Analysis of the Fire Explosion and Explosion Propagation

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  • 8/11/2019 Analysis of the Fire Explosion and Explosion Propagation

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    Asia Pacific Industrial Engineering and Management System

    Analysis of the Fire Explosion and Explosion Propagation

    Control of Sugar Dust in the Yemen Company for Sugar

    Refinery, Hodeida, Yemen

    Frras Mohammed Ahmed Othmana, Maida A. Dela Cueva

    b

    aHayel Saeed Anam Group of Companies, Taiz , YemenbAdamson University,900 San Marcelino St., Ermita, 1000 Manila, Philippines

    Abstract

    Explosions on sugar refineries of different causes occurred in the past, where there were injured employees,damaged properties, and losses incurred by companies. Engineering and administrative solutions, can reduce the

    likelihood of the explosion. This study aimed to create a cost efficient system that will reduce the chance of

    explosion in the sugar refinery located in Hodeidah, Yemen, to protect employees, maintain safety and wellness,

    and prevent property damages and company losses. The refinery process, with different components from different

    work zones, was examined, identifying the areas containing huge amount of sugar dusts, and identifying potential

    risks, using Failure mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). Preventive measures were identified using the hierarchy

    of the hazard controls, in conformance to international safety standards. The benefit-cost ratio was determined to

    measure the cost effectiveness of the control measures. It has been found out that there is a possibility of sugar dust

    explosion. Failure modes are identified with high Priority Risk Numbers (PRN) for different zones. Engineering

    solutions such as suppression systems for belt conveyors in transporting sugar, for de-dusting systems, inerting

    system for rotary dryer, explosion isolation valves and lightning protection systems were recommended, and have

    been calculated to have a benefit-cost ratio of greater than 1.0. Finally, the recommended safety measures include

    administrative solutions such as comprehensive housekeeping program, fire prevention and safety program, and

    impose permitting systems specially in hot work areas.

    Keywords: sugar dusts; explosion; FMEA

    1. Background

    Sugar dusts are flammable, and sugar refinery plants are susceptible to explosion which may

    have devastating and susceptible effects. According to NFPA 654 (Standard for the Prevention of Fire

    and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing, Processing and Handling of Combustible Particulate

    Solids) it takes only 0.8 mm layer of dust on the floor covering just 5% of the surface area of a room to

    pose a significant explosion hazard. A dust explosion requires the simultaneous presence of two

    additional factors - dust suspension and confinement. If any of the five elements are removed, dust

    explosions will not occur, although a fire can still occur with oxygen, an ignition source, and the

    combustible dust serving as a fuel. Very few employees of the sugar refinery plants are aware of this

    risk. Among the 30 employees of the sugar refinery plant in Hodeida, Yemen, 65% are not aware of

    the possibility of sugar dust explosions. It is then important to design the facilities to protect the

    stakeholders, including the employees, and prevent potential hazards the sugar dust can bring, and

    effective control measures should be made.

    Hayel Saeed Anam (HSA) Group of Companies is a commercial entity that was established in

    Yemen in 1938. Its activities include various investment fields in Saudi Arabia , Egypt, Malaysia and

    Indonesia. A new plant of sugar refinery is being built in Hodeida, Yemen the Yemen for Sugar

    Refinery (YCSR). The YCSR has a production capacity of the company is 660 thousand tons per year.

    At present, the YCSR has a contract with De Smet Engineering and Contractors to provide the

    equipment for sugar refinery. Based on the contract, De Smet Contractors will provide de-dusting

    system in order to reduce the risks of dust explosions. The de-dusting unit collects sugar dusts from

    discharged conveyors below the refined sugar silos and other transporting conveyors and sugar dryer.

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    This study aimed at designing preventive and protective procedures to control and reduce

    risks of dusts explosions.

    2.0 Methodology

    The analysis was made based on the three zones of the refinery plant. Each of these zones

    was examined. Potential hazards for each zone were identified using Failure Mode Effect Analysis

    (FMEA).Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) concentrates on identifying possible failure modes and

    their effects on the equipment and the whole system. Identification of potential failure modes leads to a

    recommendation for an effective reliability of the system . Priorities on the failure modes were set

    according to the FMEAs risk priority number (RPN) and concentrated effort were placed on the

    higher RPN items obtained from the analysis. RPN has been calculated as the product of Severity,

    Probability of Occurrence, and Probability of Detection!!"# ! !!!!!!. The values of RPN areshown in Table 1. The company set an RPN of 51 as the critical. The values in red are considered

    critical . the subsystem on each zone found to have RPN greater than or equal to 51were studied

    further to minimize severity of failure, reduce the occurrence of the failure mode, and improve

    detection.

    Table 1. Risk Priority Number (RPN) values

    Measures to control the potential hazards were identified; The potential benefits of the

    proposed control measures, and the costs associated in the installation and maintenance for the

    engineering controls were estimated, then the ratio of benefits and costs using the conventional and

    modified B/C ratios were determined.

    3.0 Result and Discussion

    3.1. Facility Description and Sugar Refinery Process

    The sugar refinery process starts when the raw sugar will be unloaded by truck coming from the

    seaport. There are two unloading stations near to the raw sugar store . The sugar is conveyed by belt

    conveyors to the horizontal sugar silo. The sugar pile is done through a mobile head conveyor called

    tripper. The tripper is moving along the raw sugar storage. The sugar will be taken by a front loader

    to load one of the eight bins to feed the refinery through belt conveyors. The raw sugar is transported to

    the process building for refining ,the refined sugar is transported through belt conveyor to the storage

    area i.e. Four concrete silos of 3,000 T capacity, are then transferred to the bulk sugar truck or to the

    packing buildings. Dozens of screw conveyors and horizontal conveyor belts transport granulated sugar

    throughout the packing buildings which house manual or semi-automatic machines to pack the refined

    sugar into various sizes. The closed granulated sugar screw conveyors and belt conveyors located

    throughout the process , storage silos and dryer are equipped with dust removal equipment including

    the equipment installed in the packing building - 1 bag filters to recover the air from dryer , and 1 bagfilters to recover the air from cooler and silos. None of the conveyors, however, is designed to safely

    vent overpressure outside the enclosure if combustible sugar dust inside the enclosure is ignited.

