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Breaking Washington’s “Playbook”: Obama’s Break with Foreign Policy Precedents in the

Middle East

Infamously noted in Jeffery Goldberg’s published interviews with Barack Obama in the Atlantic,

On August 30, 2013 President Barack Obama’s decision not to enforce the ‘red-line’ he drew for

President Assad in the summer of 2012, was the most defining moment of his foreign policy legacy. The

‘red-line’ was a threat of military action against Assad if he used chemical weapons against his own

citizens. In August of 2013, mounting evidence suggested that Assad had used sarin gas against

individuals of the Syrian opposition in Ghouta, but Obama refused to act against him. This decision

reflected Obama’s outlook on the U.S.’s role in the Middle East. In his eight years as president, Obama’s

policies have created a new world order.

Following the end of the Cold War, America emerged as the sole global superpower with the

ability to enact its doctrine and will upon the rest of the world. During the first Gulf War in 1991, the

United States successfully led a coalition that swiftly removed Saddam Hussein from Kuwait.

Subsequently, the U.S. and U.N. were able to establish a no-fly zone in Northern Iraq to protect Iraqi

Kurds and provided them with humanitarian aid as well. This reveals that in 1990s the U.S. was a

powerful force for good in the Middle East. The American intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq in 2001

and 2003 would change this view and be the force which inspired the establishment of a new geopolitical

landscape under the Obama Administration.

According to Jeffery Goldberg, President Obama’s guiding foreign policy principle has been

“don’t do stupid shit” (Goldberg). Unfortunately for Syria, “don’t do stupid shit” became synonymous

with malaise towards the Middle East. Obama’s inaction in 2013 was the moment when he broke with

what he calls “Washington’s Playbook,” which he defines as the Washington foreign policy

establishment’s ‘fetish’ for gaining credibility through the use of military force, something he deeply

despises. (Goldberg). Obama’s presidency marked a turning point in America’s foreign policy in the

Middle East. His inaction and withdrawal from the region, use of drones, and the weakening of the United

States’ relationship with its allies are key characteristics of Obama’s foreign policy. These components

have contributed to his creation of an American attitude that lacks enthusiasm for the traditional concept

of democracy as good for other people and worth ensuring in other nations. This new attitude has

developed an international situation where power and influence of the United States in the Middle East

has significantly diminished.

Drone Wars

During his 2008 campaign, President Obama promised to end the wars in the Middle East and

restore the reputation of the United States worldwide. He maintained this position throughout his two

terms and reminded the American public of the success of his military rollback in Iraq during his

campaign for re-election in 2012. In order to realize his campaign promises, Obama reduced the amount

of troops and personnel on the ground in the Middle East, but soon realized that in the absence of U.S.

military engagement the region would remain an exporter of violence and terror towards the United States

and its interests. To solve this, he turned to the use of drones to carry out his military operations.

Under President Obama “there has been a clear policy shift towards greater reliance on [drone

strikes]” (McCrisken, 97). In addition, “upon taking office in January 2009, President Barack Obama

almost immediately made drones one of his key national security tools” (Bergen, 1). For decades, the

United States has maintained a policy prohibiting targeted killings, but the increased use of the drones to

target militant jihadists in the tribal areas of Northern Pakistan and Yemen, reveals a significant break

with Washington’s former policies. While the first drone strikes began in 2002, “under Obama the drone

program accelerated from an average of one strike every [forty] days to one every [four] days by mid-

2011” (Bergen, 1). Moreover, while George W. Bush reportedly oversaw [forty-eight] predator drone

strikes in Pakistan during his presidency, Obama is estimated to have presided over an additional 302 in

the country (McCrisken, 97). It is evident that Obama has increased the dependence of the United States

on drones to carry out its military operations and protect its citizens. Neither the legality, nor the

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effectiveness of this policy of targeting potential terrorists with drones will be discussed here; rather the

consequences and policy implications of this practical shift that will reverberate throughout the Middle

East and the world in upcoming years.

First, it is not surprising that Obama has pursued this course. Under the drone program, the United

States government continues to combat threats to U.S. interests without significant troop commitments.

Citing a parallel between lowering U.S. troop counts in the Middle East and the concomitant rise in drone

strikes, the International Crisis Groups asserts that, “as the Obama administration looks to withdraw most

of its troops from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, it is likely U.S. reliance on remote [drone strikes]

will…intensify” (ICG, 34). It appears that the Obama administration views the drone program as an

alternative to traditional military engagement and it is likely that the use of drones will continue to

escalate. Akin to having your cake and eating too, it is evident that President Obama continued

conducting warfare in the Middle East with drones, instead of soldiers, so that he could keep his domestic

political leverage, while still protecting American interests abroad. Drones are a perfect solution for

President Obama’s military policy of withdrawal. Obama knew that he not only needed to keep his

campaign promises, but also that he had an obligation as the President of the United States to eliminate

individuals who posed an imminent threat to the United States. In this case, military withdrawal is farce

and disingenuous. It is evident that Obama’s heightened use of drones has marked a significant break

with America’s prohibition of targeted killings in past decades.

