Alternative Liquidity Fund Limited...This could be good news for the Brazilian government as at this stage it needs fresh faces to deal with the current political crisis, and Mr. Temer

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Alternative Liquidity Fund Limited Portfolio Update November 2016

2 ALF, Ltd Portfolio Update

Alternative Liquidity Fund Limited Portfolio Overview

1) Positions listed by decreasing AUM exposure by underlying manager. This table represents ALF exposure to underlying funds whose weight exceeds 1% of AUM as of 31 August 2016. Percentages may not equal 100% due to rounding.

Summary of Investments1

Fund Weight Currency Residency of Manager

Vision Funds 37.3% BRL Brazil

Vision FCVS RJ Fund 17.7% BRL Brazil

Vision SCO ELT Fund 13.4% BRL Brazil

Vision FCVS PB Fund 5.2% BRL Brazil

Vision Tercado, Piaui, Chapadao Funds 1.0% BRL Brazil

Ubique Funds 16.9% UAH Ukraine

Ubique Cornerstone Fund 13.4% UAH Ukraine

Ubique Gallois Fund 3.6% UAH Ukraine

Growth Management & Growth Premier 13.6% USD, EUR United Kingdom

Abax Arhat Fund 7.5% USD, RMB Hong Kong

SFL Clover Ltd 5.7% CZK, INR, UAH N/A—SPV

3DPropCo Ltd 4.1% SGD Singapore

South Asian Real Estate LTD 3.2% INR UK and India

GLG Emerging Markets Growth Fund 1.6% USD United Kingdom

Cash 5.2%

All Other Investments 5.2%

Accrued Receivables Net of Liabilities & Expenses -0.4%



Significant Fund Developments

Cash Cash Received Over the last few months ALF has received several cash distributions from underlying fund investments. These flows have come almost entirely from GML/Growth Premier, which redeemed just over 50% of its NAV as of August 31 (settlement occurred on Sep 1st and 2nd, 2016). Cash Balance In the last Board Meeting which took place on October 26th, the Board asked the investment manager to calculate the current cash balances in the Company, take into account the future expected working capital requirements for the Company and propose a distribution amount. The investment manager has done this and the board is considering the proposal. We expect a formal announcement as to the amount and timing of a distribution sometime in the next few weeks.

Share Transactions Issuance ALF issued 587,752 shares to shareholders of The Green Fund as of June 30. This issuance was in exchange for a small number of positions held by the Green Fund (which ALF already holds). This transaction has allowed the Green Fund to liquidate and close. ALF now holds the Green Fund assets directly and has therefore reduced a significant layer of costs. The total number of shares in issuance is now 146,644,387.



Given the importance of the two largest positions in the portfolio please find a detailed update on both:

Vision Summary and Market Observations: ALF currently has exposure to six Vision Funds: Vision FCVS RJ Fund, Vision FCVS PB Fund, Vision Eletrobras, Vision Tercado Fund, Vision Chapadao Fund and Vision Piaui Fund. All of the above Vision Funds are invested in Brazil, and together they represent over 37% of the ALF´s NAV as of August 2016. Brazil’s current political crisis and the confirmation of the impeachment of Brazil’s president, Dilma Rouseff meant that Brazil will continue on a difficult road in the short to medium term. Ms. Rouseff was replaced by the Vice President – Michel Temer – who is somewhat more conservative. This could be good news for the Brazilian government as at this stage it needs fresh faces to deal with the current political crisis, and Mr. Temer would arguably attempt to form a government with people who are unrelated to the current corruption allegations. However, any changes in the government might produce further delays to the novation processes and therefore delays to the monetization of the current funds. The Fund’s exposure to the Brazilian Real (BRL) is not hedged and therefore movements in the BRL directly affect the NAV for the Vision Funds. However, during 2016 the BRL has recovered most of its recent losses. Management Fees: FCVS RJ has not paid management fees since December 2015 and 2016 is the last year that FCVS PB will pay any management fee. The FCVS Funds’ accrued liabilities include a portion of management fees that have not been paid, and this will only be charged if and when there is a realization. Vision is no longer charging management fees for the three Farm Funds. In 2014 Vision offered to convert certain accrued and unpaid management fees to equity at May 2014´s NAV, which would dilute the shareholders between 1.5 and 1.7%. This offer is still in discussion with the Funds’ directors. Performance Fees: Each Fund has a different agreement regarding performance fees, with most of them having