    10100090080070060050040030020010010

    9810729648567486405324243162819

    8640576512448384320256192128648

    749044139234329424519614798497

    636032428825221618014410872366

    52502252001751501251007550255

    41601441281129680644832164

    390817263544536271893

    24036322824201612842

    1109876543211

    10987654321

    Severity

    ProbabilityofDetection

    Probability of accuarnce

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    The proposed site lay-out ( Figure 1) gives enough room to transport the refined sugar from the

    process building to storage silos by means of belt conveyor instead of bucket elevator. This existing

    system (without any bucket elevators) reduces the dust generating and simplifies the risk management

    of explosion and fire .

    Heat exchangers are installed in various places in the process building by using steam that comes

    from the co-generating power plant. Steam comes from the boiler house at 63 bar. In the process house,

    two pressure reducing stations are foreseen: One from 63 to 7 bar, other from 7 bar to 2 bar. i.e. The

    steam produced is used as heat source in several heat exchangers the temperature of the steam is 107oC.

    The steam consumption is approximately 93.2 % of the row sugar refined .

    3.2. De-dusting System

    There is a separate de-dusting system for the packing building and for the feeder belt conveyor

    coming from the sugar storage silos. The aspiration pipes are connected to the feeding belt conveyor

    and distributed throughout the plant ,the pipes aspiration points are located near to the opening to the

    bagging machine right after the Weighing and dosing equipment .The de-dusting system is located

    inside the sugar bagging building. Figure 16 shows the top view of the packing building showing the

    general arrangement of the de-dusting system.

    3.3. Possible Ignition Sources

    Dust explosions occur when an effective ignition source of sufficient energy to initiate flame

    propagation is present. Avoidance or elimination of potential sources of ignition is a very important

    step in preventing dust explosions. The possible ignition sources that could lead to sugar dust explosion

    in the Yemen Company for Sugar Refinery are: Flames and direct heat; Hot work; Hot surfaces;

    Electrostatic sparks; Electrical sparks; Friction; Electrostatic; and Lightning, with a 30,0000C and

    extreme high current.

    3. 4. Possible Sugar Dust Sources

    The sugar crystals have sharp edges as seen with the use of microscope. The abrasive nature of

    sugar crystals makes the generation of fine particles easy when the particles are brushed against eachother . The rotary movement of the refined sugar inside the rotary drier and transporting it to the

    Storage silos where it drops down at elevation of 30 meters makes the formation of sugar dust very

    much significant . The sugar dust can be seen at the inlet and out let of transporting conveyors ,

    throughout the intervals of the belt conveyor, and inside the storage soils . The sugar dust is sucked

    with the use of suction fans which delivers the air with the dust particles to bag filter where 99 % of the

    sugar dust gets trapped and collected leaving the air clean from the sugar dust.

    3.5. Failure Mode and Effect Analysis

    There are 13 subsystems identified in Zone 1, at which potential failure mode can occur, as

    shown in Table 2. The potential effects were identified, and the corresponding RPN. Table 3 shows

    all possible scenarios that might lead to failure for each potential failure mode for each subsystem, the

    causes of failure mentioned in the FMEA spreadsheet are general and the possible scenarios ofpotential causes of failure. There are several failure modes with High Risk Priority Numbers and

    should be addressed at the earliest possible time: Carbon dioxide leakage having Risk Priority

    Number ( 365 ); Contact with caustic soda having Risk Priority Number ( 350 ); Heat stock to operator

    having Risk Priority Number ( 245); Running the pump without water ring having Risk Priority

    Number ( 120); and Draw Bodies due to the centrifuge having Risk Priority Number ( 120). The safety

    measures taken by the YCSR at this Zone like include: the conveyors are fitted with a speed switch,

    security ropes and belt deport detectors. If one switch detects a failure or is activated, the conveyor

    gives a warning signal to the control room; and an available static permanent magnet separator. It

    removes all the ferrous elements that may lay in the raw sugar such as bolts, nuts.

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    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

    S.N

    Subsystem/

    Module &Function

    Potential

    FailureMode

    Potential End

    Effects(s) ofFailure

    SeverityRanking

    Potential

    Cause(s) ofFailure

    Probability ofOccurrence

    Ranking

    Current

    Controls/Fault

    Detection

    Probabilityof Detection

    Ranking

    Risk Priority

    Number.Existing(PRN)

    Recommended

    Action(s)SeverityRanking

    Probability

    ofOccurrence

    Ranking

    Probability ofDetectionRanking

    NewRPN

    1Melter to melt

    the raw sugar

    Over flow

    of mixture

    Burning andscalds to

    operator.

    Down time toplant.

    7Failure of

    level sensor2

    Isolation ofthe tank byheat rated

    material

    Installation oflevel sensor

    4 56

    1. Isolation ofthe melterwith guardrail .

    2. Wearing the

    PPE at alltime .

    3. Regularpreventive

    maintenance.

    3 1 2 6

    2Melter to meltthe raw sugar

    Burning

    incidentdue tocontact

    Burning and

    scalds tooperator.

    6

    Damage of

    the isolationmaterial

    with time

    2

    Isolation of the

    tank by heatrated material

    7 84

    1. Isolation ofthe melter

    with guardrail .

    2. Wearing thePPE at all

    time.3. Posting

    warning

    signs.4. Training

    programs toworkers .

    1 1 5 5

    3

    Inside theprocessbuilding

    Heat stockto operator

    Heat relatedillness due to the

    hot workingenvironment

    7

    The natureworking

    environmentin the

    processbuilding

    which

    involvesheat.

    5Open type

    process building7 245

    1. Appropriateventilationsystem.

    2. Warningsigns.

    4 2 4 32

    4

    Heat exchangerto heat the

    Sugar syrup.

    Burst ofpipe due to

    Pipeblockage

    Burning tooperators .

    Down time toplant

    6No regular

    cleaning2 None 8 96

    1. Isolation ofthe heat

    exchanger2. Precaution

    signs.3. Wearing of

    PPE at alltime.

