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Law enforcement agencies currently have no oversight requirements for drone flightsConnor Friedersdorf, August 28, 2014, The Atlantic, http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2014/08/california-lawmakers-back-a-restraining-order-on-police-drones/379267/

Imagine that you lived in a house with a relatively private backyard: fences on all three sides, trees around the perimeter, and no easy way for the neighbors to peek in. Say you're out there playing with your kids, or sunbathing, or consummating a romantic encounter in a hot tub that, let's be honest, you rarely use. If I, intrepid journalist, were to appear overhead in a helicopter with the specific intent of peering down onto your property, you'd be justified in thinking that I violated your reasonable expectations of privacy. But your common-sense notions would be at odds with America's mixed-up Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. "In the 1989 case Florida v. Riley, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that since airplanes and helicopters often fly over private property, citizens do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy that their activities will not be observed from the air ," Ronald Bailey explains in Reason. "Consequently, the police were permitted use of evidence obtained without a search warrant from helicopter observation of a greenhouse in which they suspected marijuana was being grown." Article Continues After Advertisement At the time, aerial surveillance was at least constrained in practice by the significant cost of flying a helicopter. But today, at the dawn of the cheap- drone era , precedents like the one set in 1989 pose a novel threat to privacy rights. Hence the effort by California lawmakers to pass added protections into law: Earlier this month the California State Assembly voted to require police to obtain warrants to use drones for surveillance except in exigent circumstances. Now the State Senate has handily passed the legislation with a 25 to 8 vote. If Governor Jerry Brown signs this law when it crosses his desk, the Golden State will have struck the right balance: permitting drone surveillance in cases where police obtain an individualized warrant, while insisting on privacy rights consistent with the original understanding of the Fourth Amendment, not the diminished version that War on Drugs jurisprudence has given us. Reuters reports there is opposition to the bill from the public-employee unions that represent law enforcement, as well as the Los Angeles District Attorney's office, which calls the law "an inappropriate attempt to impose search and seizure requirements on California law enforcement agencies beyond what is required by the 4th Amendment." Without conceding that this law goes beyond the Fourth Amendment, the district attorney's argument is notably at odds with the notion that the Bill of Rights was a partial, incomplete articulation of the minimum rights owed a free people, not an upper bound on protecting liberty. Privacy-loving residents of other states should urge their legislators to follow suit.

And, in the absence of coherent limitations, federal agencies have developed fleets of drones – groups like the DHS and CBP are loaning federal drones to local jurisdictions.

Barry, 2013 (Tom, senior policy analyst at Center for International Policy, “Drones Over Homeland,” April 23, CIP, Online: http://www.ciponline.org/research/html/drones-over-the-homeland)

Drones are proliferating at home and abroad . A new high-tech realm is emerging, where remotely controlled and autonomous unmanned systems do our bidding. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles ( UAVs) and Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) – commonly known as drones – are already working for us in many ways. This new CIP

International Policy Report reveals how the military-industrial complex and the emergence of the homeland security apparatus have put border drones at the forefront of the intensifying public debate about the proper role of drones domestically. Drones Over the Homeland focuses on the deployment of drones by the Department of Homeland Security ( DHS ), which is developing a drone fleet that it projects will be capable o f quickly responding to homeland security threats , national security threats and national emergencies across the entire nation . In addition, DHS says that its drone fleet is available to assist local law-enforcement agencies. Due to a surge in U.S. military contracting since 2001, the United States is the world leader in drone production and deployment.

Other nations, especially China, are also rapidly gaining a larger market share of the international drone market. The U nited S tates, however, will remain the dominant driver in drone manufacturing and deployment for at least another decade. The central U.S. role in drone proliferation is the direct result of the Pentagon’s rapidly increasing expenditures for UAVs. Also fueling drone proliferation is UAV procurement by the Department of Homeland Security, by other federal agencies such as NASA, and by local police, as well as by individuals and corporations. Drones are also proliferating among

state-level Air National Guard units. Despite its lead role in the proliferation of drones, the U.S. government has failed to take the lead in establish ing appropriate regulatory frameworks and oversight processes. Without this necessary regulatory infrastructure – at both the national and international levels – drone proliferation threatens to undermine constitutional guarantees, civil liberties and international law.

The practice of surveillance is discriminatory. Marginalized groups are subject to heavy scrutinyGiroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP]

The practice of surveillance is both separate and unequal . ... Welfare recipients ... are more vulnerable to surveillance because they are members of a group that is seen as an appropriate target for intrusive programs. Persistent stereotypes of poor women, especially women of color, as inherently suspicious, fraudulent, and wasteful provide ideological support for invasive welfare programs that track their financial and

social behavior. Immigrant communities are more likely to be the site of biometric data collection than native-born

communities because they have less political power to resist it. ... Marginalized people are subject to some of the most technologically sophisticated and comprehensive forms of scrutiny and observation in law enforcement, the welfare

system, and the low-wage workplace. They also endure higher levels of direct forms of surveillance, such as stop-and-frisk in New York City.60 The corporate-surveillance state collects troves of data, but the groups often targeted by traditional and new forms of

digital surveillance are more often than not those who fall within the parameters of either being a threat to authority, reject the consumer culture or are

simply considered disposable under the regime of neoliberal capitalism. The political, class and racial

nature of suppression has a long history in the U nited States and cannot be ignored by whitewashing the issue of surveillance as a form of state violence by making an appeal to the necessity of safety and security.

Racism and biopolitics are co-constitutive, while certain populations become marked as worthy of preservation, others become disposable commodities

Mendieta 02-[Eduardo Prof. & Chair of Philosophy at SUNY at Stony Brook ‘To make live and to let die’ –Foucault on Racism Meeting of the Foucault Circle APA Central Division Meeting –Chicago, April 25th2002, http://www.stonybrook.edu/commcms/philosophy/people/faculty_pages/docs/foucault.pdf]

The narrative developed by Foucault in these lectures is more fractious and detailed that I am portraying. The canvass that Foucault is panting in these lectures concerns not just the wars that gave birth to our society, and its novel forms of knowledge, it also concerns something which I find fascinating, and provocative: the invention of a people. To counter and challenge the power of the invaders, as well as the power of popes and kings, and using the narratives to unmask their acts of usurpation and tyranny, elements within a social body begin to appeal to the ideas of a people, which then refers to a race, which then refers to a populations, and

then is enshrined in the anodyne notion of “society.” From a Foucauldian perspective, the objects of scientific study are partly constituted by the disciplines that seek to study them. So, just as psychiatry produces the madman, and sexology the sexual deviant, and so on, political theory in conjunction with historical discourse, produces a people. But the discourse of political rationality that emerged since the sixteenth century does not secrete a univocal idea of a people. As the political rationality of the modern state develops and grows in intensity, as it augments its claims to power, a people becomes a nation, becomes a population, becomes a biological phenomenon to be tended by all the sciences at the service of the state. Analogously to how sexuality became the locus of the production of control, insofar as it was the pivot of interaction between individuals and their surrounding social environment, race also became the pivot around which the biopower state came to exert its claims, so as to be able to produce certain power effects. What is provocative here is the link that Foucault establishes between the emergence of biopower and the constitution of something that we have now become accustomed to calling society, by which we in fact mean a population, a people, a particular nation. For Foucault the emergence of political rationality is directly linked to the constitution of the object over which it must act. And here I am able to foreground one of the central lessons of these lectures, namely that political theory has to attend to the emergence of political rationality in terms not of its rationality, or claims to reason, but in terms of its modalities of operation. Behind political rationality does not stand reason, or rather, reason is not the alibi of political rationality; instead, political rationality has to do with the horizon of its enactment. If we accept that Foucault is a historical nominalist, and he is a nominalist through and through, in the way that Rorty reads him, and correctly I would argue, then there is no reason behind political power. Political power itself cannot be mystified. There is no power without the horizon of its enactment and the vehicles of its transmission. This is still a misleading way of putting. The effects produced by a certain way of organizing the social body, of studying it, of policing it, of taking care of it, of making sure that its health and protection are attended to in the most detailed and careful ways possible, produce a confrontation of forces, whose momentary stalemates, clashes, subjugations and dispersal, are

summarized in the name of power. And that power is the power over life. The political rationality of the modern state is above all a rationality grounded in the way it tends to the life of the population . The power of the biopolitical state is a regulation of life , a tending, a nurturing and management of the living . The political rationality of the modern total state is management of the living body of the people. This logic was epitomized in the paroxysm of the Nazi state, but also in the communist states, withtheir Gulags. I have thus far discussed Foucault’s triangulation between the discourses of the production of truth, the power that these discourse enact and make available to social agents, and the constitution of a political rationality that is linked to the invention and creation of its horizon of activity and surveillance. I want now to focus on the main theme of this courses’ last lecture. This theme discloses in a unique way the power and perspicacity of Foucault’s method. The theme concerns the kind of power that biopower renders

available, or rather, how biopolitics produces certain power effects by thinking of the living in a novel way. We will approach the theme by way of a contrast: whereas the power of the sovereign under Medieval and early Modern times was the power to make die and to let live, the power of the total state, which is the biopower state, is the power to make live and to let die. Foucault discerned here a telling asymmetry. If the sovereign exercised his power with the executioner’s axe, with the perpetual threat of death, then life was abandoned to its devices. Power was exhibited only on the scaffold, or the guillotine –its terror was the shimmer of the unsheathed sword. Power was ritualistic, ceremonial, theatrical, and to that extent partial, molecular, and calendrical. It was also a power that by its own juridical logic had to submit to the jostling of rights and claims. In the very performance of its might, the power of the sovereign revealed its limitation. It is a power that is localized and

circumscribed to the theater of its cruelty, and the staging of its pomp. In contrast, however, the power of the biopower state is over life [expand]. And here Foucault asks “how can biopolitics then reclaim the power over death?” or rather, how can it make die in light of the fact that its claim to legitimacy is that it is guarding, nurturing, tending to life? In so far as biopolitics is the management of life, how does it make die, how does it kill? This is a similar question to the one that theologians asked about the Christian God. If God is a god of life, the giver of life, how can he put to death, how can he allow death to descend upon his gift of life –why is death a possibility if god is the giver of life? Foucault’s answer is that in order to re-claim death, to be able to inflict death on its subjects, its living beings, biopower must make use of racism; more precisely, racism intervenes here to grant access to death to the biopower state. We must recall that the political rationality of biopower is deployed over a population, which is understood as a continuum of life. It is this continuum of life that eugenics, social hygiene, civil engineering, civil medicine, military engineers, doctors and nurses, policeman, and so on, tended to by a careful management of roads, factories, living quarters, brothels, red-districts, planning and planting of gardens and recreation centers, and the gerrymandering of populations by means of roads, access to public