In addition, drones allow the government more flexibility and less responsibility when conducting

military operations. According to Charlie Savage, “in 2012 the Obama administration loosened limits on

targeting in Yemen to permit strikes at presumed militants whose identities were unknown” (Savage,

257). The use of drones has allowed for more flexibility in warfare and provided significant advantages

over America’s adversaries. Moreover, during the United States drone campaign against members of Al-

Qaeda in Yemen in 2011, the Yemeni government continued to cover for the United States by falsely

claiming that, “its own fighter jets had fired the missiles” (Savage, 226). This policy has given the United

States less responsibility when strikes have significant civilian casualties or sometimes fail to hit their

targets at all. The secrecy of the strikes also inhibits any further military inquiry, because it is more

difficult for foreign governments or non-state militants to determine who delivered the strikes, especially

when they take place in tribal areas.

Furthermore, drones allow the president and CIA to conduct warfare without congressional

oversight, further expanding the powers of the presidency. Drone warfare is the use of force, but not in

the conventional way that policymakers think of when they talk about the “use of force.” They allow the

United States to conduct warfare without a significant military commitment and prevent deaths of

American soldiers on the ground. For example, Charlie Savage notes that when “a drone crashed or was

shot down, its pilot still went home for dinner” (Savage, 272). In addition, “because of the recent practice

of only invoking the War Powers Resolution if American causalities have been suffered” the president is

not inclined to reveal drone activity if no American lives are at risk (Alberto). Consequently,

policymakers and executives are now less inclined to take necessary precautions when the strikes appear

to be negligible. This changes the game of warfare. Drones allow the president to conduct warfare without

the consent of Congress, thus expanding their powers of the executive branch.

Due to the United States’ heightened use of drones in parts of the Middle East, drone programs

are now under way in other countries. Obama’s use and overuse of drones “has generated a new and

dangerous arms race for this technology” (Boyle, 22). In addition, “more than [seventy] countries now

have some type of drone,” which include Russia, Pakistan, and India (Bergen, 10). The implications of

drone proliferation are going to reshape the way warfare and foreign policy is conducted. According to

Michael J. Boyle, the United States currently controls a majority of the market share in drone technology,

but he asserts that “as the market expands with new buyers,” notably China and Israel, “and sellers,

America’s ability to control the sale of drone technology will be diminished” (Boyle, 23). Unfortunately,

Obama’s increased use of drones has inspired other countries to seek out this new lethal technology. It is

likely that the United States’ own over dependence on drones in Pakistan and Yemen has accelerated the

influx of a world order in which its own “qualitative advantages in drone technology are eclipsed” (Boyle,

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23). The asymmetric advantage that drones give to the United States will no longer exist as the

asymmetric becomes symmetric and more countries own and can operate military drone technology. The

United States must now prepare for a world in which covert surveillance is the norm and warfare is

contracted to remote vehicles roaming the skies. It is likely that the strength and resolve of countries will

be tested as unmanned vehicles enter their airspace. Similarly, “states are much less likely to practice the

same methods of deterrence with UAV’s as they do with nuclear weapons, because “drone surveillance is

unmanned, low cost, and deniable” (Boyle, 24). The future of military engagements will be reshaped by

the reliance of militaries on unmanned drones. Under Obama, the United States has been a key player in

popularizing the use of drones to conduct warfare, the consequences of which have not yet been fully

realized.

The Red Line in Syria

Obama’s decision not to enforce his threat against Syria after President Assad used chemical

weapons against members of the Syrian opposition demonstrated a dramatic shift in American foreign

policy practice. His failure to act on the threat immediately depleted America’s credibility and global

influence. In August 2013, Secretary of State John Kerry claimed that enforcing the red-line was “directly

related to [America’s] credibility and whether countries still believe the United States when it says

something” (Kerry qtd. in Goldberg). In addition, both Hillary Clinton and Leon Panetta believed the

President had made a mistake. Two of President Obama’s former foreign policy advisors and iconic

foreign policymakers, as well as his current Secretary of State all disagreed with his decision, proving its

iconic shift away from foreign policy norms. Additionally, a recent article by Maria Abi-Habib in the

Wall Street Journal article revealed that fifty-one State Department officers signed a “dissent channel

cable” concerning the President’s Syria policy.

