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    Commonplace Knowledge and InnovationAuthor(s): Ruth AmossyReviewed work(s):Source: SubStance, Vol. 19, No. 2/3, Issue 62/63: Special Issue: Thought and Novation (1990),pp. 145-156Published by: University of Wisconsin Press

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    Commonplace Knowledge and InnovationRuth Amossy

    THERES NOTHINGMOREDIFFICULTo eradicate than the obvious.Whenever a deep-rooted notion refers to what we consider an "EternalTruth"or a natural fact, its cultural relativity is forgotten. Its emergence ata given period, its dependence on a specific intellectual and ideologicalbackground and its possible dismissal in the future are simply ignored.Such is the case with the conception of "novelty" expressed by the notionof "stereotype,"and with the modernity of this very notion. We generallyfeel that stereotyping, insofar as it opposes fruitless repetition to creativeoriginality, has been recognized and condemned by countless generations.Of course, the termdid not exist in the past, but one should not pay toomuch attention to a mere question of vocabulary. Moreover, stereotypes asfrozen patterns, simplified schemas shared by a whole community, seem tobe a universal feature of social life. Didn't the ancient Greeks already havea stereotyped vision of the Barbarians, and 17th-century France astereotyped image of the Turks? Even in societies without writing, anthro-pologists have been able to single out group stereotypes.*However, there is a difference between our ancestors' collective im-ages of foreign groups, and their ability to think in terms of "stereotypes."Societies of the past did not see in their common beliefs misleading precon-ceptions or collective opinions derived from habit. Similarly, repetition ofwell-known themes and the persistence of stable categories like "theMiser" or "the Collector" were not interpreted as blind adherence to thedejd-dit, r as lack of originality. The emergence of the noun "stereotype" nits figurative sense at the turn of the century coincides with a new aware-ness of the alienating power of prevalent cultural models. That inheritedviews and group categorization should be regarded as misleading a priori,that collective images should be considered an obstacle o intellectual andartisticinnovation, was by no means obvious to past centuries. It is a con-

    For heseremarks, amindebted o FranqoisHeran rom he RevuerancaiseeSociologie.

    SubStanceN? 62/63, 1990 145

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    temporary attitude, resulting from an evolution that started at the begin-ning of the 19th century.Its origins are well-known-the Romanticemphasis on individualismand originality led to a general condemnation of banality; trite themes,hackneyed figures had to be exposed. Since pejorative terms were neededto deprecate worn-out expressions and ideas, the words "commonplace"and "cliche"were seized upon. The first is none other than the toposofclassical rhetoric interpreted, no longer as an element of inventio,buildingup argumentation through points of common agreement, but as a publicplace surrendered to the common herd. Cliche irst meant, like stereotype,a plate made by moldir,g a matrix of a printing surface, and making fromthis a cast in type metal. Later,around 1869, with the advent of photog-raphy, clichecame to mean photographic negative. By metaphoricalexten-sion, it came to define any frozen stylistic pattern.12In the 19th century,stereotypewas synonymous with cliche as far as printing techniques wereconcerned. However, only the adjective "stereotyped"was widely used tostigmatize repetitive structures;all definitions of the noun were restrictedto typography.This position singles out the notion of "stereotype,"which was intro-duced into current use rather late, when designations of formal andthematic banality already existed. Despite its semantic indetermination (itis still synonymous with cliche), it appears that the notion of "stereotype"was used more and more to condemn not only a lack of literaryoriginality,but also consensus of opinion and classificationof a group. Inother words,social models and group judgments had to be perceived as negativebefore"stereotypes" could be described as simplistic collective images, like thehappy-go-lucky, ignorant Negro or the tactful, gentle, dependent and ofcourse talkative woman. Twentieth-centurydictionariesdefine stereotype s"a standardized mental picture that is held in common by members of agroup and that represents an oversimplified opinion, affective attitude oruncritical judgment" (Webster'sDictionary).Thus in the contemporaryview, images held by individuals under the influence of their social en-vironment cannot but be "preconceived and frozen, simplistic and clear-cut."3

