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An Evaluation of the Plant Health Enhanced Inspection and Surveillance (PHEIS) Budget Evaluation Report

06 April 2016

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An Evaluation of the Plant Health Enhanced Inspection and Surveillance (PHEIS) Budget

An Evaluation of the Plant Health Enhanced Inspection and Surveillance (PHEIS) Budget Evaluation Report

A report submitted by ICF International

Date: 06 April 2016

Job Number 30300486

ICF International Watling House 33 Cannon Street London EC4M 5SB

T +44 (0)20 3096 4800 F +44 (0)20 3368 6960

www.icfi.com


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Document Control

Document Title An Evaluation of the Plant Health Enhanced Inspection and Surveillance (PHEIS)

Budget

Job No. 30300486

Prepared by Rupert Haines, Stefania Chirico

Checked by Andrew Jarvis

Date 06 April 2016

This report is the copyright of Defra and has been prepared by ICF Consulting Services Ltd under

contract to Defra. The contents of this report may not be reproduced in whole or in part, nor passed to

any other organisation or person without the specific prior written permission of Defra.

ICF has used reasonable skill and care in checking the accuracy and completeness of information

supplied by the client or third parties in the course of this project under which the report was produced.

ICF is however unable to warrant either the accuracy or completeness of such information supplied by

the client or third parties, nor that it is fit for any purpose. ICF does not accept responsibility for any legal,

commercial or other consequences that may arise directly or indirectly as a result of the use by ICF of

inaccurate or incomplete information supplied by the client or third parties in the course of this project

or its inclusion in this project or its inclusion in this report.


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Contents

Executive Summary .......................................................................................................... 1

Abbreviations and Glossary............................................................................................... 8

1 Introduction 10 1.1 Context and scope ................................................................................................................. 10

2 The Evaluation Approach 13 2.1 The evaluation questions ....................................................................................................... 13 2.2 The counterfactual ................................................................................................................. 13 2.3 Evaluation methods ................................................................................................................ 13

3 Evaluation Findings across the Biosecurity Continuum 18 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................................ 18 3.2 The risk register and risk-based decision making .................................................................. 18 3.3 Improving the border security ................................................................................................ 30 3.4 Improving inland surveillance ................................................................................................. 43 3.5 Improving preparedness ........................................................................................................ 55 3.6 Improving diagnostic support ................................................................................................. 58 3.7 Awareness raising .................................................................................................................. 62

4 Cross-cutting issues 67 4.1 Governance ............................................................................................................................ 67 4.2 Economic Impacts .................................................................................................................. 71 4.3 The relative effectivenss of PHEIS investments .................................................................... 74

5 Conclusions and recommendations 84 5.1 Conclusions ............................................................................................................................ 84 5.2 Recommendations ................................................................................................................. 86

Annex 1 Evaluation approach ............................................................................... 90

Annex 2 Supporting information ........................................................................... 91


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Executive Summary

Introduction

In 2014 the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) published a Plant Biosecurity

Strategy for Great Britain1 and a Tree Health Management Plan2 that together defined a new framework

for preventing the entry and establishment of plant pests and diseases in Great Britain. These policy

documents responded to recommendations made in the final report of the Tree Health and Plant

Biosecurity Expert Taskforce, a group convened to examine the issues raised by an outbreak of Chalara

(ash die-back).

Defra committed to a set of new investments intended to: increase the effectiveness of plant health

biosecurity services; address short term needs; and enable a long term uplift in the system’s ability to

combat biosecurity risks. These investments are referred to collectively as the ‘Plant Health Enhanced

Inspection and Surveillance’ (PHEIS) programme.

The PHEIS budget available in 2014/15 and 2015/16 totalled £17m, representing approximately one

third of the total plant health budget. It was distributed across the Animal and Plant Health Agency

(APHA)3, the Food and Environment Research Agency (FERA)4, the Forestry Commission (FC)5 and

Forest Research (FR)6.

ICF International has evaluated the PHEIS investments, considering the actions enabled by the

enhanced PHEIS budget in 2014/15 and 2015/16 and those enabled through budget re-prioritisation in

2013/14. The evaluation considered how the enhanced budget was implemented, the effects of the

budget on plant health outcomes and what lessons can be learnt to inform future budget allocations and

enhancements. It was focused on PHEIS; it was not a strategic review of the performance of the UK’s

plant health inspection and surveillance system as a whole, nor of the GB strategy and its overall

approach to biosecurity. It was informed by analysis of programme data and interviews with 22 plant

health stakeholders (principally from Defra and the plant health agencies).

The evaluation tracked the effects of the PHEIS budget across the various components of the

‘biosecurity continuum’ maintained by GB plant health services. The findings are structured by reference

to those individual elements:

■ Risk based decision making: the principle that decisions should be based on a structured

understanding and consideration of the risk-reward balance and related uncertainties.

■ Border security: preventing harmful plant pests from entering the EU from third countries.

■ Inland surveillance: identifying and monitoring pests and diseases already in the UK.

■ Outbreak preparation and contingency planning: the governance and procedural arrangements by

which outbreaks are managed.

■ Diagnostic support: the identification of pests and diseases and other scientific support.

■ Awareness raising: events and training that foster improved knowledge, skills and biosecurity

practices.

A commentary is also provided on PHEIS governance arrangements, various aspects of the impacts of

the PHEIS investments, and the case for further investment.

1 Defra (2014). Protecting Plant Health. A Plant Biosecurity Strategy for Great Britain. April 2014 2 Defra (2014). Tree Health Management Plan. April 2014 3 APHA executes plant health policy in England and Wales and aspects of tree health policy. 4 FERA provides diagnostic and scientific support, principally for plant health. 5 FC executes tree health policy in Great Britain. 6 FR provides diagnostic and scientific support, principally for tree health.


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Risk based decision making

£1.2 million was allocated to the development and management of a plant health risk register and to

enhanced pest risk assessments (PRAs). A risk register that fulfilled its intended purpose was delivered

and is actively used. The population of the risk register resulted in additional demand for PRAs. PHEIS

enabled this demand to be met, and helped to improve PRA quality.

The risk register is a tool that helps the Plant Health Risk Group (PHRG), a body chaired by the Office

of the Chief Plant Health Officer (CPHO), to identify and determine the significance of plant pest and

disease risks and appropriate risk management actions. The investment has enabled an improved

standard of evidence and comparability of risk assessments that has “transformed the way we carry out

decision making”. Benefits are that: decisions are made more quickly; decision making is more

consistent; it is possible to achieve greater stakeholder buy-in; officials have better control over

decisions; and stakeholders can access better information to inform their biosecurity practices. These

benefits should make delivery of plant health services more efficient and reduce plant health risks (and

the associated negative impacts). The management of the risk register is relatively labour intensive. Its

ongoing effectiveness is therefore contingent on continued availability of funding. Future enhancements

to the risk register would need to be supported by commitment of adequate resources.

Improving border security

PHEIS provided £3m over 2014/15 and 2015/16 to increase plant health border security. This was used

by FC to retain tree health contractors and by APHA to support the recruitment of 16 new inspectors

and other staff. The APHA recruitment process took longer than planned. This was mostly due to the

use of fixed term contracts that matched the two-year PHEIS period (but which excluded candidates

looking for permanent roles), and the limited size of the labour pool as compared to the posts advertised.

EU law sets requirements for inspection of certain trades. The UK had been repeatedly criticised for

failing to meet prescribed targets for such inspections. PHEIS funding enabled the number of inspections

to be increased and specified targets to be achieved. It also facilitated an increase in inspections of so-

called ‘uncontrolled’ trades (those for which inspection rates are not defined by EU law). These

increased as a proportion of total inspections. Levels of interceptions of pests and diseases7 increased.

Uncontrolled trade inspections achieved higher interception rates than inspections of controlled trades.

PHEIS investments in border security have generated a variety of long-term benefits. These include:

training and other measures to improve the capability of inspectors; engagement with the EU and third

countries to foster better biosecurity practices and reduce import risks; and in-field diagnostics, both the

successful (albeit delayed) deployment of in-field diagnostics and a new protocol that should make future

in-field diagnostics deployment more efficient. APHA and FC provided examples of cases where

compliance by businesses and exporting countries was improved as a direct consequence of PHEIS-

funded border security activities.

Improving inland surveillance

PHEIS provided £2.6m for the recruitment and training of 14 new staff, as well as £4.0m for surveys

outsourced to contractors. APHA had some difficulty in recruiting new staff with relevant expertise on

fixed term contracts.

The principal impact of the additional inspection capacity at APHA was an increase in general quarantine

inspections (inspections carried out at risk-rated sites8) of 25% in 2014/15 as compared to 2012/13. The

inspection rate for the first half of 2015/16 is below this level on a pro rata basis, but consultees expected

7 An interception refers to the identification of a pest or disease in a particular goods consignment. 8 Sites at which plant material is grown or distributed are given one of four risk ratings from ‘very high’ to ‘low’. Targets are set for the number of visits to these sites. Multiple inspections of consignments may be carried out during an individual visit.


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the full year figure to be in line with that of 2014/15. Data indicate that detections of pests and diseases9

have increased, although the trend is not clear.

PHEIS enabled FC to deliver new and ongoing survey programmes. This included continuation of FC’s

aerial surveillance programme. Aerial surveillance, which is now a core part of FC’s surveillance

operations, is more effective and efficient than ground surveys at detecting tree pests and diseases

since many symptoms can often only be identified by surveying the canopy from above.

PHEIS supported developments in capability that should support improvements in pest and disease

detection over the long term. Examples include development of a quality management system, revisions

to standard operating procedures and an appraisal of training needs. The long term impact of increased

capacity and the training of in-house staff and contractors is less certain but potentially significant if that

capacity can be retained. While a direct link to detection rates is difficult to establish, the overall capability

of the plant health system has been increased.

Improving preparedness

PHEIS provided approximately £0.5m for development of the generic and pest-specific contingency

plans. Where contingency plans have been implemented the feedback provided has been, on the whole,

very positive. The processes for engagement and set up of outbreak responses are much improved.

The clarity that the contingency plans bring to the process, in tandem with the defined role of the Office

of the Chief Plant Health Officer (CPHO), makes the initial response more efficient. Benefits attributed

to the structured pro formas used to document information and decisions include: certainty over what

information and decisions need to be made; smoother flows of information between parties that enables

faster decisions; better tracking of expenditure enabling more accurate resourcing decisions; and a more

robust audit trail of decisions. Overall, the lessons from the Chalara outbreak appear to have been learnt

and the improved contingency plans go a long way to redressing the problems apparent when only

standard operating procedures (SOPs) were used.

Improving diagnostic support

PHEIS provided £1.8 million to FERA and FR. This supported an increase in diagnostic and scientific

support capacity and the development of new and enhanced diagnostic tests and methods as planned.

These methods, combined with improved training, have enabled faster detection of new and emerging

pests and diseases. They enabled more detailed diagnoses to be performed, which provides greater

certainty to diagnostic results. Faster processing of samples can have positive impacts on regulated

firms (such as by reducing the delays imposed on consignments). Enhanced capacity, supported by

cross-training of staff to provide greater flexibility, was appropriate to meet the current and expected

increase in demand for diagnostic support. FERA and FR were able to deal with an increased number

of requests for diagnostic tests.

Improving awareness raising

PHEIS provided £1.2m for support to awareness raising activities. Most were delivered as planned and

in some instances the audiences reached were wider than originally envisaged. Positive feedback from

participants and organisers suggests that events achieved their aims. The EU Food and Veterinary

Office also recognised the quality and originality of the UK approach to awareness raising.

Consultees provided examples of actions taken by participants to improve plant health biosecurity,

particularly related to new initiatives with major supermarkets and government ministries as well as

follow-up advisory requests to APHA from industry training workshop participants. Volunteers for

Observatree (a citizen science network that undertakes inland surveillance for pests and diseases)

received additional training. The potential value of such networks was illustrated in 2015 when an

Observatree volunteer identified the Oriental Chestnut Gall Wasp (OCGW) in what proved to be the

9 A detection refers to the identification of a pest or disease in a particular consignment or the natural environment.


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second verified outbreak of the pest in the UK. The early detection enabled a swift and effective

response by the plant health authorities.

Evidence on impacts was not available for all PHEIS-funded awareness raising initiatives, particularly

those reaching more diffuse audiences e.g. at trade and public shows. It is difficult to calibrate the extent

to which overall plant health risks are reduced and the extent to which external plant health surveillance

(e.g. Observatree) can be relied upon to complement plant health services activity.

PHEIS governance arrangements

No specific governance arrangements were put in place for PHEIS. Where new activities that were set

up with the PHEIS budget were assigned specific cost codes for booking time, then tracking of PHEIS

expenditure and outputs was feasible10. However, in general, PHEIS funded the delivery of a larger

volume of pre-enhancement activities. Setting up PHEIS-specific monitoring indicators and governance

was considered problematic. This affected the availability of data to evaluate PHEIS impacts, especially

where the metrics of interest were not collected as part of existing management information systems.

There was no obvious coordination between elements of PHEIS expenditure across the plant health

agencies.

PHEIS impacts

Economic impacts

PHEIS investments have resulted in additional interceptions and detections as well as more efficient

outbreak management for a number pests and diseases. This may have reduced the risks of pest and

disease incursions and outbreaks and/or reduced the likelihood or extent of outbreak spread. This is

likely to have resulted in the avoidance of the negative economic, environmental and social impacts that

result from outbreaks of pests and diseases. However, due to the complexity and resources required to

undertake robust assessment of impacts, it has not been feasible within the scope of this evaluation to

estimate the likelihood or extent of the avoided costs.

Benefits are also expected from improvements in diagnostic and surveillance systems that lower the

cost of regulation. Improvements in the speed and rate of pest and disease detection deliver benefits

for both the industry and regulators. For example, use of in-field diagnostics is expected to benefit

industry by reducing costs incurred when consignments are detained pending the results of tests. It is

also expected to reduce public expenditure on laboratory analysis.

The relative effectiveness of PHEIS investments

Two investments bringing fundamental changes were the risk register and contingency planning. The

risk register was widely reported by consultees to have been an effective investment. It is credited with

bringing efficiencies to identification and assessment of risk, increasing speed and confidence of

decision making, and helping GB plant health services to move from a reactive to a more proactive

operating model. It influences all aspects of plant health service work and supports a more effective risk-

based allocation of resources.

Contingency plans brought a fundamental change to how outbreak management activities are initiated

and managed. The efficacy of the contingency planning arrangements was proven through the

management response to OCGW and other smaller outbreaks. Interviews provide evidence of how the

processes of outbreak management have been improved and how this increased outbreak management

efficiency, and hence effectiveness.

The appointment of additional staff absorbed the largest proportion of the enhanced budget. The

enhanced capacity was credited with enabling many additional activities to be completed. PHEIS

investments in capacity have had a direct, positive effect on output levels of the plant health agencies.

They enabled:

10 e.g. the risk register whilst it was under the remit of FERA (H1 2014/15)


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■ An increase in the quantity and quality of PRAs.

■ An increase in border inspection and attainment of the target to inspect 65% of all ‘other controlled’

trades entering the UK, a rate not achieved in previous years, with an associated increase in

interceptions.

■ An increase in the volume of uncontrolled trade border inspections. These have higher interceptions

rates, and hence were identified as a more effective area for investment, than controlled trade

inspections.

■ A doubling of general inland surveillance site visits and an indication that detections have increased,

although the evidence is not clear.

■ Accommodation of the increased demand for diagnosis of samples and higher levels of enquiries.

■ Development of new diagnostic tests and methods.

■ Delivery of additional awareness raising events and training.

Commitment to permanent posts offered a more cost-effective solution, in both the short and long term,

than use of fixed-term contracts, particularly for specialist inspector posts. However, it required

managers to take on a budgetary risk as PHEIS money was only available for two years. Fixed-term

contracts made recruitment more difficult, slowing the acquisition of new capacity, and meant that the

roles of new recruits had to be more narrowly defined. These contracting arrangements could also result

in the loss of new staff just at the point where they have acquired enough experience to become fully

functional.

Demonstrating the impact of the above on rates of pest incursion and risk levels is not feasible because

the true intercept rate is not known (as not all incursions will be detected). Furthermore, meeting the

challenge of proving negatives (the absence of incursions) and attributing them to improvements in risk

management in the supply chain has not been possible with the data made available to the evaluation.

The relationship between inputs, outputs and outcomes in plant health is not well mapped and

understood. As a result, the indicators available for analysing inputs, activities and their effects are

limited. This places constraints on assessment of the effectiveness of the plant health security system

as a whole and the implications of changes to it.

Benefits of PHEIS investments that will persist beyond the funding period

Activities that improve system capacity and capability can have a long term impact on the performance

and productivity of front line services. There was a link between the capacity enhancements funded by

PHEIS and agencies’ ability to undertake strategic projects that improved capability. Previously the

inspection workload had heavily constrained their capacity to take on such projects. PHEIS capability

investments that offered long term benefits addressed procedures, training and supporting

infrastructure. These, as well as tools such as the risk register and contingency plans, will need

continued investment to ensure that they remain fit for purpose. The extent to which the PHEIS

investment in additional inspectors and training will have a legacy beyond the PHEIS budgeting period

depends to a large extent on whether those posts are retained, either through an extension of the

additional funding or reprioritisation within agency budgets.

The scope for further strategic investment

The variability of demand for different services is a key challenge of plant health service management.

Consultees stated that this unpredictability remains an ongoing area of concern and it is not clear how

far the enhanced workforce provides managers with sufficient flexibility to respond to events (e.g. major

outbreaks). Access to the benefits associated with the enhanced capacity provided by PHEIS is

contingent on the new recruits staying in post. There is also a recognition that it is not feasible for

projected increases in demand for plant health services to be met by a commensurate rise in workforce

capacity. Improving the labour productivity, especially in front line services, is going to be key to ensuring

that the plant health service as a whole can meet future needs.


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The consultations and analysis suggest that there are further efficiency gains to be made from strategic

investments in performance and productivity improving measures. The service will need to continue to

look for such improvements to meet the twin challenges of increasing biosecurity threats and ongoing

budgetary pressures.

Conclusions

PHEIS investments enabled plant health services to increase output (as measured by inspections

completed, scale of surveillance activity, etc.), improve service quality and performance (such as

through development of a risk register, improved contingency planning arrangements, extension of

quality management systems), increase productivity (such as through adoption of technologies that

provide faster diagnostic testing), and promote improved biosecurity management among stakeholders

(such as through awareness raising with industry).

A key step enabling many of these changes was the acquisition of additional staff and contractor

capacity. This accounts for the single largest category of PHEIS expenditure. Recruitment plans were

successfully delivered, although APHA had some difficulty hiring the large number of people required

into fixed term posts. Use of fixed term contracts was a necessary consequence of the limited duration

of enhanced funding period but was not cost-effective. The FC was able to access additional capacity

by appointing contractors rather than recruiting new staff. This approach was not feasible for plant health

inspections because of the specialist nature of the roles concerned.

Some of the investments in systems developed supported by PHEIS, notably the risk register and

contingency planning, are regarded as having transformed the way in which plant health services

operate, principally by facilitating a more proactive approach to risk management. They provide for a

swifter and more effective allocation of resources. The enhanced capacity and cross-training of staff

have made a contribution to making the plant health service better able to cope with the variable

demands placed upon it.

Prospects for the sustainability of PHEIS investments are mixed. Much of the benefit of the investment

made in additional staff and their training will be lost to the service if those individuals are not retained

beyond the PHEIS funding period. . In turn, capacity to conduct inspections and to service the enhanced

risk management systems (such the risk register) that were developed with PHEIS support will fall. The

standard operating procedures and process adjustments delivered via PHEIS will be sustained, as will

the benefits of the new technologies developed.

The integrated nature of the investments across a broad range of plant health activity areas, and the

multifunctional dimension of many plant health staff roles meant separating management reporting of

PHEIS outputs and outcomes was, quite reasonably, considered difficult and inefficient. Some data that

could provide potential indications of outcomes do not appear to be routinely reported and are not readily

accessible. This created challenges for the evaluation in terms of tracking and attributing PHEIS outputs

and, in particular, in determining the effect on plant health outcomes. This has important consequences

in terms of the ability not only to design and deliver further improvements to the enhanced system, but

also to build a convincing case for the maintenance or increase in funding necessary to deliver them.

Outcome indicators are not a common part of the plant health monitoring framework. There is some

monitoring of interceptions and detections, however much of this is not regularly reported. Awareness

raising outcomes are monitored for some specific activities, but are not systematically monitored. No

other outcomes indicators were identified.

There is a commonly held concern that quantitative indicators alone cannot fully capture the changing

state of the plant health system and that they can be misleading due to the influence of external factors

(e.g. the changing nature of trade; the weather; etc). Use of more robust indicators, alongside qualitative

measures of performance, would help to inform the strategy and allocation of resources. There is scope

to include information gathered from staff and regulated entities as part of the development of a balanced

approach to assessing system performance.

The evaluation raises some questions about how best to monitor efficiency and effectiveness of plant

health services, and what information decision-makers need when allocating resources to manage and


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mitigate plant health risks. The evaluation has also confirmed the need to continue to focus on improving

performance and productivity as a response to the twin challenges of increasing biosecurity risks and

ongoing budget constraints.

Recommendations

The high level recommendations of the evaluation are detailed below. A number of supplementary

recommendations relating to specific aspects of the biosecurity continuum are detailed in the report.

■ Safeguard funding for key risk management tools. The risk register and contingency plans have

significantly improved the effectiveness and efficiency of plant health risk management. They will

need an ongoing commitment of resources if that efficacy is to be maintained.

■ Options analysis for the enhanced capacity. The benefits of the considerable investments made

in the acquisition and training of enhanced inspection capacity at APHA are at risk if the individuals

concerned are lost at the end of the current fixed term contracts. There will also be a direct impact

on service outputs as the capacity to conduct inspections will be reduced. There is a need to identify

the best available option for retention of this capacity, taking into account Defra budgetary flexibilities

and constraints, and competing calls on funding.

■ A prioritised programme to increase performance and productivity and so improve

biosecurity outcomes and the cost-effectiveness of service delivery. To safeguard the

service’s future, there is a need to consider how best to improve efficiency (i.e. enable more to be

done with the available resources) as well as effectiveness. Recommended areas for consideration

include enhanced use of technology; more comprehensive use of existing data and novel

intelligence sources to better target inspections, and exploring opportunities and models to enhance

workforce flexibility. This should be informed by a scan across the Defra family and to other

regulators to draw learning on: the targeting and delivery of inspections; how the service locates and

reduces plant health risks and how it engages with supply chains to encourage and reward better

biosecurity.

■ Improve tracking of the flow of resources and links to plant health outcomes. An exercise to

map and review how the plant health system delivers outcomes, and its performance against

strategic and operational objectives, is recommended. This should include an assessment of

whether best use is being made of the data captured within the system. Information gathered from

staff, industry and other stakeholders could be used to complement data gathered within the system

to help provide a balanced perspective on system performance, considering parameters such as

effectiveness, efficiency and capability.

Additional budget enhancements should be contingent on it being possible to track outputs and

outcomes (quantitatively or qualitatively) and related activities being coordinated. Where existing

reporting and performance monitoring arrangements are deficient, enhancements may need to be

carried out at the system level, rather than for the enhanced budget alone


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Abbreviations and Glossary

Abbreviations

APHA Animal and Plant Health Agency

CPHO Chief Plant Health Officer

EU European Union

FC Forestry Commission

FPC Fresh Produce Consortium

FR Forest Research

FTE Full time equivalent

FVO Food & Veterinary Office of the European Commission

FY Financial year

GB Great Britain

OCGW Oriental Chestnut Gall Wasp

OPM Oak processionary moth

PHEIS Plant Health Enhanced Inspection & Surveillance

PHRG Plant Health Risk Group

PHSI Plant Health and Seeds Inspectorate

PZ Protected Zone

SOP Standard operating procedure

SPHN Statutory Plant Health Notice

THDAS Tree Health Diagnostic Advisory Service (of Forest Research)

TSU Tree Survey Unit (of Forest Research)

UAV Unmanned aerial vehicle

UK United Kingdom

WPM Wood packaging material

Glossary of terms

Chalara Chalara die-back of ash is a chronic fungal disease of ash trees in Europe

characterised by leaf loss and crown dieback in infected trees. It is

caused by Hymenoscyphus fraxineus.

dunnage Loose wood used, or intended for use, to wedge or support cargo, but

which does not necessarily remain associated with it

eDomero eDomero is an internet based facility that enables those requiring plant

health services to apply for these services without the need for paper

applications.

Observatree A collaborative project between Forest Research, the Forestry

Commission, APHA, Defra, FERA, the National Trust, Natural Resources

Wales and the Woodland Trust. The project is developing a ‘Tree Health

Early Warning System’ using a citizen science approach.


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Phytophthora ramorum Phytophthora ramorum is a fungus-like pathogen which causes extensive

damage and mortality to a wide range of trees and other plants.


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1 Introduction

In 2013/14 the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) committed to a set

of new investments in plant health inspection and surveillance services. For the purposes of

this evaluation, these investments are referred to collectively as the ‘Plant Health Enhanced

Inspection and Surveillance’ (PHEIS) programme. PHEIS was a response to the 2014 Plant

Biosecurity Strategy for Great Britain, and was intended to provide an uplift in the effectiveness

of plant health biosecurity services to support delivery of the strategy.

Defra commissioned an evaluation of the PHEIS programme from ICF International. Its

purpose is to assess the effectiveness of the PHEIS funding and to identify the more and less

successful aspects of the programme with the aim of informing ongoing policy and future

operational design and decision-making to safeguard the health of plants in Great Britain. This

is the final evaluation report. It is structured as follows:

■ Section 1.1 briefly describes the context for PHEIS and sets out the programme scope.

■ Section 2 provides an overview of the evaluation framework and methodology, including

the evaluation questions and the challenges and limitations of the methods and data

used.

■ Section 3 presents the findings of the evaluation related to the areas of plant health

biosecurity activity influenced by PHEIS.

■ Section 4 presents the findings of the evaluation for cross-cutting issues and learning.

■ Section 5 concludes and presents the key recommendations of the evaluation.

■ Annexes provide additional detail and information to support the methodology description

and the analysis presented in the report.

1.1 Context and scope

In 2014 Defra published a Plant Biosecurity Strategy for Great Britain11 and a Tree Health

Management Plan12. These responded to recommendations made in the final report of the

Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce in May 201313. The Taskforce had been

convened to examine the issues highlighted by an outbreak of Chalara (ash die-back) in early

2012.

The strategy and management plan defined a framework for action in Great Britain to prevent

entry and establishment of plant pests and diseases. They resulted in a number of changes to

the Plant Health biosecurity programme, including changes to policy and doctrine,

organisation, personnel, training and equipment.

The majority of the relevant changes were implemented during the period spanning the

financial years (FY) 2014/15 and 2015/16, and were funded through a specific enhanced plant

health budget made available during these two years following business case approval. Some

activity also took place in the preceding year (2013/14). Although no new funding was made

available for 2013/14, the activities undertaken were the subject of a business case and

existing funding was re-prioritised to deliver them. A number of work streams were

implemented during 2013/14 to prepare the ground for enhancements made during the

following two years.

The evaluation reported here is focused on specific additional budgetary enhancements

provided by PHEIS that were allocated in order to make investments and improvements to

11 Defra (2014). Protecting Plant Health. A Plant Biosecurity Strategy for Great Britain. April 2014 12 Defra (2014). Tree Health Management Plan. April 2014 13 UK Government (2013). Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce. Final Report. 20th May 2013.


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particular aspects of the plant health biosecurity system, in support of the overall plant health

objectives. It considers the actions enabled by the enhanced budget in FY2014/15 and

2015/16 and the re-prioritised 2013/14 budget. The enhanced budget available in 2014/15 and

2015/16 totalled £17m, representing approximately one third of the total budget14. It was

distributed across the Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)15, the Food and Environment

Research Agency (FERA)16, the Forestry Commission (FC)17 and Forest Research (FR)18.

Table 1.1 details the scope of the evaluation by listing the relevant activities from the 2013/14

period delivered through the re-prioritised budget, as well as the activities from the 2014/15-

2015/16 period funded under PHEIS.

The evaluation is not a strategic review of the performance of the UK’s plant health inspection

and surveillance system as a whole (including its fit to present and future challenges and

opportunities), nor of the GB strategy and its overall approach to biosecurity.

Table 1.1 Evaluation scope

Period In scope Out of scope

FY 2013/14 ■ Risk register development

■ Increased Pest Risk Assessments

(PRAs)

■ Enhanced contingency planning

■ General admin staff increases across

Defra plant health (e.g. evidence and

analysis staff recruitment)

■ Impact of activities already being

undertaken as part of core plant health

services (in place before the

enhanced budget).

