Douglas Little. American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945. Chapel Hill:University of North Carolina Press, 2002. xiv + 407 pp. ISBN 978-0-8078-5539-3; $34.95 (cloth), ISBN978-0-8078-2737-6.

Reviewed by Kail Ellis (Villanova University)Published on H-Levant (March, 2004)

American Orientalism

American OrientalismThe title of Douglas Little’s book evokes the late

Edward Said’s seminal work, Orientalism. For Said,orientalism was the conceptual framework that ra-tionalized Western colonialism and its attendant cul-tural and economic imperialism. It viewed the re-gion and its peoples as essentially “dehumanized” andthereby justified Western domination. Where Saidemployed the concept to counter pathological stereo-types of Arabs and Muslims as violent, backward,and driven by passion and religious fanaticism, Littleemploys it to explain American policy in the MiddleEast since 1945.

Little introduces his study with a culturaloverview of eighteenth- and nineteenth-centuryAmerican popular culture that viewed Muslims,Jews, and other peoples of the Middle East as back-ward, decadent, and untrustworthy. He argues thatthis popular view was shaped in the early days ofthe republic when American statesmen employed itafter their encounter with the Barbary pirates. Itwas further advanced by publications such as the Na-tional Geographic magazine with their depictions ofthe “exotic” Arab and Muslim. (Little makes sev-eral references to National Geographic in his workand it is interesting that in the October 2003 issueon Saudi Arabia the magazine’s editor describes thestory as “essential reading for those who won’t settlefor stereotypes.”)

Mark Twain, whose travels to the Middle Eastwere recorded in his popular and influential memoir,Innocents Abroad, published in 1869, added to theAmerican perception of Muslims as “a people by na-ture and training filthy, brutish, ignorant, unprogres-sive [and] superstitious” (quoted, p. 13). Interest-ingly, Little also credits Twain as being “among thefirst to interpret the U.S. relationship with the Middle

East as the byproduct of two contradictory ingredi-ents: an irresistible impulse to remake the world inAmerica’s image and a profound ambivalence aboutthe people to be remade” (p. 3). It is this irony thatleads Little to his definition of American Orientalism:“a tendency to underestimate the people of the regionand to overestimate America’s ability to make a badsituation better.”

Having established orientalism as a framework forhis study, Little examines its influence on U.S. policyin the Middle East through a series of eight chapters,each of which is devoted to a single topic that leadsto the next theme. The first theme Little discusses isthe role of oil and how the multinational corporationsestablished a symbiotic relationship with Americanpolicymakers to protect their interests in the region.His review of the formation of OPEC in the 1970s andthe effect of the oil crisis on the American public afterthe October 1973 war is an excellent context for un-derstanding the primacy of oil in the various MiddleEast conflicts. It was generally known that Ameri-can oil executives influenced U.S. policy throughoutthe Middle East. But when the extent of their influ-ence was exposed after the oil crisis hit the UnitedStates, and they were characterized as greedy corpo-rate holders in collusion with Arab Sheiks, they re-sponded by blaming America’s energy woes on U.S.support for Israel. In the process, they precipitateda clash between domestic politics, lobbying groups,and international business.

Little expands on this discussion with a reviewof the role of special interest groups in the UnitedStates. It is Israel’s development of nuclear weaponsand its success in presenting itself as the UnitedStates’s strategic asset and only reliable ally in theMiddle East that is most significant from a policystandpoint. This, in turn, leads to a discussion of the

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next theme, the Cold War and the American responseto Soviet expansionism in the Middle East.

Little begins this discussion by reviewing GreatBritain’s withdrawal from the Middle East afterWorld War II, which coincided with the beginningof the Cold War. The expansion of the Soviet Unioninto the heart of Europe, along with Soviet aid tothe Communist rebellion in Greece and the Sovietattempt to get Turkey to cede its two northwestprovinces (Kars and Ardahan) and share control ofthe Straits, propelled the United States to exclude theSoviet Union as a player in the Middle East. Littleexamines this policy from the historical perspective ofthe four eponymous doctrines: Truman, Eisenhower,Nixon, and Carter. His analysis of these doctrinesand their effectiveness is an excellent recounting ofU.S. diplomatic history in the region since the endof World War II. The author does not discuss theReagan Doctrine in the context of the Middle East,since it pertained to destabilizing the Soviet Union bymaking its involvement in Afghanistan costly both inmilitary and economic terms, yet Little does mentionit in the global context of U.S. policy. There is acertain irony in the lessons of the conflict and the de-teriorating situation in which the United States findsitself in Afghanistan today.

Little goes into more detail on the early historyof U.S. involvement in the Middle East in the sec-tion dealing with the history of lost opportunities toobtain peace. These failed efforts begin with the un-fortunate manner in which the emergence of the Arabnationalist movement under Gamal Abdel Nasser ofEgypt was regarded as well as how Nasser’s attemptto rid Egypt of British colonialism was interpretedand seen as inviting the Soviet Union into the region.

