Analysis of the 1999 Parliamentary Elections

Patterns, Trends and Motives

Univ.-Prof. Dr. Fritz Plasser (University of Innsbruck)Univ.-Doz. Dr. Peter A. Ulram (FESSEL-GfK Institute for Market

Research)Dr. Franz Sommer (ZAP - Center for Applied Political Research)

Vienna, October 4, 1999

This report can also be found at the ZAP homepage: http://www.zap.or.at.

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Table of Contents

Page

0. Preliminary remarks 3

1. Pre-electoral situation and election results 4

2. When the voter made his/her decision 6

3. Voting behaviour of the party changers 7

4. The voter’s key motives for making his/her choice 9

5. Voting behaviour by socio-demographic groups 11

6. Traditional determinants and new cleavages in voting behaviour 17

7. Transformation of the party system 19

8. References 21

9. The authors 22

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0. Preliminary remarks

This report provides a first sociological analysis of the voting behaviour in Austria in

the 1999 parliamentary elections. In terms of method, the analysis is based on the data

of a representative exit poll.

A nation-wide sample of N = 2,200 voters were interviewed about their voting

behaviour and the motives for choosing a particular party immediately after leaving

the polling stations. The FESSEL-GfK (Institute for Market Research) selected – by

random sampling – 160 locations throughout Austria. The task of the 110 interviewers

working for the institute was to interview the voters after they had left the polling

station within a certain time-frame (in the morning and early afternoon on election

day). Furthermore, the choice of the interviewees was based on a predetermined

gender- and age-specific quota sampling plan.

Due to time constraints, the present report deals only with the most significant

structures and patterns of the voting behaviour. A comprehensive analysis of the

changes of the voting behaviour as well as the competitive conditions of the Austrian

party system is in preparation.1

1 Fritz Plasser, Peter A. Ulram, Franz Sommer (editors). Das österreichische Wahlverhalten. Wien 2000 (inpreparation).

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1. Pre-electoral situation and election results

The 1999 parliamentary election campaign was one of the most dramatic in Austria's

Second Republic. Its initial phase was shaped by the confrontation between the two

government parties SPO and OVP, characterised to a large extent by issue-related

positioning. This allowed the FPO to seize the opportunity and tap into an undefined

wish for change and modify its public image by nominating a new leading candidate

(industrialist Thomas Prinzhorn). In the first half of September, the direction of the

campaign issues and the general mood underwent a significant change brought about

by the publication of the results of opinion polls in particular, which seemed to show

the FPO in a clear lead vis-à-vis the OVP, and by the massive coverage and

commentary of the elections by the mass media. With the exception of the issue of

foreigners, controversial political issues were increasingly pushed into the background,

whereas speculations on the outcome of the elections, coalition scenarios and the like

came to the fore. Considering this, it seems worth mentioning that after all 20 percent

of the voters (included in the exit poll) said that they were directly or partly influenced

by the publications of opinion poll results in the media as to their voting behaviour.

The election results of October 3 not only showed a strong decrease in the voter

turnout – with 76 percent, or a drop of nearly nine percent, compared to 1995 the

lowest voter turnout ever in the Second Republic – but also indicated massive losses of

votes for the SPO (approximately 326,000 votes, or a loss of 4.7 percent and 6 seats)

and even greater gains for the FPO (plus 5.3 percent and 12 seats; approx. 160,000

additional votes). On the other hand, with minus 1.4 percent, the losses of the OVP

were rather moderate (number of seats remained unchanged). At the time of this

analysis, the question whether OVP or FPO will come in second is still open, as the

two parties are only separated by about 14,000 votes, and there are about 200,000

absentee ballots (cast by people voting outside their usual districts) yet to be counted.

The Greens increased their share of votes from 4.8 to 7.1 percent (plus 4 seats). The

Liberal Forum remained clearly below the 4-percent mark with 3.4 percent, or minus

2.1 percent, and is now no longer represented in the new parliament. A total of 2

percent of the votes went to other parties.