BRL TO USD EVOLUTION BRL/USD % FROM MAY 2015

MAY 2015 3.18

SEPTEMBER 2015 3.95 -19.5%

DECEMBER 2015 3.96 -19.7%

MARCH 2016 3.59 -11.4%

JUNE 2016 3.24 -1.9%

SEPTEMBER 2016 3.25 -2.2%



distribution fees attached to certain milestones including distributing amounts relative to a benchmark NAV before certain dates. In these scenarios it is unlikely that there will be any performance fees. If any performance fee is charged it would likely be an insignificant amount. Recapitalization of the FCVS Funds: The independent directors were in charge of moving forward with a bridge loan negotiation. By early 2016 the cash level in each fund was starting to reach critical levels. In June 2016, the independent directors reached an agreement in order to recapitalize the FCVS PB Fund with a $1 million loan to be months. They are now very close to a similar proposal for FCVS RJ which should be concluded before year end. The dilution effect should not be very high as the funds´ NAV is approximately USD 90 million. Administrator Change: After changing the onshore administrator from BNY Mellon to a local fund administrator – Socopa – in order to reduce onshore administration fees by up to 75%, Vision is now looking to appoint a new Cayman Islands based administrator whose office head previously lead the team at RBC that dealt with the Vision Funds. They are already very knowledgeable on the different Vision Funds´ situations. Their appointment will take place immediately for the Funds that currently have cash (SCO ELT), and the rest of the funds will be added to the relationship as soon as the bridge loans take place for each one. The calculation of NAVs after September 2015 (BNY’s last NAV) will be done by the new administrator, whose method will be based on Vision making an estimated asset value which consists of applying BNY Mellon´s last calculated mark to market discount to the different Funds´ face value and then subtracting the various costs and liabilities. Legacy fees issue: In the restructuring that took place in 2013, all investments in Vision Funds were comingled and were moved to asset specific vehicles. At the time of the restructuring there were unpaid management fees, which were assigned at the investor level instead of the fund level. Vision set up a different share class series for each investor which has the legacy management fee as a liability and these series invest into each asset specific SPV. KPMG as auditor argues that these liabilities should be held as a separate line item liability on the shareholder statement rather than in the series shares because at present the sum of the total NAV of the Fund is not equal to the total NAV of the series. This is the reason the audited financial statement’s opinion is qualified and will continue to be qualified. Vision Special Opportunities ELT Fund Represents USD 16,679,409 of ALF´s NAV as of August 2016 (estimated). This Fund invested in legal claims against Brazil’s largest energy provider, Eletrobras. The portfolio currently has 49 different claims at differing stages of the judicial process. The claims were purchased at a discount from Brazilian corporations who carried these claims on their balance sheets. Back in the ‘80s and ‘90s, Eletrobras took compulsory loans from these companies in order to invest in infrastructure and grow the network. These loans were adjusted by interest and inflation rates, but when Eletrobras decided to repay them, they miscalculated the value of the loan due to Brazil’s period of hyperinflation. This turned into a class action law suit which went to the superior court and received a favorable judgment at this instance, where the court acknowledged that



Eletrobras’s payment had not been correctly calculated. What remains at this point is a lengthy, multi-stage court process for each of the claims where the outstanding amount is determined. Throughout this whole process Eletrobras has been using delaying tactics to slow the process. Over the past 24 months Vision has started to receive payments from Eletrobras from some of the claims which have successfully gone through all the court stages. The court process to define the outstanding value of the loans for each claim is as follows: • Both Vision and Eletrobas put forward their calculation of the outstanding face value to the court. Eletrobras’s number

is usually between 20 to 50% of Vision’s calculation. • The Court then acknowledges Eletrobras’s calculation as the absolute minimum of what is owed, which is called the

“Undisputable Amount” and proceeds to order Eletrobras to pay this Undisputable Amount to a court held account to be released by the Judge’s order to Vision’s accounts.

• The process then continues to resolve the difference between Eletrobras’ and Vision’s outstanding face value calculations, called the “Disputable Amount”.