    3 1 8 24

    .

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    S.N

    Subsystem/Module &

    Function

    PotentialFailure

    Mode

    Potential EndEffects(s) of

    Failure

    Severity

    Ranking

    PotentialCause(s) of

    Failure

    Probability ofOccurrence

    Ranking

    CurrentControls/

    Fault

    Detection

    Probabilityof Detection

    Ranking

    Risk PriorityNumber.

    Existing(PRN)

    Recommended

    Action(s)

    Severity

    Ranking

    Probabilityof

    OccurrenceRanking

    Probability ofDetection

    Ranking

    New

    RPN

    5

    Carbonationvessel for sugar

    purification

    Carbondioxideleakage

    Asphyxia andhealth illness.

    7Seal wearand tear

    6 None 8 336

    1. Providingventilation

    system.2. Regular

    maintenancefor seals.

    3. Wearingbreathingmask at alltime.

    4 2 3 24

    6

    Lime dosingstation for

    sugar

    purification.

    Continuous contact

    with Lime

    stone

    Danger to thelungs and eye in

    a long run

    exposure

    7

    Failure ofde-dustingsystem for

    lime stone.

    3De-dusting

    system4 84

    1. Regular

    maintenancefor filters.

    2. Training of

    workers .3. Wearing PPE

    at all time.

    4 2 2 16

    7 Vacuum pump

    Runningthe pump

    withoutwater ring

    Pump burns

    causingdowntime.

    4

    Running the

    vacuumpump dry.

    3 None 10 120

    1. Continues

    water supplyto the vacuumpump.

    2. Preparingcheck listbeforeoperating hepump

    2 1 4 8

    8

    Dosing ofcaustic soda for

    declaration

    Contactwith

    causticsoda

    Causes burns

    and scarring, cancause serious

    damage to allbody tissues

    contacted

    7The operatordealing with

    chemicals

    5 None 10 350

    1. Training

    program for

    awareness.2. Precaution

    signs .3. Wearing PPE

    at all time.

    4 2 3 24

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    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

    S.N

    Subsystem/

    Module &

    Function

    Potential

    Failure

    Mode

    Potential End

    Effects(s) of

    Failure

    Severity

    Ranking

    Potential

    Cause(s) of

    Failure

    Probability

    of

    Occurrence

    Ranking

    Current

    Controls/

    Fault

    Detection

    Probability of

    Detection

    Ranking

    Risk Priority

    Number.

    Existing

    (PRN)

    Recommended

    Action(s)

    Severity

    Ranking

    Probability

    of

    Occurrence

    Ranking

    Probability of

    Detection

    Ranking

    New

    RPN

    9

    Dosing of

    Hydrogen

    chloride for

    decalaration

    Contact

    with

    Hydrogen

    chloride

    May causedamage to the

    following

    organs: Lungs,

    Upper

    Respiratory

    ,skin and eye.

    7

    The operator

    dealing with

    chemicals

    5 None 10 350

    1.Training

    program for

    awareness.

    2.Precaution

    signs .

    3.Wearing PPE

    at all time.

    4 2 3 24

    10

    Evaporator

    to

    concentrate

    the sugar

    syrup.

    Burning o

    skin due to

    contact

    Burning and

    scalds to

    operator.6

    Wear and tear

    of isolation5 Isolation 3 90

    1.Isolation by

    guard rail.2.Regular

    preventive

    maintenance.

    3.Warning

    signs.

    4.Wearing PPE

    at al time.

    4 2 2 16

    11

    Heat

    exchanger

    to heat the

    Sugar

    syrup.

    Burning o

    skin due to

    contact

    Burning and

    scalds to

    operator.6

    Wear and tear

    of isolation5 Isolation 3 90

    1.

    Isolation by

    guard rail.

    2.

    Regular

    preventive

    maintenance.

    3.Warning

    signs.

    4.Wearing PPE

    at all time.

    4 2 2 16

    12

    Continues

    and

    discontinues

    centrifugal

    Draw

    bodies

    Cut and other

    injuries and

    may lead to

    death due to

    the high

    kinetic energy

    involved in

    centrifuge

    8Worker contact

    with rotatingparts

    3 None 5 120

    1.Isolation by

    guard rail.

    2.`Warning

    signs.

    3.Training of

    workers to

    increase

    awareness..

    4 2 5 40

    13

    Continues

    and

    discontinues

    centrifugal

    Mechanical

    failure.

    Total

    destruction to

    the machineand injury to

    worker due tothe broken

    parts

    8

    Over load

    No

    preventive

    maintenance

    1 None 10 80

    1.Regular

    preventive

    maintenance.

    2.Wearing PPEat all time.

    3.FollowingOperation

    manuals

    correctly.

    4 1 5 20

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    Table 3. Scenarios that might lead to failure for each subsystem

    S.

    No

    Subsystem/

    Module &

    Function

    Potential

    Failure

    Mode

    Potential End

    Effects of

    Failure

    Possible scenarios of potential causes of failure.

    1Melter to melt the raw

    sugarOver flow of mixture

    Burning and scalds tooperator.

    Down time to plant.

    The sensor got damage due to the heat of melter and did not operate causing the over flow of the.

    The sensor did not give the signal to the control unit due to loos connection in the wiring .

    The floating system of the sensor is filled with sugar syrup disabling the function of sensor.

    Excessive voltage.

    2Melter to melt the roe

    sugar

    Burning incident due

    to contact.

    Burning and scalds to operator.

    The isolation is decaying with time.

    The isolation wrapping is done poorly by contractor.

    The warning sign is not in place .

    The operator is not wearing the personal protective equipment

    3Inside the process

    building

    Heat stock to

    operator

    Heat related illness due to the

    hot working environment

    The operator is dehydrated due to the low consumption of water .

    The ventilation fans are not installed in the process building .

    The precaution sign is not installed in the area .

    4Heat exchanger to heat

    the Sugar syrup.

    Burst of pipe due to

    Pipe blockage

    Burning to operators .

    Down time to plant

    No regular cleaning before process start up.

    The cleaning procedure is no t done adequate.

