Shri R. V. Dhulekar: *[Sir, I submit that the period of two hours that will be given to us tomorrow for general discussion is too short. It is a different matter that hundreds of amendments will be received. When every membergets an opportunity of expressing his views, the amendmentsthat are tabled after a discussion of a few days, arealtered. The amendments are not referred to in thediscussion. Therefore I request that if we are given threeor four days' time for discussion and every Member is askedto observe the rule that he should not speak for more thanfifteen minutes, every Member then will have thesatisfaction that he has made his contribution in the Housein the framing of the constitution. I submit that one daymeans only five hours time. If Dr. Ambedkar takes it up atfour today and takes half the time tomorrow, there willhardly be left any time for us. Therefore I humbly requestthat we may be given an opportunity of speaking on thishighly important constitution. The opportunity of framingthe constitution does not come over and over again andeveryone desires to speak out whatever he has to say for hiscountry and nation. I want to submit also that whatever wespeak here is not meant for this House only or for thepresent time only. Whatever is spoken here will be read evenafter hundred or two hundred or four hundred years and thepeople will come to know of the views of their ancestors ona particular point. They will interpret it accordingly.Therefore, Sir, I think we the Members in this House will behighly obliged if at least four days are granted to us.Everyone of us wants only fifteen minutes and I want to tellyou on behalf of other Members also that if this opportunityis given to us, we shall sit together and come to a decisionregarding the hundreds of amendments that may be broughtforward and the Members of this House will help you infinalising the constitution as quickly as possible.]

Mr. President: *[We shall consider this later on. Thetime now being spent on the preliminary discussion reducesthe time available for detailed discussion. Therefore, Iwould ask that you allow the real work to start.]

-----------------------------

* [] Translation of Hindustani speech.

Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava (East Punjab: General):*[Mr. President, at the very outset I would like to enquirewhether the Honourable Dr. Ambedkar has given any notice ofhis intention to introduce the Draft Constitution asrequired by the Rule 38-L or not. I am asking for thisinformation, because if no such notice has been given, I amafraid he can not move for consideration. According to therules five days' notice is necessary.]

Mr.

President: *[Yes! It has been included there. Ithas been included in the Agenda. It being a re-draft all theamendments will be up again.]

Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava: *[Another point which Iwanted to bring to your notice falls under Rules 38-M. Thecopy of the draft constitution, which is a re-draft, hasbeen given to us just today at the time when you wereadjourning the House for lunch, whereas it should havereached us much earlier. I think all the Members have notreceived a copy each so far. According to Rule 38-M. suchcopies should reach the Members at least three days before,more particularly for the reason that it contains variousreports on new matters. Unless it has been thoroughly readand studied, how can amendments be sent?]

Mr. President: *[Which copy are you referring to? TheDraft Constitution placed before you by Dr. Ambedkar of 21stFebruary, the copies of which were distributed, will bemoved by him and the amendments on it will be proposed asamendments and they will be moved on behalf of the Drafting Committee .]

Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava: *[The third point forsubmission on which I respectfully want to lay more emphasisis regarding the interpretation of Rule 38-O. In my opinionthe view that the words "two clear days before the `day' onwhich the constitution is to be considered" in Rule 38-O isthat all the amendments should reach the office by Sundaybefore 5 P.M., is not correct for the reason that theconstitution shall not be taken up for consideration on the9th November only; rather, its consideration will continuefrom day to day when the clauses will be discussed. Therewill be other dates further on after which it would bestated that the Constitution will be considered on thoseparticular dates. That being the case, Members have theright to send in their amendments, two days before the datewhen the particular amendments shall be discussed.]

Mr. President: *[Let us not take a decision on thispoint at this stage.]

Pandit Thakur Dass Bhargava: *[I am aware that you wantto give full opportunity to the Members for discussion andthat their right of giving notice of amendments shouldremain intact. Every Member has confidence in the matter of the exercise of your discretion. But in my humble opinion,the question of discretion does not arise here, becauseaccording to my interpretation, every Member can send inamendments as a matter or right. This is also the intentionof Rules 38-P and 38-Q. Your order that Members should sendtheir amendments by 5 o'clock on Sunday goes in a way, primafacie, against the Members, which is not in order and shouldbe reviewed. You may not decide it now, if you do not wantto, though incidentally and in a way, the decision is there.In my humble opinion, if without reviewing the order, youextend the date, instead of 7th, to 10th and decide thequestion, when occasion arises, then nobody will have anygrievance.]

Shri T. Channiah (Mysore State): On a point of order,Mr. President, Sir, most of the honourable Members who spokepreviously know the English language very well. We are verysorry to bring it to your notice that most of the

Members,especially Members coming from Madras, from Bengal, Bombay,Assam and many other places cannot understand Hindi orHindustani. We have

-----------------------

* [] Translation of Hindustani speech.

to sit almost like dumb people. Mr. President, Sir, you arehere to protect the interests of all the Members. I would,therefore, request you to see that all those members whoknow English and who are able to speak in English are madeto speak in English.

MOTION re DRAFT CONSTITUTION

Mr. President: I think we shall now proceed with thediscussion. I call upon the Honourable Dr. Ambedkar to movehis motion.

The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar (Bombay: General):Mr. President, Sir, I introduce the Draft Constitution assettled by the Drafting Committee and move that it be takeninto consideration.

The Drafting Committee was appointed by a Resolutionpassed by the Constituent Assembly on August 29, 1947.

The Drafting Committee was

in effect charged with theduty of preparing a Constitution in accordance with thedecisions of the Constituent Assembly on the reports made bythe various Committees appointed by it such as the UnionPowers Committee, the Union Constitution Committee, theProvincial Constitution Committee and the Advisory Committeeon Fundamental Rights, Minorities, Tribal Areas, etc. TheConstituent Assembly had also directed that in certainmatters the provisions contained in the Government of IndiaAct, 1935, should be followed. Except on points which arereferred to in my letter of the 21st February 1948 in whichI have referred to the departures made and alternativessuggested by the Drafting Committee, I hope the Drafting Committee will be found to have faithfully carried out thedirections given to it.

The Draft Constitution as it has emerged from theDrafting Committee is a formidable document. It contains 315Articles and 8 Schedules. It must be admitted that theConstitution of no country could be found to be so bulky asthe Draft Constitution. It would be difficult for those whohave not been through it to realize its salient and specialfeatures.

The Draft Constitution has been before the public foreight months. During this long time friends, critics andadversaries have had more than sufficient time to expresstheir reactions to the provisions contained in it. I daresay some of them are based on misunderstanding andinadequate understanding of the Articles. But there thecriticisms are and they have to be answered.

For both these reasons it is necessary that on a motionfor consideration I should draw your attention to thespecial features of the Constitution and also meet thecriticism that has been levelled against it.

Before I proceed to do so I would like to place on thetable of the House Reports of three Committees appointed bythe Constituent Assembly *(1) Report of the Committee onChief Commissioners' Provinces (?)(2) Report of the ExpertCommittee on Financial Relations between the Union and theStates, and (??)(3) Report of the Advisory Committee onTribal Areas, which came too late to be considered by thatAssembly though copies of them have been circulated toMembers of the Assembly. As these reports and therecommendations made therein have been considered by theDrafting Committee it is only proper that the House shouldformally be placed in possession of them.

