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release of an accused charged with a non-capital offense.


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The High Court ruled that the trial court may not reject

otherwise acceptable sureties and insist on a cash bond.

After defining bail under the Rules of Court it affirmed

that—“The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an

accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet

secure his appearance for trial.” It then observed that to

require cash bond would entail hardship on the part of the

accused in securing the transfer of these assets in thepossession of the court “as to have the effect of altogether

denying him his constitutional right to bail.” Then it

reiterated settled jurisprudence:

“In this jurisdiction, the accused as of right, is entitled to bail

prior to conviction except when he is charged with a capital

offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right is

guaranteed by the Constitution and may not be denied even

where the accused has previously escaped detention or by reason

of his prior absconding.“In order to safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the

Constitution further provides that ‘excessive bail shall not be

required.’ This is logical because the imposition of an excessive

bail may negate the very right itself.”

In the subsequent case of Bernardo vs. Mendoza, 90 SCRA

214 (1979) the orders of Judge Rafael T. Mendoza, a CFI

judge in Zamboanga del Norte were assailed in a certiorari

petition for among others, refusing to dismiss a criminal

information which emanated from a purely civil obligationand for refusal to fix and accept the bail bonds being

offered in said case. The High Court declared as error the

actuation of the judge of giving due course to the aforesaid

information. “But his graver error is in issuing a warrant of

arrest without a recommendation for bail” by the fiscal

when the charge is clearly bailable. It finally held: “The

right to bail is a constitutional right. Its denial to an

accused is allowed only in rare cases. Respondent judge

would do well to examine more carefully the laws and jurisprudence on the right to bail before denying the same.”

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e) People vs. Sola of 1981 to People vs. Calo of 1990 —

In People vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981) the accused in the

murders of several persons were immediately issued bail by

the trial judge without giving the prosecution an

opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt of the accused is

strong. The High Court faulted the trial court for this and

set aside the order granting bail. It explained that thefailure to accord the prosecution the opportunity to present

its evidence against the plea for bail is “to disregard the

authoritative doctrine enunciated in People vs. San Diego

(26 SCRA 522).” And “there would be a violation of

procedural due process and the order of the court granting

bail should be considered void on that ground.” On the

other hand, in Rodil vs. Garcia, 104 SCRA 362 (1981), it

was the defense that was denied the right to procedural

due process. In this case, the accused moved for the recall

of a witness during the preliminary investigation proper so

that the defense could cross-examine him on “clarifi-catory

and amplificatory matters” which was denied. The motion

for bail was also denied. When the issue was brought to the

High Court, it set aside the order of denial of bail and

directed the lower court to conduct hearing on the bail

application in accordance “with the requirements of the

Constitution, the Rules of Court and this opinion.” It also

directed that the hearing on bail application “while

summary in character, is not to be a mere sham orpretense. It must not be an exercise in futility. The accused

should not be denied his day in court.”

In Bolaños vs. Dela Cruz, 116 SCRA 78 (1992) the High

Court resolved a Petition challenging the validity of the

order of the trial court denying bail to some accused who

were charged with murder. It sustained the ruling of the

trial court by reiterating the settled rule that an accused is

bailable unless the charge is for capital offense and

evidence of guilt is strong. It further conceded that: “It is

the trial court which is tasked to determine whether or not

the evidence of guilt is strong and it has determined the

affirmative in this case after consideration of the evidence

already presented by the prose-

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23/48

cution. In the absence of manifest abuse of discretion, We

are not prepared to substitute Our judgment for that of the

trial court.”

In Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, 121 SCRA 472 (1983) the

High Court ruled that the suspension of the writ of habeas

corpus carried with it the suspension of the right to bail.

This holding was later abandoned under the Constitutionof 1987 (Sec. 13, Art. III—Bill of Rights). In this case, the

accused were arrested and detained pursuant to a PCO

(Presidential Commitment Order) when they were raided

while having a conference in the house of Dra. Aurora

Parong at Bayongbong, Nueva Ecija. They filed a Petition

for Writ of Habeas Corpus and prayed therein admission to

bail during pendency of the case. After the hearing before

the Supreme Court, and the parties had submitted their

memoranda, it resolved to sustain the validity of the

arrests of the detainees. As to their plea for admission to

bail, the High Court ruled: “The suspension of the privilege

of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the

suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s

campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and

rendered effective.” It added that if bail is granted to

detainees, they might only rejoin their comrades and thus

jeopardize the efforts of the government against the rebels.

