An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics by Stephen Edelston Toulmin Review by- John Rawls

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An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics by Stephen Edelston ToulminReview by: John RawlsThe Philosophical Review, Vol. 60, No. 4 (Oct., 1951), pp. 572-580Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181428 .Accessed: 11/09/2013 07:25

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AN EXAMINATION OF THE PLACE OF REASON IN ETH-ICS. By STEPHEN DELSTON OULMIN.Cambridge, England, Cam-bridge University Press, I950. Pp. xiv, 228. $3.25.

In discussing this book I shall not attempt to give a summary of itscontents for several reasons. First, the author considers a great manytopics in a brief space, and a summary would be both confusing andmisleading in a short review; and second, it seems reasonable to as-sume that students of ethics will want to study the text for themselves,since it is the first book to consider their subject from the standpointof the kind of analysis now being practiced at Cambridge and Oxford.

( i ) In the first of the four parts into which the book is divided Toul-min considers what he calls the objective, the subjective, and the

imperative approaches to the study of ethics as these are represented

in the writings of Moore, Stevenson, and Ayer. Each of these tradi-tional theories (as they are called) falls before the same objection:namely, they each fail to provide an account of what is a good reasonin moral discussion; they do not describe accurately the pattern ofmoral reasoning which actually takes place. For example, in apprais-ing Stevenson's view, Toulmin asks how far the account given inEthics and Language takes us. He thinks that it is no doubt interestingand illuminating; and there is no reason why a similarly accuratepsychological account could not be given about what goes on in othersorts of arguments - mathematical, scientific, theological, and so on.But this is not what we want:What we want o know s in which of these discussions he arguments resentedwere worthy of acceptance, nd he reasons ivengood reasons; n whichof thempersuasion as achieved t least in part by valid reasoning, nd in which agree-ment was obtained y means of mere persuasion- fine rhetoric unsupported yvalid arguments r good reasons.And it is over the criteria or rather, he com-plete ack of criteria) given for the validity of ethical arguments hat the mosttelling objection o this (and any) subjective heory arise (p. 38).

The purpose of ethical theory, then, is to give an account of validmoral reasoning, and any theory which fails to do this, whatever otherend it may serve, has failed in its primary task. This is the mainobjection which Toulmin raises to all three of what he calls the tradi-tional theories.

Considering Toulmin's criticism of Stevenson further, he notes thatit will not do for a proponent of the subjective view to say that it is

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inappropriate or devoid of interest to study the question of validity onthe grounds that all one is then doing is to select those reasons whichone is psychologically disposed to accept. Toulmin argues at pages

39-41, if I understand him correctly, that there is a usage of beingpsychologically disposed to do something which is reasonably clearand recognizable in ordinary language; and that its sense is distortedwhen it is applied to our acceptance of valid reasoning. It is incorrectto say that valid moral reasons are simply those considerations whichwe are psychologically disposed to accept, just as it would be incorrectto say that good evidence for an assertion about a matter of fact issimply that class of statements to which we are psychologically dis-posed to nod our heads. The ordinary usage of being psychologicallydisposed is of another sort, e.g., to take Toulmin's example, Adoles-cent Hottentots when sober have an acute sense of moral obligation,but after a pint of beer they lose all scruples and do only those thingswhich they are psychologically disposed to do (p. 40). The point isthat the phrase in question has a definite application to certain kinds ofrecognizable behavior which can be contrasted with other kinds. Tosay that we are psychologically disposed to do everything we do, evento give our assent to what intelligent persons think to be good reasons,is to use the phrase in such a way as to destroy its proper sense. Imight add that the same mistake is made by writers who assert thatall moral evaluations are the result of prejudices. Once again, a preju-dice is a recognizable kind of attitude which can be contrasted withother kinds of attitudes. To call all moral evaluations prejudices isto use the word prejudice in such a way as make its use pointless.

I think that Toulmin wants to say that there just is the distinctionbetween valid and invalid moral reasoning, just as there is a distinctionbetween good and bad reasoning about matters of fact; and it is the

task of the ethical philosopher to give a complete account of it, and ofthe variety of criteria by which we recognize it. It is because tradi-tional theories fail to do this that they must be rejected. While I thinkthat Toulmin is mistaken, even misinformed, about what he calls

traditional theories (see below), I find these points well taken andsound.'