FY 2014/15

to 2015/16

■ Risk register and horizon scanning

enhancements

■ Increased PRAs

■ Increased PHSI/FC staff

■ Increased Fera/FR diagnostics staff

■ Capability investments (incl. enhanced

diagnostics testing and information

technologies)

■ Improved contingency planning and

exercising

■ Tree health outbreak management

programmes (two-year extension)

■ Increased awareness raising and

training

■ R&D

■ General admin staff increases across

Defra plant health (e.g. evidence and

analysis staff recruitment)

■ Impact of activities already being

undertaken as part of core plant health

services (in place before the

enhanced budget)

1.1.2 Plant Biosecurity Strategy model

The vision of the Plant Biosecurity Strategy is; “to protect plants from pests that have been

identified as priorities for action, and to build awareness of the risks from pests, knowledge of

how to reduce those risks and to introduce a system of management that will incentivise risk

reduction”19.

The Strategy depicts a biosecurity system, as illustrated in Figure 1.1. Elements of the system

are organised across a so-called ‘biosecurity continuum’, referring to pre-border, at the border

14 Source: Defra, 2015/16 Enhanced Budget Allocation. Budget data provided to ICF; and Defra (2013). Plant Health Marginal Cost Benefit Analysis. 15 APHA executes plant health policy in England and Wales and some aspects of tree health policy. 16 FERA provides diagnostic and scientific support, principally for plant health. 17 FC executes tree health policy in Great Britain. 18 FR provides diagnostic and scientific support, principally for tree health 19 Protecting Plant Health, A Plant Biosecurity Strategy for Great Britain. Defra, April 2014.


12

and inland activities. Underpinning requirements are capability and capacity, and evidence.

Overarching principles of risk-based decision-making and greater awareness and involvement

of stakeholders complete the system.

The identified actions funded by PHEIS have been located within four of the elements of the

Strategy: A, B, D and E. The purpose of PHEIS is to improve the delivery of these elements,

by providing enhanced investment to address both short term needs, and to provide a long

term uplift in the system’s ability to combat biosecurity risks. The evaluation tracked the effects

of the PHEIS budget across the various plant health strategy principles and components of

the ‘biosecurity continuum’ (see Figure 1.1) maintained by GB plant health services, these

elements being:

■ Risk based decision making: the principle that decisions should be based on a structured

understanding and consideration of the risk-reward balance and related uncertainties.

■ Border security: preventing harmful plant pests from entering the EU from third countries.

■ Inland surveillance: identifying and monitoring pests and diseases already in the UK.

■ Outbreak preparation and contingency planning: the governance and procedural

arrangements by which outbreaks are managed.

■ Diagnostic support: the identification or pests and diseases and other scientific support.

■ Awareness raising: events and training that foster improved skill and biosecurity practices.

Figure 1.1 Schematic representation of the elements of the Plant Biosecurity Strategy


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2 The Evaluation Approach

The evaluation design and approach was developed by following good practice guidance20.

This involved the production of a structured evaluation design that defined the scope of the

evaluation, a plan for what will be evaluated, when this will happen, and how the evaluation

will be implemented. This was delivered to Defra as an evaluation design report in October

2015 and was accepted by the evaluation’s Advisory Group (listed at Annex A1.1. All elements

of the evaluation approach were developed and discussed with input from the Advisory Group.

2.1 The evaluation questions

Evaluation questions are used to test whether an intervention has achieved its aims and

objectives. In the current context evaluation questions are used to explore whether the PHEIS

has achieved the planned outcomes and impacts, and whether it has worked in the manner

anticipated.

The evaluation questions developed were intended to ensure a balance between breadth and

depth. Had all of the interesting lines of enquiry been pursued, the evaluation scope would

have been too broad. The number and reach of the evaluation questions were the focus of a

considered design approach, undertaken in consultation with the evaluation Advisory Group,

to ensure that specific, useful results could be drawn.

The process involved the preparation of an initial long list of possible evaluation questions.

Through detailed discussion and a process of proposal and comment, a short list of viable and

complementary questions were selected for the evaluation. The final schedule of questions is

presented in Box 2.1 to Box 2.3. They consider aspects of impact, process and learning.

2.2 The counterfactual

The counterfactual used in the evaluation is a continuation of the status quo before PHEIS i.e.

before the budgetary and resource enhancements were provided. Financial Year 2012/13 is

adopted as the baseline year to ensure a clean break between the pre- and intra-PHEIS

period. Where data are presented the comparator year is defined in part by the availability of

data.

2.3 Evaluation methods

The evaluation had two core research elements:

■ A semi-structured interview programme with core stakeholders; and

■ Analysis of available data on PHEIS funded activities and plant health outcomes.

The interview programme identified data and provided expert opinion. Given the difficulties in

identifying from the interview programme provides the principal evidence source on which the

evaluation findings are based.

Interview quotes presented in the reported are set in quotations and italic. They are not

individually sourced to the interviews. Where quotations from other sources are used they are

appropriately referenced in the text.

20 HM Treasury (2011), The Magenta Book: Guidance for evaluation, April, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/220542/magenta_book_combined.pdf.

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/220542/magenta_book_combined.pdf

https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/220542/magenta_book_combined.pdf


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Box 2.1 PHEIS Impact Evaluation Questions

Box 2.2 PHEIS Process Evaluation Questions

2.1 Is the risk register being developed and managed as envisaged?

2.2 How is the risk register (incl. PRAs) being used to guide risk-based decision making?

2.3 Have PHEIS funded awareness raising activities been delivered as planned?

2.4 Have new inspectors (border & inland) been recruited as planned and received adequate and timely training?

2.5 How has the balance of border and inland inspections changed across the consignment types and risk-based sites?

2.6 What informs border inspectors’ decision making on what uncontrolled trades to inspect?

2.7 Are in-field diagnostics being deployed as expected?

2.8 Has the development of new and enhanced diagnostic tests and methods progressed as planned?

Improving understanding of risks and risk-based decision making

1.1 Is risk-based decision making based on the risk register having a positive effect

on pest and disease interceptions and detections?

Reducing the likelihood of pests & diseases crossing the border

1.2 Have enhanced inspections - capacity (recruitment of inspectors), capability

(ability to deploy diagnostics) - increased the likelihood of pest and disease

detection?

1.3 Has awareness raising resulted in improved compliance by importers, exporters

and passengers?

1.4 Has PHEIS investment generated long-term improvements (i.e. benefits that will

persist even after PHEIS funding is removed) in management of pest risk at the

border?

Improving inland pest & disease detection

1.5 Has enhanced inspector surveillance capacity and capability increased

detections rates / improved surveillance outcomes?

1.6 Has use of aerial surveillance improved surveillance outcomes?

1.7 Has PHEIS investment generated long-term improvements in pest and disease

detection?

Improving preparedness

1.8 Have improved contingency plans enabled more appropriate and faster

implementation of outbreak management activities?

Improving diagnostics support

1.9 Is enhanced diagnostics capability adequate to ensure rapid detection of

new/emerging pest and disease risks?

Economic and Social Impacts

1.10 What are the economic impacts of enhanced inspections and surveillance?


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2.9 Is enhanced diagnostics capacity appropriate to support the anticipated demand from enhanced border/inland inspections and surveillance?

2.10 What were the overarching Governance arrangements for the enhanced budget and has this enabled co-ordination of expenditure across PH actors?

Box 2.3 PHEIS Learning Evaluation Questions

2.3.1.2 Semi-structured interviews

Purpose

The purpose of the semi-structured interview programme was to gather evidence that would

inform answers to the full suite of process, impact and learning evaluation questions. The

interview programme provided data and expert opinion to provide descriptive and explanatory

information and expert judgement, especially where data or other sources of information are

scarce/limited.

Given the difficulties in identify appropriate indicators for outcomes and impacts and in

collating indicator data, the evidence from the interview programme provides the principal

evidence source on which the evaluation findings are based.

Approach

Semi-structured interviews were conducted with a set of consultees that were regarded as

essential for the evaluation based on expectations of their ability to provide information and

judgment that would inform the evaluation questions. To allow for all of these consultees to be

interviewed with the given evaluation resources, more than one person was consulted in a

single interview where it was considered that their experience and/or expertise was similar

enough to make this viable.

A list of the stakeholders that were interviewed is provided in Annex A1.2. Interviews were

carried out with 22 people via 16 interviews. Interviews lasted between one and three hours.

Single person interviews were conducted by telephone, two person interviews were conducted

face-to-face or through a mix of face-to-face and telephone participation.

A list of interview questions covering all the evaluation questions was developed. A topic guide

was prepared for each individual interview using these questions, the guide being tailored to

the interviewee’s experience of the PHEIS budget and area of expertise. The list of specific

questions put to each interviewee was determined on a case by case basis. Where the same

questions were asked of multiple individuals, the wording of the question remained the same

to ensure that the responses were comparable. All interviewees were made aware that their

3.1 Which type of investments have resulted in the most (cost-) effective benefits to

biosecurity, and why / how?

3.2 What type of investments are expected to provide benefits that will persist beyond

the duration of the PHEIS investment? Is there scope for other such strategic

investments in the system?

3.3 How can the Plant Health Risk Register be better used to guide risk-based

targeting of inspection and surveillance activities?

3.4 How could governance and co-ordination of any future budget enhancements be

improved?

3.5 Where are the greatest uncertainties between investment and impact/outcomes?

What are the information gaps and how can these be filled?


16

responses would be treated in confidence and would only be available to members of the

research team.

The results of the interviews were transferred into a coding framework. Responses from each

interviewee were coded against the relevant evaluation question or additional topic of interest.

This provided a framework by which the results could be comprehensively analysed to identify

common issues and areas where interviewees differed in their views.

2.3.1.3 Desk research

Purpose

The purpose of the desk-based research and analysis was to obtain quantitative indicators of

PHEIS funded activities and related plant health outcomes and impacts.

Approach

Elements of the desk research were:

■ Review of PHEIS budget documentation and supporting preparatory documents21.

■ Collation and review of PHEIS reports and briefing notes.

■ Telephone discussions with key plant health data holders regarding the availability of data

on which to populate desired indicators, followed by a formal data request for the extraction

of available data sets from operational reports and databases.

Datasets obtained were analysed on a time-series basis in order to demonstrate the change

in indicators compared to pre-PHEIS performance. This compared a pre-PHEIS counterfactual

with current performance.

21 The PHEIS business case paper and a savings scenario spreadsheet. These documents were supplied by Defra and provided an initial analysis of expected costs and benefits of increased plant health activity.

Caveats to the stakeholder interviews

Ideally, stakeholders would be interviewed individually. It was not possible, however, to speak to each priority consultee individually with the available evaluation resources. Interviewing multiple people at the same time can risk individuals being influenced by each other, which can affect the results. One stakeholder can dominate the discussion and limit the input received from others. ICF tried to limit such effects by encouraging even and fair representation from all those involved.

Of the 22 stakeholders interviewed, 21 were from Defra and the plant health agencies. Achieving a sufficiently high number of Defra and plant health agency interviewees was necessary to ensure adequate exploration of all aspects of the biosecurity system affected by PHEIS. However, this meant that the effects of PHEIS investments on external stakeholders could not be directly explored and the effects of PHEIS on plant health service operations could not be externally verified.

Caveats to the use of data

■ The evaluators experienced difficulties in obtaining data, in particular data for the years prior to PHEIS. This was influenced in part by changes that had occurred to key performance indicators. In addition the data required were often not recorded or were not readily accessible in a suitable format on plant health service databases. This resulted in a limited set of data being collated and this in turn had consequences for the extent to which quantitative data could be used in the evaluation analysis.


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■ Because key performance indicators and other reporting systems were not explicitly set up to track the effect of the PHEIS budget, many datasets did not distinguish between the contribution of PHEIS and non-PHEIS budgets.

■ Many plant health indicators are significantly influenced by external factors outside the control of the plant health agencies. Further, each unit of a quantitative indicator may have differing resource input requirements – hence all units are not equal. As such, whilst differences in quantitative indicators between the pre- and within-PHEIS periods may be demonstrated, it is often not feasible to establish the degree to which the change can be attributed to PHEIS.


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3 Evaluation Findings across the Biosecurity Continuum

3.1 Introduction

This section presents the evaluation findings as they relate to each of the key areas of activity

influenced by PHEIS within the biosecurity continuum (listed below). Where an evaluation

question is relevant to more than one area, it is repeated and addressed separately under

each subsection.

■ The risk register and risk-based decision making (3.2);

■ Improving border security (3.3);

■ Improving inland surveillance (3.4);

■ Improving preparedness (3.5)

■ Improving diagnostic support (3.6);

■ Awareness raising (3.7).

3.2 The risk register and risk-based decision making

3.2.1 Introduction

Risk-based decision making is one of the principles that underpins the GB Plant Health

Strategy. It means that decisions should be based on a structured understanding and

consideration of the risk-reward balance and related uncertainties. Specifically, the strategy

states the need to:

“Understand the risks, through enhanced and prompt risk assessment, to stay ahead of pests.

Ensure that activity and decisions are risk-based and targeted to deliver the best protection

possible”.

A prioritised UK Plant Health Risk Register was one of the recommendations made by the

Tree Health and Plant Biosecurity Expert Taskforce. It is a tool that helps to implement the

risk-based decision making principle. It provides a comparable set of information on all plant

health risks, enabling decision makers to better allocate resources across those risks.

The risk register is ‘owned’ and maintained by the Office of the Chief Plant Health Officer

(CPHO). All entries onto the risk register are discussed and details, updates and actions

agreed through monthly meetings of the Plant Health Risk Group (PHRG), which is chaired by

the Office of the CPHO.

The objectives of the risk register are to:

■ identify the greatest plant health threats to UK crops, trees, gardens and ecosystems;

■ suggest appropriate actions; and

■ provide a framework for systematic decision making on priorities for action;22 and

■ be a publically available resource.23

The risk register provides a basic level of detail about plant health risks. Where more in-depth

information is required, Pest Risk Analysis (PRA) is conducted. If a pest is determined as a

priority for a PRA then a suitable plant health scientist will be commissioned to write it. The

22 PH Summit Workshop 23 Defra (2014). Protecting Plant Health. A Plant Biosecurity Strategy for Great Britain. April 2014


19

PRA is then presented to a further meeting of the UK PHRG for discussion and used to inform

decisions on how to manage the risk posed by the pest.

PRA is defined under the International Plant Protection Convention as: “The process of

evaluating biological or other scientific and economic evidence to determine whether a pest

should be regulated and the strength of any phytosanitary [plant health] measures to be taken

against it”24. There are international standards that define what should be considered when

conducting a PRA. PRAs vary in length from simple expert judgements to long technical

documents.

24 Defra’s Approach to Pest Risk Analysis. Available at: https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/phiw/riskRegister/plant-health/pest-risk-analysis-consultations.cfm

Summary statement: risk register and risk based decision making.

During 2013/14, £438k was spent, and £750k of PHEIS budget allocated over 2014/15 and

2015/16 to the risk register and PRAs. A risk register that fulfilled its intended purpose was

delivered in around six months. Its ongoing management and development is progressing

according to plan. The PHEIS budget has been vital to its development and ongoing

maintenance. The risk register has resulted in additional demand for PRAs and PHEIS has

enabled this demand to be met, and in some cases has helped to improve PRA quality.

The PHRG use the risk register to determine the significance of risks and appropriate risk-

management actions. PHEIS helped enable the PHRG to dedicate the time necessary to

develop and use the risk register.

The risk register is a decision support tool that provides a structured process through which

risks can be assessed in a systematic and comparable way. The structure and rules

applied in the risk register, and interaction with the PHRG and with other stakeholders, has

enabled an improved standard of evidence and comparability of risk assessments to be

achieved. It has “transformed the way we carry out decision making”.

The risk register, in combination with the PHRG, brings a wide range of benefits to plant

health activities, providing more confidence and transparency in assessments and decision

making. Benefits include:

- Decisions can be made more quickly;

- Decision making is more consistent;

- It is possible to achieve greater stakeholder buy-in;

- Officials have better control over decisions;

- Stakeholders can access better information to inform their biosecurity practices.

These benefits should provide for more efficient plant health services delivery and reduce

plant health risks (and the associated negative impacts).

A Defra scoping exercise has identified possible improvements that could be made to the

risk register’s methodology and functionality. However, management of the risk register is

relatively labour intensive. Any enhancements that increase its burden on staff time need

to be adequately resourced to avoid erosion of the benefits that it brings.

https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/phiw/riskRegister/plant-health/pest-risk-analysis-consultations.cfm

https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/phiw/riskRegister/plant-health/pest-risk-analysis-consultations.cfm


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3.2.2 EQ2.1: Is the risk register (and PRA) being developed and managed as envisaged?

3.2.2.1 Summary statement

3.2.2.2 Analysis

Expenditure on the risk register and PRAs

Work on the risk register began in 2013/14, the year before the additional PHEIS budget came

on stream. It is considered to be linked to the PHEIS budget programme25 and hence is

included in this evaluation26.

During 2013/14, £438k was spent on the risk register and PRAs. The available PHEIS budget

for this work in 2014/15 and 2015/16 was £400k and £350k, respectively. Expenditure during

the first six months of 2014/15 was estimated at £137k as compared to a budget of £200k (6

month pro rata), indicating a likely underspend (see Table A2.1 for a presentation of the

available data). Expenditure data for subsequent periods are not available as staff time was

not recorded to specific time codes27 and hence it is not possible to identify the level of

expenditure committed. The budgeted amount was £750k over the two year PHEIS period.

The risk register is the first of its kind in the world. Interviewees recalled its design and

development as a challenge whose scale was accentuated by the timescale (approximately

six months). The core intellectual challenge was to develop a repeatable, robust and rapid

method for assessing risk. There was also (and remains) an issue of managing the

expectations of different stakeholder groups with regard to what the risk register can and

cannot do.

Interview respondents recognised that the delivery of the risk register was a notable

achievement and felt that it has been managed in a “dynamic but professional way”. They

indicated that the product fulfils its planned purpose – a screening tool that enables more rapid

and comparative assessment of plant health issues. Stakeholder feedback has been very

favourable. Other plant health authorities (e.g. European Commission and other countries) are

very interested to learn from the UK’s experience in developing and using the risk register.

25 Work during 2013/14 was funded through a reorganisation of the pre-existing budget. 26 PHEIS Evaluation Advisory Group, pers comm. 27 Office of the UK CPHO, pers comm., 12.10.15

A risk register that fulfilled its intended purpose was delivered in around six months. Its

ongoing management and development is progressing according to plan.

The PHEIS budget has been crucial to the ongoing maintenance of the risk register. As well

as directly funding time for the Office of the CPHO, it has enabled recruitment of additional

staff elsewhere (e.g. inspectors at APHA). This relieved PHRG members of certain

responsibilities and enabled them to dedicate additional time to risk register management

and development.

Management of the risk register is relatively labour intensive for those involved. The work

required to maintain risk register records meant the PHRG met more frequently in 2015

than planned (i.e. more than monthly). Any future reductions in budgets that result in

members of the PHRG having to take on responsibilities elsewhere could have implications

for the time that they can put to the risk register, and hence effect its ongoing robustness.

The risk register has resulted in additional demand for PRAs. Additional resources made

available for PRAs have enabled this demand to be met, and in some cases have helped

to improve PRA quality. The lack of a dedicated PRA resource in Forest Research appears

to make it more difficult for FR to react to PRA-related requests put to it by the PHRG.


21

When the risk register was developed in 2013/14 a large number of pests were added as part

of the development process. Since then, risks have been added on a monthly basis, linked to

the inputs and decisions of the PHRG.

Table 3.1 Risks28 added to the register and reviewed

2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 (Apr-Oct only)

Risks added to the register* 693 80 49

Risks on the register undergoing review 44 37 36

* Some pests have been deleted because of changes in taxonomy.

The PHRG is the principal body responsible for updating entries in the risk register and played

an important role in the initial population of the register. It is estimated that the PHRG reviews

about 100 pests and diseases every year29. The work required to maintain risk register records

meant the PHRG met more frequently in 2015 than planned (i.e. more than monthly).

Whilst it was generally found that development and resourcing of the risk register had gone

well and was appropriate, it was also recognised that it has created a significant new stream

of work for those directly involved in its maintenance. Interviewees stated that the recruitment

of inspectors, funded by the PHEIS budget, enabled certain PHRG members to commit time

to the PHRG meetings and risk register work without negative impacts on performance

elsewhere.

It was recognised in interview that the continued usefulness of the risk register is reliant upon

timely and robust updates. Any future reduction in inspectorate staff and other resources may

have implications for the availability of PHRG members and hence the quality and

completeness of the risk register.

A Phase II of risk register development is planned. Its purpose is to enhance the methodology

and to address a number of functional, information and presentational issues. Whilst this

should address some perceived weaknesses in the current system, these refinements may

add complexity to the risk register and make it more time-consuming to maintain.

PRAs

The number of PRAs produced has increased significantly in the last two years (Table 3.2).

The initial population of risk register resulted in the identification of more than 50 pests that

needed PRAs. However, there was not full consensus among consultees on whether the risk

register was driving an ongoing increased demand for PRAs. Some interviewees indicated

that it was the risk register alongside other new technologies (e.g. social media), that was

resulting in more pests of concern being identified and so prompting more demand for PRAs.

Table 3.2 FERA is now producing many more PRAs each year than is was at the turn of the decade Number of PRAs produced by FERA (last 7 years)*

2008/9 2009/10 2010/11 2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15

Number of PRAs 6 9 8 19 18 18 29

* The time required to conduct any given PRA can vary, so the number of PRAs is not necessarily a direct indicator of the volume of work conducted. Furthermore, the structure and nature of PRAs was overhauled in 2013/14, also affecting the amount of time required to conduct PRAs.

The risk register now drives the decision making process for PRAs. Requests for PRAs are

prioritised and then matched to available resources (allowing for other claims on staff time).

28 The total risks on the register is different from the total number of pests, as some have multiple risks e.g. Bemisia and Xylella only count as one pest, but the risk is different depending on type or origin in each case. 29 Evaluation interview.


22

The same people within the Office of the CPHO are both maintaining the risk register and

producing PRAs. This, “has resulted in some pressures on their work – their focus used to be

just PRAs”.

Part of PHEIS budget was allocated to “maintenance of the existing risk register and enhanced

Programme Risk Assessment (PRA) as prioritised by risk register”.30 Interviewees

acknowledged the importance of the additional resources that were allocated to PRAs in

enabling the increased workload to be delivered – there were six PRA staff in 2014 as

compared to just three for large parts of 2010 to 201331.

“The match between what is asked and what we are able to do has been much easier

to manage due to the additional resource. The additional resource has made a huge

difference.”

The increased resource also helped to improve PRA quality. Whilst new starters typically have

a training and learning period, consultations indicate that the new staff employed have taken

to their jobs very well, with few quality control problems.

Whilst the risk register drives demand for PRAs, it was also recognised in interviews that it can

also reduce the number of instances in which a PRA is requested. The risk register has been

used to conduct “mini-assessments” which can provide sufficient information for decision

making without the need for a PRA. It was noted in interview that this clearly has positive

implications for PRA resources. It also enables the PHRG to consider more potential risks and

enables them to make decisions more quickly.

The Office of the CPHO leads on the development of PRAs for non-forestry species and FR

leads on PRAs for forest species. Unlike the Office of the CPHO, FR does not have a dedicated

PRA team. This has led to challenges in the delivery of forest species PRAs by FR. The

relatively small team at FR and the multiple activities and demands that are placed on their

time provide a challenging environment for resource planning. As such, there have been

instances when FR was not able to respond immediately to PRA development and input

requests when these coincide with other competing demands. The Office of the CPHO now

increasingly leads/coordinates forestry species PRAs, as well as non-forestry species PRAs.

However there remains a need for FR to lead some PRAs and for the Office of the CPHO to

consult with consult with FR staff during PRA development.

3.2.3 EQ2.2: How is the risk register being used to guide risk-based decision making?


The risk register is a decision support tool that provides a structured process through

which risks can be assessed in a systematic and comparable way. For those involved

the new approach, using the risk register, has “transformed the way we carry out decision

making”.

Prior to the risk register, plant health agencies developed lists of prioritised pests on

which to focus resources and actions. However the evidence available to the prioritisation

and subsequent decision making processes was not of a uniform standard. It is the

structure and rules applied in the risk register and interaction with the PHRG and with

other stakeholders that enable this greater standard of evidence and comparability of risk

assessments to be achieved.

The principal user of the risk register is the PHRG. It is a tool that helps the PHRG to

determine the significance of risks and appropriate risk management actions. It is seen as

a strategic tool for use in setting priorities and making resource allocation decisions.

30 Defra, 2015/16 Enhanced Budget Allocation. Budget data provided to ICF 31 Office of the UK CPHO, pers comm., 08.10.15


23

The PHRG inspection and surveillance sub-group use the risk register, along with other

tools, to target inspections of uncontrolled trades and non-EU surveillance activity.

Inspectors are not constrained by what is on the risk register when inspecting

uncontrolled trades.

The risk register is used to prioritise PRAs and contingency planning work and to inform

the focus of awareness raising activities. To a lesser extent it is also used to identify and

prioritise the development of new diagnostic tests/methods.

3.2.3.2 Analysis

The risk register is a decision support tool that provides a structure through which risks can be

assessed in a systematic and comparative way. Prior to the risk register, organisations within

the plant health service developed lists of prioritised pests on which to focus resources and

actions. However the new approach, using the risk register, has “transformed the way we carry

out decision making”.

How the risk register is used

Use of the risk register

The principal user of the risk register is the PHRG which undertakes initial risk assessments

and takes decisions on actions and risk management measures to be adopted to address

plant health risks. The PHRG both uses and maintains the risk register.

The PHRG members are government officials (e.g. Defra, FC, APHA, devolved

Administrations). The PHRG uses the risk register in its review of new and existing threats.

The risk register facilitates the work of the PHRG to determine the significance of risks and

indicates where action may need to be taken (e.g. to develop policy, regulate, deregulate,

redistribute resources, communicate). It helps the PHRG identify gaps in the evidence base

and in the operational set up. It is used as a strategic tool to aid the identification of necessary

plant health actions and to mobilise resources efficiently.

“It has enabled us to work with policy and lab to identify gaps that we didn’t know /

suspected that we had, but didn’t have any evidence on how to mitigate the problems

that we would encounter if we got an incursion of disease. In real terms it enabled

us to see, with certain pests, do we have measures to manage, diagnose and

eradicate them if they were to come into the UK.”

“It effectively points us towards recommendations on what needs to be done. So

things are very clear – what we need to do to move forward with action.”

“The nature of the risk register is such that the rules can be applied to a particular

threat in a light touch way, so we can consider a number of new issues at each

meeting – normally between 5 and 10. A short template is completed for each new

issue on the agenda which gives us the risk register rating before mitigation is

applied. Then, following mitigation, we consider the residual threat and potential

actions that could help to reduce the future impact.”

The risk register is generally seen as a strategic, rather than an operational, tool. Most

interviewees not on the PHRG reported that they did not use the RR on a daily basis; many

did not use it at all. Rather, they felt that the RR was informing decisions, in particular policy

decisions, being made by others that were then communicated to them via instructions

regarding prioritisation for their work.

The risk register and border and inland inspections and surveillance

The UK Plant Health Strategy states that:


24

“Import inspections are based on risk-based EU targets and in addition inspections

are carried out on other material focussing on those trades posing the greatest risk.

Inland inspections and surveillance are also risk-based; using EU decisions,

outcomes of PRA or targeting premises assessed as providing the greatest potential

for distributing pests”.

The risk register, along with EU targets and inspector experience, influences the targeting of

inspection effort. One example of the risk register being used in targeting inspections is in

relation to wood packaging. The risk register enables the identification of commodities

associated with high risk wood packaging. Inspections are targeted toward these commodities,

sometimes resulting in positive interceptions of pests.

There is a feedback loop between the risk register and inspection and surveillance activity,

with data generated through inspections and surveillance being one source of evidence used

in risk assessments.

The risk register and other areas of the biosecurity continuum

For other areas of plant health activity, interview responses indicate that the risk register is

principally used as a tool for gap analysis and prioritisation for:

■ Contingency plans: it is used to determine the need for a contingency plan for a pest and

therefore is a key driver of pest-specific contingency plan development activity.

■ Diagnostics: the risk register is sometimes used to identify applications for which new

tests/methods are needed. However this is also driven by the nature of samples submitted

for diagnosis by inspectors. It is more commonly used in the prioritisation of the diagnostic

tests/methods for development/review.