However, there is a “Vitorian Liability” in the fund for the amount of BRL 65m which has prevented the Fund from making distributions so far. The Vitorian Liability arose from the payment terms negotiation, in which a portion of the payment was due upon the recovery of value from the court process for some of the Claims. Some of the claims are liable for up to 100% of their realizations for the Vitorian Liability until full repayment of the liability, some up to 50% and some not at all. The total current liability is BRL 65 million, and it continues to accrue interest at the Celic rate (Brazilian Central Bank reference rate which currently stands at 14.25%), which means that even though the Fund has been making significant payments to reduce it, it is also growing at a high rate. During 2015 a number of claims achieved liquidity events for a total of BRL 23.1 million, of which the net cash flow to the Fund was BRL 11.4 million. In fact since 2013, the Fund had gross realizations of BRL 73.8 million and net realizations of BRL 17.4 million which means that BRL 56.4 million went to the Vitorian Liability from 2013 until December 2015. Moreover, during December 2015, the Vision SCO ELT Fund received the first “Disputable Payment”, which represents the portion of the claim not originally acknowledged by Eletrobras during the execution phase. Virtually all the net realizations since 2013 were used to cover the operational costs of the fund. The Vitorian Liability is being reduced, albeit slowly and the proportion of net cash flow should improve in the coming quarters. Moreover, two of the largest claims – Siemens Ltda and Cargill Agricola S/A –, are fairly advanced and close to achieving a liquidity event which could be used to fully cover the remaining Vitorian Liability, although Siemens’ claim in particular does not need to be used for this because is not part of the agreement. Vision is considering whether it makes sense to use any realization – even those that are not in the agreement – to repay the Vitorian Liability as soon as possible, as there is a net negative interest rate difference for the fund between the Vitorian Liability and the growth of the claims’ face value of between 4 and 5% per year.



The outstanding face value of the Vision SCO ELT held portfolio of claims is approximately BRL 1.1 billion, which is growing at 9-10% per year – it accrues for interest and inflation. An administrative strike that took place between May and November 2015 slowed all progress, but since November work has been resumed. However there is no guarantee that these administrative workers will not strike again as negotiations for a legislation is currently underway to address the union groups’ demands. Vision FCVS PB and RJ Funds Vision FCVS RJ Fund represents USD 21,912,267 and Vision FCVS PB Fund represents $ 6,454,054 of ALF´s NAV as of August 2016 (estimated). These are insurance policies for mortgages in the States of Rio de Janeiro and Paraiba, which are to be converted into a combination of cash and Brazilian government bonds. Back in the ‘80s and ‘90s the Brazilian government tried to encourage home ownership in Brazil. Banks made mortgage loans into the market, and due to the fact that the general population did not receive salary increases at the same level as the official inflation index, there was an insurance fund set up to pay out this difference. When hyperinflation hit, this spread widened and the banks called on their insurance fund, which went bankrupt. The Federal government intervened in 1992 to bail out this insurance fund by converting these insurance policies into Brazilian debt claims. Vision bought these claims in an auction process from two states Paraiba (PB Class) and Rio de Janeiro (RJ Class). All novations were frozen (due to a system malfunction) in 2011 by Caixa which is responsible for administering the FCVS novation process, however some trades occurred while Caixa’s system was down, and when it came back up some novations had been shuffled around. This prompted an audit of the entire novation process by Caixa which took the whole system down until the end of 2014. The system for the novation process was restarted again for the PB Fund but Caixa did not reopen the process for the Rio de Janeiro (RJ) State. This process helped to distinguish good faith from bad faith holders as there were suspicions of wrongdoing, with Vision being identified as a good faith holder. Even if Caixa agrees to release novation for the RJ Fund, the process is still expected to be complicated, as the process has changed since the audit performed by Caixa and even though the majority of RJ Fund’s portfolio was in an advanced stage of the process before the system crash, there could be further analysis or documentation required which could be challenging and time consuming. The face value of RJ is growing roughly at a 6% per year in BRL, and PB is growing at 3% per year in BRL, depending on the Taxa Referencial (TR) Rate, which is theoretically adjusted by inflation but in Vision´s opinion the inflation component in almost nonexistent. Once released for novation, the best estimate of time to monetization through the completion of the novation process is two years.