Concurrently, the consequences of Obama’s inaction were immediately made known when

foreign leaders around the world spoke out against him. Mohammed bin Zayeed, the crown prince of Abu

Dhabi declared Obama “untrustworthy” and the Saudi’s were “infuriated” (Goldberg). Likewise, the King

of Jordan, Abdullah II, felt betrayed when Obama shifted away from the Sunni Muslims in favor of the

Shia-dominated Iran, Assad’s biggest backers (Goldberg). This decision has proven to strain relations

with the U.S.’s allies in the Middle East. Countries around the world typically look to the United States

for leadership against threats like Assad. In 1991, it was the United States that declared Saddam Hussein

to be breaking international law when he invaded Kuwait. President George H.W. Bush followed up this

declaration by organizing an international U.N. coalition to push Hussein’s army back within its own

borders. Now, Obama’s declaration “that the time has come for President Assad to step aside,” has been

backed up with little action at all (Dueck, 85). The world looks to the U.S. for leadership and as a

successful foreign policy example; but now it appears that President Obama has made the U.S. less likely

to lead when it comes to foreign policy issues both in the Middle East and around the world.

Unfortunately, “the lesson drawn by allies and adversaries alike from this example was that commitments,

red lines, and declarations issued by the United States…count for little when called upon” (Dueck, 88).

Similarly, a key component of Obama’s foreign policy was pressing for a peace agreement

between Israel and the Palestinians, but “in the case of Israel it was not so much the United States but the

Israelis who were expected to help kick start peace negotiations by imposing a freeze on the construction

of Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem” (Dueck, 48). Again, the United States made a

foreign policy declaration but did little to actually make that declaration a reality. During Obama’s

presidency little has actually been done to push the Israelis and Palestinians to the negotiating table. It is

evident that throughout Obama’s presidency there has been “a mismatch between his words and his

deeds” (Kaplan, 47). The consequences of these empty declarations will continue to limit the reliability of

United States foreign policy. The breakdown of credibility and resolve globally marks a significant

change in the United States’ foreign policy goals.

Moreover, President Obama’s inaction in Syria has paved the way for other countries, like Russia

and Iran, to regain relevance in the Middle East region. According to Robert Satloff, the Director of the

Washington Institute, the Russians saw what happened with the Red line in Syria in 2013 and took the

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“opportunity to engage and advance their interests.” Russia isn’t the only country that has taken the

initiative in America’s absence. North Korea, for example, has allegedly tested a nuclear bomb and the

world now faces an emboldened Iran, which has been warmly welcomed by the Obama administration

back into the international community, while it still engages in what Ben Rhodes, the president’s Deputy

National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication, admits are “destabilizing activities” (Rhodes).

Even China has made aggressive moves to claim disputed islands in the South China Sea. These are just

some examples of how dictators around the world have been emboldened by the United States’ military

inaction. Syria showed them that they could push the envelope and test the U.S.’ power.

In the absence of Obama’s action in Syria, Putin has been able to change the balance of power in

Syria in his favor. Putin realized that someone had to fill the power vacuum left open by the United

States’ inaction; he rushed to fill that role. In addition, Obama’s inaction has removed the United States

from a place of negotiating relevance. The goal of intervention was “to diminish the Assad regime’s

ability to kill and to provide clear incentives for Russia, Iran, and Assad to change their calculus and

begin negotiating in something resembling good faith with Syrian rebel forces” (Hamid). Not only, did

Obama’s inaction remove the chance of the United States being involved in these negotiations, it also

gave Assad, Russia, and Iran no reason to negotiate with the rebels at all. Obama’s stance toward Syria

was short-sighted. It served to remove the United States from the equation and allowed the civil war to

continue. This is a departure from former United States foreign policies. During the Cold War and its

aftermath the United States has always displayed its strength and protected its interests in the Middle

East. Obama’s malaise toward the region is essentially telling the world that the United States no longer

sees the Middle East as relevant to the United States’ interests.

Libya In Libya, during the Arab spring, when Gaddafi posed an imminent threat to the Libyan people,

President Obama was hesitant to act. On the contrary, his staff and cabinet cited “moral imperatives” as

enough to necessitate action (Kaplan, 48). Perfectly aligned with previous ideals, Obama’s guiding

principles for action were “no U.S. boots on the ground, no military action at all unless it had a legal basis

and a decent chance of succeeding, and, finally, an appropriate division of labor with allies” (Kaplan, 48).

An unidentified Obama advisor would later deem this approach “leading from behind” (Kaplan, 49). The

United States has never been known to lead from behind. In these types of situations, countries around the

world have looked to the U.S. for leadership. For example, it was the United States that organized the

coalition to expel Saddam Hussein from Kuwait in 1991 and it was the United States that led the world in

the war against terror following 9/11. Additionally, Kenneth Pollock from the Brookings Institute asserts

that the United States has “often played the constructive roll of mitigating conflict” (Pollock). But,

President Obama chose to take a different course. For him, his approach makes total sense. With no boots

on the ground, the president could still remain loyal to his ‘no war’ agenda. His political rhetoric at home

tied his hands, so the president relied on U.S. airpower and intelligence to support the allies on the

ground. In fact, throughout the entire episode, “the Obama administration refused to describe the U.S.

military actions as war, preferring to label it ‘kinetic action’ in which the United States was leading from

behind” (Dueck, 82). In addition, if Obama insisted on no military action unless there was legal backing

for it, then he could never be blamed if his intervention failed, the way his predecessor was.