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Table: Parliamentary elections in Austria 1979–1999

In percent SPO OVP FPO GREENS LIF DU

1979 51.0 41.9 6.1 n. c. n. c. n. c.

1983 47.7 43.2 4.9 3.3 n. c. n. c.

1986 43.1 41.3 9.7 4.8 n. c.. n. c.

1990 42.8 32.1 16.6 4.8 n. c. n. c.

1994 34.9 27.7 22.5 7.3 6.0 n. c.

1995 38.1 28.3 21.9 4.8 5.5 n. c.

1999*) 33.4 26.9 27.2 7.1 3.4 1.0

*) Preliminary result excl. absentee ballots.

n. c. = no candidacy.

List of Austrian Parties:

German German abbr. English English abbr.SozialdemokratischePartei Österreichs

SPÖ Social DemocraticParty of Austria

SPO

ÖsterreichischeVolkspartei

ÖVP Austrian People’sParty

OVP

Freiheitliche ParteiÖsterreichs

FPÖ Freedom Party ofAustria

FPO

Die Grünen - The Greens -Liberales Forum LIF Liberal Forum LIFDie Unabhängigen DU - -

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2. When the voter made his/her decision

One fifth of the voters of the parliamentary elections did not make their final decision

as to which party to vote for until the last days and weeks before October 3. The

percentage of “late” and “last-minute deciders” roughly corresponds to that in 1995.

According to the representative exit poll carried out by FESSEL-GfK, the voters of the

smaller parties GREENS, LIF (and DU) were among the last to make up their minds.

However, when exactly the voters of the three major parties made their decision is of

particular interest and corresponds to the course of the election campaign. As far as

both the SPO and FPO are concerned, each garnered 15 percent of the late deciders.

On the other hand, 18 percent of the OVP voters decided rather late, with 12 percent of

the OVP group having made their definite decision only during the last couple of days

before the election. A fact that proves the extraordinary mobilisation of the voter

potential sympathetic to the OVP in the final phase of the election campaign.

Table: Trends regarding the time of the voting decision (1979–1999)

Percentage ofvoters who madea definitedecision...

1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999

late deciders(shortly beforethe election)

9 8 16 14 18 21 20

early deciders(earlier on)

91 92 84 86 82 79 80

Source: FESSEL-GfK, exit polls (1979–1999).

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3. Voting behaviour of the party changers

According to their statements, 18 percent of the voters of the election on October 3,

1999 voted for a party other than the one they had voted for in the 1995 parliamentary

elections, which roughly corresponds to the average figures of the elections in the

nineties. The slight decrease in party changers from 1995 to 1999 has to be seen in the

light of the significant drop in voter turnout, which affected the SPO to a much

stronger degree than the OVP.

Table: Share of party changers in parliamentary elections (1979–1999)

Percentage of voters in theparliamentary elections

1979 1983 1986 1990 1994 1995 1999

... who voted for another partythis time

7 10 16 17 19 20 18

Source: FESSEL-GfK, exit polls (1986–1999).

The profile of the party changers clearly differs from that of the electorate as a whole

in several points. In relative terms, the strongest group is formed by the 30 to 44-year

olds making up 44 percent of all party changers. The share of secondary school

graduates/university graduates (50 percent) and white-collar workers (38 percent) is

high above average. On the other hand, the share of party changers among the older

voters and people with a lower educational level is clearly below average. Gender-

specific differences as a whole are comparatively small. In a detailed analysis,

however, they are quite telling: for instance, 63 percent of those who switched over

from the SPO to the FPO and 57 percent of those who went over from the OVP to the

FPO are men.

As with all elections since 1986, the FPO was able to garner the largest share of party

changers with 37 percent (1999), followed by the Greens with 17 percent, the OVP

with 16 percent and the SPO with 15 percent. In analytical terms, 83 percent of the

SPO and OVP voters each had already voted for the respective party in 1995. The

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OVP was able to win slightly more former Green and LIF voters than the SPO. As

regards the FPO voters of 1999, approx. 60 percent are former FPO voters. Moreover,

the FPO was able to win more former SPO voters than former OVP voters. The

Greens, too, won more votes from the SPO than from the OVP. With 8% and 9%

respectively, the share of first-time voters who voted for the FPÖ and the Greens was

significantly larger than that of voters who voted for the SPO (4%) and OVP (3%).