(2) Another good point which Toulmin makes is the following:(Pt. II, Ch. I) there are many varieties of reasoning each with its ownpurpose and each with its own set of criteria whereby good and badreasoning of each type is distinguished. We cannot hope to answer

' It may be of interest to note that a view similar to Ayer's and Stevenson'swas expressed by Axel Hagerstr6m in Till frdgen om den objektivca ittensbegrepp (On the Question of the Objective Notion of Justice) (Upsala, I9I7).See also his piece in Die Philosophie der Gegenwart, Bd. VII, ed. RaymundSchmidt (Leipzig, I929), especially at pp. 44 ff. For some notion of the extent ofHigerstr6m's influence in Scandinavia, consult almost any volume of Theoria.

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the question what is good and bad reasoning in general (pp. 8o, 84).Rather we have to ask what is good and bad deductive reasoning;what is good and bad inductive reasoning; and what is good and badmoral reasoning. All that we can say of a general nature is that reason-ing, of whatever type, has for its purpose the presentation of an argu-ment such that the conclusion is worthy of our acceptance (pp. 70-72).Whether a conclusion is worthy of our acceptance will depend on thekind of argument it is designed to be a conclusion of and the criteriaof valid reasoning appropriate to that kind.

The importance of recognizing the versatility of reasoning, as Toul-min calls it, is obvious. One has only to recall the attempts of some

philosophers (Hume is the classic case) to specify what reasoning isin accordance with just one of its various types, say deductive reason-ing, and then, having examined other kinds of reasoning in the lightof this model, and having found that they do not satisfy it, to assertthat there is no reason for believing that the sun will rise tomorrow, orfor preferring the scratching of one's finger to the destruction of theworld. We will be much less likely to make mistakes of this kind ifwe keep in mind the great variety of the kinds of reasoning.

One may ask, however, in what way one can find out what are thecriteria appropriate to a given type of reasoning. Toulmin suggeststhat we can do this only by carefully examining various instances ofthe sort of reasoning in question and noticing how we actually distin-guish between good and bad reasoning (pp. 74, 83). I think that thissuggestion is correct as far as it goes, but that we also require somecriteria for the instances we should pick for study. For example, if wewere to study instances of inductive argument for the purpose ofmaking clear the criteria of inductive reasoning, we should not studythe arguments in advertisements, or propaganda of nation states. Weshould study the kind of evidence acceptable in a law court; or thekinds of evidence which competent scientists expect one another togive in support of their theories. Analogous restrictions should beimposed on the instances of moral reasoning which an ethical philoso-pher should study.2

(3) A further merit of the book is its calling attention to a typeof question which Toulmin calls limiting questions (pp. 155-i60,202-211). What he has to say about these is rather good although

there are points which I would like to have seen put differently, and Iam certain that a much more thorough treatment of the logic of thesequestions is needed. But what is important is that Toulmin has stressedthe finite character of all reasoning, how in any rational discussion itmust be permissible to rest one's case at some point, how senseless it is

2 See the reviewer's discussion, Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics,Philos. Rev., LX (I95I), I77-I97.

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to keep asking for a reason indefinitely, and how similar many of thedoubts about the validity of ethical reasoning are to doubts about thevalidity of inductive arguments. The latter point is suggested by hisreference to a remark of Wittgenstein's (p. 206 n.), and by his wayof contrasting and comparing scientific and moral reasoning (cf. Pt.IT).

On the basic questions, like those considered so far, I find little withwhich to disagree. The general view expressed seems to me to be thatwhich any one who is acquainted with philosophical analysis is boundto hold. After all, the aim of such analysis is to grasp and understandthe logic of all kinds of arguments, and not by the magic of a verbalformula of an inadequate semantics to commit large segments of com-mon-sense reasoning to the trash basket.

I find, however, that I disagree with Toulmin's exposition of moralreasoning on many questions of detail, and while I realize that he isonly attempting a small-scale map of such reasoning (p. i86), it seemsto me that it is defective even for this purpose.

(i) First concerning Toulmin's discussion of the pattern of moralreasoning. He rightly recognizes that there are a variety of types ofethical reasoning and lists the following: (a) Reasoning about the

rightness of specific actions in individual cases. He thinks that suchquestions are resolved by an appeal to an accepted social rule if itunambiguously, and without conflict with other rules, covers the case(pp. I44-146). (b) Reasoning about the rightness of a specific actionwhere there is a conflict between moral rules applicable to the case.These cases are decided by weighing the relative risks involved in theadoption of the various alternatives (pp. I46-I47). (c) Reasoningabout whether an action is right when there is no rule stating a dutybut where the action may meet another's need. In such cases we justifyby reference to consequences (pp. I47-I48). (This case seems to, fallunder the traditional notion of rational benevolence.)

