Analysing e-Government Project Success and Failure Using the Design-Actuality Gap Model

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Any examination of the relationship between ICTs, organisational reform and institutional change may commence with the words of Nye (2002): Technol-ogy affects society and government, but the causal arrows work in both directions. Technological change creates new challenges and opportunities for social and political organizations, but the response to those challenges depends on history, culture, institutions, and paths already taken or forgone. The outcome of an e-government project, therefore, does not rely on a single project entity alone, and instead depends on the interaction between different actors in the process and the nature of the relationships between them. Gaps in project design and implementation can in reality be seen as expressions of differences arising from the interaction between different (often conflicting) actor moves and strategies, determined to a large extent by actor perceptions, and played out within the context of set, often inflexible circumstances.

In order to assess the extent to which success or failure impacts e-government project implementation, this article will examine the analytical framework first proposed by Richard Heeks The Design-Actuality Gap Model and its three seminal archetypes; which contends that the major factor determining project outcome is the degree of mismatch between the current ground realities of a situation (where are we now), and the models, conceptions, and assumptions built into a projects design (the where the project wants to get us). In doing so, the article endeavours to pay due cognisance to the degree to which project failure (or the general inability of the project design to meet stated goals and resolve both predicted and emerging problems) is symptomatic of a broad, complex set of interrelated inequalities, unresolved problems, and

lopsided power relations; both within the adopting organisation and in the surrounding environmental context.

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Traditionally, political institutions have been seen as preconditions for civilised society, with students of politics being interested in how they work and how their organisation within a social system impacts the everyday lives of citizens (March & Olsen, 1989). Institutions may be thought of as: the structure that humans impose on human interaction and there-fore define the incentives that together with the other constraints (budget, technology, etc.) determine the choices that individuals make that shape the perfor-mance of societies and economies over time (North, 1994, p. 1). Institutional change, therefore, according to Prats (2000), refers to the intentional or voluntary insertion of innovation into a current system through a sufficiently assumed transformation of its rules and internal games.

Alterations of relative prices, such as information costs or technology changes, become the most important sources of institutional change, however, changes in relative prices are motivated both by the transformation of actor perceptions regarding those changes as well as the behaviour alterations which those perceptions give rise to; that is, through the construction of new mental models that result from the acquisition of learning and skills which help interpret the new context. More precisely, such institutional change generally occurs when an alteration in a relative cost is perceived by one or more group of actors to be a win-win situation for either that group alone or for all the participants involved. Whilst such change thus depends chiefly

Shefali VirkarDepartment of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, UK

DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-5888-2.ch316

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on actors perceptions with respect to the gains (the payoffs) to be obtained, it must be remembered that it is the existing structure and form of an institution itself that determines the nature and direction of the payoffs (North, 1994).

If, like Thomas and Bennis (1972), one understands organisational change within institutions to be the deliberate design and implementation of a structural innovation, a policy, a new goal, or an operational transformation; it may be accepted that ICT applica-tions could result in organisational changes (such as the efficient and speedy delivery of public services, the increased proximity of services to the citizen, or the simplification of formalities and requirements) that impact core public management values. What is less clear, though, is how public sector ICT applications re-sult in either formal or informal institutional alterations, which include, to paraphrase North (1990), the reform of the rules of interactions within those structures, or, more strictly speaking, the alteration of the constraints that humans impose on their political, economic, and social interactions. This is largely due to the fact that the relationship between technology and institutional transformations has not yet been clearly defined.

In assuming that the manner in which ICT applica-tions are being used depends on the type of institution they are adopted by, Fountain (2002) believes that the potential benefits of implementing an e-government strategy will be strongly influenced by current institu-tions of government, as the actors involved determine the choices they make depending on the incentive systems within those structural arrangements. ICTs in the public sector are thus designed, developed, and used according to the preferences of government stakeholders which, in turn, have been shaped taking into consideration the formal and informal rules and constraints (or institutions) as well as the enforcement characteristics of both (Fountain, 2002).

The stated design of an information system on paper, however, does not automatically translate into a successful project on the ground, nor does it lead one to necessarily conclude that technology transformations alter significantly the status quo of the adopting public organisation. According to Gasc (2003), Information and Communication Technologies will give way to institutional change only if the new skills and learning that governmental actors acquire mesh with current ground realities in such a way that they conclusively alter employee perceptions regarding the potential gains

that result from the new situation. In turn, the degree to which those perceptions may be altered depends on how much the workplace and other ground realities of an actor is affected by the new structures that result from ICTs applications.