    The Affiation process is not efficient in taking out the impurities before going to the heat exchanger .

    5Carbonation vessel for

    sugar purification

    Carbon dioxide

    leakageAsphyxia and health illness.

    Over pressure inside the carbonation vessel.

    The seals are worn out .

    The flanges are not tight enough to prevent the leakage.

    6Lime dosing station for

    sugar purification.

    Continuous contact

    with Lime stone

    Danger to the lungs and eye in

    a long run exposure The bag filters of the de-dusting system is not cleaned regularly.

    The operator is not wearing the breathing mask during operation .

    7 Vacuum pumpRunning the pump

    without water ring

    Pump burns causing

    downtime.

    The operator is not familiar with the running procedure .

    The operator did not attend the training course .

    8Dosing of caustic soda

    for declarationContact with caustic

    soda

    Causes burns and scarring, can

    cause serious damage to all

    body tissues contacted

    The operator is not familiar with the risk of the chemical .

    The operator is not wearing the personal protective equipment.

    Lack of patience during loading and unloading of chemical .

    9

    Dosing of Hydrogen

    chloride for

    declaration

    Contact with

    Hydrogen chloride

    May cause damage to the

    following organs: Lungs,

    Upper Respiratory ,skin and

    eye.

    The operator is not familiar with the risk of the chemical .

    The operator is not wearing the personal protective equipment.

    Lack of patience during loading and unloading of chemical .

    10

    Evaporator to

    concentrate the sugar

    syrup.

    Burning o skin due to

    contact

    Burning and scalds to operator. The isolation is decaying with time.

    The isolation wrapping is done poorly by contractor.

    The warning sign is not in place .

    The operator is not wearing the personal protective equipment .11Heat exchanger to heat

    the Sugar syrup.

    Burning o skin due to

    contact

    Burning and scalds to operator.

    12

    Continues and

    discontinues

    centrifugal

    Draw bodies

    Cut and other injuries and may

    lead to death due to the high

    kinetic energy involved incentrifuge

    The operator is not familiar with the running procedure .

    The operator did not attend the training course .

    The warning sign is not in place. The machine is not isolated and guard .

    13

    Continues and

    discontinues

    centrifugal

    Mechanical failure.

    Total destruction to the

    machine and injury to worker

    due to the broken parts

    Over load of the centrifugal .

    Not conducting the preventive maintenance .

    Not performing the inspection procedu re before start up.

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    There are 21 subsystems identified with potential failures on Zone 2, as shown in Table 4.Table 5

    shows as all possible scenarios that might lead to failure for each potential failure mode for each

    subsystem, the causes of failure mentioned in the FMEA spreadsheet are general and the possible scenarios

    of potential causes of failure. The subsystems that need to be prioritized include Dust Explosion due to hot

    work having PRN (450); Dust Explosion due to Stopping the Drum when it is hot and full of sugar

    having PRN (350); Dust Explosion due to Hot surfaces like Hot bearings having PRN (300); and DustExplosion due to electro static having PRN (300).The safety measures taken by the YCSR at this Zone

    include: the conveyors are provided with a speed switch, security ropes and with belt deport detectors ,If

    one switch detects a failure or is activated the conveyor should give a warning signal to the control room;

    the conveyor cannot be started without the de-dusting system starting and have to stop in case of failure in

    the de-dusting system; In case of shut down of the suction fan of the hot de-dusting system , the alert signal

    is appearing in the control room to shut down the dryer; If the drier temperatures are out of range, the alert

    signal is appearing in the control room to shut down the feed screw conveyor ; Certified explosion bursting

    disc with burst sensor mounted on the outside of the filter unit and the rotary dryer.

    There are 8 subsystems identified with Failure Modes as shown in Table 6, four of which

    have High Risk Priority Numbers and should be addressed immediately : Dust Explosion due to Hot

    bearing having PRN (300); Dust Explosion due to the accumulation of sugar dust having PRN

    (300) ; Dust Explosion due to electro static having PRN (240); and Injury of the hand of the operator(piercing) in the sewing machine having PRN (560). The safety measures taken by YCSR in this

    zone include: The conveyors are fitted with a speed switch, security ropes and with belt deport

    detectors ,If one switch detects a failure or is activated the conveyor is giving warning signal to the

    control room; The conveyor cannot be started without de-dusting system starts and have to stop in

    case of failure in the de-dusting system; Certified explosion bursting disc with burst sensor mounted

    on the outside of the filter unit .

    The evaluation of benefits and costs of the recommended actions mentioned in FMEA spread

    sheet are shown in Table 8, wherein all the recommended actions have a B/C ratio of greater than 1.0.

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    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15

    S.N

    Subsystem/

    Module &

    Function

    Potential

    Failure

    Mode

    Potential

    End

    Effects(s)

    of

    Failure

    Severity

    Ranking

    Potential

    Cause(s) of

    Failure

    Probabilit

    y of

    Occurren

    ce

    Ranking

    Current

    Controls/

    Fault

    Detection

    Probabilit

    y of

    DetectionRanking

    Risk

    Priority

    Number.

    Existing

    (PRN)

    Recommende

    d

    Action(s)

    Severity

    Ranking

    Probability

    of

    OccurrenceRanking

    Probabilit

    y of

    DetectionRanking

    New RPN

    1

    Sugar rotary

    drier

    Dust Explosion

    Injury and

    chances of

    death to

    workers

    ,including

    Plant

    down time

    10

    The

    Electrical

    connection

    are no more

    Explosion

    proof due to

    wear and tear

    3

    Explosion

    venting.

    Explosion

    proof

    connection

    s.

    6180

    Regular

    preventive

    maintenanc

    e and

    inspection.

    6 2 3 36

    2 Dust Explosion

    May lead

    to burning

    of sugar

    creating

    source of

    heat and

    damage to

    the dryer

    10

    Stopping the

    Drum when

    it is hot and

    full of sugar

    5

    Explosion

    venting.

    Explosion

    proofconnection

    s

    7 350

    1. Tainting

    to

    operators

    .

    2. Followin

    gOperatio

    nmanuals

    correctly

    .