    This development deserves some attention, as it is by no means self-evident. The inability of the first half of the 19thcentury to conceive of thestereotype, ven when the notions of commonplacend cliche(designed tocondemn stylistic and thematic banality) were well-established, is highlysymptomatic. In a previous study on popular literature in the 1840s inFrance,4I have shown that the "litteraturefacile"r "industrielle"as it was

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    called at the time) was never attacked on the basis of its stereotyped char-acters. This is especially striking in the case of the "physiologies,"hortworks centered on the description of well-known types: the "Grisette,"the"Portiere"or dreaded French concierge, the "Old Maid," "theClerk," "theStudent," etc. There is nothing that seems closer to a standardized,simplified collective representation than these short publications, unani-mously described as inferior mass productions. No mention, however, isever made of their tendency to stereotype, since at this time the only valueof the enterprise lay in its legitimate attempt at "typification."Knowledgewas supposed to be achieved through systematic classification, definitionand description of social categories; generalizations were consideredindispensable in presenting an orderly and understandable picture of con-temporary reality. The "physiologies"hus carry out, in a shallow way, thetask that the encyclopedias of the 19th century achieve through seriouscompilation. It is easy to see why the notion of "stereotype" is excludedfrom the intellectual landscape of the time; it is much too close to theconcept of "Type," defined by the Grand DictionnaireUniverseldu XIXesiecleof Pierre Larousse as an "object gathering to a high degree all objectsof the same nature" and a "cluster of characteristic features." Even if theresemblance is not perfect, it is enough to threaten the hegemony of theTypeand its cognitive powers. In short, a period so keen on the supremacyof types could not admit the notion of "stereotype," which remained out-side of its field of vision.

    An important shift in perspective occurred when emphasis was placednot on the encyclopedic ordering of social reality, but on the way socialdiscourse distortsreality. Side by side with ordinary dictionaries, a newgenre emerged: the "sottisier," r dictionary of conversation, which becamewith Flaubert the Dictionnairedes ideesreques.5The latter is well-known asan encyclopedia of public opinion, ironically displaying its stupidity.Widely circulated "categorizations"are no longer the way to Knowledge;or, rather, they are the way to commonplace knowledge, that is, to therealm of collective views and mere betise. This is subtly displayed inFlaubert's entries:

    Chambermaids. Prettierhantheirmistresses.Knowall theirsecretsandbetray hem.Alwaysdishonored y the sonofthefamily.Scholars Laughable.To be a scholar,you need only memoryand hardwork.Focusing on what is thought and said about a given group, and notabout its problematic reality outsidesocial discourse, Flaubertexemplifies a

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    change that will gradually come to prevail in the 20th century-the transi-tion from optimistic typification to general suspicion concerning collectivecategorization and consensus of opinion. The notion of stereotype grewand developed in this context; it soon came to be considered the plague ofmodern times. (Needless to say, a period increasingly obsessed withstereotypes finds it difficult to deal with "types"-they always threaten toturn into collective schemas. This is seen in the general 20th-century rejec-tion of literary "types.")It is in such a general framework that the term "stereotype"found itsway into cultivated circles, with the distinction between its literalmeaningand its subsequent metaphorical ature gradually becoming indistinct.Increasingly frequent in everyday language, it achieved currency amongeducated people. The word "stereotype"thus conveyed what these elitesthought about collective images, widely-shared opinions, banality and in-novation. It expressed commonplace views on... the commonplace. At thisstage, it seems that the innovative powers of the notion come to an end.Having lost its novelty, the "stereotype"participatesin a semantic networkwhere it reinforces common views about the dangers of uncritical repeti-tion and common knowledge. Anybody can use it to denounce the collec-tive images that contaminate conversation and texts. Actually, criticism ofstereotypying readily turns into a stereotyped judgment.