Turning to the main question. A student ofConstitutional Law if a copy of a Constitution is placed inhis hands is sure to ask two questions. Firstly what is theform of Government that is envisaged in the Constitution;and

----------------------

* Appendix A. (?) Appendix B. (??) Appendix C (1 to 3).

secondly what is the form of the Constitution? For these arethe two crucial matters which every Constitution has to dealwith. I will begin with the first of the two questions.

In the Draft Constitution there is placed at the headof the Indian Union a functionary who is called thePresident of the Union. The title of this functionaryreminds one of the President of the United States. Butbeyond identity of names there is nothing in common betweenthe form of Government prevalent in America and the form ofGovernment proposed under the Draft Constitution. TheAmerican form of Government is called the Presidentialsystem of Government. What the Draft Constitution proposesis the Parliamentary system. The two are fundamentallydifferent.

Under the Presidential system of America, the Presidentis the Chief head of the Executive. The administration isvested in him. Under the Draft Constitution the Presidentoccupies the same position as the King under the EnglishConstitution. He is the head of the State but not of theExecutive. He represents the Nation but does

not rule theNation. He is the symbol of the nation. His place in theadministration is that of a ceremonial device on a seal bywhich the nation's decisions are made known. Under theAmerican Constitution the President has under himSecretaries in charge of different Departments. In likemanner the President of the Indian

Union will have under himMinisters in charge of different Departments of administration. Here again there is a fundamental differencebetween the two. The President of the United States is notbound to accept any advice tendered to him by any of hisSecretaries. The President of the Indian Union will begenerally bound by the advice of his Ministers. He can donothing contrary to their advice nor can he do any thingwithout their advice. The President of the United States candismiss any Secretary at any time. The President of theIndian Union has no power to do so long as his Ministerscommand a majority in Parliament.

The Presidential system of America is based upon theseparation of the Executive and the Legislature. So that thePresident and his Secretaries cannot be members of theCongress. The Draft Constitution does not recognise thisdoctrine. The Ministers under the Indian Union are membersof Parliament. Only members of Parliament can becomeMinisters. Ministers have the same rights as other membersof Parliament, namely, that they can sit in Parliament, takepart in debates and vote in its proceedings. Both systems ofGovernment are of course democratic and the choice betweenthe two is not very easy. A democratic executive mustsatisfy two conditions - (1) It must be a stable executiveand (2) it must be a responsible executive. Unfortunately ithas not been possible so far to devise a system which canensure both in equal degree. You can have a system which cangive you more stability but less responsibility or you canhave a system which gives you more responsibility but lessstability. The American and the Swiss systems give morestability but less responsibility. The British system on theother hand gives you more responsibility but less stability.The reason for this is obvious. The American Executive is anon-Parliamentary Executive which means that it is notdependent for its existence upon a majority in the Congress,while the British system is a Parliamentary Executive whichmeans that it is not dependent for its existence upon amajority in the Congress, while the British system is aParliamentary Executive which means that it is dependentupon a majority in Parliament. Being a non-ParliamentaryExecutive, the Congress of the United States cannot dismissthe Executive. A Parliamentary Government must resign themoment it loses the confidence of a majority of the membersof Parliament. Looking at it from the point of view ofresponsibility, a non-Parliamentary Executive beingindependent of parliament tends to be less responsible tothe Legislature, while a Parliamentary Executive being moredependent upon a majority in Parliament become moreresponsible. TheParliamentary system differs from a non-Parliamentary systemin as much as the former is more responsible than the latterbut they also differ as to the time and agency forassessment of their responsibility. Under the non-Parliamentary system, such as the one that exists in theU.S.A., the assessment of the responsibility of theExecutive is periodic. It is done by the Electorate.

InEngland, where the Parliamentary system prevails, theassessment of responsibility of the Executive is both dailyand periodic. The daily assessment is done by members ofParliament, through questions, Resolutions, No-confidencemotions, Adjournment motions and Debates on Addresses.Periodic assessment is done by the Electorate at the time of the election which may take place every five years orearlier. The Daily assessment of responsibility which is notavailable under the American system is it is felt far moreeffective than the periodic assessment and far morenecessary in a country like India. The Draft Constitution inrecommending the Parliamentary system of Executive haspreferred more responsibility to more stability.

So far I have explained the form of Government underthe Draft Constitution. I will now turn to the otherquestion, namely, the form of the Constitution.

Two principal forms of the Constitution are known tohistory - one is called Unitary and the other Federal. Thetwo essential characteristics of

a Unitary Constitution are:(1) the supremacy of the Central Polity and (2) the absenceof subsidiary Sovereign polities. Contrariwise, a FederalConstitution is marked: (1) by the existence of a Centralpolity and subsidiary polities side by side, and (2) by eachbeing sovereign in the field assigned to it. In other words.Federation means the establishment of a Dual Polity. TheDraft Constitution is, Federal Constitution inasmuch as itestablishes what may be called a Dual Polity. This DualPolity under the proposed Constitution will consist of theUnion at the Centre and the States at the periphery eachendowed with sovereign powers to be exercised in the fieldassigned to them respectively by the Constitution. This dualpolity resembles the American Constitution. The Americanpolity is also a dual polity, one of it is known as theFederal Government and the other States which correspondrespectively to the Union Government and the StatesGovernment of the Draft Constitution. Under the AmericanConstitution the Federal Government is not a mere league of the States nor are the States administrative units oragencies of the Federal Government. In the same way theIndian Constitution proposed in the Draft Constitution isnot a league of States nor are the States administrativeunits or agencies of the Union Government. Here, however,the similarities between the Indian and the AmericanConstitution come to an end. The differences thatdistinguish them are more fundamental and glaring than thesimilarities between the two.

The points of difference between the AmericanFederation and the Indian Federation are mainly two. In theU.S.A. this dual polity is followed by a dual citizenship.In the U.S.A. there is a citizenship of the U.S.A. But thereis also a citizenship of the State. No doubt the rigours ofthis double citizenship are much assuaged by the fourteenthamendment to the Constitution of the United States whichprohibits the States from taking away the rights, privilegesand immunities of the citizen of the United States. At thesame time, as pointed out by Mr. William

Anderson, incertain political matters, including the right to vote andto hold public office, States may and do discriminate infavour of their own citizens. This favoritism goes evenfarther in many cases. Thus to obtain employment in theservice of a State or local Government one is in most placesrequired to the be a local resident or citizen. Similarly inthe licensing of persons for the practice of such publicprofessions as law and medicine, residence or citizenship inthe State is frequently required; and in business wherepublic regulation must necessarily bestrict, as in the sale of liquor, and of stocks and bonds,similar requirements have been upheld.

