AN EXAMINATION OF THE RELATIONSHIPBETWEEN THE CONCEPTS OF PROJECTIVEIDENTIFICATION AND INTERSUBJECTIVITY

Carol Weaver

ABSTRACT Projective identification has been described as `the most fruitful psychoanalyticconcept since the discovery of the unconscious' (Young 1994, p. 120). Many psychoanalysts,including Ogden, have also begun exploring the philosophical concept of intersubjectivity andhow it may augment psychoanalytic understanding and practice. Existential psychotherapistsinclude those who believe that intersubjectivity is the basic way in which humans relate.Diamond writes that `Without a notion of intersubjectivity, psychoanalysis is in difficulty, for itis impossible to envisage how feelings belonging to one individual pass into another' (Diamond1998, p. 202).

After exploring the concept of projective identification and the claims from variouscontemporary psychoanalysts that this mechanism is interpersonal rather than purelyintrapsychic, the paper explores the philosophical concept of intersubjectivity. Thecommunication of emotion and the implications for therapy are then discussed, beforeconclusions are drawn about the relationship between the two concepts under examination.

Introduction

Klein first used the term `projective identification' in her paper entitled `Notes on SomeSchizoid Mechanisms' (1946). The term was used in a fairly strict sense to describe amainly intrapsychic mechanism where the child or patient, in phantasy, projects bad partsof the self into the mother or therapist and then identifies with that object (i.e. person).

Although many Kleinians still employ the term `projective identification' in itsoriginal, mainly intrapsychic sense, after 1946 others noted how this intrapsychicmechanism often had an actual effect on the external object, where one was involved.Since then the definition of projective identification has been broadened to encompassmany kinds of interpersonal relationships with a variety of motives, including the motiveof communication.

Torras de Bea describes projective identification as `the mechanism basic to allhuman interaction' (Torras de Bea 1989, p. 272) whilst, within the existential andphenomenological schools of thought, intersubjectivity is considered to be the basic wayof relating. Perhaps therapists within different schools have observed similar phenomenawithin relationships but have used different terms to describe them.

CAROL WEAVER was awarded an MA in Psychotherapy and Counselling by City University in1998, having studied at Regent's College, London. She is now UKCP registered. She is a counsellorand psychotherapist for South Lincolnshire Healthcare, and an honorary therapist at the Edith CavellHospital in Peterborough. Address for correspondence: 10 Fotheringhay, Peterborough PE8 5HZ. [email: CarolWeaver@compuserve.com]

British Journal of Psychotherapy, Vol 16(2), 1999© The author

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The Concept of Projective Identification

In 1946 Klein wrote of how the splitting of the ego results in excrements and badparts of the self being projected into the mother, the purpose being to control and takepossession of this object. The mother is then seen as being part of the self in thisaggressive relationship. She writes:

Much of the hatred against parts of the self is now directed towards the mother. This leads to aparticular form of identification which establishes the prototype of an aggressive object relation.I suggest for these processes the term 'projective identification'. When projection is mainlyderived from the infant's impulse to harm or to control the mother, he feels her to be apersecutor. In psychotic disorders this identification of an object with the hated parts of the selfcontributes to the intensity of the hatred directed against other people. As far as the ego isconcerned the excessive splitting off and expelling into the outer world of part of itselfconsiderably weaken [sic] it. For the aggressive component of feelings and of the personality isintimately bound up in the mind with power, potency, strength, knowledge and many otherdesired qualities. (Klein 1946, p. 183)

Since 1946 there has been much thought around the concept of projectiveidentification. Hinshelwood tells us that 'the history of Kleinian thought, from the mid-1950s or so onwards, has been largely the development of projective identification' (Hinshelwood 1991, p. 164). There has also been much debate about the concept, themechanisms involved and the definition, especially with regard to the followingquestions.

1. What is the difference between projection and projective identification?Freud was the first to use the term 'projection' and, like many psychoanalytic concepts,including the one currently under discussion, it has been used in a variety of ways sincethen. 'Projection' is mainly used to attribute certain states of mind to someone else. Forexample, 'I love him' becomes 'I hate him' becomes 'he hates me' and so persecutoryfeelings are experienced.

The difference between projection and projective identification as Klein saw themappears to be that, where projective identification is concerned, the infant projectsexcrements and (usually) bad parts of the self into the mother but does not see themother as a separate individual. Instead the mother is seen as the bad self. This is wherethe 'identification' part applies. In the concept of projection, internal feelings areexternalized onto a separate individual.