The question is, then, what will motivate that change? Fountain and Osorio-Urzua (2001) identified three groups of institutional variables that would col-lectively influence not only whether a project would be undertaken at all, but also whether a new technol-ogy would be adopted by all the actors concerned; thereby giving rise to alterations in their perceptions of the given technology. The first group consists of Technological Variables, which include the ability of a user-population to access ICTs, the quality of the user populations Internet use, the availability of an internal technological infrastructure, and the provision of technical skills to the government workforce. Foun-tain and Osorio-Urza argue that the quality of an agencys Information and Communication Technology infrastructure and overall skill level are critical inputs to make-or-buy decisions.

The second group is that of Managerial Variables, in which are included the efficiency and effectiveness of the supply chain, the characteristics of the agencys culture, and the capacity of the adopting agency to adapt to and to manage change. Again, Fountain and Osorio-Urzua argue that an agency that is well managed is likely to have a higher probability of success implementing either internal or outsourced e-government solutions. The final group, Political Variables, consists of the perceptions public servants have regarding potential labour cuts, administrative turnover, and changes in executive direction generated by the development of e-government, together with the impression they have of the desire of other political actors to be associated with e-government projects, the budgetary resources available, and the direction or orientation of the project to long-term results.

Only when all these variables are present and sum total of their interrelationships taken into account will both organisational and institutional change occur in permanence. In sum, because Information Technology projects within the public sector result in new organi-sational forms that exploit new knowledge and give rise to work alterations, there is obviously a chance for institutional change to take place (Gasc, 2003). Like all political interactions, the behaviour of actors related to the design and uptake of e-government projects is

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circumscribed by the organisations and institutions of which they are a part, and by the range of actors itself taken from the individuals and groups directly and in-directly involved with the process of governance. From this discussion, two areas of study present themselves as useful starting points for this article:

Actor Perceptions: Organisations and insti-tutions both shape and are shaped by the use of technology, which is in turn influenced by changes in the perceptions of governmental actors towards that technology. Understanding actor preferences and opinions is thus key to determining the disjoint between project design and current ground realities, together with the nature and direction of organisational reform and institutional change.

Project Outcome: The design and implemen-tation of a project must be carried out within the constraints of the current organisational and institutional set-up. In other words, the outcome of a project depends on the interaction between organisational and institutional realities and the project design. In turn, project outcome has an impact on the existing organisational and insti-tutional frameworks.

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and that of Actuality may be further divided into and measured according to key underlying elements or sub-components.

The second perspective is that of Elemental Gaps, or mismatches in dimensional sub-components that are found more particularly where the separate elements of each Design dimension along which a project is evalu-ated are not identically matched to the sub-components of each Actuality dimension put forward. The concept of dimensional elements may, therefore, be underlined, in that it breaks down each axis of design and actuality into measureable pieces. In consequence, an understanding of the differences that may arise between the two base axes and within the elements or subcomponents of both Design and Actuality allows for a better, in-depth, and more subtle comprehension of the top-level gaps that might come about (Virkar, 2014).

Seven dimensions, summarised by the ITPOSMO acronym and illustrated in Figure 1, have been fur-ther identified by Heeks (2006) as being necessary and sufficient to provide the researcher with a base understanding of design-actuality gaps. These are: Information, Technology, Processes, Objectives and Values, Staffing and Skills, Management Systems and Structures, and Other Resources.

These conditions may be further classified into three so-called archetypes of failure, situations when a large design-actuality gap and, hence, failure is more likely to emerge: Hard-Soft Gaps, Public-Private Gaps, and Country Context Gaps (Dada, 2006).

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Hard-soft gaps refer to the difference between the actual, rational design of the technology (hard) and

Figure 1. The ITPOSMO dimensions of e-government project design-actuality gaps (Source: Heeks, 2003)

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the actuality of the social context people, culture, politics, etc. within which the system operates (soft). These sorts of gaps are commonly cited in examples of e-government failure in developing countries, where soft human issues that are not initially taken into account whilst designing a project result in undesir-able effects after implementation (Dada, 2006). Many scholars, such as Stanforth (2006), see technology as just one of a number of heterogeneous socio-technical elements that must be considered and managed dur-ing the design and implementation of a successful e-government project, whilst different sets of case studies have revealed that numerous factors which al-low individuals in developing countries to access ICTs (and which depend on resources, skill-levels, values, beliefs, and motivations, etc.) are often ignored (Madon, 2004). It may thus be inferred that a lack of training, skills, and change management efforts would all affect rates of failure, as it is these factors that would bridge the gap between the technology itself and the context within which it exits.