From these three types which concern specific actions, we must dis-tinguish: (d) Reasoning about the validity of social practices under-stood to be adopted by society as a whole; and this we do by estimatingthe consequences of adopting them so far as we can make them out(pp. I48-150). (e) Disputing the justice of a principle by refusing toconform to it on a particular occasion giving rise to a test case, asToulmin calls it. Test cases are decided not by reference to currentpractice and accepted rules, but presumably by weighing the merits ofthe disputed principle (or rule) and the code of which it is a part(pp. I50-I52).

To be distinguished from all these kinds of reasoning is that of thefollowing type: (f) Reasoning about the comparative worth of differ-ent ways of life as a whole. Such cases are matters for personal, ratherthan ethical, decision; because the only practical meaning of such ques-

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tions is whether one is to remain in one's own society or, say, to goand live as an Arab tribesman n the desert (pp. I52-I53, I55-i60).

(ii) The following doubts come to mind: First, under (a) Toulmin

speaks of there being moral rules to which appeal can be made tojustify specific acts. He seems to think of these as a definitely known,and publicly ascertainable set of rules to which explicit reference isconstantly being made. But the only rules Toulmin mentions are therule that promises should be kept and the rule that one should driveon the left-hand (right-hand) side of the road. The rule about promisesis perhaps the most definite of all moral rules (probably because it isthe favorite example of moralists and not because of anything in reallife), whereas the rule of the road is a legal rule. Now the point of myobjection is this: there is no commonly accepted, well-known, definite,and constantly referred to moral code; at best but a very few rules,e.g., the one about promises. To think otherwise is to confuse moralitywith law and to think of the two as similar in most respects except thatone is enforced by public opinion, the other by the police. Now onemark of the law is the great variety and number of its specific rules,standards, and principles, whereas the morality of everyday life isrelatively free of rules. There is no definite and set procedure of justi-

fying one's actions which we all should adopt as there is often onedefinite way in which one had better defend oneself in court, or else.Consider for example the maxim that one should repay kindnesses. Isthis a rule? Perhaps, but consider how indeterminate it is. There arean indefinite number of ways in which one can fulfill it. It's a loosesort of pattern of behavior, riddled with blanks to be filled in as one'sgood sense dictates, not a rule. On these grounds I think that thenotion that we frequently justify specific actions by appeal to a sort ofwell-recognized code of rules is a mistake.3

Now all of this bears on one of Toulmin's main contentions, name-ly, that there are two kinds of reasoning: (i) justification of specificactions by appeal to rules socially recognized; and (2) justificationof the practices which the acceptance of the rules involves by appealto consequences, fecundity, social welfare, and so on (pp. I5-I51).He holds that in giving reasons for a particular action one must refersolely to the rule under which it falls (overlooking for the moment thecase wherein rules conflict and assuming that there is a rule). One canjustify saying I ought to take the book back to him by saying be-cause I promised to let him have it back, and by saying because Iought to do whatever I promise anyone to do, and so on. Beyond this

8 I think that the reflective opinions of competent persons can be explicated bya set of general principles, and that we may think of these principles as possiblegrounds of ordinary reasoning; but such an explication, if successful, is not tobe confused with a definite, explicit, and constantly referred to code of moralrules. Cf. the discussion cited above, footnote 2.

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point the question cannot arise: there is no more general reason to begiven in addition to the one which relates the action in question to anexpected social practice (p. i46). One cannot give a reason by saying

because one must not inflict avoidable suffering. This sort of groundis appropriate only when discussing the validity of social practices(pp. I50-I5 )0.

