‘An archaic Law does not govern us today’ Towards an institutionalisation of gender equality in Lebanon: KAFA civil society as a case study

Inés Devesa BuadesUniversity of LeedsMaster in International Relations and Politics of the Middle

East

ines.devesa.buades@gmail.com

8 Wetherby Grove

Leeds, UK

LS42JH

‘An archaic Law does not govern us today’ 1

Towards an institutionalisation of gender equality in Lebanon: KAFA civil society as a case study

AbstractThis paper aims at setting the grounds for understanding the role of the Lebanese organisation KAFA as a norm entrepreneur and the mechanisms used by it to achieve a greater institutionalisation of gender equality. The dynamics surrounding the current family code will help us to comprehend what the obstacles are which impede this institutionalisation and, perhaps, determine future directions. With the purpose of comprehending the evolving processes which norms go through we are taking on board the theoretical framework of the norm cascade. How does the theory around normative change apply to our case study? Through an inductive approach this research will define what the theory limitations are, if any, concerning the case study of KAFA.

Key wordsLebanese family code, secularism vs sectarianism, feminism, normative change, state, NGOs, KAFA, international norms, CEDAW

1 Slogan used by KAFA in its 2015 campaign. (Kafa.org.lb)

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Introduction‘An archaic Law does not govern us today’ was the main slogan used by the Lebanese civil society organisation KAFA (Enough Violence and Exploitation) in a campaign in 2015 (KAFA’s Annual Report, 2015). Presently, in the Lebanese confessional system, the family code is based on religious beliefs, with each sect having its own Religious Court, making a total of sixteen courts. These have control over family matters following a set of archaic and discriminatory codes which pose a significant hindrance to achieving an equal society (Salloukh et al., 2015; Lamia, 2010)

Taking the organisation’s slogan as a starting point, we will examine what the role of NGOs, and, particularly KAFA, is in promoting ideational change which could result in a greater institutionalisation of gender equality. NGOs, as with other non-state actors, act as pressure agents to implement and diffuse a set of norms which contest the existent values present in a particular country.

Through understanding KAFA as a norm entrepreneur, we will analyse the different tools used by it. These tools are utilized to normalise a set of assessments which embrace secular, feminist, and egalitarian values generally shared by the international norm. This paper will attempt to focus on the issues they tackle with the hope of shedding some light on the current dynamics of women’s rights in the private sphere and the efficacy of the methods employed. For this purpose, it becomes essential to place the relevant scholarship on ideational change and the so-called norm cascade theory within the dynamics of this NGO and its unique context.

Literature Review

The core of the scholarship which will be used as a framework for this case study goes back to the 1990s. Normative changes have largely been analysed by international relations scholars. Two leading scholars,

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Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, have coined the phrases norm cascade and boomerang pattern and theorised around it. It is also important not to disregard the more recent academic work done on the subject of normative and ideational change. This paper’s primary goal is to evaluate where KAFA stands regarding these patterns and what obstacles emerge from the particularities of the system and the society concerned. Hitherto, this scholarship has not been applied to the family code dynamics in Lebanon and the rights of the women in the private sphere. What makes this topic relevant is the importance of non-state actors in bringing about changes in society by re-opening the hotly debated topic of interfering in the secrecy of the private sphere. When engaging with the scholarship, we need to keep asking ourselves why some norms have failed so far to be institutionalised in the Lebanese context and whether there is any bright future ahead or not.

Before going into what Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) term as the norm cascade theory, we need to step back and conceptualise our understanding of a norm. Finnemore (1996) defines norms as “shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors” (1996:22). In her book National Interests in International Society, she argues that state actors use norms to justify their actions, but likewise, normative structures can also have an impact on states. With respect to the actions taken by actors, Finnemore distinguishes between the “logic of appropriateness” that is essentially determined by norms and the “logic of consequences” which is defined by self-interest (Finnemore, 1996:29). It is important to bear in mind these two notions inasmuch as we will be arguing that the maintenance of the religious family code can be understood as somewhere in between these two concepts.

