General Information

Description

US administrator of Irag L. Paul Bremer Discusses "My Year in Iraq"

Keywords

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer, Iraq Policy, Iraq War, Coalition Provisional Authority, CPA, Troop Strength

, Diplomat, Author, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, Iraq Strategy, Intelligence, Insurgency,

Insurgents, Weapons of Mass Destruction, WMD, Clear and Hold, Joint Chiefs of Staff, My Year in Iraq,

Post-war Planning, President George W. Bush, Presidential Advisers, Foreign Policy, General John

Abizaid, Lieutenant General Ricardo Sanchez, Vice President Dick Cheney, Richard Cheney

Citation

MLA

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer Discusses "My Year in Iraq"https://archives.nbclearn.com/portal/site/k-12/browse/?cuecard=3921

Source: NBC Today Show Resource Type: Video News ReportCreator: Matt Lauer Copyright: NBCUniversal Media,

LLC.Event Date: 01/09/2006 Copyright Date: 2006Air/Publish Date: 01/09/2006 Clip Length 00:05:10

Page 1 of 4© 2008-2017 NBCUniversal Media, LLC. All Rights Reserved.

"Ambassador L. Paul Bremer Discusses "My Year in Iraq"." Matt Lauer, correspondent. NBC Today

Show. NBCUniversal Media. 9 Jan. 2006. NBC Learn. Web. 15 July 2017

APA

Lauer, M. (Reporter). 2006, January 9. Ambassador L. Paul Bremer Discusses "My Year in Iraq".

[Television series episode]. NBC Today Show. Retrieved from https://archives.nbclearn.com/portal/site/k-

12/browse/?cuecard=3921

CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE

"Ambassador L. Paul Bremer Discusses "My Year in Iraq"" NBC Today Show, New York, NY: NBC

Universal, 01/09/2006. Accessed Sat Jul 15 2017 from NBC Learn:

https://archives.nbclearn.com/portal/site/k-12/browse/?cuecard=3921

Transcript

Ambassador L. Paul Bremer Discusses "My Year in Iraq"

MATT LAUER, co-host:

Ambassador Paul Bremer had never set foot in Iraq, but in May of 2003 he took on what some would call

an impossible job. His mission: to run that country until sovereignty could be returned to the Iraqis. Now

Ambassador Bremer has written a book called "My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope."

Ambassador Bremer, good to see you. It's a pleasure.

Mr. PAUL BREMER (Former Presidential Envoy to Iraq): Nice to see you.

LAUER: We have so much to talk about. Let's start talking about troop strength. You took this job, you

go to Iraq; shortly after you were there, from what I understand, you see a think tank report that basically

says, `Look, it's going to take three times the number of troops the US currently has in Iraq to stabilize

that country.' Did that report alarm you?

Mr. BREMER: Well, it certainly got my attention. I--I'm not a military expert, I'm a trained diplomat, so I

looked at it as a diplomat, and felt that it was something we ought to take into account. It wasn't so much,

by the way, the number of American troops on the ground...

LAUER: Total troops.

Mr. BREMER: ...it was co--coalition forces.

LAUER: You brought that--that report to the attention of Donald Rumsfeld. You sent it forward, said,

`Think you should look at this.' What response did you get?

Mr. BREMER: Well, I never heard directly back from him. You know, I want to say very clearly

something important here, Matt; Don Rumsfeld's been a friend of mine for 30 years, I've always admired

his patriotism and his energy and his decisiveness, and it's no secret that we had disagreements, they're

covered in the book, but he remains a friend and I consider him a great secretary of Defense.

LAUER: And--and nobody's asking you to say anything that's going to get him in hot water. However, he

did not respond to your memo saying, `Hey, take a look at this.' That had to be disheartening to you.

Page 2 of 4© 2008-2017 NBCUniversal Media, LLC. All Rights Reserved.

Mr. BREMER: Well, look, we had a lot of discussions about troop strength after I got to Iraq. The

secretary of Defense gets a lot of advisors, he's got the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he's got military experts,

which, again, I was not.

LAUER: Yeah, but you're the number one guy in Iraq, it's your job to rebuild that country.

Mr. BREMER: Sure. Yeah, sure. But he has other advisers, the president has other advisers. I'm one of a

number of advisers, and I had my own view on it. Actually, as I lay out in my book, my main concern was

the quality of the Iraqi security forces, that was my main concern.

LAUER: And we'll talk about that in a second. Let me talk about the insurgency. You write in the book

candidly that you did not see the insurgency coming, at least to the level and strength that it--that it has

surfaced and that others in the administration didn't as well. And a lot of people are going to read this and

say, `After two and a half years of seeing reports of daily and bloody attacks by these insurgents on US

troops and Iraqis--how could no one have seen it coming?'