    7 2 2 28

    3 Dust Explosion

    Hot

    bearings

    and

    creating

    heat

    source

    10

    Excessive

    heat and

    vibration on

    bearings

    4

    Explosionventing.

    Explosion

    proof

    connection

    s

    6 240

    1. Tainting

    tooperators

    .

    2. Followin

    g

    Operatio

    n

    manuals

    correctly

    .

    3. Regular

    preventi

    ve

    maintena

    nce and

    inspectio

    n.

    7 1 2 14

    4 Dust Explosion

    Increasing

    the

    temperatur

    e of dryer

    ,Creating

    source of

    ignition

    which lead

    to dust

    explosion

    10

    Temperature

    transmitter

    not operating

    3

    LCD

    monitoring

    system

    5 150

    1. Tainting

    tooperators

    .

    2.

    Followin

    g

    Operatio

    n

    manuals

    correctly

    .

    3. Regular

    preventi

    ve

    maintena

    nce and

    7 1 2 14

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    5 Burning incident

    Burning

    and scalds

    to

    operator.

    10

    No warning

    signs are

    mounted nearto the dryer

    6 Non 8 480

    1. Isolation

    by guard

    rail.

    2. Warning

    signs.

    3. Training

    of

    workers

    to

    increase

    awarenes

    s..

    6 2 3 36

    6

    Belt

    conveyor

    transportingthe refined

    sugar fromDryer to

    storage silos

    and from

    storage silos

    to packing

    building

    Dust explosion

    Injury and

    chances of

    death toworkers

    ,including

    Plant

    down time

    10Hot surfaces

    like Hot

    bearings

    3De-dusting

    system10 300

    1. Regular

    preventi

    ve

    maintena

    nce

    2. Installation off

    frictionless

    bearings.

    3. Impleme

    nting the

    explosio

    n

    venting

    7 1 3 21

    7 Dust explosion

    Injury and

    chances of

    death to

    workers

    ,including

    Intensive

    destruction

    10

    Spark due to

    the electro

    static

    3De-dusting

    system10 300

    1. Groundin

    g of the

    system. 7 1 7 49

    8 Dust explosion

    Injury and

    chances of

    death to

    workers

    ,including

    Plantdown time

    10Spark due to

    hot work5

    De-dusting

    system9 450

    1. Intensive

    Tainting

    to staff.

    2. Special

    hot

    working

    permission.

    10 1 7 70

    9 Dust explosion

    Injury and

    chances ofdeath to

    workers

    ,including

    Plant

    down time

    10

    Inadequatesystem for

    dust suction

    inside the

    conveyor.

    2De-dusting

    system10 200

    Regularinspection of

    filters in the

    de-dusting

    system.

    10 1 5 50

    10 Belt Damage

    Belt

    conveyor

    damage

    which lead

    to Plant

    downtime.

    7

    Overload and

    speed

    indicator not

    operating

    3

    Overload and

    speed

    indicator

    5 105

    1. Tainting

    to

    operators

    .

    2. Followin

    g

    Operatio

    n

    7 1 2 14

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    manuals

    correctly

    .

    3. Regular

    preventi

    ve

    maintena

    nce and

    inspectio

    n.

    11 Belt Damage

    Belt

    conveyor

    damagewhich lead

    to Plantdowntime.

    7

    Alignment

    sensor not

    operating

    3Alignment

    sensor5 105

    1. Tainting

    to

    operators

    .

    2. Followin

    g

    Operatio

    n

    manualscorrectly

    .3. Regular

    preventi

    ve

    maintena

    nce and

    inspectio

    n

    7 1 2 14

    12

    Dedustingsystem for

    dryer

    Dust explosion of

    the system

    Injury and

    chances of

    death to

    workers

    ,including

    Plant

    down time

    8

    Spark due to

    the electro

    static

    3 Non 10 240

    1. Spark

    detection

    system.

    2. Flameles

    s

    explosio

    n

    venting

    on pipe.

    3. Isolation

    quick

    closingvalve.

    4. Explosio

    nsuppressi

    on .

    5. Groundi

    ng of the

    system.

    4 1 3 12

    13 Dust explosion

    Injury and

    chances of

    death to

    workers

    ,including

    Plant

    down time

    8Spark due to

    hot work3 Non 10 240

    1. Spark

    detection

    system .

    2. Flameles

    s

    explosio

    n

    venting

    on pipe.

    3. Isolation

    quick

    closing

    4 2 4 32

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    4. Explosio

    n

    suppressi

    on .

    5. Groundi

    ng of the

    system.

    6. Tainting

    to

    operators

    .

    7. Special

    hot

    working

    permissi

    on.

    14

    Dedusting

    system for

    sugar coolerand

    conditionin

    g

    Dust explosion

    Injury and

    chances of

    death toworkers

    ,including

    Plant

    down time

    10Spark due to

    hot work3 Non 10 300

    1. Spark

    detectionsystem .

    2.

    Flameless

    explosio

    n

    venting

    on pipe.

    3. Isolation

    quick

    closing

    valve.

    4. Explosio

    n

    suppressi

    on .

    5. Special

    hot

    workingpermissi

    on

    4 2 4 32

    15 Dedusting

    system for

    sugar cooler

    and

    conditionin

    g

    Dust explosion

    Injury and

    chances of

    death to

    workers

    ,includingPlant

    down time

    10

    Ignition

    source due

    hot

    equipmentlike bearings

    3 Non 10 300

    1. Regularpreventi

    ve

    maintenance

    2. Installati

    on off

    frictionle

    ss

    bearings.

    3. Impleme

    nting the

    explosio

    n

    venting

    7 1 3 21

    16 Dust explosion of

    the system

    Injury and

    chances of

    death to

    workers

    ,including

    8

    Spark due to

    the electro

    static

    3 Non 10 240

    1. Spark

    detection

    system .

    2. Flameles

    s

    4 1 3 12

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    down time n

    venting

    on pipe.

    3. Isolation

    quick

    closing

    valve.

    4. Explosio

    n

    suppressi

    on .

    5. Groundi

    ng of the

    system.