Each State has also certain rights in its own domainthat it holds for the special advantage of its own citizens.Thus wild game and fish in a sense belong to the State. It is customary for the States to charge higher hunting andfishing license fees to non-residents than to its owncitizens. The States also charge non-residents highertuition in State Colleges and Universities, and permit onlyresidents to be admitted to their hospitals and asylumsexcept in emergencies.

In short, there are a number of rights that a State cangrant to its own citizens or residents that it may and doeslegally deny to non-residents, or grant to non-residentsonly on more difficult terms than those imposed onresidents. These advantages, given to the citizen in his ownState, constitute the special rights of State citizenship.Taken all together, they amount to a considerable differencein rights between citizens and non-citizens of the State.The transient and the temporary sojourner is everywhereunder some special handicaps.

The proposed Indian Constitution is a dual polity witha single citizenship. There is only one citizenship for thewhole of India. It is Indian citizenship. There is no Statecitizenship. Every Indian has the same rights ofcitizenship, no matter in what State he resides.

The dual polity of the proposed Indian Constitutiondiffers

from the dual polity of the U.S.A. in anotherrespect. In the U.S.A. the Constitutions of the Federal andthe States Governments are loosely connected. In describingthe relationship between the Federal and State Government inthe U.S.A., Bryce has said:

"The Central or national Government and the StateGovernments may be compared to a large building and a set ofsmaller buildings standing on the same ground, yet distinctfrom each other."

Distinct they are, but how distinct are the StateGovernments in the U.S.A. from the Federal Government? Someidea of this distinctness may be obtained from the followingfacts:

1. Subject to the maintenance of the republican form ofGovernment, each State in America is free to make its ownConstitution.

2. The people of a State retain for ever in theirhands, altogether independent of the National Government,the power of altering their Constitution.

To put it again in the words of Bryce:

"A State (in America) exists as a commonwealth byvirtue of its own Constitution, and all State Authorities,legislative, executive and judicial are the creatures of,and subject to the Constitution."

This is not true of the proposed Indian Constitution. NoStates (at any rate those in Part I) have a right to frameits own Constitution. The Constitution of the Union and of the States is a single frame from which neither can get outand within which they must work.

So far I have drawn attention to the difference betweenthe American Federation and the proposed Indian Federation.But there are some other special features of the proposedIndian Federation which mark it off not only from theAmerican Federation but from all other Federations. Allfederal systems including the American are placed in a tightmould of federalism. No matter what the circumstances, itcannot change its form and shape. It can never be unitary.On the other hand the Draft Constitution can be both unitaryas well as federal according to the requirements of time andcircumstances. In normal times, it is framed to work as afederal system. But in times of warit is so designed as to make it work as though it was aunitary system. Once the President issues a Proclamationwhich he is authorised to do under the Provisions of Article275, the whole scene can become transformed and the Statebecomes a unitary state. The Union under the Proclamationcan claim if it wants (1) the power to legislate upon anysubject even though it may be in the State list, (2) thepower to give directions to the States as to how they shouldexercise their executive authority in matters which arewithin their charge, (3) the power to vest authority for anypurpose in any officer, and (4) the power to suspend thefinancial provisions of the Constitution. Such a power ofconverting itself into a unitary State no federationpossesses. This is one point of difference between theFederation proposed in the Draft Constitution, and all otherFederations we know of.

This is not the only difference between the proposedIndian Federation and other federations. Federalism isdescribed as a weak if not an effete form of Government.There are two weaknesses from which Federation is alleged tosuffer. One is rigidity and the other is legalism. Thatthese faults are inherent in Federalism, there can be nodispute. A Federal Constitution cannot but be a writtenConstitution and a written Constitution must necessarily bea rigid Constitution. A Federal Constitution means divisionof Sovereignty by no less a

sanction than that of the law of the Constitution between the Federal Government and theStates, with two necessary consequences (1) that anyinvasion by the Federal Government in the field assigned tothe States and vice versa is a breach of the Constitutionand (2) such breach is a justiciable matter to be determinedby the Judiciary only. This being the nature of federalism,a federal Constitution have been found in a pronounced formin the Constitution of the United States of America.

Countries which have adopted Federalism at a later datehave attempted to reduce the disadvantages

following fromthe rigidity and legalism which are inherent therein. Theexample of Australia may well be referred to in this matter.The Australian Constitution has adopted the following meansto make its federation less rigid:

(1) By conferring upon the Parliament of the Commonwealth large powers of concurrent Legislation and few powers of exclusive Legislation.

(2) By making some of the Articles of the Constitution of a temporary duration to remain in force only "until Parliament otherwise provides."

It is obvious that under the Australian Constitution,the Australian Parliament can do many things, which are notwithin the competence of the American Congress and for doingwhich the American Government will have to resort to theSupreme Court and depend upon its ability, ingenuity andwillingness to invent a doctrine to justify it the exerciseof authority.

In assuaging the rigour of rigidity and legalism theDraft Constitution follows the Australian plan on a far moreextensive scale than has been done in Australia. Like theAustralian Constitution, it has a long list of subjects forconcurrent powers of legislation. Under the AustralianConstitution, concurrent subjects are 39. Under the Draft Constitution they are 37. Following the AustralianConstitution there are as many as six Articles in the Draft Constitution, where the provisions are of a temporaryduration and which could be replaced by Parliament at anytime by provisions suitable for the occasion. The biggestadvance made by the Draft Constitution over the AustralianConstitution is inthe matter of exclusive powers of legislation vested inParliament. While the exclusive authority of the AustralianParliament to legislate extends only to about 3 matters, theauthority of the Indian Parliament as proposed in the Draft Constitution will extend to 91 matters. In this way theDraft Constitution has secured the greatest possibleelasticity in its federalism which is supposed to be rigidby nature.

It is not enough to say that the Draft Constitutionfollows the Australian Constitution or follows it on a moreextensive scale. What is to be noted is that it has addednew ways of overcoming the rigidity and legalism inherent infederalism which are special to it and which are not to befound elsewhere.

First is the power given to Parliament to legislate onexclusively provincial subjects in normal times. I refer toArticles 226, 227 and 229. Under Article 226 Parliament canlegislate when a subject becomes a matter of nationalconcern as distinguished from purely Provincial concern,though the subject is in the State list, provided aresolution is passed by the Upper Chamber by 2/3rd majorityin favour of such exercise of the power by the Centre.Article 227 gives the similar power to Parliament in anational emergency. Under Article 229 Parliament canexercise the same power if Provinces consent to suchexercise. Though the last provision also exists in theAustralian Constitution the first two are a special featureof the Draft Constitution.

The second means adopted to avoid rigidity and legalismis the provision for facility with which the Constitutioncould be amended. The provisions of the Constitutionrelating to the amendment of the Constitution divide theArticles of the Constitution into two groups. In the onegroup are placed Articles relating to (a) the distributionof legislative powers between the Centre and the States, (b)the representation of the States in Parliament, and (c) thepowers of the Courts. All other Articles are placed inanother group. Articles placed in the second group cover avery large part of the Constitution and can be amended byParliament by a double majority, namely, a majority of notless than two thirds of the members of each House presentand voting and by a majority of the total membership of eachHouse. The amendment of these Articles does not requireratification by the States. It is only in those Articleswhich are placed in group one that an additional safeguardof ratification by the States is introduced.