As a case study of lost opportunities, Nasser’sEgypt is well chosen. The revolutionary officers whotook power in Egypt in 1952 were interested in end-ing British colonialism, not in engaging in the Arab-Israeli conflict. What changed this, according toNasser, was the Israeli raid on Gaza in February1955 which proved to be the turning point of Egypt’sconflict with Israel. Prior to the Israeli incursion,the border had been relatively quiet. According toNasser, Egypt had done nothing to provoke such ac-tion and, in his words, it was “revenge for nothing.”The raid served as a wake up call for Nasser andpropelled him to seek arms from whatever source hecould, including the Soviet bloc. This, however, car-

ried with it an implicit invitation to the Soviets toenter the Middle East which, when coupled with hisanti-British colonialism and his attempts to maintain“positive”neutrality in the east-west conflict, broughtNasser on to a collision course with the United States.In the world of John Foster Dulles, where neutralismin the Cold War was not acceptable, Nasser’s policiescame to be identified with the objectives of SovietCommunism, particularly after the 1956 Suez Cri-sis. Little’s analysis of Dulles’s“no neutralism”policyis a useful reminder of the antecedents of PresidentGeorge W. Bush’s declaration to the world in a jointsession of Congress after the September 11 attacks:“either you are with us or you are with the terrorists.”

One of the weapons used to counter Soviet in-fluence in the Middle East was the Eisenhower Doc-trine. Declared in 1957, the doctrine specified thatthe United States would use military force and eco-nomic aid to counter Soviet inroads in the MiddleEast. After the July 1958 Iraqi revolution, whichoverthrew the pro-Western monarchy and removedIraq from the Western-sponsored Baghdad Pact, theUnited States invoked the doctrine to intervene in theLebanese civil war which threatened the overthrowof the pro-Western Chamoun government. Justifyingthe intervention, President Eisenhower drew a paral-lel between the civil war in Lebanon, the Iraqi rev-olution and the “pattern of (Soviet) conquest withwhich we became familiar during the period of 1945-1950.”[1]

Significantly, according to Little, American inter-vention in Lebanon was designed to give an impor-tant message to the Soviet Union. By its actions, theUnited States demonstrated that it would not onlyfrustrate the Soviets’ bid to become a Middle East-ern power but it would aid its allies when necessary.The intent of the Lebanese action was to show thatthe United States had the strategic capability to re-act swiftly with conventional armed forces even inresponse to small-scale or “brushfire” conflicts.

Countering Soviet influence in the Middle Eastproved to be but one stage in the United States’s pol-icy in the region. American policymakers concludedthat modernization was also essential to achieving re-gional stability in the region. Little demonstrateshow the United States attempted to forestall revo-lution in three countries (Iraq, Libya, and Iran) byinitiating democratic and economic reforms. The at-tempt backfired, however, when leaders once deemed

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friendly to the United States were deposed, killed,or sent into exile. The plan failed for two basic rea-sons. First, modernization accelerated the revolutionof rising expectations that culminated in the over-throw of the reactionary regimes they were designedto save. Second, the more the reactionary regimesbecame identified with westernization and economicgrowth, the more they were seen as betraying tradi-tional Islamic values.

Although Henry Kissinger, Walt Rostow, and,later, Zbigniew Brzezinski grappled with the para-doxes of modernization, Little notes that it wasKissinger who finally admitted the limitations of theexperiment. In his memoirs, Kissinger acknowledgedthat the American experience, based as it was on lib-eral political traditions, a mature industrial economy,and a strong middle class, was “not entirely relevant”for the Third World societies. In words reminiscentof the current imbroglio in Iraq, Kissinger stated that“nation-building depended crucially on the ability toestablish political authority.”

It is unfortunate that Little’s analysis of mod-ernization could not have included President Bush’sNovember 7, 2003, address to the National Endow-ment for Democracy which called for the expansionof democracy in the Islamic world. Responding tothe increasingly difficult situation in the Middle Eastand the criticisms of U.S. policies in Iraq, Bush as-serted that “the prosperity, and social vitality andtechnological progress of a people are directly deter-mined by the extent of their liberty. Freedom honorsand unleashes human creativity–and creativity deter-mines the strength and wealth of nations. Liberty isboth the plan of Heaven for humanity and the besthope for progress here on Earth.”

Given the President’s stated desire to promotedemocracy in the region, it is ironic that during thefirst few months of his administration, he distancedhimself from the Middle East conflict because he sawno hope of resolving it in the near future. Afterthe terrorist attacks of September 11, however, hisadministration is in the thick of nation-building inAfghanistan and establishing democracy in Iraq andthrough it, in the other Arab and Muslim countriesof the Middle East. All this is happening at a timewhen hope for a resolution of the Middle East conflictis at its lowest.