    17

    Storage

    silos 4 X3000T

    Dust explosion

    Damage to

    the roof ofsilos and

    thefeeding

    belt

    conveyors,

    death of

    workers

    10Ignition

    source due to

    hot work

    2De-dusting

    system8 160

    1. Spark

    detection

    system .

    2. Explosio

    nventing

    3.

    Taintingto

    operators

    .

    4. Special

    hot

    working

    permissi

    on

    8 1 2 16

    18 Dust explosion

    Damage to

    the roof of

    silos and

    the

    feeding

    belt

    conveyors,

    death of

    workers

    10

    Ignition

    source due

    hot

    equipment

    like bearings

    2De-dusting

    system8 160

    1. Regular

    preventi

    ve

    maintena

    nce

    2. Installati

    on off

    frictionle

    ss

    bearings.

    3. Implementing the

    explosio

    nventing

    8 1 2 16

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    Table 5. Possible scenarios of potential causes of failure on Zone 2.

    S.No

    Subsystem/Module &Function Potential Failure Mode Potential End Effects of Failure Possible scenarios of potential causes of failure.

    1

    Sugar rotary drier

    Dust ExplosionInjury and chances of death to workers

    ,including Plant down time

    The electrical connections are loos without isolation .

    Electrical spark due to loose connection.

    Hot surface due to the over load of the circuit breaker .

    2 Dust ExplosionMay lead to burning of sugar creating source

    of heat and damage to the dryer

    Failure in the rotating wheel.

    The temperature increase inside the rotary dryer.

    The operator is not aware of the consequences of the sudden shutting down of the rotarydryer.

    The warning sign is not in place .

    Unpredicted failure of the monitoring software. .

    3 Dust Explosion Hot bearings and creating heat source

    Over load of the rotating rollers on the bearings.

    Not providing lubrication for the bearings before start up .

    Not conducting the preventive maintenance for the bearings.

    4 Dust ExplosionIncreasing the temperature of dryer ,Creating

    source of ignition which lead to dust explosion

    The sensor got damage due to the heat of rotating dryer and did not operate causing theincrease of heat .

    The sensor did not give the signal to the control unit due to loos connection in the wiring .

    The setting parameters for the software are corrupted .

    5 Burning incidentBurning and scalds to operator.

    No guard rails to isolate the area.

    The operator is not aware of the hazard related to rotary dryer or no PPE.

    No warning signs are mounted near.

    6

    Belt conveyor transporting therefined sugar from Dryer to

    storage silos and from storage

    silos to packing building.

    Dust explosionInjury and chances of death to workers

    ,including Plant down time

    Over load of the rotating rollers on the bearings.

    Not providing lubrication for the bearings before start up .Not conducting the preventive maintenance for the bearings.

    7 Dust explosionInjury and chances of death to workers

    ,including Intensive destruction

    Spark generated due to the electro static buildup on the surface of the conveyor due to

    contact with sugar.

    The equipment are not grounded to the earth.

    8 Dust explosionInjury and chances of death to workers

    ,including Plant down time

    Residual smoldering particles left over right after the welding process.

    No clear instruction and procedure on hot work permit especially for the dust hazard area .

    The clearance distance and safe zone arrangement where not done before conducting the

    welding process.

    9

    Belt conveyor transporting therefined sugar from Dryer to

    storage silos and from storagesilos to packing building.

    Dust explosionInjury and chances of death to workers

    ,including Plant down time

    The preventive maintenance are not carried out for the de-dusting system .

    Regular cleaning for the de-dusting system is not done.

    The de-dusting pipe is shocked due to the accumulation of dust particles.

    10 Belt DamageBelt conveyor damage which lead to Plant

    downtime.

    The sensor got damage due to the heat and other physical damage.

    The sensor did not give the signal to the control unit due to loos connection in the wiring .

    The setting parameters for the software are corrupted .

    11 Belt Dama eBelt conveyor damage which lead to Plant The sensor got damage due to the heat and other physical damage.

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    20 Poisoning Death to worker , or dyspnea or asthma

    Breathing the antiseptic chemicals used to killer germs and insects inside the silos .

    Breathing the pesticides chemical used to killer germs and insects inside the silos .

    The operator not wearing the proper face mask and breathing filters during the process ofapplying the pesticides and the antiseptic chemicals inside the silos.

    21 Operator fall Death to worker or major injury Appointing people having phobia of elevation to do the maintenance above the silos.

    Not providing guard rails around the silos.

    not installing anti slipping materials on footbaths.

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    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

    S.N

    Subsystem/Module &Function

    PotentialFailureMode

    Potential EndEffects(s) of

    Failure

    SeverityRanking

    PotentialCause(s) of

    Failure

    Probability ofOccurrence

    Ranking

    Current

    Controls/Fault

    Detection

    Probabilityof Detection

    Ranking

    Risk PriorityNumber.

    Existing (PRN)

    RecommendedAction(s)

    SeverityRanking

    Probabilityof

    Occurrence

    Ranking

    Probabilityof Detection

    Ranking

    1

    Belt conveyortransportingthe refinedsugar from

    silos topackingbuilding

    Dust explosion

    Injury and chancesof death to workers

    ,including Plantdown time

    10Hot surfaces

    like Hot

    bearings

    3 None 10 300

    1. Regular

    preventivemaintenance

    2. Installation offfrictionless

    bearings.Implementingthe explosionventing

    7 1 3

    2

    Belt conveyor

    transportingthe refinedsugar from

    silos topacking

    building

    Dust explosion

    Injury and chancesof death to workers

    ,including Plantdown time

    10

    Inadequatesystem for dustsuction insidethe conveyor.

    2 None 10 200Regular inspection of

    filters in the de-dusting system.

    10 1 5

    3

    Packingbuilding which

    contains all

    equipment forsugar packing

    Dust explosion

    Injury and chancesof death to workers

    ,including Plantdown time

    10

    Accumulationof sugar duston various

    surfaces and

    presence ofignitionsource.

    3 None 10 300

    1. Regularcleaning of the

    facility withspecial vacuum.

    2. Regularinspection from

    the safety incharge.

