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The labor market effects of foreign owned firms
Rita Almeida
The World Bank, United States
Received 15 March 2004; received in revised form 28 September 2006; accepted 31 October 2006
Abstract
Foreign firms have a more educated workforce and pay higher wages than domestic firms even after
controlling for worker quality, at a given moment in time. This does not imply that foreign ownership
improves the labor market outcomes of the workers since foreign investment may be guided by unobservable
firm and worker characteristics correlated with schooling or wages. This paper asks whether foreign investors
acquire firms with high human capital or wages, or whether foreign acquisition improves these outcomes.
Using a matched employeremployee data set, I find that foreign acquisitions of domestic firms have small
effects on the human capital and on average wages of the acquired firms. Instead, foreign investors cherry
pick those domestic firms that are already very similar to the group of existing foreign firms.
2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Foreign direct investment; Acquisitions; Employment; Wage structure; Panel data
JEL classification: C31; F23; J31
1. Introduction
A large empirical literature documents that, in the cross-section, foreign firms are larger, more
productive, more capital intensive, pay higher wages and have a more skilled workforce than
Journal of International Economics 72 (2007) 7596
www.elsevier.com/locate/econbase
I am very grateful to Antonio Ciccone for raising my interest in the topic and for his guidance and to Pedro Carneiro for
very valuable comments. I am also very grateful to the editor and two anonymous referees for many detailed comments that
substantially improved the paper. I am grateful to the Department of Statistics of the Portuguese Ministry of Employment for
access to the data. I thank Koen Debacker, Jaume Garcia, Maia Gell, Adriana Kugler andJos Mata forseveral suggestions.
I benefited from comments made at the Spie, UPF, Simposio de Analisis Economico, UNL, CEPR conference
Globalization and labor markets(Bergen), World Bank and IIOC (Chicago). All the errors are my own. I gratefully
acknowledge the financial support ofFundao para a Cincia e Tecnologia
. 1818 H Street, NW, MSN MC3-301, Washington, DC 20433, USA.
E-mail address: [email protected].
0022-1996/$ - see front matter 2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.10.001
mailto:[email protected]://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.10.001http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.10.001mailto:[email protected]7/28/2019 Almeida the Labor
2/22
domestic firms. This suggests that foreign investors may have a positive effect on the welfare of
the workforce of the host economy. This argument has been used to justify regional or national
industrial policies to attract and secure foreign investment. But, while cross-sectional differences
are large, they are not necessarily causal. For example, they may arise because foreigners acquiredomestic firms that already have a more educated workforce and pay higher wages than the
average firm, because foreign investment leads to an increase in the demand for skills and average
wages of the acquired firms, or both. Disentangling correlation from causality is crucial for
understanding the welfare effects of foreign investment in the host economy and for designing
appropriate policies.
In this paper, I analyze the interaction between foreign ownership and labor market outcomes
using a Portuguese matched employeremployee data set during the nineties. The paper
addresses the following questions: (1) Do foreigners acquire domestic firms with high human
capital and that pay higher wages even after controlling for worker quality? (2) Does foreign
ownership improve the labor market outcomes of the acquired firms? To quantify the effects offoreign ownership, I analyze the evolution in total employment, human capital of the workforce
and average wages conditional on worker quality following a foreign acquisition of a domestic
firm.1 The main findings of the paper can be summarized as follows. Most of the large cross
sectional differences between foreign and domestic firms are explained by foreigners cherry
picking the domestic firms. In the years prior to the acquisition, firms that will become
acquired are already larger, employ a more educated workforce and pay higher hourly wages for
a given worker quality (both to low and high educated workers) than the average domestic firm
in the sector. Moreover, before the foreign acquisition firms are already very similar to the group
of existing foreign firms. Consistently with the few theories of foreign acquisitions, these
findings strongly suggest that foreign acquisitions are not random. When foreign firms enter anew country and/or a new product market, by acquiring an existing firm it is more likely that
they choose firms with relatively high productivity and with technological characteristics that
are similar to their own (Hennart and Park, 1993; Buckley and Casson, 1998). Otherwise,
foreigners would face very high costs of adapting the technology, changing the workforce and
gaining experience in the host country. In Portugal the costs of adjusting the workforce are
particularly high since it has one of the most restrictive employment protection regulations in
the world. I also find evidence that the change in the nationality of the ownership has little effect
on different labor market outcomes of the acquired firms. By comparing the same firms before
and after the acquisition, I find that following the acquisition the size of the firm increases but
that there is no significant change in the human capital of the average worker in the firm. 2
Moreover, there is evidence that following the acquisition average wages increase slightly in
manufacturing firms but these results are in stark contrast with the large cross sectional
estimates of the foreign wage premium. Suggestive evidence shows that this might not be
specific to foreign acquisitions since wages go up by similar magnitudes following domestic
acquisitions.
