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Andrew Larsen
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The Making of a Hegemon: Iran and the Nixon Doctrine
After the fall of Mohammad Mussadiq’s nationalist movement in 1953 at the hands of the
United States and Great Britain, Iran underwent rapid economic growth and rapid military
development. This was in large part due to the assistance and guidance of the United States.
During a period of uncertainty and fear throughout the Cold War, the United States sought to
create a stable ally in the Middle East that would stem the spread of communism. Over the next
twenty-five years the U.S. would mold the shah’s regime in Iran to serve this purpose. The
presidencies of Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon all played a critical role in the
development of this special relationship, but Nixon developed a unique policy to propel Iran to
an unmatched level of military dominance. Iran’s strategic location, bordering the Soviet Union,
and its extensive oil reserves, made it a perfect partner for the United States under Nixon’s new
foreign policy plan, which would later be termed: The Nixon Doctrine.
U.S. Policy toward Iran under Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
Following the ousting of Mussadiq by the United States after Operation AJAX, the U.S. played
a vital role in propping up the Zahedi government and the Shah. Within ten days of the coup, in
order to prevent disorder and a Soviet takeover, Eisenhower’s administration augmented an
existing aid program “with $23.4 million and an additional $45 million in emergency aid”
(Gasiorowski, 90). In addition, “the Tehran CIA station also began a variety of covert efforts to
assist the new government” (Gasiorowski, 91). Moreover, the United States helped to broker an
oil deal with the NIOC (National Iranian Oil Company), which divided the old AIOC monopoly
into a partnership of consumers (Rubin, 95). This new consortium not only served to
proportionately divide the royalties among all the oil companies and Iran, but also gave the Zahedi
government more legitimacy. It demonstrated that the new government could be successful and
had Iran’s best interest at heart. In America, the new deal brokered by the Eisenhower
Administration was essential to the prevention of a global oil crisis. Because of this, it was evident
that the U.S. was already highly invested in the new Iranian government. In the Shah, American
policymakers saw a future partner that played perfectly to Eisenhower’s ‘New Look Strategy’ of
containing the Soviet Union (Gasiorowski, 93). Iran’s geographic location in the northeast of the
Middle East and bordering the Soviet Union made it a “crucial buffer against soviet expansionism”
vital to the United States and to regional security (Moens, 214). After a long period of investment
in European countries, Eisenhower shifted his focus to establishing relationships with countries
within the democratic sphere of influence, but along communist borders. His goal was “to regain
the initiative in confrontation with the Soviet Union while reducing U.S. defense expenditures”
(Gasiorowski, 93). The Eisenhower Administration played an essential role in solidifying the new
Iranian government under the Shah and in laying the groundwork for a special relationship
between the United States and Iran.
Although the U.S. made sizeable contributions of $200 million in economic aid and $200
million in military aid, it was not enough to meet the demands of the Shah and certainly not
enough to put Iran in a position of military supremacy in the region (Rubin, 95). Eisenhower’s
Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles believed that, “America’s retaliatory strength was the
greatest barrier to any Soviet advance” not Iranian military power (Rubin, 99). Dulles thought
that any incursion on Iran by the Soviet Union would definitely lead to a global conflict,
consequently involving the United States. Furthermore, the U.S. felt that “Iran could never
actually build a strong enough military force to check the USSR” (Rubin, 98).
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Instead, the United States urged the Shah to build a smaller force strong enough to subvert
any potential internal communist revolution. A common policy held throughout the Eisenhower
and Kennedy Administrations was that internal issues in Iran posed a much larger threat to Iran’s
stability than external regional pressures. This policy served to justify the denial of more
American arms to the Shah. Moreover, in March of 1962 Kennedy “sought to shift the Shah’s
preoccupation from military security to economic progress, even if it became necessary to limit
American military aid as leverage” (Rubin, 107). The policies of the Eisenhower and Kennedy
administrations not only served to consolidate the Shah’s power, but also forced him to develop
economically and modernize his country. By withholding some military aid at the outset, but
offering to provide more a later date, the United States was able to motivate the Shah to increase
domestic investment as opposed to reinvesting all of Iran’s revenue into the military. While these
policies were successful in the 1950’s and early 1960’s, geopolitical events, including the
communist influence over the Baathists in Iraq and the mobilization of Russian ships on the Red
Sea, changed the political environment of the Middle East, prompting dramatic changes in the
U.S.’s policy towards Iran.