The PB portfolio is more advanced than the RJ portfolio, with Tranche 1’s audit in the process of being finalized - Tranche 1 is almost 2/3 of PB´s entire portfolio, or BRL 360 million. After Caixa resumed the novations in December 2014, the first novations for the State of Paraiba happened in November 2015. Caixa had a budget BRL 12.5 billion for novations in 2015, but it only novated 4.5 billion BRL in November 2015. The good news are that novations are moving forward but so far the Vision FCVS PB has not achieved any novations. Beneficiaries of the novation process received cash (57%) plus CVS bonds (43%). The estimated total size of awaiting novations for all claimants is approximately 80 billion BRL. In June 2016 a Brazilian bank approached Vision twice in order to potentially acquire Tranche 2 in a first instance which they finally did not pursue, and Tranche 1 in a second instance for which they have acquired portfolios for 35% of face value in the past. Vision considers that FCVS PB’s Tranche 1 is of a better quality than the ones previously acquired and that that pricing would not make sense for them. However, discussions are ongoing to explore this exit strategy. For the calculation of the NAV, the fair value is calculated independently by two different administrators by attributing a discount to face value of the claims according to the phase in which each contract is. The average fair value was 54.3% of face value for the FCVS RJ portfolio and 73.8% of face value for the FCVS PB portfolio as of September 2015. Vision Tercado, Chapadao and Piaui These Funds represent undeveloped farmland in Brazil, each with open legal cases that are currently being litigated. The original idea of this portion of the Fund was to acquire undeveloped potential farming properties under one structure and invest in the development of the farms until they started generating cash flow after one or two years. Eventually the goal was to IPO this instrument that contained several farms. Problems arose when the investors called back the capital that was to be used to develop the properties due to the 2008 crisis, and therefore the properties were never developed and have been since under diverse litigations. Moreover, in 2010 a new Brazilian law restricted the direct acquisition of land by foreigners, which limited the market for sale of the farms. However, the actual Funds are transferrable to both Brazilian nationals and foreigners, so an interested party could acquire the farms indirectly via ownership of shares of the Fund. The Manager agreed to stop charging Management Fees on these Funds from June 2014 onwards in order to prevent further cash flow issues, and is currently working on a way to finance future expenses on the Funds. Moreover, they are analyzing further cost reductions in the Funds by lowering or removing certain expenses relating to valuations, auditing and directors fees while they continue to look for exit opportunities. All three Farms are affected by various legal cases, the main one is the Boi Gordo legal case. Boi Gordo is a famous Brazilian bankruptcy case in which the court blocked all accounts for the Funds because of suspicion of unlawful acquisition of the farms by a related person to the bankruptcy case. The issue is that because of the Fund structure, the court is not aware of the identity of the investors, and therefore cannot rule out that the related person to the bankruptcy case is not the final



beneficial owner. The chance of success in having this case dismissed is very high, and in August 2016 PWC finally presented the judge with its independent forensic analysis to confirm the identity of the investors and that they are not a related party to the bankruptcy proceedings. The findings were that PWC was able to show the sources and uses of over 90% of the capital used to acquire the farms, neither of which have any relation to Golin Group. The legal opinion of the outside counsel was that this report should sufficiently strengthen the Funds’ legal defense, but there is no estimate on how long it might take for the judge to make a decision to either maintain or reconsider the 1st instance decision which upheld the blockage of the bank accounts of the Funds. In light of the Funds’ current status, ALF’s Board of Directors has decided to reserve against the Vision farm funds following a recommendation by the Investment Manager. The Investment Manager proposed a 45% provision given the continuing litigation and uncertainty surrounding these assets and their eventual recovery. This had a negative $1 million impact on ALF’s NAV. Vision Piaui Fund: Represents USD 190,761 of ALF´s NAV as of August 2016 (estimated). Vision Tercado Fund: Represents USD 879,891 of ALF´s NAV as of August 2016 (estimated). Vision Chapadao Fund: Represents USD 171,286 of ALF´s NAV as of August 2016 (estimated).

Ubique Funds

Summary and Market Observations: ALF currently has exposure to three Ubique sub Funds: Ubique Cornerstone Fund, Ubique Gallois Fund and Ubique Green Fund. All the above Ubique Funds are invested in Ukraine, and together they represent approximately 16.9% of the ALF’s NAV as of August 2016. The situation in Ukraine has been dire since the 2008 financial crisis, when the Ukrainian Hryvnia (Ukrainian local currency, UAH) suffered a massive drop vs other currencies. Moreover, during 2014 there was internal unrest over the