The Portuguese case is interesting because it combines two important features. First, Portugal
had a permissive legal framework for the operation of foreign firms that translated into substantial
1 Other papers have used foreign acquisitions to quantify the foreign wage premium (e.g., Aitken et al., 1996; Conyon
et al., 2002a; Lipsey and Sjoholm, 2002). See Navaretti and Venables (2004) for a survey.2 I find that employment in the firm increases on average by 14% following the foreign acquisition. However, this
evidence should be interpreted cautiously since there is also evidence of selection of foreign investment into firms where
employment was growing faster prior to the acquisition.
76 R. Almeida / Journal of International Economics 72 (2007) 7596
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amounts of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the late eighties and nineties. Before becoming an
European Union member in 1986, the amount of FDI in Portugal had never reached 1% of GDP
(3.2% of total investment) and in the beginning of the nineties this influx had more than tripled to
3.2% of GDP (12% of total investment in 1990).
3
Second, there exists a census of all the firmsoperating in Portugal covering the nineties. For each firm in this data set, foreign participation can
be traced over time so that the identification of foreign acquisitions of domestic firms is possible.
Moreover, since it is a matched employeremployee data set, workforce characteristics can also
be traced over time making this data particularly well suited for the analysis of the effects of
foreign ownership on labor market outcomes.
One of the contributions of the paper is to provide a systematic evaluation of the impact of
foreign investment on different labor market outcomes of workers in the host country. While
there is some evidence for the UK that foreigners buy domestic firms with above average
productivity and wages, little is known about the human capital characteristics of firms that are
acquired by foreigners (e.g., Harris and Robinson, 2002; Girma and Grg, 2003a,b; Conyonet al., 2002a).4 There is also evidence that following a foreign acquisition average wages
increase slightly but it is unclear whether this is the result of worker reallocation and changes in
the firm's human capital or as a result of increases in labor productivity (e.g., Conyon et al.,
2002a; Girma and Grg, 2003a,b). The main reason for this lack of knowledge is the difficulty
in obtaining datasets that simultaneously have information on characteristics of the firm and of
its workforce over time. Using a sample of Indonesian manufacturing firms Lipsey and Sjoholm
(2002) focus on the evolution of employment and average wages within broad skill groups
following a foreign acquisition.5 The Portuguese data has the advantage of covering both
manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors and to have, for each year, detailed information
on all wage earners in the private sector. Since each individual is uniquely matched with a firm,several workforce characteristics are observed for each firm. Interestingly, my findings for
foreign acquisitions in Portugal are closer to those found for the UK and are quite different from
those found by Lipsey and Sjoholm (2002) for Indonesia. Lipsey and Sjoholm (2002) do not
find evidence of selection of foreign investment into high wage firms and show that following
the acquisition average wages increase substantially, possibly due to increases in productivity.6
They also show that the employment of blue collar workers and average wages within
occupations increase after the acquisition. The stark contrast with my findings suggest that the
effects of foreign acquisitions in the labor markets in developed and developing countries can be
quite different.
My paper is also related with the literature that investigates the foreign wage premium (seeTable A.1 in the appendix for a summary). If foreigners are in a disadvantaged position to attract
the best workers, they would have to pay higher wages than comparable domestic firms with
3 The most important sources of FDI into Portugal is the European Union and OECD, with 76% and 89% of the FDI in
1992.4 Harris and Robinson (2002) and Girma and Grg (2003a,b) find evidence ofcherry picking of foreign investment
into UK firms with a high level and growth of productivity. Conyon et al. (2002a) also find evidence that acquired firms
pay above average wages.5 Table A1 shows that Lipsey and Sjoholm (2002) have information on average wages for blue and white collar
workers but they do not have information on schooling or other worker characteristics. Lipsey and Sjoholm (2004) have
information on schooling but it is only available in 1996.6 Arnold and Javorcik (2005) find evidence for Indonesian plants that foreign ownership leads to an increase in
productivity in the acquired plants by approximately 30% over the three years following the acquisition. In contrast,
Harris and Robinson (2002) find that for the UK, average firm productivity falls in the short run following a foreign
acquisition.