In January of 1968, Great Britain announced that they would be withdrawing all their forces
from the Persian Gulf by 1971, leaving a power vacuum that would inevitably be filled by the
next most powerful force. Washington feared that independent Kuwait, Qatar, Oman, Bahrain,
radical Iraq, Nasser’s Egypt, and Soviet backed local Marxists would rise to fill the vacuum
(Rubin, 125). President Johnson knew that the United States was in no way prepared to take on
such a responsibility. Instead, inspired by Britain’s “two-pillar policy,” Johnson focused on
cooperation between the two most powerful states in the Middle East at the time, Iran and Saudi
Arabia (Alvandi, 35). To the Shah’s dismay, the United States chose a policy that would
diminish Iranian primacy in the region. But, luckily for the Shah, Richard Nixon was inaugurated
the following January in 1969. From that point on, the relationship between Iran and the United
States would never be the same.
The Nixon Doctrine
Richard Nixon’s presidency marked a turning point in the United States’ foreign policy
toward Iran. After the British withdrawal, the U.S. knew that its only hope for maintaining
influence in the region was to guarantee that the power void would be filled by a state friendly to
the United States. Under Johnson, the U.S. had sought to produce stability in the region by
supporting a mutual cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia. But, under Nixon, the U.S. moved
away from the British two-pillar policy in favor of a policy which concentrated on Iranian primacy.
In the Shah of Iran, Nixon claimed to have a partner, who would promote American interests in
the Middle East, protect against communist incursion, and protect the oil supply that western
economies depended on.
The Vietnam War and other conflicts in South Asia made it close to impossible for any
U.S. president to support any more armed conflicts abroad. For this reason, Richard Nixon
established a new foreign policy, which would later become known as the Nixon Doctrine.
Although Nixon began his presidency by continuing Johnson’s two-pillar policy, regional tension
and instability, including a border conflict in the Shatt al-Arab waterway between Iran and Iraq in
which Iran forced Iraq to back down, gave Nixon “little doubt about the Shah’s resolve to assert
Iran’s power in the Persian Gulf against any regional threat” (Alvandi, 46). The new policy’s
primary principle “was that the United States would call on its allies and friends to supply their
own manpower to ‘defend’ themselves against ‘Communist aggression,’ while America provided
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only advice, aid, and arms,” but not direct military intervention (Kimball). Nixon saw in the Shah
of Iran, the perfect leader to carry out his new policy in the Middle East.
Under Nixon’s new policy, “the United States would rely on the Shah to maintain
stability in the Persian Gulf” (Alvandi, 28). By 1970, the partition of Pakistan after losing
another war with India, the Marxist revolution in South Yemen, a growing Soviet naval power in
the Red Sea, and the Iraqi-Soviet friendship treaty all pointed to increased instability around the
Persian Gulf, further justifying the Shah’s argument for more weapons. On November 7, 1970
Nixon signed NSDM (National Security Decision Memoranda) 92, which signaled a change in
“U.S. Gulf policy from balancing to Iranian primacy” (Alvandi, 55). Nixon’s goal was to
empower the Shah to the point where he could enforce regional security. In May 1972, Nixon
promised to allow Iran to buy any American made weapons except for nuclear devices (Rubin,
129). At last, the Shah would get what he had lobbied U.S. presidents for since Eisenhower;
recognition as the region’s primary protector and an unlimited amount of American made
weapons. Nixon’s promise marked the beginning of a special relationship between Iran and the
United States.
The Shah was elated by Nixon’s new policy. His dream of becoming a global power
would be made possible by high tech American made weapons. From “1970 to 1975 American
military exports increased from $1 billion to $10 billion a year,” principally into Iran (Rubin,
160). The Shah’s expensive arms bill meant that he needed more revenue from oil. In 1969, Iran,
along with other oil producing states, formed OPEC with the hope of gaining the collective
power necessary to increase oil prices (Rubin, 131). Next, Iran used OPEC and threatened to stop
production unless the money given to exporting countries was increased. In an attempt to solve
the crisis, oil companies implemented the Tehran agreement in 1971; in this arrangement,
“companies granted large price increases to producing countries in exchange for their promise to
keep prices stable” (Rubin, 131). To make matters worse, “Libya and Iraq nationalized most of
their oil production in 1972 and Iran took over most of its consortium the following year”
(Rubin, 131). Throughout the crisis, the U.S. stressed the importance of maintaining good
relations with Iran and this proved beneficial when OPEC declared an oil embargo on western
countries. During the crisis, Iran continued to supply oil to the United States, which kept oil
prices and the U.S. economy stable. This confirmed the benefits of a positive relationship with
Iran and provided a domestic justification for Nixon’s new foreign policy.