It reiterated the holding in Buscayno vs. Military

Commission, 109 SCRA 273 (1981) which also “held thatthe constitutional right to bail is unavailing when the

privilege of writ of habeas corpus is suspended with respect

to certain crimes.” This holding was also reiterated in the

subsequent habeas corpus case of Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile,

121 SCRA 538 (1983) which further held that “to hold

otherwise, would defeat the very purpose of the suspension.

Therefore, where the offense for which the detainee was

arrested is anyone of the said offenses (national security

cases) he has no right to bail even after the charges are

filed in court.” However this holding was later abandonedin People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991), as will be

discussed later in this inquiry.

In Bravo, Jr. vs. Borja, 134 SCRA 466 (1985) the

defendant who was accused of murder was 16 years old at

the time of

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VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 183

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commission of the offense. He then moved for grant of bail

alleging that the evidence of his guilt not being strong and

that as minor he would be entitled to at most only life

imprisonment. The Judge refused bail. On a Petition for

Certiorari before the High Court it ruled to grant bail in

view of the unrebutted evidence (Certified true copy of the

birth certificate of the accused) as to the minority of the

accused. The Court ruled that even if he would be

sentenced to death, he would be entitled to one degree

lower penalty “which effectively rules out the death

penalty.” This decision was prior to ratification of the

Constitution of 1987. It also held that the birth certificate

attached to the motion and unrebutted by the fiscal was

sufficient to prove the age of the accused. However, itrejected his contention to the effect that the test of

determining whether the charge is capital offense is the

actual penalty imposed upon the accused. It held that “the

capital nature of an offense is determined by the penalty

prescribed by law.” To base issuance of bail on the actual

penalty imposed would require already a full hearing and

would naturally defeat the purpose of bail.

In Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago, 162 SCRA 840 (1988)

the High Court ruled again on the right of the

Commissioner on Immigration to grant bail although the

basic petition was for habeas corpus. In this case, 3

foreigners who were detained prior to deportation filed a

Petition for bail which was denied by the Commissioner.

Even as one was allowed provisional release for 15 days,

they brought a Petition for Habeas Corpus before the

Supreme Court. The High Tribunal sustained the

Commissioner on Immigration for the foreigners who were

pedophiles were validly arrested and were facing

deportation proceedings as undesirable aliens. It held that:“Writ of habeas corpus will not be granted when the

confinement is or has become legal.” It also sustained the

Commissioner in her denial of the petition to bail by these

foreigners “because in deportation proceedings the right to

bail is not a matter of right but a matter of discretion on

the part of the Commissioner on Immigration and

Deportation.” As earlier ruled, deportation proceedings are

not in the nature of criminal pro-


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ceedings hence the constitutional guarantee to bail cannot

be availed of.There is also the case of People vs. Dacudao, 170 SCRA

489 (1989) which pertains to the issuance of bail without

giving the prosecution a chance to be heard or its right to

procedural due process. As will appear in this case, the

accused who was charged with murder filed a Motion for

issuance of bail. The judge without any hearing

immediately issued an order granting bail and on motion

for reconsideration, it held in abeyance resolution pending

presentation of prosecution of its evidence. On certiorari

without resolution of the motion for reconsideration, the

High Court set aside the challenged order because—“The

Respondent Court acted irregularly in granting bail in a

murder case without any hearing on the motion asking for

it, without bothering to ask the prosecution for its

conformity or comment, as it tuned out later, over its

strong objection.” If further held: “To appreciate the

strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt, the

prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is equally

entitled to due process.”The defense contended that “murder is no longer a

capital offense being no longer punishable with death.” The

High Court reasoned:

“This is erroneous because although the constitution states that

the death penalty may not be imposed unless a law orders its

imposition for heinous crimes (Constitution, Art. III, Section 19

[1]), it does not follow that all persons have an absolute right to

bail. In Art. III, Sec. 13 of the Constitution, “capital offenses” is

replaced by the phrase “offenses punishable with reclusionperpetua.”

Then as to the claim of lack of motion for reconsideration so

that the trial court could possibly correct its error, the High

Court argued that “this rule does not apply when special

circumstance warrant immediate or more direct action.”