One can therefore safely say that the Indian

Federationwill not suffer from the faults of rigidity or legalism. Itsdistinguishing feature is that it is a flexible federation.

There is another special feature of the proposed IndianFederation which distinguishes it from other federations. AFederation being a dual polity based on divided authoritywith separate legislative, executive and judicial powers foreach of the two polities is bound to produce diversity inlaws, in administration and in judicial protection. Upto acertain point this diversity does not matter. It may bewelcomed as being an attempt to accommodate the powers ofGovernment to local needs and local circumstances. But thisvery diversity when it goes beyond a certain point iscapable of producing chaos and has produced chaos in manyfederal States. One has only to imagine twenty differentlaws-if we have twenty States in the Union-of marriage, ofdivorce, of inheritance of property, family relations,contracts, torts, crimes, weights and measures, of bills andcheques, banking and commerce, of procedures for obtainingjustice and in the standards and methods of administration.Such a state of affairs not only weakens the State butbecomes intolerant to the citizen who moves from State toState only to find that what is lawful in one State is notlawful in another. The Draft Constitution has

sought toforge means and methods whereby India will have Federationand at the same timewill have uniformity in all basic matters which areessential to maintain the unity of the country. The meansadopted by the Draft Constitution are three

(1) a single judiciary,

(2) uniformity-in fundamental laws, civil and criminal, and

(3) a common All-India Civil Service to man important posts.

A dual judiciary, a duality of legal codes and aduality of civil services, as I said, are the logicalconsequences of a dual polity which is inherent in afederation. In the U. S. A. the Federal Judiciary and theState Judiciary are separate and independent of each other.The Indian Federation though a Dual Polity has no DualJudiciary at all. The High Courts and the Supreme Court formone single integrated Judiciary having jurisdiction andproviding remedies in all cases arising under theconstitutional law, the civil law or the criminal law. Thisis done to eliminate all diversity in all remedialprocedure. Canada is the only country which furnishes aclose parallel. The Australian system is only anapproximation.

Care is taken to eliminate all diversity from lawswhich are at the basis of civic and corporate life. Thegreat Codes of Civil & Criminal Laws, such as the CivilProcedure Code, Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure Code, theEvidence Act, Transfer of Property Act, Laws of MarriageDivorce, and Inheritance, are either placed in theConcurrent List so that the necessary uniformity can alwaysbe preserved without impairing the federal system.

The dual polity which is inherent in a federal systemas I said is followed in all federations by a dual service.In all Federations there is a Federal Civil Service and aState Civil Service. The Indian Federation though a DualPolity will have a Dual Service but with one exception. It is recognized that in every country there are certain postsin its administrative set up which might be called strategicfrom the point of view of maintaining the standard of administration. It may not be easy to spot such posts in alarge and complicated machinery of administration. But therecan be no doubt that the standard of administration dependsupon the calibre of the Civil Servants who are appointed tothese strategic posts. Fortunately for us we have inheritedfrom the past system of administration which is common tothe whole of the country and we know what are thesestrategic posts. The Constitution provides that withoutdepriving the States of their right to form their own CivilServices there shall be an All India service recruited on anAll India basis with common qualifications, with uniformscale of pay and the members of which alone could beappointed to these strategic posts throughout the Union.

Such are the special

features of the proposedFederation. I will now turn to what the critics have had tosay about it.

It is said that there is nothing new in the Draft Constitution, that about half of it has been copied from theGovernment of India Act of 1935 and that the rest of it hasbeen borrowed from the Constitutions of other countries.Very little of it can claim originality.

One likes to ask whether there can be anything new in aConstitution framed at this hour in the history of theworld. More than hundred years have rolled over when thefirst written Constitution was drafted. It has been followedby many countries reducing their Constitutions to writing.What the scope of a Constitution should be has long beensettled. Similarly what are the fundamentals of aConstitution are recognized all over the world. Given thesefacts, all Constitutions in their main provisions must looksimilar. The only new things, if there can be any, in aConstitution framed so late in the day are the variationsmade to remove the faults and to accommodate it to the needsof the country. The charge of producing a blind copy of theConstitutions of other countries is based, I am sure, on aninadequate studyof the Constitution. I have shown what is new in the Draft Constitution and I am sure that those who have studied otherConstitutions and who are prepared to consider the matterdispassionately will agree that the Drafting Committee inperforming its duty has not been guilty of such blind andslavish imitation as it is represented to be.

As to the accusation that the Draft Constitution hasproduced a good part of the provisions of the Government ofIndia Act, 1935, I make no apologies. There is nothing to beashamed of in borrowing. It involves no plagiarism. Nobodyholds any patent rights in the fundamental ideas of aConstitution. What I am sorry about is that the provisionstaken from the Government of India Act, 1935, relate mostlyto the details of administration. I agree thatadministrative details should have no place in theConstitution. I wish very much that the Drafting Committeecould see its way to avoid their inclusion in theConstitution. But this is to be said on the necessity whichjustifies their inclusion. Grote, the historian of Greece,has said that:

"The diffusion of constitutional morality, not merely among the majority of any community but throughout the whole, is the indispensable condition of a government at once free and peaceable; since even any powerful and obstinate minority may render the working of a free institution impracticable, without being strong enough to conquer ascendency for themselves."

By constitutional morality Grote meant "a paramountreverence for the forms of the Constitution, enforcingobedience to authority acting under and within these formsyet combined with the habit of open speech, of actionsubject only to definite legal control, and unrestrainedcensure of those very authorities as to all their publicacts combined too with a perfect confidence in the bosom ofevery citizen

amidst the bitterness of party contest thatthe forms of the Constitution will not be less sacred in theeyes of his opponents than in his own." (Hear, hear.)

While everybody recognizes the necessity of thediffusion of Constitutional morality for the peacefulworking of a democratic Constitution, there are two thingsinterconnected with it which are not, unfortunately,generally recognized. One is that the form of administrationhas a close connection with the form of the Constitution.The form of the administration must be appropriate to and inthe same sense as the form of the Constitution. The other isthat it is perfectly possible to pervert the Constitution,without changing its form by merely changing the form of theadministration and to make it inconsistent and opposed tothe spirit of the Constitution. It follows that it is onlywhere people are saturated with Constitutional morality suchas the one described by Grote the historian that one cantake the risk of omitting from the Constitution details of administration and leaving it for the Legislature

toprescribe them. The question is, can we presume such adiffusion of Constitutional morality? Constitutionalmorality is not a natural sentiment. It has to becultivated. We must realize that our people have yet tolearn it. Democracy in India is only a top-dressing on anIndian soil, which is essentially undemocratic.

In these circumstances it is wiser not to trust theLegislature to prescribe forms of administration. This isthe justification for incorporating them in theConstitution.