Table: Voting behaviour of party changers (1986–1999)

Percentage of party changerswho voted*)

SPO OVP FPO GREENS LIF DU

Parl. El. 1986 10 24 39 22 n. c. n. c.

Parl. El. 1990 15 11 51 9 n. c. n. c.

Parl. El. 1994 9 10 40 15 24 n. c.

Parl. El. 1995 25 21 34 5 13 n. c.

Parl. El. 1999 15 16 37 17 8 4

Source: FESSEL-GfK, exit polls (1986–1999).

*) Remaining percentage to make up 100%: other parties and rounding errors.

n. c. = no candidacy

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4. The voter’s key motives for making his/her choice

Motives for voting SPO

The reasons for deciding in favour of the Social Democratic Party (SPO) given by

almost two thirds of the SPO voters were: maintaining political and social stability

(65%), and the representation of interests and tradition (62%). Securing jobs and social

benefits ranked third (55%). The fact that the SPO advocates the preservation of

neutrality and opposes NATO membership was a central motive for 44% of the SPO

voters, and preventing a coalition between OVP and FPO was decisive for 38%. Last

on the list of the “reasons” as indicated by opinion polls is the leading candidate of the

SPO, Viktor Klima (35%).

Motives for voting OVP

The list of the motives for voting in favour of the OVP was headed by the

representation of interests and tradition (69% of the OVP voters). Quite equally rated

were the OVP’s economic competence (44%), preventing political instability (44%)

and the desire to prevent the FPO from outperforming the OVP (40%). Next on the list

is the party’s program of promoting the family and the personality of the leading

candidate (35% and 22%, respectively). Significant differences can be observed,

however, between traditional OVP voters and those who switched to the OVP from

other parties. In the group of party changers, 59 percent stated that it was most

important to them to prevent the OVP from falling behind the FPO; 50 percent

mentioned the prevention of political instability as an additional motive. The reasons

in favour of the OVP thus reflect the effect of the mobilisation of the voter potential

sympathetic to the OVP during the final phase of the election campaign.

Motives for voting FPO

The most important reasons given for voting in favour of the FPO were the disclosure

of irregularities and scandals (65%), and the wish for a breath of fresh air (63%). The

immigrants issue, however, was of central significance for only 47% of the FPO voters

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(fourth on the list after representation of interests and tradition). From a socio-

demographic point of view, their anti-immigration views played a more important role

for female pensioners (two thirds) and blue-collar workers (50%). Both, the

personality of Jörg Haider (40%) and the desire to teach the two coalition parties a

lesson (36%) were of comparatively lower significance.

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5. Voting behaviour by socio-demographic groups

The continuing transformation of the Austrian party system is reflected in significant

changes in the voting behaviour of individual population and professional groups.

Considering the present data it is no exaggeration to speak of a “realignment”, i.e. the

reorientation of voting behaviour in Austria. In breaking down the voting behaviour,

not only must members of individual professional groups be considered, but also

includes gender- and age-specific reorientations. Traditional determinants of the

Austrian voting behaviour provide fewer and fewer explanations. Issue-related

expectations and general sentiment, on the other hand, seem more and more to explain

patterns of voting behaviour.

The reorientation mentioned above primarily affects striking gender-specific

differences in voting behaviour: among male voters; the FPO - though by a narrow

margin – has become the strongest party among men with a share of votes of 32

percent. The SPO was elected by 31 percent, the OVP by 26 percent of male voters.

Five percent of the male voters opted for the Greens, three percent for the Liberal

Forum.

The FPO scored particularly high (34%) among the group of men who are not yet

employed (mainly younger males who are still in vocational training and/or at school).