Now this seems to be mistaken. Consider the promise-keeping case,since this is Toulmin's example. It is true that if one were to insiston taking a book back to someone even where there seemed goodreason for one's not doing so, one could explain and justify one's in-sistence by saying I promised him I would bring the book back. Indoing this one simply describes the relevant moral facts of the situationwith an eye to what one knows happens to be a well-understood prac-tice. But if one is asked for a further reason, one would not repeatedlyrefer to the rule. One might, but it is unlikely and unnecessary. Aperson has already done that by saying the case involves promise keep-ing. When one goes on to give more reasons one says things like Heneeds the book because he is lecturing on a chapter in it tomorrow,

He is studying for an examination tomorrow and this book containsthe best account of the subject, and so on. And these answers are

samples of many possible answers like them; and if we were to considerthe principle at which these descriptions are aimed (not, of course,explicitly referred to), we might find that the principle was suspicious-ly like the sort of principle to which Toulmin says we cannot appeal.4The point is that a reason is any consideration which competent per-sons in their reflective moments feel bound to give some weight towhether or not they think the consideration sufficient in itself to settlethe case. And competent persons just do accept as having some weightin particular cases considerations of another kind than those which

simply point out that it is the done thing.Another oversight is that Toulmin fails to notice the open texture

of the concepts involved in moral rules, and the defeasible character ofthese rules when they exist.5 He interprets the rule about promises as

One ought to do whatever one has promised to do. But the ruleshould be interpreted as something like, When one had used a formof words, ordinarily said to constitute a 'promise,' then one shouldnot disappoint those expectations which it is reasonable to expect arebased thereon, unless... unless.... Certain standard exceptions are

4Note that one function of principles s to indicate how a case can be describedso that the description constitutes a reason.

IFor the notion of open texture, see F. Waismann in Symposium: Verifi-ability, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supp. Vol. XIX (I945), II9-,50at 121-I24. For the notion of defeasibility, see H. L. A. Hart, The Ascriptionof Responsibility and Rights, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, N.S.XLIX (I949), U7I-I94.

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allowed for, and also openings are left for the entirely unexpected, andthe merits of particular exceptions may have to be weighed case bycase.

In weighing the merits of particular exceptions who can say that itwill not be appropriate on some occasions to refer implicitly to gen-eral principles such as avoiding unnecessary suffering and the like?Another thing to note is that the open-textured and defeasible char-acter of moral rules allows us to challenge them in particular caseswithout questioning the soundness of the rule as a matter of generalpractice. This fact makes me dubious of Toulmin's notion of test cases,for this is his way of saying that we cannot deny a rule in a particularcase without questioning its general validity.

Again: Toulmin talks as if the appeal to accepted rules, either bydescription of the case, or by explicit reference, always has the sameforce (assuming that there is a rule, and no conflict of rules). Butthis is not so. It is true that if there is a recognized rule then appeal toit always has some force. There are obvious utilitarian grounds forthis which need not be considered here. Yet the force of the appealvaries from one kind of case to the next. Consider first the kind ofsituation where it does not matter which of several alternative rules

we have as long as one rule is known and adopted by everybody, e.g.,the rule of the road case. In such cases the appeal to rule is strongsimply because it does not matter what the rule is so long as all knowit and follow it, and there is nothing to be gained by changing it. Con-sider next a case where it may make a difference what the rules are,yet at the same time it is important that the rules be ascertainable andstrictly adhered to, e.g., rules relating to property, wherein it is ac-cepted that it is better that the law be settled than that it be settledright.6 Herein the reference to settled rule would have considerableforce, but the question of the justice of the law would be involved aswell. We should have to balance the interest in the security of propertytransactions against our interest in just law, and the appeal to ruleshere would not have the same force as in the previous case. Contrastboth these kinds of cases with the sort of case which would arise if arationing board overlooked special needs, e.g., enforced a rule to theeffect that expectant mothers would not be allowed extra points. Herethere are not two or more morally indifferent rules; nor need there beany concern about interests other than justice, and it would be likelythat many persons would think the appeal to such a rule as having nomoral force at all other than that they would rather grudgingly admitto it on the grounds that it is a rule. These illustrations are takenfrom legal rules (I have already suggested why it is much easier to do

' See Roscoe Pound, A Survey of Social Interests, Harvard Law Review,LVII (ig43), i-39 at 20.