    Although it paradoxically condemns itself, by denying any cognitivepotential for commonplace knowledge, the notion of stereotypes was suc-cessfully introduced in the 1920s into the vocabularyof the social sciences,where it demonstrated (against its own principles) how a notion deeplyrooted in common social ground can bear fruit when transplantedto scien-tific areas of research. Let us briefly examine the innovation this com-monplace notion, devised to condemn banality of thought and expression,brought about in the field of social psychology.It is generally admitted that Walter Lippmann first introduced theterm "stereotype" into the social sciences. It is no wonder that thestereotype made its first "scholarly" appearance in a work devoted topublic opinion in modern democracies. In his PublicOpinion(1922), Lip-pmann stressed not only the negative, but also the constructive aspects ofcommonplace thought. The stereotype, he claimed, is anecessary featureofmodern society. Our world is too vast and complex to be directly ap-prehended; the individual cannot but perceive reality through commonpatterns and images circulatedby the media.

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    In thegreatblooming,buzzingconfusionof the outerworld,we pickupwhat ourculturehasalreadydefined orus, and we tend toperceive hatwhichwe havepickedoutinthe formstereotypedor usbyourculture.6Lippmann called stereotypes "picturesin our heads," and sees in themone of the "fictions"through which "theadjustmentof man to his environ-ment takes place," the range of fiction extending "all the way from com-

    plete hallucination to the scientist's perfectly self-conscious use of aschematic model."7It is interesting to see how Lippmann raises new issues by using a

    notion borrowed from commonplace use. Investigating the relation be-tween individuals and public affairs, he can no longer confine himself tomere condemnation of collective representations. In his thoughtful ex-ploration of democratic societies, he brings out the multiple functions ofstereotypes in social life. Originally a pejorative term meant to denouncebanality, the stereotype becomes a concept through which the relation ofman to his environment can be re-evaluated. No precise definition isneeded to further Lippmann's analyses. On the contrary, he achieves hismost fruitful insights by weaving a series of metaphors ("pictures in ourhead," "fictions")around a term both familiar and rather vague. He thusopens it up to new connections, eventually displaying its positiverelation tocultural mediation, social representation and cognitive schematization.

    Lippmann's "stereotype"was adopted by the social sciences, where itgave birth to a considerable amount of scholarly work. As expected, re-search has developed both in the experimental and the theoretical fields. Inthe experimental domain, Katz and Bralystarted in the 1930s a pioneeringwork on "Verbal Stereotypes and Racial Prejudice" that was to have alasting effect on social psychology.8 They developed a technique aimed atdetermining and measuring the content of stereotypes. Ten ethnic groupswere selected as test-cases. One hundred Princeton undergraduates werethen asked to read through a list of 84 adjectives and to pick the charac-teristics they thought most appropriate for each of the selected ethnicgroups. Another group of students was asked to rate these adjectives onthe basis of the desirability of the given traits. Statisticalprocessing of thecollected data displayed the preconceived images of racialgroups commonto the Princeton population in 1932. Thus the Germanswere thought to bescientifically-minded, industrious, stolid, intelligent, methodical, extreme-ly nationalistic, progressive, efficient, jovial, musical, persistent, practical.As for the Jews, they were shrewd, mercenary,industrious, grasping, intel-ligent, ambitious, sly, loyal to family ties, persistent, talkative, aggressive,very religious.