However, Spillius (1983) thinks that it is not useful to distinguish between the twoconcepts and that Klein added depth and meaning to Freud's concept of projection.

2. Should the term only be used when the recipient is emotionally affected?The more modern view as to the difference between the definitions of projection andprojective identification seems to centre around whether or not a real external object hasbeen affected. Spillius (1988) feels that this is not in accordance with Klein's originaldefinition, telling us that the term 'projective identification' is often used in a manner thatis incompatible with Klein's original conception. Many Kleinians believe that theconcept of projective identification includes projection into internal objects, and externalobjects may or may not be affected.

Young (1994) writes that many American analysts concentrate on the interpersonalform of projective identification at the expense of the intrapsychic one, and feels that thisimpoverishes the concept by not allowing sufficient scope and space for the inner

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world and internal objects. He writes that `The key issue here is whether or not a real,external Other, who has been affected by the projection, is essential to the concept.British Kleinians say no; some American interpreters say yes' (Young 1994, p. 124).

3. Is the projection always related to a body part?Spillius (1988) tells us that Klein thought a specific bodily phantasy was alwaysinvolved. Klein writes, `The... attack derives from the anal and urethral impulses andimplies expelling dangerous substances (excrements) out of the self and into the mother'(Klein 1946, p. 183). She adds, `Together with these harmful excrements, expelled inhatred, split off parts of the ego are also projected on to the mother, or as I would rathercall it, into the mother' (Klein 1946, p. 183).

Those non-Kleinian therapists who concentrate solely on the interpersonal aspects ofprojective identification are ruling out the unconscious phantasies which were the root ofKlein's definition. By this, I mean that Klein felt that unconscious phantasies were basedon `the somatic events in the body which comprise the instincts, and are physicalsensations interpreted as relationships with objects that cause those sensations' (Hinshelwood 1991, p. 32).

4. Is projective identification only to be used for the projection of bad qualities?Projective identification is normally associated with the projection of bad aspects of theself into an object. However, Klein made it clear that good qualities can be projected aswell as bad, writing, '... if this projective process is carried out excessively, good parts ofthe personality are felt to be lost' (Klein 1946, p. 184). Good aspects of the self may alsobe projected into an object for safekeeping, i.e. to split and separate them from the badparts remaining. With the more recently defined interpersonal forms of projectiveidentification, then good feelings may be communicated as well as bad for a variety ofmotives.

Bion's (1967) theory is that the patient projects emotion into the therapist in orderthat the emotion may be modified and returned to the patient, i.e. `contained'. Perhapsthis, in turn, builds upon Jacques's (1955) theories which say that individuals may puttheir internal conflicts into persons in the external world, unconsciously follow thecourse of conflict by means of projective identification, and re-internalize the course andoutcome of the externally perceived conflict.

Money-Kyrle (1955) writes about how therapists identify with patients both in theintrojective and projective forms of identification, believing that there is a fairly rapidoscillation between the two. The therapist introjects the patient, understands him, thenreprojects him with an interpretation. Presumably this would allow for emotions to bemodified.

Casement (1985), furthering the work of Bion (1967), describes a particular form ofprojective identification as `affective communication'. This concerns the projection of anemotion by the patient into the therapist for purposes of communication. The patient mayor may not feel the emotion themselves.

Many therapists believe that `empathy' is essential in the therapeutic relationship.Empathy has been defined as a capacity to share in the experience of another (Reik1937). So, if the therapist senses the patient's emotion, is this due to projectiveidentification or empathy? In order for us to be able to share the experience of the patientaccurately, must the patient be using projective identification? If the patient is notprojecting emotion, then are we just imagining how it would be for us if we had

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the patient's experience? On the other hand, if empathy does involve projectiveidentification on the part of the patient and introjective identification on the part of thetherapist, then could this be why empathy is such a `necessary condition' for therapeuticchange (Rogers 1957)? Young (1994) believes that projective identification is thefoundation of the therapeutic relationship. To him empathy, countertransference andunconscious communications are all forms of projective identification.

The discussion so far has centred on how the child or patient uses projectiveidentification to project feelings into the mother or therapist, but the reverse may also betrue. In both the therapeutic relationship and the mother/child relationship, projectiveidentification may be two way.

To summarize, the concept of projective identification does not appear to be veryclearly defined. The original Kleinian concept has been extended and there is muchdebate. Various writers, including Bion (1967), have tried to divide the concept intodifferent `versions' or `forms' - the intrapsychic and the interpersonal versions; theabnormal (psychotic) and the normal versions; the form used for communication and theform used to control the object.