■ PRAs: the risk register is used in the prioritisation of PRAs.

■ Awareness raising: the risk register is critical to engagement activities. It informs the

prioritisation of pests covered in stakeholder engagement activities and provides

information that is used to develop messages used in those communications.

The risk register and external stakeholders

The risk register provides a database of information about pests and the nature of risks that

external stakeholders can access and use to inform their own biosecurity-related decision

making. Stakeholder are reportedly using the risk register in this way:

“It’s also helped some stakeholder groups / individual businesses in looking at

threats to them. I attend regular meeting with potato stakeholders – they’re always

very interested in new threats that we’ve been looking at of relevance to them.”

“There have been some individual businesses that track the risk register to help in

their resourcing decisions to try to avoid particular pests.”

“Observatree32 volunteers can be mobilised quickly and the risk register can enable

them to look quickly at all the information about the pest and go out with confidence

to look for it.”

“Part of industry have also been thinking about how they can use it to help them

prioritise their evidence needs around a particular crop or system.”

Inappropriate use of the risk register

Consultees indicated that they were aware that the information available on the risk register

can be used inappropriately, i.e. in a way that wasn’t intended. The main example provided

32 Observatree is a collaborative project involving FR, the FC, APHA, Defra, FERA, the National Trust, Natural Resources Wales and the Woodland Trust. It is a ‘Tree Health Early Warning System’ using a citizen science approach. A network of volunteers carry out survey activities to help spot new pest and disease outbreaks. See www.observatree.org.uk for more details.


25

was that stakeholders use the numeric assessments of risk to identify the ‘top ten’ threats.

Geographic issues and the relative nature of impacts, mean that this can provide a false

picture, particularly when it is being used at a local level.

“Although it produces a RR rating, so you can see those with highest numbers, that’s

not to say that they’re the top ten threats. The numbers are influenced by the value

of sector involved. But a pest could have a significant threat to small industries, and

it could wipe them out, but because they have a low total value, this may not show

through in the RR as their overall value is small. So you have to be careful to avoid

using the risk register in too limited or direct a way.”

3.2.4 EQ1.1: Is (risk-based) decision making based on the risk register having a positive effect on pest and disease interceptions and detections?


3.2.4.2 Analysis

Beyond the inspection activity directed by EU law, the risk register is sometimes used to target

import inspections of uncontrolled trades. One example of the risk register being used in

targeting inspections is wood packaging inspection. The risk register identified certain

commodities associated with wood packaging as high risk. Inspections were targeted at these

commodities, which were not previously inspected, and this resulted in some positive

interceptions of pests.

Examples such as this show that the risk register can have a positive effect on interceptions

and detections. However the risk register is only one influence on this discretionary inspection

and surveillance activity. Inspectors are, for example, given the freedom to use their own

experience and judgement to determine what to inspect.

The risk register may also inform decisions that result in preventative actions being taken pre-

border that reduce the risk of imported goods containing pests arriving in the UK. This may

The risk register, in combination with the PHRG, brings a wide range of benefits to plant

health activities, providing more confidence and transparency in assessments and decision

making. These include:

- Decisions can be made more quickly;

- Decision making is more consistent;

- It is possible to achieve greater stakeholder buy-in;

- Officials have better control over decisions;

- Stakeholders can access better information to inform their biosecurity practices.

These benefits should enable more efficient plant health services delivery and reduce plant

health risks (and the associated negative impacts).

Beyond the inspection activity directed by EU law, the risk register is sometimes used to

target import inspections of uncontrolled trades. A successful example of this is the

targeting of wood packaging, not previously inspected, which has led to quarantine pest

interceptions. Not all inspections of uncontrolled trade are targeted, and much is left to the

discretion of inspectors. It is difficult to discern the distinct effect on targeting of these two

influences and it is not clear whether the risk register is having a positive effect on the

significance or overall level of interceptions and detections.

As a ‘first of its kind’ tool, the risk register has generated significant interest from other

countries and is influencing approaches to risk assessment in some cases. Such

investments enhance the UK’s international standing and enables the export of better

practices, potentially reducing UK plant health risks.


26

result in a reduction in interceptions of such pests. An example was provided of the flea beetle:

since it was identified on the risk register, the UK took action in a context where the EU might

not have. Other EU Member States then followed the UK’s lead. Preventative actions were

taken to reduce the risk of this pest arriving in the UK and further measures taken to deal with

any incidences of the pest being found.

3.2.4.3 Other benefits

The risk register brings other benefits to plant health management system. The structured and

systematic approach brought in by the risk register, together with its public accessibility, has

strengthened assessments and subsequent decision making. The various benefits are

described below.

Confidence in the assessments of risk and decisions being made has improved, due to:

■ Greater confidence in the underlying evidence: evidence in the risk register is updated

regularly and is checked and validated internally and externally. Stakeholders are asked

to review underlying evidence and to comment on whether they agree with it.

■ Greater ability to utilise the evidence: whilst there is still a large degree of judgement

involved in scoring risks in the risk register, the amount of factual detail that can be

included and compared is greater with the use of the risk register.

■ A more complete view of risks: the risk register provides information not only on the risks

faced, but also the extent to which mitigation may be feasible and on the potential impacts

of outbreaks.

■ Wide acceptance of the approach being used: the scoring criteria and approaches used in

the risk register to assess risks are generally accepted, internally and externally.

■ Consistency: the consistency of the assessment approach across risks instils confidence

in the comparability of risk scores.

“It is the comparability of risks that appears to be the critical part of what the risk

register offers. In the past…., because different groups do the assessment and the

method evolves over time, it makes it difficult to make direct comparisons between

assessments. The risk register enabled a look to be taken across everything over a

short time period. That has provided a level of consistency across organism risk

assessments to be achieved.”

Decisions are taken more quickly: the streamlined risk assessment procedures enabled by

the risk register mean more risks and issues can be considered by the PHRG at its monthly

meetings. This, combined with the improved confidence in the evidence base and

assessments, mean that less time is spent examining what actions may be appropriate when

an issue arises. It enables new information to be fed in, actions decided upon and advice

provided faster.

“There was an unexpected outbreak of a new pest in sweet chestnut and we had to

act fast and reprioritise resources to it. We were able to go straight to the risk register

and access information on the pest very quickly. The risk register clearly states the

evidence gaps so we know where we need to fill gaps quickly. In particular with

outbreak response – it enabled us to take action within 10 days – this is

unprecedentedly quickly. The risk register provides us with the confidence to make

decisions that quickly. We were able to brief the minister the same day that we had

the finding.”

“This process enables resources to be agreed [with Ministers], to move quickly to

action without spending months going through a process of deciding what to do”

“Before the risk register, we did not have access to the same level of resource on

risk analysis. We were able to access risk analysts, but they were not able to provide

the same level of response as the PHRG.”


27

“If inspectors are finding new pests then the risk register and PHRG enables those

findings to be fed into the system much more quickly. We can fairly rapidly produce

a new risk register rating, and practical actions can be fed back to inspectors quickly.

Previously, many issues were held up because throughput was less”

Decisions are more transparent: the risk register provides better access to and use of the

available evidence for assessments and decision making. It is publically available online so all

interested stakeholders can access the information held on it. Templates and other outputs of

risk assessments and decisions taken are made available to the public on the risk register.

The transparency that the risk register brings to decision making, with regards the evidence

used and the processes and judgements involved, helps to achieve greater stakeholder buy-

in to actions.

“They can see it all as it’s all available online. It is important that we get buy in from

other people regarding the evidence held on the risk register.”

“It explains what the pest is about. It helps to sell the actions to stakeholders who

may be required to do things on their land in order to manage the pests.”

Officials have better control of decisions. Confidence in the evidence held in the risk register

and the speed with which new issues can be reviewed and included in it, makes it easier to

ensure decisions are not unduly influenced by external pressures. Situations can be dealt with

calmly and ‘media-driven' decisions avoided.

“If there is a new threat people want to know about, then you can say with certainty

whether and what we know about it“

“Action is often driven by what is deemed to be ‘exciting’ by

political/social/stakeholder groups.”

“…providing an evidence base to defend those decisions and ensure that decisions

are not ‘media-driven’.”

“The RR ensures that we can deal calmly with a situation, even when the press are

getting excited. Without it then we’d be having to react to such excitement and

making decisions on a reactive basis”

More consistent decision making: assessments and decisions are thought to be more

consistent and less prone to potential bias i.e. the same results would be arrived at regardless

of the make-up of the PHRG. Whilst they still require expert judgement (e.g. on how much a

mitigation actions reduces risk scores), the structured processes followed in assessing risk

and making decisions, the common methods applied and the documentation produced in the

audit trail all contribute to this.

“Decisions being made were less dependent on the individuals making them than

before the risk register, and hence more consistent over time”.

“Still lots of judgement involved - still requires expert opinion, for example on how

much each mitigation reduces risk scores”

Improved biosecurity practices by external stakeholders: use of the risk register by

industry and individuals has improved the evidence on which they make biosecurity-related

decisions and may help them to avoid particular risks.

“It’s also helped some stakeholder groups / individual businesses in looking at

threats to them. I attend regular meeting with potato stakeholders – they’re always

very interested in new threats that we’ve been looking at of relevance to them.”

“There have been some individual businesses that track the risk register to help in

their resourcing decision to try to avoid particular pests.”

Observatree: the risk register provides a readily accessible database of information about

pests and the nature of risks that Observatree volunteers can use.


28

“Observatree volunteers can be mobilised quickly and the risk register can enable

them to look quickly at all the information about the pest and go out with confidence

to look for it.”

Influence over EU and international plant health practices: There has been significant

interest in the UK’s risk register from other countries inside and outside of the EU. This may

lead to similar risk registers, or aspects of the risk register, being taken up by other countries.

The rapid approach to risk assessment, which provides for more comparable results across

risks by improving methodological consistency (because methodologies, and people applying

them, change over time), was highlighted as an area of interest. Where this improves other

Member States’ ability to assess risk and undertake risk-management actions, this may have

benefits in terms of reducing plant health risks to the UK.

“Other countries have also been interested in using it”

“The risk register is regarded very highly – in the UK and externally…… This could

have a positive effect on the UK’s standing, not just in the EU but globally.”

“A comprehensive risk register isn’t something that EPPO33 is trying to develop and

adopt yet. Although they are trying to speed up processes, adopting an express PRA

scheme……EPPO is looking at more rapid approaches to risk assessment”

3.2.5 EQ3.3: How can the Plant Health Risk Register be better used to guide risk-based targeting of inspection and surveillance activities?

3.2.5.1 Summary

3.2.5.2 Analysis

Consultations indicate that the risk register is currently working well, is fit for purpose and

meets its design objectives. A number of improvements have already been made to it as a

result of stakeholder feedback.

A second phase of risk register development was always planned. The main purpose of the

upgrade was to bring a level of ‘academic refinement’ to the methodology by enabling

quantification of risks, better expression of uncertainty, and the incorporation of modelling of

risks (pathways and spread). Recommendations on what could be taken forward under this

second phase of development were imminent, but not yet published, at the time of writing.

Specific opportunities to refine the risk register, many of which have already been identified

by the phase two scoping work, were mentioned by interviewees. They are:

33 European and Mediterranean Plant Protection Organisation.

A second phase of the risk register was always planned, primarily to improve its

methodological robustness. A number of improvements to the risk register’s methodology

and functionality have been identified as part of the scoping of Phase II development

options.

Suggestions provided by interviewees on how the risk register could be better used to guide

targeting of inspections and surveillance include: providing more time for the PHRG sub-

group to coordinate and target inspection activities; and, enabling the risk register to be

used on a ‘trade pathway’ basis, as this would be more useful for informing import

inspections.

The risk register serves its planned purpose well. Any enhancements need to be adequately

resourced and carefully implemented otherwise they may risk undermining the speed and

consistency that the risk register brings to risk assessment and decision making.

Enhancement decisions needs to be carefully weighed against these points.


29

■ Facilitating stakeholder input. Whilst the risk register is publically accessible, having

channels for receipt of stakeholder comments on evidence would open it up to a wider

pool of expertise. This could improve quality.

■ Improving the capture of data for the risk register and PRAs. This includes the quality of

inspection and interception data recorded. Inspections that do not result in

interceptions/detections are often not recorded and that there are often errors in how

inspection data are fed into the eDomero database.

■ Improving the way uncertainty in the evidence and assessments is communicated.

■ Broadening its geographic scope through partnering with other EU Member States.

■ The facility to look at the evidence from a particular sector or geographical perspective.

Parts of industry are keen to use the risk register to prioritise their own risks and inform

their decision making e.g. in relation to a particular crop. Devolved Administrations are

interested in information within the Register that are relevant specifically to their area of

authority and responsibility.

■ Refine the spatial dimensions of analysis within the Register. The national values currently

included could be complemented by local values that are better aligned with the

geographic areas where outbreaks are most likely to occur. This could improve its use as

an intelligence tool, enabling interventions to be spatially targeted.

■ Including the cost of actions to support analysis of the potential cost-benefit and trade-offs

implied by different response options.

Two recommendations related specifically to the targeting of inspections and surveillance:

■ More time and resources could be given to the PHRG sub-group for inspections and

surveillance (which is concerned with the targeting of inspections based on risk) to improve

coordination and targeting of inspection and surveillance activities.

■ For the risk register to support trade-based queries. Inspections are generally targeted at

trades (i.e. a particular commodity coming from a particular country). The identification of

high risk trades is currently done informally, based on inspector knowledge. If the risk

register could be interrogated on a trade basis it would provide a more robust approach

for identifying ‘high risk’ trades. In particular this would allow more effective inspection

targeting of uncontrolled trades. Such an enhancement may be more appropriately

considered through an additional tool rather than as an enhancement to the risk register

itself.

There are a number of factors to be considered when contemplating improvements to the risk

register. Interviewees flagged a number of general and specific risks and barriers:

■ There is a danger that plant health services become over reliant on the risk register, to the

detriment of expertise and common sense. The risk-management actions indicated

through the risk register need to be constantly balanced against available resources.

■ The maintenance of the risk register is already resource intensive. Additional functionality

is likely to increase this workload. If matching resources are not available then the quality

and usefulness of the risk register would diminish. If the additional features slow the speed

with which issues can be considered it would reduce the throughput of the PHRG, the

speed of which is one of the key benefits that the risk register currently brings.

■ The risk register is a screening tool, not a comprehensive and accurate record of all risks.

If greater detail or accuracy is required then this should be accommodated within the PRA

component.

■ Creating additional modules or multiple versions of the risk register, particularly if these

are not linked to the master version and would not, therefore, be automatically updated

with new information, may result in decisions being made on inaccurate or out of date

information.


30

3.3 Improving the border security

3.3.1 Introduction

Border security import controls (documentary checks and physical inspections) exist to prevent

harmful plant pests from entering the EU from third countries34. These checks also indirectly

monitor the effectiveness of procedures in exporting countries. The EU plant health regime

uses a risk-based categorisation. It classifies plant and plant material into one of the three

groups:

■ Prohibited: Import to the EU is only permitted for specified purposes, such as research

or trialling, under authority of a licence issued by government;

■ Controlled: Requires a phytosanitary certificate issued by the plant protection service of

the exporting country. There are EU requirements to undertake inspections of this

material at the point of entry to the UK.

■ Uncontrolled: Not subject to plant health controls and no notification is made on import.

The UK undertakes inspections of controlled material in line with these EU requirements and

also conducts risk targeted inspections of uncontrolled consignments.

The Forestry Commission is responsible for inspections of imported forest products. APHA is

responsible for all other relevant imports.

The PHEIS budget provided funds to support improvements to border security, and specifically

to enable the recruitment of more inspectorate staff so as to:

■ Increase inspection rates of controlled material to intercept consignments carrying pests

and diseases and ensure infraction is avoided.

■ Increase targeted inspections of uncontrolled material to intercept consignments carrying

pests and diseases and to identify emerging threats and provide evidence to support any

necessary regulation.

■ Undertake actions to enable a sustained improvement in border security.

Summary statement: improving border security

£1.3m of PHEIS funds were spent on the recruitment of 16 APHA import inspectors and

£0.2m allocated for recruitment of one FC inspection manager and increased FC import

inspections (conducted by contractors). The inspectors were employed as planned. For

APHA the recruitment process took longer than planned, largely due to the use of fixed

term contracts that mirrored the period of available PHEIS funding and the relatively large

number of posts advertised as compared to the available labour pool.

PHEIS funding led to increased inspections of controlled trades, thus supporting the

achievement of a 65% inspection rate target, which was previously not being met.

Enhanced funding also resulted in an increase in uncontrolled inspections. Inspections of

uncontrolled trades have increased in absolute terms and relative to controlled trade

inspections. Levels of interceptions have increased accordingly. Uncontrolled trade

inspections have shown higher interception rates than for controlled trades - between

15% and 27% compared to between 1% and 3% - which is in line with pre-PHEIS

performance. Passenger baggage channel inspections at airports achieved interception

rates of 4% during a two week trial.

34 Material from within the EU (including third country material which has entered via another member state) is not subject to import checks. A consignment of plant material that poses a significant plant health risk is ‘certified’ by a plant passport. This material is checked via ‘inland inspections’ – see Section 3.4.


31

Technical problems delayed the deployment of in-field diagnostics. It is too early to

conclude on the effects of diagnostics deployment on interception levels. Lessons

learned from the implementation informed a written protocol for deployment of new

technologies. The application of the protocol is expected to ensure faster deployment in

the future.

APHA and FC provided examples of cases where compliance by businesses and

exporting countries was improved as a direct consequence of PHEIS-funded activities.

Data to demonstrate the overall increase in importer and exporter compliance were not

available.

PHEIS investments have generated long-term benefits in relation to: training to improve

the capabilities of inspectors; engagement with the EU and third countries to foster better

biosecurity practices and reduce import risks; and in-field diagnostics, both the successful

deployment of in-field diagnostics and lessons and procedures that should make future

in-field diagnostics deployment more efficient.

3.3.2 EQ2.4: Have new border inspectors been recruited as planned and received adequate and timely training?


FC inspectors were recruited and trained as planned, thus ensuring increased border

inspection capacity. FC benefitted from a flexible recruitment process: for border inspections

it used external contractors who had sufficient capacity and expertise to take on additional

work without needing further training.

The planned number of APHA inspectors have been recruited and trained. The net increase

in capacity is somewhat lower than planned due to staff turnover and the new posts being

filled by people recruited from within the organisation. The recruitment process took longer

than expected as it proved difficult to find candidates with the required skills. The fixed-term

duration of PHEIS-funded contracts (aligned to PHEIS budget timescale) made the posts less

attractive to well qualified candidates. The recruitment challenge was accentuated by the lack

of a lead-in time between confirmation of the PHEIS funding and the start of the two year

budget period.

3.3.2.2 Analysis

PHEIS funded the recruitment and training of new staff with the aim of increasing border

inspection capacity and so enabling inspection objectives to be met.

Expenditure on inspector recruitment

PHEIS budget was allocated as follows35:

■ FC: a budget of £105,000 was allocated to inspection of new trades and wood packaging

materials at ports of entry. A further £50,000 was allocated to the employment of a GB

Cross Border Liaison Manager who was tasked with managing the increase in border

inspections and improving FC’s relationships with importers and links with plant health

inspectors.

■ APHA: £1,350,000 was allocated to the recruitment of 16 import inspectors.

35 Defra, 2015/16 Enhanced Budget Allocation. Budget data provided to ICF; FC, 2015. GB PH 4th quarter report, 2014-15. Expenditure data provided to ICF


32

Actual (2014-2015) and forecast (2015-2016) PHEIS expenditure on staff was broadly

consistent36 with APHA and FC PHEIS budget allocations37.

Recruitment and training of new inspectors as compared to initial plans

FC was able to recruit the planned one additional member of staff within the planned timeline.

The new recruit “was effectively trained and is performing very well”.

For border inspections FC uses external contractors that are appointed through a tendering

process. Interview responses indicate that contractors were able to take on the additional

inspection work funded by PHEIS.

APHA recruited 16 new point of entry border inspectors under the PHEIS budget38.

Interviewees stated that it was difficult to estimate the net effect on inspector numbers due to

staff turnover. Whilst overall head count rose initially, vacancies arose due to staff turnover in

the second half of 2015 and vacated posts were not filled39. Interviewees estimated the net

increase at four or five border inspectors and noted that vacancies remain40.

Confirmation of PHEIS funding did not come until December 2013. Recruitment started in

Mar/Apr 2014 and was completed in late summer. The majority of inspectors started their new

roles in October 201441. Some APHA staff successfully applied for the PHEIS-funded

positions so APHA had to spend additional time and resources backfilling those positions.

The recruitment process was heavily influenced by the limited duration of PHEIS funding which

resulted in fixed term contracts being offered to new recruits. In APHA, new inspectors were

taken on with 14 to 18 month contracts running through to March 2016 (when the funding was

due to end)42. This affected the calibre of candidates and so the recruitment process:

“People who are already established in a relevant career aren’t going to leave a

permanent post to join a fixed term contract. We had a lot of applicants from

graduates who lacked relevant academic and practical experience.”

Due to the PHEIS budget being rolled into plant health agencies’ core budgets, it has been

possible for contracts to be extended (until March 2017 for APHA contracts). FC and APHA

would like to convert all the new fixed-term contracts into permanent contracts. The investment

of time and effort needed to recruit and train new staff is considerable, and the benefits are

only really felt at least 12 months after a new recruit is in post (and full benefits take even

longer). If, and how, contracts can be converted to a permanent status has not yet been

determined.

Training

Training of the inspectors recruited by FC was the responsibility of the contractors. As such,

FC did not need to provide any additional training to deliver the additional inspection capacity.

FC did organise twice-yearly sessions to provide information and gather feedback from

inspectors.

APHA’s new recruits attended training and development courses over a period of about six

months. The training was delivered by a specialised team in APHA and benefitted from the

inputs of a new Applied Training Manager paid for with PHEIS funds. Such training had

36 Detailed information on expenditure is provided in Annex A2.2. 37 FC, 2015. GB PH 4th quarter report, 2014-15. Expenditure data provided to ICF; APHA, 2015. Plant Health Inspectorate Enhanced Funding Project. Briefing note provided to ICF. 38 APHA, 2015. Plant Health Inspectorate Enhanced Funding Project. Briefing note provided to ICF 39 With budget offered back as ‘in-year savings’ 40 Whilst turnover of staff had an impact on the net change in staff numbers, it was reported in interview that job churn / staff turnover is low and not considered an issue. 41 APHA, 2015. Plant Health Inspectorate Enhanced Funding Project. Briefing note provided to ICF 42 APHA, 2015. Plant Health Inspectorate Enhanced Funding Project. Briefing note provided to ICF


33

previously been provided by border inspectors. There were contrasting views on the effect of

the change in training delivery arrangements on outcomes. Some interviewees recognised the

efficiency gains associated with the use of specialist training providers and better identification

of need and targeting of courses. Others indicated that the new courses did not adequately

cover the new inspectors’ training needs and that additional time (six to eight weeks) was

required to train inspectors in the field.

3.3.3 EQ2.5: How has the balance of border inspections changed across the consignment types?


PHEIS funding enabled increased inspections of controlled trades. This supported

achievement of the target inspection rate of 65% for controlled trade consignments.

Enhanced funding also resulted in an increase in uncontrolled inspections. The proportion of

inspections that were on uncontrolled trades has more than doubled during the PHEIS period

compared to the two years prior. Data indicates that the increase in inspection activity

corresponds broadly with the time when new recruits finished their formal training (early

2015).

3.3.3.2 Analysis

PHEIS funding was intended to:

■ Enable the target inspection rate of 65% for controlled trade consignments to be met and

support an associated increase in interceptions.

■ Support additional risk-based inspections of uncontrolled trades with the aim of

identifying new and emerging threats.

Between 2013 and 2014, the European Commission added new commodities to the controlled

goods lists. APHA and FC had to reprioritise their inspection resources to deal with the

resulting significant increase in the volume of controlled imports. The most significant changes

were:

■ On 1 April 2013, minimum levels of inspection were set for wood packaging material

used for transport of Chinese stone43. In 2014/15, in England there were 4,178

consignments of Chinese stone, representing 53% of all controlled consignments within

the scope of FC’s controls.

■ On 1 October 2014, minimum inspection frequencies for capsicum (peppers) were

introduced44. This resulted in a 45% increase in the number of controlled consignments

that needed to be inspected by APHA.

APHA used PHEIS funding to increase inspections of both controlled and uncontrolled trades.

Table 3.3 indicates the time spent carrying out inspections increased during the PHEIS period.

Fewer inspection were completed in the first year of PHEIS than in the two prior years, but the

number of inspections in the second year of PHEIS (2015/16) is on course to be higher.

This delayed increase in inspection output may be partly explained by the delay in recruiting

additional inspectors. They did not come into post until October 2014 and would not have

finished their training until the end of 2014/15. At Heathrow “we reached our peak of resources

in Jan this year [2015]”. The delayed increase may also be explained by the nature of trades

43 Commission Implementing Decision of 18 February 2013 on the supervision, plant health checks and measures to be taken on wood packaging material actually in use in the transport of specified commodities originating in China. 44 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1021/2014 of 26 September 2014 amending Annex I to Regulation (EC) No 669/2009 implementing Regulation (EC) No 882/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council as regards the increased level of official controls on imports of certain feed and food of non-animal origin.


34

requiring inspection: “[if] you have more money, you can inspect more things and therefore

find more high-risk material. [But] inspections of high risk material take longer – therefore the

overall inspection rate may go down”.

Before receiving the enhanced funding, APHA was struggling to meet its target to inspect 65%

of all controlled trades entering the UK. In 2012-13 the inspection rate was just 39%45.

However, since the recruitment and training of new inspectors these targets have been met

most of the time (see Table 3.4 and Figure 3.1). Figure 3.1 shows a clear improvement in the

achieved inspection rate since early 2015 (which aligns with the timing and training of new

recruits discussed above).

The number of uncontrolled trade inspections has increased during the PHEIS period (Table

3.3). Data indicate that there was a relative increase in uncontrolled inspections compared to

controlled inspections during the PHEIS period compared to the two years prior: from 3% and

5% of total inspections (2012/13 and 2013/14 respectively) to 7% and 9% (2014/15 and Q1-3

2015/16, respectively) (Table 3.3). By half way the end of the third quarter of 2015/16, APHA

had already exceeded the annual total for the previous year, and their own target (see Table

3.3 and Table 3.4).

Table 3.3 APHA total inspections 2012/13 to Q3 2015/16

Pre-PHEIS period PHEIS period

2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 (Q1-Q3 only)

Controlled trade inspections 35,073 34,666 31,476 27,048

Uncontrolled trade inspections 936 1,740 2,242 2,561

Total inspections 36,009 36,406 33,718 29,609

Uncontrolled as % of total 3 5 7 9

Time spent on border inspections

(hours) 52,686 55,152 58,163

31,815

(Q1&Q2 only)

Source: APHA, overview of inspection and interception data provided to ICF; and APHA Q3 inspections report – overview, provided by APHA to ICF.

Table 3.4 APHA 2015/16 Q3 inspection overview

2015/16 target

Consignments received (controlled) or forecast (non-controlled)

Inspections completed

Proportion of inspections completed, Q3

100% of consignments are

inspected (controlled trades

- mandatory checks).

978 978 100%

At least 65% of

consignments are inspected

(other controlled goods)

40,858 26,070 64%

At least 2,800 consignments

are inspected (non-

controlled goods)

2,100 2,561 122%

Source: APHA Q3 inspections report – overview, provided by APHA to ICF

45 Source: APHA, Plant Health Enhanced Inspection and Surveillance. Note provided to ICF.


35

Figure 3.1 APHA border inspection rates, other controlled materials (%), 2014 – 2015

Sources: APHA, 2015. Plant Health Inspectorate Enhanced Funding Project. Briefing note provided to ICF; APHA, written communication to ICF

From 2013, FC stopped uncontrolled inspections to shift resources to checks of Chinese

stone. In 2014/15, 50% of these consignments were inspected46.

In 2014/15 FC used its core budget to meet the new EU inspection requirements and used

PHEIS funding to resume the inspection of uncontrolled materials. The uncontrolled goods

primarily targeted by FC were wood packaging material (WPM), dunnage47, bark and firewood.

In general, the FC does not record data on the number of uncontrolled trade inspections.

Targeted analyses are done for specific commodities to investigate trends and improvements

regarding intercepted materials. During the PHEIS period, for example, inspection data were

collected by FC for wood packaging associated with steel and Chinese bark (see section

3.3.6).