transformations, placement of schools, and so on. Biopolitics is the result of the development and maintenance of the hothouse of the political body, of the body-politic . Society has become the vivarium of the political rationality, and biopolitics acts on the teeming biomass contained within the parameters of that structure built up by the institutions of health, education, and production. This is where racism intervenes, not from without, exogenously, but from within, constitutively. For the emergence of biopower as the form of a new form of political rationality, entails the inscription within the very logic of the modern state the logic of racism. For racism grants , and here I am quoting: “the conditions for the acceptability of putting to death in a society of normalization. Where there is a society of normalization, where there is a power that is, in all of its surface and in first instance, and first line, a bio-power, racism is indispensable as a condition to be able to put to death someone, in order to be able to put to death others. The homicidal [meurtrière] function of the state, to the degree that the state functions on the modality of bio-power, can only be assured by racism “(Foucault 1997, 227) To use the formulations from his 1982 lecture “The Political Technology of Individuals” –which incidentally, echo his 1979 Tanner Lectures –the power of the state after the 18th century, a power which is enacted through the police, and is enacted over the population, is a power over living beings, and as such it is a biopolitics. And, to quote more directly, “since the population is nothing more than what the state takes care of for its own sake, of course, the state is

entitled to slaughter it, if necessary. So the reverse of biopolitics is thanatopolitics.” (Foucault 2000, 416). Racism , is the thanatopolitics of the biopolitics of the total state. They are two sides of one same political technology , one same political rationality: the management of life, the life of a population, the tending to the continuum of life of a people. And with the inscription of racism within the state of biopower, the long history of war that Foucault

has been telling in these dazzling lectures has made a new turn: the war of peoples, a war against invaders, imperials colonizers, which turned into a war of races, to then turn into a war of classes, has now turned into the war of a race, a biological unit, against its polluters and threats. Racism is the means by which bourgeois political power, biopower, re-kindles the fires of war within civil society. Racism normalizes and medicalizes war. Racism makes war the permanent condition of society, while at the same time masking its weapons of death and torture. As I wrote somewhere else, racism banalizes genocide by making quotidian the lynching of suspect threats to the health of the social body . Racism makes the killing of the other , of others, an everyday occurrence by internalizing and normalizing the war of society against its enemies. To protect society entails we be ready to kill its threats, its foes, and if we understand society as a unity of life, as a continuum of the living, then these threat and foes are biological in nature.

Advantage 1: Migrant Rights Drones are deployed by CBP for surveillance in areas near the border – and deployment is increasing.

Elliot and Brian ’14 [Spagat, Elliot, University of San Diego— Associated Press San Diego Skoloff, Brian, University of Tennessee-Knoxville Associated Press Pheonix, Arizona “Drones keep eye on U.S. border; Aircraft's high-resolution cameras sweep remote areas of the Mexico frontier.” 2014.] [MBM]

The U.S. government now patrols nearly half the Mexican border by drones alone in a largely unheralded shift to

control desolate stretches where there are no agents, camera towers, ground sensors or fences, and it plans to expand the strategy to the Canadian border.¶ It represents a significant departure from a decades-old approach that emphasized fences and agents. Since 2000, the number of Border Patrol agents on the 1,954-mile border more than doubled to surpass 18,000,

and fencing multiplied nine times to 700 miles.¶ Under the new approach, Predator B drones sweep remote mountains , canyons and rivers with high-resolution video cameras and return within three days to shoot video in the same spot, two officials with direct knowledge of the effort said on condition of anonymity because details

have not been made public.¶ The two videos are then compared for analysts who use sophisticated software to identify tiny changes -- perhaps the tracks of a farmer or cows, perhaps those of immigrants entering the country or a drug-laden Hummer , they said .¶ About 92% of drone missions have shown no change in terrain , but the

others raised enough questions to dispatch agents to determine whether someone got away. The agents,

who sometimes arrive by helicopter because an area is so remote, look for any sign of human activity -- footprints, broken

twigs, trash.¶ About 4% of missions have been false alarms, such as tracks of livestock or farmers, and about 2% are inconclusive. The remaining 2% offer evidence of illegal crossings from Mexico, which typically results in ground sensors being planted for closer monitoring. ¶ The government has operated about 10,000 drone flights under the strategy , known internally as Change Detection , since it began in March 2013. The flights currently

cover about 900 miles, much of it in Texas, and are expected to expand to the Canadian border by the end of

2015.¶ The purpose is to assign agents where illegal activity is highest, said R. Gil Kerlikowske, commissioner of Customs and

Border Protection, the Border Patrol's parent agency, which operates nine unmanned aircraft across the country.¶ "You have finite resources," he said in an interview. "If you can look at some very rugged terrain [and] you can see there's not traffic, whether it's tire tracks or clothing being abandoned or anything else, you want to deploy your resources to where you have a greater risk, a greater threat."¶ If the video shows the terrain unchanged, Border Patrol Chief Michael Fisher calls it "proving the negative" -- showing there isn't anything illegal

happening there and therefore no need for agents and fences.¶ The strategy was launched without fanfare and is being expanded as President Obama considers issuing an executive order by the end of this year to reduce deportations and enhance border security .¶ Rep. Michael McCaul, a Texas Republican who chairs the House Homeland Security Committee, applauded the approach

while saying that surveillance gaps remained. " We can no longer focus only on static defenses such as fences and fixed [camera] towers," [Rep. McCaul] he said.¶ Sen. Bob Corker, a Tennessee Republican who co-wrote legislation last year to add 20,000 Border Patrol agents and 350 miles of fencing to the Southwest border, said, "If there are better ways of ensuring the border is

secure, I am certainly open to considering those options."¶ Border missions fly out of Sierra Vista, home of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Ft. Huachuca, or Corpus Christi, Texas. They patrol at altitudes between 19,000 and 28,000 feet and within 25 to 60 miles of the border. ¶ The first step is for Border Patrol sector chiefs to identify areas that are least likely to attract smugglers, typically far from towns and roads. Analysts scour the drone videos at operations centers in Grand Forks, N.D.,

Sierra Vista and Riverside. ¶ Privacy advocates have voiced concern about drones since C ustoms and Border

Protection introduced them in 2006, saying there is potential to monitor innocent people under no suspicion.

Drone deployment to detect immigrants has further securitized the border – military leadership, training, and assets have been drawn into border policing – exacerbating border violence.

Wall and Monahan ’11 [Tyler Wall Eastern Kentucky University, USA. Tyler Wall is an Assistant Professor in the School of Justice Studies as Eastern Kentucky University. He received his Ph.D. in Justice Studies, an interdisciplinary degree from Arizona State University. He has published his work in academic journals such as Theoretical Criminology, Social Justice: A Journal of Crime, Conflict, & World Order, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, and Surveillance & Society, among others. Torin Monahan Vanderbilt University, USA. Torin Monahan is Associate Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Monahan is an associate editor of the leading academic journal on surveillance, Surveillance & Society. “Surveillance and violence from afar: The politics of drones and liminal security-scapes”] [MBM]

UAVs are also being used as technologies of state surveillance and policing and are deployed in security- scapes other than military combat zones. For instance, in the USA drones are increasingly being used to police foreign migrants in relationship to its territorial borderzones, particularly by locating people who are attempting to enter the country illegally. In addition, as we will detail below, some police depart- ments are now conceiving of

drones as surveillance devices that might prove useful in the routine policing and monitoring of domestic territories.¶ Soon after President Obama announced in May 2010 that 1200 National Guard soldiers (Werner and Billeaud, 2010) would be deployed to the already heavily militarized and surveilled US–Mexico border (Dunn, 1996; Pallitto and Heyman, 2008),

conservative Arizona Governor Jan Brewer wrote a letter to Obama urging him to send also what she referred to as ‘aviation assets’, specifically military UAVs and helicopters (Lach, 2010). Brewer asserted that drones have proven effective in US military campaigns over- seas and that they would therefore assist in securing the US border:¶ I would also ask you, as overseas operations in Iraq and Afghanistan permit, to consider wider deployment of UAVs [unmanned aerial vehicles] along our nation’s southern border. I am aware of how effective these assets have become in Operations Iraqi and Enduring

Freedom, and it seems UAVs operations would be ideal for border security and counter-drug missions.¶ (Quoted in Lach, 2010)¶ This appeal for drones at the border obscures the fact that UAVs have already been providing aerial surveillance over US border regions (Shachtman, 2005; Gilson, 2010). Since 2006, the USA has spent approximately $100 million for UAVs on both the southern and northern US borders as part of its efforts to create a so-called virtual fence (Canwest News Service, 2007). As of 2010 the US Customs and Border Protection (CBP) was operating six unarmed Predator drones for overhead surveillance missions along the US–Mexico border , five of which

were based in Brewer’s state of Arizona (Gilson, 2010). Since late 2007 or early 2008, the CBP has been testing drones in US/ Canada border regions (Canwest News Service, 2007). CBP officials credit their drones with ‘helping bust 15,000 lbs of pot and 4,000 illegal immigrants’ (Gilson, 2010). In the words of a defense executive: ‘It is quite easy to envision a future in which (UAVs), unaffected by pilot fatigue, provide 24–7 border and port surveillance to protect against terrorist intrusion ... Other examples [of possible uses] are limited only by our imagination’ (McCullagh, 2006).¶ Clearly, drones have been enlisted in efforts to restrict illegal immigration and combat the war on drugs. The notion of ‘drug drones’ has become fashionable in international drug enforcement, especially for use in maritime operations (Padgett, 2009). For instance, under the name ‘Monitoreo’, which is Spanish for monitoring, the US Southern Command recently conducted a drone ‘testing project’ that mobilized an Israeli-made $6.5 million Heron drone from El Salvador’s Comalapa Air Base to track down suspected drug cartel members who were allegedly using the open waters to smuggle drugs into the USA (Padgett, 2009; see also Shachtman, 2009). By remaining thousands of feet in the air for up to 20-hours while being equipped with a ‘set of sensors better suited for spotting the subs [mini-submarines] that have become so popular among narco-cartels’ (Shachtman, 2009), this particular Heron drone promises to be a longer endurance technology than conventional planes commonly used in drug surveillance. As Time

magazine journalist Tim Padgett (2009) writes,¶ If battlefield drones like the Predator can scan and bomb Taliban

targets in the mountains of Afghanistan, the logic goes, a similar drone like the Heron should be able to find the ‘go fast’ boats and submarines used by drug cartels in the waters of this hemisphere.¶ UAVs are also currently flying in the skies over some cities in both the USA and United Kingdom. As reported in 2006, one North Carolina county is using a UAV equipped with low-light and infrared cameras to keep watch on its citizens. The aircraft has been dispatched to monitor gatherings of motorcycle riders at the Gaston County fairgrounds from just a few hundred feet in the air—close enough to identify faces—and many more uses, such as the aerial detection of marijuana fields, are planned.¶ (McCullagh, 2006)¶ In 2007, the Houston Police Department in Texas controversially tested the use of unarmed surveillance drones, with the eventual objective of monitoring traffic, aiding evacuations during natural disasters, helping with search and rescue operations, and assisting with other ‘tactical’ police incidents (Dean, 2007). The Executive Assistant Police Chief admitted that UAVs over the skies of Houston ‘could include covert police actions’ and that the police force