Finnemore and Sikkink’s (1998) norm cascade theory distinguishes three different stages that a norm goes through before being institutionalised and codified into law. As indicated in the appendix 2, these are norm emergence, norm cascade and internalisation2. These scholars describe

2 Refer to Appendix 2.

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which actors, motives and mechanisms are required in every phase of the norm life cycle. What was once appropriate for a society can gradually change as a result of norm entrepreneurs, states and international actors’ activity. Motives evolve gradually through altruism or commitment, legitimacy and, eventually, conformity once the norm is internalised.

Finnemore and Sikkink claim that norms emerge through persuasion techniques, followed by their socialisation, to then be finally institutionalised. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) identify norm entrepreneurs as agents who pressure the government to conform policies in line with international norms. Although this literature falls short in defining profoundly the possible political pressures and interests which influence the norm cascade process, we will keep these patterns in mind when looking upon KAFA’s promotion of ideational change.

Similarly, Risse and Sikkink in The Power of Human Rights (1999) provide a slightly more complex picture of the norm life cycle, which includes instead five different stages: repression, denial, tactical concessions, prescriptive status and rule-consistent3. The model they use has been termed as the spiral model and its stages will serve us in understanding the dynamics surrounding civil society demands and the state’s reaction. In general terms this model follows the same process as the norm cascade theory but it depicts a more complex structure and focuses more in depth on the role of the state.

Risse and Sikkink argue that a modification of the domestic structures and, therefore, a political desire for change are needed to implement an international norm. Since KAFA, in general terms, promotes the international standards on gender equality which CEDAW embodies, it is important to pay close attention to the correlation between these norms and the role of the domestic structures in either fully adopting them, rejecting them or adjusting them. In addition to this, what they term as a “process of shaming”, carried out through campaigns and other tools

3 Refer to Appendix 1.

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used by NGOs, can enable an understanding of the methods of pressure and persuasion which KAFA employs.

An important concept introduced by (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) termed the Boomerang Pattern, has allowed for a more lucid understanding of the relationship between State reluctance to implement a civil family code and the NGOs. According to the theory, non-state actors ally themselves with international and legitimate actors such as UN agencies when their demands are neglected by the state and the paths to reach it are blocked. This way, domestic groups achieve legitimacy, leverage and funding, whilst making them more capable of pressuring for policy change. In our case study, this pattern becomes crucial to understand KAFA’s network and capabilities. This pattern, however, does not sufficiently explain to what extent states can disregard some demands when they are also concerned on their international legitimacy.

The way in which Keck and Sikkink (1998) describe the transnational advocacy networks can help us to comprehend how organisations deal with the powerful tool of information since it provides us with an insight into the dynamics of campaigns as change and debate promoters. Campaigning provides the basis for the dissemination of information and by extension normative or ideational change. Since the political context is a relevant aspect in our research, it is important to mention the authors’ allusion to it as a key determinant for a movement to emerge and succeed.

More recent studies have also touched upon ideational change. Krook and True (2010) for example, argue that norms should be seen as processes and not as a static set of values. This understanding of norms as dynamic processes, helps us understand the State’s reservations when ratifying the International Norm represented by CEDAW (Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women). According to Krook and True, norms change when the ideas which constitute them change, how does this apply in our case study?

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On the other hand, authors such as Hirsch (2013), suggest a slightly different approach. Although the author agrees with the non-static perspective of norms, Hirsch also argues that ideational change causes or paves the way for a norm to emerge and finally to be institutionalised. In our case study there is not such precise causal mechanism; thus, we need to pay close attention to the different dynamics between the international norm and the existent norm that the system represents. Moreover, as Finnemore (1996) illustrates, it is essential to focus on the goals and values linked with a norm. What are those in our case study?