3.3.4 EQ2.6: What informs inspectors’ decision making on what uncontrolled trades to inspect?


Decisions on which uncontrolled trades to inspect are mainly informed by inspectors’ own

knowledge and the analysis of results of previous inspections. The risk register was also used

by FC to support decisions.

3.3.4.2 Analysis

Inspectors’ knowledge and results of previous inspections (e.g., Europhyt48) provide the main

inputs to decisions on what uncontrolled trades should be prioritised. For example, FC

explained that “If we have persisting problems on a particular uncontrolled trades, then we can

decide to target all these consignments”. APHA organises weekly meetings for all port

inspectors where recent findings are discussed and shared.

46 A small proportion of WPM and dunnage inspections was funded with the core budget. 47 Dunnage is defined by FC as “loose wood used, or intended for use, to wedge or support cargo, but which does not necessarily remain associated with it”. 48 Europhyt is a notification and rapid alert system operated by the European Commission. It deals with interceptions, for plant health reasons, of consignments of plants and plant products imported into the EU or being traded within the EU itself.


36

While APHA mostly relies on internal expertise, FC also consults the risk register to identify

possible high risk materials to inspect.

“The risk register has allowed us to prioritise activities on high risk areas, and this

impacted on our interception levels. For example, through the risk group we

identified certain commodities associated with wood packaging as high risk. We did

targeted inspections which resulted in interceptions. The risk register informs how

we target our inspections: we know the countries and the trades to be inspected.”

Intelligence from other departments is also integrated in decision making. For example, FC

decided to inspect a new uncontrolled trade (Chinese bark) based on information supplied by

HMRC. FC explained that it “had been alerted to the shipment by Customs, who had stopped

the consignment for another reason […]. We would not have been aware of this trade and we

would not have had the capacity to investigate further without the additional funding”49.

3.3.5 EQ2.7: Are in-field diagnostics being deployed as expected?


Technical problems delayed the deployment of in-field diagnostics. Lessons learned from the

implementation informed a written protocol for deployment of new technologies. The

application of the protocol is expected to ensure faster deployment in the future.

3.3.5.2 Analysis

In-field testing of inspected materials can provide diagnosis more quickly than laboratory

analysis, and support the efficient delivery of the increased number of inspections. Field testing

also enables laboratories to concentrate their resources on diagnosing the more unusual,

novel threats.

In 2014/15 PHEIS funded the establishment of a new laboratory facility within APHA’s

Heathrow office. Heathrow is the most significant point of entry for controlled goods to the UK;

around 70% of the inspectors conducting import checks are located there50. The new

laboratory provides for in-field diagnosis. It eliminates the need to hold consignments pending

receipt of results from laboratories located elsewhere.

PHEIS funds were also used to establish procedures for the implementation of an in-field

diagnosis technology called Genie. Genie is a portable machine for rapid DNA analysis. It

provides results in less than 30 minutes51 as compared to two or three days for laboratory

analysis.

The Genie technology was already available before PHEIS; the enhanced budget supported

its in-field deployment52. Overall, APHA representatives were satisfied with the Genie

implementation though they did have to address some unexpected technical problems, such

as instability of reagents and its failure to extract DNA. APHA noted that:

“Moving a science-based technology into the field is harder than originally

appreciated […] Implementing Genie was a slow process but has taught us a lot. It

taught us that we need to have a whole controlled process to sign up for and

introduce new technology.”

49 Source: FC, Case study - conifer bark screening. Presentation provided to ICF. 50 Source: evaluation interview. 51 FERA, pers. comm. September 2016. 52 For example, PHEIS funded the validation of in-field screening methods to be implemented with the Genie machine.


37

It was confirmed that, “A lot of time was invested in procedures, decision making processes

and in having safeguards in place to make sure that the technology is used correctly.” These

issues were ultimately overcome, but deployment took longer than anticipated.

As a result, the deployment of the Genie technology “has not moved along as quickly as

expected – we are only using it now for one particular organism from one particular region”.

APHA described the following benefits from the use of Genie at points of entry:

■ If imported material proves to be high risk, inspectors can take action to mitigate the risk

much more quickly. This is the case, for example, of pests that are about to become

mobile.

■ The use of in-field diagnostics reduces delay due to consignments being held pending

laboratory analysis, thus decreasing costs to industry (see section 4.3 on economic

impacts).

3.3.6 EQ1.2: Have enhanced inspections - capacity (recruitment of inspectors), capability (ability to deploy diagnostics) - increased the likelihood of intercepting pests and diseases?


Increased inspector capacity has enabled FC and APHA to increase inspections and has

resulted in an increase in interceptions. Inspections of uncontrolled trades have increased in

absolute terms and relative to controlled trade inspections and see higher interception rates

than do controlled trade inspections. However there does not appear to have been any

increase in the underlying interception rate of controlled or uncontrolled trades.

It is too early to conclude on the effects of diagnostics deployment on interception levels.

3.3.6.2 Analysis

Interception data provided by FC suggests that increased capacity resulted in an increase in

interceptions: in 2014-15, overall interceptions levels were around three times higher than in

the previous year53. FC was able to increase its risk-based inspections of uncontrolled trades,

which had higher interception rates than inspections of controlled trades (Table 3.5).

Table 3.5 Interception rates for controlled trades vs uncontrolled materials – examples from FC (2014-15) (England)

Trades Inspections Interceptions Interception rate (as % of inspections)

Controlled – WPM associated

with stone imports from China

2,285 16 0.7%

Controlled – sawn timber 3,749 10 0.3%

Uncontrolled – dunnage

associated with steel

consignments

41 11 27%

Source: FC, Cross Border Plant Health and Forest Reproductive Material – England Report 2014/15. Report provided to ICF; FC, overview of steel shipments inspections. Spreadsheet provided to ICF.

Increased capacity also enabled FC to undertake follow-up actions on interceptions of

previously uninspected trades. For example, one interception of Chinese bark led to a wider

53 FC, 2015. Annual Report and Accounts 2014-15. Available at: http://www.forestry.gov.uk/pdf/FinalFCE-CentralServices14-15.pdf/$FILE/FinalFCE-CentralServices14-15.pdf.


38

investigation. FC contacted 17 companies importing or selling Chinese bark products, and this

resulted in further interceptions of non-compliant material (see also section 3.3.7).

Table 3.6 FC - Total number of interceptions

2014-15 2015/16 (Mar to Sep)

Controlled (funded with core budget) 19 21

Uncontrolled (PHEIS-funded) 79 50

Unknown 11 5

Source: FC, summary of Europhyt reporting. Spreadsheet provided to ICF.

The PHEIS budget also allowed APHA to focus on uncontrolled trades, which typically

generate higher interception rates (see Table 3.7):

“Controlled [trades] are almost a self-regulating area – it has been regulated for years

- while non-controlled have a higher risk of presenting pests and diseases.

Additionally, for non-controlled material we have more discretion in choosing the

material to be inspected and we can focus on areas where there is a higher chance

to find a problem.”

The additional capacity lead to an increase in quarantine pest interceptions for uncontrolled

inspections in 2014/15 when compared to the average for the three preceding years. This

increase is enhanced further when ‘potential’ quarantine pest and disease interceptions54 are

included. Notable external factors also affect the likelihood of detecting non-compliant

materials. For example, over the PHEIS period third countries introduced voluntary bans on

the export of some commodities. The EU added new commodities to the controlled trades list,

partly as a result of UK interceptions (see section 0).

The quarantine pest interception rate on both controlled and uncontrolled trades in 2014/15

was slightly below that in the previous three years. The quarantine and possible quarantine

interception rate on uncontrolled trades was in line with previous years. It is not however

possible to conclude whether the lower interception rate was a result of diminishing returns to

increased inspections, or due to other external factors. It is not yet possible to conclude on

performance in 2015/16 due to the lack of data.

54 Detections where the diagnosis is only the genus and not the species can be determined and hence it cannot be concluded whether the detection was of a quarantine pest species or another species.


39

Table 3.7 APHA - inspections and interceptions of controlled and uncontrolled trades

2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15

2015/16 (Q1&Q2)

Controlled

Inspections N/A 35,073 34,666 31,476 21,581

Interceptions of confirmed quarantine

pests N/A 950 1,130 1,007 451

Interception rate N/A 3% 3% 3% 2%

Interception of confirmed & possible

quarantine pests N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A

Uncontrolled

Inspections 1,023 936 1,740 2,242 N/A

Interceptions of confirmed quarantine

pests 184 164 371 344 N/A

Interception rate 18% 18% 21% 15% N/A

Interception of confirmed & possible

quarantine pests 145 118 171 289 N/A

Interception rate 14% 13% 10% 13% N/A

Source: APHA, overview of inspection and interception data provided to ICF.

Note: N/A = data not available

In-field diagnostics had not been deployed for long enough for their impact on interceptions to

be detectable.

PHEIS enabled exploratory work on undertaking inspections on passenger baggage to be

carried out. A two week ‘proof of concept’ pilot demonstrated the biosecurity risk posed by

passenger channels. It resulted in:

■ 1112 inspections carried out by the border force over the 8 days

■ 82 (7%) of these inspections contained plant material

■ 41 (4%) contained plant material requiring seizure

■ 31 of the seizures (75.61%) were from passengers travelling from Bangladesh

Agreement on regular, monthly inspections at Gatwick, Heathrow and Manchester is close:

“We have the resources, but the process has been slowed down. But we are finally

making some good progress in exposing the risks – we have now a regular presence

in Gatwick and are finding a lot of non-compliant material. We also expect to have a

regular presence in Manchester airport and East Midlands.”


40

3.3.7 EQ1.3: Has awareness raising and exposure to border inspections resulted in improved compliance and supply chains by importers, exporters and passengers?


Awareness raising and exposure to inspections resulted in increased compliance by targeted

businesses and exporting countries. APHA and FC provided examples of cases where

compliance was improved as a direct consequence of PHEIS-funded activities. Data to

demonstrate the increase in scale of awareness raising activities and the overall increase in

importer and exporter compliance as a result of PHEIS funding were not available.

Changes in HM Customs’ inspection priorities resulted in a decrease in their focus on plant

health. This affected the success of passenger awareness activities. It is therefore unclear if

passenger compliance has improved as a consequence of awareness raising.

The enhanced budget helped the UK to retain its status as a leading country for plant health

inspections in the EU, supporting the role of the UK as an important influencer of EU plant

health policy.

3.3.7.2 Analysis

PHEIS supported awareness raising activities aimed at improving compliance with import

regulations and plant health biosecurity practices. It funded:

■ Additional staff time and capacity for APHA and FC to engage with importers and

exporters;

■ Actions that would reduce the risks associated with materials brought into the UK in

passengers’ baggage by: (i) improving the plant health awareness of HMRC inspectors

and (ii) increasing APHA inspector presence in passenger channels at airports and ferry

ports.

Importer and exporter compliance

PHEIS resources enabled FC and APHA to increase their investment in awareness-raising

among importers and exporters.

FC communicated new risk/problems identified in imported material to importers. This

encouraged them to take preventative action so that future consignments were more likely to

be compliant. FC also contacted industry representatives to raise awareness of non-compliant

materials and notify a wider group of importers. FC consultations suggest these activities

resulted in increased compliance. Importers that received notices from FC took action to

improve compliance, such as stopping trade with non-compliant suppliers. Data demonstrating

an overall improvement of compliance rates were not available to inform the evaluation.

Awareness raising activities were found to generate supply chain improvements. With

additional resources, UK inspectors were able to participate in more knowledge transfer

initiatives involving inspection services from other countries. For example, APHA hosted a visit

by officials and producers from Ghana and “as a result they better understood our methods of

detection for the interception of, in particular, pepper weevil and thrips”. APHA also noted

regulatory responses by third countries:

“We have not maintained notes of these improvements but during the period of the

additional funding we saw voluntary bans on certain trades by India, Bangladesh,

Ghana and the Dominican Republic. These were as a result of repeated

interceptions which included interceptions on non-controlled material. We also saw

bans on certain exporters put in place by Kenya as a result of our findings.”

“Our enhanced money has allowed us to cover the work of the inspectors in the UK.

We can release staff to participate in the [EU] training - as delegates, or, really


41

importantly for pushing boundaries further from our shores, send our experienced

inspectors to be the lecturers on those meetings”.

Passenger compliance

Whilst agreement for regular, monthly inspections at Gatwick, Heathrow and Manchester is

close, passenger baggage inspections have principally been limited to a two week ‘proof of

concept’ pilot. A regular presence has now been established at Gatwick, but it is not yet

possible to determine what effect this may be having on passenger compliance.

3.3.8 EQ1.4: Has PHEIS investment generated long-term improvements (i.e. benefits that will persist even after PHEIS funding is removed) in management of pest risk at the border?


PHEIS investments have generated long-term benefits in relation to: training to improve the

capabilities of inspectors; engagement and ensure influence with the EU and third countries

to foster better biosecurity regulation and practices and reduce import risks; and in-field

diagnostics, both the successful deployment of in-field diagnostics and lessons and

procedures that should make future in-field diagnostics deployment more efficient.

3.3.8.2 Analysis

The main long-term benefits identified in consultation with FC and APHA related to training,

engagement with the EU and third countries and in-field diagnostics.

Training

PHEIS investment in training has the potential to provide long-lasting benefits in pest risk

management. PHEIS funding has allowed APHA to invest more resources on training in new

pests and diseases. This prepares inspectors to identify new pests and diseases quickly once

and if they do arrive in the UK. There was a concern that benefits from training risk being lost

if trained personnel are not retained following the PHEIS period. It has ensured that UK

inspectors can continue to contribute as trainers and presenters for EU training events, helped

to export UK best practices which is expected to reduce EU, and hence UK, plant health risks.

Ability to influence international decisions on plant health

The enhanced budget helped the UK to retain its status as a leading country for plant health

inspections in the EU. In 2014 the UK was responsible for 42% of all EU interceptions of

harmful organisms from third countries55. UK findings from uncontrolled material inspections

resulted in new commodities being added to the EU list of controlled material (although these

were acknowledged to be influenced by interceptions from before the PHEIS period as well as

during)56:

“The EU’s activity on addressing non-compliant countries has radically increased,

and that is sustained by UK’s continued findings. The EU is better protected in part

also due to PHEIS – other parties learning from UK best practice indirectly benefits

the UK.”

55 Source: EU Food and Veterinary Office, 2015. Europhyt 2014 Annual report. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/docs/ph_biosec_europhyt_annual-report_2014.pdf. 56 Seven commodity types were added in February 2015 and in September 2015 the EU agreed a ban on five commodities from Ghana largely as a result of UK interceptions. Source: APHA, written communication.


42

Long-term improvements from in-field diagnostics

Based on the lessons learned from Genie implementation, APHA drafted standard operating

procedures (SOPs) and agreed a protocol for approval of new diagnostic techniques. These

procedures are expected to ensure a quicker deployment of new technologies in the future.

The deployment of Genie, “has had an instrumental impact on the laboratory who can now

focus more efforts on exploratory detection and identification work as part of on-going

surveillance activity rather than routine monitoring57”.

APHA observed that the establishment of a new laboratory at Heathrow is likely to result in

up-skilling of inspectors to do on-site diagnostic testing. This is expected to enable more

inspectors to do on-site diagnoses in the future.

57 FERA capability-building report 2014/15, draft report provided to ICF.


43

3.4 Improving inland surveillance

3.4.1 Introduction

Inland surveillance is undertaken to identify pests that are not intercepted by border

inspections, are introduced to the UK through intra-EU trade (which is not subject to border

checks) or other pathways (e.g. on the wind or through imports of other non-plant material

goods). Inland surveillance is undertaken at specified sites, e.g. nurseries, as well as in the

wider environment. The Forestry Commission is responsible for surveillance of woodland.

APHA is responsible for all other surveillance. The main elements are:

■ Surveys targeted at specific listed pests as required by EU Directive 2000/29/EC,

including protected zone surveys. The PHRG also requests ad hoc surveys in response

to intelligence or changes in risks.

■ Monitoring undertaken as part of crop certification and plant passporting inspections.

■ Quarantine surveillance at sites where plant material is grown or sold, using risk-based

targeting of EU as well as non-EU imports.

PHEIS funding was used mainly to recruit additional inland staff and to fund additional survey

work. The aim of both categories of investment was to:

■ Increase the number of inspections delivered;

■ Identify ‘unknown’ (new) pest & diseases, both in the wider environment and related to

third country produce;

■ Enhance knowledge and intelligence of outbreaks and the spread of disease;

■ Increase inspection rates at the highest risk sites (usually nurseries).58

Improving inland surveillance summary statement

For 2014/15 and 2015/16, PHEIS provided £2.1m for the recruitment and training of eight

APHA inland inspectors, and £0.5m for the recruitment of six FC England members of staff,

as well as £4.0m for contractor-based surveys (including aerial surveillance and the

Phytophthora, oak processionary month and Chalara programmes). APHA had some

difficulty in recruiting new staff with relevant expertise. Contributory factors were the relatively

small labour pool being targeted and the offer of short fixed-term contracts.

The principal impact of the additional inspection capacity at APHA was an increase in ‘general

quarantine inspections’ (inspections carried out at risk-rated sites59). These increased by 25%

in 2014/15 as compared to 2012/13.

Data indicate that there has been little change in the overall number of detections during the

PHEIS period, but indicate some increase in detections through general surveillance at risk-

rated sites. The distribution of inspection effort across sites of different risk rating did not

change markedly by comparison with 2012/13 but the largest absolute increase in inspections

was seen in low risk sites. Increasing the number of inspections at lower risk sites was part

of a strategy to look for new pests and look for issues in the parts of the system that are less

heavily scrutinised. Detection rates (detections per site visit) are highly variable, both across

years and across site risk categories. The data shows no clear pattern.

58 APHA, 2015. Plant Health Inspectorate Enhanced Funding Project. Briefing note provided to ICF 59 Sites at which plant material is grown or distributed are given one of four risk rating from very high to low. Targets are set for the number of visits to these sites. Multiple inspections of consignments may be carried out during an individual visit.


44

PHEIS supported ongoing FC survey programmes in response to the Phytophthora, oak

processionary moth and Chalara outbreaks.

FC’s aerial surveillance is found to be more effective and efficient than ground surveys at

detecting many tree pests and diseases since symptoms can often only be identified from

above. Aerial surveillance is now a critical part of FC’s surveillance operations.

PHEIS supported developments in capability that should support improvements in pest and

disease detection over the long term. Examples include development of a quality

management system, revisions to standard operating procedures and an appraisal of training

needs. The long term impact of increased capacity and the training of in-house staff and

contractors is less certain but potentially significant if that capacity can be retained. While a

direct link to detection rates is difficult to establish, the overall capability of the plant health

system has been increased.

3.4.2 EQ2.4: Have new inland inspectors been recruited as planned and received adequate and timely training?


Inland inspectors and related staff have been recruited as planned, although there were some

delays, particularly for APHA, in getting staff in post. The new recruits did not significantly

increase overall resources deployed but did help to reverse the decline seen over the last five

years.

APHA had some difficulty in recruiting new staff with relevant expertise. Contributory factors

were the relatively small labour pool being targeted and the offer of short fixed-term contracts.

FC England recruited fewer staff, offered permanent contacts (despite the fixed duration of

PHEIS funding) and had fewer problems finding candidates. Both FC and APHA are now

working to secure the retention of the recruits beyond the PHEIS period (subject to additional

funding or reallocation of existing budgets).

Recruits to both organisations have received training. The comparative lack of experience of

most APHA recruits meant that more training was needed than would have been the case in

the past or, potentially, if longer-terms contracts had been offered.

3.4.2.2 Analysis

PHEIS funded the recruitment and training of new staff with the aim of increasing inland

inspection capacity and so enabling inspection objectives to be met.

Recruitment and training of new inspectors

APHA: APHA budgeted £2.1m for enhanced surveillance over 2014/15 and 2015/16. The

budget funded the recruitment and training of eight additional inland inspectors.60 The full

budget value was committed despite the new recruits not being in place for the whole of the

2014/15, and has since been extended to cover 2016/17.

Following confirmation of the availability of the PHEIS budget in December 2013, inspectors

were recruited over the summer of 2014. They started in October 2014 on fixed term contracts

running to March 201661. As such, it was six months from the start of the PHEIS period before

the new inspectors were in their new roles.

The net increase in inspector capacity for inland work is unclear. In APHA as a whole, overall

inspector headcount increased by over 20 (less than the number of new recruits due to staff

60 APHA, 2015. Plant Health Inspectorate Enhanced Funding Project. Briefing note provided to ICF 61 APHA, 2015. Plant Health Inspectorate Enhanced Funding Project. Briefing note provided to ICF


45

turnover). The eight additional inland inspectors were on top of a baseline complement of

approximately 70 inland inspectors. This increase effectively reversed cuts that were made

five years ago and relieved the pressure on staff resources that was becoming acute at

seasonal pinch points. It is common for inspectors to split their time between inland

surveillance and eradication on the one hand and import inspections and other work on the

other. This practice may vary across regions depending on the ‘points of entry’ in the region.

It was recognised that for such specialist jobs it is “difficult if not impossible to get people who

are immediately up to speed”. Consultees suggested that the profile of recruits has changed

– candidates that would previously have had industry experience are now typically younger

and do not have the same skills (though it was also suggested that this may be because salary

levels being offered were a grade lower than in the past). The skills profile had implications

for the time required to train new recruits. It was reported that it typically takes around three to

six months to train an inspector but the lack of experience of many of the new recruits meant

that a longer period, and a lot of in-field training, was required.

The sector has traditionally considered that it takes two years to bring inspectors fully up to

speed due to the seasonality of the work and the time required to understand trade and

industry issues and to build relationships that enable successful pursuit of statutory work (e.g.

enforcement of Statutory Plant Health Notices). With a two year contract, new recruits are only

just starting to become fully functional inspectors by the end of their employment.

Managers responded to this by defining new recruits’ activities more narrowly than normal in

the expectation that they would become effective in those areas more rapidly. Nonetheless

the situation meant that the investment in training new recruits, including the time of

experienced inspectors used for in-field training, had a very short payback period. This

reduced the overall uplift in resource available during this period and hence the impact on

inspection rates and other strategic activities.

FC England: FC received £0.52m over two years for the recruitment of six new staff for inland

surveillance: four tree health staff, one survey administrator and one survey/contract manager.

FC was successful in recruiting the planned staff (confirmation of staff numbers and roles was

not obtained).

FC received £2m for the undertaking of surveys62. A Tree Health Surveys framework

agreement (2014-2017) was established to complement the existing Service Level Agreement

(SLA) with FR’s Technical Support Unit (TSU)63). No problems were found in accessing Tree

Health Survey framework contractors of the FR Technical Support Unit.

Factors affecting recruitment

Recruitment was “one of the hardest parts of PHEIS to deliver”. Delays were in part due to the

proximity of the confirmation of PHEIS funding (December 2013 to the start of the PHEIS

period (April 2014) and the length of in-house recruitment processes. APHA was also trying to

recruit a large number of inspectors (24 in total, eight of which were inland inspectors) all at

once from a relatively small labour pool. The short two-year fixed period contracts were also

thought to have made the posts on offer less attractive to potential candidates. Some advice

suggests that the salaries on offer may also have accentuated the problem.

Whilst FC England has some of the same difficulties in recruiting experienced individuals, its

use of permanent contracts meant that it did not experience the other challenges faced by

APHA.

APHA found that the labour pool of appropriately skilled and experienced individuals was

insufficient to meet its needs so it needed to recruit individuals with aptitude who could then

62 This included £1.4m in each of the PHEIS years to conduct OPM survey work, although it was reported that approximately 36% was used for surveys and the remainder was through to be used for control and eradication. 63 The TSU work across a range of functions, including survey work.


46

be trained. The limited labour pool also meant that FC relied on some internal recruitment and

upskilling.

Unlike APHA, FC England chose to recruit new staff on permanent contracts. This was

because the enhancement to the team was made a priority and it was recognised that

temporary contracts can create issues with staff retention. If the enhanced budget is not

continued beyond the current PHEIS period FC will make adjustments elsewhere in its

business to fund the ongoing employment of the new recruits.

3.4.3 EQ2.5: How has the balance of inland inspections changed across risk-rated sites?


The principal impact of the additional inspection capacity purchased with PHEIS funds was

an increase in ‘general quarantine inspections’ (inspections carried out at risk-rated sites64).

These increased by 25% in 2014/15 as compared to 2012/13, a level that is being sustained

through 2015/16.

The distribution of inspection effort across sites of different risk rating did not change markedly

by comparison with 2012/13 but the largest absolute increase in inspections was seen in low

risk sites. Increasing the number of inspections at such sites was part of a strategy to look

for new pests and look for issues in the parts of the system that are less heavily scrutinised.

3.4.3.2 Analysis

The total number of inland inspections carried out by APHA65 in 2014/15 was, at approximately

57,900, 24% higher than the number achieved in 2012/1366. The number of inland inspectors

had increased by approximately 10%67. Data for the first seven months of the 2015/16 is

behind that of 2014/15 on a pro-rata basis. Consultees expect the full year figures to be similar

to 2014/15.

Table 3.8 APHA inland surveillance activity

2012/13 2014/15 2015/16 (April to Oct only)

Site visits 16,644 17,613 8,671

Inspections 46,658 57,935 29,620

Source: APHA

The main change has been an increase in ‘general quarantine surveillance inspections’

(inspections of consignments carried out during visits to risk-rated sites68). These nearly

doubled from 16,900 in 2012/13 to 31,500 in 2014/1569. General surveillance accounted for

36% of all inspections in 2012/13, rising to 54% in 2014/15 (and 60% for the first seven months

of 2015/16). There was a step change in the number of site visits70 after the recruitment of

64 Sites where organisations grow or distribute plant material are given one of four risk rating from very high to low. Targets are set for the number of visits to these sites. Multiple inspections of consignments may be carried out during an individual visit. 65 This evaluation question does not apply to FC as only APHA are involved in inspections of risk-rated sites. 66 The baseline year of 2012/13 was chosen as being a ‘typical year’ based on the advice of APHA. 67 Based on 8 new inspectors joining a reported “70-odd” (interview with representative of APHA) strong team of inland inspectors. 68 Sites where organisations grow or distribute plant material are given one of four risk rating from very high to low. 69 APHA, 2016. Inland surveillance data provided to ICF. 70 Multiple inspections of consignments may be carried out during a site visit.


47

new inspectors in October 2014 (Figure 3.2). Consultees directly attributed this increase to the

increased capacity brought through PHEIS.

“Quarantine surveillance inspections was where one of the main increases in

inspections was targeted with a principal aim to find out what’s out there that we

don’t currently know about i.e. addressing the unknowns.”

Annual general quarantine inspection targets are set based on the expected number of

inspectors. These targets are then passed to regional managers who are responsible for the

deployment of staff to meet them. Targets were increased based on the capacity increase

provided by PHEIS funds.

Sites are allocated to one of four risk levels71. Whilst the targets were increased across all

levels, there was a particular focus on increasing inspections of lower risk sites (Table 3.9).

This was to satisfy the aim of trying to find new pests. There is very little difference in the

distribution of site visits across risk categories between 2012/13 and the PHEIS period to date.

However, when current targets are compared to those set for 2010/11 the increase in the

relative weight of inspections at low risk sites is more apparent (Figure 3.3).

The inland inspection and surveillance activity and the inland outbreak and eradication activity

are funded from the same pot. There are trade-offs between the two and there is an agreement

between APHA and Defra that the site inspection targets should be flexible. They can be

adjusted if, for example, an increased need for eradication activity reduces inspectors’ ability

to undertake site inspections. It is with the lower risk sites that the flexibility is applied.

At the mid-point of 2015/16, APHA was on track to meet the annual minimum targets for low

risk sites. The slight lag shown for very high and high risk sites is expected as more work on

such sites is typically carried out in the second half of the financial year.

Figure 3.2 Total number of risk rated site visits Figure 3.3 Distribution of risk rated site visits

APHA, 2016. Inland surveillance data provided to ICF APHA, 2016. Inland surveillance data provided to ICF

71 An example of a very high risk site is a propagator, whilst an example of a low risk client is an end-point retailer. The key difference is the likely extent of distribution that can occur from the site owner’s activities.

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

20

11

/12

Q2

'12

Q3

'12

Q4

'12

Q1

'13

Q2

'14

Q3

'14

Q4

'14

Q1

'15

Q2

'15

Q3

/15

V high High Mod Low

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600


48

Table 3.9 General quarantine inspections – site visits by site risk level

Site risk level 2012/13 2014/15 2015/16 (Apr to Sep)

Very high 138 205 125

High 443 629 327

Medium 1463 2411 1202

Low 1014 1494 950

Total 3058 4739 2604

Source: APHA, 2016. Inland surveillance data provided to ICF

Note: multiple inspections may be carried out during any single site visit.

