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Dylan Lambert

Mr. Grimshaw

U.S History II

21 May 2012

The Passenger Train and Amtrak

The passenger train; one of America’s longtime institutions that has proven time and time

again that it simply won’t die (unlike some Wall St. banks). This means one must wonder if the

passenger train needed some sort of salvation considering the widespread development of the

interstate highway network, and increasing popularity of the automobile. Since the inception of

the railroad as a means of transportation in the early 1800s, passenger trains were in place to

move people from point A to point B. Some of the most prestigious passenger trains were to

come about in the early 1900s. Trains like the Twentieth Century Limited, Southwest Limited,

Knickerbocker, Yankee Clipper, Empire Builder, and the Merchants Limited were all established

to provide luxurious travel to patrons for the price of a sleeping car ticket. These days were not

to last forever as by the eve of World War II automobile traffic and an improved road network

had eaten away at passenger trains, seeing smaller branch lines and lesser main line trains

canceled, curtailed, or combined with existing services. The streamlining innovation helped draw

ridership while developing more durable equipment, but it didn’t stem the decline. Simply put,

Amtrak’s formation was necessary to prevent the decline in passenger rail and increase

ridership on a national level.

It was the formation of the National Railway Passenger Corporation, or Amtrak as it is

more commonly known, that stopped the decline. One would imagine that the passenger train

would increase in popularity (and thanks to Amtrak it has) but Congress has proven to be a

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impediment for increasing Amtrak’s subsidy and developing a better passenger rail network.

Ever since its inception Amtrak has been used as a political football, usually having its funding

cut before any other government program, and this leads to a constant fear that Amtrak will be

forced to significantly curtail service. Because of funding problems, Amtrak is left to cover 85%

of its costs, and that is a system-wide scale. Individual routes that Amtrak operates, such as the

Pacific Surfliner, attract significant ridership and reach marginal levels of profitability; yet these

routes aren’t enough to cover the system-wide problem of covering maintenance costs and

purchasing new equipment to retire the oldest assets in the Amtrak fleet (some of the dining cars

and sleepers were built in the 1950s and were transferred to Amtrak at birth). Is all this political

football even worth the time and trouble when Congress should be able to agree on something so

incredibly simple so it can focus on more prudent measures, such as our military and the

economy?

Amtrak’s story is one of survival against all odds. As said by Joseph Vranich in his book

Derailed: What went wrong and what to do about America’s Passenger Trains, “on some days,

riding Amtrak can be great; on other days, a disaster” (Vranich 1). This can only serve to

highlight the problems faced by Amtrak day in and day out. Finances, mechanical failures and

politics are a constant impediment to the job that Amtrak is sent to do. But when did the motions

begin which had the seemingly inevitable outcome of the formation of Amtrak on May 1, 1971?

In hindsight, we can trace the fractures that led to Amtrak’s creation going back to the 1930s.

The nation was recovering from the Great Depression, and the automobile made serious inroads

into the passenger traffic of the railroads, both large and small. In the case of some small

shortlines, passenger service was discontinued to maintain profitability. Furthermore, although

the decline in ridership was detrimental to many of the smaller railroads and their passenger

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operations, the larger conglomerates were working to draw new ridership through innovation and

technological advancement.

But where was this ridership supposed to come from? Only a revolution in passenger

train operations would draw such ridership that the railroads envisioned. That answer came in the

form of “streamliners”. Newer, lighter materials made the heavyweight cars of the era, so called

because of how the all-steel construction contributed to the weight, were made redundant by

lighter alloys like aluminum and stainless steel. The first railroad to invest heavily in stainless

steel was the Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railroad; “despite its initial high cost, stainless

steel has no other life expectancy than ‘long’, thus the Burlington expected that use of stainless

steel and its associated costs would be offset by lower maintenance and a carbody’s increased

longevity” (Schafer and Welsh 12). The minds at the CB&Q were correct in their assumption,

for stainless steel is the preferred material for use in Amtrak’s passenger cars because of the

lower maintenance costs (which is nearly none, as stainless steel is impervious to corrosion).

Some cars in Amtraks are nearing 60 years old, and the only reason they have been utilized for

such an extensive period of time is due in part to the carbodies being in excellent condition.