    3. Declaration ofno smoking

    zone.

    3 1 2

    4

    De-dustingsystem whichcollects the

    dust fromdifferent of thepacking system

    Dust explosion

    Injury and chancesof death to workers

    ,including Plantdown time

    8Spark due tothe electro

    static

    3 None 10 240

    1. Spark detectionsystem .

    2. Flamelessexplosionventing on pipe.

    3. Isolation quick

    closing valve.4. Explosion

    suppression .

    5. Grounding ofthe system.

    4 1 3

    .

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    S.N

    Subsystem/Module &

    Function

    PotentialFailure

    Mode

    Potential EndEffects(s) of

    Failure

    Severity

    Ranking

    PotentialCause(s) of

    Failure

    Probability ofOccurrence

    Ranking

    CurrentControls/

    Fault

    Detection

    Probabilityof Detection

    Ranking

    Risk PriorityNumber.

    Existing (PRN)

    Recommended

    Action(s)

    Severity

    Ranking

    Probabilityof

    OccurrenceRanking

    Probabilityof Detection

    Ranking

    5

    Chute ofweighing

    machine for

    sugar .

    Formation ofsugar dust which

    leads to dust

    explosion .

    Injury and chancesof death to workers

    ,including Plant

    down time

    10

    Accumulationof sugar duston various

    surfaces and

    presence ofignitionsource.

    3 Non 10 300

    1. Regularcleaning of thefacility with

    special vacuum.2. Regular

    inspection fromthe safety in

    charge.3. Declaration on

    nonsmoking

    zone..

    3 1 2

    6Packing

    machines.

    Machine

    trapping workerhands while he isfeeding the bags.

    Injury to worker 5

    Operator not

    focused whileperforming the

    work.

    10 Non 10 500

    1. Personnelprotectiveequipment.

    2. Manualactivation ofmachineclamps.

    3. Training.

    3 4 3

    7Packing

    machines.Back ach of the

    operator.Injury to worker 6

    Worker lifting

    the sugar bagsthe wrong

    way.

    7 None 8 336

    1. Personnel

    protectiveequipment.

    2. Training

    3 4 4

    8

    Sewingmachine to

    close up thesugar bag.

    Injury of thehand of the

    operator(piercing)

    Injury to worker 7

    Operator notfocused while

    performing thework.

    7 None 10 560

    1. Personnelprotectiveequipment.

    2. Training.3. Installing

    mechanicalguard.

    3 4 4

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    Table 7. The possible scenarios of potential causes of failure are for Zone 3

    S.

    No

    Subsystem/

    Module &

    Function

    Potential

    Failure

    Mode

    Potential End Effects of Failure Possible scenarios of potential causes of failure.

    1Belt conveyor transporting the refined sugar

    from silos to packing buildingDust explosion

    Injury and chances of death to workers ,including Plantdown time

    Over load of the rotating rollers on the bearings.

    Not providing lubrication for the bearings before start up .

    Not conducting the preventive maintenance for the bearings.

    2Belt conveyor transporting the refined sugar

    from silos to packing buildingDust explosion

    Injury and chances of death to workers ,including Plantdown time

    The preventive maintenance are not carried out for the de-dusting system .

    Regular cleaning for the de-dusting system is not done.

    The de-dusting pipe is shocked due to the accumulation of dust particles.

    3Packing building which contains all

    equipment for sugar packingDust explosion

    Injury and chances of death to workers ,including Plantdown time

    Not performing the regular cleaning up with the use of vacuum cleaner can leadto accumulation of sugar dust on various locations which can fuel the secondary

    explosion.

    4De-dusting system which collects the dust

    from different of the packing systemDust explosion

    Injury and chances of death to workers ,including Plantdown time

    Spark generated due to the electro static build-up on the surface of the de-

    dusting pipes due to contact with sugar.

    The equipment are not grounded to the earth.

    5 Chute of weighing machine for sugar .Formation of sugardust which leads to

    dust explosion .

    Injury and chances of death to workers ,including Plantdown time

    Not performing the regular cleaning up with the use of vacuum cleaner can leadto accumulation of sugar dust on various locations which can fuel the secondaryexplosion.

    6 Packing machines.

    Machine trapping

    worker hands while he

    is feeding the bags.

    Injury to worker Operator is not focused while performing the work.

    Performing repetitive work for long time causes the body to fatigue and which

    may lead to slower motion and absenteeism of concentration .

    7 Packing machines.Back ach of the

    operator.Injury to worker

    The operator involves himself in bag lifting where he is not supposed to dobecause the machines drops the bags and no need for the operator to interfere .

    The wrong ergonomics arrangement which causes the operator to suffer frominjuries.

    8 Sewing machine to close up the sugar bag.Injury of the hand of

    the operator (piercing)Injury to worker

    Operator is not focused while performing the work.

    Performing repetitive work for long time causes the body to fatigue and whichmay lead to slower motion and absenteeism of concentration.

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    Table 8. Estimated costs and benefits for the recommended systems

    Name of system

    Estimatedbenefit(saving on

    the equipment)equipment that

    may get damage

    according to thescenario presented

    (per 10 years)

    InitialInvestment costthe cost of thesuppression

    system as per

    the quotationgiven by

    reliable supplier

    ConventionalBenefit to cost

    Ratio with

    Present worthfactor

    ModifiedBenefit tocost Ratio

    with presentworth factor

    ConventionalBenefit to cost

    Ratio with

    Annual worthfactor

    ModifiedBenefit to cost

    Ratio with

    Annual worthfactor

    Suppressionsystem for thebelt conveyortransporting the

    sugar fromprocess building

    to storage silos

    360,000$ 30,000$ 4.6 7.9 4.6 7.9

    Suppressionsystem for thebelt conveyortransporting thesugar from the

    storage silo tothe packingbuilding

    380,000$ 36,245$ 4.066 6.825 4.066 6.825

    Suppressionsystem for the

    De-dusting units1,250,000$ 142,569$ 3.468 5.622 3.468 5.622

    Inerting systemfor the rotary

    dryer360,000$ 35,161$ 4.021 6.807 4.021 6.807

    Explosionisolation valves

    1,250,000$ 40,000$ 16.802 22.195 16.802 22.195

    Lightningprotection

    system725,000$ 47,481$ 9.089 16.939 9.089 16.939

    4.0 Conclusions/Recommendations

    Based on the data gathered from analyzing the existing system in YCSR, the process of sugar