A major cause of project failure in developing countries is a general lack of skills and training, which are necessary for both government officials and citizens to effectively use a system (Moon, 2002). This is a par-ticularly significant problem in developing countries, where there is often a chronic lack of qualified staff and training schemes. According to Basu (2004): there are insufficient numbers of people in developing countries trained in appropriate technologies to do all the work. Training opportunities are also straining to meet needs. Widespread low rates of literacy make this situation very difficult and costly to change, exacerbating failure of projects in these countries (Bhatnagar, 2004).

Jaeger and Thompson (2003) assert that an e-government system would fail if the government did not take an active role in educating citizens about the value of e-government, a fact all the more pertinent in developing countries where low levels of education and skills amongst end-users and a lack of familiarity with technology could result in systems not being used to their full potential. Thus it may be inferred that the rate of success or failure is likely to be influenced by the ability of a population to access useful information and services (Virkar, 2011).

The issue of change management also impacts the hard-soft gap in developing countries, as e-government projects result in the realignment of working practices

and government functions (Dada, 2006). As this article will discuss later, the successful implementation of an e-government project requires that the public sector changes and re-engineers its internal processes to adapt to the new technology and work culture. In situations where corruption and rent-seeking is the norm, the realignment of information flows and power structures can be heavily resisted by actors with vested interests (Peterson, 1998). Project design often does not take into account the potential for resistance amongst government employees, and project designers are consequently not equipped with the tools necessary to counter it when they come across it.

In their paper examining the impact of the Gyan-doot Project on the rural population of Andhra Pradesh (India), Ceccini and Raina (2004) state that in order for e-government projects to succeed, it is imperative that the service and information needs of the end-user community are established, and that technology should be developed in collaboration with local staff. Doing this, they feel would create a sense of local ownership and significantly decrease any hard-soft gap. They also advocate greater participation in project implementa-tion, from local administrators and other political actors to the community at large through a sustained campaign of local awareness (Ceccini & Raina, 2004).

Hard-soft gaps thus may be seen as the outcome of interactions played out primarily at the level of the project itself, between individuals and agencies involved with the design and acceptance of the technology (Virkar, 2011). For instance, decisions taken by senior officials relating to issues of change management and skill levels might be motivated by the desire of the top brass to curtail and keep in check the power of their junior employees and to maintain control over their territories. Similarly a clash between powerful rivals on a project planning committee could result in either half-baked compromise decisions or strong decisions that are not followed through, leading to chaos at the implementation stage that has repercussions on more junior staff.

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The next archetype put forward by Heeks (2003) is that of private-public gaps, which refers to the difference between organisations in the private and public sectors, and the mismatch that results when technology meant


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for private organisations is used in the public sector without being adapted to suit the role and aims of the adopting public organisation. A common problem is again the lack of highly skilled professionals in the public sector, resulting primarily from uncompetitive rates of pay in that sector as compared to the private sector (Ciborra & Navarra, 2005). The design of e-government projects is consequently outsourced to the private sector, resulting in a clash of values, objectives, culture, and large design-actuality gaps.

The gap between the public and private sector may also be discussed in terms of management styles, val-ues, and cultures; and the impact that these differences have on system design (Ciborra, 2005). For instance, private sector systems are designed to see recipients of services as customers, while to governments they are citizens. There are numerous problems associated with viewing citizens as customers, not in the least that customers by definition need markets to operate in and have the ability to choose between alternative products, both of which are necessarily difficult to find in the public sector since public service providers are usually monopolies. Further the private sector sees customers as a means of making a profit and thus prices its goods accordingly, and not always to the benefit of all (Virkar, 2011).

On the other hand, government services are public goods that every individual has a right to access, and thus the government needs to set prices to ensure equal access of services to everybody. In other cases, private sector organisations with activist leanings may attempt to impose their own value systems and goals on the de-sign of a project, leading to a clash of priorities. Overall, in adopting private sector values, governments would often be required to make an enormous paradigm shift and tailor their way of working accordingly, something that developing country agencies often find difficult to adjust to (Virkar, 2013).