3.4.4 EQ2.6: What informs inspectors’ decision making on what consignments to inspect?


The general focus of inspections is decided by the PHRG, taking into account the

requirements of EU law and risks. These instructions are passed to inspectors. When on-site,

inspectors use their experience and intuition to decide which consignments to inspect.

3.4.4.2 Analysis

Inspectors’ decisions on what consignments to inspect are in part governed by survey and

inspection targets and instructions passed down from the PHRG and inland surveillance

managers. These are themselves determined to a large extent by the availability of resources.

One of the aims of the enhanced budget, and the increase in the inspector resources, was to

release inspectors from their risk-orientated work and the pursuit of targets. APHA “tried to

encourage inspectors to look at other issues rather than focus on meeting their inspection

targets. These others sites and issues looked at will have a lower hit rate”. It provided a formal

instruction to inspectors to explain what and how additional inspections and samples could be

undertaken to satisfy the purposes of the PHEIS budget (Box 3.1).

Inspectors’ decisions on what to focus on, within the bounds of their formal instructions, are

made “intuitively” and based on “value judgements” and their own intelligence. They may

consider known risk factors such as commodity type, country of origin, weight of consignment,

and importer.

Box 3.1 Instructions provided to inland inspectors on additional PHEIS-enabled inspections

When and where to visit?

1. As you will be aware there is an expectation from Defra that we will increase inspections inland, targeting known risk, but Defra is also keen that we find the next unknown.

2. In addition the recording of negative inspections of genera is also very valuable as it provides data that is essential when making risk assessments i.e. it allows PRA authors to more confidently declare country freedom therefore justifying statutory action.

3. Consequently the number of recommended visits for Very high, High, Medium & Low risk premises (as defined by the risk matrix) have been increased to provide enough headroom to accommodate the increased inspections.


49

4. The types of premises that require a risk rating has also been increased and SOP 2725 provides guidance on the process.

5. Risk ratings allocated and visits carried out will be monitored by the S&A BIG.

When to sample?

6. To support the desire to find the next new pest there is now an emphasis to look and sample freely and lab capacity has been increased accordingly.

7. Genera you may have skipped inspecting as having low/negligible risk are now fair game and all inspectors are encouraged to sample, both to find new pests and to confirm any symptoms seen are not of quarantine significance.

8. This is especially true for newer members of staff.

Source: APHA evaluation briefing note provided to ICF (17 July 2015)

3.4.5 EQ1.5: Has enhanced inspector surveillance capacity and capability increased detections?


Data indicate that there has been little change in the overall number of detections during the

PHEIS period, but that detections through general surveillance at risk-rated sites (where the

most significant increase in surveillance activity was generated by PHEIS) have seen some

increase, principally in 2015/16. Detection rates (detections per site visit) are highly variable,

both across years and across site risk categories. The data shows no clear pattern.

The extension of survey effort by FC supported ongoing survey programmes. The Chalara

survey detected infections in areas that had not previously been surveyed.

3.4.5.2 Analysis

APHA: The total number of detections of quarantine pests and diseases made during the

PHEIS period is broadly unchanged from that in the preceding years. When potential

quarantine pest and disease detections72 are included, there is a more discernible increase

during the PHEIS period.

However, detection levels and rates are significantly influenced by factors other than just the

number of inspections. For example, warm wet periods can result in increased detections of

fungal diseases. Hence changes in detection levels or rates cannot be confidently attributed

solely to changes in surveillance activity.

General surveillance at risk rated sites, which witnessed the largest increase in surveillance

activity (see Section 3.4.3), have shown some increase in detections. This was limited in

2014/15, but a clear increase can be seen so far in 2015/16. Data for the first half of 2015/16

indicates detection levels are already in line with full year figures for the two years preceding

PHEIS. Figure 3.4 shows the quarterly trend in general surveillance visits, samples and

quarantine pest detections.

Detection rates (rate of detection per site visit) are highly variable across years and site risk

categories (see Table 3.11). It was reported that a lower detection rate is expected at lower

risk sites (a factor that can also be influenced by the inspector’s level of experience). However

such a pattern is not clearly demonstrated in the data. It was also recognised that the purpose

72 Detections where the diagnosis is only the genus and not the species can be determined and hence it cannot be concluded whether the detection was of a quarantine pest species or another species.


50

of increasing inspection activity was not only to find “the next pest/disease, but also about

providing reassurance through finding nothing”.

Table 3.10 APHA inland surveillance pest and disease detections

2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16 (Apr to Sep)

Quarantine pest and disease detections

Total quarantine detections 776 893 842 443

General surveillance 242 238 250 235

Quarantine and potential quarantine pest and disease detections

Total detections 847 1016 1148 568

General surveillance detections 270 282 389 300


Figure 3.4 APHA general surveillance at risk rated sites


Table 3.11 General surveillance at risk rated sites: Detections per 100 visits

Quarantine pest and disease detection

rate Quarantine and possible quarantine

pest and disease detection rate

Site risk level 2012/13 2014/15 2015/16

(Apr - Sept) 2012/13 2014/15 2015/16

(Apr - Sept)

Very high 2.9 4.9 8.8 3.6 8.8 12.0

High 15.3 7.3 9.5 16.3 12.9 15.6

Medium 7.5 5.7 10.3 8.5 8.6 12.6

Low 5.9 3.8 7.3 6.7 5.5 8.6

Average 7.9 5.3 9.0 8.8 8.2 11.5

Source: ICF calculations based APHA, 2016. Inland surveillance data provided to ICF

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

1600

Q1

'20

12

/13

Q2

'20

12

/13

Q3

'20

12

/13

Q4

'20

12

/13

Q1

'20

13

/14

Q2

'20

13

/14

Q3

'20

13

/14

Q4

'20

13

/14

Q1

'20

14

/15

Q2

'20

14

/15

Q3

'20

14

/15

Q4

'20

14

/15

Q1

'20

15

/16

Q2

'20

15

/16

Site visits Samples Quarantine pest & disease detections


51

The PHEIS budget was also used to implement an experimental activity involving the

inspection of intra-EU trade73. Inspections were carried out at Coquelles (the French side of

the Channel Tunnel) and Harwich (a port in Essex). A target of 100 visits was set for 2015/16,

however the activity was stopped during the summer due to the scale of migrant problems at

Coquelles, as well as other demand on staff time during the summer months. Intelligence was

gathered on the nature and timing of imports74. This intelligence was passed to inland

inspectors and used to inform decisions on what sites to visit, when to do so and what to

inspect. There were cases of intelligence-driven inspections resulting in detections but data

on the frequency of this were not available. The intelligence also allows inspectors to build up

a better picture of trades. This includes understanding the routes that certain suppliers follow

and their client base so that detections at one site can be followed up at other sites where the

same batch of product will have been received. Consultees suggest that this helps inspectors

target their effort for maximum impact, but noted that it is difficult to say with certainty that this

results in more detections. A profile of intra-EU imports to Harwich is being prepared as a

result of the surveillance activities undertaken.

FC England

The PHEIS budget provided FC with additional capacity to maintain survey work in support of

the Oak Processionary Moth (OPM) Control Programme and to extend survey work for

Chalara and Protected Zones (PZ). Consultees indicated that it would not have been possible

to meet the targets set for the OPM survey without the PHEIS budget75. The extension of the

Chalara survey coverage detected infections in areas that had not previously been surveyed76.

The tree health survey and PZ survey budgets were used on a more reactive basis and more

interchangeably. The uplift that these budgets gave to outbreak related surveillance work was

considered to be “extremely significant”. It enabled an increase in the number of PZ survey

projects to double from three to six. PZ surveys are seen as important to supporting the

justification of PZ status. In the past PZs were established based on relatively limited

indications of infected and non-infected areas. The increased coverage and detail offered in

the evidence base enabled by the PHEIS budget meant that significantly more confidence can

be placed on the UK’s survey data and the extent of outbreak spread, fostering increased

confidence for EU decision makers designating PZs.

It was recognised that the contractor survey framework put in place with the PHEIS budget,

and the training that has been conducted with those contracts, has improved contractor

capabilities: “we’ve upskilled the contractors and developed tools and methods… and upskilled

the broader sector”. However there was no evidence to determine whether this led to

increased detections.

3.4.6 EQ1.6: Has use of aerial surveillance improved surveillance outcomes?


Aerial surveillance is more effective than ground surveys at detecting many tree pests and

diseases since symptoms can often only be identified from above. As such, aerial surveillance

supports more effective and early detection. It is also much more cost-effective - aerial

73 Trade from within the EU (even if it originates from a third country) is not normally inspected at the point of entry. 74 Using the inventory of goods on board provided by the driver to identify consignments of interest for inspection as they arrive in the UK and the locations of clients. 75 The effectiveness of the OPM Programme is the subject of an ongoing Defra evaluation. 76 In 2014/15 the survey covered 493 hectads and 236 samples were sent to FERA. Of these, 154 were confirmed positive for Chalara infection within 122 hectads, of which 65 related to previously unsurveyed hectads. In 2015/16 283 hectads were being surveyed. Full results are still pending survey completion. A hectad is an area 10km by 10km square.


52

surveillance enables the FC to survey a significantly larger area than would be feasible using

ground surveys. Aerial surveillance is now a critical part of FC’s surveillance operations, not

only for Phytophthora but also for other pests and diseases.

3.4.6.2 Analysis

The FC has a programme of aerial surveillance which is an extension of the Phytophthora

ramorum aerial surveillance programme that started in 2010. The aerial surveillance

techniques that have been developed are applicable to other diseases and are used to cover

a broader range of surveillance needs. The surveillance is useful not only for disease detection

but also to enhance baseline datasets. Key benefits of aerial surveillance are the scale of area

that can be covered, its cost-effectiveness as compared to alternative approaches and its

ability to spot problems that are not visible from the ground.

FC England has been at the forefront of aerial surveillance for tree health. It continues to find

new applications, examples being tree restock surveys and the identification of mammal

damage. FC England, working together with FR and industry, has also been exploring the use

of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Aerial surveillance is considered to be “an integral part

of the surveillance programme”.

The programme’s continuation in England has been fully funded by PHEIS and its benefits

can thus be attributed to the enhanced budget. The annual expenditure in England on aerial

surveillance under PHEIS was around 10% greater than in the preceding two years, with a

corresponding increase in the number of flying hours purchased77.

In 2013/14 and 2014/15 respectively 32,150ha and 35,225ha of larch were surveyed and an

additional 693,463ha and 745,328ha of other woodland were surveyed78. The average unit

cost rates for the two years were £5/ha for larch and £0.23/ha for other woodland79. These

compare to ground survey costs of approximately £100/ha. The total cost of the larch survey

in 2014/15, including the cost of on-ground follow-up to suspect sites, was £0.3 million80.

Surveying the same area using only ground surveys would have cost £3.2 million81.

For Phytophthora, as well as many other pests, symptoms can only be readily detected by

looking at trees from above as they are more typically present in the upper canopy. The value

of an aerial view is accentuated by the fact that it is more valuable to identify symptoms early

i.e. when only a single branch or individual tree may be exhibiting symptoms.

The number of suspect sites and detection rates are presented in Table 3.12. Confirmation of

detection rates is not a measure of effectiveness as it is dependent on the intensity and extent

of symptoms observed. All suspect sites receive a ground visit. Other pests detected through

the aerial surveillance programme were: Acute oak decline, Dothistroma needle blight, Green

spruce aphid, and Great spruce bark beetle.

77 FC England. 2015. PHEIS Data Request: FC Aerial Surveillance. Provided to ICF 16.10.2015 78 Data taken from: FC England. 2015. PHEIS Data Request: FC Aerial Surveillance. Provided to ICF 16.10.2015 79 The fixed hourly unit cost is effected by the density of woodland being surveyed and transit time. 80 Calculated as: (32,150ha x £5.45/ha) + £159k 81 Calculated as: 32,150ha x £100/ha


53

Table 3.12 Aerial surveillance for Phytophthora: suspect sites and confirmation rates82

Phytophthora ramorum Phytophthora lateralis

Suspect sites observed

Detection confirmation rate

Suspect sites observed

Detection confirmation rate

2011/12 499 26.3 2 100

2012/13 567 29.3 na na

2013/14 468 47.6 3 33.3

2014/15 293 49.5 2 100

2015/16 (to date) 187 30.5 3 66.6

Aerial surveillance is also used as a tool for following up on Statutory Plant Health Notice

(SPHN) compliance and areas where land managers/owners are expected to undertake tree

restocking. All confirmed sites identified as having Phytophthora receive a SPHN and are

checked from the air in the year it is issued and in subsequent years. Breaches are reported

to FC area teams who follow up to ensure compliance. This provides an efficient targeting of

resources to encourage and provide advice to land owners / managers to ensure the required

actions are undertaken. This process is thought to have worked well.

A general indicator of the overall effectiveness of the Phytophthora control and surveillance

programme, of which aerial surveillance is an integral part, is the average size of SPHN area.

Table 3.4 indicates that this has been declining.

Table 3.13 Average size of individual Statutory Plant Heath Notice areas for Phytophthora83

2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Area (ha) 10.3 3.8 3.1 3.5 1.8 0.9

3.4.7 EQ1.7: Has PHEIS investment generated long-term improvements in pest and disease detection?


PHEIS investment has supported developments in capability that should bring improvements

in pest and disease detection over the long term. Examples include development of a quality

management system, revisions to standard operating procedures and an appraisal of training

needs. The long term impact of increased capacity and the training on in-house staff and

contractors is less certain, but potentially significant if that capacity can be retained. While a

direct link to detection rates is very difficult to establish, the overall capability of the plant

health system has been increased.

3.4.7.2 Analysis

For APHA the increase in inspector numbers meant that staff time could be allocated to high

priority enhancements to system capability and quality that should yield long term benefits.

Many of these projects would have been pursued without the PHEIS investment but would

have taken significantly longer to complete in a context where all available resources were

dedicated to meeting the assigned inspection targets. APHA data (Table 3.14) indicate that

hours spent on business improvement increased significantly during the PHEIS period84.

82 FC England. 2015. PHEIS Data Request: FC Aerial Surveillance. Provided to ICF 16.10.2015 83 FC England, pers. com., 05.11.2015 84 These data includes all inland business improvement activity and includes time spent promoting and testing contingency plans.


54

Table 3.14 APHA inland surveillance and eradication Business Improvement Group activity (hours)

2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 Apr-Oct 2015/16

Business improvement activity (hours) 1134 1086 1608 1821

Source: APHA inland surveillance time data provided to ICF

Examples of activities enabled or enhanced by PHEIS with the potential for long term impact

are:

■ Increased investment in quality management, including training and application of

ISO17020, a quality standard for inspections. ISO accreditation was achieved for the plant

passporting scheme;

■ A review of training requirements that has provided a set of recommendations on training

needs and frequency of requirements;

■ Business Objects training to enable more staff to run reports using eDomero85;

■ A redesign of standard operating procedures (SOPs) to make them more effective and

enable them to fit in with the new outbreak management contingency plans.

If new recruits are retained, the benefits of increasingly experienced inspectors could be long-

lasting. Turnover of staff in these roles has historically been low; inspectors are often in post

for over 30 years. The new recruits help to address the aging profile of inspectors

(approximately 40% of inspectors are over 5586). New inspectors are learning from their more

experienced colleagues, a development that should – if those staff can be retained - provide

greater resilience as a cadre of older inspectors move into retirement.

FC England noted that the contractor survey framework put in place with the PHEIS budget,

and the training that has been conducted with those contractors, had improved the resource

available to FC: “we’ve upskilled the contractors and developed tools and methods… and

upskilled the broader sector”.

85 eDomero is APHA’s electronic system is used to record plant health activity in England and Wales. 86 APHA, 2015. Plant Health Inspectorate Enhanced Funding Project. Briefing note provided to ICF.


55

3.5 Improving preparedness

3.5.1 Introduction

Contingency plans aim to ensure a rapid and effective response in the event of a pest

outbreak. These plans include governance of the response through Outbreak Management

Teams.87

The PHEIS budget enabled continuation of the contingency planning work that had begun in

2013, in particular, the further refinement and testing of the national plan and the development

of new pest-specific plans. There are now three components to the system:

■ A national contingency plan that guides the establishment and organisation of an outbreak

response;

■ Pest-specific contingency plans that guide what surveys and actions should be taken for

particular pests. The need for pest-specific plans is determined based on a risk-prioritised

basis, as informed by the risk register;

■ Standard operating procedures (SOPs) that specify how to conduct surveys and other

actions.

3.5.2 EQ1.8: Have improved contingency plans enabled more appropriate and faster implementation of outbreak management activities?


Where contingency plans have been implemented, for large scale and small scale outbreaks,

feedback is, on the whole, very positive. The processes for engagement and set up of

outbreak responses are considered to be much improved. The clarity that the contingency

plans bring to this process, in tandem with the role of the Office of the CPHO, makes the initial

response far more efficient. Benefits attributed to the structured pro formas used to document

information and decisions include: certainty over what information and decisions need to be

made; smoother flows of information between parties that enables faster decisions; better

tracking of expenditure enabling more accurate resourcing decisions to be made; and a more

robust audit trail of decisions. Overall, the lessons from the Chalara outbreak appear to have

been learnt and the improved contingency plans go a long way to redressing the problems

apparent when only SOPs were used.

3.5.2.2 Analysis

Under the contingency planning system adopted after the Chalara outbreak, the Chief Plant

Health Officer leads the operational response to a disease outbreak. The Office of the CPHO

‘owns’ the contingency plans. Before contingency plans the chain of command was not clear

– a key weakness exposed by Chalara. The generic plan brings this ‘command-and-control’

structure. Because all parties are signed-up to the process, they accept the decisions that

come from it. In particular, where an outbreak requires the involvement of FC, APHA and the

devolved administrations, it provides a clear procedure, led by the Office of the CPHO, to

determine who the control authority (i.e. lead) should be. By the end of a single contingency

group meeting, the Office of the CPHO states who the control authority is. This has saved time

in implementing outbreak management responses as compared to previous arrangements.

There was previously a sole reliance on SOPs. SOPs only provide information on how to deal

with an organism on the ground. Now the process dictates how organisations interact with

each other, how the media is engaged, etc. In the case of Chalara (prior to the development

of contingency plans) Defra took over as control authority from FC as the situation escalated.

87 Defra (20914). Protecting Plant Health. A Plant Biosecurity Strategy for Great Britain


56

Pro formas are used which help to direct conversations about an outbreak. The familiarity of

the format and content facilitates the flow of information through the ‘chain of command’ and

supports more rapid decisions. The use of standardised documentation also provides a

comprehensive record of information and decisions that can be audited if necessary.

The improved documentation of decisions and activities supports better financial

management. It provided greater transparency of how much time was being spent on outbreak

management and by whom. For large outbreak situations, specific project codes to facilitate

reporting on expenditure are set up. This supports discussions with Defra on resource

allocation and how resources are best managed to enable the outbreak to be dealt with whilst

avoiding negatively impacting on other activities. In the past such decisions were often made

on ‘educated guesses’ rather than using data on actual expenditure.

Consultees indicated that the wider promotion of contingency plans to stakeholders has helped

to achieve buy-in to actions ensuring a smoother implementation of outbreak management

activities.

The contingency plans were widely reported (although not universally) to have improved the

processes of outbreak management: plans set out formalised rules of engagement and specify

how work can be coordinated with other organisations. People know what their roles are and

what skills are needed.

The oriental chestnut gall wasp (OCGW) outbreak in 2015 was identified as an example of

where contingency plans were used effectively: “we were able to specify the type of

surveillance and response needed”. Elements of the national contingency plan have been

successfully used for a number of smaller outbreaks.

PHEIS provided funding for half a full time equivalent (FTE)88 to take forward the further

development of the contingency planning framework, a process that was co-ordinated by

APHA. In addition, the extra inspector capacity provided by PHEIS also freed up staff time89,

in particular that of a senior manager. Table 3.14 (see section 3.4.7) indicates the increase in

time spent on ‘business improvement activities’ by APHA, a significant proportion of which was

used for contingency plan development, testing and refinement. Additional resources at the

Office of the CPHO were also used for contingency planning. FC had one member of staff,

on a fixed term contract funded by PHEIS, working on contingency planning90. FR was also

involved in contingency plan development but its inputs were funded through the FR research

budget rather than PHEIS. One consultee observed that the PHEIS budget has “really helped

to kick start the process”.

Contingency planning actions supported by PHEIS funds include:

■ Continued refinement of the national contingency plan.

■ The production by Defra/APHA of five, and by the FC of three, pest-specific contingency

plans91.

■ A national testing exercise that included plant health service staff from the devolved

administrations. This improved understanding of roles and responsibilities and more

confidence that the processes could applied under real circumstances.

■ A two-day training exercise undertaken in partnership with EPPO in early 2015. It provided

a sense-check regarding its likely efficacy from external, international plant health

professionals, as well as promotion of UK best practice to EU partners.

88 One FTE is equivalent to one employee working full-time. 89 See Section 3.4 on ‘inland surveillance’ for further discussion on this point. 90 Source: evaluation interview 91 Defra/APHA: for Asian longhorn beetle, Citrus longhorn beetle, Potato spindle tuber viroid (PSTVd), Potato Zebra chip, Xylella fastidiosa. FC: for the pine wood nematode (PWN), European spruce bark beetle (Ips typograhus) and the bronze birch borer. Source: FC (2015). GB PH 4th Quarter report (2014/15)


57

■ Delivery of contingency plan training courses for APHA and contingency plan workshops

in Northern Ireland, Wales and Scotland.

■ The purchase of four ‘contingency trailers’ that are stationed around the country. They

provide stocked, mobile facilities that can be used for work in support of outbreak

management and enable faster response times.

■ Engagement with stakeholders on the national and pest specific contingency plans.


58

3.6 Improving diagnostic support

3.6.1 Introduction

FERA is responsible for diagnosis of samples of regulated and listed organisms from border

inspections and inland surveillance. FR has a Tree Health Diagnostic Advisory Service

(THDAS) which provides diagnosis support to the GB forestry sector. THDAS responds to

queries/requests for diagnosis (‘enquiries’92) relating to both regulated and unregulated

organisms.

PHEIS funding was provided to enhance capacity and capability to address the increased

demand faced by FERA and FR for diagnostic support to service border and inland

inspections. It was also intended to enable the quicker detection of new and emerging risks.

Investments were made in the:

■ Recruitment and training of additional staff;

■ Development and validation of new diagnostic tests and enhancement of existing

methods93.

Improving diagnostic support summary statement

PHEIS provided £1.8 million to FERA and FR. Part of this supported the development of new

and enhanced diagnostic tests and methods as planned. New and enhanced diagnostics

methods, combined with improved training, are adequate to ensure rapid detection of new

and emerging pests and diseases. Enhanced capacity, supported with cross-training of staff

to provide greater flexibility, was appropriate to meet the current and expected increase in

demand for diagnostic support. FERA and FR were able to deal with a greater number of

requests for diagnosis.

3.6.2 EQ2.8: Has the development of new and enhanced diagnostic tests and methods progressed as planned?


The development of new and enhanced diagnostic tests and methods progressed as planned.

PHEIS funding was essential for these improvements.

3.6.2.2 Analysis

The development of new and enhanced diagnostic tests has progressed as planned. Over the

first 18 months of the PHEIS period, FR developed or enhanced at least seven protocols

(additional details are provided in section 3.6.4). PHEIS funding was essential for these

developments:

“We wouldn’t be able to develop [new/enhanced diagnostic tests] without funding –

we would only have 2-3 members of staff, who would only be able to deal with

enquiries and do the training. There wouldn’t be enough time to develop new

protocols.”

92 Enquiries can be submitted to FR by anyone, including members of the public, FC and APHA inspectors, industry representatives and Observatree volunteers. Enquiries can consist, for example, of the submission of samples and/or questions on how to deal with a pest. In some cases, enquiries only consist of photographs of suspect pests. Based on this, THDAS provides diagnostic support. Enquiries are registered by FR in a database. 93 In-field diagnostics development for border inspections is discussed in section 3.3.5.


59

FERA focussed on the development of new technologies and improvements in methods.

Interviewees reported that good results in both these areas were achieved in 2014-15, and

other methods were expected to be delivered as planned by the end of the PHEIS period.

3.6.3 EQ2.9: Is enhanced diagnostics capacity appropriate to support the anticipated demand from enhanced border/inland inspections and surveillance?


Enhanced capacity was appropriate to meet the current and expected increase in demand

for diagnostic support. FERA and FR were able to deal with a greater number of requests for

diagnosis. The PHEIS funding also facilitated an improvement in the quality of diagnostic

support provided.

3.6.3.2 Analysis

PHEIS supported the recruitment of four generic technicians at FR and funded 60% of the

salary of a technician specifically tasked with the diagnosis of Phytophthora ramorum. This

represented a significant increase as compared to pre-PHEIS staffing levels of three to four

full time equivalents (additional details are provided in Table A2.3).

Consultees indicated that the number of samples from FC border inspectors requiring

diagnosis did not increase as a result of additional inspection activity funded by PHEIS. The

number of enquiries submitted to FR increased significantly from 2012/13 onwards due to the

discovery of Chalara in February 2012 (data on enquiries are provided in Figure 3.5 and Table

A2.4) i.e. not due to any increase in activity funded by PHEIS. Enquiries also increased as a

consequence of better citizen awareness of plant pests and disease. FR could not

comprehensively deal with the volume of enquiries in 2012/13 and 2013/14, but additional staff

have since enabled FR to deal with the increased workload.

The additional funding also allowed FR to improve the quality of diagnosis and advice. Before

PHEIS it was not able to provide detailed tests due to the scarcity of resources:

“We could confirm, for example, if a pathogen was present at genus level […] but we

did not have the resources (staff time, funding for lab materials) to do detailed

analysis, e.g. we could not analyse for species which is important if you are trying to

identify if you have a new risky organism”.

Figure 3.5 Number of yearly enquires/reports to THDAS

Note: peaks in 2012-13 and 2013-14 resulted from the Chalara outbreak. In 2012-13 most of the enquiries could not be logged in FR’s enquiries database and were dealt with by form letters. The graph provides an overview of all enquiries submitted. Source: FR THDAS, 2015. Data from FR on Plant Health Enhanced Inspection and Surveillance (PHEIS) Activities. Written note provided to ICF.

580 670 585828

704

3,0813,238

1,982

1,281

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

3,500

Num

ber o

f enq

uirie

s/re

port

s


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At FERA, PHEIS funded the recruitment and training of five generic diagnosticians, eight

specialists and two staff members providing administrative support. In December 2015, there

were 75 diagnosticians in total at FERA, compared to 65 before PHEIS94.

Consultations with FERA indicate that it did not see an increased demand for diagnosis until

January 2015 (Figure 3.6). This was due to the time needed to recruit and train new border

and inland inspectors funded with PHEIS (which mirrors findings on inspection activity

presented in section 3.3.3). By the time increased demand for diagnosis was being seen,

FERA had already recruited and trained the necessary new staff. Interviews with APHA

indicated that “turnaround [time] appears to be as good if not better than it has in the past”95,

but that the time taken to undertake a diagnosis had increased.

FERA also explained that the enhanced funding had allowed it to provide more complex and

comprehensive diagnostic support and more detailed results.

Figure 3.6 Number of samples processed by FERA each year

Source: FERA, 2015. PHEIS – Evaluation Data Request – Diagnostics. Written note provided to ICF.

3.6.4 EQ1.9: Is enhanced diagnostics capability adequate to ensure rapid detection of new/emerging pest and disease risks?


New and enhanced diagnostics methods are adequate to ensure rapid detection of new and

emerging pests and diseases. Improved training and pests and diseases reporting tools also

enabled quicker detection of pests and diseases.

3.6.4.2 Analysis

Development of new methods

New diagnostic methods helped improve the detection of new and emerging tree diseases:

“Last year we detected a new pathogen on cedar trees (Sirococcus tsugae) for which

we had to develop a new diagnostic method (plants and cultures). This is a new

pathogen in EU and by using the new diagnostic method we were able to confirm its

presence in several locations in the UK. […] We are surveying for quarantine

pathogens such as Fusarium circinatum (Pitch canker), Ceratocystis platani (plane

wilt) and have diagnostic methods in place for these as well as the newly emerging

94 Staff numbers fluctuate on a seasonal basis. Therefore the additional PHEIS-funded staff did not directly result in a net increase of the total number of diagnosticians. 95 There is a Standard Operating Procedure that states that samples must be looked at within 3 days.