The literature regarding CEDAW and the emergence of feminist movements is rather extensive. Nonetheless, we will focus on Keck and Sikkink (1998) as it is more applicable due to the paper’s normative approach. Keck and Sikkink claim that the emergence of an increasing number of international conferences, dealing with women’s rights in the second half of the last century, functioned as a platform for the spread of ideas and concerns regarding gender inequalities. These conferences helped accelerate the ratification of the CEDAW by different states and served as a vehicle for the legitimisation of the feminist discourse. The focus on violence against women in the private domain is also pertinent to this paper. Raising this question internationally, revitalised the debate on the public and private spheres’ boundaries but, this time, focusing on gender issues. In our case study we are particularly analysing the discrimination and violence against women within the private sphere, therefore, understanding the origin of the debate is crucial.

Theoretical framework

This paper draws upon the way the civil society organisation KAFA seeks a normative change within the specificity of the Lebanese context. A normative theoretical framework is clearly the most appropriate inasmuch as we are dealing with the assessments that constitute norms,

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and consequently, with the emergence and evolution of determined ideas.

Methodology

Regarding the methodology, this essay follows a case study paradigm. This research will analyse KAFA within its particular context. This will help us to understand and identify more easily similar cases and, even, set the grounds to investigate similar patterns occurring in other countries or regarding other NGOs. The method employed will be moderately inductive and highly reflexive and will try to reach a conclusion throughout the process instead of fully assuming it a priori.

In addition to this, a brief justification of why KAFA has been selected as our case study needs to be provided. On the one hand history tells us that KAFA is not the sole advocate for gender egalitarianism and that the attempts to implement a civil code have been multiple and done by many different actors throughout history (Salloukh et al., 2015). On the other hand, as Keck and Sikkink (1998:9) argue, transnational advocacy includes a large number of actors such as social movements, trade unions, international organizations, domestic and international NGOs.

Given my scope, I will minimize the remit of my research to an analysis of KAFA rather than a brushstroke engagement with Lebanese civil society in its entirety; whilst also setting groundwork for further academic research. I will analyse the dynamics of women’s rights within the private sphere and the possibility of a civil code for which KAFA provides a clear archetype given the secular parameters within which it works. In addition to this, the vast network and expertise that characterises KAFA makes it one of the leading and most known domestic NGOs in Lebanon regarding gender equality.

Analysis and findings

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KAFA as a norm entrepreneur

With reference to Annexe 2 by Finnemore and Sikkink (1998:898) and Annexe 1 by Risse and Sikkink, (1999:32), we will start by examining the main mechanisms employed by KAFA- assuming that their motives are, in principle, genuine ideational commitments with the hope to return to these points further on. The question we should ask ourselves is where KAFA stands as a norm entrepreneur and where the ideational change it promotes appears within the norm life cycle considering both, the spiral model and the norm cascade. For this purpose, we will elucidate some of its most recent activity relating to women’s rights and the international norm together with one of its last main accomplishments.

One of the main strategies of the organisation is raising awareness through varied mechanisms. According to KAFA’s 2015 annual report (Kafa.org.lb, 2015), the organisation carries out an annual campaign during the “International sixteen days of Activism against Gender-Based Violence”4. The 2015 campaign is particularly relevant to our research since it primarily focused on the Personal Status Codes, raising two main powerful slogans which provide us with an insight into their ideology: “The personal status laws are ‘dissonant’” and “A patriarchal law cannot

govern us today” (Kafa.org.lb, 2015). The word ‘dissonant’ appears in quotations for symbolic reasons. According to the family code, a woman is considered dissonant and, therefore, not entitled to alimony, or even child custody, when she abandons the household without justification or, even, when she refuses to fulfil the marital rights of her spouse according to some sects (Kafa.org.lb, 2010). Going back to the scholarship on normative change and the norm entrepreneurs’ strategies, the usage of the term dissonant serves as a conceptual bridge between the existent norm and the new norm (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). This tactic is employed as part of a wider ‘process of shaming’ to promote debate and

4 This campaign was initiated by the Centre for Women’s Global Leadership on the 25th of November which was the official date of Activism against gender-based violence until the 10th of December - the International Human Rights Day (Cwgl.rutgers.edu, n.d.).