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    Katz and Braly'smethod brings us one step further; t creates he veryobject it seeks to investigate. The social scientist generates an object calleda "stereotype;" it raises it to the status of an autonomous entity, andproduces artificially a "reality"nowhere else to be found. Now there is astereotype of "the German," "the Jew," "the Woman," "the Bolshevik,"etc., capable of being examined and described, measured in its intensityand followed in its evolution. Thestereotype of "theGerman,"for instance,can be analyzed "BeforePearl Harbor and After"9where it appears that itdid not undergo any significant change in an American women's college in1941;it is only in 1942 and 1943 that "aggressive," "cruel"and "arrogant"appear along with the more favorably-rated traits. Later experimentalmethods all develop along the same lines, and according to the sameprinciples. It is interesting to note that even before the adjective checklist,an early technique based on the rating of photographs was developed byRice in 1926-7. In it, a photograph-for example, a man with a stringtie-is to be matched with a label ("AmericanSenator"or "Bolshevik").10nthe photograph device, Lippmann's "pictures"acquire even more consis-tency, as if they were coming to life.Experimental studies of stereotypes have developed on two levels.Firstof all, new methods of analysis were invented and improved. Let usonly mention Edwards (1940) who defined the four "dimensions" of thestereotype: contents,or the traits making it up; uniformity, he amount ofagreement on these traits;direction, heir favorable or unfavorable quality;and intensity,the degree of favorableness." Such a framework allowed forquantitative analyses presented in the form of tables and graphs. Secondly,an incredible amount of research has been devoted to the study of specificstereotypes. A few examples: "AComparison of racial stereotypes of 1935and 1942,"12 Encountersbetween Blacksand White Liberals:the Collisionof Stereotypes"'3 and "L'identite bretonne: notes sur la production del'identite negative."14 Beside the ethnic domain, social sciences are inves-tigating the stereotypes of social classes, old age, sex images, publicopinion issues and others.The fecundity of the notion of "stereotype" in research on socialgroups is more than obvious. It is less clear on the theoretical plane, whereno consensus has been reached. According to Katz and Braly, thestereotype is first a working hypothesis; definitions necessarily follow theexperimental stage. Definitions, however, did not automatically follow;and when they did, it was only to create a confusion much criticized bysocial scientists.

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    No doubt the confusion started at an early stage. As "apicture in ourhead," the stererotype was a vague notion hardly worthy of inclusion inscientific terminology. Whereas the author of PublicOpinion,a professionaljournalist, was not very keen on scientific terminology and methods, hissuccessors insisted on accuracy and scientific rigor. They set out to definethe stereotype in order to elevate a common notion to the dignity of ascientific concept. Thus the stereotype came to be described in textbooksand encyclopedias as a "belief,"but also as a "concept,"a "schema,"15'16n"idea,"17'18an "opinion,"1an "image,"20 r a "collective representation."21Now, how can anything be simultaneously a belief and a concept, not tomention the other heterogeneous definitions? No wonder that the semanticproliferation of the term made it an unsatisfactory concept for many socialscientists. If the Encyclopedia f Psychology(1972) only notes at the entrystereotype:"a term whose meaning varies," Harding, in the InternationalEncyclopedia f the SocialSciences,does not hesitate to deplore the fact that"thebroad and undiscriminating usage of the noun 'stereotype' is now toowell established to be dislodged."22

    The relationship between fecundity and innovative powers, on the onehand, and so-called "scientific rigor," on the other, needs to be re-ex-amined. My contention is that the stereotype has fertilized research onsocial issues not in spiteof,but becauseof its indetermination. It has proveda most flexible, and therefore convenient, notion. Retaining the multipleconnotations of its current use, enriched with Lippmann's imagery andtheoretical considerations, it could be made to serve various purposes.Each discipline has exploited its malleability so that it could answer itsown specific needs. As a consequence, a new set of questions could beformulated and explored around the notion of "stereotype"in each field.Let us take the example of the "belief-concept"issue. From the 1930son, the stereotype acquired a privileged status in the study of group inter-relations. "Images" in my head of Arabs, Negroes, Communists orpolicemen largely determine my attitude and thus my behavior towardsthem. If "women" in my eyes are weak, inferior in intelligence and de-pendent, I will tend to judge every woman not according to her ownachievements, but in accordance to so-called "female characteristics."Thisready-made picture represents my belief about women-"belief" beingused here "ina generic sense to include knowledge,pinionsand faith."23t isin this context that the stereotype was re-defined as a belief or, in a milderform, as its cognitive component. We read that "Stereotypedenotes beliefsabout classes of individuals, groups, or objectswhich are preconceived,"24and that "A belief that is simple, inadequately grounded, at least partially