was ‘not ruling out someday using the drones for writ- ing traffic tickets’ (Dean, 2007). In another example, a confidential document revealed that the Las Vegas Police Department may have been using UAVs above the city of Las Vegas as early as 2007 (Public Intelligence, 2010). The document further outlines a plan for UAVs to help monitor special events and discusses ways in which the Las Vegas UAVs are integrated into Department of Homeland Security (DHS) ‘fusion centers’ to assist with the investigation of suspicious activity reports (Public Intelligence, 2010). As noted in

other work on the militarization of cities, the application of drone technologies to urban areas promises to extend the surveillance networks within which people are caught (Murakami Wood, 2007) and intensify the policing of cultural difference and political dissent that have historically marked cities as vibrant, democratic spaces (Graham, 2010).¶ Within the current political and cultural milieu, this particular movement of mili- tary technology to civilian spheres reveals a symbiotic relationship between the war on crime and war on terror. Jonathan Simon (2007: 11) persuasively argues that in some respects the war on terror is an unacknowledged continuation of the war on crime, sharing with it similar discourses and

institutional arrangements. When the rationalities and technologies of the war on terror are applied to other domains and other perceived threats, there is a heightened danger that existing legal protections and rights will be vitiated in the process, thereby ratcheting up cultures of control that already disproportionately harm marginalized populations (Wacquant, 2009). For instance, DHS fusion centers may have

originated as organizations to share data on terrorist threats, but they have since been linked to spying on non-violent anti- war protesters, environmentalists, students at historically black colleges, and others (Monahan, 2011).¶ In contemporary cultures of control, all populations may be called upon—or be responsibilized—

to manage risk in highly individualized ways and through increasingly privatized means (Rose, 1999), but this in no way indicates a diminished role for the state, or state-corporate apparatuses, in extending discipline and control into domestic territories (Garland, 2001; Monahan, 2010). The use of drones in non-combat settings may symbolically transform those sites to arenas of agonistic engagement and further militarize domestic police departments and government agencies to the detriment of individual liberties and the public good .

IMPACT 1: Border securitization intensifies the effects of structural violence experienced by migrants.

Chávez ’12 [Karma R. Chávez, associate professor of rhetoric, politics and culture at University of Wisconsin-Madison. Ph.D. Arizona State University, 2007. M.A. University of Alabama, 2003. M.A. University of Alabama, 2002. “Border Interventions: The need to Shift from a Rhetoric of Security to a Rhetoric of Militarization,” 2012] [MBM]

Border Militarization in the broadest sense, militarization “refers to the use of military rhetoric and ideology , as well as military tactics, strategy, technology, equipment , and forces” (Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico Border 3). More

specifically, militarization suggests the intermingling between police and military forces, so much so that

police engage in military functions and the military engages in police activity. As Timothy J. Dunn argues, one of the most significant sites of border militarization is the US-Mexico border , as the US Customs and Border Patrol has increasingly teamed up with US military forces in order to deter drug trafficking for the past three decades. As a

consequence of this relationship, and because the border is also the stage for concerns over undocumented migration, both migration and drug trafficking have become central to the development and implementation of militarization policies and practices. The intentional development of such policies is more than three decades in the making, beginning with the earliest implementation during the end of US President Carter’s administration. for example, events such as the Mariel boatlift in 1980, which landed tens of thousands of Cuban refugees in the United

States, provoked alarmist calls for stricter immigration policies. Dunn explains that as immigration gained salience as a social, political, and economic issue in the United ¶ States, the INS budget and staff also increased (Dunn, Militarization of the US

Mexico Border 35). The INS made equipment and technology enhancements, increasing its enforcement capacities, which were designed to ameliorate concerns over national security that emerged particularly following Mariel. While Carter set the ground for increased militarization, President Reagan’s administration was most responsible for rolling out the immense infrastructure that would lead to the most drastic border militarization. As Reagan came into office in the United States, the US approach to the US-Mexico border took the characteristic of “low-intensity conflict doctrine” (L i C). Though this approach typically refers to how the US military managed counter- insurgencies

internationally, especially in Central America, it also refers to the supposedly low level of military involvement (with significant effects) designed for “ maintaining social control over targeted civilian populations ” domestically on the US-Mexico border (Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico Border 35). In other words, the militarization of the US-Mexico border was designed to be relatively minor in the sense that the goal was not to have an overwhelming military- like presence, but

rather one that was visible and tactical enough to suggest control. Spending for the in S, and especially the Border Patrol, grew

tremendously as the number of staff increased 90 percent and funding 149 percent (Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico

Border 49). Moreover, the Reagan administration established detention as an appropriate punishment for non-Mexican

undocumented migrants (Mexicans could simply be sent back) and for political asylum seekers. Thus, more detention facilities were established, and as is consistent with L i C doctrine, many nongovernmental organizations’ housing resources were used for detention (Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico Border 59). In addition to this growth, the Border Patrol also incorporated increased high-tech equipment ranging from M-1 4 and M-16 military rifles to extensive sensor and night-vision systems, television surveillance, and airborne infrared radar, to name a few of the new technologies. By the time George H. W. Bush was elected president, the INS’s realm of control had greatly expanded, and most congressional allocations for spending were aimed at the Enforcement Division. The so-called War on Drugs was in full swing by this time, and it functioned as a convenient excuse to exacerbate enforcement measures on the US- Mexico border, while also leading to a close association between “drug trafficker” and “illegal alien” among immigration officials (Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico Border 87). Additionally, the increased emphasis on targeting “criminal aliens,” those immigrants who had committed crimes other than overstaying visas or making a clandestine crossing into the United States (actions which are misdemeanors), further linked immigration and crime. Moreover, the reach of this category was of ten unclear as immigrants who hadn’t committed other crimes were regularly detained alongside so-called criminal aliens at the growing number of detention facilities in the United States. Under the first Bush administration, reports emerged of systemic

human rights abuses at the hands of Border Patrol agents. The in S also waged its largest immigration enforcement crackdown since the infamously named operation Wetback in 1954 in the Lower Rio Grande v al ley in south Texas. The in S’s strategy, as outlined in a 1989 internal document titled “Enhancement Plan for the Southern Border,” included: (1) rigorous enforcement of immigration laws and detention for those who violated laws; (2) quick and thorough processing of asylum claims; and (3) a media campaign that would work to create “‘pub l ic understanding and acceptance of the difference between claims [for po l iti cal asylum] ma de from a third

country and those made after entry [into the United States] without inspection’” ( in S Report 2 as cited in Dunn, Militarization of the US M exico Border 92). The INS’s crackdown not only resulted in human rights violations within the United States (and in parts of Mexico and

Central America due to related information-seeking missions), but also demonstrated the in S’s ability to engage in carefully

targeted militarization tactics without disrupting usual business, traffic, and life for most local residents in the area. The entrenchment of militarization policies and practices undoubtedly existed during the first Bush administration; however, the detrimental impacts on human lives would take a worse turn during President Clinton’s administration and in the wake of the north American free Trade Agreement’s passage. NAFTA advocated free trade and open foreign investment at the same time that it more or less promoted closed borders for the movement of people (Johnson, “ free Trade and Closed Borders”). The creation of NAFTA was an impetus to restrictionist attitudes and anti-migrant legislation on the state and federal levels (Johnson, “An Essay on immigration” 122). f o r example, the 1993 in S campaign “operation Blockade/Hold the Line” sought to deter undocumented migration in El Paso, and the 1994 in S campaign “operation Gatekeeper” aimed to curb migration from Tijuana to San Diego, both of which represented the highest traffic areas for undocumented crossings. These federal initiatives were bookends to California’s 1994 ballot initiative, Proposition 187 (Save our State). At its most basic level, according to the summary prepared by the attorney general, Proposition 187 “makes illegal aliens ineligible for public social services, public health care services (unless emergency under federal law), and public school education” (cited in o no and Sloop 169). Ultimately, Proposition 187 was deemed unconstitutional, despite passing with 59 percent voter approval. Both the overwhelming support and the extensive campaign surrounding the initiative paved a pathway for additional anti-migrant initiatives and legislative efforts through out the United States. Operation Gatekeeper came on the tide of the Proposition 187 campaign, and could have even been viewed as a

federal response to the proposition ( n e vins 92). Clinton’s immigration positions were constantly under conservative fire, and Gatekeeper functioned to “restore integrity” of the San Diego- Tijuana border by enforcing the border more stringently ( n e vins 3). Gatekeeper was a part of a broader four-stage Southwest Border Strategy that sought to funnel migration out of metropolitan areas and into desolate areas like the Arizona desert as a means of deterring crossers, and in fact, in 2001, a General Accounting office report suggested that shifting traffic was the primary effect of the strategy (Stana and Rezmovic). The rationale for what the University of Arizona Binational

Migration institute describes as the “funnel effect” was that both the deaths that would undoubtedly occur as well as the danger posed by the desert would be enough to prevent people from making the clandestine journey (Arnoldo García; Rubio- Go ldsmith et al.). 2 Though many earlier militarization strategies overtly suggested that the primary goal of militarization was to enable successes in the War on Drugs, the Southwest Border Strategy expressly states its focus as deterring “illegal aliens” (Stana and Rezmovic 1). This focus led to the Border Patrol’s budget being around $1.2 billion in 2001 and, of the 9,096 Border Patrol agents in the United States at that time, 93 percent of them being

located in sectors on the Southwest border (5). The “funnel effect,” which pushed crossings to the most desolate and dangerous parts of the Arizona desert, also led immigration officials to suggest a need for increased military-like technology in order to find and apprehend border crossers (Rubio- Goldsmith et al.). As of May 2001, around

76 miles of border fence were erected as part of the strategy (Stana and Rezmovic 8). Though the Department of Homeland Security and, more specifically, US Customs and Border Protection suggest that nearly two decades of border militarization strategies are leading to more security on US borders and ports of entry, the human consequences of such strategies are astronomical. The impacts of militarization are most devastating for border crossers. In a 2009 report sponsored by the American Civil Liberties Union and Mexico’s national Commission of Human Rights, María Jimenez calculates the numbers of deaths and

apprehensions along the Southwest border from fiscal year 1994 to 2008. 3 Compiling data from Mexico’s Secretariat of Foreign Relations, the US General Accounting office, the US Department of Homeland Security Border Safety initiative, and various news sources, Jimenez reports 23 deaths in 1994, 358 deaths in 1999, and 827 in 2007 (Jimenez 17). 4 On average , between 356 and 529 migrant remains are recovered each year along the Southwest border. Meanwhile, apprehension rates have hovered between 723,840 and 1,643,679, with the two lowest years for apprehensions (2007 and 2008) correlating with the two highest years for remain recovered. Moreover, as Dunn shows, even as it became clearer that militarization policies and practices were as much, if not more, about immigration as they were about drug trafficking , prevention of drugs was used as a rationale for increasingly bringing members of the military to the Southwest border. In 1989, the military created Joint Task force- 6 ( JT f- 6), a military operation designed to help patrol the border and collect information for the Border

Patrol, largely to prevent drug activity. Because of the intermixing of drug trafficking and immigration , the actions of JT f- 6 pose a serious dilemma for human rights on the border, which evidences the grave consequences of militarization. Dunn explains that while police forces such as the Border Patrol are tasked with caring about human and civil rights—though their failures are well documented (see f alcón)—military forces are tasked with diffusing potential hostile situations at virtually any cost. When JT f- 6 soldiers and marines do the job of the Border Patrol, interacting with civilian populations and having little training in the Border Patrol’s operating procedures, the consequences can be dire (Dunn, “Border Militarization”). Dunn illustrates this

situation through examining the case of the “ Redford shooting ,” in which a marine shot an eighteen- y ear- old US citizen , Esequiel Hernandez, who was tending his goats and carried a single-shot .22 caliber rifle with him to ward off animal predators. Though one might describe the Hernandez murder as an isolated incident, it suggests that militarization practices have been detrimental for citizens and migrants alike.