Little’s analysis demonstrates that there are nofacile solutions to the Middle East’s problems. TheBush administration claimed that the overthrow of

Saddam Hussein’s regime would provide a leaven fordemocratic change throughout the Middle East, in-cluding a resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian con-flict. For others, however, this assertion was back-ward. The Arab-Israeli conflict, they point out, re-mains the prism through which most Arabs see theUnited States. Indeed, it would be puzzling if thePalestinian-Israeli conflict were not central in theminds of the Arab public. Since the creation of Israelin 1948, five major Arab-Israeli wars, each of whichwas devastating to the Arabs, have shaped the col-lective psychology of several generations. Indeed, theargument is the reverse: the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, rather than the occupation anddemocratization of Iraq, would help democratizationin the region.

Little’s discussion of the objectives of the firstGulf war is also instructive. He demonstrates thatthe objectives of that war were not only to over-turn Saddam’s occupation of Kuwait but, more sig-nificantly, to break the“’Vietnam syndrome’ that hadcurtailed armed U.S. intervention in regional conflictsfor nearly two decades.” To provide context for thisgoal, Little provides an overview of the involvementof U.S. presidents in the Middle East from Rooseveltto the first President Bush. He shows that the re-joicing that ensued after the first Gulf War was dueprimarily to its short duration (a hundred hours).

For the first Bush Administration, the success-ful conclusion of the war finally broke the “VietnamSyndrome,” which inhibited American interventionin world crises. The optimism proved to be pre-mature. Even after the first Gulf war, few Ameri-cans were interested in sending U.S. troops to for-eign countries, whether to nearby Haiti to countercivil unrest and promote stability, to prevent geno-cide in faraway Africa (Rwanda) or Europe (the for-mer Yugoslavia), or to relieve starvation and engagein nation-building in Somalia. Little notes that theClinton administration was divided on how best tothwart the alleged weapons of mass destruction har-bored by Iraq. When Al-Qaeda operatives bombedthe U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, for ex-ample, Clinton’s response was to launch cruise mis-siles against bases in Afghanistan, not armed inter-vention. It was not until after September 11 and theBush administration’s successful attempt to link ter-rorism, Osama bin Laden, and Saddam Hussein thatAmericans began to wholeheartedly support militaryintervention abroad.

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The success of the first Gulf War was not withoutits short-term benefits. Significantly, as Little shows,it helped to pave the way for Israeli-Palestinian nego-tations and the Oslo Accord in 1993. Little examinesthe hopes generated by the Oslo negotiations. TheU.S. prescription of land for peace was the founda-tion for the agreement but, tragically, this foundationgave way to frustration and stalemate with the fail-ure of Israel to withdraw from the occupied territoriesand its increased settlement activity in the OccupiedTerritories.

With the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa Intifada, vio-lence on both sides escalated. The terror campaignagainst Israeli civilians by radical Palestinian groupsalienated world opinion and hardened the resolve ofthe Israelis not to negotiate under threat of violence.For its part, Israel engaged in “targeted” assassina-tions of the leaders of the radical Palestinian groupsand inflicted severe damage on the Palestinian civil-ians through its bombing of refugee camps and Pales-tinian cities, and the blockade and closures of theterritories which prevented Palestinians from earn-ing their livelihoods. Palestinian hopelessness anddespair increased at the same time Israelis began todespair of their own security. As a result, this chapterremains unfinished.

Little’s diplomatic history is an excellent resourcefor students of the Middle East. Although much ofthe material covered will be familiar to those who areacquainted with the literature of the field, the studynevertheless presents a context from which to evalu-

ate the fast pace of events that daily greet us from theregion. In reading it, one finds oneself constantly con-textualizing and making comparisons to events thathave occurred after the book was written. This is theparticular gift of this book and it will benefit studentsand specialists alike.

Little’s writing style is lucid and the quotes whichintroduce his chapters beautifully complement histhemes. The use of primary sources, oral historiesand interviews, and government documents informhis careful analyses of the contradictions of U.S. pol-icy. Moreover, he succeeds in maintaining the overalltheme of orientalism throughout the book. Nowhereis this more evident that in his description of the cur-rent state of the U.S. psyche regarding the MiddleEast:

“Although there is greater appreciation for thecomplexities of the Muslim world than a generationago, most Americans still view radical Islam as acause for instant alarm. Having been fed a steadydiet of books, films, and news reports depicting Arabsas demonic anti-Western others and Israelis as heroicpro-Western partners and having watched in horrorthe events of 11 September 2001, the American pub-lic understandably fears Osama bin Laden and cheersAladdin.”

Little’s book goes far to help rectify that percep-tion.

Note[1]. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace, 1956-

1961 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), p. 177.

If there is additional discussion of this review, you may access it through the list discussion logs at:http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-bin/logbrowse.pl.

Citation: Kail Ellis. Review of Little, Douglas, American Orientalism: The United States and the MiddleEast since 1945. H-Levant, H-Net Reviews. March, 2004.URL: http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=9025

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