32,102 31,081

38,152 37,141

20,518

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

30,000

35,000

40,000

45,000

2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-Sep 16

Num

ber o

f sam

ples


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pathogen in Europe, Xylella fastidiosa. We now have everything in place for the

detection of these quarantine pathogens that are currently absent from the UK.”

FERA also noted benefits associated with the method development work:

“The range of pest and diseases covered by the new methods is potentially vast as

many of the technologies developed, or method improvements made, are generic in

nature and provide the capability to test for a wide range of target organisms”.

Enhanced training

FERA used PHEIS funding to pay for ‘cross-training’ of its new inspectors, with the objective

of ensuring that diagnosticians are able to work on samples outside their specialism. This

involved on-the-job training on rotation around the different diagnostic FERA sub-teams. FERA

believed that this strategy had been successful in creating a more flexible workforce of

diagnosticians.

Other capability improvements

PHEIS funding has supported improvements of tools for tree pest and disease reporting.

THDAS staff worked with FC Scotland, FC England and Natural Resources Wales to improve

the ‘Tree Alert’ tool. PHEIS funding also supported the alignment of Tree Alert with THDAS

databases.

Tree Alert is an online application that can be used by tree professionals and members of the

public to report suspected cases of tree pests and diseases. This is an important reporting tool

for volunteer surveyors trained as part of the Observatree initiative96. It was originally created

as a response to the Chalara outbreak in 2012, and then extended to all tree diseases.

The improvement of reporting enabled a more rapid detection of diseases:

“We found that the quality of data sent through Tree Alert was not sufficient. […]. We

therefore redesigned and tested Tree Alert […] In the early version, people were not

requested to add much contact detail information, so it was difficult to get back to

them. It also sometimes took a lot of time to respond and to find the location of the

tree. This has been fixed and now [Tree Alert] is a better tool: data on tree location

and contact details have to be provided. Images need to be provided as well to

support diagnosis. This reduces the amount of time needed for THDAS staff to obtain

the right information and take the first steps in diagnosing the cause of the tree health

problem.”

96 Observatree is a citizen science platform that uses a network of over 200 volunteers to carry out a range of survey activities to help spot new pest and disease outbreaks.


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3.7 Awareness raising

3.7.1 Introduction

One of the priorities of the GB Plant Biosecurity Strategy is to build awareness among industry,

NGOs, landowners and the public of risks arising from plant pests and measures to prevent

their introduction and spread. The aim is to improve confidence in plant biosecurity and ensure

that stakeholders can play a role in improving the system97.

The organisation of PHEIS-funded awareness raising activities was led by APHA and FR. The

main activities were:

■ Participation in events (such as public shows and trade shows) and delivery of training

across government, industry and the professional horticultural sector. PHEIS funded the

delivery of new events and the enhancement of existing activities with improved

equipment.

■ Events and training targeted at the public: these included awareness raising activities to

involve plant health professionals and the public in the identification and reporting of plant

pests (‘citizen science’).

■ Enhancement of web-based awareness raising materials. This involved the development

of e-learning modules for use within the plant health agencies.

■ Development of an industry-led Charter Mark. This was intended to be a quality mark to

certify that traders take action to improve their biosecurity processes and procedures but

has not to-date been taken forward.

■ Awareness raising activities of border inspections targeted at importers and passengers

(these are discussed in section 3.3.7), and by inland inspectors with plant industry

(growers, importers and distributors).

Awareness raising summary statement

PHEIS provided £1.2m in support of awareness raising activities towards recruitment of new

staff and other operational costs. Most awareness raising activities were delivered as

planned. In some instances the audiences reached through these activities was wider than

originally planned. The exceptions were e-learning and trade certification scheme.

Positive feedback from participants and organisers suggests that events achieved their aims.

The EU Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) also recognised the quality and originality of the

UK approach to awareness raising.

Consultees provided examples of actions taken by participants to improve plant health

biosecurity, particularly related to new initiatives with major supermarkets and government

ministries as well as advisory requests to APHA from industry participants in industry training

workshops. The presence of Oriental Chestnut Gall Wasp in St Albans in 2015, the first time

this pest has been confirmed as present in the UK, was identified by an Observatree

volunteer. These examples suggest that activities can be successful in fostering the adoption

of good practices and preventative action.

Evidence on impacts was not available for all PHEIS-funded awareness raising initiatives,

particularly those reaching more diffuse audiences e.g. at trade and public shows. Further, it

is difficult to calibrate the extent to which overall plant health risks are reduced, or external

plant health surveillance (e.g. Observatree) can be relied upon to complement plant health

services activity.

97 Source: Defra, Protecting Plant Health. A Plant Biosecurity Strategy for Great Britain. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/307355/pb14168-plant-health-strategy.pdf.


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3.7.2 EQ2.3: Have PHEIS funded awareness raising activities been delivered as planned?


Most activities were delivered as planned:

■ Enhanced participation at events, training and citizen science initiatives were successfully completed. In some instances the audiences reached through these activities was wider than originally planned.

■ Awareness raising through e-learning was implemented at a slower pace than expected, mainly due to a decision to focus efforts on citizen science initiatives.

■ The trade certification scheme was not implemented due to limited support by the industry.

■ Increased inspector capacity has allowed inspectors to undertake more direct engagement and awareness raising with industry and other stakeholders.

Positive feedback from participants and organisers suggests that events were successful in

raising awareness of plant pests. The EU Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) also recognised

the quality and originality of the UK approach to awareness raising.

3.7.2.2 Analysis

Participation in events and delivery of training

Through PHEIS funding, APHA was able to increase its attendance at events and purchase

new display stands and equipment. APHA believed that these activities were successful in

raising awareness:

“The public’s awareness of plant pests and diseases and how to prevent and reduce

spread has definitely improved. We are increasing the number and type of trade

events we exhibit at, targeting those which will have the biggest impact, e.g. the

Landscape Show. We are working closely with other organisations and putting

resources into joint ventures, e.g. producing new biosecurity posters aimed at

amateur gardeners in conjunction with RHS.”

In addition to participation in trade and public shows, PHEIS enabled APHA and FC to organise

training within government and industry organisations on biosecurity best practice. The main

initiatives were: training courses delivered to the Ministry of Justice and Ministry of Defence

training of industry representatives; work with major supermarkets with backing from the British

Retail Consortium; more targeted and higher quality participation in trade shows and public

shows; and participation in landscapers’ events.

These activities were successful: “We have delivered [more than] planned as we were able to

reach out to wider audiences, going beyond our initial strategy.” APHA collected feedback

from participants in some events, which showed positive ratings for the quality of training and

effects on awareness98.

In 2015 the EU FVO carried out a mission to the UK to gather information on plant health

control measures and surveillance. The FVO recognised the good quality of awareness raising

initiatives:

“The mission team found that the UK has established a comprehensive system for

identifying, assessing and proposing mitigation measures for New and Emerging

Risks. […] Good awareness, public engagement and stakeholder's involvement are

key elements of the new strategy. There are many examples of good practice and

the UK is clearly to the forefront in this area.”

98 Source: APHA training analysis reports provided to ICF.


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Citizen science

PHEIS provided additional capacity that has supported the ongoing delivery of Observatree

training courses (delivered by FC, with support from FR and APHA). The objective of these

courses was to train volunteers and professionals in recognizing symptoms of pests and

diseases and correctly report them through Observatree. APHA as a supporting organisation

also provided experienced and skilled staff to Observatree training events, to the project board,

& to organised events and shows involving distribution of materials to encourage participation

with citizen science initiatives. The additional capacity across the plant health agencies

involved was identified as an important factor in enabling these events to be delivered.

These activities were delivered as planned and improved awareness:

“We disseminate information on existing pests, encourage people to manage the

health of trees and report if they see anything suspicious. One indicator of increased

awareness is the increased number of enquiries coming to us and the improved

nature of reports via TreeAlert”.

The types of benefits identified from these events varied across the different target audiences.

For example:

■ Land surveyors: training resulted in volunteers being more effective in doing surveys and

sending the right samples for analysis. For example, FR as a result of training Woodland

Trust volunteers working on Observatree “are now better at spotting symptoms and send

us better quality samples”.

■ Local authorities working with trees: the training updates them on what may affect trees

and how to recognise this.

■ Broader groups, such as gardeners and members of the public with an interest in tree

health: FC obtains reports from members of the public but often they are poor in

recognising organisms/describing symptoms. With training, these groups are able to get a

better understanding of what can affect health of trees and therefore better report possible

pests.

Enhancement of web based activities

APHA initially planned to develop three e-learning modules. These were not completed as

initially planned because the focus of awareness raising shifted towards other initiatives, such

as citizen science events. One of the planned modules was developed in 2014-15 and APHA

still plans to develop the remaining modules, although this is likely to happen after PHEIS.

Charter Mark

APHA explored the possibility of introducing a certification scheme to encourage voluntary

supply chain improvements and better plant health standards. The initiative was supported by

industry representatives, but there were also concerns about the practicalities of

implementation and the cost of the scheme. For this reason, the initiative has not been taken

forward99.

Engagement with industry by inspectors

The increase in inspector capacity has enabled inspectors to undertake more awareness

raising engagement activities. For inland inspectors this includes spending more time with

growers and for new awareness literature to be developed and distributed to them. This

provides an opportunity to explain their responsibilities e.g. regarding plant passports and

biosecurity practices. The increased risk-rated inspection visits enabled by PHEIS has given

APHA a bigger presence in the ‘low risk’ segment of the industry. It has enabled relationships

99 Source: written note provided by to ICF as part of Phase 1 of this study.


65

to be built and plant health issues brought to the awareness of parts of the industry that may

have been unware of such issues and their associated responsibilities.

3.7.3 EQ: What impact has awareness raising had on plant health biosecurity?


Consultees provided examples of actions taken by participants to improve plant health

biosecurity, particularly related to new initiatives with major supermarkets and government

ministries. For example, awareness raising activities with the Ministry of Justice and the

Ministry of Defence resulted in policy changes and greater adoption of biosecurity practices;

industry training led to suppliers approaching APHA for advice on new imports helping to

reduce risk of pest and disease entry, and the presence of Oriental Chestnut Gall Wasp in St

Albans was identified by an Observatree volunteer, the first time this pest has been confirmed

as present in the UK. This finding also reached a wider audience due to publicity in the media,

which keeps tree & plant health issues in the public domain. Although it is not possible to

conclude on the extent to which this finding, or others, can be attributed to the increase in

Observatree training provided for by PHEIS. These examples suggest that activities can be

successful in fostering the adoption of good practices and preventative action.

However, evidence on impacts was not available for all PHEIS-funded awareness raising

initiatives. Further, it is difficult to calibrate the extent to which overall plant health risks are

reduced, or to which external surveillance (e.g. Observatree) can be relied upon to

complement plant health services activity.

3.7.3.2 Analysis

Consultees provided examples of improved biosecurity practices implemented as a result of

participation in these activities. The application of good practices in dealing with plant materials

is expected to result in a decreased likelihood of bringing or spreading pests into the UK.

Follow-up to evaluate the impact of awareness raising occurs principally for those activities

where target groups are relatively specific (e.g. targeted events with a small number of

organisations). There is less available evidence for those events with broader audiences (e.g.

trade and public shows) or with groups less directly involved in handling plant material or

carrying out surveillance (e.g. local talks to wildlife trusts).

Where feedback and evaluation was received by APHA on training courses and engagement,

responses often indicated that participants felt able to apply the learning outcomes within their

organisations100.

For example, APHA following outcomes regarding the success of awareness raising in

encouraging participants to undertake concrete actions to improve biosecurity practices were

identified:

“The British Retail Consortium (BRC) are more aware of [biosecurity] issues. As a

result of our events, they are working more closely with growers to put in place

practices to prevent pests and diseases at pre-border stage. They take additional

steps to identify potential pests and diseases, they ask questions to growers that

they would not have asked before […]. Additionally, the Ministry of Defence [is

discussing] how biosecurity procedures can be implemented on their side”

Following from that [biosecurity awareness raising events with the Ministry of

Justice]), we established working groups to embed what was done in their general

working practice

100 Source: APHA training analysis reports provided to ICF.


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“The Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Justice introduced policy changes as a

result of our activities. The Ministry of Justice embedded biosecurity into their

policies”.

In addition, industry training courses had resulted in suppliers approaching APHA directly for

advice related to any risks of importing new produce, thereby potentially reducing the chance

of pests and diseases entry. Table A2.2Table A2.2 (in Appendix A2.4) provides additional

details on outcomes and impacts from activities delivered by APHA.

Training of citizen science volunteers resulted in increased accuracy of pest identification, and

therefore better quality or Tree Alert reporting. This increases the likelihood of identifying new

and established pests, thus enabling effective outbreak management. Observatree has

resulted in a number of quarantine pest detections by volunteers. The most notable was of

Oriental Chestnut Gall Wasp in St Albans in June 2015. This was the first confirmed detection

in the UK, despite surveillance for the pest having been carried out by plant health agencies

since 2006. This finding also reached a wider audience due to publicity in the media, which

keeps tree & plant health issues in the public domain. Although it is not possible to conclude

on the extent to which this finding, or others, can be attributed to the increase in Observatree

training provided for by PHEIS.


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4 Cross-cutting issues

4.1 Governance

The delivery of the ‘Plant Biosecurity Strategy for Great Britain’ is overseen by the UK Plant

Health Strategy Board, which meets on an as required basis to consider strategic UK level

plant health issues. Strategy delivery is routinely managed through the subordinate Plant

Health (England) Programme Board, a decision making body that meets quarterly to review

progress across policy, research and delivery work streams for plant and tree health. It wasn’t

until the advent of the Plant Health Strategy Board that an effective framework for monitoring

activities of plant health agencies101 was put in place. The agencies provide the Plant Health

(England) Programme Board (and the linked APHA Delivery Board) with quarterly reports on

their activities and outputs. Reporting arrangements were changed at the end of 2014/15 to

include a new set of key performance indicators (KPIs) and reporting on expenditure (including

PHEIS, albeit not as a separate item). The provision of the PHEIS budget helped to catalyse

this change.

One benefit of these new arrangements was that they provided more timely information on

expenditure. Increased transparency has made it easier for budgets to be managed flexibly in

response to changing priorities, and for KPI targets to be altered in accordance with these

changing priorities and associated distribution of budgets e.g. shifting resources from

surveillance to outbreak management in the event of an outbreak.

4.1.1 EQ2.1: What were the overarching governance arrangements for the enhanced budget and has this enabled co-ordination of expenditure across PH actors?


No specific governance arrangements were put in place for PHEIS. Where new activities

were set up with the PHEIS budget with, in some instances, new cost codes for booking time,

then tracking of PHEIS expenditure and outputs was feasible. However, in general, PHEIS

funded the delivery of a larger volume of existing activities. The integrated nature of the

investments that were made across a broad range of plant health activity areas, and the

multifunctional dimension of many plant health staff roles meant separate tracking of PHEIS

outputs and outcomes was, quite reasonably, considered difficult and inefficient. There was

no obvious coordination between elements of PHEIS expenditure across the plant health

agencies.

Despite this, consultees generally felt that governance arrangements were sufficient. This

may indicate a tendency of consultees to place greater weight on operational needs or overall

plant health services accountability, rather than the need to be accountable for the

performance of PHEIS investments specifically.

4.1.1.2 Analysis

The PHEIS business case identified a series of workstreams. These included a number of

activities for which budget proposals were drawn up and agreed. However, once the PHEIS

budget was approved, the money was provided to the agencies and effectively added to their

core budgets. The PHEIS budget officially became a part of core funding at the beginning of

2015/16, rather than remaining a separate budget stream for the full two year period.

There were no separate governance or reporting arrangements put in place for PHEIS. The

absence of any PHEIS-focussed governance arrangements was agreed at the outset of the

PHEIS period.

101 Defra, APHA, FERA, FC and FR


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“There was no separation in funding oversight”

“PHEIS was not necessarily tracked as a separate budget at programme level”

“We agreed that PHEIS outcome monitoring would be wrapped-up in the strategy”

“It was monitored through existing governance arrangements”

“There was no specific evaluation of PHEIS money; it was wrapped in the wider

reporting of APHA/FERA. There was no splitting out of separate budget lines”

“This [business planning/reporting] recognises the enhanced and rest of the budget

which is rolled into a global pot figure”

The rationale given was that, with a few exceptions, PHEIS was to be spent on delivering more

outputs from existing activities, e.g. doing more inspections. On this basis it was considered

to be illogical and financially inefficient to try to set up separate monitoring on the PHEIS

budget. It would have required a high level of detail for logging inspectors’ time (who typically

undertake multiple activities) and could be conceptually difficult to establish when an activity

was being carried out with the PHEIS budget or core budget.

“It’s difficult to record at a fine detail what was enhanced budget and what wasn’t.

Could have done that level of detail, but it would cost a lot to do that.”

Some of the main PHEIS budgets components could be tracked under existing arrangements.

For example, data are available on the number of new recruits funded by PHEIS, the number

of inspections undertaken, progress in populating the risk register, the number of PRAs

produced, events delivered, new diagnostic methods developed.

However there are a number of challenges in tracking expenditure and outputs that mean that

changes in these output indicators are not always adequate representations of changes in

service delivery. For example:

■ Units of a given output (e.g. inspections) are not always equal and may have different input

(time and other cost) requirements (e.g. depending on the nature of the consignment being

inspected). Hence performance based on a quantitative output indicator alone can be

misleading.

■ Where individuals’ roles are multifaceted but their time is logged to separate codes, the

inputs associated with outputs may not be obvious e.g. time spent undertaking PRAs102.

Due to the points above, the role of external factors in influencing outputs and changes in

reporting arrangements during PHEIS, before and after comparisons do not always allow for

changes to be attributed to PHEIS.

“It is difficult to identify comparable data for the pre-PHEIS period, given there is

there is general a lack of consistency in data that has been reported, with some

structural changes confounding such comparisons further”.

There was no obvious coordination among plant health agencies in how PHEIS expenditure

was being delivered (in order to take account of how changes in expenditure in one area may

influence activities in another area). The Plant Health (England) Programme Board, set up

under the new plant health governance arrangements, was thought to be the body that

oversaw this for plant health services overall.

“Dealing with other organisations hasn’t tied up/delivered as much as expected that

it might.”

“Not sure [whether governance arrangements enabled coordination]. I think the

programme board now helps that, but we had no bespoke arrangements for PHEIS.”

102 e.g. time was booked and hence expenditure on the risk register and separately on PRAs could be tracked whilst under the remit of FERA (H1 2014/15). This distinction was lost on transfer of these roles to the Office of the CPHO.


69

“Not sure how coordination worked”.

“One example that I can think of where governance has not been very good is for at

least one contingency plan developed as part of the Defra funded Future Threats

project. We had written the plan and found out that that the Forestry Commission

was also writing a contingency plan for the same agent. [...].The lack of co-ordination

may have been partly because the Defra funded project had started before the

PHEIS funding. Maybe Defra could have coordinated activities better.”

“We do not have good sight of the range of activities within the wider tree health

programme that might also relate to tree health outcomes and how these are

coordinated with our own enhanced funded activities.”

Despite the lack of PHEIS-specific governance arrangements and some difficulties in tracking

PHEIS expenditure and outputs, a majority of consultees responding to this question thought

that the governance arrangements were sufficient. A minority of consultees noted that this

wasn’t the case at the start of PHEIS.

“I don’t think the governance arrangements in place two years ago were good

enough to oversee outcomes delivered with PHEIS money in isolation.[…]. A much

better governance has been set up over the last six to twelve months.”

“The Governance arrangements are sufficient now but its taken a while to get there.”

“This year we’ve completely revised our business planning approach.”

This opinion (that governance is sufficient) suggests consultees placed a greater weight on

what is operationally effective for the delivery of workstreams, or on the need to be accountable

for plant health services delivery, budgets and outcomes at an overall level, as opposed to

ensuring coordination across organisations or being accountable for PHEIS specifically.

4.1.2 EQ3.4: How could governance and co-ordination of any future budget enhancements be improved?


Governance arrangements, including a monitoring and evaluation plan, should be included

as part of business plan development. The presence of such a plan should be a requirement

of funding approval. This will ensure consideration is given to these factors upfront so that

they can be readily put in place.

Monitoring indicators should be established as part of the governance set-up and be reported

on. Improvements to plant health databases/data recording should be considered where

necessary to enable indicators to be aggregated at the appropriate level and better tracking

of outcomes.

A single body should provide oversight of enhanced budget expenditure and performance.

4.1.2.2 Analysis

Consultees recognised that data on outputs could be more detailed, outcomes better

represented and expectations on how agencies should oversee and report on the

enhancement could be clearer.

“It would be good to go beyond the analysis of outputs and do more analysis of what

interventions are more effective in terms of reducing risks.”

“There was recognition that where we could we’d try to show the benefits, but reality

was that there’s quite a lot of activities where that’s difficult”


70

“It would also be useful to have a better coverage and more credible data sets

relating to inspection numbers and diagnostic sampling levels (including turnaround

times and splits between services), although data improvements are ongoing”.

“Setting up clearer outcome indicators at the start of the process alongside

expectations in the way that agencies were required to oversee and report the

delivery of the enhanced spend would also have helped”.

The set up and delivery of PHEIS provides lessons for the future governance of any budget

enhancements. For example:

■ The lead-in time between the PHEIS proposal (August 2013), confirmation of PHEIS

funding (December 2013) and start of the PHEIS funding period (April 2014) was very

short. This created design, planning and delivery challenges for PHEIS workstreams (e.g.

it was identified by consultees to be a contributing factor to the delay in recruitment of new

inspectors: “Timelines for the funding were too tight.. […].. there is a lag in recruitment”).

■ The PHEIS proposal did not set out governance needs, focussing only on demonstrating

the business case i.e. the operational need.

■ PHEIS was not set up as a specific programme. The name ‘plant health enhanced

inspection and surveillance’ (PHEIS) budget was established retrospectively. It is not clear

that there was any definition given prior to this; PHEIS was originally presented as a simple

uplift in the core budget103. This is not in itself problematic but challenges do arise if there

is a subsequently an interest in tracking the impacts of the enhancements and the generic,

system-wide reporting and governance arrangements do not provide the requisite data.

■ Consultees indicated that there was limited coordination across agencies104. Oversight

and coordination of PHEIS expenditure was expected to come from the Plant Health

(England) Board.

■ Indicators for reporting plant health activity changed during the PHEIS period. Indicators

are subject to external factors so their interpretation is not always straightforward. Data for

some outputs and outcomes is not routinely reported on and appears to be difficult to

obtain from the plant health databases e.g. detections by inland site inspections, time

allocated to tasks for staff whose roles are multi-dimensional.

Key lessons:

■ A longer lead-in time between budget confirmation and the start of a fixed term budget

enhancement would help to reduce delays in capacity increases at the start of the period.

“We would benefit from notice, say six months, regarding the enhanced budget

opportunity. We had very little time to respond with tendering and recruitment.”

“We spent a lot of time looking at opportunities to reduce spending, which is down to

prioritisation within the programme. If we had this prioritisation done before the PHEIS

budget was agreed, that would have saved us time.”

■ If funders wish to evaluate the effects of budgetary enhancements, then clear governance

arrangements, including a monitoring and evaluation plan, should be included as part of

business plan development. The presence of such information should be a requirement of

103 This is in line with consultee evidence that the enhanced budget was effectively rolled into the core budgets of the plant health agencies – unofficially in year 1 of PHEIS and officially in year 2. 104 An example of a lack of more general coordination of activities between FR and FC was provided, where both FC and FR separately wrote contingency plans for the same pest, which then had to be merged together. It was suggested that this may have occurred due to a lack of coordination between the PHEIS funding and the Future Threats project.


71

funding approval. This will ensure consideration is given to these factors upfront so that

they can be readily put in place.

■ Monitoring indicators should be defined as part of the governance set-up and be reported

on. Improvements105 to plant health databases/data recording should be considered where

necessary to enable indicators to be disaggregated at a level that is appropriate for

informing monitoring of outputs and outcomes106 and better understanding the

relationships between inputs, outputs and outcomes.

■ Governance arrangements should provide regular and co-ordinated oversight between

plant health service delivery and enhanced budget delivery, as well between different

agencies and departments whose interactions may be influenced by the additional funding.

The governing group should feedback on issues affecting interagency coordination to

relevant managers.

“[Governance and coordination could be improved by making sure the programme board

meets; making sure that it takes a holistic view of risks and delivery across the different

bits of the plant health service; avoiding duplication of work”.

“We would probably benefit from seeing the overall monitoring of the program and learning

about activities of other parts of the enhanced budget”.

Whilst such arrangements will bring with them a cost, they will enable better coordination,

monitoring and evaluation of budget expenditure. In particular they will provide a better

indication of where additional money is most effectively and efficiently allocated to generate

improved outputs and outcomes. This will benefit the overall quality of plant health risk

management as well as the overall accountability of the plant health agencies.

4.2 Economic Impacts

Investments in enhanced inspection and surveillance can deliver economic benefits, such as

avoidance of the costs of outbreaks. Measuring these impacts is challenging, due to the

absence of a counterfactual, the importance of external factors, and difficulties in determining

the effect of enhanced activities107 in relation to outbreak avoidance. Such challenges mean

that research often needs to make assumptions to estimate the impacts of plant health risk

management activities.

In addition to these generic challenges, there are some additional factors particular to the

PHEIS case. The PHEIS investments have only been in place for a short period. Many of these

investments are still being put in place108, or have lag periods between action and effect109.

Collectively these challenges limit the scope to undertake a comprehensive analysis and

quantify economic impacts. Therefore potential PHEIS impacts identified during the research

are presented in illustrative and qualitative terms.

105 Notwithstanding ongoing improvements reportedly being made to management information e.g. through the FERA Long Term Service Agreement. 106 Example: detections by inland inspectors and uncontrolled trade interceptions by border inspectors are reportedly not recorded distinctly on eDomero. However understanding the detection/interception rate and levels is relevant for budget decisions on where additional inspectors would be best deployed. 107 For example: where the number of inspections has increased, it is not possible to determine whether any given interception would have occurred under the counterfactual position. Additionally, it is not possible to determine were the pest not intercepted whether it would have resulted in an outbreak. 108 e.g., improved diagnostic tests. 109 e.g., the effect of awareness raising on supply chains and the effect of increased interceptions on EU plant health policy and regulation.


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4.2.1 EQ1.10: What are the economic impacts of enhanced inspections and surveillance?


PHEIS investments have resulted in interceptions and detections as well as more efficient outbreak management for a number pests and diseases. This may have reduced the risks of pest and disease incursions and outbreaks and/or reduced the likelihood or extent of outbreak spread. This is likely to have resulted in the avoidance of negative economic as well as environmental and social impacts that result from outbreaks of pests and diseases. However it has not been possible to estimate the likelihood or extent of the avoided costs.

Benefits are also expected from improvements in diagnostic and surveillance systems that lower the cost of regulation. Improvements in the speed and rate of pest and disease detection deliver benefits for both the industry and regulators. For example, in-field diagnostics are expected to benefit industry by ensuring quicker turnaround for diagnosis, and therefore reduced costs arising from consignments being detained. In-field diagnostics are also expected to reduce public expenditure on laboratory analysis.

4.2.1.2 Analysis

Impacts were assessed in relation to:

■ Costs of border clearance delays; and

■ Costs of outbreaks.

Reduced costs to industry of border clearance delays

Use of in-field diagnostics can reduce the time needed for sample analysis110. For example,

the use of Genie technology is estimated to reduce turnaround times from approximately two

or three days to less than 30 minutes111. These time savings deliver positive impacts for the

industry. APHA provided the following example:

“[In-field diagnostics] reduces unnecessary delay due to consignments being held

pending laboratory analysis […]. There is a rule of thumb – detaining a consignment

for 24 hours means a 25% loss of value (for air freight).”

Benefits from a quicker turnaround were also identified by the industry. For example, in 2015

the Fresh Produce Consortium (FPC) assessed costs from official controls on fresh produce

imports, including impacts of delays in clearance112. Based on information provided by

importers, FPC estimated that consignments are normally cleared within two to three days in

the UK, compared to less than 24 hours for other EU points of entry. The FPC estimated that

the cost arising from UK delays in clearance is between £7,000 and £50,000 per importer per

annum, depending on the volumes imported. The report concluded that a turnaround below

24 hours would be of “greater commercial value”.

Genie thus offers an opportunity to cut the costs of compliance both for the regulated and the

regulator. In a competitive market it would be expected that some of the business benefits (i.e.

lower costs) would be passed on to customers. This PHEIS activity has not yet advanced to a

stage where these benefits can be confirmed. The extent of these benefits depends on the

scope of application of the Genie technology, i.e. the types of pests and plant materials on

which it is used.