This is the same ruling in the case of People vs. Calo,

Jr., 186 SCRA 620 (1990) wherein the trial court was

adjudged precipitate in granting bail even as it held


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hearings therefor. This arose from the shooting of a person

inside a courtroom in

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Butuan City which resulted also in shooting of the fiscal

investigating the case. Atty. Tranquilino Calo, Jr., who was

charged along with others for the courtroom killing was

granted bail after a speedy hearing on his bail application.

When brought to the Court of Appeals, the said court

sustained the issuance of bail. However, the High Court set

aside the order granting bail by declaring that “The mere

fact that formal hearings were conducted does not preclude

a finding of arbitrariness and denial of due process” for theprosecution. And in this case, it was shown during the

hearing that accused “Tranquilino Calo, Jr. slipped the

fatal gun to the alleged assailant.” Furthermore, there was

undue haste to resolve the incident because the judge

terminated the hearings on the bail application even as the

prosecution was still presenting witnesses.

f) Carpio vs. Maglalang of 1991 to Pico vs. Combong of 1992

—

Carpio vs. Maglalang , 196 SCRA 41 (1991) is a challenge of

the order granting bail to an accused in the murder of

Mayor Jose Payumo of Dinalupihan, Bataan. The accused

who was in the custody of the NBI was granted bail by a

Bataan trial judge after a hearing wherein the number of

witnesses for the prosecution were merely mentioned in the

order granting bail and thereafter there was a conclusion

that evidence of guilt was not strong. This plea for bail was

strongly opposed by the NBI since the accused was charged

with a capital offense. On appeal by certiorari by the NBIDirector and the People, the High Court nullified the order

granting bail. The Court faulted the trial judge in not

following the teaching of People vs. San Diego which directs

the court to summarize the factual basis of its order and to

discuss the respective testimonies of the witnesses. The

High Court observed that the position of the judge is “that

since death penalty has been constitutionally abolished and

reclusion perpetua has replaced it, bail may be granted to

Escano (the accused) inasmuch as at that particular point,


27/48

no legislative enactment had as yet been made restoring

the death penalty.” Consistent with the hold-

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ing on this point in People vs. Dacudao, supra, it declared

this premise to be “invalid and reflects the lower court’s

reckless application of the provisions of the Constitution

and the Rules of Court.” It then ruled that:

“Section 13, Article III of the Constitution explicitly provides that

“(a)ll persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by

reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall before

conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released onrecognizance as may be provided by law.” As the phrase “capital

offenses” has been replaced by the phrase “offenses punishable by

reclusion perpetua,” crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua

instead of those punishable by the death penalty, when evidence

of guilt is strong, are the exceptions to the rule that the right to

bail should be made available to all accused.”

Then in People vs. Donato, 198 SCRA 130 (1991) the High

Court addressed the following issues whether bail may be

denied to a person even as the offense charged is bailableand whether the right to bail may be waived. These were

the issues in the case involving the rebellion charges filed

against Rafael Salas and company who were arrested in

1986. When the informations for rebellion were filed

against Salas and company, the penalty for said offense

was reclusion perpetua to death. But during pendency of

his motion for bail, the penalty was restored as originally

set forth under Art. 135 of the R.P.C. pursuant to

Executive Order No. 187. Thus Salas was granted bail. The

People appealed the ruling and was sustained by the High

Court. It ruled that rebellion is a bailable offense since the

penalty is now lower than reclusion perpetua and also

under the 1987 Constitution it is provided that the right to

bail subsists even with the suspension of the writ of habeas

corpus. The High Court concluded that this provision

“overturns the court’s ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et

al., supra” which held that when the writ of habeas corpus

is suspended the right to bail is also suspended. However,


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the grant of bail was set aside since in the course of the

proceedings, Salas had made a categorical waiver of his

right to bail “which is a right personal to the accused and

whose waiver would not be contrary to law, public order,

public policy, mor-

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als, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a

right recognized by law.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court

concluded: “The respondent Judge then clearly acted with

grave abuse of discretion in granting bail to the private

respondent.”

Lebarios vs. Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 (1991) is an off-shootof the Tranquilino Calo, Jr. case ( People vs. Calo, supra.).