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this) but they may serve to illustrate the point that the logical forceof the appeal to rule varies depending on a variety of factors; and itseems hard to account for this unless we permit the legitimacy ofgeneral utilitarian considerations even in reasoning about individualactions. (This does not mean that we recommend as a practical methodof making ethical decisions always to try to compute what action willmaximize social welfare, which recommendation Toulmin apparentlyattributes to utilitarianism [pp. I4I-I42, i6i]. Despite Broad'sauthority, Mill repudiated this notion under the head of misapprehen-sions so gross that it might appear impossible for any person ofcandor and intelligence to fall into them. 7)

A further difficulty arises with types of reasoning (d) and (e).Toulmin speaks vaguely of the appeal of consequences, the avoidanceof unnecessary suffering, and the like. Now all British moralists withwhom I am acquainted admit the principle of utilitarianism in someform, even intuitionists, e.g., Butler, Price, and Ross. The main ques-tion is whether it is the only principle involved in reasoning about theworth of social practices (waiving for the present the matter of specificactions). Even the utilitarians themselves seem to admit that it is not.Bentham had his principle about every man to count for one and no

more than one, and Sidgwick admitted certain rational intuitions, e.g.,that of benevolence.8 Since Toulmin's view is a kind of utilitarianism,one would expect, even in a small-scale map, some discussion of thiscrucial question. Instead the whole territory is left blank and labeled

the appeal to consequences.One final and general point: with due respect to Moore, Ayer, and

Stevenson, isn't it absurd on its face to take them as examples of tradi-tional moral philosophy? A comparatively small part of traditionalmoral philosophy is concerned with what today would be called analy-sis, and it is easy to find passages in older writers which state the aimof philosophical ethics in the same way as Toulmin does, namely, togive an account of ethical reasoning.9 What is more, a writer like Sidg-wick was not only fully aware that this is what he was setting out todo, but he did it in an admirably thorough and conscientious manner.The fault with the misinformed attitude toward traditional moral phi-losophy displayed in this book is that it may cause us to forget whatolder moralists have had to say. Why is this undesirable? Mainly be-cause morals is not like physics: it is not a matter of ingenious dis-

7See Utilitarianism, ch. ii, paras. 22-24; and also Letters of John Stuart Mill,ed. Hugh S. R. Elliot (London, I9IO), I, 250; II, 96.

8See The Methods of Ethics, Bk. III, ch. xiii, sec. 3 (7th ed.; London,g907).

'E.g., Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea, II45b 2-7; Butler, Dissertation II: Ofthe Nature of Virtue (note first paragraph and his general method); Hume,An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals, sec. I (end); Sidgwick, op.cit., I, 12-I4, 77-78, 373-374.

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covery but of noticing lots of obvious things and keeping them all inreasonable balance at the same time. It is just as disastrous for one ageto cut itself off from the moral experience of past ages as it is for one

man to cut himself off from the moral experience of his fellows. It maybe that Toulmin's remarks about traditional moral philosophy are justan expository device; but if so, it is one which could profitably bedispensed with.

JOHN RAWLSPrinceto'n Univsersity

SOCIAL THOUGHT IN AMERICA. By MORTON G. WHITE. New

York, Viking Press, i949. Pp. ix, 260. $3.50.The scope of Professor White's perceptive book is more restricted

than its title indicates. Its main purpose is to follow the course ofliberal social philosophy in America from the end of the nineteenthcentury to the nineteen-thirties (p. 4). For this purpose he hasselected for study the work of five men -Charles A. Beard, JohnDewey, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., James Harvey Robinson,and Thorstein Veblen - who supplied the American mind in thetwentieth century with the concepts of instrumentalism, progressiveeducation, legal realism, the economic interpretation of politics, thenew history, institutional economics, and political liberalism (p.236). His aim is not only to describe the doctrines of these influentialthinkers but to examine their philosophical claims and methods andto estimate the present worth of their achievement. Are we facedwith a dead tradition - a chapter of American thought that is alreadybehind us? Are we to perform an analysis or an autopsy ? (p. 6).His answer comes, appropriately, at the end of the book. The current

of thought these thinkers represented, he tells us, has not yet spentitself and may be only temporarily submerged. The problems withwhich they dealt are real and serious, and their answers set a patternfor one of the few distinctive movements of American thought in thetwentieth century. Above all, they communicated a respect for freedomand social responsibility which has all but disappeared from the earth.For all their fuzziness and their lack of logic they have been a forcefor the good in American intellectual life. We would do well to have ageneration which would advance some of their causes and implementsome of their programs (p. 243). In spite of its obvious effort to lookfor the silver lining this has more of the tone of an obituary than of areport on the assured intellectual assets of a going concern.

The major interest of this book lies in its identification of the centraldifficulty in which these liberal thinkers were involved. They were all,as Professor White neatly remarks of Beard, the scholarly productof a progressive age bent upon raking muck and fulfilling the promise

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An Examination of the Place of Reason in Ethics by Stephen Edelston Toulmin Review by- John Rawls