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    inaccurate and held with considerable assurance by many people is calleda stereotype."25These definitions often appear in sections devoted to "prejudice"and"ethnic relations." Indeed, preconceived beliefs in typical characteristicsassociated with a sexual, national or religious group, and negative evalua-tion of these characteristics,are the very core of prejudice. Similarly, whatI believe to be true about "the Jew," "the Negro" or "the American" isbound to have a direct impact on my affective response towards theseethnic groups. If action is taken along these lines-if I do not consider aNegro or a woman as fit for a given job as a result of my stereotypedbeliefs, mere prejudice gives way to actual discrimination. This over-simplified account only aims at showing how the stereotype came to beused in the analysis of prejudice. (Some textbooks even assimilatestereotype and prejudice. Closely linking the two notions, Grawitz simplynotes: "Prejugeest plus courant,mais plus pejoratifet plus charge affective-ment"-"Prejudice is more commonbut morepejorative,and affectivelymoreserious.,26

    On the other hand, the notion of stereotype has been widely used inissues related to the sociology of knowledge. Gordon Allport, in TheNatureof Prejudice(1954), already equated stereotyping with ordinary catego-rization, arguing that "our experience in life tends to form itself intoclusters."27 n the first phase of social research, stereotypes were generallydescribed as "afalse classificatoryconcept" (Young, 1947)28iable to distortour understanding of the surrounding world. Being second-hand, frozenand rigid, they were thought to hinder intellectual processes. Furthermore,they were proved to be an obstacle to cognition even on the perceptionlevel. In 1940, a picture representing a luxury villa with a beautiful lawnwas shown to white children in the United States; they were then askedwhat the Negro woman was doing in the picture. Some of them answeredshe was cleaning the house, although there was no Negro woman at all inthis particularphotograph.29In a second phase of the research, stereotypes have often beendescribed as concepts or schemas, participating like them in any cognitiveprocess.30If concepts are "organizationsof experience with certain classesof objects (persons), based on perceived relationships," then, Vinacke ar-gued in 1957, stereotypes are concepts.31It is interesting to note that theissue of typification vs stereotyping, evaded by the 19th century as well asby contemporary currentuse, is dealt with at length in the social sciences.Seeing no essential difference between sound categorization andstereotyping, some social scientists, like Asch, deplore that so much energy

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    is being spent condemning what is in itself an indispensable cognitiveprocess.32It is impossible to sum up here a debate that goes on for severaldecades. (Fora more detailed presentation of this specific issue, see Amos-sy, 1989.)33I only wanted to show how stereotypes came to be defined interms of concepts, thus contributing to the reflection on categorization andcultural models in cognitive processes.This brings us back to the innovative powers of a flexible notion takenfrom everyday use. Indeed, the common term kept its ideological implica-tions-inferiority of collective thinking, the assimilation of "common"with"commonplace"and "fruitless"repetition, opposition between the precon-ceived, biased opinion of the masses and the precise, verified statements ofscience. But all these acquired a new significance when they came todescribe social attitudes and group interrelations. In their new context,they illuminated the nature of public opinion. They raised important issuesconcerning the way social groups reactto each other and perceive themsel-ves in relation to "images" circulated by their culture. They led to ananalysis of prejudice and social identity, as well as to crucialinsights on therelation between socialization and cognition. It is the displacement, nd notthe deconstruction, of a commonplace notion that fertilized many areas ofthe social sciences. In each field, the stereotype was linked to a new set ofquestions that led to its re-definition, and to which it contributed freshinsights. To bring about a new understanding, it took the form of ametaphorical net, a working hypothesis allowing experimentation and aproblematic concept leading to theoretical discussions. In all these aspects,it proved fruitful insofar as the current notion, loaded with all its com-monplace knowledge, was worked out in a new context.Parallel to the social sciences, semiotics have dealt since the 1960swithstereotyping in the mass media, in publicity, cartoons, school textbooks,popular literature and so on. These studies lay bare the mechanisms ofvarious sign systems participating in what Edgar Morin aptly called"l'industrialisation el'esprit."4The combined efforts of different disciplineseventually led to a growing awareness of stereotyping in the educatedmiddle classes. This awareness was also reinforced, and transmitted tolarger audiences, by the merciless progress of the cultural industry. So thenotion of stereotypes, borrowed by scientific research from commonplaceknowledge, travelled full circle and came back at last to its place of origin.In so doing, it deeply affected contemporary culturalproduction and gavebirth to new strategies both in popular and avant-garde literature.I would like to emphasize two central points. First, the growingawareness of stereotypes in a large audience modified the criteriacurrently