Another criticism against the Draft Constitution isthat no part of it represents the ancient polity of India.It is said that the new Constitution should have beendrafted on the ancient Hindu model of a State and thatinstead of incorporating Western theories the newConstitution should have been raised and built upon villagePanchayats and District Panchayats. There are otherswho have taken a more extreme view. They do not want anyCentral or Provincial Governments. They just want India tocontain so many village Governments. The love of theintellectual Indians for the village community is of courseinfinite if not pathetic (laughter). It is largely due tothe fulsome praise bestowed upon it by Metcalfe whodescribed them as little republics having nearly everythingthat they want within themselves, and almost independent of any foreign relations. The existence of these villagecommunities each one forming a separate little State initself has according to Metcalfe contributed more than anyother cause to the preservation of the people of India,through all the revolutions and changes which they havesuffered, and is in a high degree conducive to theirhappiness and to the enjoyment of a great portion of thefreedom and independence. No doubt the village communitieshave lasted where nothing else lasts. But those who takepride in the village communities do not care to considerwhat little part they have played in the affairs and thedestiny of the country; and why? Their part in the destinyof the country has been well described by Metcalfe himselfwho says:

"Dynasty after dynasty tumbles down. Revolutionsucceeds to revolution. Hindoo, Pathan, Mogul, Maharatha,Sikh, English are all masters in turn but the villagecommunities remain the same. In times of trouble they armand fortify themselves. A hostile army passes through thecountry. The village communities collect their little cattlewithin their walls, and let the enemy pass unprovoked."

Such is the part the village communities have played inthe history of their country. Knowing this, what pride canone feel in them? That they have survived through allvicissitudes may be a fact. But mere survival has no value.The question is on what plane they have survived. Surely ona low, on a selfish level. I hold that these villagerepublics have been the ruination of India. I am thereforesurprised that those who condemn Provincialism andcommunalism should come forward as champions of the village.What is the village but a sink of localism, a den ofignorance, narrow-mindedness and communalism? I am glad thatthe Draft Constitution has discarded the village and adoptedthe individual as its unit.

The Draft Constitution is also criticised because of the safeguards it provides for minorities. In this, theDrafting Committee has no responsibility. It follows thedecisions of the Constituent Assembly. Speaking for myself,I have no doubt that the Constituent Assembly has donewisely in providing such safeguards for minorities as it hasdone. In this country both the minorities and the majoritieshave followed a wrong path. It is wrong for the majority todeny the existence of minorities. It is equally wrong forthe minorities to perpetuate themselves. A solution must befound which will serve a double purpose. It must recognizethe existence of the minorities to start with. It must alsobe such that it will enable majorities and minorities tomerge someday into one. The solution proposed by theConstituent Assembly is to be welcomed because it is asolution which serves this twofold purpose. To diehards whohave developed a kind of

fanaticism against minorityprotection I would like to say two things. One is thatminorities are an explosive force which, if it erupts, canblow up the whole fabric of the State. The history of Europebears ample and appalling testimony to this fact. The otheris that the minorities in India have agreed to place theirexistence in the hands of the majority. In the history ofnegotiations for preventing the partition of Ireland,Redmond said to Carson "ask for any safeguard you like forthe Protestant minority but let us have a United Ireland."Carson's reply was "Damn your safeguards, we don't want to be ruled by you." No minority in India has taken this stand.They have loyally accepted the rule of the majority which isbasically a communal majority and not a political majority.It is for the majority to realize its duty not todiscriminate against minorities. Whether the minorities willcontinue or will vanish must depend upon this habit of themajority. The moment the majority loses the habit ofdiscriminating against the minority, the minorities can haveno ground to exist. They will vanish.

The most criticized part of the Draft Constitution isthat which relates to Fundamental Rights. It is said thatArticle 13 which defines fundamental rights is riddled withso many exceptions that the exceptions have eaten up therights altogether. It is condemned as a kind of deception.In the opinion of the critics fundamental rights are notfundamental rights unless they are also absolute rights. Thecritics rely on the Constitution of the United States and tothe Bill of Rights embodied in the first ten Amendments tothat Constitution in support of their contention. It is saidthat the fundamental rights in the American Bill of Rightsare real because they are not subjected to limitations orexceptions.

I am sorry to say that the whole of the criticism aboutfundamental rights is based upon a misconception. In thefirst place, the criticism in so far as it seeks todistinguish fundamental rights from non-fundamental rightsis not sound. It is incorrect to say that fundamental rightsare absolute while non-fundamental rights are not absolute.The real distinction between the two is that non-fundamentalrights are created by agreement between parties whilefundamental rights are the gift of the law. Becausefundamental rights are the gift of the State it does notfollow that the State cannot qualify them.

In the second place, it is wrong to say thatfundamental rights in America are absolute. The differencebetween the position under the American Constitution and theDraft Constitution is one of form and not of substance. Thatthe fundamental rights in America are not absolute rights isbeyond dispute. In support of every exception to thefundamental rights set out in the Draft Constitution one canrefer to at least one judgment of the United States SupremeCourt. It would be sufficient to quote one such judgment of the Supreme Court in justification of the limitation on theright of free speech contained in Article 13 of the Draft Constitution. In Gitlow Vs. New York in which the issue wasthe constitutionality of a New York "criminal anarchy" lawwhich purported to punish utterances calculated to bringabout violent change, the Supreme Court said:

"It is a fundamental principle, long established, thatthe freedom of speech and of the press, which is secured bythe Constitution, does not confer an absolute right to speakor publish, without responsibility, whatever one may choose,or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunityfor every possible use of language and prevents thepunishment of those who abuse this freedom."

It is therefore wrong to say that the fundamentalrights in America are absolute, while those in the Draft Constitution are not.

It is argued that if any fundamental rights requirequalification, it is for the Constitution itself to qualifythem as is done in the Constitution of the United States andwhere it does not do so it should be left to be determinedby the Judiciary upon a consideration of all the relevantconsiderations. All

this, I am sorry to say, is a completemisrepresentation if not a misunderstanding of the AmericanConstitution. The American Constitution does nothing of thekind. Except in one matter, namely, the right of assembly,the American Constitution does not itself impose anylimitations upon the fundamental rights guaranteed to theAmerican citizens. Nor is it correct to say that theAmerican Constitution leaves it to the judiciary to imposelimitations on fundamental rights. The right to imposelimitations belongs to the Congress. The real position isdifferent from what is assumed by the critics. In America,the fundamental rights as enacted by the Constitution wereno doubt absolute. Congress, however, soon found that it wasabsolutely essential to qualify these fundamental rights bylimitations. When the question arose as to theconstitutionality of these limitations before the SupremeCourt, it was contended that the Constitution gave no powerto the United States Congress to impose such limitation, theSupreme Court invented the doctrine of police power andrefuted the advocates of absolutefundamental rights by the argument that every state hasinherent in it police power which is not required to beconferred on it expressly by the Constitution. To use thelanguage of the Supreme Court in the case I have alreadyreferred to, it said:

"That a State in exercise of its police power maypunish those who abuse this freedom by utterances inimicalto the public welfare, tending to corrupt public morals,incite to crime or disturb the public peace, is not open toquestion. . . . . "

(What the Draft Constitution has done is that insteadof formulating fundamental rights in absolute terms anddepending upon our Supreme Court to come to the rescue ofParliament by inventing the doctrine of police power, itpermits the State directly to impose limitations upon thefundamental rights. There is really no difference in theresult. What one does directly the other does indirectly. Inboth cases, the fundamental rights are not absolute.)