This controversy also arose from the tragic shooting of the

litigant (Mayor Mariano Corvera, Sr.) inside a courtroom in

the Butuan City Regional Trial Court and the subsequent

shooting also of the fiscal investigating the case. For his

unsatisfactory handling of his judicial function, an

administrative complaint was filed against the judge for

gross ignorance of law for immediately granting bail to

Tranquilino Calo, Jr. and company who were charged with

murder. The Court found the judge guilty of ignorance of

the law for which he was accordingly fined by the Court. It

clarified again that when an accused is charged with a

capital offense, the “trial court must conduct a hearing in a

summary proceeding, to allow the prosecution an

opportunity to present, within a reasonable time all

evidence it may desire to produce to prove that the

evidence of guilt against the accused is strong before

resolving the issue of bail for the temporary release of the

accused. Failure to conduct hearing before fixing bail in theinstant case amounted to a violation of due process.”

In Aswat vs. Galido, 204 SCRA 205 (1991) the issue to

be resolved was whether a member of the military who shot

to death a fellow soldier can file a Petition for Habeas

Corpus from the military court martial. He further alleged

that he is entitled to bail under Section 13, Art. III of the

Constitution. The High Court ruled that the right to bail “is

not without exception.” It cited Comendador vs. De Villa

(200 SCRA 80) which ruled that the right to bail has not


29/48

traditionally been recognized and “is not available in the

military, as an exception to the general rule embodied in the

Bill of Rights.”

People vs. Nano, 205 SCRA 155 (1992) is another case

questioning an Order granting bail to an accused charged

with a capital offense (Kidnapping with Murder) wherein

the trial

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court issued bail without hearing. On a Petition for

Certiorari and Prohibition to annul the bail order before

the Supreme Court, it accordingly set aside the same. It

warned that “Nothing is more settled than that where thePeople is deprived of due process, an order granting bail to

the accused charged with offense without affording the

prosecution the opportunity to adduce proof of guilt is a

patent nullity and must be struck down for being null and

void.” This ruling was reiterated in Pico vs. Combong, Jr.,

215 SCRA 421 (1992) an administrative case against a

judge for serious misconduct and abuse of discretion for

granting bail to a person accused of murder without

ascertaining whether he was in custody and without any

hearing and without even ascertaining if he was already in

custody of the law. The grant of bail without hearing

“effectively deprived the People of its right to due process.”

The High Court castigated the judge and labeled what he

had done as “arbitrary, capricious and whimsical action.

Such inexcusable conduct reflects either gross ignorance of

the law or a cavalier disregard of its requirements.”

Respondent judge fined P20,000, censured and warned to

be more diligent in his duties and repetition of the same in

the future would be dealt with more severely.

g) Medina vs. De Guia of 1993 to People vs. Nitcha of 1995

—

Medina vs. De Guia, 219 SCRA 153 (1993) involves

administrative complaints against Judge Romeo

Maglalang, among others, filed by a fellow judge at the

regional judicial district of Bataan. One of the charges

(A.M. No. RTJ-89-306) pertained to the issuance of bail by

Judge Romeo Maglalang to one accused of statutory rape


30/48

punishable with reclusion perpetua, a non-bailable offense.

Said judge did not accord “the prosecution the opportunity

to show that the evidence of guilt against the accused is

strong.” The High Court faulted the judge on this score and

once more reiterated the settled rule that: “where a person

is accused of a capital offense, the trial court must conduct

a hearing in a summary proceeding, to allow the

prosecution an opportunity to present, within a rea-

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sonable time, all evidence it may desire to produce to prove

that the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong,

before resolving the issue of bail for the temporary releaseof the accused. Failure to conduct a hearing before fixing

bail amounts to a violation of due process. (Libarios vs.

Judge Dabalos, 199 SCRA 48 [1991] and People vs. Sola,

103 SCRA 393 [1981]).”

People vs. Fortes, 223 SCRA 619 (1993) is very pertinent

to the case under annotation. In this case, the accused

was convicted of rape of a 13 year-old rural girl and was

found guilty thereof for which he was sentenced with

reclusion perpetua and also ordered to pay money

judgment. He appealed the ruling and filed a Petition for

Bail pending his appeal which was denied by the trial

court. On appeal, the Supreme Court sustained the denial

order of the trial court on the matter of bail and also

affirmed the conviction. Citing Sec. 3, Rule 114 of the Rules

of Court, the High Court declared that “if an accused who is

charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua is

convicted by the trial court and sentenced to suffer such a

penalty, bail is neither a matter of right on the part of the

accused nor of discretion on the part of the court. In such asituation, the court would not have only determined that

the evidence of guilt is strong—which would have been

sufficient to deny bail even before conviction—it would

have likewise ruled that the accused’s guilt has been

proven beyond reasonable doubt. Bail must not then be

granted to the accused during the pendency of his appeal

from the judgment of conviction.” About the same holding

was rendered by the High Court in People vs. Valeriano,

226 SCRA 694 (1993).


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The case of Aguirre vs. Belmonte, 237 SCRA 778 (1994)

repeated once more settled principles on bail issuances.