With streamliners being the main passenger trains operating in inter-city service, we

could gain a look at what pattern that Amtrak’s long distance trains would follow far before its

birth. Original streamliners were nothing like what we see today; they were fixed consists that

required heavy equipment, like that found in a repair shop, to alter the train consists (Schafer and

Welsh 11). The name of the game quickly became a balance between flexibility and cost-

effectiveness, as by the 1950s, when the streamliner reached maturity, the automobile was

exploding in popularity. “Arguably the ultimate virtue of the auto- its flexibility- would prove

stiff competition for the passenger train, which through the 1920s remained a stalwart operation”

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(Schafer and Welsh 10), and such flexibility was indeed an issue to passenger rail. But there

was a second component; the freedom of going wherever you wanted whenever you wanted. It’s

that freedom that many Americans flock to, even to this day where we see young adults going

out of their ways to gain a car because of that very freedom it offers.

Fast forward some more, into the 1960s, and there had been a dramatic drop in passenger

train operations. In 1944, near the end of World War II, passenger trains held 74% of the

intercity trade; this would fall to 48% by 1949 and 29% by 1960 (Frailey 5). Such decline made

maintaining passenger trains at a profitable level nearly impossible. The old adage, “a snowball’s

chance in hell” easily applies here. The real reason the passenger trains survived through the

1960s was the United States Postal Service. Yes, the Post Office, which seems near to total

collapse, once relied on railroads for moving and sorting massive amounts of mail on the nation-

wide network.

Loss of that traffic normally meant the end to passenger operations on a given railroad. In

the case of the Kansas City Southern, mail revenues supported their passenger operations. To

make the operations appealing to the public, Kansas City Southern maintained a respectable

passenger network, with two trains in each way, in an area with sparse population, and all of this

under William Deramus Jr. and his notorious public-be-damned attitude (Frailey 11). But why

bother keeping the passenger trains appealing? It was simple; “Deramus gladly spent money to

make money” (Frailey 16). This “spend money to make money” attitude of the management at

Kansas City Southern is further enhanced by the purchase of 5 new coaches from American Car

and Foundry, and 4 used tavern-observation cars from the New York Central for $25,250 each

(Frailey 12). That public appeal would see itself pay off with increases in ridership, which were

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mostly supplemental to the postal traffic carried by many of the passenger trains still running by

the 1960s.

But the United States Postal Service proved to be the undoing of the passenger trains on

Kansas City Southern. “On December 4, 1967 Kansas City Southern told the ICC it had every

intention of quitting the passenger business after all. The reason was all too familiar. The Postal

Service had informed KCS it would end RPO and storage mail contracts, taking away more than

$800,000 in revenue and some $650,000 in profits that had sustained the trains” (Frailey 18).

Clearly, even with a loyal clientele, the reason the passenger trains on KCS (and on nearly every

other railroad at the time) was the profits provided by RPO and storage mail contracts. Without a

reason to justify the expenses of the passenger trains, many railroads killed them off as a cost-

saving measure. In the case of Union Pacific, it managed to maintain its passenger network by

combining all its trains at key locations and setting off cars for other routes, the managed to

focus their network while growing their train, nicknamed the “City of Everywhere”, to a

gargantuan length of 55 cars (Frailey 23). So other ways to keep the passenger trains running and

ensuring they made some money still existed. Such concepts seem foreign these days, and that is

partly due to the existence of Amtrak and its heavily simplified network.

Now, let us fit Amtrak into this formula. While it began operations on May 1, 1971, the

idea of Amtrak (or some sort of government involvement in the operations of passenger trains)

went back nearly a decade. “On May 20, 1962, Sen. Claiborne Pell (Dem. Rhode Island) gave a

speech that now, almost 50 years later, is remembered as the first effective call to arms for a

revolution in passenger rail” (Phillips 23). Clearly, Senator Pell had enough foresight to

recognize the importance that passenger rail would have in the national transportation network.