Mr. BREMER: Well, I don't know the answer, but why the intelligence didn't see it coming--I think quite

logically, one answer might be that, quite logically, the intelligence community was focused on the major

question before the war...

LAUER: Weapons of mass destruction.

Mr. BREMER: ...which was weapons of mass destruction. That was, after all, the key concern not just in

our government, but in the governments of most of the major powers in the world. And that was their top

priority. And in intelligence, as in many things, you have to set priorities.

LAUER: You know the criticism, and you've heard it many times, that one of the main reasons for the

insurgency, sources of the insurgency, was the fact you had this Iraqi army that, before the war, they had

paychecks and weapons and after the war they had no paychecks and weapons. And they lashed out as

what they saw was an occupying force. You don't think that's fair criticism. And by the way, you're the

one targeted with making the decision to span that army.

Mr. BREMER: Yeah. Well, it was--I recommended the decision, certainly, and I support it, I think it was

the right thing to do. And the reason is that the army basically had left, they had deserted. Most of the

army was made up of draftees, all Shia, serving under brutal Sunni officers. They weren't there when we

got there, there was not a single unit standing anywhere. But the important political point, Matt, is this:

that army had been one of Saddam's major instruments of tyranny and repression of the Shia and the

Kurds, which, by the way, make up 80 percent of the population.

LAUER: So bring it back together and the Shia and the Kurds are going to say, `No way.'

Mr. BREMER: They did say `no way,' there's no question. The Kurdish leaders absolutely were clear, I

point it out in the book. So this was a correct decision, I fully supported it.

LAUER: Write--you write in the book that by the end of 2003, while the administration was quietly

talking about perhaps bringing some troops home in 2004, you became very concerned that we didn't have

a strategy for winning the war. And you talked to the vice president, Dick Cheney, and you express that

concern. He shared your belief, didn't he?

Mr. BREMER: He did. And the good--I mean, that's the bad news. The good news is that it's quite clear

now the administration has got a strategy, and they've addressed the two concerns I raised at the time,

Page 3 of 4© 2008-2017 NBCUniversal Media, LLC. All Rights Reserved.

Matt. I raised two concerns. Number one, we were not going in and holding cities, we were not holding--

clearing and holding, we are doing that now. And number two, we did not have professionally trained

Iraqi security forces, but we do now, and that's good.

LAUER: But you say--you say that was the bad news. The bad news was the administration officials were

publicly saying the opposite, they were saying `We do have a strategy for winning this war.' And I think

even you, Ambassador Bremer, would come on shows like this and publicly say, `Yes, we do have a

strategy.' Did you do a disservice to the cause by not speaking out then?

Mr. BREMER: No, I--I--I spoke very clearly, and I believe it's important to speak, when you're in

government, very clearly and frankly in the government about your concerns. And if you reach a point--

I've been in public service for 40 years now--my view is if you reach a point where you can no longer

support a policy that you are trying to advocate, then you have one choice, which is to resign. I never got

to that point.

LAUER: Do you get to--you never got to the point where you...

Mr. BREMER: Absolutely not.

LAUER: ...were so concerned that there wasn't an exit strategy...

Mr. BREMER: No.

LAUER: ...or winning strategy, that it would work?

Mr. BREMER: No. Look, I'm a--I strongly support the president's war on terrorism and on his decision to

liberate Iraq. It was a great decision and a right one, and I believe we're making progress now in carrying

out those decisions.

LAUER: I want to say that in May of 2004, you sent a private message to Donald Rumsfeld, again, your

direct boss, you asked for more US troops--did you consult with the generals, Sanchez and Abizaid,

before asking for that?

Mr. BREMER: No, I did not. And I didn't ask for more US troops, by the way, I said...

LAUER: A larger force.

Mr. BREMER: Yeah. Well, it's an important distinction.

LAUER: Sure, it is. Absolutely.

Mr. BREMER: It's an important distinction. No, I did not. I repo—I report in the book about a private

question I raised with General Sanchez, I raised a question, he didn't. I said, `What would you do if you

had two more divisions available to you?' And he said, `Well, I'd do better at controlling the streets of

Baghdad,' and so forth. But I did not discuss my recommendation. And by the way, it seems to me not

surprising that I didn't hear back from Secretary Rumsfeld. He undoubtedly gave this question to the Joint

Chiefs, and they reached their decision. I repeat again, I'm not a military expert.

LAUER: Well, the book is out now. Paul Bremer, it's a fascinating read. Thanks very much for being

here.

Mr. BREMER: Good to be with you again.

Page 4 of 4© 2008-2017 NBCUniversal Media, LLC. All Rights Reserved.