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similar worker quality.7 I am also motivated by the evaluation of the effects of acquisitions on
labor reallocation. Ownership changes are often associated with the real-location of resources
from inefficient to efficient firms. This can cause the displacement of jobs and lower wages and it
is a source of preoccupation for workers and labor unions (e.g., Harris and Robinson, 2002).Furthermore, firm acquisitions may change the allocation of monopoly rents between firms and
workers which can also lead to wage changes (McGuckin and Nguyen, 2001). Finally, my work
also relates to the literature that studies the profile of firms acquired by foreigners, and the motives
for a foreign acquisition of a domestic firm.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, I describe the data and the sample used.
Section 3 presents evidence on how much better foreign-owned firms look at any point in time
and asks whether foreigners select the best domestic firms to be acquired. Section 4 analyzes the
effects of foreign acquisitions on different labor market outcomes. Section 5 discusses the
robustness of the results. Section 6 concludes.
2. Data
The data set used is a based on a mandatory yearly survey conducted by the Portuguese
Ministry of Employment, Quadros do Pessoal. The survey covers all the firms with wage-earners
in Portugal excluding the public sector. It is a matched employeremployee data where firms can
be traced over time and each period workers can be matched to firms.8 The survey collects firm
information on the ownership of the capital (foreign, domestic private and public), five digit-ISIC
sector, region, size and age of the firm. It also reports detailed worker characteristics like gender,
age, schooling, tenure on the job, monthly hours worked (normal and extra hours) and gross
monthly wage.To construct the sample, I identified all the firms that changed the nationality of their
ownership during the period covered 19911998.9 I consider a firm to be foreign owned if the
share of foreign capital is larger than 10%.10 I selected all the firms that are continuously owned
by domestic and foreign owners. I kept only those firms that report information on key variables
in the paper like wages, hours worked and schooling. I identify 1381 firms that change the
nationality of their ownership between 1991 and 1998, of which 688 are foreign acquisitions
(domestic firms acquired by foreigner firms) and 505 domestic acquisitions (foreign firms
7 There are different reasons for foreigners paying higher wages (e.g., Navaretti and Venables, 2004). First, workers
could have a preference for domestic firms. This could happen if, for example, foreign firms are perceived to be morevolatile employers. There is little evidence supporting this claim, though. Second, foreigners might be more likely to
minimize turnover if they invest more in training or want to avoid the leakage of their technological advantages. Third, a
foreigners might be interested in attracting the best workers.8 By law the information collected is sent to the Ministry of Employment and latter is made available to all the workers
in the firm. Since the data is administrative and it is made available it tends to be very reliable. The survey has been
conducted since 1982 and is organized in firm, plant and individual files. The firm level data covers 148,044 firms in
1991 and 224,456 in 1998. The individual files cover approximately 2 million workers each year.9 Some observations report missing information on the ownership structure of the capital. I tested the robustness of the
results to excluding these firms and to make different assumptions on the nationality of the capital. Firms observed just
once are assumed to be domestic firms, given its similarity in size, education and average wages to the average domestic
firm in the same sector. Firms observed more than once, are assumed that they kept either their last ownership structure or
an average of the past ownership's structure (more than 95% of these firms are assumed to be domestic). Since I suspect
measurement error problems for those firms with more than one ownership change, these firms were excluded from the
sample (less than 3% of the acquisitions).10 The choice of the 10% threshold is not restrictive since 95% (75%) of the firms with positive foreign ownership have
more than 10% (50%) of foreign capital and 50% of the firms with a foreign participation have a full foreign ownership.
78 R. Almeida / Journal of International Economics 72 (2007) 7596
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acquired by domestic firms).11 About 90% of the acquisitions in the sample are observed for three
or more periods.12
Since I am interested in analyzing the effects of foreign ownership on firm's characteristics of
the workforce, I aggregate these at the firm level. This aggregation is possible because eachworker has a unique firm identifier. I consider a worker to be low educated if it has nine or less
years of schooling and a worker to be high educated if it has more than nine years of schooling.13
Gross monthly wages are computed summing up monthly labor earnings for regular and extra
work hours. Hourly wages are gross wages divided by total monthly hours worked. Firm average
wages are computed excluding extreme values for hourly wages.14 The price cost margin is
defined as total sales minus total labor costs divided by total sales.15 The consumer price index
comes from National Department of Statistics. The level of aggregation used for sector
composition was two-digit ISIC sector (total 46 sectors).