IMPACT 2: The “Drone Stare” dehumanizes marginalized populations and justifies structural violence by distancing drone operators from the consequences of their actions

Wall and Monahan ’11 [Tyler Wall Eastern Kentucky University, USA. Tyler Wall is an Assistant Professor in the School of Justice Studies as Eastern Kentucky University. He received his Ph.D. in Justice Studies, an interdisciplinary degree from Arizona State University. He has published his work in academic journals such as Theoretical Criminology, Social Justice: A Journal of Crime, Conflict, & World Order, Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power, and Surveillance & Society, among others. Torin Monahan Vanderbilt University, USA. Torin Monahan is Associate Professor of Communication Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Monahan is an associate editor of the leading academic journal on surveillance, Surveillance & Society. “Surveillance and violence from afar: The politics of drones and liminal security-scapes”] [MBM]

The technological mediation vital to what we call ‘ the drone stare’ is most often framed by advocates of UAV systems as an unproblematic ability to see the truth of a particular situation (see Rattansi, 2010) or to achieve a totalizing view of the ‘object’ under cosmic control . In the words of Robins and Levidow (1995: 121): ‘Enemy threats —real or imaginary , human or machine—became precise grid locations , abstracted from their human context. ’ To the extent that this description is accurate, it would appear to hold true for the use of drones in combat as well as non-combat settings . ¶ Journalist Noah Shachtman (2005), who observed drone operators monitoring the US–Mexico border, betrays through his description the dehumanizing tendency of drone- mediated perceptions : ‘ Everyone looks like germs, like ants , from the Hunter’s 15,000- foot point of view. Especially when the ant hill breaks apart, and everybody scatters in a dozen different directions.’ But this particular articulation makes no distinction between ‘illegal immigrants’, political refugees, or Mexican-American citizens. In this sense, the drone system radically homogenizes these identities into a single cluster of racialized information that is used for remote-controlled processes of control and harm. Bodies below become things to track, monitor, apprehend, and kill, while the pilot and other allies on the network remain differentiated and proximate, at least culturally if not physically. ¶ In the case of the use of military drones for ‘precision’ killing, the practical action of firing a Hellfire missile is translated and transformed by the informational system into a computerized checklist of ‘things to do’. As one journalist writes concerning US Air Force drones, ‘Now, pilots say, it takes up to 17 steps—including entering data into a pull-down window—to fire a missile’ (Drew, 2009). In this respect, as Kevin Haggerty (2006) has pointed out, the speed and mobility of informatized warfare is perforce slowed by attendant complex systems of control, which is a generalizable finding that presents an important caution against overdetermined conclusions about inevitable increases in the velocity of war

technologies. But this step-by-step process of entering ‘data’ into a computer system nonetheless propagates a dehumanizing abstraction when living human beings are rendered into mere spatial or tactical coordinates . As Avital Ronell

(1992: 75) puts it: ‘the cyborg soldier, located in command and control systems, exercises on the fields of denial’. Killing transpires not only at a distance but through the routine, banal computerized procedure of typing and clicking . UAV systems, according to one military drone operator, are ‘pretty simple’ to operate but,¶ the challenge is taking all the information available and fusing it into something that’s usable and then practicing and exercising the constraint or the lethal power to either preserve life or to prosecute an attack. And that is where the challenge really is, honing that warrior spirit— knowing when to say when.¶ (Rattansi, 2010)¶ But as

we have discussed, this ‘knowing when to say when’ is not a ‘decision’ that is made in a vacuum but is rather a

sovereign act shaped by social and political norms, which are encoded in both the institutional practices and technological systems of drone warfare.¶ The state killing enacted by UAV systems exists in a discursive and symbolic context where a steadfast belief in precision technology helps justify the techno-scientific violence of the West (Shaw, 2005). Central to common representations of virtuous warfare, and especially aerial

warfare, is the idea that the USA is technologically superior to other countries in its war capabilities, particularly because of its reliance on ‘smart bombs’ and ‘precision-guided missiles’ that distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate targets (Der Derian,

2001). This, in turn, brings about an expectation that militaries should go to great lengths to use their violence in discriminatory ways that target combatants while avoiding civilians (Beier, 2003). Militaries in

technologically advanced countries such as the US embrace this rhetoric to assert that they have the capacity to conduct war in more legal and moral ways than less technologically advanced countries (Beier, 2003).¶ Of course, claims to technological sophistication are always relative ones that can invite hubris on the part of those parties presuming superiority. This was revealed when it was discovered in 2009 that Iraqi insurgents had accessed unencrypted video footage from US Predator drones (Gorman et al., 2009). This example, while embarrassing for US military officials, illustrates a paradox in the construction of the enemy other. Insurgents were apparently presumed too backward and unsophisticated to tap unen- crypted signals broadcasted by the USA. By intercepting these signals with apparent ease using ‘$26 off-the-shelf software’ (Gorman et al., 2009) and storing the feeds on laptop computers, the enemy effectively elevated its own symbolic legitimacy as civilized peo- ples, in large part because in the West technological achievement and ability are often equated with civilization (Adas, 1989). The enemy moreover demonstrated its agency and its refusal to become a legible and docile object for

western control.¶ People who are aware of adversarial monitoring from the skies also engage in tactics to evade the drone stare. Specifically, subjects of drone surveillance have tried to be stealthier and camouflage themselves better than they have in the past. In the North¶ Waziristan region of Pakistan where drone surveillance and violence has been heavily concentrated, the standard ways in which militants have traditionally traveled, slept, and communicated has been significantly altered by the aerial gaze of UAVs, according to some local sources (Perlez and Shah, 2010). Combatants have allegedly abandoned ‘sat- ellite phones and large gatherings in favor of communicating by courier and moving stealthily in small groups’ while also establishing hide-outs in mountainside tunnels and relying more on civilian-looking transportation as opposed to ‘all-terrain vehicles’

(Perlez and Shah, 2010). In addition, if past ruses of camouflage and spatial deception employed by undocumented immigrants along US border regions are good indicators, undocumented migrants seeking entrance to the USA will find new ways of subverting and disappearing from the gaze of UAVs (Corchado, 2003).

Advantage 2: BiopoliticsWidespread use of drones colonizes civilian space – every aspect of civilian life will be policed at all times, bringing us to the brink of absolute state power over violence.

Neocleous ’13 [Mark Neocleous, PhD Philosophy, MSc Politics and Sociology, BSc Philosophy and Sociology Department of Politics and History, Brunel University, Uxbridge UB8 3PH, England. “Air power as police power,” 2013. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 2013, volume 31, pages 578 – 593] [MBM][AM]

Thus, to turn back to my argument concerning air power, what we find is that a form of technology which has been understood too readily and too easily in ‘military’ terms is better understood through the lens of police power. This is not ‘war becoming police’ and neither is it the idea that war is being reduced to police (as though war is somehow something bigger, better, more substantial than police). Neither is it a ‘small wars’ affair. My argument is that, understood in terms of the fabrication of order, this particular technology has always needed to be understood through a war–police nexus . In what remains of this paper I would like to try and strengthen this

argument by using it to try and make sense of perhaps the fundamental issue in contemporary air power: drones.

Conversely, I would like to use the contemporary development of drone technology to help restate my argument. Victory through air power As is well known, the air power used in the war on terror has increasingly been operated through drone technology. The US Department of Defense’s UAV (unmanned aerial vehicle) inventory grew from 167 in 2002 to 7000 in 2010 (Hearing before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, 2011, pages 2 and 75). Between 2001 and 2008 the hours of surveillance coverage for US Central Command encompassing Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen rose by 1431% as a result of the developing drone technology; in 2010 the US Air Force projected that the combined flight hours of all its drones would exceed 250000 hours, exceeding in one year the total number of hours from 1995 to 2007 (Turse and Engelhardt, 2012, page 37), while in the UK the Reaper UAV reached a landmark figure of 20 000 flying hours in 2011 (Ministry of Defence, 2011). At the same time, news about drones is now constant, as more and more

states (now around fifty) operate them. Drones also occupy a key space in debates about the new virtuous war—“at the heart of virtuous war is the technical capability and ethical imperative to threaten and, if necessary, actualize violence from a distance ... with no or minimal casualties” (Der Derian, 2001, page xv, emphasis in the original)—and, as a consequence, so too does anger about them among activists and critical thinkers. One feature of this anger seems to be that the drones are unmanned, and thus a new step in the technology of military ‘distancing’ or ‘risk-transfer warfare’. This claim has been made so frequently that a complete list of references would be pointless, so let Eric Hobsbawm’s more general point stand in here: one of the features of the “age of extremes”, notes Hobsbawm, is the “new impersonality of warfare, which turned killing and maiming into the remote consequence of pushing a button or moving a lever. Technology made its victims invisible, as people eviscerated by bayonets, or seen through the sights of firearms, could not be.” One of Hobsbawm’s main examples is, unsurprisingly, air power: “Far below the aerial bombers were not people about to be burned an eviscerated, but targets ... the greatest cruelties of our century have been the impersonal cruelties of remote decision” (1994, page 50). The impersonal cruelty of remote killing and unmanned technology seems to be the essence of one aspect of the criticism of drones: bombings and assassinations by a piece of equipment far removed from any human operator. From a critical perspective, this seems a rather naive thing to be angry about, either in terms of the conflicts of world history or in terms of technological possibility, since

maximising lethality while reducing the risk to a state’s own combatants is inherent to the logic of all military technological advance. The other major concern people have about drones is that they now patrol the skies not just in the lands of

Afghanistan, Iraq, and Pakistan but of the whole planet, and not just in ‘war zones’ but in ‘civilian areas’. Thus one finds that they now fly over cities engaged in police operations , from managing emergencies caused by natural disasters to spying on foreign drug cartels, fighting crime , conducting border control operations, and general surveillance (Wall and Monahan, 2011, page 240). In the US, following a 2003 decision by the Federal Aviation Authority to grant license to UAVs to fly over American civilian airspace, more and more American states now work with drones, and a Congressional Research Service report noted in 2010 that “recent UAV modification is part of an ongoing push by some policymakers and CBP [Customs and