Anyone who drives knows that at peak times, stretches of highway in urban areas are essentially

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paralyzed because of lacking capacity. There have also been realizations that some Amtrak

services don’t offer enough capacity for the growing ridership. Take the Capital Limited for

example; with through coaches and sleepers (through in this case means cars that are removed

from one train at certain predetermined points and connected to other trains, which means

passengers wouldn’t have to switch trains) connecting with the Pennsylvanian, Amtrak estimates

that it could attract a further 20,000 new riders to the Capital Limited (Johnston 8). While that

kind of ridership increase in the course of a year is seemingly small, that is 20,000 more riders

who support Amtrak by using its passenger services. Considering Congress doesn’t look to make

up its mind anytime soon regarding Amtrak, those new riders would be a needed asset.

“Amtrak deserves credit for keeping passenger trains around long enough for a renewed

debate on their existence” (Craghead 4). Surviving against sometimes formidable government

pressure is no accomplishment to be taken lightly. But within that opposition lays a question

about reliability. Reliability encompasses a one simple factor; on-time performance. So, how

does Amtrak stack up in the on-time performance categories? Let’s look at some of Amtrak’s

best and worst preformers;

Route On-time percentage

Capitol Corridor 93.2%

Missouri River Runner 91.1%

San Joauquin 90.7%

Pennsylvanian 90.1%

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Coast Starlight 89.9%

Hiawatha Service 89.5%

Sunset Limited 87.8%

(Johnston 18)

These trains range from corridors (smaller intercity routes, like Boston-Portland, ME) to

long distance services (overnight trains like the Sunset Limited and Coast Starlight). While we

may wish that all of Amtrak’s routes operated with this kind of efficiency, we must remember

that these trains use infrastructure owned by private concerns, so freight traffic can prove a

difficult obstacle in maintaining on-time performance.

Route On-time percentage

Carolinian 48.9%

Cardinal 51.4%

California Zephyr 52.6%

Michigan Trains (all Michigan services) 61.2%

Palmetto 64.3%

Capital Limited 68.4%

Texas Eagle 69.7%

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(Johnston 18)

Even though these are Amtrak’s worst performers, none of the routes served fall below

45% on-time performance. But what is the determining factor of Amtrak’s on-time performance?

The formula is simple; Trains traveling fewer than 250 miles have a 10 minute window on the

scheduled time, trains traveling between 251-350 miles have 15 minutes, trains traveling 351-

450 miles have 20 minutes, trains traveling between 451-550 miles have 50 minutes, and trains

traveling more than 551 miles have a 30 minute cushion (Johnston 19). To better compare these

statistics, there is a bar graph on page 13 of this paper that illustrates the percentages illustrated

in the two tables, along with a key designating which number on the lower half of the chart

represents a given train.

So, generally Amtrak has a mixed bag of routes with different performances. But on-time

performance isn’t just a result of scheduling issues and congested railways. One needs to account

the equipment that is being used. Riders have and will be drawn to rail by the amenities it offers

(Solomon 7). So the coaches that they ride in can be looked at as the main face of those

amenities, and then to draw even more ridership, the product must be of good quality (Solomon

36). Therein lays the greatest reason for service improvements, increased dependability (Nice

21). As a result, Amtrak has in recent years placed orders for new sleeping cars, coaches, dining

cars and baggage cars so service can be expanded on some routes to a daily offering, but that

won’t be a possibility until 2012, when those new cars are delivered (Johnston 8). That improved

service can be used to increase timings for many of the trains in Amtrak’s eastern region of

operations. Better timings and service quality translates into ridership increase and consistent

patronage which further develops into more income that is vastly needed by Amtrak. However,

trains that are oft on-time are doomed to be trapped in a cycle of decline, as delay is murderous

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to public support (Frailey 13). Some believe this is a sign of the worst; “Amtrak’s on-time

performance has never been, nor will it ever be, at the point where passengers can expect

European-like dependability” (Vranich 8). In some cases this may hold true, but I go back to the

fact that, for the most part, Amtrak runs its individual routes between 45% and 95% at schedule.

One must also note that only one of Amtrak’s trains, the Carolinian, runs on-time less than 50%

of the time. That can be considered both a problem and an accomplishment; trains not running to

schedule tend to perform below expectations, while managing an on-time rating of 48.9% is no

easy feat, and improvement to the timings should be much easier considering how close the

Carolinian runs to the upper half of the rating scale.

Over the years, Amtrak’s finances have varied over such a wide spectrum that one must

note what the changing climate entails. By 1995, Amtrak’s funding had varied from anywhere

between $1 Billion to $20 Million in 1986 during the Regan Administration (Nice 27).