Furthermore, “the first phase of the resulting operation was ultimately a success…but the second

phase was a failure: a new government never fully formed” (Kaplan, 49). The events since the 2011

regime change in Libya have essentially mirrored the events that followed the ousting of Saddam Hussein

in 2003. Libya, like Iraq, has become a violent epicenter of terror and sectarian violence. It is a breeding

ground for ISIS militants and there is still no government in place. In contrast with his predecessor,

President Obama, has craftily wiped his hands clean of responsibility for these atrocities. After aiding in

the overthrow of Gaddafi, Obama turned his attention elsewhere, and “provided little support for Libya’s

nascent democratic authorities to stave off the mounting violence and disorder” (Dueck, 83). His policy of

leading from behind has set himself up with the ability to back away from any situation that may not turn

out well. While the United States assisted the U.N. coalition with the initial airstrikes that removed

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Gaddafi from power, Obama placed the responsibility of building a new state in the hands of NATO

allies. As evident from Iraq, state building following a successful military operation is the most

challenging task and Obama successfully diverted this task to other states. Essentially, Libya is in the

same situation that Iraq was and still is in following the U.S. invasion in 2003, but due to Obama’s

‘leading from behind’ policy, the U.S. is neither involved in nor responsible for the chaos that now

persists there. Although chaos endures in Libya, Obama has emerged from the ashes nearly unscathed.

Conclusion

President Obama’s foreign policy legacy will continue to develop over the next decades. It is

evident that his decisions and resultant consequences have carried a significant weight. The implications

of the United States withdrawal from the world in a traditional sense are dramatic and the Syrian civil war

is an exemplary highlight of this issue. According to Kenneth Pollock, without decisive action by external

actors, civil wars tend to last for decades (Pollock). More importantly, he notes, they tend to spill over

into neighboring countries (Pollock). The failure to act against Assad and neutralize the violence in Syria

will have a lasting impact on the Middle East and on U.S. interests in the region. Additionally, the U.S.

disengagement has motivated other nations to increase their military activity, particularly Saudi Arabia,

Iran, and Russia, to promote stability and their national interests in the region. More often than not, these

actions fuel sectarian rivalry, further exacerbating violence, which continues between Sunnis and Shiites.

This schism underlies the majority of the fighting in the Middle East region.

Despite the dire circumstances the Middle East now faces, perhaps a more engaged American

foreign policy will include these three steps: a quick forceful military reengagement to promote a

cessation of hostilities, power-sharing agreements in conflict areas, and finally, civil and political

institution building.

The United States must adopt a more engaged policy towards the conflicts in the Middle East,

which places the United States in a position where it can mitigate conflict, rather than a reactive policy

which merely seeks to address the symptoms of the conflicts. First, they must increase their use of

military force on the ground in places of violence. This may include increased airstrikes on the strong

points of those inflaming violence, like Assad’s air force bases in Syria or ISIS’s operations in Sirte,

Libya on the Mediterranean coast. In some cases, it may be as simple as posing threats and coercion, to

force the enemies’ hand. According to Pollock, this will “change the military dynamics such that none of

the warring parties believes that it can win a military victory” (Pollock). This will force warring factions

to negotiate. Next, Pollock argues that the U.S. must work to “forge…power-sharing agreement [s]” in

places of conflict, which places each warring faction in a position of relevance in the new government

(Pollock).

And finally, the United States must work to initiate institutions, which assure all parties involved

that previously understood power-sharing agreements will remain in place. Building civil and political

institutions is an essential component of any regime change strategy. They ensure a civil society remains

intact even when leadership changes hands, and help to promote the rule of law. Right now, governments

usually only communicate with one another at the state level, but in some of these countries, especially

Iraq, governments have lost control over their population’s destiny. Eric Brown, a Senior Fellow at the

Hudson Institute, believes in the importance of having diplomats on the ground, who know local

languages and engage directly with the local populations of warring factions. Proximity and frequency are

both key components necessary for building institutions. This is done through building relationships with

local citizens, building trust, and through education. Without governing institutions, like judicial systems,

constitutions, electoral systems, and an adequate police force, no peacemaking efforts in warring areas

will have any lasting effect. At a time when non-state actors are the driving force in the Middle East this

new type of diplomacy becomes increasingly crucial. This reality must motivate the United States to adust

their diplomatic methods in the region.

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Works Cited

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