This case involves the fixing bail in the warrant of arrest

for murder (ambush-slaying in Bulacan) for accused

Estelita Hipolito, et al. who were even at large at the time.

The judge was charged with ignorance of the law, among

others. It ruled that “the sua sponte grant of bail, without

any motion or application therefor by any of the accusedand without any notice to the prosecution or any hearing

conducted therein” was stigmatized by the Court as

“whimsical and arbitrary exercise of

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jurisdiction which calls for this Court’s exercise of

disciplinary power.” The case of Lardizabal vs. Reyes, 238

SCRA 640 (1994) is another administrative complaint

against a judge for issuing also bail to an accused in a rape

of a 12 year-old girl and also reducing the same without

affording the prosecution opportunity to be heard. The

High Court took to task the respondent judge for such

display of ignorance of the law. It held that the judge

should have conducted a hearing on the question of

strength of the evidence of guilt of the accused considering

the charge of rape which calls for capital penalty.

“Respondent (judge) could not have arrived at a fair

conclusion that the evidence was not enough to deny bail to

the accused when the prosecution had not been heard on

the matter. Respondent’s unjustified haste in granting bail

and thereafter reducing the amount thereof, in both

instances, without hearing the side of the prosecution,

speaks poorly of his competence in applying the law and

jurisprudence on the matter.” A similar ruling was handeddown by the Supreme Court in Guillermo vs. Reyes, Jr., 240

SCRA 155 (1995) wherein it faulted a judge who in an

application for bail “acted affirmatively thereon without

conducting another hearing and, what is worse, his order

concededly lacked the requisite summary or resumé of the

evidence presented by the parties and necessary to support

the grant of bail.”

People vs. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283 (1995) is a case cited in

the decision under annotation pertaining to the granting


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of bail pending appeal. In this case, the accused was

charged with murder for having shot at the back of the

head a neighbor during a quarrel. He was convicted and

sentenced to reclusion perpetua among others. The High

Court affirmed the decision with modification and in the

course thereof, it declared that: “The subsistence of a bail

bond is no legal obstacle to accused-appellant’s immediate

incarceration after promulgation of a decision involving afelony punishable by reclusion perpetua. It cited the case of

People vs. Fortes, supra which ruled that bail cannot be

granted after conviction of a capital offense because

“conviction imports that the evidence of his guilt of the

offense charged is strong” (en banc resolution of 15

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Oct. 1991 in People vs. Ricardo Cortez).

h) Concerned Citizen vs. Elma of 1995 to Gimeno vs.

Arcueno also of 1995 —

The case of Concerned Citizen vs. Elma, 241 SCRA 84

(1995) is significant because a judge was dismissed through

the complaint of an unknown complainant (Concerned

citizen) for ignorance of the law in failing to observe settled

guidelines in the grant of bail. In this case, a person

accused of illegal recruitment in a large scale (a non-

bailable offense) was granted bail by him upon a mere

petition by the accused without hearing. The High Court

ruled that while the judge has the discretion to weigh the

strength of the evidence against the accused, “such

discretion may be exercised only after hearing called to

ascertain the degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose

of determining whether or not she should be grantedprovisional liberty.” The judge claimed that he did ask the

prosecutor to comment which the latter did and therefore

there was substantial compliance with the requirement of

hearing.

This only infuriated the Court which rejected this

pretense thus:

“The stance of the respondent judge magnifies his ignorance of the

law. Summary hearing is “such brief and speedy method of


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receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable

and consistent with the purpose of the hearing which is to

determine the weight of the evidence for purposes of trial.”

The High Court further explained the importance of a

hearing: “On its result depends the right of an accused to

provisional liberty as opposed to the duty of the State to

protect its people against dangerous elements.” The Court

noted that in 2 previous cases, “the respondent judge has

run roughshod on the right of the prosecution to oppose

bail of persons accused of capital offenses.” Accordingly,

respondent judge was ordered dismissed from the judiciary.