3. Evidence on selection of foreign investment
In this section I document the differences between foreign and domestic owned firms and
examine whether firms that become acquired by foreigners have an average worker with a very
different quality than the typical domestic firm. The latter is important to understand the
motivations for foreign entry. Moreover, there is almost no evidence in the literature on the human
capital profile of the average worker in acquired firms. This is important since foreign firms are
often associated with a better technology and a more intensive use of skilled labor than domestic
firms. However, this need not translate into an increase in the employment of skilled workers, as
long as foreigners acquire firms that already have the desired worker profile.
Looking at the theoretical and empirical literature on mergers and acquisitions it is difficult toextract strong predictions about the profile of the acquired firm and its post acquisition
performance. This literature has identified two motives for acquisitions independently of the
nationality of the acquiring firm. The neoclassical approach views acquisitions as a form of
natural selection motivated by profit maximizing managers which result in the replacement of
inefficient firms (Lichtenberg and Seigel, 1987, 1990).16 Alternatively, acquisitions could be
made by managers motivated to acquire operating efficiency (McGuckin and Nguyen, 1995). In
11 Domestic firms are firms with at least 90% of national capital each year, foreign firms are firms with at least 10% of
foreign capital each year and acquisitions are firms that changed once their ownership nationality over the sample period.In the final sample there are 194,560 domestic firms, 2350 foreign firms and 1381 acquisitions. In the manufacturing
sample, there are 40,873 domestic firms, 701 foreign firms and 205 foreign acquisitions of domestic firms.12 81% and 72% of the foreign acquisitions are observed one year before and one year after the acquisition, respectively.
About 50% and 52% of the foreign acquisitions are observed two years before and two years after the acquisition,
respectively.13 I prefer the aggregation by education groups rather than by occupational groups since it is less ambiguous and also
less likely to be affected by ownership changes. In the worker level data there is a positive correlation between education
and skills: 84% of the high educated are skilled workers and 40% of the low educated are unskilled workers.14 Workers with implausibly low earnings (hourly wage lower than 50% of the minimum wage) or implausibly high
earnings were excluded from the sample. There were less than 1% of the workers in each years in these cases.15 Unfortunately, the Portuguese data does not collect sufficient information to compute firm's productivity. It collects
information on total sales but there is no information on raw materials or stock of capital in the firm. Approximately 9%
of the firms in the sample report zero sales and hence do not have a price cost margin. I exclude from the analysis those
firms with values below percentile 1 and above percentile 99 of the distribution for price cost margin.16 This theory also predicts that firms will perform better after the acquisition since they are disciplined by managers
with cost savings policies.
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this case, firms with high levels of productivity are more likely to change ownership.17 The
empirical literature also shows different results. Lichtenberg and Seigel (1987, 1990) and Conyon
et al. (2002b) find that firms with lower productivity or profits are more likely to be acquired by
domestic firms, in the US and UK, respectively. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987), Matsusaka(1993) and McGuckin and Nguyen (1995) find for the US that the more profitable and high
productivity firms are more likely to change ownership.18
The theory looking at the motivations of foreign acquisitions is more scarce but less
ambiguous. Markusen (1995) shows that foreign firms prefer to establish capacity in the host
country, in opposition to export or technology licensing, whenever firms have specific advantages
that overcome the costs of entry. Caves (1996) and Pfaffermayr (1999) relate these advantages to
economies of scale, brand names, management know-how and other types of advantages that can
be exploited in different locations without incurring in additional costs. The literature on the
motivations of the different entry modes argues that foreign firms are more likely to acquire an
existing firm rather than start a new firm if they have little experience in producing in the hostcountry and learning costs are high, if they are entering a new product market or if there are high
costs of increasing competition (Hennart and Park, 1993; Buckley and Casson, 1998). Moreover,
conditional on choosing to acquire, foreign firms are more likely to buy domestic firms with
relatively high productivity and with technological characteristics that are similar to their own.
Otherwise, foreigners firms would face very high costs of adapting the technology, changing the
workforce or of gaining experience in the host country.