Essentially, Amtrak has been the kickball of Congress. The politics of begging for money each

year, facing the consequent backlash when members of both the House and Senate try to initiate

sever cuts to Amtrak’s operating subsidies. This hasn’t really been an effective strategy since the

Reagan years for the following rationale – “One political force that might affect the distribution

of service is interparty competition. In a competitive political environment, votes are valuable.

Consequently, members of Congress may feel greater pressure to support programs that may

earn the gratitude of voters” (Nice 34). One can only surmise that if Amtrak is important to the

voters, then if a candidate wants to gain (or maintain) his/her public office, it would be best to

follow the will of his constituents and support such popular programs, which could include

anything from Social Security, FEMA, and most importantly, Amtrak.

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State support should also be touched on, considering some of the great successes

experienced by those partnerships. “When the Amtrak system was created, the states were given

an additional opportunity to participate in transportation policymaking. The law creating Amtrak

provided that states could obtain additional passenger rail service if officials in those states were

willing to help pay the costs of the additional service” (Nice 47). Those state subsidies are

known to vary widely, depending on if the state is willing to support a higher degree of service.

“In 1985, for example, the largest state subsidy was less than $4 Million; in 1996, three states

spent less than $200,000 on their subsidy programs. In an era of multibillion dollar state budgets,

even less affluent states may be able to afford modest subsidies of rail passenger service” (Nice

48). But the state demographics are also known to play a role as well. “Rural States tend to be

more oriented towards highway building and to spend more on road and highway programs. As a

result, fewer dollars are likely to remain for nonhighway transportation programs” (Nice 49). So,

then if rural states spend less on Amtrak subsidies, then more developed states must spend more

on their subsidy for Amtrak, right? Case in point – Amtrak California. Funded in part by the

State of California, Amtrak California is more than just a brand name; the equipment is all

owned by the state, and staffed by Amtrak employees (Lawrence 33). The service has been

incredibly successful, as between February 2010 and January 2011, the Capitol Corridor (one of

three routes operated by Amtrak California) saw 1.62 Million riders, with 130,860 using the

service in January alone (Lawrence 33). Then there is the Pacific Surfliner, yet another service

(but having a completely separate image); in 2010 it saw 2.6 Million riders, giving it the second

largest ridership rate for any Amtrak route (Lawrence 34).

The kind of ridership the Pacific Surfliner sees is indicative of Amtrak’s cemented status

in the national transportation agenda. The same statute is proven through some of Amtrak’s

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largest passenger facilities, most prudently shown through the 30th Street Station in Philadelphia.

30th Street Station was originally built in the 1920s for the Pennsylvania Railroad, and took 5

years and cost $60 Million to build (Keefe 47). There are three companies that call at 30th Street;

Amtrak, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (or SEPTA) and NJ Transit

(Keefe 50). The original designers even took into account the commuter traffic, and to make sure

that the long distance trains weren’t impeded two levels were constructed for the different trains;

the lower serving long distance trains that called in Philadelphia and the upper level serving the

many commuter trains that operated out of 30th Street (Keefe 47). That foresightedness has

proven most valuable, as 580 trains call at 30th Street serving (on average) 20,000 each day

(Keefe 46). If one was to do the math that would be 7.3 Million passengers and 211,700 trains

each year. If that many people are accessing Amtrak service through one location each year, then

clearly the demand for Amtrak and passenger rail in general is large enough to justify the

primary mission behind Amtrak’s creation; preventing decline in the passenger rail sector and

grow ridership. In accordance with those increases, Amtrak increases train miles by adding more

service to existing services on a given route or forming new services entirely on completely

different routes (Nice 73).

Now the paper comes back to the question; Amtrak’s formation necessary to prevent

the decline in passenger rail and increase ridership on a national level. Amtrak was only

meant to last for 20 years, and looking now it becomes clear that Amtrak has lasted twice as long

as intended at its formation (Katz 6). Existing for 40 years instead of the originally expected 20

indicates that Amtrak managed to develop a loyal following in Congress and develop a repertoire

with the American people. The verdict of many Americans is clear; we needed, and still need

Amtrak to preserve and develop passenger rail in the United States. Has Amtrak’s job been easy?