Twenty-five percent of this population group voted for the OVP, 14 percent for the

Greens, and only one out of ten voted for the SPO and the Liberal Forum. As regards

male voters, it is only among pensioners that the SPO is clearly in the lead (41%).

OVP and FPO have an equal share with 27 percent and 28 percent respectively among

male pensioners.

The competitive situation concerning women shows a totally different picture. Among

female voters, the SPO remains the strongest party by far with a share of 35 percent.

Twenty-seven percent of the women voted in favour of the OVP, 21 percent for the

FPO, 9 percent for the Greens and four percent for the Liberal Forum. The Social

Democratic Party scored highest with female pensioners. Forty-five percent of the

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female pensioners voted for the SPO, 32 percent for the OVP and only 19 percent for

the FPO.

In addition to the gender-specific differences regarding the voting behaviour,

significant age-specific differences became visible. Among the voters below the age of

30, the FPO was by far the strongest party with a share of 35 percent. Twenty-five

percent of those belonging to the younger generation of voters made their decision in

favour of the SPO, only 17 percent voted for the OVP. Thirteen percent of those under

30 voted for the Greens, four percent for the Liberal Forum.

Among the voters in the age group 30 to 44, SPO and FPO are neck and neck with

shares of 32 and 29 percent, respectively, 23 percent of this age group voted for the

OVP. Only among members of the older generation of voters (60 years and older), the

two governing parties both have an outstandingly high percentage of votes.

Changes, however, can also be seen in the voting behaviour of the traditional core

voters of the SPO and the OVP. Among the self-employed and those in liberal

professions, the OVP is still the strongest party with a share of 41%, 33% of this

professional group, however, turned to the FPO this time. It was only among farmers

that the traditional predominance of the OVP was preserved. 87% of Austria’s full-

time farmers voted for the OVP.

It is perfectly legitimate to speak of a spectacular development as regards the

reorientation in terms of voting among the Austrian blue-collar workers. Forty-eight

percent of foremen and skilled workers voted for the FPO. Only 31 percent of the

members of this professional group voted for the SPO, the traditional workers’ party.

Even among semi-skilled and unskilled workers, the FPO has become the strongest

party with a share of 45 percent. Only 40 percent of the members of this professional

segment voted for the Social Democrats, a mere 10 percent for the OVP.

The SPO, however, was able to stand its ground regarding its predominance in

elections among male and female pensioners: 43 percent of the pensioners voted for

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the SPO, 30 percent for the OVP and 24 percent for the FPO. The pattern among

housewives, however, is less uniform. Thirty-three percent voted for the SPO, whereas

the OVP and FPO with 26 percent and 25 percent respectively are de facto on a rather

equal footing. Among voters who are still at school or in vocational training, the

characteristic features of the changes in voting behaviour have become more obvious:

one out of every five in this group of voters opted either for the SPO, the OVP, the

FPO or the Greens.

One indication of how dramatic the final phase of the election campaign was, is

provided by the data on the behaviour of those voters who – according to their own

statements – had made their definite decision only in the last few days before the

election. Twenty-nine percent of these “last-minute deciders” voted for the OVP, 22

percent for the SPO, 17 percent for the FPO and 14 percent for the Greens. However,

among those voters who - according to their own statements - had made up their minds

as to who to vote for as late as in the last one or two weeks before the election – the

“late deciders“ – the SPO was the strongest party with a share of 30 percent. The FPO

came second with a share of 25 percent. Eighteen percent and 17 percent respectively

of the “late deciders” voted for the OVP or the Greens.

The voting behaviour of the party changers is also most telling: 37 percent of the party

changers voted for the FPO and 17 percent for the Greens. The OVP was able to

attract only 16 percent, the SPO only 15 percent of the party changers. Switching

parties, of course, only partly explains the shift in votes. Due to the strong decrease in

the voter turnout, the number of those who abstained from voting as a sign of protest

also contributed to the losses that the governing parties, in particular, had suffered.

However, as only those who voted could be interviewed within the scope of an exit

poll, the following data do not provide any indications for the quantification of the

non-voter effect.