In Portugal, the costs of adapting the workforce are particularly important since it has one of the
most restrictive employment protection regulations in the world. The legislation on collective
dismissals imposes a long, complex and very costly dismissal process on employers. In particular,
the employer must justify a worker's dismissal. The employer must also notify the impendingdismissal to the commission of workers as well as the Ministry of Employment. The dismissal will
only become official after the commission issued an appraisal and after the worker is given the
opportunity to dispute the allegations made. Dismissed workers must receive a written notice at least
60 days prior to the dismissal. These workers then have certain benefits, which include time off to
look for a new job, a financial compensation and a special right to resign. Except in the case of a
disciplinary dismissal (serious infraction by the worker), the employer must pay the employee one
monthly wage per year worked, with a minimum of three monthly payments. No maximum ceiling is
established in the law for the severance payments. However, Portugal has a relatively flexible wage
policy. The minimum wage is set annually at the national level and collective bargaining agreements
establish the starting wage for each occupation. These wage floors are established at relatively lowlevels so that, in practice, employers have some flexibility in setting the wages. ( Bover et al., 1998,
discuss in detail the Portuguese labor regulation). Together, these arguments suggest that in my
sample, when foreigners choose to enter the market by acquiring an existing firm, they tend to select
those firms that already have many of the characteristics that are desirable to them.
17 Theoretical models also yield conflicting predictions for firm performance in the period following the acquisition.
When acquisitions are motivated by managerial discipline, some models predict that firm performance improves
following the acquisition. When acquisitions are motivated by the acquisition of operating efficiency, models predict that
firm performance remains unchanged or decreases slightly following the acquisition. A negative performance could be
more likely to occur with foreign acquisitions, where assimilation problems could potentially be larger.18 Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Matsusaka (1993) show that firms and had little or no gain in productivity in the
post-acquisition period. Conyon et al. (2002b) look specifically at the evolution of employment following a change in
ownership. They find that acquisitions are generally followed by reductions in employment and output resulting in an
increased efficiency in the use of labor.
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The empirical analysis of foreign acquisitions for developed countries is focused on the UK
and finds that acquiring foreign firms cherry pick domestic firms. However, nothing is known
about the human capital of firms acquired by foreigners. For example, in the procedure of
selection of foreign investment into firms with more educated workers, these firms would payhigher average wages in the pre acquisition period but would not necessarily pay higher wages
conditional on worker's schooling. Alternatively, if selection of foreign investment is also based
on unobservable firm characteristics (e.g., technological or organizational advantages) average
wages for a given worker quality would already be higher in the pre acquisition period. One way
of testing for selection of foreign investment, is to compare firms that will become acquired by
foreigners, existing foreign firms and domestic owned firms that will not be acquired in the near
future.19 I estimate the following equation for different outcomes:
yjt bAj dFjXS
s1
gsDs XT
t1
gtDt jt 3:1
whereyjtis the outcome of interest for firmjin period t(employment, average schooling, age, tenure,
share of females in the firm, average hourly wage and pricecost margin),Aj is a dummy variable that
assumes the value one in the years before the acquisition for those firms that will be acquired by
foreigners,Fjis a dummy variable that assumes the value one if firmjis foreign owned in yeartandDsis a two digit sector dummy andDt is a time dummy for yeart. The foreign premium , represents the
average difference in outcomeybetween foreign and domestic firms in the same sector of activity and
year. If (future) foreign acquisitions are already better performers relatively to domestic firms in the
years prior to the acquisition,should be large and statistically significant. Moreover, if future foreign
acquisitions are very similar to existing foreign firms, I expect to see to be very similar to . On theother hand, if foreigners do notcherry pick domestic firms, should be small and different from .
However, one would expect foreign firms to pay higher hourly wages simply because their
workforce has a different human capital composition than the workforce in domestic firms.
Mincer (1974), and a large literature that followed, shows that differences in education, age,
tenure and gender are associated with significant differences in hourly wages. Hence, when the
dependent variable in Eq. (3.1) is average hourly wages, I also control for differences across firms
in average education, age, tenure and gender of the workers, so that the wage premiums captured
by and exclude these composition effects.20 Eq. (3.1) is estimated by least squares using all
the firms. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The estimates are reported in columns (1)
to (10) of Table 1. The table also reports the p-values for the test: =.I start by examining how foreign owned firms differ from the average firm in the same sector. In the
sample, foreign firms are approximately twice the size of a domestic firms, but do not have more
average hours of work per worker. The average years of schooling is almost two years higher than in a
domestic firm of the same sector. The workforce in foreign owned firms is, on average, less than 1 year
younger and the share of females is 3 percentage points higher than the workforce in domestic firms.