Another private-public mismatch has to do with project design in relation to funding. e-Government projects in developing countries are usually driven by government departments who rely either on public funds or aid from donor agencies, money that usually comes in as a block budgetary allocation that has to be used by a particular date (Heeks, 2003). Projects are thus often planned as one-off investments a very private sector mind-set. However, this may result in an all-or-nothing approach to systems development, rather than a set of incremental improvements, to the

overall detriment of the project. Public-private gaps often arise out of games played at the level of the adopting government agency, generally between the agency and its private sector counterparts, although it is not uncommon to find interactions between public and private individuals on project committees having an impact on the outcome of a project as well.

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The final archetype of failure defined by Heeks (2003) is the country context gap, or the gap that arises when a system designed for one country is transferred into the reality of another. This is particularly true for sys-tems transferred between developed and developing countries, where designs for one may clash with the actualities within the other. Country context gaps are closely related to hard-soft gaps as they arise from, amongst other things, differences in technological infrastructure, skill sets, education levels, and working cultures (Dada, 2006).

As discussed in previous sections, benefits to be had from e-government in developed countries include a reduction in processing costs and in the time saved through the complete automation of work and the processing of all transactions online. In order that they be fully realised, both service providers and end-users need to have the skills and savoir-faire to use the technology to its full potential. On the other hand, developing countries often lack the basic infra-structure physical and human needed to support the wholesale computerisation of tasks and services, and as a consequence those systems adopted in their entirety from the developed world without taking into account these factors have a high chance of failing.

Country-context gaps emerge chiefly as a result of games played by national, provincial, and international actors operating across borders. For instance, decisions to adopt or promote a certain management style or value system, to buy or sell a particular technology from a particular organisation or country, or to collaborate with particular government agencies in different parts of the world, all stem from games of international trade, aid, and diplomacy.

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This article contributes further to the Design-Actuality Gap Framework proposed in earlier sections through the introduction of the dual concept of dimensional gaps and of elemental gaps. The extended framework explains with greater precision the gaps that arise between a governments ICT policies and current on-the-ground actualities, particularly when neither the design and actuality dimensions of a situation nor the elements of each dimension are the same, and allows for both a better, in-depth evaluation of current circumstances and a more comprehensive identification of the ways in which the design process might be enhanced.

In this vein, the research on and the application of the base theory of the proposed framework therefore contributes significantly to the literature on ICT for de-velopment and on the positioning of ICTs in developing countries, whilst its nuances enrich the literature canon surrounding the mechanisms of policy evaluation, especially through the development of a method that assesses policy design success in terms of the degree of difference between design objectives and citizens realities. The key outcome of this research, therefore, for both practitioners and policymakers is the fulfil-ment of the need for a thorough assessment tool that encourages the involvement of citizens and business representatives in the policy design process, in order that design-actuality gaps may be either completely avoided or so that their closure has a greater impact on a countrys ICT growth and efficient usage.

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Two major criticisms have been levelled against Heeks model in the literature, which emerge from the discus-sion of the framework presented in this article. The first is that it is much too simplistic: it is fairly obvious that the larger the gap between a proposed system and the realities on the ground as a consequence of differences in factors relating to resources, culture, preconceptions, and other rigidities; the more difficult it would be to implement a new system successfully. The second criti-cism is that the classification is prone to subjectivity in the expectations about the future and in perceptions of reality, especially since some issues can be arguably included into different categories.

In recognising these drawbacks, this author main-tains that Heeks model forms an integral part of any evaluation of e-government success or failure, as any initial evaluation made using the basic model may be nuanced and expanded upon (as has been done) by exploring in greater detail the factors resulting in the eventual outcome. Further, it is important to remember that placing different reasons for failure into the vari-ous categories is not as important as understanding the issues and the underlying factors themselves, thereby being able to anticipate and deal with such problems if they were to arise.

The model is particularly useful given the large investments made by developing country governments in e-government systems and the large opportunity costs associated with implementation, as it encourages project planners to take a focused, holistic view of problem solving; making them consider concurrently the technology at hand, the current circumstances, the impact of actors motivations and actions, and possible vested interests. It may be used both as a predictive tool anticipating potential failings and heading them off at the initial stages, as well as being used to di-agnose problems during the execution of the project. The framework is thus a means of evaluating outcome and problem solving strategies at all stages during the development of a project, and not just to examine what went wrong in hindsight.

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Analysing e-Government Project Success and Failure Using the Design-Actuality Gap Model