The comparison of a series of five representative exit polls so far offers insight into

long-term changes of selected groups of voters. Compared to the 1995 parliamentary

elections, the SPO had done slightly better among white-collar workers, the OVP

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slightly worse. Compared to the parliamentary elections of 1986, the SPO lost four

percent, the OVP lost 13 percent and the FPO won nine percent.

The reorientation in the voting behaviour of the Austrian workers is far more dramatic.

While in 1986 the SPO was still elected by 57 percent of Austria’s workers, this figure

decreased to a mere 35 percent in 1999. In other words, the Social Democratic Party

has lost 22 percent points in its core group within the last 13 years. In the same period,

the OVP’s share among workers was reduced by 50 percent. In 1999, a mere 12

percent of the workers voted for the OVP, whereas the FPO has become the strongest

party among workers. While in 1986 only ten percent who voted for the FPO, 47

percent did so in 1999. Within a period of 13 years, not only did the FPO quadruple its

share of votes among the workers but also became by far the predominant workers’

party since the 1999 parliamentary elections.

Table: Changes in the voting behaviour of selected voter groups: blue-collarworkers

In percent SPO OVP FPO GREENS LIF

Parl. El. 1986 57 26 10 4 *

Parl. El. 1990 52 21 21 2 *

Parl. El. 1994 47 15 29 4 2

Parl. El. 1995 41 13 34 3 4

Parl. El. 1999 35 12 47 2 1

Changes (1986–1999) -22 -14 +37 -2 -1

Source: FESSEL-GfK, exit polls (1986–1999).

Due to strong gains in other professional groups, the proportion of workers (blue-

collar) among the FPO voters has at the same time diminished overall. Twenty-seven

percent of the FPO voters now come from the working class, while in 1995 35 percent

were from this group. The rise of the FPO to become the predominant workers’ party

indicates deep changes in the social basis of the Austrian parties. The political

reorientation of the workers is unprecedented in the extent of the change when

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compared to the situation in Western Europe. Twenty years ago, four percent of

Austrian workers voted for the Freedom Party, while in 1999 47 percent did so. This

means that the FPO share has risen more than tenfold during this period.

By contrast, the voting behaviour of working women has only slightly changed as

compared to 1995. The SPO lost about three percent, and the OVP was able to

maintain its share of votes, while the Greens managed to win five percent among

female workers.

However, the attractiveness of the governing parties among the younger voting

generation has continued to decline. Only 25 percent of the voters under 30 voted for

the SPO, and only 17 percent cast their vote for the OVP. With a 35 percent share of

the votes, the FPO is by far the strongest party in this age group. The Greens, however,

also made an above-average showing in this age group with a share of 13 percent.

There are striking changes in the voting behaviour of the civil servants and public-

sector workers. In 1995, the SPO posted its strongest gains especially in this

professional group, appealing to 48 percent of this voter group, whereas in 1999 its

share of votes dropped to a mere 33 percent. On the other hand, the OVP posted an

increase of some 10 percent among civil servants and public-sector workers, following

close behind the Social Democrats at 30 percent.

As in the preceding parliamentary elections, the gender-specific composition of the

party constituencies partly shows significant differences. Once again, the structure of

the FPO constituency is predominantly male: 62 percent of the FPO voters are male.

On the other hand, women predominate among the voters of the Greens: 63 percent of

the constituency of the Greens is female. Thus, the Greens have a larger proportion of

women among their voters than the Liberal Forum.

The age-specific differences in the 1999 parliamentary elections remained unchanged.

Middle-aged voters and those of the elder generation make up the majority of the

voters of the two governing parties. The voters of the three opposition parties, by

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contrast, are comparably younger. Three out of four voters of the Greens, for instance,

are under 45, as are about 60 percent of the FPO voters.

As regards the level of education, the differences are similarly significant. Nearly three

quarters of Liberal Forum voters have at least completed secondary higher education,

as have two thirds of those opting for the Greens. Graduates from secondary schools or

university graduates make up 41 percent of the OVP voters. The proportion of SPO

and FPO voters with a higher educational level is 30 percent each.