19 An alternative way to test for selection is to estimate a probit model for the event of being acquired. This approach has
been used by Clerides et al. (1998) to document selection of exporting firms. Using this approach the sign of the effect of
each variable on the probability of being acquired would be the same as the sign in Table 1 (not reported).20 The estimated model is identical to the one reported in Eq. (3.1) where the dependent variable is the logarithm of real
hourly wages per employee in firm j. The only difference is that I also control for Xjt, a vector of workforce
characteristics including average years of schooling, average age, average job tenure and share of females in the
workforce. A similar model is used to estimate the foreign wage premium for each education group. The only difference
is that average wages and worker characteristics are relative the each education group.
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Table1
Differencesbetweenfutureforeignacquisitionsand
foreignownedfirmsrelativelytodomesticfirms
Employment
Hourswork/
totalworkers
Yearsof
schooling
Age
workforce
Tenure
workforce
Females/
totalworkers
Average
hourly
wag
e
Loweducated
hourlywage
Higheducated
hourlywage
Price-cost
margin
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Futureforeign
acquisitions
0.85
0.0000
1.6
5
1.37
1.0
7
0.02
0.32
0.2
4
0.40
0.001
[0.0
62]
[0.0
04]
[0.0
97]
[0.2
53]
[0.2
20]
[0.0
10]
[0.014]
[0.0
13]
[0.0
17]
[0.0
01]
Foreignfirms
1.05
0.0003
1.9
3
0.66
0.0
1
0.03
0.40
0.3
2
0.48
0.0
00
[0.0
30]
[0.0
02]
[0.0
43]
[0.1
20]
[0.1
08]
[0.0
04]
[0.006]
[0.0
06]
[0.0
08]
[0.0
00]
Sectordummie
sincluded?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Timedummies
included?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Av.schooling,
age,tenure,
sh.
Females
included?
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Ftest:Futureforeignacquisitions=
Foreignfirm
s(Pvalue)
0.00
0.7
5
0.0
0
0.00
0.0
0
0.25
0.00
0.0
0
0.00
0.0
4
N
647,984
647,9
84
647,9
84
647,984
647,9
84
647,984
647,9
84
616,4
91
256,9
37
579,2
88
Rsquared
0.22
0.0
6
0.4
0
0.11
0.0
6
0.47
0.43
0.3
9
0.39
0.1
7
Thenumbersin
column(1)representthecoefficients
ofaregressionoflogemploymentonadummyvariableifafirmwillbeco
meacquiredbyforeignersandonadummyvariable
ifthefirmisforeignowned.Controlsfortwodigitsectordummiesandyeardummiesincluded((3.1)intext).Standarderrorsa
reclusteredatthefirmlevel.N
isthe
samplesizein
eachregression
.Pvaluesareforthetestthatthecoefficientonthefutureforeignacquisitionsisequaltothatofforeignownedfirms.Thecoefficientsforemploy
ment,hoursof
work,average
hourlywages(average,lowandhigh)arebeinterpretedaspercentagedifferences(logdependentvariable).E.g.,
0.85incolumn(1)impliesthatfutureforeign
acquisitionsare
85percentagepointslargerthantheaveragedomesticfirmintheyearspriortotheacquisition.1.6
incolumn(3
)impliesthattheaverageyearsofsch
oolinginfirms
acquiredbyforeignersis1.6yearshigherthaninth
eaveragedomesticfirminthesecto
r.
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These differences in the workforce characteristics, if not accounted for, translate into differences in
hourly wages across ownership types.21 Columns (8) and (9) of Table 1 report the foreign wage
premium for each education group after controlling for differences across firms in average schooling,
age, tenure and gender for each group respectively: it is 32% for the low education workers and 48%for the high education workers.22 This finding is consistent with Lipsey and Sjoholm's (2004) result of
a foreign wage premium which is increasing with workers' skill.
The estimates forreported in the table show that firms that in the future will become acquired by
foreigners are already very different from the average domestic firm in the sector in the years prior to
the acquisition. Future foreign acquisitions are 85% larger than domestic firms but do not differ in the
average hours of work per employee. Two years before the acquisition they already have a more
educated workforce since their average number of years of schooling is 1.6 years above the one in
existing domestic firms. The workforce in these firms is also younger, less tenured and with more
females than the workforce in domestic firms. Controlling for the differences in these human capital
characteristics, I find evidence of selection of foreign investment into higher wage firms. Firms thatwill become acquired pay 32% higher average hourly wages than domestic firms. This premium
holds for each education group since hourly wages are 24% and 40% higher for low and high
educated workers, respectively. These wage premiums are below the average wage differences
between foreign and domestic owned firms (32% for low educated and 48% for the high educated).