    refining requires a lot of heating. The principle used in heating the syrup and hot air for the purpose of

    sugar drying is done using heat exchangers with the means of hot steam coming from the coal

    burning power plant. This type of heating makes the plant safer than direct heating using burners. The

    risk of catching fire in this case is reduced significantly but the hot surfaces present a threat and could

    cause dust explosions. Safety management system is not yet fully implemented. The safety team isengaged in a daily work; monitoring the safety procedure to be followed while performing the

    installation work done by contractors. It is very important to establish safety management system in

    this company before starting the manufacturing operations, else, there could many accidents during the

    time of commissioning of the machines due to the presence of unknown threats and unidentified

    hazardous places.

    The YCSR has implemented the de-dusting unit where the sugar dust is collected to bag filters

    which is one of the important safety measures to control sugar dust explosion. The explosion venting is

    provided in this de-dusting unit and in the rotary dryer to reduce the damage in case of any explosion.

    These two measures cannot protect the equipment plant in case of an explosion. Thus, YCSR needs

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    additional safety control measures to reduce the risk of the sugar dust explosion following the hierarchy

    of controls.

    For zone 1, the following measures are recommended: machine guarding; Reliable

    scheduling and documentation of maintenance activity; Implement safe work practices,

    instruction and training; strict implementation of PPE wearing zone.

    For zone 2, the following measures are recommended: machine guarding; Controlling the

    risk using engineering controls stated in the NFPA standards, below are the engineering controls

    stated in the NFPA standards; Use Engineering controls as referred to NFPA standards such as

    Spark /Ember detection and suppression system, Deflagration detection and suppression

    system, Lightning protection system, Automatic fast acting valve system, System grounding,

    and Portable Electric vacuum cleaners; Reliable scheduling and documentation of maintenance

    activity; Implement safe work practices, instruction and training; Strict implementation of PPE

    wearing zones.

    For zone3, the following measures and recommended: Control the risk using

    engineering controls stated in the NFPA standards such as Spark /Ember detection and

    suppression system, deflagration detection and suppression system, lightning protection

    system, automatic fast acting valve system, system grounding, and portable electric

    vacuum cleaners; Reliable scheduling and documentation of maintenance activity;

    Implement safe work practices, instruction and training; strict implementation of PPE

    zones.

    All of the solutions mentioned have a B/C ratio of greater than 1.0, which means that the benefit

    that the company can gain is greater than the costs to be incurred.

    The implementation of the hierarchy control especially the proposed engineering solution can

    save life and properties of the company, not only that but it can insure continuous operation of the

    plant, reduced risks, increased productivity, healthier and happier better motivated employee, better

    reputation among investors, customers and communities. The proposed solution is justified to have

    more benefits comparing to the investment cost and besides, implementing this control measure can

    lead to less premium paid to the insurance company as well . Safety is a corporate objective like sales

    and profit. Safety is profitability in terms of saving lives, saving properties from being damage,

    increased quality in products, decreased workers compensation claims savings when workers do not

    have to be replaced or retrained due to accidents, and potential reductions in health and insurance

    costs.

    It is further recommended in the future to have periodical risk assessment; administrative

    programs like training ( specially dust hazard awareness) and comprehensive housekeeping be created

    to engage employees in controlling the dust accumulation, emergency evacuation plans, fire and

    rescue drills must be conducted to be prepared in case of any incident, use belt conveyor designed with

    explosion venting; impose permitting systems to hot work and confined spaces; install fire alarm and

    fire fighting system; maintain bearing according to the manufacturers recommendations; prohibit the

    use of compressed air to clean the dust.

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    5.0 References

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    Pondicherry University.

    [2] Australian Government Department of Resources and Energy Tourism. (2008).Risk Assessment

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    [4] Bridges, W. (2011). Selection of Hazard Evaluation Techniques. Retrieved: December 5, 2012,

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    [6] Cote, A. (2003).Fire Protection Handbook, 19 thed. Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

    [7]Dust Explosion Venting Protective Systems BSEN 14491. (2006). UK: British Standard.

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    [9]Explosion Suppression Systems BSEN 14373. (2005) UK: British Standard.

    [10]Explosion Venting Devices BSEN 14797. (2006) UK: British Standard.

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    [13] Gould, J. ( 2000).Review of Hazard Identification Techniques. Sheffield: Health and Safety

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    [14] Health and Safety Executive. (2011).Five Steps to Risk Assessment. UK: HSE Books

    [15] Hugot, E. (1986).Handbook of Sugar Cane Engineering. Amsterdam: Elsevier Science

    Publishers B.V.

    [16] International Finance Corporation. (2007).Environmental, Health and Safety Guidelines for

    Sugar Manufacturing. USA: International Finance Corporation.

    [17] Lipol, L. (2011). Risk Analysis Method: FMEA/ FMECA in the Organizations.International

    Journal of Basic and Applied Sciences/ JBAS/ JENS, 11, 74-82.

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    Protection Association.

    [19]NFPA 61 Standard for the Prevention of Fires and Dust Explosions in Agricultural and Food

    Processing Facilities. (2008) .Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

    [20]NFPA 68 Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting. (2007). Quincy, MA:

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    [21]NFPA 69 Standard in Explosion Prevention Systems. (2008). Quincy, MA: National Fire

    Protection Association.

    [22]NFPA 70 National Electrical Code. (2002). Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection

    Association.

    [23]NFPA 654 Standard for the Prevention of Fire and Dust Explosions from the Manufacturing,

    Processing, and Handling of Combustible Particulate Studies. (2006). Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection

    Association.

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    [24]NFPA 2001 Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems. (2004). Quincy, MA: National

    Fire Protection Association.

    [25] Pain, S. (2010). Safety Health and Environmental Auditing A Practical Guide . Florida: CRC

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