In the Draft Constitution the Fundamental Rights arefollowed by what are called "Directive Principles". It is anovel feature in a Constitution framed for ParliamentaryDemocracy. The only other constitution framed forParliamentary Democracy which embodies such principles isthat of the Irish Free State. These Directive Principleshave also come up for criticism. It is said that they areonly pious declarations. They have no binding force. Thiscriticism is of course superfluous. The Constitution itselfsays so in so many words.

If it is said that the Directive Principle have nolegal force behind them, I am prepared to admit it. But I amnot prepared to admit that they have no sort of bindingforce at all. Nor am I prepared to concede that they areuseless because they have no binding force in law.

The Directive Principles are like the Instrument ofInstructions which were issued to the Governor-General andto the Governors of the Colonies and to those of India bythe British Government under the 1935 Act. Under the Draft Constitution it is

proposed to issue such instruments to thePresident and to the Governors. The texts of theseInstruments of Instructions will be found in Schedule IV of the Constitution. What are called Directive Principles ismerely another name for Instrument of Instructions. The onlydifference is that they are instructions to the Legislatureand the Executive. Such a thing is to my mind to bewelcomed. Wherever there is a grant of power in generalterms for peace, order and good government, it is necessarythat it should be accompanied by instructions regulating itsexercise.

The inclusion of such instructions in a Constitutionsuch as is proposed in the Draft becomes justifiable foranother reason. The Draft Constitution as framed onlyprovides a machinery for the government of the country. It is not a contrivance to install any particular party inpower as has been done in some countries. Who should be inpower is left to be determined by the people, as it must be,if the system is to satisfy the tests of

democracy. Butwhoever captures power will not be free to do what he likeswith it. In the exercise of it, he will have to respectthese instruments of instructions which are called DirectivePrinciples. He cannot ignore them. He may not have to answerfor their breach in a Court of Law. But he will certainlyhave to answer for them before the electorate at electiontime. What great value these directive principles possesswill be realized better when the forces of right contrive tocapture power.

That it has no binding force is no argument againsttheir inclusion in the Constitution. There may be adifference of opinion as to the exact place they should begiven in the Constitution. I agree that it is somewhat oddthat provisions which do not carry positive obligationsshould be placed in the midst of provisions which do carrypositive obligations. In my judgement their proper place isin Schedules III A & IV which contain Instrument ofInstructions tothe President and the Governors. For, as I have said, theyare really Instruments of Instructions to the Executive andthe Legislatures as to how they should exercise theirpowers. But that is only a matter of arrangement.

Some critics have said that the Centre is too strong.Others have said that it must be made stronger. The Draft Constitution has struck a balance. However much you may denypowers to the Centre, it is difficult to prevent the Centrefrom becoming strong. Conditions in modern world are suchthat centralization of powers is inevitable. One has onlyto consider the growth of the Federal Government in theU.S.A. which, notwithstanding the very limited powers givento it by the Constitution, has out-grown its former self andhas overshadowed and eclipsed the State Governments. This isdue to modern conditions. The same conditions are sure tooperate on the Government of India and nothing that one cando will help to prevent it from being strong. On the otherhand, we must resist the tendency to make it stronger. Itcannot chew more than it can digest. Its strength must

becommensurate with its weight. It would be a folly to make itso strong that it may fall by its own weight.

The Draft Constitution is criticized for having onesort of constitutional relations between the Centre and theProvinces and another sort of constitutional relationsbetween the Centre and the Indian States. The Indian Statesare not bound to accept the whole list of subjects includedin the Union List but only those which come under Defence,Foreign Affairs and Communications. They are not bound toaccept subjects included in the Concurrent List. They arenot bound to accept the State List contained in the Draft Constitution. They are free to create their own ConstituentAssemblies and to frame their own constitutions. All this,of course, is very unfortunate and, I submit quiteindefensible. This disparity may even prove dangerous to theefficiency of the State. So long as the disparity exists,the Centre's authority over all-India matters may lose itsefficacy. For, power is no power if it cannot be exercisedin all cases and in all places. In a situation such as maybe created by war, such limitations on the exercise of vitalpowers in some areas may bring the whole life of the Statein complete jeopardy. What is worse is that the IndianStates under the Draft Constitution are permitted tomaintain their own armies. I regard this as a mostretrograde and harmful provision which may lead to thebreak-up of the unity of India and the overthrow of theCentral Government. The Drafting Committee, if I am notmisrepresenting its mind, was not at all happy over thismatter. They wished very much that there was uniformitybetween the Provinces and the Indian States in theirconstitutional relationship with the Centre. Unfortunately,they could do nothing to improve matters. They were bound bythe decisions of the Constituent Assembly, and theConstituent Assembly in its turn was bound by the agreementarrived at between the two negotiating Committees.

But we may take courage from what happened in Germany.The German Empire as founded by Bismark in

1870 was acomposite State, consisting of 25 units. Of these 25 units,22 were monarchical States and 3 were republican cityStates. This distinction, as we all know, disappeared in thecourse of time and Germany became one land with one peopleliving under one Constitution. The process of theamalgamation of the Indian States is going to be muchquicker than it has been in Germany. On the 15th August 1947we had 600 Indian States in existence. Today by theintegration of the Indian States with Indian Provinces ormerger among themselves or by the Centre having taken themas Centrally Administered Areas there have remained some20/30 States as viable States. This is a very rapid processand progress. I appeal to those States that remain to fallin line with the Indian Provinces and to become full unitsof the Indian Union on the same terms as the IndianProvinces. Theywill thereby give the Indian Union the strength it needs.They will save themselves the bother of starting their ownConstituent Assemblies and drafting their own separateConstitution and they will lose nothing that is of value tothem. I feel hopeful that my appeal will not

go in vain andthat before the Constitution is passed, we will be able towipe off the differences between the Provinces and theIndian States.

Some critics have taken objection to the description ofIndia in Article 1 of the Draft Constitution as a Union ofStates. It is said that the correct phraseology should be aFederation of States. It is true that South Africa which isa unitary State is described as a Union. But Canada which isa Federation is also called a Union. Thus the description ofIndia as a Union, though its constitution is Federal, doesno violence to usage. But what is important is that the useof the word Union is deliberate. I do not know why the word'Union' was used in the Canadian Constitution. But I cantell you why the Drafting Committee has used it. TheDrafting Committee wanted to make it clear that though Indiawas to be a federation, the Federation was not the result of an agreement by the States to join in a Federation and thatthe Federation not being the result of an agreement no Statehas the right to secede from it. The Federation is a Unionbecause it is indestructible. Though the country and thepeople may be divided into different States for convenienceof administration the country is one integral whole, itspeople a single people living under a single imperiumderived from a single source. The Americans had to wage acivil war to establish that the States have no right ofsecession and that their Federation was indestructible. TheDrafting Committee thought that it was better to make itclear at the outset rather than to leave it to speculationor to dispute.