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Tucay vs. Domagas, 242 SCRA 110 (1995) is another

administrative case against a judge who granted bail on

non-bailable offense of murder and justified his action by

claiming that the fiscal had noted in the petition that it

was not interposing objection thereto. Still the High Court

found the action erroneous and a fine of P20,000 was

imposed upon the judge. It ruled that a hearing should

nonetheless be held to ascertain whether the fiscal was not

really opposing the petition for bail and for the purpose of taking into account the guidelines set forth in Rule 114,

Sec. 6 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as

amended. About the same thing happened in the

subsequent case of Sule vs. Biteng, 243 SCRA 524 (1995)

wherein the judge “granted with indecent haste the

petition for bail at P50,000.00 without affording the

prosecution an opportunity to be heard.” The High Court

found “with his open admission that he granted bail to the

accused without giving the prosecution any opportunity tobe heard, the respondent deliberately disregarded decisions

of this Court holding that such an act amounts to a denial

of due process.” Respondent judge was found guilty of

ignorance of the law and imposed a fine of P20,000.00 along

with the usual warning. A similar holding regarding

another case of issuance of bail for murder and reduce the

same illegal possession of firearm without hearing was

made by the Supreme Court in the subsequent case of

Santos vs. Ofilada, 245 SCRA 56 (1995).


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However in the administrative case entitled Alvarado

vs. Laquindanum, 245 SCRA 501 (1995) the judge who

issued bail to an accused in a dangerous drugs case was

absolved by the High Court of charges of ignorance of the

law, grave abuse of discretion and gross misconduct. It

found the charges of ignorance of the law unfounded and

that the judge was not remiss in her duties when she

granted bail to the accused in question. The High Courtfound that: “She conducted hearings to determine the

existence of probable cause against the accused” which was

actively participated in by witnesses for the prosecution.

Then again in De los Santos vs. Montesa, Jr., 247 SCRA

85 (1995) a judge with a record of incompetence was finally

or-

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dered dismissed for gross ignorance of the law for having

issued bail to Estelita Hipolito, et al., accused for another

ambush-slaying in San Juan Del Monte, Bulacan, of a

policeman and barangay captain even without the required

petition for bail, without hearing and even as the accused

were still free. The High Court cited settled jurisprudence

on the matter, particularly on the need to conduct hearing

to accord the prosecution the chance to prove the strength

of the evidence regarding the guilt of the accused. It further

concluded that: “the respondent judge wantonly ignored the

due process requirement of hearing to afford the

prosecution reasonable opportunity to prove that evidence

of guilt of the applicants is strong.” Then came Chin vs.

Gustilo, 247 SCRA 175 (1995) another administrative case

against a judge for ignorance of the law. The judge in this

case was reprimanded for issuing bail to an accusedwithout giving “notice to the public prosecutor of the

application for bail.”

In Paderanga vs. CA, 247 SCRA 741 (1995) the High

Court summarized the prevailing rule on admission to bail

as it ruled on the propriety of granting or denying bail to a

lawyer who was charged with others with multiple

murders. A lawyer who was implicated in the crime of

multiple murders by his client “in a bizarre twist of fate”

during preliminary investigation was granted bail while he


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was in the hospital recuperating from an illness. The

issuance was questioned by the People in a certiorari

petition before the Supreme Court. As to whether the

accused was under the jurisdiction of the trial court when

he asked for bail, the Court ruled that he was under

“constructive custody of the law.” The prosecution was not

accorded procedural due process since it was not

represented by the authorized prosecutor and that it wasnot given “reasonable time” to oppose the application for

bail. The Supreme Court after discussing the basic

doctrines on bail applications disagreed. It found that there

was the appearance by an authorized representative of the

prosecution, there was hearing on the bail application, the

order contained summary of the evidence of the prosecution

and the defense, and the records showed “scrupulous

adherence to procedural rules.”

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Then finally, in Gimeno vs. Arcueno, Sr., 250 SCRA 376

(1995) the High Court reiterated the importance of holding

a hearing for bail applications. In this Robbery In Band

With Homicide case the accused were granted bail upon the

filing of information after the prosecutor merely filed a

comment on the petition for bail wherein no hearing was

conducted. The High Court faulted the judge for this and

categorically declared that hearing is mandatory for bail

applications, after citing its earlier rulings in previous

cases: “A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge

can aptly be said to be in a position to determine whether

the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong.”