Border Protection] to both expand CBP’s UAV resources and open domestic airspace for UAV operations” (Haddal and Gertler, 2010, page 1). In the UK a number of police forces have trialled the use of drones, over 120 companies have been given ‘blanket permission’ to fly small drones within the UK for surveillance purposes, and the UK ASTRAEA programme aims to “enable the routine use of UAS [Unmanned Aircraft Systems] in all classes of airspace without the need for restrictive or specialised conditions

of operation” (ASTRAEA, 2012; also Cole, 2012, page 26). Hence the criticism, which runs: this is technology designed for war and it is being used to police civilians; it is another step in the ‘militarisation’ of policing. My argument, however, is that air power has always been police power. On this basis we need to read the drone not as a new form of military technology that is somehow being allowed to sneak into civilian spaces but, rather, as a continuation of the police logic inherent in air power since its inception . Despite the

publicity surrounding them the vast majority of drones are not sophisticated bombing or killing machines but are in fact small and unarmed models used primarily for battlefield surveillance. Of the 10499 missions flown by Predator and Reaper drones over Iraq and Afghanistan during 2007 and 2008, missiles were fired on only 244 missions (Turse and Engelhardt, 2012, page 149; Wall and Monahan, 2011, page 242). Their key feature is that they are disposable, a feature highlighted by the smaller and smaller UAVs, dropped from aircraft, fired into the air by hand, catapult, or slingshot (Blackmore, 2005, pages 130–131; Singer, 2009, pages 116–120). This

disposability is a reflection of their main function which is not to bomb or assassinate but to gather—that is, to construct—

knowledge. This explains the surveillance-oriented names for almost all the different drones—Global Hawk, Dragon Eye,

Desert Hawk, Gorgon Stare (after the creature in Greek mythology whose main power resided in the eye), Watchkeeper—and

goes some way to also explaining why they are spoken o f by the state less as killing machines and more in terms of a range of other abilities, such as recognizing and categorizing humans and human-made objects , identifying movements, interpreting footprints, and distinguishing different kinds of tracks on the earth’s surface. Moreover, and more pressingly, we need

to understand that from the wider historical perspective of air power there are no civilian areas and there are no civilians; the only logic is a police logic. As soon as air power was created the issue was: what does this do to civilian space? And, essentially, the answer has been: ‘it destroys it’. Air power thus likewise destroys the concept of the civilian. This was the major theme of the air power literature of the 1920s, found in the work of Mitchell, Seversky, Fuller, and all the others, but the analysis provided in The Command of the Air by Giulio Douhet, first published in 1921, expanded in 1927, and perhaps the first definitive account of the influence of air power on world history, is representative: the art of aerial warfare, notes Douhet, is the art of destroying cities, of attacking civilians, of terrorising the population. In the future, war “will be waged essentially against the unarmed

populations of the cities and great industrial centres”. There are no longer soldiers and citizens, or combatants and noncombatants: “war is no longer a clash between armies, but is a clash between nations, between whole populations.” Aerial bombing means war is now “total war” (Douhet, 2003, pages 11; 158; 223). The major powers fought against accepting this for some time. (Or at least, fought against accepting it in their classic doctrine of war as a battle between militarily industrialised nation-states; the police bombing of colonies was entirely acceptable to them, as we have seen). But eventually, in the course of World War 2 they conceded, and by July 1945 a US Army assessment of strategic air power could openly state that “there are no

civilians in Japan” (cited in Sherry, 1987, page 311). This view has been maintained ever since: “There are no innocent civilians”, says US General Curtis LeMay (cited in Sherry, 1987, page 287). Recent air power literature on ‘the enemy as a system’ continues this very line.(4) Hence, and contrary to claims made at both ends of the political spectrum that the recent air attacks in Beirut and Gaza reveal “the increasing meaninglessness of the word ‘civilian’” (Dershowitz, 2006) or mean that we might be “witnessing ... the death of the idea of the civilian” (Gregory, 2006, page 633), it has to be said that any meaningful concept of ‘the civilian’ was destroyed with the very invention of air

power (Hartigan, 1982, page 119).(5) The point is that seen from the perspective of air power as police power, the use of drone technology over what some would still like to call ‘civilian spaces’ was highly predictable.

This allows us to make a far more compelling argument about drones. For like air power technology in general, the drone serves as both plane and possibility (Pandya, 2010, page 143). And what becomes possible with the drone is permanent police presence across the territory. “Unmanned aircraft have just revolutionized our ability to provide a constant stare against our enemy”, said a senior US military official. “Using the all-seeing eye, you will find out who is important in a network, where they live, where they get their support from, where their friends are” (cited in Barnes, 2009). Much as this might be important geopolitically, with drones being capable of maintaining nonstop surveillance of vast swathes of land and sea for so long as the technology and fuel supplies allow, it is also

nothing less than the state’s dream of a perpetual police presence across the territory (Neocleous, 2000). And

it is a police presence encapsulated by the process of colonisation, captured in the army document

“StrikeStar 2025” which speaks of the permanent presence of UAVs in the sky as a form of “air occupation”

(Carmichael et al, 1996, page viii). Drones have been described as the perfect technology for democratic warfare, combining as they do a certain utilitarian character with an appealing ‘risk-transfer’ (Sauer and Schoring, 2012),

but perhaps we need to think of them equally as the perfect technology of liberal police. When in 1943 Disney sought to popularise the idea of ‘victory through air power’, the company probably had little idea just quite what this victory might mean,

beyond the defeat of Japan. But if there is a victory through air power to be had on the part of the state it is surely not merely the defeat of a military enemy but the victory of perpetual police .

IMPACT 1: Pedagogy—breaking through censorship and repression is key to curtailing the neoliberal ideology that causes oppressionGiroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP] edited for ablest language

Some of the most dreadful consequences of neoliberal modernity and cultures of surveillance include the elimination of those public spheres capable of educating the public to hold power accountable , and the dissolution of all social bonds that entail a sense of responsibility toward others. In this instance, politics has not only become dysfunctional and corrupt in the face of massive inequalities in wealth and power, it also has been emptied of any substantive meaning . Government not only has fallen into the hands of the elite and right-wing extremists, it has embraced a mode of lawlessness evident in forms of foreign and domestic terrorism that undercuts the obligations of citizenship, justice and morality . As surveillance and fear become a constant condition of American society, there is a growing indifference, if

not distaste, for politics among large segments of the population. This distaste is purposely manufactured by the ongoing operations of political repression against intellectuals, artists, nonviolent protesters and journalists on the left and right. Increasingly, as such populations engage in dissent and the free flow of ideas, whether online or offline,

they are considered dangerous to the state and become subject to the mechanizations of a massive security apparatuses designed to monitor, control and punish dissenting populations. For instance, in England, the new head of MI5, the British intelligence service, mimicking the US government's distrust of journalists, stated that the stories The Guardian published about Snowden's revelations "were a gift to terrorists," reinforcing the notion that whistle-blowers and journalists might be considered terrorists.42 Similar comments about Snowden have been made in the United States by members of Congress who have labeled Snowden a traitor, including Sens. Dianne Feinstein, a California Democrat; John McCain, an Arizona Republican; Saxby Chambliss, a Georgia Republican; and House Speaker John Boehner, as well as former Vice President Dick Cheney.43 Greenwald, one of the first journalists to divulge Snowden's revelations about the NSA's secret "unaccountable system of pervasive surveillance"44 has been accused by Rep. Peter King of New York along with others of being a terrorist.45 More ominously, "Snowden told German TV ... about reports that U.S. government officials want to assassinate him for leaking secret documents about the NSA's collection of telephone records and emails."46 As the line collapses

between authoritarian power and democratic governance, state and corporate repression intensifies and increasingly engulfs the nation in a toxic climate of fear and self-censorship in which free speech, if not critical thought, itself is viewed as too dangerous in which to engage. The NSA, alone, has become what Scott Shane has called an "electronic omnivore of staggering capabilities, eavesdropping and hacking its way around the world to strip governments and other targets of their secrets, all while enforcing the utmost secrecy about its own operations. It spies routinely on friends as well as foes."47 Intelligence benefits are far outweighed by the illegal use of the Internet, telecommunication companies and stealth malware for data collection and government interventions that erode civil liberties and target individuals and groups that pose no threat whatsoever to national security. New technologies that range from webcams and spycams to biometrics and Internet drilling reinforce not only the fear of being watched, monitored and investigated but also a propensity toward confessing one's intimate thoughts and sharing the most personal of information. What is profoundly disturbing and worth repeating in this case is the new intimacy between digital technologies and cultures of surveillance in which there exists a profound an unseen intimate connection into the most personal and private areas as subjects publish and document their

interests, identities, hopes and fears online in massive quantities.48 Surveillance propped up as the new face of intimacy becomes the order of the day, eradicating free expression and , to some degree, even thinking itself. In the age of the self-absorbed self and its mirror image, the selfie, intimacy becomes its opposite and the exit from privacy becomes symptomatic of a society that gave up on the social and historical memory.

One of the most serious conditions that enable the expansion of the corporate-state surveillance

apparatus is the erasure of public memory. The renowned anthropologist David Price rightly argues that historical memory is one of the primary weapons to be used against the abuse of power and that is why "those who have power create a 'desert of organized forgetting.' "49 For Price, it is crucial to reclaim America's battered public memories as a political and

pedagogical task as part of the broader struggle to regain lost privacy and civil liberties."50 Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, America has succumbed to a form of historical amnesia fed by a culture of fear, militarization and precarity . Relegated to the dustbin of organized forgetting were the long-standing abuses carried out by America's intelligence agencies and the public's long-standing distrust of the FBI, government wiretaps and police actions that threatened privacy rights, civil liberties and those freedoms fundamental to a democracy. In the present historical moment, it is almost impossible to imagine that wiretapping was once denounced by the FBI or that legislation was passed in the early part of the 20th century that criminalized and outlawed the federal use of wiretaps.51 Nor has much been written about the Church and Pike committees, which in the 1970s

exposed a wave of illegal surveillance and disruption campaigns carried out by the FBI and local police forces, most of which were aimed at anti-war demonstrators , the leaders of the civil rights movement and the Black Panthers. And while laws implementing judicial oversight for federal wiretaps were put in place, they were systematically dismantled under the Reagan, Clinton, Bush and Obama administrations. As Price points out, while there was a steady increase in federal wiretaps throughout the 1980s and 1990s, "in

the immediate aftermath of 9/11, the American public hastily abandoned a century of fairly consistent opposition to govern wiretaps."52 As the historical memory of such abuses disappeared, repressive legislation such as the USA PATRIOT Act and growing support for a panoptical surveillance and "homeland" security state increased to the point of dissolving the line between private and public, on the one hand, and tilting the balance between security and civil liberties largely in favor of a culture of fear and its underside, a

managed emphasis on a one-dimensional notion of safety and security. The violence of organized forgetting has another component besides the prevalence of a culture of fear and hyper-nationalism that emerged after 9/11 .