The Concept of Intersubjectivity

Existentially, intersubjectivity may be seen as a state of being-in-the-world. It is thespace between humans in which they interact. Intersubjectivity is the intersection of twoor more beings-in-the-world. Intersubjectivity is not a philosophy that regards humanbeings as discrete objects where individuals are isolated thinkers, but as beings 'inrelation' to other people and objects, as described by various philosophers.

Cohn (1997) defines intersubjectivity as 'being-in-the-world-with-others', empha-sizing the relational context. He quotes Merleau-Ponty:

True reflection presents me to myself not as an idle and inaccessible subjectivity, but asidentical with my presence in the world and to others, as I am now realizing it: I am all that Isee, I am an intersubjective field. (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 452)

Crossley (1996) writes that intersubjectivity is an interdisciplinary concept whichappeals to philosophers, sociologists, psychologists and political thinkers alike, and helpsto form connections between the disciplines. He discusses two types of intersubjectivity -'egological' intersubjectivity based on Husserl (1991) and 'radical' intersubjectivity basedon Buber's (1958) 'I-Thou' relationship.

Egological intersubjectivity is based on Husserl's work and 'empathic intentionality' -the self in the position of the other. We experience the world as intersubjective, i.e. alsoexperienced by others: we suppose others see the world as we do. Schutz (1970)criticizes Husserl saying that consciousness of self entails a sense of the other. 'Self' and 'other' are relational terms and therefore meaningless without the other. There can be noself-consciousness nor self-awareness without the other. Hegel (1979) believed thathumans have a desire for recognition. 'Subjects experience each other as experiencingbeings and experience themselves as experienced' (Crossley 1996, p. 20).

Husserl's idea of others seems to be subject-centred, i.e. 'the other' is created by theself. From a psychological viewpoint, this could be likened to an intrapsychic objectrelationship.

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Crossley's radical intersubjectivity is based on the work of Buber (1958) who tells usthat the terms `self' and `other' must always be relational and writes of I-Thou and I-Itrelationships. These two types of relationships are ways of addressing the other. I-Itrelationships deal with others as objects of our experience to be used, whereas IThourelationships are mutual relationships where the other is a subject in communication withus. Buber takes the meeting of participants and the space between them as an irreducibleand primordial structure. The thoughts and meanings that arise are formed in and belongto the interworld which forms between them. In contrast to Husserl's idea of others, the I-Thou relationship could be seen as an interpersonal relationship.

From the above, it could be argued that both intersubjectivity and projectiveidentification have developed, from the philosophy or psychology of the individual, to aphilosophy or psychology which is `in relation' or `interpersonal'.

Trevarthan (1977) imported the term intersubjectivity from phenomenologicalphilosophy into biology. His belief is that infants are born with the requirements forintersubjectivity and are motivated by a desire to communicate. This is `primaryintersubjectivity' and is followed, at a later stage, by `secondary intersubjectivity' whereinfant and caregiver share in a world of objects together.

Stern (1985) also defines intersubjectivity in biological terms and describes the earlyinteraction between mother and child. He believes that intersubjectivity is a primarypsychobiological need related to achieving security needs and attachment goals. Sternwrites about the view that there is a need for 'human-group-psychicmembership' (Stern1985, p. 136), saying that it is necessary to be part of a group to survive and the survivalvalue of intersubjectivity is enormous.

The term `intersubjective' has also been used explicitly within the discipline ofpsychoanalysis, by various authors including Stolorow and Atwood. Their definition ofintersubjectivity seems to revolve around the idea of `the observer is the observed' (Stolorow & Atwood 1992, p. 2). They first used the term `intersubjectivity' in a paperdiscussing the interplay between transference and countertransference, saying that thisterm reflects the interaction between the differently organized subjective worlds ofpatient and analyst. Once again, there is a link here with projective identification, as bothtransference and countertransference can be described as forms of projectiveidentification.

Although the term `intersubjectivity' is being used within different disciplines andsome authors seem to be describing it as something to be achieved, the basicphilosophical concept states simply that intersubjectivity is:

1. An attack on Cartesian dualism, i.e. Descartes' theory of an isolated mind in a body.2. A belief that humans cannot exist without each other.3. A belief that our experience is subjective.4. A belief that, as our experience is subjective and we cannot exist in isolation, our

experience is also intersubjective.

Intersubjectivity is a basic condition of existence - something that 'is' not somethingthat 'is achieved' (Diamond 1998). This means that it may be negative as well as positive.