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6. Traditional determinants and new cleavages in voting behaviour

The voting behaviour of persons who are strongly affiliated with a religious

denomination has remained steady in the course of time, although their share in the

electorate has continuously declined. In these elections, 59 percent of the voters who

were strongly affiliated with a particular religion – defined as regular attendance of the

church service – have voted for the OVP, 20 percent for the SPO and only 13 percent

for the FPO. On the other hand, the formative influence of union affiliation, which is

the second traditional determinant of voting behaviour in Austria, has become slightly

weaker. Forty-nine percent of the union members voted for the SPO, whereas nine

years ago this figure had been 62 percent. In 1999, 21 percent of the union members

voted for the FPO. Thus, the share of FPO voters among union members has doubled

within nine years. The proportion of the OVP, however, is comparably stable: 19

percent of the union-member employees again voted for the Austrian People’s Party in

these elections.

In the late 90s, however, these traditional determinants are no longer sufficient to

describe the complexity of the Austrian voting behaviour. New conflicts and shifts are

meanwhile shaping the voting behaviour of the Austrians to a greater extent than the

affiliation with a particular church or union membership. Due to time constraints, the

authors can only deal with the fundamental changes in the conflicting structure of the

Austrian party system.

• Class voting, which shaped the Austrian voting behaviour until the 70s is a thing of

the past. Only 35 percent of the blue-collar voters opted for the Social Democratic

Party, while 60 percent voted for centre-right parties, of which the FPO managed to

attract 47 percent. The behaviour of the white-collar voters also shows only relics

of traditional class voting. In this group, too, the Social Democratic Party is in

fierce competition with the OVP and FPO, but also with the new post-materialistic

and libertarian parties such as the Greens or the Liberal Forum.

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• The most striking gender-specific differences in voting behaviour can be found

with the FPO, which is number one among men, but continues to rank third in the

group of female voters. It is a gender gap which has only been seen in the voting

behaviour in the US, where the Republican Party, similar to the FPO, has caused a

gender-specific polarisation in voting behaviour.

• Age is another significant dividing factor in the Austrian voting behaviour. Only 42

percent of the voters under 30 opted for the SPO or OVP. The FPO has become the

strongest party by far among the members of younger generations of voters with a

share of 35 percent. But even in the 60 plus age group, pensioners no longer

concentrate their votes on the two traditional parties. The SPO and OVP continue

to have an above-average share of voters among senior citizens, and, consequently,

the governing parties have an obviously overly aged voter structure. However, with

a share of 23 percent, this time the FPO has become a competitive factor in this

voting sector.

• Since the 1994 parliamentary elections the Austrian election researchers have also

pointed to a new shift in the voting behaviour between the sheltered and

unsheltered production sector, for which there is empirical evidence in the 1999

parliamentary elections. Only 21 percent of the public-sector employees voted for

the FPO as compared to 31 percent of the employees in the private sector. This is

also reflected in the voting behaviour of non-union member employees. The OVP

and FPO have an equal share of 30 percent each among non-union members, while

the SPO is only the third-largest party in this voter segment with a 24 percent

share.

• The voting behaviour of persons living in a worker household shows how

permeable the “Lager”, which are so characteristic for Austria, have become. This

is the line along which the conflict and competition runs between the SPO (41

percent share) and FPO (38 percent share), which are steering an increasingly

fiercer confrontational course within this social class.