UAH TO USD EVOLUTION UAH/USD % YTD

DECEMBER 2015 24.028

MARCH 2016 26.20 -8.29%

JUNE 2016 24.83 -3.23%

SEPTEMBER 2016 25.935 -7.35%



decision whether to pursue closer ties with the EU or the Russian Federation, which prompted the resignation of President Yanukovych, the eventual armed conflict in the Donetsk region between the Ukrainian government and Russian supported separatists, and finally the Crimean annexation by the Russian Federation. All the above caused the UAH to drop from 5 UAH/USD pre 2008 crisis to the current 25 UAH/USD and the installation of capital controls by the Ukrainian Government, which have been relaxed from 2015 onwards. Funds Background: The Ubique Funds own the title to several real estate projects and land in Nikolaev and Kiev. The properties are either currently under development, partially developed, with development plans, or currently for sale. Between 2010 and 2016 the Manager has managed to gradually improve the liquidity of the portfolio by asset restructuring and by the completion and sale of some of the unfinished properties. The proceeds from these sales was reinvested towards the completion of the rest of the properties. Investment Structure: At the end of June 2015 the Funds were restructured in order to consolidate all the Ukranian assets from four different entities to one – CIF-2. The structure (as of July 2016) is detailed below, however there are plans to continue to restructure the Funds in order to reduce costs. The Green Fund has since been dissolved, ALF now owns its underlying assets directly and converted its CIF 2 ownership into additional Cornerstone shares. The next restructuring plan is to do the same for Gallois and we will keep you updated as that progresses. Lastly, potentially eliminating the BVI structure altogether is the final goal. All of these efforts will result in significant cost savings for ALF and its shareholders.

Valuations: The monthly valuations of CIF-2 are generated by an independent auditor in Ukraine, based on internationally accepted methodologies and valuations of independent appraisers. The discount rate used is 8%.



These independent appraisers are licensed and are making their valuations according to local regulations by using three different valuation methods. The Funds have a write down policy in place in accordance to IFRS standards. Audited Financial Statements: The three Ubique Funds have an unqualified opinion in their audited financial statements dated June 30th 2015. However all three also have an emphasis of matter regarding the illiquid nature of the underlying and the lack of visibility and uncertainty of the Ukrainian political situation. CIF-2 Asset Description: “Nikolaev” project: Represents around 70% of the NAV of Ubique’s exposure to CIF-2 as of end of July 2016, or around $28.4 million. It comprises the development and sale of around 90 thousand square meters of the “Riviera” real estate complex in the city of Nikolaev. The complex is located at the South Bug riverside and consists of two cascades of high-rises, linked together in the form of loops, and a third, separate construction. As of August 2016, the First Loop completion status is at over 87%, with properties in the First Loop #10, #11 and #15 completed and 95% sold. The First Loop is expected to be completed by the end of 2016. The Second Loop’s project design documentation is almost complete and the construction work is planned to begin during H2 2016 with its completion planned for 2022. The estimated gain from sales ($35.9 million) after estimated construction costs ($18.7 million) is expected to be $17.1 million. The Third Complex is planned for completion in 2019, with an expected cost of $5.7 million and expected sales for $11.8 million. The current sales from the First Loop are being used to finance the construction of the Second Loop and Third Complex, but the Manager expects to be able to start returning capital to investors beginning in 2018, as sales proceeds begin to outpace construction capital requirements. “Timoshenko” project: Represents around 17.5% of the NAV of Ubique’s exposure to CIF-2 as of end of July 2016, or around $7.06 million. The Timoshenko project owned by CIF-2 consists of an unfinished 25-storey tower and two additional smaller premises owned by the project’s strategic partner, UDP with a total area of 15.4 thousand square meters. The project concept consisted of developing a combination of residential real estate and commercial complex, and it needed around $13 million for completion, of which $6.4 million was supposed to be financed by CIF-2, and construction was planned to be resumed by the end of 2016. However, in September 2016 the Fund managed to sell the property at close to the carrying value for $7 million in three different tranches. Tranche 1 ($3 million) is to be paid by November 2016, Tranche 2 ($2 million) by April 2017 and Tranche 3 ($2 million) by October 2017. These proceeds will be partly used to pay creditors for the fund arising



from service providers to the different funds. Land Plots: Represents around 7.5% of the NAV of Ubique’s exposure to CIF-2 as of end of July 2016, or around $3 million. They consist of three land plots in the outskirts of Kiev, close to major highways. These properties have received some interest albeit at significant discounts, but the manager considered that even if they sold it now, it is not possible to distribute proceeds outside of Ukraine because of the current capital controls. For the time being they believe it is better to keep the properties than to sell them at a significant discount. Properties in Kiev: Represents around 2% of the NAV of Ubique’s exposure to CIF-2 as of end of July 2016, or around $0.8 million. They consist of three commercial properties located in Kiev. Unfortunately demand has been low in these areas, and the prices have fallen by half during the last two years. The manager expects to be able to sell all three properties by 2022.