110 Data on turnaround times are not consistently recorded by FERA and FR, therefore it is not possible to estimate exact time savings. 111 Source: evaluation interview 112 FPC, 2015. A review by the FPC of charges for official controls on fresh produce imports. A report to the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). Available at: http://discuss.bis.gov.uk/focusonenforcement/files/2015/05/FPC_review-of-charges-for-official-controls-on-fresh-produce-imports.pdf.


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Avoidance of outbreaks

PHEIS investments in increased inspections, surveillance and improved diagnostic support

resulted in new pests and diseases being intercepted, enhanced capability to diagnose certain

pests and diseases, and in action being taken that may otherwise not have occurred. For

example, inspections of uncontrolled material by FC, enabled by PHEIS funding, resulted in

interceptions of Asian longhorn beetle and Pine wood nematode, for which outbreaks could

present economic, environmental and/or social impacts113.

The potential for positive impacts were also identified in relation to awareness-raising

activities. For example, FC worked with importers to raise awareness of the need to improve

plant health practices to prevent pests and diseases. Increased awareness was regarded by

consultees as a means to improve compliance and avoid industry costs of dealing with pest

incursions and outbreaks. No evidence was available to establish estimates of the scale of

such avoided costs or the extent to which the uplift in awareness raising activities had actually

facilitated them.

An Observatree volunteer made the first UK detection of Oriental chestnut gall wasp114 in 2015.

This detection may have helped to reduce the extent of the outbreak compared to a scenario

with no Observatree surveillance, although it is not possible to determine whether this specific

detection can be attributed to the increased Observatree training enabled by PHEIS.

Costs of outbreaks can greatly affect businesses. For example, a nursery had to destroy

material valued at £316,000115 due to the detection of Citrus Longhorn Beetle (Anoplophora

chinensis). This corresponded to around £1 million in lost sales. The nursery also had to

absorb the labour costs of dealing with the outbreak (for example, costs of incineration and

chemical treatments of the affected materials).

Outbreaks can also lead to public costs in the monitoring and mitigation of outbreaks, such as

expenditure in increased inspections and surveillance. They can also result in wider

environment and social impacts. For example, the Chalara PRA, prepared by the FC116,

identifies the potential for ecological impacts and changes in visitor numbers to woodlands

and impacts on woodland-based tourism. Overall, the spread of the pathogen in the UK and

Ireland is estimated to result in potential non-market losses (such as loss of recreation,

amenity and biodiversity values) of £1 million to £16 million per annum. Continued ground and

aerial surveillance surveys, funded by the PHEIS budget, resulted in detections of Chalara in

new areas that had not previously been surveyed.

Impact scores on the risk register and PRAs are determined on the basis of possible economic,

social and environmental impacts of pests and diseases. Table A2.6 (see Appendix A2.6)

identifies some of the areas where PHEIS investments have been targeted against pests and

pathogens that have the potential for a large economic impact. However it has not been

possible within this evaluation to assess the actual economic, environmental or social impact

benefits of this aspect of the PHEIS spending.

113 See Table A2.6 for Risk Rating impact scores of pests for which PHEIS investments may have contributed to reduced risks of outbreak. 114 See Table A2.6 for Risk Rating impact scores of pests for which PHEIS investments may have contributed to reduced risks of outbreak. 115 Source: Plant Health Controls at the Border – Heathrow Airport. Presentation provided to ICF. 116 FC, 2013. Pest Risk Analysis for Hymenoscyphus pseudoalbidus for the UK and the Republic of Ireland.

Available at: https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/phiw/riskRegister/downloadExternalPra.cfm?id=3848.


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4.3 The relative effectivenss of PHEIS investments

PHEIS was designed to deliver an increase in plant health resources that could enable targets

(e.g. border inspection targets) to be met and support strategic investments that would provide

long term improvements to GB plant health risk management.

Across APHA and FERA, at least 70% of the PHEIS budget supported the recruitment of new

in-house staff (principally inspectors) and up to 30% funded consultancy projects and other

goods and equipment.117

Across FC and FR, nearly 30% of the PHEIS budget supported the recruitment of new in-

house staff (principally inspectors, diagnosticians, managers and administrators), and over

60% funded surveillance programmes delivered by contractors. 10% funded consultancy

projects and other goods and equipment.118

4.3.1 EQ3.1: Which type of investments have resulted in the most (cost-) effective benefits to biosecurity, and why/how?


Investment in the risk register and contingency plans are two areas that provided direct

benefits. They have facilitated the transition from a reactive to proactive approach and have

had a demonstrable effect on efficiency in areas where the speed, clarity and accuracy of

decision making have a large bearing on risk management and plant health outcomes.

The funding of additional staff posts absorbed the largest proportion of the enhanced budget.

PHEIS investments in inspector and scientific support capacity have had a direct, positive

effect on output levels of the inspection and diagnostician teams. Data indicate a related

increase in border interceptions and to a lesser extent, an increase in inland detections. Whilst

there are examples of pests intercepted and detected, it is not possible to quantify the overall

effect on GB plant health outcomes of PHEIS spending.

Investment in awareness raising and training has enabled substantive improvements in their

scope and quality. There are examples of how this has improved biosecurity practices but it

is not clear how far improved awareness and skills of industry and other stakeholders (e.g.

Observatree surveillance volunteers, the general public) has changed plant health risk levels

or provided for an extension of plant health service capacity.

Cost effectiveness of diagnostic support provided by FERA and FR has been improved

through PHEIS. PHEIS supported the development of new and enhanced diagnostic tests

and methods as planned. New and enhanced diagnostics methods, combined with improved

training, are adequate to ensure rapid detection of new and emerging pests and diseases.

Enhanced capacity, supported with cross-training of staff to provide greater flexibility, was

appropriate to meet the current and expected increase in demand for diagnostic support.

FERA and FR were able to deal with a greater number of requests for diagnosis. They

developed diagnostic methods that provide financial savings. Aerial surveillance for tree pests

and diseases is more cost-effective than ground surveys and PHEIS enabled the existing

programme to be continued for two years.

PHEIS investments have helped the UK to retain its status as a leader in plant health risk

management, and hence its influence over EU policy and the practices employed by other

countries. This helps to reduce import risks.

117 Approximate estimates based on PHEIS budget plans provided to ICF 118 Approximate estimates based on PHEIS budget plans provided to ICF


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4.3.1.2 Analysis

Determining whether PHEIS investments have been effective in improving biosecurity, and

their comparative cost-effectiveness in doing so, has proven problematic for a variety of

reasons, some intrinsic to tracking performance of plant health systems and others particular

to PHEIS. Barriers include:

■ That key biosecurity indicators (e.g. number of incursions to GB per year across all pests

and pathogens (detected and undetected)) are not readily estimated and the drivers of

changes in measurable indicators are not well understood;

■ The relationships between plant health service activities and indicators of the state of GB

biosecurity are not well understood;

■ Comparative (before/after) cost and performance data are not yet available or were not

collected (e.g. on new diagnostic methods) for some PHEIS investments;

■ The various PHEIS activities deliver a variety of benefits that are not equally distributed

over time. Some are ‘quick wins’ while others offer potential biosecurity improvements over

the long term.

In addition, whilst some of the PHEIS investments have the potential to deliver a high level of

economic and social benefit, not all the benefits are measured in improved biosecurity. Cost

savings can accrue to plant health agencies and other stakeholders. An example is the new

laboratory and the use of in-field diagnostics at Heathrow. These should reduce the time taken

for pest and disease diagnosis results on suspect consignments, thereby reducing the time

that consignments are detained. Much of the total benefit of this improvement will accrue to

the supply chain (and potentially consumers) in lower costs and avoided loss of product value.

It will also provide for a more efficient use of plant health service resources.

There are, however, examples of PHEIS-funded investments that consultees are confident will

help to improve biosecurity, and developments that will improve the cost-effectiveness of

service delivery.

Two investments bringing fundamental changes were the risk register and contingency

planning. The investment in the risk register delivered a working tool, with supporting methods,

process and documentation. It was widely reported by consultees to have been an effective

investment. It is credited with bringing efficiencies to identification and assessment of risk,

increasing speed and confidence of decision making, and helping GB plant health services to

move from a reactive to a proactive operating model. It influences all aspects of plant health

service work and supports a more effective risk-based allocation of resources. Feedback on

the risk register is very positive and interviews yielded evidence of some of the efficiencies

that it brings to the processes of decision making and resource allocation.

Contingency plans brought a fundamental change to how outbreak management activities are

initiated and managed. The efficacy of the contingency planning arrangements were proven

through the Oriental Chestnut Gall Wasp (OCGW) and other smaller outbreaks. Interviews

provide evidence of how the processes of outbreak management have been improved and

how this increased outbreak management efficiency, and hence effectiveness. It is cited as an

example of where the lessons from the Chalara outbreak have been learnt.

Recruitment accounted for the largest proportion of the enhanced budget (just over 50%), with

APHA taking on the largest number of new recruits, principally inspectors. In total 24 new

inspectors were hired by APHA at an average cost of approximately £100,000 per inspector

per year119. The total number of inspectors at APHA increased from 117 in 2013/14 to 139 in

119 The overhead recovery rate (which include basic wage costs, employer contributions, direct programme expenditure and administrative support i.e. finance, HR, IT, etc) for PHEIS funded border inspectors was £50.38 per hr and for inland inspectors was £79.08 (which is multiplied by 7.4/hours day and 220 days/yr.


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2014/15 and was 138 as at March 2016. FERA recruited 9 diagnosticians and 2 support staff

at an average cost of approximately £80,000 each per year.

The enhanced capacity was credited with enabling many additional activities. PHEIS

investments in inspector and scientific support capacity have had a direct, positive effect on

output levels of the inspection and diagnostician teams. They enabled:

■ An increase in border inspection levels up to a target level to inspect 65% of all ‘other

controlled’ trades entering the UK, a rate not achieved in previous years.

■ An increase in the volume of uncontrolled trade border inspections. These have higher

interceptions rates, and hence were identified as a more effective area for investment,

than controlled trade inspections. Inspections of trade and airport passenger channels not

previously targeted led to interceptions and were successful in identifying new risks.

■ An increase in the overall number of inland surveillance inspections, including a doubling

of general inland surveillance site visits. Detection data for general surveillance at risk-

rated sites indicates some increase in detections during the PHEIS period, but the pattern

is not clear.

■ Extension of tree health monitoring programmes for a further two years.

■ Accommodation of the increased demand for diagnosis of samples and higher levels of

enquiries.

Demonstrating the impact on rates of pest incursion is not feasible. This is due to a

combination of the fact that the intercept rate is not known (as not all incursions will be

detected) and the challenge of proving a negative (i.e. the absence of an incursion by virtue

of improving risk management in the supply chain). The evaluation was able to provide

evidence of the benefits of increased capacity on other areas of the biosecurity continuum.

PHEIS investments have helped the UK to retain its status as a leader in plant health risk

management, and hence its influence over EU policy and the practices employed by other

countries. The development of the risk register generated much international interest and has

helped foster changes in aspects of risk assessment by other non-UK organisations and

regulators. The risk register and contingency plans have both gained visibility outside of UK

and contributed to the perception of the UK as a leader in plant health risk management.

Increased inspections and interceptions have helped the UK to retain its position as the EU

member state achieving the highest level of interceptions. This contributes evidence with

which the EU categorises trades120, helping to improve categorisation and hence reduce

import risks.

The analysis indicates that commitment to permanent posts offered a more cost-effective

solution, in both the short and long term, than use of fixed-term contracts. A key point of

context was that there was not an adequate pool of candidates with the relevant skills, so most

new recruits required investment in formal and on-the-job training before becoming fully

functional. The use of fixed term contracts:

■ Made recruitment more difficult (as many prospective candidates preferred permanent

posts) and so slowed the acquisition of new capacity.

■ Meant that new recruits’ roles were defined more narrowly than normal as part of a strategy

to help them acquire a core capability more quickly, a move that undermines efforts to

build a more flexible workforce.

■ Risked higher turnover as recruits look for permanent positions elsewhere in advance of

their fixed-term contracts expiring.

■ Could result in the organisation being unable to make a return on its investment in training

if the recruits are not retained beyond the PHEIS period – the contracts of new inspectors

120 Whether trades should be categorised as controlled or uncontrolled


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ending just at the point where they have acquired enough experience to be fully functional

in their roles.

The FC strategy of using contractors (that were already trained and could be retained on an

as-needed basis) and recruiting inspectors via permanent contracts avoided these issues. The

use of permanent contracts required managers to take on a budgetary risk as PHEIS money

was only available for two years. The relatively high number of people recruited by APHA

increased this risk and influenced its decision to use only fixed term contracts. Use of

contractors by APHA is rare. It is generally not considered to be feasible; tree health

inspections tend to be very specific and cover a more limited range of issues whilst plant health

inspections cover a broad range of issues and require a commensurately wider range and

depth of expertise.

Cross-training of staff (to diversify their skills) in FERA was undertaken and has improved its

ability to deal with the highly variable level of demands placed on plant health services. In

other agencies this wasn’t identified as a specific aim, but the increased size of the workforce

was thought to enable greater flexibility. However the effect is likely to be undermined, at least

in the short term, by the relatively narrow focus of the training given to some new inspectors

(as identified in the bullet list above). Dealing with variable levels of demand was identified as

a key challenge for plant health service operations. Despite some improvements enabled by

PHEIS, consultees stated that it remains an ongoing area of concern (in part linked to potential

future budget cuts). The extent to which the enhanced workforce provides sufficient flexibility

to cope with shifts in demand (e.g. as a result of major outbreaks) is unclear. Such impact as

is provided will be contingent on new recruits staying in post.

“Extra resources and staffing allowed us to improve our flexibility when it comes to dealing

with crises or peaks in workload.”

“It’s important to ensure that things aren’t let go in quiet periods, as we are then unable to

respond to emergencies. You need to think about long term requirements rather than short

term”.

“If we need staff for a huge case, such multi-skilling to build in flexibility is useful”

“If we have more people, we can be more flexible”

Awareness raising and training is an area where PHEIS investment was particularly effective.

There was a marked increase in the quantity and quality of events and training provided, and

there was good participant feedback. The baseline level was low, which accentuated the

perceived effectiveness of activities in raising awareness.

“Whatever you do in this area will be good as there wasn’t much before, and what

was there was ad hoc. Now it’s done with a strategy behind it and there is a very

tangible difference to how things were done before. We get a lot for their money.”

The role of awareness raising and training of industry and sector professionals, as well as

Observatree volunteers, was identified as an important route for reducing plant health risks as

well as enhancing the size and quality of the workforce available to deal with demands created

by major outbreaks. However, continued investment is recognised as necessary. The extent

to which these activities change or improve practices is often not clear. Such changes are an

important part of risk management. But the extent to which these external partners can be

relied upon as a true extension of plant health service capacity is not known.

“Imparting a lot of responsibility for looking for pests onto growers is important. We’ve

upskilled not only the growers but people with interest in trying to find pests and

diseases.”

“Growers do change and numbers are likely to increase under the new EU plant

health regime. Likely that another 100-150 plant passport registered growers with no

knowledge of what’s required will come forward as a result. If we don’t get the same


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level of funding or increased funding then a batch of growers who aren’t aware of

issues regarding sourcing and risks will become known”.

“But it is difficult to measure benefits from these investments and to understand if

these are making a change and to what level we can rely on these as part of our

response.”

There is some evidence that PHEIS investments in new diagnostics and surveillance methods

provided financial savings. For example, FERA used PHEIS funding to develop a more

effective soil DNA extraction method that was faster and cheaper than the existing method121:

Through an iterative process, a cheaper and quicker soil DNA extraction method has

been developed. The existing method […] takes up to four hours to process 16

samples and costs approximately £7 per sample. The new method was 20% cheaper

[than the existing method] in terms of consumables and took half the time to

complete, resulting in a considerable reduction in staff time costs. No loss of

sensitivity was observed with the new method. This methodology will prove useful in

detection of soil-borne plant pathogens.

PHEIS supported the deployment of in-field diagnostics, by enabling the setting up of a

laboratory at Heathrow and the testing of new technologies (see section 3.3). In-field

diagnostics deployment is expected to be cheaper than external diagnostics support by FERA.

However, development of in-field diagnostics is still ongoing and their application to date is too

limited122 to draw robust conclusions about savings.

PHEIS funds were used to extend aerial surveillance activity for an additional two years. Both

the unit cost per area surveyed and the effectiveness of pest identification are better than

those for ground surveys. The average unit cost rates for the two PHEIS years were £5/ha for

larch and £0.23/ha for other woodland123. These compare to ground survey costs of

approximately £100/ha.

“In the past we used to do ground surveys. […] The helicopter survey ensures a

much broader approach. [It is] much more effective (faster) than ground surveys and

provides more intelligence across a wider range of sites and species.”

The investments made in capability, reviewed below, also offer improvements in the cost-

effectiveness of services as well as enhanced biosecurity.

EQ3.2: What type of investments are expected to provide benefits that will persist beyond the duration of the PHEIS investment? Is there scope for other such strategic investments in the system?


Activities that improve system capability can have a long term impact on the performance and

productivity of front line services. The risk register and contingency plans will be used and

provide benefits beyond the life of PHEIS. Capacity enhancements funded by PHEIS enabled

agencies to undertake strategic projects that improved capability offering long term benefits.

These included investments that addressed procedures, training and supporting

infrastructure.

Increased capacity, along with cross-training and improved stakeholder awareness of plant

health risks, are thought to have improved the flexibility of plant health services to react to

changing levels of demand. The extent to which the PHEIS investment in additional

inspectors and training will have a legacy beyond the PHEIS budgeting period depends to a

121 Source: FERA, 2015. FERA Capability Report. Annex 5. Developing a quicker, cheaper, large-scale soil DNA extraction method. Report to Defra. Draft report provided to ICF. 122 In December 2015, the use of the Genie technology was reported by consultees to be limited to one pest. 123 The fixed hourly unit cost is effected by the density of woodland being surveyed and transit time.


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large extent on whether those posts are retained. Awareness and skills degrade over time

and hence require continued investment.

PHEIS has made strategic investments that have improved capabilities and brought front line

services up to a level where key targets can now be met. However, the maintenance of these

benefits appears to remain relatively labour intensive. Future investments could explore

opportunities for improving labour productivity, in order to directly combat the expected

continued increase in demand for plant health services.

4.3.1.4 Analysis

Investments that are expected to provide benefits that will persist beyond the duration of the PHEIS investment

Activities targeted at improving capabilities offer long term impact on the performance and

productivity of front-line services. Managers were conscious of this when allocating their

additional resources:

“There’s definitely been more movement to spending the money wisely so if funding drops

over time we have more generic platforms and training that can be rolled out for new pests

and diseases and for new inspectors that come in. A lot of good foundation pieces have

been put in place that will allow us to perform a better service with budget constraints but

increasing demand for activity.”

There was a strong link between the capacity enhancements funded by PHEIS and agencies’

ability to undertake these strategic projects. For example, time recorded to the APHA inland

surveillance ‘business improvement group’ activities (including contingency planning and

redesigning operating procedures) increased from 1,086 hours in 2012/13 to 1,608 in 2014/15

and further to 1,821 in the first half of the 2015/16 (April to October). Previously the inspection

workload had heavily constrained capacity to work on projects that would deliver longer-term

system improvements.

The capability investments funded by PHEIS that offer long term benefits are detailed below.

The risk register: The investment in the risk register delivered a working tool, with supporting

methods, process and documentation. The changes (and benefits) that it has brought will last

beyond the duration of PHEIS. Ongoing investment is required to maintain the information held

on the risk register and to ensure that adequate staff time is available to interact and use it

e.g. through the PHRG.

Contingency planning: The national contingency plan124 (and the pest-specific plans) provide

a set of processes with supporting tools that will last beyond the life of PHEIS. As with the risk

register, continued investment will be required to ensure that the contingency plans are fit for

purpose.

Other capability-related activities funded by PHEIS that were intended to make services more

robust and effective and that will last beyond the PHEIS budget period are:

■ Investment in quality management, including training in and application of ISO17020, a

quality standard for inspections.

■ Business Objects125 training to enable more staff to run reports using eDomero and

thereby analyse plant health data126.

■ A redesign of standard operating procedures (SOPs) to make them more effective and

enable them to fit in with the new outbreak management contingency plans.

124 Which was initially designed prior to PHEIS, but further refined and tested with the aid of the PHEIS budget. 125 Business Objects is a software application used for generating reports from databases. 126 eDomero is APHA’s electronic system is used to record plant health activity in England and Wales.


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■ Improvements to align Tree Alert with THDAS databases.

■ Development and deployment of new and improved diagnostic methods.

■ Establishment of a new laboratory at Heathrow.

■ Drafted standard operating procedures (SOPs) and agreed protocols for the approval of

new diagnostic techniques which should improve the implementation of new techniques in

the future.

The extent to which the PHEIS investment in additional inspectors and training will have a

legacy beyond the PHEIS budgeting period depends to a large extent on whether those posts

are retained, through an extension of the additional funding or reprioritisation within agency

budgets.

A gradual decline in the biosecurity impact of awareness raising and training can also be

expected if such activities stop after the PHEIS budget period.

The scope for further strategic investments

PHEIS made strategic investments that supported improvement to service quality as well as

shifting from a reactive to proactive operating model (e.g. via the risk register).

“It’s [PHEIS] enabled us to really get on top of the overall biosecurity strategy.”

Consultees indicated that PHEIS made fundamental improvements to the ability of plant health

services to manage risks. Some consultees suggested that demands placed on plant health

services will continue to increase in the future. This indicates a need to continue to invest in

order to ensure that these demands can be met.

“With ever increasing movement of trade, the possibilities of winters being milder,

pests and diseases lasting longer – there is more to find and more to do. It’s ever

increasing rather than flattening out. Keeping the level of funding is still going to be

inadequate.”

Some consultees indicated that there was always a need for more staff. However this wasn’t

unanimous; others recognised the need to create more efficient ways of working in order to

deal with an expected mismatch between increasing demand and resources.

Preference for more staff:

“Staff would be the area that I would like

to concentrate more resources on – more

inspectors. We could get to 80%

[inspection rates on controlled goods].”

“We can always do with a few more staff.”

“An area of concern is increased

inspection capacity – if we don’t have

enough people on the ground looking for

things – that’s a big risk.”

Preference for alternative approaches:

“When out talking about resourcing, I say

we’re now where we need to be”

At the moment, there is a good level of

capability and capacity regarding border

inspections and diagnostics, I don’t think

that additional budget is needed there. But

we should not allow a drop in capacity and

capability.”

“With the new plant health [regulation]127,

every imported material will have to have a

phytosanitary certificate and will have to be

inspected. This could result in a 6-fold

increase in documents that we’ll have to

inspect. We’ve been working behind the

scenes to see how we can deal with that in

127 A new EU plant health regulation is currently being finalised. Further details at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/plant_health_biosecurity/legislation/new_eu_rules/index_en.htm

http://ec.europa.eu/food/plant/plant_health_biosecurity/legislation/new_eu_rules/index_en.htm


81

an IT-solution, as we won’t get a 6-fold

increase in staff.”

In light of government spending cuts, and the expectation that demand for plant health services

will increase (as a result of EU regulation and ever increasing trade), there is recognition that

it is not feasible for capacity to keep pace with demand. As such, a key aspect of ensuring a

plant health service that is adequate for future needs is a consideration of how to reduce the

labour intensity of plant health activities, in particular front line services.

The consultations and analysis suggest that there are further efficiency gains to be made from

strategic investments in performance and productivity improving measures, and that the

service will need to continue to look for such improvements to meet the twin challenges of

increasing biosecurity threats and ongoing budgetary pressures. Examples of specific

investment packages identified in consultations are:

■ Increased use of technology:

– Consultees suggested there is scope to expand use of technology (e.g. tablet

computers) for in-field recording of inspection data. This could reduce errors and

inefficiencies associated with recording data in the field and then transferring them to

electronic databases later, as well as ensuring that inspectors are able to access up-

to-date information (e.g. SOPs, pest identification support) required when in-field.

– Increased use of IT in the transfer and receipt of phytosanitary certificates to increase

the efficiency of the existing processes (the current system is paper-based).

– Continued development of aerial surveillance, remote sensing and other technologies

to improve effectiveness and efficiency of inland surveillance.

– New detection methods and diagnostics technologies that can improve service

effectiveness and efficiency. It was suggested that there are technologies available

but not currently being used. Though it was also noted that it would be preferable to

set the parameters of what was required and develop technologies to fit, rather than

trying to use less well suited ‘off-the-shelf’ technologies.

■ Improved intelligence to enable better targeting of inspections:

– Continuation of intra-EU trade intelligence gathering to improve targeting.

– Making more extensive use of opportunities to require notifications of intra-EU trade128

to improve inspection intelligence.

– Research to understand how the extensive datasets held on eDomero can be better

used to provide relevant intelligence on trade patterns and risk pathways.

■ New approaches for building and understanding capacity flexibility:

– Investment to improve the capacity and propensity of external partners to reduce risks

(e.g. working with growers and industry) and provide support to plant health agencies

(e.g. training of horticultural and arboricultural professionals and volunteers)129.

– Exploration of partnerships and cross-training between plant health agencies and plant

and animal health agencies to provide basic support capacity for major incidents.

128 i.e. The Plant Health (England) (Amendment) Order 2016 129 Further investment should be informed by formal evaluation of results of improved awareness and skills.


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4.3.2 EQ3.5: Where are the greatest uncertainties between investment and impact/outcomes? What are the information gaps and how can these be filled?


There is uncertainty over relationships between inputs, outputs and outcomes across all

areas of the biosecurity continuum. In some instances this is in part due to the complexity of

the cause and effect relationships and the importance of external factors. This has

implications for the ability to design satisfactory outcome indicators and hence optimise

resource allocations. Structured scoping and research to better determine the relationships

for those areas of least confidence and/or most value would go some way to correcting this.

4.3.2.2 Analysis

A balanced set of plant health system performance and capability indicators covering the

issues addressed by this evaluation is not yet established. Constructing a balanced scorecard

for plant health services is difficult because the relationship between inputs, outputs and

outcomes in the plant biosecurity continuum is not well mapped and understood. It is, as a

result, hard to assess the effectiveness of the plant health security system as a whole, and the

implications of changes to it (such as PHEIS).

Whilst insights into some of these relationships are provided by this evaluation, they are less

deep, extensive and well evidenced than would be the case if a more structured and

comprehensive approach to tracking the performance of elements within the plant health

system was in place. Key areas of uncertainty encountered are:

■ There are particular barriers to the determination of the most cost-effective deployment of

inspection effort. The relationship between inspection activity and interceptions/detections

is influenced by a number of external factors such as changes in the trades, industry

biosecurity practices and the weather. As such, it is difficult for managers to determine

how to allocate inspection effort to best effect. The relationship between changes in border

inspections (and interceptions) and the detection rates of inland surveillance inspections

is not well understood. The effectiveness of inspection activity at different locations is not

clear as the true intercept rate is not known (as not all incursions will be detected).

■ The economic and financial benefits of improved efficiencies are not being documented.

There is scope to provide better evidence on the benefits of investments in technology and

other changes that offer efficiency savings. An example is the use of in-field diagnostics.

It would be possible, through research with the trade and analysis of regulators' activity, to

identify impact and performance measures and to quantify the impact of the new

technology on them. Examples include the time taken to obtain test results, delays to

consignments and associated changes in market value, and diagnosis costs. These are

either not routinely collected or are difficult to access. Given the delays in implementing

Genie technology, it would still be feasible to set up a monitoring programme that would

enable definition of a pre-implementation baseline and monitoring and evaluation of new

approaches in the future.

■ The quality of industry biosecurity practices are not systematically evaluated. The

influence of direct and indirect awareness raising cannot therefore be tracked. This limits

the extent to which the divergences in the quality of biosecurity practices across

geographies, stakeholder groups and individual organisations can be used as intelligence

to better target awareness raising and inspection activity. Assessment of industry

biosecurity performance based on implementation of biosecurity practices and incidence

of detection and incursion events, could enable systematic tracking of industry stakeholder

and site performance. This could provide data to improve evaluation of awareness raising

activity and to fine tune site risk ratings.

There are many challenges involved in tracking cause and effect given the risk-based,

preventative nature of plant health management and the relative importance of external


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factors. As such, despite some recent efforts by Defra to enhance monitoring indicators,

particularly with regards plant health outcomes, little headway has been made. There is

resistance to the development and use of outcome indicators due to the difficulties of

interpretation130. For example, “interception rates have fallen out of favour a bit because […]

they are difficult to interpret”. Inland surveillance detection rates do not appear to be routinely

monitored. However difficulties in interpretation should be seen as a challenge for evaluation,

rather than a reason for not establishing indicators.