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cause discomfort for those who are proponents of the old norm or relate to it.

The language inherent in these campaigns, as well as that of the visual and textual material found in their website (Kafa.org.lb, n.d.), is a powerful device to convey a clear and direct message. As Keck and Sikkink (1998) argue, information is a powerful tool and properly used can be an invitation for action or, at least, attract enough attention. KAFA is cognisant of this fact, and as such, attempts to provide a straightforward explanation on the intricate legal aspects which discriminate against women (Kafa.org.lb, 2010). This process of raising awareness of the content of the Personal Status Laws, through emotive language and visual aids, elevates the issue to the public stage and impacts upon the public mindset. For instance, one of the issues the organisation raised awareness on was child marriage; this is a highly delicate issue which one would assume can hardly be ignored by the average citizen. The way these matters are framed cannot but alter people’s sense of appropriateness and, most importantly, encourages discussion around the laws which permit these practices to occur.

This same technique was employed in campaigning for the implementation of a draft Law to specifically protect women against family violence. According to the organisation’s annual report in 2014 (Kafa.org.lb, 2014), KAFA, together with other non-governmental organisations, were lobbying for around half a decade to pressure the Parliament for it to pass a draft law to protect women against domestic violence. Although the initial draft they had submitted was amended and the Law was finally named “Law on Protection of Women and Family Members from Domestic Violence”, this was evidence of significant progress in the protection of women within the private sphere. The sense of shaming this time was provoked through the “The Red Thumb” campaign that carried the slogan “Vote for Us so We Vote for You”. When issuing campaigns denouncing a malpractice or a violation of human rights the issue raised must be a “causal story” where we can identify

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who holds responsibility (Stone, 1989:10). They called upon women not to go to the polls if the Parliament was not voting for the law or, in other words, voting for them. With the visual icon of a red thumb which symbolised the victims of gender violence, they managed to arouse a sense of shame which resulted in a change in the law. Since then, KAFA has been trying to raise awareness and encourage victims and witnesses of domestic violence to file a report whenever gender violence takes place (Kafa.org.lb, 2014).

With the purpose of fostering an effective normative change and modifying the general “perception of appropriateness” which Finnemore (1996) touches upon, KAFA, in line with UNFPA5, have been carrying out training which target the Internal Security Forces (ISF) and other professionals since 2012 (Unfpa.org.lb, 2013; Kafa.org.lb, 2014). This training aims to provide key groups in society with the necessary skills and knowledge regarding Violence against Women to enable them to properly address such issues and deal with the victims tactfully (Unfpa.org.lb, 2013).

One could argue that since their attempts to pass a law through the Parliament have been, at least, partially successful, this norm on domestic violence could have reached a status of internalisation6. Nevertheless, simply assuming this fact would be to some degree optimistic and, surely, too hasty an assumption. First of all, the law has been criticised for its flaws and ambiguities (Kafa.org.lb, 2014) which could hamper a more straightforward norm diffusion. Yet, even in the ideal scenario where the law lacked any ambiguity, would this immediately result in the internalisation of the norm? Would it turn into a habit consecutively?

5 United Nations Population Fund is a UN development agency for the promotion of human rights (Unfpa.org.lb, n.d.)6 Internationalisation according to the norm cascade patterns (Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998) could be considered equivalent to the Institutionalisation and habitualisation stage within the spiral mode (Risse and Sikkink, 1999).

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At this point, we find that there are multiple variants which need to be analysed such as the heterogeneity of a society. As far as the 293 Law is concerned, it could be argued that the implementation of the Law did not necessarily go hand in hand with a full internalisation of the norm as described by the norm cascade theory. In this particular case, the process of internalisation is still being encouraged after the norm’s institutionalisation. In a bid to raise awareness on its mere existence and also, on its flaws, KAFA has continued to carry out training sessions and campaigns. The message from now on is clear: the law exists and victims of domestic violence can make use of it.