The provisions relating to amendment of theConstitution have come in for a virulent attack at the handsof the critics of the Draft Constitution. It is said thatthe provisions contained in the Draft make amendmentdifficult. It is proposed that the Constitution should beamendable by a simple majority at least for some years. Theargument is subtle and ingenious. It is said that thisConstituent Assembly is not elected on adult suffrage whilethe future Parliament will be elected on adult suffrage andyet the former has been given the right to pass theConstitution by a simple majority while the latter has beendenied the same right. It is paraded as one of theabsurdities of the Draft Constitution. I must repudiate thecharge because it is without foundation. (To know how simpleare the provisions of the Draft Constitution in respect of amending the Constitution one has only to study theprovisions for amendment contained in the American andAustralian Constitutions. Compared to them those containedin the Draft Constitution will be found to be the simplest.The Draft Constitution has eliminated the elaborate anddifficult procedures such as a decision by a convention or areferendum. The Powers of amendment are left with theLegislature Central and Provincial. It is only foramendments of specific matters - and they are only few - thatthe

ratification of the State legislatures is required. Allother Articles of the Constitution are left to be amended byParliament. The only limitation is that it shall be done bya majority of not less than two-thirds of the members ofeach

House present and voting and a majority of the totalmembership of each House. It is difficult to conceive asimpler method of amending the Constitution.)

What is said to be the absurdity of the amendingprovisions is founded upon a misconception of the positionof the Constituent Assembly and of the future Parliamentelected under the Constitution. The Constituent Assembly inmaking a Constitution has no partisan motive. Beyondsecuring a good and workable constitution it has no axe togrind. In considering the Articles of the Constitution ithas no eye on getting through a particular measure. Thefuture Parliament if it met as a Constituent Assembly, itsmembers will be acting as partisans seeking to carryamendments to the Constitution to facilitate the passing ofparty measures which they have failed to get throughParliament by reason of someArticle of the Constitution which has acted as an obstaclein their way Parliament will have an axe to grind while theConstituent Assembly has none. That is the differencebetween the Constituent Assembly and the future Parliament.That explains why the Constituent Assembly though elected onlimited franchise can be trusted to pass the Constitution bysimple majority and why the Parliament though elected onadult suffrage cannot be trusted with the same power toamend it.

I believe I have dealt with all the adverse criticismsthat have been levelled against the Draft Constitution assettled by the Drafting Committee. I don't think that I haveleft out any important comment or criticism that has beenmade during the last eight months during which theConstitution has been before the public. It is for theConstituent Assembly to decide whether they will accept theconstitution as settled by the Drafting Committee or whetherthey shall alter it before passing it.

But this I would like to say. The Constitution has beendiscussed in some of the Provincial Assemblies of India. Itwas discussed in Bombay, C.P., West Bengal, Bihar, Madrasand East Punjab. It is true that in some ProvincialAssemblies serious objections were taken to the financialprovisions of the constitution and in Madras to Article 226.But excepting this, in no Provincial Assembly was anyserious objection taken to the Articles of the Constitution.No Constitution is perfect and the Drafting Committee itselfis suggesting certain amendments to improve the Draft Constitution. But the debates in the Provincial Assembliesgive me courage to say that the Constitution as settled bythe Drafting Committee is good enough to make in thiscountry a start with. I feel that it is workable, it isflexible and it is strong enough to hold the countrytogether both in peace time and in war time. Indeed, if Imay say so, if things go wrong under the new Constitution,the reason will not be that we had a bad Constitution. Whatwe will have to say is, that Man was vile. Sir, I move.

Mr. President: Maulana Hasrat Mohani has given noticeof an amendment. It was given at half-past Eleven thismorning. I will allow him to move it, particularly becauseit will have the effect, if it is lost, of blocking anothermotion of which I have got notice. Maulana Saheb, will youkindly move your amendment?

Maulana Hasrat Mohani: *[Sir, the amendment, of which Ihave given notice, is to the effect that the presentConstitution Assembly is not competent and there are threereasons why I do not regard it as competent. The first andthe most important reason is . . . . . . . . . .]

Shri B. Das (Orissa: General): Mr. President, Sir, willMaulana Sahib please read out the amendment first?

Mr. President: I will read out the amendment. Theamendment is this:

"That the Consideration of the Draft Constitution ofIndia be postponed till the election of a fresh andcompetent Constituent Assembly on the basis of jointelectorate and the formation of political rather

thancommunal parties in India."

That is the amendment.

Shri B. Das: May I rise on a point of order, Sir? Mypoint of order, is that Maulana Sahib cannot move hisnegative amendment after ...........

Mr. President: Won't you allow him to move it?

--------------------

* [] Translation of Hindustani speech.

CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY OF INDIA - VOLUME VII

Thursday, the 4th November 1948

Shri B. Das: He has just spoken in Hindustani, thepurport of which is that he has moved his amendment. This iscontrary to the practice of this House. I think it is out oforder and it should not be allowed.

Mr. President: I think I had better allow the MaulanaSaheb to move the amendment. Then, you may take the point oforder.

Maulana Hasrat Mohani: *[I was telling the reason why Ido not regard this Constituent Assembly as a competent body.Firstly, because all over the world wherever a ConstituentAssembly has been set up, it has been done as an outcome ofrevolution. Revolution does not necessarily mean an armedrevolution. It only means that, when the prevailing systemof Government has come to an end and another is intended to be set up in its place, a Constituent Assembly has beeninvariably called to frame and pass a constitution in thelight of new

conditions. If the previous form of Governmentwere to continue then there was no need of a ConstituentAssembly. Look at our new constitution drafted by Dr.Ambedkar. There is nothing new in it. He has mostly copiedout either the Government of India Act of 1935 or, asadmitted by himself, has drawn from the constitutions ofother countries. A bit from here and a bit from there-it isa Pandora's Box. This is what has been produced by ourfriend Dr. Ambedkar! My biggest complaint on this account isthat if for the purpose of drafting a constitution he had tocopy out the constitutions of other countries, then why didhe not embody the latest and the best constitution? How wasit that he looked up to the constitutions of Australia,Canada, America, and England, but the constitution of theSoviet Union did not catch his eye? I have jotted down allthe points he has made in his speech. This is not the timeto reply them in detail, but this much I can say that he hasretained all the bad points that he could lay his handsupon. He has observed that there should be no rigidity andlegalism, but has he at any place said that a Unitary Systemof Government should be established? At one place hementioned that he could not provide for the villagePanchayats. If he had kept the Soviet Constitution in view,there would have been no difficulty in his way. I claim itand I challenge him on that point. For example, he has saidthat unless there is a unitary type of Government and apowerful Centre, nothing can be done. Such talk is besidethe point. He does not know that it is so in the SovietConstitution. What he has done is to allocate some subjectsto Provinces, some to the Centre and some have been put inthe concurrent list. In the Soviet Constitution everyconstituent state has been made a permanent republic; and towin its confidence every component unit has been givencontrol over the defence, foreign relations andcommunications. What has been the result? He says that itwould be detrimental, but there the Soviet Government havegained the confidence of their component states. The resulthas been that all parts of the Soviet Union - considered fromthe point of view of population they are all Muslimrepublics - have helped their utmost in the last war. Peopleof Caucasia and of every war-ravaged region have stoodwholeheartedly by the Soviet Union. Cossacks and others whorendered help all belonged to the Union. Thus hisobservation is unjustified. He is not taking the people intohis confidence, and says that all should merge.]