The price cost margin is 0.1 percentage points lower than in the average domestic firm before the
acquisition. However, one should be cautious when interpreting these findings since I cannot control
for differences across firms in input prices. Finally, firms that will become acquired by foreigners are
not statistically identical to foreign owned firms in the years prior to the acquisition, even though the
differences are small in magnitude (the large size of the sample leads to very small standard errors).
In sum, the results presented in this section, together with a large empirical literature, confirm thatthere are substantial differences between foreign and domestic firms. Foreign firms have a younger
and more educated workforce than domestic firms. They also pay higher average wages, controlling
for the quality of the workforce. Not accounting for differences in worker's quality leads us to
overestimate the foreign wage premium by approximately one third. The findings also show that
foreigners do not randomly pick domestic firms to be acquired. Several years prior to the acquisition,
these firms outperform the typical domestic firm in the sector in terms of size, worker quality and
hourly average wages. Moreover, I find evidence that selection on unobservable firm characteristics
is also important. Controlling for observed worker quality, in the years prior to the foreign acquisition,
the average hourly wages in acquired firms are much higher than in the average domestic firm.
4. Does foreign ownership improve labor market outcomes?
Since foreigners select the best domestic firms to be acquired and I do not observe all the
variables foreigners select on, cross sectional estimates of the causal effects of foreign ownership
on labor market outcomes are biased. Take, for example, the case of the foreign wage premium
and assume that foreigners buy firms with more educated workers. If unobserved worker ability
were independent of foreign acquisitions and positively correlated with schooling, then least
21 In appendix A, available at http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/ralmeida, I show how the foreign hourly wage premium
varies once I control for differences across firms in several workforce characteristics and when I allow the foreign
premium to vary across sectors. Throughout the paper I assume a nationally competitive labor market so that workers
move freely across regions. Relaxing this assumption leads to foreign wage premiums that are very similar.22 The number of observations for the hourly wage of high educated workers is smaller than in the other regressions
since 60% of the firms do not report having high educated workers.
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squares estimates for the foreign wage premium may be downward biased (if foreign acquisitions
and worker's schooling are positively correlated). Alternatively, unobservable technological
characteristics of the firm or unobservable organizational capital which are positively correlated
with the foreign acquisition may imply that the cross sectional estimates are biased upwards.Considering the motives for firm acquisition reviewed in the previous section, one would
expect to observe at least some changes in the acquired firm due to technological or organizational
restructuring of the firm. For example, plant closings can lead to large employment reductions.
Technological change can lead to an increased use of more skilled workers and changes in the
human capital, or it can lead to more on-the-job training with possibly different effects in the wages
of different workers. All this depends on the characteristics of labor markets, on the importance of
foreign acquisitions in the economy and on the directions of changes in the labor demand of
acquired firms. For example, productivity increases can lead to shifts in the labor demand and, as a
result, wages and employment may change. If foreign acquisitions correspond to a small part of
employment in the sector and if labor markets are competitive, wages will not increase and therewill be only increases in the employment of the firm. Alternatively, wages may increase if foreign
acquisitions have a strong impact on aggregate labor demand or if rigidities in the labor market
imply that firms face an upward sloping labor supply curve (e.g., due to monopsony). In this
section, I present reduced form estimates of the total effect of foreign acquisitions on a variety of
labor market variables. The relationship I estimate is not a structural labor demand equation (e.g.,
as in Hammermesh, 1993). However, it can be derived from it in some cases.23
In order to obtain unbiased estimates of the effect of foreign ownership on different labor
market outcomes, I need to take into account the possibility that foreign acquisitions are
endogenous, i.e., they might occur as a reaction to some kind of unobserved firm specific shock.
The findings in the previous section showed that foreign acquisitions are not random and thatforeigners acquire firms that systematically differ from the average domestic firm in the sector. If
foreign acquisitions are driven mainly by (unobserved) permanent differences across firms, this
endogeneity problem can potentially be addressed by examining the same firm over time and to
compare the outcomes of interest in the period before and after the foreign acquisition.
Econometrically, this would amount to estimating the following model with firm fixed effects:
yjt kj dFjtXT
t1
gtDt jt 4:1
where all notation is as above and j is a firm fixed effect. The error term, jt, is assumed to beuncorrelated across firms and time. The estimation of this equation requires longitudinal data for
each firm. The identification of is done exclusively by firms that change the nationality of their
ownership, i.e., that switch from a domestic to a foreign ownership.
Estimating Eq. (4.1) only for the sample of foreign acquisitions could yield biased estimates of.