In spite of the progress the approval of the 293 Law has provided, the crux of KAFA’s position is the interpretation of the religious family codes as the biggest and foremost hindrance to achieving gender equality (Kafa.org.lb, n.d.). For this purpose, KAFA, following the Boomerang Pattern (Keck and Sikkink, 1998), has sought legitimation in the international legal standards which the CEDAW treaty promotes. We also need to bear in mind that these alliances can shape the domestic groups’ assessments who tend to adjust to the International standards.

KAFA and the International Norm: “A patriarchal law cannot govern us today”

The adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of all Discrimination Against Women provided women’s rights advocates with the international framework and means for promoting gender equality. The UN convention was used as a reference to call upon states to abide by the international norm regarding gender issues (Mir-Hosseini, 2011). In Lebanon, the treaty was ratified in 1997; however, it did so with certain reservations (KAFA, 2009; Un.org, n.d.).

Recalling the different stages of the so-called spiral model7, the ratification of this treaty could imply a recognition of the international

7 Refer to Appendix 1

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standards’ validity situating its norm in the fourth phase of the model: the so-called “prescriptive status”. During this phase, governments carry out effective efforts to abide by the principles that such treaties embody and, as a result, a full institutionalisation of the norm is achieved (Risse and Sikkink, 1999).

Shortly thereafter, we notice that the reservations made by the Lebanese state when ratifying CEDAW could instead place the signature of the treaty as a “tactical concession” (Risse and Sikkink, 1999) rather than a complete recognition of the norm with all it entails. Before going any deeper in understanding the spiral model phases and where the norm promoted by CEDAW and KAFA truly stands in correlation with the state’s position, we must clarify what these reservations are, and, most importantly, why they occur.

As Lamia (2010) well proves in her article, despite the ratification of the Human Rights Declaration and that of CEDAW together with the assumption of gender equality under the Article 7 of the Lebanese Constitution, women’s status has not achieved yet the same privileges and rights as men’s has. In spite of some of the achievements made by these international actors and the local pressures, Lamia argues that the maintenance of the personal status codes continues to be the most prominent symbol of women’s subordination. Lebanon has maintained a reservation to Article 168 of the UN convention which aims to provide women with equal rights in family matters and marriage (UNICEF, 2011; Lamia, 2010). One of the motives which the author provides for the maintenance of the present family code is the reluctance of the Religious Authorities to cede their recognised privileges which they hold as community leaders (Lamia, 2010). According to a Human Rights Watch report made in 2015, Religious Authorities are given leeway to legislate within the realm of the private sphere. The report claims that sect leaders justify their pressure for the maintenance of the Religious Courts as a way to preserve the characteristic plurality which defines Lebanon. 8 It has also made reservations to Article 9 which gives women the right to transfer their citizenship to their children (Lamia, 2010).

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This is reflective of actors using norms to justify their actions (Finnemore, 1996). However, in practical terms “the multiplicity of laws means that Lebanese citizens are treated differently when it comes to key aspects of their lives, including marriage, divorce, and custody of children.” (HRW, 2015:10).

Once we understand the pressure exercised by the Lebanese community leaders and the religious elite (Salloukh et al., 2015) and some of the historical aspects, we obtain a greater picture of the tug of war which surrounds the Personal Status Codes. In order to show its opposition to the Article 16 reservation, KAFA, supported by the European Commission, launched a campaign with the purpose of raising awareness, to pressure the government and arouse a sense of shaming (KAFA, 2011).

According to a press release issued in 2011, the campaign intended to lobby for the lifting of the Article 16 reservation. It carried the purpose of pressuring parliamentarians and decision-makers and establishing the necessary coalitions and networks with other countries such as Syria and Jordan where the same reservations had been made (KAFA, 2011).

Was the ratification of CEDAW then a tactical concession? The third phase of the Spiral model, as described by Risse and Sikkink (1999), explains how domestic pressure groups are relatively modest and dependent on their international partners. The processes of shaming is seen as a highly effective tool within this phase. Thus, in a bid to preserve their legitimacy internally and externally, states make tactical concessions which imply minor changes in practice (Risse and Sikkink, 1999). These characteristics seem to well define the status of the norm promoted by CEDAW with regard to the private affairs.