Since the 1980s, the culture of neoliberalism with its emphasis on the self, privatization and consumerism largely has functioned to disparage any notion of the public good , social responsibility and collective action, if not politics itself. Historical memories of collective struggles against government and corporate abuses have been deposited down the memory hole, leaving largely unquestioned the growing inequalities in wealth and income, along with the increased militarization and financialization of American society. Even the history of authoritarian movements appears to have been forgotten as right-wing extremists in North Carolina, Wisconsin, Maine, Florida and other states attempt to suppress long-established voting rights, use big money to sway elections, destroy public and higher education as a public good, and substitute emotion and hatred for

reasoned arguments.53 Manufactured ignorance spreads through the dominant cultural apparatuses like a wildfire promoting the financialization of everything as a virtue and ethics as a liability. The flight from historical memory has been buttressed by a retreat into a politics of self-help and a culture of self-blame in which all problems are viewed as "evidence of personal shortcomings that, if left uncorrected, hold individuals back from

attaining stability and security."54 Within the crippling [devastating] "affective and ideological spaces of neoliberalism," memory recedes, social responsibility erodes, and individual outrage and collective resistance are [silenced] muted. 55 Under such circumstances, public issues collapse into private troubles and the language of the politics is emptied so that it becomes impossible to connect the ravages that bear down on individuals to broader systemic, structural and social considerations. Under such circumstances, historical memory offers no buffer to the proliferation of a kind of mad violence and paranoid culture of media-induced fear that turns every public space into a war zone . Consequently, it is not surprising that the American public barely blinks in the face of a growing surveillance state. Nor is it surprising that intellectuals such as Sean Wilentz can claim that "the lack of fealty to the imperatives of the surveillance community as demonstrated by Edward Snowden, Glenn Greenwald, and Julian Assange is an assault on the modern liberal state itself."56 Indeed, what the new apologists for the surveillance state refuse to recognize is a history of abuse and criminal behavior by US intelligence apparatuses that were less concerned with implementing the law, arresting criminals and preventing terrorist acts than they were in suppressing dissent and punishing those groups marginalized by race and class. In a moving account of the use of surveillance by Pinochet under the Chilean dictatorship, Ariel Dorfman argues that surveillance not only was linked "to a legacy of broken bodies and twisted minds, the lingering aftermath of executions and torture" but also to an assault on the imagination itself, which under Pinochet's reign of terror lived in fear that no word, gesture, comment would be "immune from surveillance."57 What is to be learned from this period of history in which surveillance became central to a machinery of torture and death? Dorfman answers the question with great clarity and insight, one that should serve as a warning to those so willing to sacrifice civil liberties to security. He writes: Who was to guarantee that someday, someone might not activate a network like this one all over again? Someday? Someone? Why not right then and there, in democratic, supposedly post-atrocity Santiago in 2006? Were not similar links and nexuses and connections and eyes and ears doing the same job, eavesdropping, collecting data and voices and knowledge for a day when the men in the shadows might be asked once again to act drastically and lethally?And why only in Santiago? What about America today, where, compared to the data-crunching clout of the NSA and other dis-intelligence agencies, Pinochet's [surveillance state] looks puny and outdated - like a samurai sword noticed by an airman above, about to drop a nuclear bomb on Hiroshima? What about

elsewhere on this planet, where democratic governments far and wide systematically spy on their own citizens? Aren't we all in harm's way?58 America is not simply in harm's way, it stands at the end of precipice about to fall into what Hannah Arendt once called "dark times." As memory recedes so does political consciousness, particularly the danger that the surveillance state has posed to poor and working-class Americans who have been monitored for years and as Virginia Eubanks points out "already live in the surveillance future."59 She writes: The practice of surveillance is both separate and unequal. ... Welfare recipients ... are more vulnerable to surveillance because they are members of a group that is seen as an appropriate target for intrusive programs. Persistent stereotypes of poor women, especially women of color, as inherently suspicious, fraudulent, and wasteful provide ideological support for invasive welfare programs that track their financial and social behavior. Immigrant communities are more likely to be the site of biometric data collection than native-born communities because they have less political power to resist it. ... Marginalized people are subject to some of the most technologically sophisticated and comprehensive forms of scrutiny and observation in law enforcement, the welfare system, and the low-wage workplace. They also endure higher levels of direct forms of surveillance, such as stop-and-frisk in New York City.60 The corporate-surveillance state collects troves of data, but the groups often targeted by traditional and new forms of digital surveillance are more often than not those who fall within the parameters of either being a threat to authority, reject the consumer culture or are simply considered disposable under the regime of neoliberal capitalism. The political, class and racial nature of suppression has a long history in the United States and cannot be ignored by whitewashing the issue of surveillance as a form of state violence by making an appeal to the necessity of safety and security. Totalitarian paranoia runs deep in American society, and it now inhabits the highest levels of government.61 There is no excuse for intellectuals or any other member of the American public to address the existence, meaning and purpose of the surveillance-security state without placing it in the historical structure of the times. Or what might be called a

historical conjuncture in which the legacy of totalitarianism is once again reasserting itself in new forms. Historical memory is about more than recovering the past ; it is also about imputing history with a sense of responsibility , treating it with respect rather than with reverence. Historical memory should always be insurgent, rubbing "taken-for- granted history against the grain so as to revitalize and rearticulate what one sees as desirable and necessary for an open, just and life sustaining" democracy and future.62 Historical memory is a crucial battleground for challenging a corporate-surveillance state that is motivated by the anti-democratic legal, economic and political interests . But if memory is to function as a witness to injustice and the practice of criticism and renewal, it must embrace the pedagogical task of connecting the historical , personal and social . It is worth repeating that C.W.

Mills was right in arguing that those without power need to connect personal troubles with public issues and that is as much an educational endeavour and responsibility as it is a political and cultural task.63

The point of no return is the normalization of surveillance- an affirmative ballot is key to acknowledge the problems inherent in surveillance cultures and check back the tide of neoliberalismGiroux 14 Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state

The point of no return in the emergence of the corporate-state surveillance apparatus is not strictly confined to the task of archiving immense pools of data collection to be used in a number of illegal ways.18 It is in creating a culture in which surveillance becomes trivialized, celebrated, and legitimated as reasonable and unquestioned behavior. Evidence that diverse forms of public pedagogy are sanctioning the security state is on full display in post-Orwellian America, obvious in schools that demand that students wear radio chips so they can be tracked.19 Such anti-democratic projects are now also funded by billionaires like Bill Gates who push for the use of biometric bracelets to monitor students' attentiveness in

classrooms.20 The normalization of surveillance is also evident in the actions of giant Internet providers who use social messaging to pry personal information from their users. The reach of the surveillance culture can also be seen in the use of

radio chips and GPS technologies used to track a person's movements across time and space. At the same time, cultures of surveillance work hard to trivialize the importance of a massive surveillance environment by transforming it into a source of entertainment. This is evident in the popularity of realty TV shows such as "Big Brother" or "Undercover Boss," which turn the event of constant

surveillance into a voyeuristic pleasure.21 The atrophy of democratic intuitions of culture and governance are evident in popular representations that undermine the meaning of democracy as a collective ethos that unconditionally stands for social, economic, and political rights.22 One example can be found in Hollywood films that glorify hackers such as those in the Matrix trilogy, or movies that celebrate professionalized modern spying and the government agents using their omniscient technological gizmos to fight terrorists and other forces of evil.

What is lost in the culture of surveillance is that spying and the unwarranted collection of personal information

from people who have not broken the law in the name of national security and for commercial purposes is a procedure often

adopted by totalitarian states . The surveillance state with its immense data mining capabilities represents a historical rupture from traditional notions of modernity with its emphasis on enlightenment, reason, and the social contract. The older modernity held up the ideals of justice, equality, freedom, and democracy, however flawed. The investment in public goods was seen as central to a social contract that implied that all citizens should have access to those

provisions, resources, institutions, and benefits that expanded their sense of agency and social responsibility. The new modernity and its expanding surveillance net subordinates human needs, public goods, and justice to the demands of commerce and the accumulation of capital, at all costs. The contemporary citizen is primarily a consumer and entrepreneur wedded to the belief that the most desirable features of human behavior are rooted in a "basic tendency towards competitive, acquisitive and uniquely self-interested

behavior which is the central fact of human social life."23 Modernity is now driven by the imperatives of a savage neoliberal political and economic system that embrace what Charles Derber and June Sekera call a "public goods deficit" in which "budgetary priorities" are relentlessly pushed so as to hollow out the welfare state and drastically reduce social provisions as part of a larger neoliberal counter revolution to lower the taxes

of the rich and mega-corporations while selling off public good to private interests.24 Debates about the meaning and purpose of the public and social good have been co-opted by a politics of fear , relegating notions of the civic good, public sphere, and even the very word "public" to the status of a liability, if not a pathology.25 Fear has lost its social connotations and no longer references fear of social deprivations such as

poverty, homelessness, lack of health care, and other fundamental conditions of agency. Fear is now personalized, reduced to an atomized fear that revolves arou nd crime, safety, apocalypse, and survival . In this instance, as the late Harvard economist

John Kenneth Galbraith once warned, modernity now privileges "a disgraceful combination of 'private opulence and public squalor.' "26 This is not surprising given the basic elements of neoliberal policy, which as Jeremy Gilbert indicates, include the: privatization of public assets, contraction and centralization of democratic institutions, deregulation of labor markets, reductions in progressive taxation, restrictions on labor organization,

labor market deregulation, active encouragement of competitive and entrepreneurial modes of relation across the public and commercial sectors.27 Under the regime of neoliberal capitalism, the expansion of government and corporate surveillance measures become synonymous with new forms of governance and an intensification of material and symbolic violence.28 Rather than wage a war on terrorists, the neoliberal security state wages a war on dissent in the interest of consolidating class power. How else to explain the merging of corporate and state surveillance systems updated with the most sophisticated shared technologies used in the last few years to engage in illicit counterintelligence operations, participate in industrial espionage29 and disrupt and attack pro-democracy movements such as Occupy and a range of other nonviolent social movements protesting a myriad of state and corporate injustices.30 This type of illegal spying in the interest of stealing industrial secrets and closing down dissent by peaceful protesters has less to do with national security than it has to do with mimicking the abuses and tactics used by the Stasi in East Germany during the Cold War. How else to explain why many law-abiding citizens "and those with dissenting views

within the law can be singled out for surveillance and placed on wide-ranging watch lists relating to terrorism."31 Public outrage seems to disappear, with few exceptions, as the state and its corporate allies do little to protect privacy rights, civil liberties and a culture of critical exchange and dissent. Even worse, they shut down a culture of questioning and engage in forms of domestic terrorism. State violence in this case becomes the preferred antidote to the demanding work of reflection, analysis, dialogue and imagining the points of views of others. The war against dissent waged by secret counterintelligence agencies is a mode of domestic terrorism in which, as