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7. Transformation of the party system

The 1999 parliamentary elections were a turning point and point to far-reaching

consequences for the Austrian party system. The historic arrangement of a party

system which is held in a state of equilibrium by two dominating parties embedded in

firmly established social milieus has definitely become history. What took shape at the

1996 election of the European Parliament for the first time – the competition between

three parties of roughly the same size – has turned into reality for Austrian

parliamentary elections on October 3. Long-term changes in the underlying structures

of party competition, which only seemingly came to a halt in the 1995 parliamentary

elections, have continued to progress under the surface and contributed to a

transformation which is unprecedented in Austria. The particular cornerstones of this

transformation are as follows:

• the dramatic losses of the Social Democratic Party, which hit an all-time low in the

1999 parliamentary elections;

• the stalemate situation between the FPO and OVP regarding the election outcome,

as only after the counting of the absentee ballots it will be clear which of the two

parties will actually rank second or third by a very narrow margin;

• the spectacular reorientation in the voting behaviour of the Austrian workers,

which made the FPO the dominant workers’ party;

• the fundamental reorientation of the voting behaviour in the younger generation of

voters, to the detriment of the two traditional parties SPO and OVP;

• the far-reaching changes in the conflicting structures of the Austrian party system,

which threatens to force the two traditional parties SPO and OVP in particular into

the opposition;

• the clear decline of voter turnout compared to former Austrian elections including

the rise in voting abstention as a sign of protest;

• the volatile moods of a public opinion which is to an increasing degree controlled

by the press concentrating on editorial news value and on circulation;

• finally, the problems of governing and in finding a functioning government

majority.

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The 1999 parliamentary elections were obviously a vote for change as well as an

expression of fundamental changes in society. In the next weeks it will be equally

important to give a responsible answer as well as to reasonably interpret the voters’

undefined desire for political changes in the country.

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8. References

Bürklin, Wilhelm/Klein, Markus: Wahlen und Wählerverhalten. Eine Einführung, 2. Auflage,Opladen 1998.

Müller, Wolfgang C./Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A. (Hg.): Wählerverhalten undParteienwettbewerb. Analysen zur Nationalratswahl 1994, Wien 1995.

Müller, Wolfgang C./Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A.: Schwäche als Vorteil, Stärke alsNachteil. Die Reaktionen der Parteien auf den Rückgang der Wählerbindungen in Österreich,in: Peter Mair/Wolfgang C. Müller/Fritz Plasser (Hg.): Parteien auf komplexenWählermärkten, Wien 1999.

Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A.: Konstanz und Wandel im österreichischen Wählerverhalten, in:Wolfgang C. Müller/Fritz Plasser/Peter A. Ulram (Hg.): Wählerverhalten undParteienwettbewerb, Wien 1995.

Plasser, Fritz/Sommer, Franz/Ulram, Peter A.: Ende des traditionellen Parteiensystems?Analyse der Nationalratswahl 1994, in: Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 1994, Wien1995.

Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A./Ogris, Günther (Hg.): Wahlkampf und Wählerentscheidung.Analysen zur Nationalratswahl 1995, Wien 1996.

Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A./Seeber, Gilg: (Dis-)Kontinuitäten und neue Spannungslinien imWahlverhalten: Trendanalysen 1986–1995, in: Fritz Plasser/Peter A. Ulram/Günther Ogris(Hg.): Wahlkampf und Wählerentscheidung, Wien 1996.

Plasser, Fritz/Ulram, Peter A./Sommer, Franz (Hg.): Das österreichische Wahlverhalten.Analysen zum „Superwahljahr“ 1999, Wien 2000 (in preparation).

Roth, Dieter: Empirische Wahlforschung. Ursprung, Theorien, Instrumente und Methoden,Opladen 1998.

Roth, Dieter/Wüst, Andreas M.: Parteien und Wähler. Erklärungsmodelle des Wahlverhaltens,in: Heinrich Oberreuter (Hg.): Ungewißheiten der Macht. Parteien, Wähler,Wahlentscheidung, München 1998.

Schmitt-Beck, Rüdiger: Mediennutzung und Wahlentscheidung: Fünf westliche Demokratienim Vergleich, in: Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 4/1998.

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9. The Authors

Fritz Plasser is Professor of Political Science at the University of Innsbruck and

Director of the Center for Applied Political Research in Vienna.

Franz Sommer is Research Consultant at the Center for Applied Political Research in

Vienna.

Peter A. Ulram is Head of the Political Research Department at the Fessel-GfK

Institut, Vienna, and Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of

Vienna.