Success of the Nixon Doctrine in Iran
Nixon’s policy of providing the Shah with a carte blanche to buy whatever American
weapons he wanted, proved to be a good and sound policy for protecting American interests in
the Middle East. For example, during the Pakistani civil war in 1971, the United States “wanted
to help Pakistan, which was not only aligned with the Americans, but was also acting as an
intermediary between Washington and Communist China” (Alvandi, 60). Even though public
opinion in the United States had shifted against Pakistan because of the massacre of Bengalis, the
Shah secretly provided American arms from their own supply to Pakistan (Alvandi, 60). It was in
these contexts that Iran played a critical role in implementing U.S. policy abroad. Even the
Shah’s own interests were aligned with the United States. He feared that if he didn’t support
Pakistan, they would look to Beijing for aid, which could further spread communist influence.
This was an excellent example of successful foreign policy under the Nixon Doctrine. The Shah
shared the same goals with the United States and was therefore able to serve both the U.S. and
himself, making Iran the perfect Middle Eastern partner. Furthermore, the Shah didn’t stop with
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Pakistan: by 1972 Iran was also involved in aiding “Jordan against the Palestinians, Saudi Arabia
against South Yemen, and the sultan of Oman against the Dhorfari Rebels” (Alvandi, 65). Under
the Nixon Doctrine, Iran became the country whom other countries in the Arab region looked to
for support in times of invasion or political unrest. The Shah had established himself as the
regional hegemon deserving of recognition and respect. In addition, the Shah’s aspirations were
unending, as he began to talk with “Australia, Mauritius, and South Africa on plans to project
Iran’s naval power into the Indian Ocean” (Alvandi, 65). It is evident that Nixon’s new policy
toward Iran propelled the Shah into the global spotlight worthy of regional supremacy. Nixon’s
relationship with Iran reflects the primary goal of the Nixon Doctrine—to create a regional proxy
strong enough to stem the expansion of the Soviet Union’s communist ideology—and is an
example of a successful foreign policy, which served both Iranian and U.S. interests.
Conclusion
Under Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy, the United States leveraged the Shah to
develop economically by withholding weapons. And, under Nixon the Shah was given virtually a
blank check to purchase whatever weapons at his discretion. In the short-term and throughout the
1970’s, Nixon’s policy toward Iran was very successful and accomplished what the United States
wanted: an Iranian proxy power in the region. Although peace did not last, the United States had
in Iran a military partner that was willing to fight the wars in the Middle East without obligating
the U.S. to get involved.
Unfortunately, there is another side to the story. While Iran’s GDP and GNP increased
dramatically during the 1960’s and 1970’s, “over 75 percent of rural families still earned less that
$66 a month and malnutrition was widespread among them” (Rubin, 143). Instead of investing
back into the population, the Shah used his immense oil wealth to buy more weapons from the
United States, which achieved his own personal goal of propelling Iran into a position of regional
dominance. But in the eyes of Iranians themselves, it looked as if he was a puppet of the United
States that did not care about their immediate needs.
In the long term, Nixon’s policy not only delegitimized the authority of the Shah in his
own country, but also served to increase anti-American sentiment among the Iranian people. The
fall of the Shah and the subsequent Islamist revolution in Iran in 1979 further reflected that the
Iranians were not happy with his policies. While their grievances had more to do with his
authoritarian leadership, many also were concerned with his lack of focus on economic
development in Iran and his failure to deliver on domestic promises. Therefore the Nixon
doctrine was only a short term success. It successfully positioned Iran as a proxy of the United
States willing to fight the incursion of the Soviet Union into the Middle East, which served
America’s immediate goals, but failed to address the domestic issues that challenged the Shah’s
legitimacy.
Applying the Nixon Doctrine through a more modern lens draws parallels to the
American invasion of Iraq in 2003; wherein the immediate short term success was short lived
due to a systemic failure to address Iraqi domestic issues. After removing Saddam power, there
was a failure to address the domestic issues that plagued Iraqi society and no realistic plan to
assist Iraqis in building a functioning civil society. In all, the Iranian and Iraqi corollary exposes
failures to understand the domestic implications of U.S. foreign policy, which, if accounted for,
would potentially ensure long term success.
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Works Cited
Alvandi, R. (2014). Nixon, Kissinger, and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold War.
Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
Gasiorowski, M. J. (1991). U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran.
Ithaca, N.Y: Cornell University Press.
Kimball, J. (2006). The Nixon Doctrine: A Saga of Misunderstanding. Presidential Studies
Quarterly, 36(1), 59-74. Retrieved from
http://search.proquest.com/docview/215686929?accountid=14868
Moens, A. (1991). President Carter's Advisers and the Fall of the Shah. Political Science
Quarterly, 106(2), 211.
Rubin, B. M. (1980). Paved With Good Intentions: Iran and the American Experience. New
York: Oxford University Press.