David Graeber has argued, violence is "often the preferred weapon of the stupid."32 Modernity in this instance has been updated, wired and militarized. No longer content to play out its historical role of a modernized panopticon, it has become militarized and a multilayered source of insecurity, entertainment and commerce. In addition, this new stage of modernity is driven not only by the need to watch but also the will to punish. Phone calls, emails, social networks and almost every other vestige of electronic communication are now being collected and stored by corporate and government organizations such as the NSA and numerous other intelligence agencies. Snowden's exposure of the massive reach of the surveillance state with its biosensors, scanners, face recognition technologies, miniature drones, high speed computers, massive data mining capabilities and other stealth technologies made visible "the stark realities of disappearing privacy and diminishing liberties."33 But the NSA and the other 16 intelligence agencies are not the only threat to privacy, freedom and democracy. Corporations now have their own intelligence agencies and data mining offices and use these agencies and new surveillance technologies largely to spy on those who question the abuses of corporate power. The emergence of fusion centers exemplifies how power is now a mix of corporate, local, federal and global intelligence agencies, all sharing information that can be used by various agencies to stifle dissent and punish pro-democracy activists. What is clear is that this combination of gathering and sharing information often results in a lethal mix of anti-democratic practices in which surveillance

now extends not only to potential terrorists but to all law-abiding citizens. Within this sinister web of secrecy, suspicion, state-sanctioned violence and illegality, the culture of authoritarianism thrives and poses a dangerous threat to democratic

freedoms and rights. It also poses a threat to those outside the United States who, in the name of national security, are subject to "a grand international campaign with drones and special operations forces that is

generating potential terrorists at every step."34 Behind this veil of concentrated power and secrecy lies not only a threat to privacy rights but the very real threat of violence on both a domestic and global level.

IMPACT 2: Self-Regulation and the crushing of activism leads to totalitarian governmentO’Neill 14-Joint Programme Director - Contextual Studies @ the University of Wales [Timi, “Michel Foucault predicts the NSA's cyber Panopticon,” Pg. 7-9, DKP]

The first thing we should highlight in our attempt to see the actions of the NSA through the eyes of Foucault should be look at the work of Jeremy Bentham and his Panopticon prison. This will help us later transfigure this physical prison into something much more ethereal and cyber; i.e. the Internet. The utilitarian Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832) created plans to develop a circular prison that would act as a fairer and more just way of incarcerating prisoners. He was also at the forefront of creating a system whereby punishment would lead to individuals within society actively altering their behaviour in order to avoid punishment and imprisonment.

In this thought, he developed plans for his Panopticon prison (Fig.1 below). Although he tried to have prisons such as these built in both Great Britain and

Russian, none were erected in the UK. These prisons were designed to maximise surveillance of prisoners and would led, he argued to “…make prison control safer, more effective, more humane, and efficient by increasing discipline while reducing staff resources required to maintain it. Prisoners in the panopticon would work rather than sitting idle, and, in the process, would not only learn the benefits of discipline but also make a profit for the prison itself.”

How does this help us understand the current issue of the NSA, PRISM and the Internet? This requires us to look at the architecture of the Internet. Now granted, the internet does not have a centre as envisioned in Bentham’s prison, but it does have ISPs and companies who

monitor (albeit they say loosely) internet traffic and management of metadata. What we saw with the actions of the NSA could be seen as the prison guards making us aware of the power of surveillance and their ability to watch and direct our behaviour; i.e. our patterns and content of our internet searches and telephone calls. Unlike, Bentham’s aims however, the effects of such surveillance do little to promote a fairer society; instead it breeds distrust, paranoia and panic. This could be seen as far as the Kremlin where President Putin has issued warnings of the power and function of the Internet, “However Moscow has recently changed its tune, with Mr Putin branding the internet an ongoing "CIA project".” 30 This is mirrored in the writings of Foucault where he argued that the Panopticon, or in

our case the internet was used as a way to change people’s behaviour, ‘the major effect of the Panopticon [is to] to induce in the inmate a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power ”. 31

This makes us see how through observation, the body and mind of the individual is constantly under interrogation. We need only see how users of facebook curtail their behaviour and body image through the eyes of others. This impacts on the bio-political aspects of surveillance, but also and perhaps more importantly it impacts on the way we use the Internet to seek questions to

issues that perhaps runs the risk of establishing the dominant vision of society. This link to power is at the heart of the relevancy of

Foucault and the actions of the NSA; In his famous Discipline and Punish , Foucault argues that we live in a world where the state exercises power in the same fashion as the Panopticon’s guards. Foucault called it “disciplinary power ;” the basic idea is that the omnipresent fear of being watched by the state or judged according to prevailing social norms caused people to adjust the way they acted

and even thought without ever actually punished. People had become “self-regulating” agents , people who “voluntarily” changed who they were to fit social and political expectations without any need for actual coercion. 32 In

this way, we could argue that the NSA wanted to be seen as being ‘caught out’ so that the panic of observation or surveillance would produce a radical movement towards ‘self-regulating’ and ‘docile bodies’ – a situation that would in many ways suit the needs and demands of an elite and their exercise in control, “When one undertakes to correct a prisoner, someone who has been sentenced, one tries to correct the person according to the risk of relapse, of recidivism, that is to say according to what will very soon be called dangerousness – that is to say, again, a mechanism of security.” 33 In this way, we could see that Foucault warns us to see the controversy as one where that the historically determined subject/self is the real victim in the cyber attacks. By attempting to mould individuals through surveillance and self-regulation, it is possible that we are in the middle of a needed ‘reset’ of individuals in a new age. This is supported, perhaps in the following

‘un-sourced’ quotation from a George Bush jnr political aide; We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality . And while you're studying that reality - judiciously, as you will - we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors, and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do. 34 In a previous quotation, the use of the word ‘security’ is one overplayed by western politicians. Whether it be the chemical weapons of Assad or the actions of ISIS, the national security card is played regularly. In this sense,

Foucault’s idea of surveillance help us see the NSA as prison guards watching over a yet undisciplined

populace. This is indeed a scary thought and one that should be seen within the dynamics of a battle for the control of power within society. The West prides itself on freedoms and ideas of enlightened thinking, but also politicians know that with such freedoms comes a potential crisis in control, legitimacy and in many

ways, sovereignty; “ Sovereignty is exercised within the borders of a territory, discipline is exercised on the bodies of individuals, and security is exercised over a whole population.” 35 Security here is quite easily be replaced by the

adjective ‘power’. When power is exercised over the population, we find ourselves in a position of seeing the state in many ways as a hidden fascist elite, hell-bent on controlling the mind, bodies and actions of an enslaved prison populace . … one of the characteristic traits of our society. It’s a type of power that is applied to individuals in the form of continuous

individual supervision, in the form of control, punishment, and compensation, and in the form of correction, that is the moulding and transformation of individuals in terms of certain norms. 3

The impact is the normalization of militant surveillance that perpetuates totalitarian violence Giroux 14

Giroux 14-Global TV Network Chair Professorship at McMaster University in the English and Cultural Studies Department and a Distinguished Visiting Professorship at Ryerson University [Henry, “Totalitarian Paranoia in the Post-Orwellian Surveillance State,” Truthout, February 10, 2014, http://www.truth-out.org/opinion/item/21656-totalitarian-paranoia-in-the-post-orwellian-surveillance-state, DKP]

The revelations of whistle-blowers such as Chelsea Manning, Jeremy Hammond and Edward Snowden about government lawlessness and corporate spying provide a new meaning if not a revitalized urgency and relevance to

George Orwell's dystopian fable 1984 . Orwell offered his readers an image of the modern state that had become dystopian - one in which privacy as a civil virtue and a crucial right was no longer valued as a measure of the robust strength of a healthy and thriving democracy. Orwell

was clear that the right to privacy had come under egregious assault. But the right to privacy pointed to something more sinister than the violation of individual rights. When ruthlessly transgressed, the issue of privacy became a moral and political principle by which to assess the nature, power and severity of an emerging totalitarian state. As important as Orwell's warning was in shedding light on the horrors of mid-20th century totalitarianism and the endless

regimes of state spying imposed on citizens, the text serves as a brilliant but limited metaphor for mapping the expansive trajectory of global surveillance and authoritarianism now characteristic of the first decades of the new millennium. As Marjorie Cohn has indicated, "Orwell never could have imagined that the National Security

Agency (NSA) would amass metadata on billions of our phone calls and 200 million of our text messages every day. Orwell could not have foreseen that our government would read the content of our emails, file transfers, and live chats from the social media we use."1

IMPACT 3: Structural Violence- Constant targeting of people of color creates “double consciousness” where people of color must self-identify as criminals in order to maintain the dream of citizenship Deflem 8-prof of sociology @ University of South Carolina [Mathieu, “Citizenship, hyper-surveillance, double-consciousness: racial profiling as panoptic governance”, Surveillance and Governance: Crime Control and Beyond, 2008, pp. 254-255, aps] ***Modified for gendered language

Any examination of surveillance and governance concerns in a racial state such as the U nited States must include the contemporary phenomenon of racial profiling . This chapter examines how the personal experiences of people of color in racialized encounters with law enforcement go well beyond the local , micro-level association focused on in the current racial profiling literature. My respondents clearly reflect on these encounters as racializing and criminalizing experiences with the state that are experienced as watershed moments in their lives. The overarching theme that emerges from their narratives is one of a break from citizenship and the liberty and justice rights frame that encompasses it. In other

examinations of how race operates in the criminal justice system, this process is referred to as an ‘‘attenuation’’ of citizenship (Pettit & Western, 2004).