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Not at all! Supporters like Senator Pell had to fight for Amtrak’s creation. Those in the public

who wanted to save the passenger train said so when they participated in the largest mass mailing

to Congressional representatives in US history (Phillips 28). Even attempts to kill Amtrak before

it could start operations on May 1, 1971 failed when a flurry of bills and legislation was

introduced and failed to pass through either house (Phillips 31). Even today Amtrak has people

like Brian Solomon who speak up and educate the public on the importance of passenger rail.

The faith that Solomon has in Amtrak, and all forms of rail transport, is fueled by the history his

family has with passenger trains (Solomon 7). The regular funding crisis hasn’t stopped Amtrak;

shortly after beginning operation Amtrak needed an increased government subsidy, and this

served to prove that Amtrak was underfunded from the start (Solomon 40). “Its periodic funding

crisis’s are like professional wrestling – they are predictable fights with predictable results, but

spectators find it interesting anyway” (Solomon 43). To visualize how successful Amtrak has

been in attracting riders, one only needs to walk to a station served by it to see anywhere

between one person to a small mob. If those souls were drawn to Amtrak because of things like

the amenities, lower costs or even the novelty of traveling by train, Amtrak has clearly succeeded

and proven its existence necessary to the American people.

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Key to Amtrak Route Percentages:

1- Capitol Corridor

2- Missouri River Runner

3- San Joaquin

4- Pennsylvanian

5- Coast Starlight

6- Hiawatha Service

7- Sunset Limited

8- Carolinian

9- Cardinal

10- California Zephyr

11- Michigan Trans (all Michigan services)

12- Palmetto

13- Capitol Limited

14- Texas Eagle

(Johnston 8).

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

On Time Preformance, measured on a scale of 0 to 100 Percent

Amtrak Route Preformance

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Works Cited

Barringer IV, John W. “Disbanding the Tribe” Classic Trains

Summer 2011 60-63.

Craghead, Alexander “Amtrak: Against All Odds” Railfan and Railroad Magazine

May 2011 4.

Frailey, Fred W. “Twilight of the Great Trains”

Waukesha: Kalmbach Publishing Company, 1998

Goldberg, Bruce “Growing up with Amtrak” Classic Trains

Summer 2011 50-59

Ingles, J. David “Ride ‘em while you can” Classic Trains

Summer 2011 32-43.

Johnston, Bob “Amtrak’s New On-Time Report Card” Trains Magazine

March 2011 18-19.

Johnston, Bob “Amtrak’s Improvement Wish List” Trains Magazine

January 2011 20-21.

Katz, Curtis L. “Amtrak turns 40” Railfan and Railroad Magazine

May 2011 6.

Keefe, Kevin P. “America’s Finest Railroad Station” Trains Magazine

March 2011 45-53.

Lawrence, Elrond “Amtrak California” Railfan and Railroad magazine

May 2011 33-35.

McCommons, James “Waiting on a Train” The Embattled Future of Passenger Rail Service

White River Junction: Chelsea Green Publishing Company, 2009

Nice, David C. “Amtrak” The History and Politics of a National Railroad

Boulder: Lynne River Publishers Inc, 1998

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Phillips, Don “Will someone get serious about passenger rail?” Trains Magazine

September 2011 11.

Phillips, Don “The Road to Rescue” Classic Trains

Summer 2011 23-31

Porterfield, James D. “Happy 40th, My Friend” Railfan and Railroad Magazine

May 2011 7-8.

Schafer, Mike and Joe Welsh “Streamliners” History of a Railroad Icon

St. Paul: MBI Publishing Company, 2002

Solomon, Brian “Amtrak” MBI Railroad Color History

St. Paul: MBI Publishing Company, 2004

Solomon, Brian “The Northeast Corridor” Railfan and Railroad Magazine

May 2011 36-41.

Vernon, Wes “Amtrak – Volpe’s Warning to Reistrup” Railfan and Railroad Magazine

May 2011 16-18.

Vranich, Joeseph “Derailed” What went wrong and what to do about America’s Passenger Trains

New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997

Wilner, Frank N. “The Amtrak Story”

Omaha: Simmons-Boardman Books Inc, 1994