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    used to distinguish mass literature from canonic or avant-garde texts.Denunciation and deconstruction of widely circulated frozen schema areno more the exclusive privilege of the elites. They are a recurringfeature oftexts written for large, relatively unsophisticated audiences anxious toprove their ability to demystify the stereotypes they are fed daily. I havetried to exemplify this in my analyses of autobiographies and biographiesof Hollywood female stars, where the presentation of the movie idol reliesheavily on the "real woman behind the glamorous image"35'36n thesebest-sellers obviously belonging to what Bourdieu calls the "champdegrandeproduction"37t appears that the notion of stereotype has introducedinto popular literaturenew strategies based on a pseudo-deconstruction ofcollective images. In other words, the notion of stereotype, by introducingnew models in the field of contemporary literature,has been an agent offerment and an innovative tool in popular culture as well.We are left with an unsolved question-and this is my second point-concerning the fecundity of the notion of stereotype as far as artisticcreativity is concerned. I do not have any kind of general answer to offer;only an example which is, in my opinion, symptomatic of some contem-porary trends. I here refer to the work of Roland Barthes,since he ideallyexemplifies what I would call the effects of our modern obsession withstereotypes. Awareness of collective frozen patterns being a condition sinequanonfor anyone aspiring to cultural distinction, detection and rejectionof stereotypes can turn into a genuine mania. As an avant-garde Frenchintellectual, Barthes is constantly trying to confound Doxa,and constantlyfeeling that it threatens to reappear in some new disguise. Does not eachidea, even new, soon "solidify" (stereosmeans solid) and become a collec-tive opinion? According to Barthes, this endless attention to stereotypingaccounts for the dynamics of his own writing: Doxa calls for paradox(a),which in turn becomes Doxa, and so on.3839 Moreover, the most subtlestrategies to outsmart stereotypes and collective stupidity are accom-panied, in Barthes's texts, by a perpetual awareness of their mechanismsand eventual failure. As a result of an implacable logic, those who most tryto avoid collective images are bound to find them everywhere; those whowant to escape the realm of common knowledge are caught in a dizzyingperpetual motion that allows for no rest in some stable 'Truth."In display-ing this dynamic, symptomatic of the contemporary avant-garde, and inmaking it into a central theme of his work, Roland Barthesparadoxicallydemonstrates how the notion of stereotype can innovate in the culturalproduction of the elites.

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    Barthes shows that we can never be "on the other side" of stereotyp-ing-only in its margins, where we try to grasp and outdo it. On a differentlevel, I would like to suggest that we cannot yet go beyond the notion ofstereotype, even if it seems to have by now fully exploited its potential forinnovation, both in the social sciences and in literary production. Socialpsychologists only continue an exploration begun half a century ago, withsimilar methods and goals. Literaryreflection seems to have reached, withBarthes, a limit that can hardly be exceeded. The research on the com-monplace is in its turn sinking into repetition. Nevertheless, the notion ofstereotypes still dominates our intellectual landscape, not because it stillinnovates in any field, but because the social conditions that account for itsrise and success have not undergone any radical change. The notion ofstereotypes reinforces the basic values of moder democracy and serves itsinterests. It contributes to the denunciation of prejudice, the demystifica-tion of the mistakes and excesses of public opinion, and to laying bare thedangers of cultural industrialization. On all these grounds, it is impossibleto dismiss it or to leave it behind. The only possible position on this issueseems to be the critical one. If we cannot go beyond the notion ofstereotype, we can at least stand on its ultimate border, where the manyquestions it raises can be revealed and analyzed. TelAvivUniversity

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