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The Communication of Emotion

The modern usage of the term projective identification describes a process whereby oneperson somehow puts their feelings into another person. The term tends to be usedmostly for the passing of negative emotions that are hard to bear. Yet good feelings canbe passed too, by whatever means of communication is used. Haven't we all experienceda feeling of warmth passed to us from caring individuals? Isn't this what most mothers domuch of the time? Can't happiness be infectious in the same way as sadness?

But how is the feeling passed? Is it mainly through non-verbal communication or is itsomething more? As Marrone says, 'There is scant literature explaining what people do,what strategies, techniques or modes of communication they use, in order to make therecipient comply with the projection' (Marrone 1998, p. 132). We are left asking how it isthat we can experience another's experience.

Crossley (1996) tells us that for Merleau-Ponty our relations with others are always 'mooded'. 'Emotion is a situated corporeal attitude, a way of being in relation to the world'(Crossley 1996, p. 45). Our emotions function at a primordial, pre-reflective level and wemay not necessarily be reflectively aware of them. The more we are absorbed in anemotional attitude, the less likely we are to realize the fact. For Merleau-Ponty:

1. Emotions are not inner states - they are public and intersubjectively definable.2. Emotion is a way of relating - it is part of the system with others. We are joined by

emotion.3. Therefore emotion must be dialogically constituted - it shapes and is shaped by our

interactions with others.

Crossley writes, 'We might be angry, for example, creating fear in the other, whichthen makes us feel guilty because we didn't want to hurt them. And we will carry thisguilt into our next situation, which might make our other suspicious, making us angrywith them, etc.' (Crossley 1996, p. 46). He could quite easily be writing about projectiveidentification here, rather than intersubjectivity.

Stern (1985) writes of how affective experiences can be shared via intersubjectivity.He calls this 'affect attunement'. This attunement is only a part of intersubjectivity andwould seem to be more about sharing emotional experiences rather than 'getting rid' ofone's bad feelings into someone else as is often, but not always, the case with projectiveidentification. So can affect attunement be said to be related to projective identification inany way, or is it more related to the concept of empathy? Stern himself says that affectattunement is not sufficiently close to empathy, writing that 'The evidence indicates thatattunements occur largely out of awareness and almost automatically. Empathy, on theother hand, involves the mediation of cognitive processes' (Stern 1985, p. 145).However, he does feel that both affect attunement and empathy share the initial processof 'emotional resonance'.

Stern's statement implies that, in order for empathy to occur, there must be awillingness to receive the feelings of another. Does this mean that with intersubjectivityand perhaps projective identification there is no such willingness? Perhaps the degree ofconsciousness is the main factor here in distinguishing between the two, if there is adistinction.

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Might not the projection of negative feelings in order to communicate or to reducethe intensity of an emotion on the part of the projector go hand in hand with anunconscious willingness to be attuned to another's feelings on the part of the recipient?Cohn writes:

Relatedness is a primary state of being - we cannot choose a world without other people.However, we can choose how to respond to this primary relatedness - what is also called 'intersubjectivity'- we can concern ourselves with it or turn our back on it. Over-involvement andisolation are both responses to being-with-others. (Cohn 1997, p. 13)

Can intersubjectivity explain unconscious communication of affect between people?Diamond states that:

However useful the notions of internalization and projection may be in clinical practice, we mustnot get confused between the understanding of specific defence mechanisms and a generalnotion of our being-in-the-world. Ogden... has noted that the process of projection could not beaccounted for without consideration of the fundamental nature of the interpersonal relation. Forwhat is required for projection is in fact an intersubjective communication of a type wherebyfeeling states of one person are received (and can be processed) by another. What some accountsof projective processes leave aside is the fact that the recipient of the projection has a specificresponse which cannot act as a mechanical sounding board for the experience of the other.Whatever happens between one person and another takes place in an intersubjective field, whichprovides the primary relation for any communication between persons. (Diamond 1996, p. 307)

Ogden writes that `the projector and the recipient of a projective identification areunwitting, unconscious allies in the project of using the resources of their individualsubjectivities and their intersubjectivity to escape the solipsism of their own separatepsychological existences' (Ogden 1994, p. 105).

He also writes, 'I view projective identification as a dimension of all inter-subjectivity, at times the predominant quality of the experience, at other times only asubtle background' (Ogden 1994, p. 99).

Implications with Regard to Therapy

Empathy is normally considered to be an important condition if therapy is to besuccessful. Spinelli (1994) writes that many therapists and authors view empathy as acognitive process where, for example, a therapist with a grieving patient might activelyremember her own experiences of grief [perhaps egological intersubjectivity - author] inorder to gain a sense of how the other feels. He then continues by writing of a differentlevel of empathy [perhaps radical intersubjectivity - author] where the therapist `attemptsto "capture" the experience within the experiential realm of the client' (Spinelli 1994, p.339). Perhaps we could liken this to the psychoanalytic concept of `examining one'scountertransference' in order to understand the patient's feelings received via projectiveidentification.