It is suggested that a scoping exercise should be conducted to identify the areas and

relationships that are understood with the least confidence, and that are considered to be most

critical to understanding cause and effect i.e. the ability to link inputs and activities with

successful plant health outcomes. It could also look at indicators of capability (including input

from staff) and confidence (including input from external stakeholders). This exercise should

also look at what might be learnt from other regulators. This scoping exercise could then inform

more detailed research to build the evidence base and develop firm proposals for investments

in an intelligence-based plant health system.

The analysis suggests that any future productivity and performance programme should have

embedded evaluation support. To better inform future spending, plant health agencies could

be doing more to evaluate more closely, and quantify more systematically, the added value

they are getting from their investments. The absence of such activity during the PHEIS makes

it more difficult to establish the value for money and to learn in a structured way from

experience.

When decisions are made on future investments the following questions should be asked:

■ ‘How will we measure the impacts?’

■ ‘How will we build intelligence about more/less effective areas of activity and learn

lessons?’

Future performance management arrangements need to be based on an understanding of

how the system works. The answers to these questions should be used to build evaluative

processes and mechanisms into the design and delivery of system enhancements to make

better use of quantitative and qualitative indicators.

130 Defra pers. comm, 03.07.15; and, anecdotal evidence from evaluation meetings and interviews.


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5 Conclusions and recommendations

5.1 Conclusions

The evaluation has examined the impacts and implementation of additional funding worth

£17m in total over the 2014/15 to 2015/16 period that was allocated to the enhancement of

plant health inspection and surveillance131. The overall aim of this enhanced budget was to

help implement Government policy to safeguard plant health through actions that would

support the Plant Biosecurity Strategy.

A key step enabling many of these changes was the acquisition of additional staff and

contractor capacity. This accounted for the single largest category of PHEIS expenditure.

Recruitment plans were successfully delivered, although APHA had some difficulty in

recruiting for the posts. Factors contributing to these difficulties included the large number of

posts being filled (e.g., 24 plant health inspectors) from what is thought to be a small pool of

qualified candidates, and the short, fixed term nature of the contracts being offered. Use of

fixed term contracts was a necessary consequence of the limited duration of the enhanced

funding period but was not cost-effective. Commitment to permanent posts offered a more

cost-effective solution, in both the short and long term, than use of fixed-term contracts.

However it required managers to take on a budgetary risk as PHEIS money was only available

for two years. Fixed-term contracts made recruitment more difficult, slowing the acquisition of

new capacity. This meant that the roles of new recruits were more narrowly defined, and could

potentially result in the loss of new staff just at the point where they have acquired enough

experience to become fully functional.

5.1.1 Conclusions on process

From a process perspective the investments generally worked as anticipated. The additional

funding was successfully utilised. Expenditure was in line with budget plans, albeit with some

small areas of work not taken forward (and budgets offered back as in-year savings) or delayed

to 2016/17.

The largest single area of PHEIS expenditure was staff costs. PHEIS supported the acquisition

of additional staff (where the capacity was brought in-house) and services (where the capacity

was contracted out). The evaluation has documented the challenges of acquiring significant

additional capacity to conduct specialist work in a context of fixed-term supplementary funding.

A significant portion of the benefits arising from PHEIS investments are at risk if the inspectors

that have been recruited and trained are not retained at the end of the current PHEIS funding

period. Permanent posts are more attractive for prospective candidates and reduce risk of staff

turnover during the enhanced funding period but do involve a level of ongoing budgetary

commitment that may be difficult to make, especially for a large number of staff posts.

The additional capacity had direct benefits, such as enhanced capacity to conduct inspections,

and indirect benefits, such as in enabling experienced staff to dedicate more time to projects

that would support the strategic development of plant health services.

The additional capacity provided management with added flexibility in a context where demand

for plant health services is not predictable (e.g. because of major outbreaks). Measures taken

to further enhance workforce flexibility, including cross-training of staff, were offset by a

narrowing of the scope of the roles of some new recruits to help them to become functional in

those roles more quickly. For some functions third party contractors can provide flexible, on-

demand services without the costs and time delays associated with training new recruits.

131 This represents approximately one third of the available budget in these years, and is equivalent to level of Phytophthora funding that was withdrawn at the end of 2013/14.


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The investments in systems to support risk-based decision-making were constructed

effectively and successfully absorbed into the plant health management system. The Plant

Health Risk Register is credited with helping to transform the way plant health risks are

managed, decisions made and resources allocated. There have been associated increases in

capacity and capability to assess risks. Maintaining the current level of pest risk assessments,

and further enhancement to risk register features and functionality, will require an on-going

commitment of resources.

There is not a direct read-across from the risk register to inspection practice. There are various

reasons for this. Some inspections are mandated in EU law and so are ‘non-discretionary’.

Inspections on so-called uncontrolled trades and for inland surveillance may be informed by

information from the risk register but are also targeted based on other intelligence and

inspector expertise. In addition, inspections provide data that feeds into the risk register.

Border inspections have increased as new staff capacity has become available. Training of

new APHA border inspectors was provided via a specialised training team. Consultations

suggest that this model of training provision provided efficiency gains but was not a full

substitute for learning in the field.

Technical problems delayed the deployment of in-field diagnostics. Lessons learned from the

implementation informed a written protocol for deployment of new technologies. The

application of the protocol is expected to ensure faster deployment in the future. At present

insufficient data are being collected from the supply chain and plant health services before,

during and after implementation of the new systems to evidence their impacts. This limits the

availability of information helpful for building business cases for future investments of this kind.

The challenges faced by the evaluation in obtaining data on various aspects of inspection

activity and inspection results raised questions about the accessibility and current use of data

in the system, both for resource and risk management.

5.1.2 Conclusions on impact

The investments enabled plant health services to increase output (as measured by inspections

completed, scale of surveillance activity, etc.), improve service quality and performance (such

as through development of a risk register, improved contingency planning arrangements,

extension of quality management systems), increase productivity (such as through adoption

of technologies that provide faster diagnostic testing), and promote improved biosecurity

management among stakeholders (such as through awareness raising with industry).

PHEIS capacity investments had a direct, positive effect on output levels. They enabled:

■ An increase in the quantity and quality of PRAs;

■ An increase in border inspections and attainment of a target to inspect 65% of all ‘other

controlled’ trades entering the UK, a rate not achieved in previous years, with an

associated increase in interceptions;

■ An increase in the volume of uncontrolled trade border inspections. These provided higher

interceptions rates than controlled trade inspections;

■ A doubling of general inland surveillance site visits and an indication that detections have

increased, although the evidence is not clear.

■ Extension of tree health surveillance and monitoring programmes for a further two years.

■ Accommodation of the increased demand for diagnosis of samples and higher levels of

enquiries.

■ Delivery of new diagnostic tests and methods.

■ Delivery of awareness raising events and training that increased in quantity and quality.


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Investments in the risk register and contingency plans (both of which had already seen some

initial development before receiving PHEIS contributions) brought fundamental changes in the

way in which plant health services operate. Principally they have facilitated a more proactive

approach to risk management. They provide for a swifter and more effective allocation of

resources, in turn improving plant health outcomes. Recent outbreak events have provided

strong evidence of the positive impacts of improved contingency planning. However

evidencing the impacts on plant health from the risk register is more challenging; in part as it

informs other activities rather than providing outcomes directly.

The evaluation has been able to say less about the impacts of the enhanced funding, and

assemble less of the evidence that might help to support similar calls for funding in the future,

than would have been the case if monitoring and evaluation (M&E) had been considered in

greater depth during the planning of PHEIS. The conclusion on process is not that additional

budgets necessarily need their own M&E architecture and governance, but rather that it is

important to check that the overall M&E arrangements will provide what is needed, and to be

alert to opportunities to gather data on the impacts of specific initiatives that fall outside that

system.

The challenge of identifying effects of PHEIS beyond the immediate outputs (e.g. number of

inspections) is compounded by the difficulties inherent in tracking changes in the target

outcomes and impacts of the biosecurity continuum, and linking them to changes in the plant

health system. The evidence on outcomes and impacts is, for many components, anecdotal

at best132. There is the scope also to complement inspection and system data with information

gathered from staff and regulated entities as part of the development of a balanced approach

to tracking system performance.

In many areas of the investment plan, the higher service and output levels achieved via PHEIS

will only be maintained if the enhanced levels of funding remain in place. Much of the benefit

of the investment made in additional staff and their training will be lost if those individuals are

not retained beyond the PHEIS funding period.

There is recognition that it is unfeasible for projected increases in demand for plant health

services to be met by a commensurate increase in workforce capacity. Enhanced labour

productivity, especially in front line services, and ongoing improvements in the targeting and

reduction of risk will be key to ensuring that the plant health service as a whole can meet future

needs. There’s a need to look to define and apply best practice in regulatory models deployed,

use of data analytics, adoption of technology and engagement with industry and other

stakeholders, as part of a process of building a more efficient and effective service.

5.2 Recommendations

Recommendations are provided in relation to the system as a whole and in relation to

individual components of the biosecurity continuum.

5.2.1 General recommendations

■ Safeguard funding for key risk management tools. The risk register and contingency

plans have significantly improved the effectiveness and efficiency of plant health risk

management. They will need an ongoing commitment of resources if that efficacy is to be

maintained.

■ Options analysis for the enhanced capacity. The benefits of the considerable

investments made in the acquisition and training of enhanced inspection capacity at APHA

are at risk if the individuals concerned are lost at the end of the current fixed term contracts.

There will also be a direct impact on service outputs as the capacity to conduct inspections

will be reduced. There is a need to identify the best available option for retention of this

132 See Annex 2.7 for further background material.


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capacity, taking into account Defra budgetary flexibilities and constraints, and competing

calls on funding. Options are currently being discussed by Defra.

■ A prioritised programme to increase performance and productivity and so improve

biosecurity outcomes and the cost-effectiveness of service delivery. There is a need

to consider how best to secure improved outcomes at the same time as improving

efficiency to safeguard the service’s future. Recommended areas for consideration include

enhanced use of technology; more comprehensive use of existing data and novel

intelligence sources to better target inspections, and exploring opportunities for and

models to enhance workforce flexibility.

There is scope to learn from other regulators that face challenges similar to those seen in

plant health, including cases where there are multiple agencies contributing to a common

set of strategic goals. The strategic challenges faced by plant health agencies are not

unique. Regulators and inspection services across the Defra family (e.g. for animal health,

waste crime) and beyond (e.g. food safety, occupational safety, health service inspection)

face very similar challenges of:

– ‘Doing more with less’.

– Finding improved ways to target inspection effort to risk, including through adoption of

enhanced intelligence systems informed by strong data analytic capabilities.

– Understanding (and where necessary modifying) the compliance behaviours of those

they inspect.

In their respective areas these regulators are funding research, innovating and developing

new approaches. Attention to the flow of relevant information within and between these

agencies should ensure that any opportunities for peer-to-peer learning and the sharing of

tools and techniques are realised.

Improve tracking of the flow of resources and links to plant health outcomes. An

exercise to map and review how the plant health system delivers outcomes, and its

performance against strategic and operational objectives, is recommended. This should

include an assessment of whether best use is being made of the data captured within the

system. Information gathered from staff, industry and other stakeholders could be used to

complement data gathered within the system to help provide a balanced perspective on

system performance, considering parameters such as effectiveness, efficiency and

capability.

Additional budget enhancements should be contingent on it being possible to track outputs

and outcomes and related activities being coordinated. Where existing reporting and

performance monitoring arrangements are deficient, enhancements may need to be

carried out at the system level, rather than for the enhanced budget alone.

It would be useful to take the opportunities that are still available to capture monitoring

data for some of the activities supported by PHEIS, such as the roll-out of new in-field

diagnostics.

5.2.2 Continuum-specific recommendations

Recommendations relating to specific elements of the biosecurity continuum are detailed

below.

5.2.2.1 Risk Register and PRA ■ Ensure continued resourcing to protect the integrity of the risk register.

■ For FR, reconcile resources allocated to PRAs with PRA demand.


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5.2.2.2 Inspections and surveillance ■ Improve inspection data recording – the comprehensiveness of recording (particularly with

regards ‘null’ findings) and the quality of recording. Evaluate the effectiveness of in-field IT

solutions and expand their use across field inspections.

■ Examine the potential for enhanced use of plant health data (e.g. that held on eDomero)

to improve pathway intelligence and targeting of inspections.

■ Continue experimental approaches to building up better intelligence systems to improve

inspection targeting (potentially including models of earned recognition that consider firms’

risk management standards and practice).

■ Continue investment in aerial surveillance and its associated research programmes and

how they can best be used to improve efficiency and effectiveness.

■ Examine opportunities to better evaluate the extent to which external surveillance activity

(e.g. Observatree, industry reporting) provides a true extension of plant health services

capacity.

■ Explore opportunities for agencies to increase their ability to respond flexibly to short term

peaks in demand for labour capacity.

■ Explore opportunities for adoption (and bespoke development) of new technologies for

pest and disease identification and detection that improve service efficiency and

effectiveness.

5.2.2.3 Contingency planning ■ Ensure continued resourcing to ensure that contingency plans remain fit for purpose.

5.2.2.4 Diagnostics ■ Monitor and evaluate the impact of new diagnostic services on service costs to regulators,

industry and other stakeholders to inform future business case development.

■ Improve understanding of the interrelationship between inspection activity and demand for

diagnostic services.

5.2.2.5 Awareness raising ■ Explore opportunities to more comprehensively evaluate the impact of awareness raising

activities (e.g. trade events and pubic shows, activities undertaken by inspectors).


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ANNEXES


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Annex 1 Evaluation approach

A1.1 Advisory Group member

A1.1.1 Permanent members

■ Jake Morris, Defra (Defra project manager)

■ James Smith, Defra

■ Tim Adey, Defra

■ Don Walker, FERA

■ Jane Barbrook, APHA

5.2.3 Other members

The following were Advisory Group members due to changing roles and priorities:

■ Matthew Dray, Defra

■ Helen Miller-Bakewell, Defra

■ Rick Mumford, FERA

A1.2 Semi-structured interview consultees

Name Organisation

Derek McCann APHA

Guy Nettleton APHA

Kelvin Hughes APHA

Lucy Carson-Taylor APHA

Mike McGuiness APHA

Paul Beales APHA

Will Surman APHA

Andy Cotterill Defra

James Smith Defra

Tim Adey Defra

Martin Ward EPPO

Andy Hall FC

Ben Jones FC

Katie Blain FC

John Morgan FC

Don Walker FERA

Rebecca Weekes FERA

Joan Webber FR

Ana Perez-Sierra FR

Nicola Spence CPHO

Richard Baker Office of the CPHO

Richard McIntosh Office of the CPHO


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Annex 2 Supporting information

A2.1 Risk register and risk-based decision making

Table A2.1 APHA/FERA expenditure (staff costs) on development and maintenance of the risk register and Pest Risk Assessments (PRAs)s

Pre-PHEIS period

PHEIS redistribution

PHEIS additional budget period

2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015/16

PRA expenditure 113,143 106,765 120,315 136,563* n/a

Risk register expenditure 0 0 317,988 n/a** n/a

Phase II Risk Register expenditure 0 0 17,890 70,191*** n/a

PHEIS budget 0 0 0 400,000 350,000

* 6 months April-September 2014 prior to plant health consultants joining Defra

** Risk register expenditure included in the PRA expenditure row; no split possible

*** Thought to be funded through the Defra R&D programme and not by PHEIS budget

n/a – ‘not available’. Mid-2014/15 responsibility transferred from FERA to the Office of the CPHO, at which point budget and time was not recorded in a way that enables the above breakdowns to be estimated.


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A2.2 APHA PHEIS Expenditure

Source: APHA, Plant Health Enhanced Inspection and Surveillance. Note provided to ICF.

Input area

No.recruit

edWhen Where Allocated

Offered

BackSpent

No.

recruitedFull year Allocated

Offered

Back

Forecast

Spend

Point of Entry

Inspections16 Jul-14 Heathrow 1350 - 1360 16 Yes* 1350 - 1404

Inland Inspections/

Phytophthora Funding8 Apr-14 Regions 1030 - 1018 8 Yes 1030 - 1048

Contingency 0.5 Apr-14Home

based75 - 75 0.5 Yes 75 - 75

Capability & Capacity 2 Apr-14 Heathrow 200 - 197 2 Yes 200 - 202

Awareness Raising 1 Apr-14Home

based300 - 296 1 Yes 300 -100 201

Evaluation N/A - - 210 - 210 - - 210 -100 110

IT systems** N/A - - 376 - 301 - - 0 - 75

Total 3541 3457 3165 -200 3115

*Extended to March 17 ** Portal work delayed into 15/16

14/15 15/16

Staff no.’s Expenditure (£000’s) Staff no.’s Expenditure (£000’s)


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A2.3 Inland surveillance

Figure A2.1 Summary of aerial surveillance woodland flow (2014/15)


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A2.4 Awareness raising

Table A2.2 APHA – overview of PHEIS-funded awareness raising activities133

Activity Overview Impact/Outcome

Ministry of Justice

Plant Health

Biosecurity Training

Training aimed at ensuring better understanding of plant and tree pest

and disease pathways and risks, behavioural change and implementation

of plant biosecurity across the prison estate.

Evaluation of training activities demonstrated up-skilling of staff,

knowledge cascade and changes in working practice.

Industry training

courses

Plant pest and disease biosecurity campaign across major food/produce

importers and retailers. Aimed at resulting in behavioural change

regarding biosecurity to protect UK growers, knowledge of produce

associated plant pests and diseases, behavioural change to give focus on

quarantine plant pests and diseases when working overseas, knowledge

on how to inspect produce.

Evaluation shows up-skill of participants. Suppliers have approached

APHA directly for advice related to any risks of importing new produce,

reducing the chance of pests and diseases entry.

Trade Shows Staffed stand/exhibit at South West Growers Show, Four Oaks, Aqua,

GroSouth (won GroSouth best show stand). Engaged with

traders/growers and answered queries and questions primarily regarding

best practice biosecurity on nursery sites, plant passporting, tree

notification scheme, emerging risks to industry, specific threats to their

business.

Greater awareness of plant pests and diseases and risk pathways,

growers given easy access to tree notification scheme, plant passporting

specifics explained and visits booked with local inspectors to address

concerns. Horticulture students given resources for learning and

encouraged to include biosecurity in their planning and biosecurity posters

distributed to those who wanted to put them up in their workplace/college.

Public Shows Staffed stand/exhibit at Chelsea Flower Show (won gold medal), Royal

Welsh Show, Welsh Spring Festival, Royal Cornwall Show, Powderham

Garden Festival, Cornwall Spring Flower Show, BBC Gardeners’ World

Live and numerous smaller local events.

Public awareness and behavioural change relating to biosecurity (clean

boots, responsible sourcing of plants, recognise and report key pests and

diseases), better awareness of plant health related activities and how the

public can help stop the spread.

Local talks PHSI give local talks to diverse groups from local garden societies to staff

from Environment Agency and Wildlife Trusts. Focus on plant health

awareness, practical biosecurity practices and topical news items relating

to plant health.

Outcomes are greater awareness, knowing the local inspector and

biosecurity behavioural change.

Citizen Science Support of Observatree citizen science project through staff time to train

and mentor volunteers and OPAL tree health survey through purchase

and distribution of tree health survey packs and postcards.

The more people who are aware and engaged with tree plant health, the

more likely we are to get an early warning of a potential pest/disease risk.

Source: APHA, plant health spend. Written note provided to ICF.

133 This is not an exhaustive list of all PHEIS funded activities. The table provides examples of the main activities and outcomes/impacts.


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A2.5 Diagnostics

A2.5.1 PHEIS funding to improve diagnostics support

A2.5.2 Data provided by FR

Table A2.3 Number of THDAS staff at Alice Holt134, full time equivalents

Staff Grade 2012-13 2013-14 2014-15 2015-16 2016-17* 2017-18*

Pay band (PB) 2 0.2 0.25 0.25 0.2 0.2 0.2

PB3 0.6 0.6 0.6 1.0 1.0 1.0

PB4 0.7 1.2 1.7 0.7 0.7 0.7

PB5 0.0 0.0 1.2 1.8 0.9 0.0

PB6A 1.4 1.9 3.0 3.9 2.1 1.1

PB6B 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1

Other (e.g., communication

staff)

0.1 0.15 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1

Totals 3.1 4.2 7.05 7.9 5.1 3.2

* Without PHEIS and based on current FC funding levels (2015-16) and not taking account of any Spending Review cuts to funding

Source: FR THDAS, 2015. Data from FR on Plant Health Enhanced Inspection and Surveillance (PHEIS) Activities. Written note provided to ICF.

Table A2.4 Enquiries received – type of enquiries

2013-14 2014-15 2015-Dec 2015

Number of enquiries received from

the public

2,284 1,544 673


FR/FC/APHA inspectors

75 206 243


the industry

147 68 169


Observatree

8 63 106

Other 724 101 90

Total 3,238 1,982 1,281

Source: FR THDAS, 2015. Detailed data on enquiries. Written note provided to ICF.

134 Diagnostics support is mainly provided by the FR Alice Holt Research Station. Another station (Northern Research Station) also provides advisory work, but diagnostics is a small proportion of their workload.


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A2.5.3 Data provided by FERA

Table A2.5 Detailed breakdown of PHEIS funding (GBP)

Pre-PHEIS PHEIS

2011/12 2012/13 2013/14 2014/15 2015-Sept15

Diagnostics

Imports 506,782 607,178 640,139 722,901 316,111

Surveillance 530,295 473,111 532,187 963,862 494,842

Trade facilitation 310,930 402,557 415,319 608,144 304,998

Support n/a n/a n/a n/a 79,177

Total 1,348,007 1,482,846 1,587,644 2,294,907 1,195,128

Cross-training of staff 15,386 78,616 62,537 365,268 90,602

Development of

new/amended diagnostic

methods

25,049 53,393 79,843 406,703 159,235

Other capacity building

actions

311,908 315,649 360,364 506,106 357,630

Note: the PHEIS budget contribution to diagnostics support can be estimated by comparing the increase to diagnostics budget in 2014-15 and 2015-Sept 2015 as compared to the pre-PHEIS period. PHEIS budget also contributed to cross-training of staff and development of methods, but did not support ‘Other capacity building actions’

Source: FERA, 2015. PHEIS – Evaluation Data Request – Diagnostics. Written note provided to ICF

A2.6 Economic impacts

Table A2.6 Examples of the potential impact of pests for which PHEIS-funded investments may have reduced risks

Pest name Risk register rating score135 of economic, environmental and social impacts

Link with PHEIS-funded activities that potentially reduced the risk of outbreak

Acute oak decline 5 ■ Continued aerial surveillance resulting in detections

Asian longhorn beetle

(Anoplophora glabripennis)

4 ■ Increased dunnage and WPM inspections by FC;

awareness raising activities aimed at improving

preventative actions from importers (interview with

FC).

■ New molecular protocol for routine detection

developed by THDAS (interview with FR).

Chalara fraxinea 5 ■ Validation and verification of diagnostic testing method

(Fera, capability report)

■ Continued aerial surveillance resulting in detections

■ Continued ground survey resulting in detections

135 Rating scores refer to impacts on the host plants and are measured on a 1-5 scale, where 5 corresponds to the highest impacts.


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Pest name Risk register rating score135 of economic, environmental and social impacts

Link with PHEIS-funded activities that potentially reduced the risk of outbreak

Chestnut gall wasp

(Dryocosmus kuriphilus)

5 ■ First confirmed detection in the UK made in June 2015

by an Observatree volunteer.

■ New diagnostic method developed by THDAS

(interview with FR).

■ New contingency plans implemented

Dothistroma needle blight 5 ■ Continued aerial surveillance resulting in detections

Phytophthora austrocedrae 4 ■ Continued aerial surveillance resulting in detections

Phytophthora ramorum 5 ■ Continued aerial surveillance resulting in detections

Pine wood nematode

(Bursaphelenchus

xylophilus)

3 ■ Increased bark inspections and interceptions of

material which did not comply with heath treatment

and fumigation (interview with FC).

■ New molecular protocol for routine detection

developed by THDAS (interview with FR).

Pitch canker of pine

(Gibberella circinata)

5 ■ New diagnostic method developed by THDAS


Plane wilt (Ceratocystis

platani)



Potato flea beetle (Epitrix

cucumeris)

3 ■ New pest identified in the risk register, which led to

preventative action being taken (e.g., washing

potentially infected material) (interview with APHA).

Shoot Blight on Cedar

(Sirococcus tsugae)



Zebra chip (Candidatus

Liberibacter solanacearum)

5 ■ Validation and verification of diagnostic testing method

(Fera, capability report)

A2.7 Illustrative logic and indicators

This annex provides a highly simplified demonstration of output, outcomes and impacts with the nature

of currently available data shown; and an illustrative detailed logic model for awareness raising and

supply chains.

Table A2.7 Simplified illustration of available data PHEIS impact pathways

Biosecurity continuum component

Outputs (available data)

Outcomes Impacts

Risk Record & detail of risk

held on a risk register

(Number of pests added

to risk register)

Better allocation of

resources

(Qualitative opinion)

More effective plant

health services

Pest Risk Assessments

(Number of PRAs

completed)

Better informed risk

management decisions

More effective

eradication and control

regime


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Biosecurity continuum component

Outputs (available data)

Outcomes Impacts

Border security More border inspections

(No. inspections by

controlled/

uncontrolled)d

More interceptions

(No. interceptions by

controlled/ uncontrolled)

Fewer pest incursions

and outbreaks

Inland surveillance More inland

surveillance

(Number of visits and

inspections)

More detections

(Number of detections

by survey and site type)


and outbreaks

Contingency planning Generic & pest specific

plans

(Number of plans)

More efficient and

effective processes and

procedures


More efficient and

effective eradication

and control

Diagnostics More / improved

diagnostic methods

(List of methods)

Enhanced detection of

risks (speed / accuracy)

(Example)


and outbreaks

Diagnosis cost savings

(Example)

More efficient &

effective regulatory

system

Total time / value of

consignments detained

is reduced


Change in regulatory

costs incurred by

industry / consumers

Awareness raising More / better events

Improved stakeholder

understanding and skills

(Examples)

Improved supply chain

management

(Examples)

Less pest incursions

and outbreaks

Improved

industry/citizen science

surveillance

(An example)

Less pest incursions

and outbreaks

More effective

eradication and control


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Figure A2.2 Illustration of detailed impact pathway for awareness raising and improvements to biosecurity practices

External factors influence the

effectiveness of supply chain

improvements

External factors influence extent to which actions are

implemented after awareness / explore is increased

Market share of supply chains where change has occurred

EQ 1.5: Has awareness raising and exposure to border inspections resulted in improved compliance and supply chains by importers, exporters and passengers?

• Awareness raising (on supply-chain related plant health issues) encourages importers to investigate more carefully their supply chains and make changes that foster a reduction in the likelihood of P/Ds occurring in their imported goods. Similarly, increased exposure to inspections and interceptions makes importers and exporters more aware of plant health and in particular the consequences of having goods with P/Ds intercepted, and hence encourages importers/exporters to change practices to reduce the chances of their goods being intercepted.

• These changes in practices within the supply chains reduce the prevalence of the targeted P/Ds and hence lead to a reduction in P/Ds coming to the UK border (from that particular pathway). • These outcomes are influenced by :

(i) external factors influence the extent to which awareness raising results in follow through of actions to improve supply chains.(i) external factors affecting P/D prevalence that are outside the control/action being taken by the importer/exporter/grower etc, (ii) the significance of market share/proportion in the overall trade of the goods / pathway that the supply chain/organisations making changes hold.

• It would be expected that such changes would occur with a significant lag between awareness raising activity occurring, changes occurring in the supply chain, and changes in P/D prevalence in newly produced goods occurring. Ie a medium term effect.

Partnership awareness raising

with major importers

General awareness raising with

importers / exporters / grower, etc

Increased inspectionsIncreased expectation that

PDs will be intercepted

Increased interceptions

Actions taken to improve supply

chains

Decrease in associated P/D

prevalence in those pathway trades

Decrease in interceptions of those P/Ds from those pathways

Trade placed on EU Watch list

Trade reclassified from uncontrolled to

controlled

PHEIS activity

Intermediate outcocmes

Final outcomes

Final outcome indicator

External factors

Change in quality of biosecurity practices

e.g. supply chains


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