Regardless of some of the achievements made in other fields (Lamia, 2010), women’s status within the private realm continues to be subordinated due to the patriarchal system embedded within the current family code. Nevertheless, the boundaries between the third and the fourth phase of the spiral model are blurred and need to be more deeply

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investigated. In general terms, the legal aspects relating to family matters have been historically protected, not only to avoid the questioning of religious principles, but also, due to the interests of the religious and political elite. As a consequence of the complexity which surrounds these sectarian practices, it becomes quite difficult to tackle these issues and simply placing them within a fixed theoretical framework becomes a subjective exercise.

Bearing this in mind, it seems that regarding gender issues and, more particularly, the family codes, the norm shared by KAFA and other international and local actors has not yet reached the latter stages of its socialisation. Hitherto, a normative change regarding an enhancement of women’s rights in the private sphere does not seem to be an overt issue within the political agenda. Despite the domestic and international pressures, the norm cascade has not occurred completely and it appears to have reached a deadlock, bearing in mind the remaining secrecy of private affairs and the institutionalised power of the religious leaders.

Normative challenges

In principle, the spiral model and the norm cascade theory can serve us as a model to comprehend the general dynamics of a norm evolution in cases where the state becomes an obstacle to the implementation of international standards. There are many aspects which seem to well define the process which a norm goes through. Finnemore and Sikkink’s understanding of the mechanisms of NGOs and advocacy networks in order to influence the state tends to be particularly useful. Yet, when the discrimination appears to be institutionalised it becomes hard for the civil society to exercise enough pressure to promote an effective normative change to the extent of an implementation of a unified civil code.

Both Norm cascade theory and the spiral model fail to capture societies as heterogeneous fields of study. Religious Authorities claim to be

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following the “logic of appropriateness” previously described and to be the representatives of the norm which the system structures promote. This perceived norm argues that family matters need to be ruled by religious principles and this is precisely what KAFA contests. We encounter then two sets of assessments surrounding the family code: the norm that the system promotes and the international values embodied by KAFA and CEDAW.

By stating this, it could seem that a new and exogenous norm competes with the old norm. Secularism versus sectarianism is at first glance what is being debated. One set of norms fighting against another set of norms. Nevertheless, plainly arguing this would be simplistic and naïve and probably lead to dangerous assumptions, generalisations and artificial dichotomies. Norms are not fixed, and the more we analyse Lebanese society in depth and its multiple particularities the more we become aware that what we call perceived norms turn out to be exactly that: a perception. In other words, no one can fairly claim to represent the Lebanese society as a whole.

KAFA’s slogan “An archaic law does not govern us today” alludes to an “us”. What is implied by this? Women? Lebanese society? or simply KAFA’s sympathisers? As Alcoff (1991) argues, it becomes problematic to define the boundaries of communities. What is clear is that defining what the sense of appropriateness is, in a pluralistic society, is a highly intricate and hazardous task. On the one hand, proponents of the old norm could easily find multiple ways to criticise and oppose an exogenous norm that endangers the conception of the pluralistic society and the idea of multi-sectarian cohabitation which has been so hard to achieve. On the other hand, Religious Authorities understand the institutionalisation of gender equality as a great challenge to the system structures which benefit them (Salloukh et al., 2015). Again, the boundaries between the “logic of appropriateness” and the “logic of consequences” as defined by Finnemore (1996), are porous and often converge.

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Due to the difficulties which targeting the whole of a society entail, organisations such as KAFA and ratified treaties such as CEDAW are finding significant obstacles to promote their set of assessments. Perhaps, the point is not to change the whole system to implement or impose an objectively non-discriminatory civil code but to find the way in which the Lebanese society could feel represented. But, is this even feasible? Does real representation lie in the freedom of choice between one system and another?

I argue in my case study that the simplistic conceptualisation of a norm fighting against another might not be the path to success and may not accurately reflect reality.

