Amending the Non Proliferation Regime Jozef Glodblat

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    Joze Goldblat is Resident Senior Fellow at the United Nations Institute or Disarmament Research.

    Jozef Goldblat

    Amending the non-proliferation regime

    To strengthen the international norm banning the prolieration o nuclear weapons, the 1968

    Non-prolieration Treaty (NPT) must be adapted to the present national security requirementsand the level o technological development in the feld o nuclear energy. This could be achievedby amending the treaty so as to remove its shortcomings and fll the gaps that are becoming increasinglyapparent. Among the possible amendments that could be envisaged:

    Under Article I nuclear-weapon parties have undertaken not to transer nuclear explosive devices toany recipient, directly or indirectly, and not to assist, encourage or induce any non-nuclear-weaponstate to manuacture nuclear weapons.

    Recommendation:The ban on indirect transer to any recipient must be understood to covertranser through military alliances. The obligation not to assist, encourage or induce the manuactureo nuclear explosive devices should be binding on non-nuclear-weapon parties as well.

    Under Article III(2)supplies o nuclear material or equipment to any non-nuclear-weapon state maytake place i they are subject to the International Atomic Energy Agency saeguards (IAEA) requiredby this article.

    Recommendation: The required saeguards must be comprehensive, that is, applied in all peaceulnuclear activities o the supplied state. All parties should adopt the 1997 Protocol Additional to the1972 Saeguards Agreement between states party to the NPT and the IAEA. A global register ostocks o plutonium and highly enriched uranium should be established and regularly updated.Withdrawal o nuclear material rom international control or non-explosive purposes (such aspropulsion) must be strictly circumscribed.

    Under Article IVall parties have the inalienable right to use nuclear energy or peaceul purposes.

    Recommendation: Parties may possess components o the peaceul nuclear uel cycle subjectto appropriate IAEA controls. Supplies o uel or civilian nuclear reactors in countries notproducing such uel should be internationally guaranteed. Highly enriched uranium used orcivilian purposes should be replaced by low-enriched uranium. Attacks on nuclear installationsshould be prohibited.

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    UnderArticle Vpotential benefts rom peaceul applications o nuclear explosions are to be madeavailable to non-nuclear-weapon parties.

    Recommendation:This article should be deleted. It is now generally recognized that conventionalexplosives can produce results equivalent to those o nuclear explosives, without posing health orenvironmental risks.

    UnderArticle VI the parties have pledged to negotiate measures relating to the cessation o thenuclear arms race and measures relating to nuclear disarmament.

    Recommendation: It should be made explicit that measures relating to the arms race includeadherence to the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the conclusion o a fssilematerial cut-o treaty, whereas measures relating to disarmament should lead to the eliminationo nuclear weapons. Negotiations must be continuous and the agreements reached must be oindefnite duration.

    UnderArticle VII the right o any group o states to assure the total absence o nuclear weapons intheir region is afrmed.

    Recommendation: This right should be reinorced by a ban on the transit o nuclear weaponsthrough nuclear-weapon-ree zones.

    UnderArticle X each party may withdraw rom the NPT i it decides that extraordinary events havejeopardized its supreme interests. Notice o withdrawal is to be given three months in advance.

    Recommendation: Only a qualifed majority o the parties should have the right to determinewhether extraordinary events have occurred. Notice o withdrawal should be given one year inadvance. Otherwise, the NPT must be considered irreversible, both in time o peace and in time owar. An international mechanism must be set up to deal with cases o non-compliance.

    Under the protocol on negative security assurances accompanying nuclear-weapon-ree zonetreaties, each nuclear-weapon state is committed not to use or threaten to use a nuclear explosivedevice. This commitment was subsequently qualifed by France, the Russian Federation, the UnitedKingdom and the United States stating that the assurances they oered would become invalid in thecase o an invasion or any other attack on them, their territories, their armed orces or other troops,their allies, or on a state to which they have a security commitment, carried out or sustained by a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state. The our great powershave thus reserved or themselves the right to use nuclear weapons in a war started with non-nuclearmeans o warare. Although it was conceived as a quid pro quo or the renunciation o nuclearweapons by non-nuclear-weapon states under the NPT, prohibition on the use o nuclear weapons

    may now be treated as a potential arms control measure to be negotiated by all states, regardless otheir association with the NPT.

    Recommendation: Employment o nuclear weapons must be defnitively prohibited, except in caseo reprisal or a nuclear aggression. A no-frst-use obligation would acilitate the process o nuclearweapons elimination.

    Under Article VIII the text o any proposed amendment to the NPT must be submitted to thedepositary governments, distributed to the parties and considered at a conerence convened at therequest o at least one-third o the parties. To set the procedure in motion, unanimity or consensusis not needed. To be approved, an amendment requires a majority o votes, including those o thenuclear-weapon parties (as defned by the treaty) and those o other parties that are members o theIAEA Board o Governors on the day the text is circulated. Not all the changes proposed above would

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    entail new legally binding obligations. Some could take the orm o politically binding undertakings orinternationally agreed interpretations. In any event, by engaging in negotiations on the issues specifedabove, no country would run a risk to its security. In case o ailure o the amendment process, the

    NPT would continue to be valid in its present orm. The ear expressed by certain countries thatamendments will lead to the break-up o the NPT is not justifed.

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