Crossley (1996) writes of how we may feel emotion without knowing it. This is basedon Merleau-Ponty's work. So if emotion is not just neurological but intersubjective, thenperhaps this begins to explain why psychoanalytic interpretations, and transferenceinterpretations in particular, often work. The patient, perhaps unknowingly, feels anemotion. The therapist senses this emotion via intersubjective

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means and makes an interpretation. This assists the patient to know what he feels,thereby making conscious what is in the unconscious mind.

Coulter (1979) writes of how we try to change our emotions or feel guilt about havingcertain emotions, yet we may have them without knowing we have them. Perhaps this iswhy learning to recognize and accept our emotions in therapy, rather than trying torepress or deny them, is so beneficial and improves our relationships.

Containment of patients is important because, if a patient has feelings that he thinksare destructive and unbearable, then if these are returned in a modified format they mightbecome more bearable. If, on the other hand, the recipient cannot handle the feelings anduses denial, further projective identification or other defences, then the patient may feelthat, indeed, those feelings are unbearable and dangerous. Failure to contain the patientcan result in therapeutic misalliances where the therapist and the patient `seekgratification and defensive reinforcements in their relationship' (Langs 1975, p. 80).

An important area in psychoanalysis may be helping patients to `separate' fromothers. Intersubjectivity in many ways implies that total separation is not possible.However, as Spinelli (1994) writes, 'I' only exist because I have separated myself fromyourself. It is necessary to distinguish 'I' from 'not I'. He says that interactive encountersoccur in:

an inter-subjective realm through which one's experience of 'being' does not occur within eachparticipant but, rather, is co-constituted between them. It is this 'middle ground', or 'space'between the engaging beings, which allows an accepting dialogue to occur. (Spinelli 1994, p.331)

This is in accordance with Merleau-Ponty (1962) who says that perception is not aninner representation of an outer world. The perceptual field is formed in the spacebetween the perceiver and the perceived by means of the active engagement of the two.

So if the perceptual field is formed in the space between the therapist and the patient,then this could be argued to be analogous to creating a third subject in the room. Ogdenwrites, 'This third subjectivity, the intersubjective analytic third (Green's [1975] "analyticobject"), is a product of a unique dialectic generated by/ between the separatesubjectivities of analyst and analysand within the analytic setting' (Ogden 1994, p. 64).

Conclusions

Klein believed that mental activity is based on unconscious phantasy mainly arising frombodily instincts. For her, projective identification is based on these phantasies. Spinellisays that:

The existential-phenomenological model assumes an inter-subjective basis to all mental activity.In other words it argues that everything we are, or can be, aware of, all that we reflect on, defineor distinguish, is relationally derived. (Spinelli 1994, p. 288)

From the above statements, there is the suggestion that, as projective identification isbased on intrapsychic activity and intersubjectivity describes interpersonal activity, thetwo concepts describe different phenomena. However, if we look at projectiveidentification in its broader, more modern sense, which includes interpersonal activitythere is a convergence between the two. The concept of projective identification

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began with Klein's description of an intrapsychic object relation based on phantasy.Husserl described intersubjectivity as being alone (ownness) though he was trying toargue against solipsism. From these historical beginnings both concepts have evolvedinto something that involves others - intersubjectivity is `in relation' and projectiveidentification is `interpersonal'. In modern times, for phenomenologists, intersubjectivityis the way in which all people relate. For some psychoanalysts, projective identification isabout the way all people relate.

Within the therapeutic situation there must always be intersubjectivity in order forthere to be a relationship. This intersubjective relationship is the intersection betweenhuman beings which allows an unconscious exchange between them, as well as thecreation of an `analytic third' (Ogden 1994). My view is that there is also projectiveidentification in most therapeutic relationships, both in its intrapsychic and itsinterpersonal forms. Projective identification is able to move from the realms of theintrapsychic to the interpersonal by means of intersubjectivity. Perhaps we could evencall this interpersonal form of projective identification `intersubjective projectiveidentification' in order to distinguish it from Klein's original intrapsychic phantasybaseddefinition. Once the emotions have moved into the space between the therapist andpatient, then the therapist is able to empathize with the patient on a deeper level and toanalyse his or her own countertransference in order to contain the patient and to makeappropriate psychoanalytic interpretations.

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