Conclusions

KAFA, as with many other NGOs defending gender egalitarianism, is facing multiple obstacles. As a norm entrepreneur, they have been employing a variety of mechanisms to spread a normative change with the objective of achieving a change in policy. The advocacy and training carried out by the organisation are the means to achieve this. Their main role has consisted of promoting debate around women’s issues and opening people’s eyes to a hidden reality by unravelling the complexity of the legal procedures. Raising awareness has been their core activity and, in order to increase their legitimacy and scope, they have allied with other local NGOs and international networks. Nonetheless, determining the scope of an organisation is an arduous task.

However, once we understand the Lebanese context, we realise that many of the assumptions made by the theoretical framework on normative change, fall short in explaining all the particularities of the dynamics surrounding gender egalitarianism and the family codes. It is indeed helpful to utilise these theories in order to get a bigger picture on how civil society can have an impact on ideational change and influence domestic policies. Nevertheless, the more we immerse ourselves in these

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dynamics the more complex these interactions turn out to be and the more grey areas we encounter. The causality that the norm cascade seems to imply has proved insufficient to comprehend accurately the hindrances which civil society and NGOs such as KAFA face. This is why this case study becomes fascinating and highly complex making the future highly unpredictable.

Future research

At this point it would be necessary to investigate further on the Lebanese civil society as a whole and the role of the Religious Authorities and their proponents to comprehend in a richer manner the dynamics surrounding the family code. Not only this, deeper research on the conception of religion in society would turn out to be significantly useful to avoid generalisations and erroneous conjectures before assuming who speaks for who. Understanding the secrecy which encompass family matters would pave the way to elucidate why women have hardly achieved the same degree of rights as they did in the public sphere.

As Shor (2008) argues, there is a tendency to understand norms as homogenous principles which can hardly be modified or adjusted. If by contrast we conceive them as modifiable agents, we would definitely obtain a more realistic perspective on their evolution.

Moreover, the reasons behind the maintenance of the current system go far beyond a mere desire to keep the present family code and its values. Historical reasons, increasing sectarianism, clientelism and the deterioration of the country do not seem at first glance to go hand in hand with a strong institutionalisation of gender equality in the private realm.

As a first step to continue my research, we need to define what the obstacles are and, subsequently ask ourselves how these can be

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overcome. Which approach should KAFA and other NGOs take to stimulate a full normative change in gender issues while bearing in mind the difficulties of the context?

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Phases Repression

Denial Tactical Concessions

Prescriptive status

Rule-consistent behaviour

Dominant actors

moving process to next phase

-Transnational human rights networks

Transnational human rights networks

Transnational Human Rights networks and domestic opposition

National governments and domestic society

National governments and domestic society

Dominant mode of

interaction

Instrumental rationality

Instrumental rationality

Instrumental rationalityRhetorial actionArgumentative rationality

Argumentative rationality and institutionalisation

Institutionalisation and habitualization

“The spiral model”. Source: Risse and Sikkink, 1999:32.

Appendix 2

Stage 1: Norm emergence

Stage 2: Norm cascade

Stage 3: Norm Internalization

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Actors Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms

States, international organisations, networks

Law, professions, bureaucracy

Motives Altruism, empathy, ideational commitment

Legitimacy, reputation, esteem

Conformity

Dominant Mechanisms

Persuasion Socialisation, institutionalisation, demonstration

Habit, institutionalisation

“Stages of norms”. Source: Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:898.

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Presentation of the author:

Inés Devesa Buades, from Alicante (Spain), is a graduate student in International Relations and Politics of the Middle East at the University of Leeds. In 2015, she obtained her Bachelor’s degree in Arabic and Islamic studies at the University of Granada, during which she carried out two exchange years at the University of Jordan and at the American University of Beirut. She is passionate for the Arabic language and Middle Eastern affairs, and more concretely, gender issues, civil society and conflict resolution. Currently in her studies, she is specialising in family code in Lebanon due to her MA dissertation and in the Israeli-Palestine conflict.

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