Other notable underlying fund updates

Growth Management Limited

& Growth Premier Fund IC

As expected, GML/Growth Premier made a distribution which was received by ALF in early September, at NAV this will reduce the position from approximately 13.5% of NAV to 6.3% of NAV.

Argo Special Situations

The Fund fully wrote down its position in its bankrupt bank as of June 30 and now holds it as a contingent asset (the position had formerly been held at $5 million). Due to the purchase of a senior secured claim by the Argo Distressed Credit Fund, Argo was able to gain full control of its petrochemical business, and subsequently wrote up ASSF’s subordinated claim on the business by $2 million. Argo is involved in discussions with TPPI/Pertamina (who for the first time in years have expressed a willingness to purchase the catalyst owned by Argo), which has made a goodwill payment of $500,000 and established a timeline for the purchase of the remaining catalyst. Negotiations are ongoing, but Argo believes a $10-15 million cash recovery for the fund is possible. Difficulties in Argo’s Real Estate holdings in the Ukraine caused a write down of the position by half ($3.3 million). Argo Distressed Credit Fund bought the Deutsche note from Deutsche Bank and subsequently reduced the principal of the note to its purchase price and reduced the rate owed by the fund. This created an uplift to NAV of $3.7 million. NAV at the end of August was $12.9 million. Argo accounts for $1.1 million of ALF NAV.

ALF, Ltd Portfolio Update

Alternative Liquidity Fund Limited disclosures

13

Disclosures This document is for informational purposes only and should not be distributed. Past performance is not indicative of future results. This is neither an offer to sell nor a solicitation of an offer to buy interests in any investment fund managed by Morgan Creek Capital Management, LLC or its affiliates. Descriptions of portfolio companies in which Morgan Creek Partners V, LP invests are based on information provided by the underlying managers. Morgan Creek Capital Management, LLC does not warrant the accuracy, adequacy, completeness, timeliness or availability of any information provided by non-Morgan Creek sources. There can be no assurance that the investment objectives of Morgan Creek Partners V, LP or any fund in which Morgan Creek Partners V, LP invests will be achieved. The Morgan Creek Partners V, LP data set forth in this document is not audited and is subject to change upon audit.

The Internal Rate of Return is the discount rate at which the present value of the future cash flows of an investment equals the cost of the investment. It is found by a process of trial and error; when the net present values of cash outflows (the cost of the investment) and cash inflows (returns on the investment) equal zero, the rate of discount being used is the IRR. When IRR is greater than the required return-called the hurdle rate in capital budgeting-the investment is acceptable. Definition from Barron’s Financial Guides, Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms.

There can be no assurances that estimated residual (net) value is a true representation of actual market value, nor can there be any assurances that the estimated net IRR will not be materially different from the estimate presented. The Estimated Residual (Net) Value is calculated by Morgan Creek based on information provided in part by the underlying funds and upon Morgan Creek’s own valuations of the underlying portfolio companies. The underlying funds have not provided the Estimated Residual (Net) Value and in fact, may calculate the value in a materially different manner resulting in a materially different valuation. To the extent the actual Residual (Net) Value is materially lower than the estimate provided herein, the actual Net IRR will also be materially lower. The estimated residual (net) value may never be realized. There can be no assurances that unrealized value included in the estimated Residual (Net) Value calculations will be realized at the time the underlying funds liquidate their investments. Investments which are currently reflecting unrealized gain may realize a loss when actually liquidated.

Investments are speculative and are meant for sophisticated investors only. An investor may lose all or a substantial part of its investment in funds managed by Morgan Creek Capital Management, LLC. Funds of funds have a number of layers of fees and expenses which may offset profits. This is a brief summary of investment risks. Prospective investors should carefully review the risk disclosures contained in the funds’ Confidential Private Offering Memoranda. Neither past performance, estimated values, nor estimated IRRs are necessarily indicative of future results.

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Alternative Liquidity Fund Limited...This could be good news for the Brazilian government as at this stage it needs fresh faces to deal with the current political crisis, and Mr. Temer