Western (2006, p. 193), in his examination of the role and effects of status differentials in regard to incarceration, views the effects of race and socioeconomic status as an ‘‘evolutionary’’ aspect of African-American citizenship because of the retrenchment of citizenship that results from disenfranchisement resulting from incarceration (of which racial profiling is a potential precursor to). Yet, as shown by the active and frequent engagement of the justice and liberty rights frame that many of my respondents

engage, my respondents continue to make claim to the citizenship realm and resist denial of full citizenship by the racial state. Writing in the late 1800s, DuBois (1986, p. 364) described this same struggle to reconcile the ‘‘warring ideals’’ of minority identity and citizen identity imposed by the racial state with the self- identified sense of being a full citizen. In this regard, the current study finds that for people of color, the racialized traffic stop is deeply contextualized within a well-developed base of knowledge about how race operates in the United States. This goes to the DuBoisian perspective that people of color possess insight into the inner workings of the social world – they know the ‘‘souls of white folks’’ to a greater extent than Whites understand the experiences of people of color. My respondents indicate that they assess their encounters with the state by comparing similarly-situated conditions with Whites or through a process of elimination that racial status is the motivating factor in their being stopped, among other things. Indeed, many, though not all, respondents articulated initial reluctance to view a traffic stop (and the criminal justice system generally) as raced, having adopted and believed in much of the liberty and justice frame that orients our national,

and specifically criminal justice, discourse. This classic construction of living in both worlds is very much a part of the contemporary experience of people of color. Strides that have been made in the years following DuBois’s 1897 treatise may have dulled the demarcation of citizenship that existed in DuBois’s day, but those strides remain outweighed by the restricted substance of citizenship for communities of

color. As Foucault argues, surveillance as a tool of governance by the state is a form of ‘‘disciplinary’’ power that is: exercised through its invisibility; at the same time it imposes on those whom it subjects a principle of compulsory visibility . In discipline, it is the subjects who have to be seen. Their visibility assures the hold of the power that is

exercised over them. It is the fact of being constantly seen , of being able always to be seen, that maintains the disciplined individual in his [their] subjection . And the examination is the technique by which power , instead

of emitting the signs of its potency, instead of imposing its mark on its subjects, holds them in a mechanism of objectification. (Foucault,

1977, p. 187) Foucault’s conception of panopticonism , as argued earlier, is an appropriate backdrop for contextualizing racialized traffic stops and the more general idea of the criminalization of communities of color . The obvious connection concerns the foundation of racial profiling processes: the omnipresent eye of the state on communities of color, especially young minority males. The Panopticon effect , as discussed, also includes a permanent change in the individual under its effects to where views of the state (as embodied by the panoptic processes) become alienated from previously neutral or even positive standpoints. The racial surveillance and governance that manifests in racial profiling practices complicates the notion that surveillance as a tool of the state is primarily about

crime control. These processes are fundamentally about racialized social control that exploit society’s emphasis on particularly forms of behavior in order to maintain racial ordering spatially, ideologically, and politically. Ultimately, while my respondents acknowledge that racial governance via panoptic surveillance processes limits full citizenship, they still engage the promise of citizenship by self-identifying as such and resisting the criminal identity imposed upon them by the state .

Thus, the plan: The United States Federal Government will substantially curtail its domestic surveillance by instituting the requirement that law enforcement agencies obtain search warrants prior to the operation of drones in surveillance activities.

SolvencyComprehensive warrant requirements are key to prevent drone abuseACLU 2015 (American Civil Liberties Union, https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-technologies/domestic-drones)

U.S. law enforcement is greatly expanding its use of surveillance drones , and private actors are also seeking to use the technology for personal and commercial use. Drones have many beneficial uses, including in search-and-rescue missions, scientific research, mapping, and more. But deployed without proper regulation, drones equipped with facial recognition software, infrared technology, and speakers capable of monitoring personal conversations would cause unprecedented invasions of our privacy rights. Interconnected drones could enable mass tracking of vehicles and people in wide areas. Tiny drones could go completely unnoticed while peering into the window of a home or place of worship. Surveillance drones have been the subject of fierce debate among both legislators and the public, giving rise to an impressive amount of state legislation—proposed and enacted—to protect individuals’ privacy. Uniform rules should be enacted to ensure that we can enjoy the benefits of this new technology without bringing us closer to a “surveillance society” in which our every move is monitored, tracked, recorded, and scrutinized by the government. The ACLU recommends the following safeguards: • Usage Limits: A drone should be deployed by law enforcement only with a warrant, in an emergency, or when there are specific and articulable grounds to believe that the drone will collect evidence relating to a specific criminal act . • Data Retention: Images should be retained only when there is reasonable suspicion that they contain evidence of a crime or are relevant to an ongoing investigation or trial. • Policy: Usage policy on drones should be decided by the public’s representatives, not by police departments, and the policies should be clear, written, and open to the public. • Abuse Prevention and Accountability : Use of domestic drones should be subject to open audits and proper oversight to prevent misuse. • Weapons: Domestic drones should not be equip ped with lethal or non-lethal weapons .

And, warrants are key to check militarization of domestic space – accountability guarantees transparency & limits the scope of acceptable drone operations.

Bauer, 2013 (Max, JD @ Boston College – Attorney at White & Associates, “Domestic Drone Surveillance Usage: Threats and Opportunities for Regulation,” ACLU Briefing Paper, Online: https://privacysos.org/domestic_drones)

History shows that our response to threats to our physical safety mustn't involve programs or policies that diminish our core rights . Two centuries ago, during a time of great national insecurity, the War of 1812, the Constitution’s primary author, President James Madison, took virtually no steps to diminish civil liberties. Madison's approach did not lead to the nation’s

demise. [56] With the rise of domestic drones as a cherry on top of an already sprawling surveillance state, America is headed in the opposite direction . But there is time yet to ensure the technology doesn't trample all over our rights. If mass drone surveillance is inescapable, warrant and data collection reporting requirements will provide a critical check against government abuses . Justice Brandeis has written,

“Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient policeman.” [57] Domestic drones can monitor individuals almost constantly; it’s therefore essential to have sunlight shine upon their operators, to monitor their actions. The publicity necessary to hold their operations accountable to the public requires transparency and accountability. [58] Drone usage will continue to expand and may not stop even at infrared camera

surveillance and biometric data acquisition. The Guardian’s Glenn Greenwald has cautioned that although domestic drones may currently be limited to those outfitted only with surveillance equipment, given the increasing militarization of domestic law enforcement, the time may come soon when domestic drones are weaponized. [59] But even short of that futuristic nightmare, drone surveillance already poses a new threat to liberty at home . As our Fourth Amendment search protection diminishes with the progress of technology, [60] legislative initiatives and public outcry may be the only way to protect the right to privacy in the age of domestic drones.

And, changes in surveillance policy must be grounded in anti-militarist knowledge production – it’s impossible to change these material conditions without an appreciation for how militarism structures policymaking and other realities.

Chávez ’12 [Karma R. Chávez, associate professor of rhetoric, politics and culture at University of Wisconsin-Madison. Ph.D. Arizona State University, 2007. M.A. University of Alabama, 2003. M.A. University of Alabama, 2002. “Border Interventions: The need to Shift from a Rhetoric of Security to a Rhetoric of Militarization,” 2012] [MBM]

Scholars of rhetoric and performance have opened important terrains in the study of immigration and borders pertaining to subjects such as citizenship, media representation, and migrant identity (Cisneros, “(Re)Bordering the Civic imaginary”; DeChaine, “Bordering the Civic i

maginary”; McKinnon; o no and Sloop; Shi). Though a number of scholars in other academic disciplines within the humanities and social

sciences have written about border militarization (e.g., Andreas, “Redrawing the Line”; Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico

Border; nevins), in reviewing rhetoric and communication scholarship pertaining to immigration and borders, with the exception of a few passing mentions (Demo, “Afterimage” and “Sovereignty Discourse; Carrillo Rowe; DeChaine, “Bordering the Civic imaginary”; o no

and Sloop), an engagement with the rhetoric of border militarization is virtually nonexistent. instead, in post–September 11, 2001, US America, where the dominant border rhetorics emerge from the so- called War on Terror, discourses of “border security” and “national security” are the parlance of the day for rhetoric scholars (e.g., Dunmire, “9/11 Changed Everything” and “Preempting the future”; Gales; i vie; i vie and Giner; Mirrlees; o no; Rojecki; Ross).

Though many of these analyses offer rigorous critiques of the way security discourses manifest and perpetuate troubling

imaginaries of safety and privacy, the problem with the emphasis scholars place on analyses of the rhetoric of security is

that it enables state apparatuses and conservative ideology to dictate the framing of discussion and debate. Ono and Sloop argue that discourses construct borders, and i would extend this to say that discourse constitutes the way immigration, generally, is understood. If scholars use the state’s conservative ideographs— their ideological building blocks—to talk about matters of public interest (McGee, “‘ ideograph’”),

conservative ideology continues to frame the broader debate in people’s minds. This in turn suggests that the public may be more willing to support problematic state policy and action, for no other terms

exist by which to understand important issues . The issue of framing is especially dire in relation to the US- Mexico border, which has, in the eyes of many politicians, pundits, and citizens alike become the greatest source for insecurity in the

national imaginary. The discourse of national security intertwines with the War on Terror, the threat of drug smuggling, and the invasion of “illegal aliens” so that militarization of regions of the US- Mexico border seems natural and warranted in order to protect citizens f rom these supposed threats. Moreover, as scholars

increasingly note, “everyday militarization” aptly describes the ways in which “ordinary people” accept the beliefs of militarism and militarization in such a way that upholds state military and militarization policy (Bernazzoli and f lint). Caren Kaplan quips in an essay on how the popularity of technology like Global Positioning Satellites (GPS) can lead to militarized consumers and citizens: “ for most people in the United States, war is almost always everywhere” (693). feminist scholars such as Cynthia Enloe have long called attention to the way that militarization seeps into ordinary lives as a regular part of public discourse (Enloe, Does Khaki Become You?, Globalization and Militarism, Maneuvers ). Because

military discourse pervades the everyday , its further expansion in myriad forms proves for many to be

commonplace instead of worrisome. Importantly, militarization of the US- Mexico border has not occurred in response to the War on Terror; instead, it has been in the US government’s plan at least since the Reagan administration, and has virtually nothing to do with the events of September 11 , 2001 (Dunn, Militarization of the US Mexico Border ). As one example, the immigration and naturalization Services’ ( in S’s) four- phase “Southwest Border Strategy,” implemented post- NAFTA in 1994, strategically planned to militarize the US- Mexico border in order to allegedly deter clandestine crossings

(Stana and Rezmovic). The events of September 11, 2001, provided a convenient rationale to heighten these strategies,

which had been in motion for decades; yet, a context of “everyday militarization” coupled with the rhetoric of security has obfuscated an urgent need to focus on the devastation of border militarization on border crossers and communities specifically, and privacy and civil liberties more generally. Gordon Mitchell suggests that rhetoric scholars who study

social movements should also enable movement with their work. This chapter will demonstrate the need for border rhetoric scholars to turn the discourse of security toward a discourse of militarization in the hopes of making a civic intervention into the broader national debate. If more people understood how militarization works and the careful way that the rhetoric of security disguises its material impacts , it is likely that the US government would be forced to be more accountable to its people , and rhetoric scholars should lead this charge. I begin this argument by first defining militarization and briefly tracing the increase in border militarization, specifically on the US-Mexico border since the mid- to late 1 980s. Next, I outline the severity of the consequences such militarization has had for border communities and border crossers, and what this means for residents of the United States more broadly. I then argue why the language of militarization is so crucial through a brief analysis of Secure Border Initiative Monthly, or SBI Monthly, produced by the Secure Border initiative (SB i ) Program Management o ff ice (PM o ) and designed to provide news and information on the SB i and the now- defunct SB i net, two major programs of the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) to augment “border security.” These newsletters evidence the ease with which undocumented migration and terrorism are conflated, similarly to how undocumented migration and drug trafficking were conflated decades ago, as a justification for increased militarization.