§ VI. The State of the Law and Jurisprudence

Culled from the Constitution, the law, circulars and the

decisions of the High Tribunal, the principles, doctrines or

holdings on bail are clearly summarized in Paderanga vs.

CA, supra:

“1. Section 1 of Rule 114, as amended, defines bail as the security

given for the release of a person in custody of law, furnished by

him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearing before any


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court as required under the conditions specified in said Rule. Its

main purpose, then, is to relieve an accused from the rigors of

imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance

at the trial. As bail is intended to obtain or secure one’s

provisional liberty, the same cannot be posted before custody over

him has been acquired by the judicial authorities, either by his

lawful arrest or voluntary surrender. As this Court has put it in a

case, “it would be incongruous to grant bail to one who is free.”The rationale behind the rule is that it discourages and

prevents resort to the former pernicious practice whereby an

accused could just send another in his stead to post bail, without

recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal

appearance therein and compliance with the requirements

therefor.

x x x x x x x x x

x x x x x x x x x

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VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 195

Bail

x x x x x x x x x

2. Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule

that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail, except

only those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion

perpetua, when the evidence of guilt is strong. In pursuance

thereof, Section 4, Rule 114, as amended, now provides that all

persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court

of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, be admitted to bail as a matter of right. The right

to bail, which may be waived considering its personal nature and

which, to repeat, arises from the time one is placed in custody of

the law, springs from the presumption of innocence accorded

every accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at

the outset since after trial would be entitled to acquittal, unless

his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.

Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the

regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is entitled to

be released on bail as a matter of right, the present exceptions

thereto being the instance where the accused is charged with a

capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or

life imprisonment and the evidence of guilt is strong. Under the

general rule, upon proper application for admission to bail, the

court having custody of the accused should, as a matter of course,


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grant the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine

the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now,

Section 2) Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of bail

becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of the court

under the exceptions to the rule, a hearing, mandatory in nature

and which should be summary or otherwise in the discretion of

the court, is required with the participation of both the defense

and a duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time toascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for the

provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden of proof

is on the prosecution to show that the evidence meets the required

quantum.”

Then in the event of conviction of an offense punishable by

reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the bail

bond of the accused shall be canceled and the latter shall

be placed in confinement during the pendency of appeal. At

this stage or after conviction, bail is no longer a matter of right on the part of the accused or of discretion on the part

of the court because

196


Bail

evidence of guilt is not only strong but in fact it wasalready proven beyond reasonable doubt.

§ VII. The Case of Robin C. Padilla vs. CA and Its

Significance

It is the unfortunate fate of Robin Padilla that from the

facts of his case, he could not find any refuge under the

prevailing law and well-entrenched jurisprudence as set

forth above. As has been regularly reported in the media afew years ago, Mr. Robin Padilla, was on his way to

Pampanga when he sideswiped a balut vendor which led to

the local police to apprehend him. In the process, the police

found assorted firearms in his vehicle. Hence, he was

charged with violation of P.D. No. 1866 for illegal

possession of firearms which is punishable by reclusion

temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua. While the case

was being tried before the regional trial court of Pampanga,

Robin Padilla was granted bail for his temporary liberty.


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After trial which has been closely watched and monitored

by the media given the celebrity status of the accused, the

trial court promulgated a decision convicting the latter.

The penalty was for an indeterminate penalty of 17 years,

4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal to 21 years of

reclusion perpetua. Robin Padilla immediately appealed to

the Court of Appeals and in a few months the latter

affirmed the conviction.Thereafter, the Court of Appeals canceled his bail bond

and ordered his immediate imprisonment at the

Muntinlupa National Penitentiary. After the denial of his

Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals

decision, Robin Padilla appealed to the Supreme Court by

way of Petition for Review on Certiorari with an

application for bail pending appeal. He further moved for a

separate resolution on his plea for bail while the appeal

pended with the High Tribunal.

Hence, the High Court’s resolution of this plea for bailafter conviction in the lower court and affirmance of the

same by the Court of Appeals. As stated above the weight

of law and authority militates against the plea for bail of

petitioner

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VOL. 260, JULY 31, 1996 197

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Padilla. Relying upon clear provisions of law and its

previous decisions on the matter, the High Tribunal held

that where an accused is charged and thereafter convicted

of a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua bail is no

longer a matter

Documents

Annotation Bail