Pandit Balkrishna Sharma: May I rise to a point oforder? The revered Maulana Sahib is discussing the merits of the Constitution whereas the proposal that is put forwardbefore us is that we must not consider this Constitution.The discussion of the merits of the Constitution cannot bebrought before the House when we are to consider only thequestion of postponement of the discussion.

--------------------

* [] Translation of Hindustani speech.

Mr. President: I thought it would save time if you lefthim alone.

Maulana Hasrat Mohani: *[I repeat what I have alreadysaid, that the reason why this House is

not competent, isthat you have consulted all the constitutions of the world;but you have not cared to see the latest and the bestconstitutions. The second point arises, what was the basisof the election of our Constituent Assembly? It was oncommunal basis. Muslims had elected Muslims and Hindus hadvoted for the Hindus, but the States were not represented.What was the position at the time of the first meeting of the Constituent Assembly? On your own admission there werethree parties, namely, the Congress, the Muslim League andthe States; but up to that time the States had not come in.No member of the Muslim League had taken any part. Theresult has been that the constitution that has been framedhas been forged by one party alone. How can you enforce iton others? I mean to say that no reliance can be placed byus as the Constitution has been framed by one party alone.In the situation that has how arisen we also find the same,namely that there is only one party. It is like this: theMuslim League is finished, it has dissolved itself and allthe States have merged themselves in the Indian Union andnow only the Indian Government, namely one party, hasremained in the field. That is why we have to form politicalparties so that your difficulties may come to an end.]

Shri Satyanarayan Sinha (Bihar: General): *[Did youfind out any better solution?]

Maulana Hasrat Mohani: *[I am coming to that. Dr.Ambedkar has just said that the majority party should beconsiderate towards the Minority party. I say: we do notwant them. You have provided in the constitution that 14 percent of the seats should be reserved for the Muslims. Youstill consider yourself 86 per cent and Muslims to be 14 percent. So long as you have this communalism, nothing can bedone. Why do you say that Muslims are in a Minority. So longas you depict them in communal colours Muslims shall remaina Minority. When we come as members of a political party oras members of the Independent Communist party or asSocialists and then form a coalition party, then as a wholethey will be arrayed against the rest.

You say that a long time has elapsed that many thingshave happened and that you have worked so hard. Mr.President, I would recall that when Pandit Jawahar Lal Nehruhad presented the Draft Constitution, I had then raised anobjection and he had advised me to leave alone a primarymatter. I had thereupon pointed out to him that it would beabsurd to leave aside a point which is to be settled first.I had also pointed out that by doing so he would not betaking any strong and firm stand but would be stuffingirrelevant matter in all directions. I had also enquiredwhat he would do if questions were raised on these issues,if without taking any decision, he started framing theconstitution. It is a futility; we should see what type ofConstitution is required. We want to make a picture, but ifthat picture is not painted correctly, then it cannot betermed a picture. You will say that you have

worked hard andthat quite a long time has elapsed. My answer would be thatthere is no difficulty about it, neither was there any risk.I had protested at that time and I was glad that theHonourable President had stated that the point would beconsidered and it was on that understanding that we haddiscussed the resolution. You know that the same thing hashappened in Pakistan as well. Mr. Jinnah had said that solong as the Constituent Assembly was not elected, theconstitution could not be passed. This is the reason why Iam telling you that so long as the Constituent Assembly isnot elected on non-communal basis, you have no right to geta constitution passed by this Constituent Assembly. Nomatter receives any consideration from you, because you areinflated with the idea that you are in a majority and thatwhatever you like will be passed. Do not

--------------------

* [] Translation of Hindustani speech.

imagine that no blame will come upon you. I am alone and Iam saying all I can say. You may not agree. In reality youare doing all that the British Government had been doing.After sometime they

used to give us pensions and used to askus to stay at home. But why should we do so?

I would like to ask you what you are doing inHyderabad. You say that a Constituent Assembly will be setup which would frame a constitution. You have accepted thisprinciple for Hyderabad. Why don't you do it here? Obviouslyall this is being done on communal lines in which truth andjustice have no place.

If he says that he cannot do that, he has no power toelect a new Constituent Assembly on the basis of jointelectorate and that would be done after the constitution hasbeen framed, then I repeat what you have said, that`legalism' and `rigidity' should be cast aside. I ask himwhether he can set up a Constituent Assembly in Hyderabadwithout the Nizam's fireman. But here we set up anelectorate for the Constituent Assembly as we felt the needfor it; so it is incorrect to say that we can not do it."Where there is a will, there is a way." If you are inearnest to be just to the country and if you want to treatevery one equally, then I give you a warning that yourendeavour to assimilate all into one whole, to build aparamount Indian power, will bring disaster. The latestexample is that of Aurangazeb the Emperor. After conqueringthe whole of India he annexed the two Southern States ofBijapur and Golcanda with the intention of founding aunitary Moghul Empire. What was the result? They sayAurangazeb lost his kingdom because of his bigotry but I sayit was lost because of his imperialistic ideas. If he hadnot done that, he would not have lost a kingdom. Do notthink it is easy to form a single unitary Government bycoercing each and all into your fold. That can not last. Youshould hold fresh elections on non-communal basis, on thebasis of joint

electorates, and then whatever constitutionyou frame will be acceptable to us. We regard theconstitution framed by you worthy of being consigned to thewaste paper basket.]

Shri B. Das: I wish to point out that under Rule 31sub-clause (2) the motion for adjournment on the motionmoved by the Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar for theconsideration of Draft Constitution of India should not havebeen allowed by the Chair.

Mr. President: I have taken this under Rule 25, Clause(5), sub-clause (b) as a motion for adjournment ofconsideration of a motion which is under discussion.

Shri B. Das: But he is wanting a fresh election to takeplace first in the country. That is a negation of the wholeidea.

Mr. President: I have liberally construed the rule forthe Honourable Member and I have taken it, as I have said,under Rule 25, Clause (5), sub-clause (b).

Begum Aizaz Rasul (United Provinces: Muslim): Sir,before we adjourn for the day, may I know how many days theChair proposes to allow for the general discussion on Dr.Ambedkar's motion?

Mr. President: As at present advised, it is hoped toconclude the discussion tomorrow. I will limit the time ofeach speaker and if I find that there is a considerableopinion in favour of further discussion, more time may begiven.

The Constituent Assembly then adjourned till Ten of theClock on Friday the 5th November 1948.

--------------------

* [] Translation of Hindustani speech.