In particular, it would be identical to comparing outcome yj in the pre and post-acquisition period
without taking into account other aggregate shocks contemporaneous to the acquisition (Meyer,
1994). Therefore, I include in the analysis a control group of domestic firms that identify the
aggregate shocks in the economy captured by t . Domestic firms are a good control group for the
23 In particular, under the assumption that labor supply curves faced by the firms are not affected by the nationality of
their ownership, the reduced form effects are all due to changes in labor demand. Otherwise, they are the combination of
labor supply and labor demand changes. Lichtenberg and Seigel (1992), Brown and Medoff (1988) and McGuckin and
Nguyen (2001) use a specification (for employment) that is closer to this approach.
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sample of acquired firms if both types of firm are growing at similar rates in the years prior to the
acquisition (and hence are likely to be affected similarly by aggregate shocks). In other words, this
approach would be invalid if firms which are acquired grow at systematically different rates than the
average domestic firm. This evidence would suggest that foreign acquisitions would be correlatedwith some firm unobserved shock in growth rates and hence the beforeafter comparison would be
invalid. Even though there is no formal way to test this claim, I present some evidence that this
problem is not very important for several outcomes of interest. To do this I estimate a model similar to
Eq. (3.1) but having the growth rate of the outcome yjt as dependent variable:
lnyjtlnyjt1 bAj dFjXS
s1
gsDs XT
t1
gtDt ejt 4:2
where all the notation is as in Eq. (3.1). This equation is estimated for all firms acquired by foreigners
and for existing domestic and foreign owned firms. In this specification, measures the percentagepoint difference in the growth rate between firms that will be acquired by foreigners over the
following years and domestic firms in the same sector. Analogously, measures the percentage point
difference in the growth rate in existent foreign owned firms and domestic firms in the same sector.
The results of estimating Eq. (4.2) for several outcomes with least squares are presented in
columns (1) to (10) of Table 2. The evidence suggests that acquired firms are growing in the pre-
acquisition period at rates that are not statistically different from the rates of growth in domestic firms
in the same sector. The only exception is for the size of the firm, average tenure of the workers and the
price cost margin. In these cases, there is evidence that firms acquired by foreigners were growing at
higher rates prior to the acquisition than domestic firms (7 percentage points above for employment,
0.03 years above for average tenure of the workforce and 1 percentage point above for the price-costmargin). Existing foreign firms tend to grow at a different rate than the rates acquired firms are
growing in the pre-acquisition period, even though the quantitative differences are small.24 I interpret
these findings as suggestive that for most of the outcomes of interest foreign acquisitions are a
reaction to a permanent firm specific shock (and hence a first difference approach would yield
unbiased estimates for the effect of foreign acquisitions) but that foreigners tend to acquire firms
whose employment, tenure and price cost margin is growing above the average for the sector.
The results of estimating Eq. (4.1) for foreign acquisitions and for existing domestic firms are
reported in Table 3.25 Panel A reports the results when the sample includes firms in manufacturing
and non-manufacturing sectors. The findings suggest that following an acquisition there is an
increase of 14.5% in the total size of the firm. I do not find evidence of substantial restructuring of theworkforce in the acquired firm. There are no significant changes in the average education of the
workforce following the acquisition, measured by the average years of schooling. I also do not find
evidence that other demographic characteristics of the workforce (like age, tenure or gender) change
substantially.26 All this evidence strongly suggests that the profile of the average worker in the firm is
24 For most of the outcomes, I accept the null hypothesis that =. The exceptions include total employment, average
hourly wage of high educated workers and the pricecost margin. Because firms could anticipate the effects of the
acquisition, I tested the robustness of the results to including only growth rates two and three years before the acquisition
for those firms that become acquired. The results are very similar (not reported).25 Since the differences in growth rates between acquired and foreign owned firms are quantitatively small (Table 2), I
also test the robustness of the estimates in Table 3 to the inclusion of foreign owned firms as a control group. I do not find
significant differences in the outcomes relatively to those reported in Table 3 (not reported).26 The coefficients for average age, tenure on-the-job and share of females in the workforce are statistically strong
though quantitatively small.
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Table2
Differencesinthegrowthofoutcomesbetweenfutureforeignacquisitionsandforeignownedfirmsrelativelytodomesticfirms
Employment
Hours
work
perem
ployee
Yearsof
schooling
Age
workforce
Tenure
workforce
Females/
totalworkers
Average
hourlywage
Loweducated
hourlywage
Higheducated
hourlywage
Price-cost
margin
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
Futureforeign
acquisitions
0.0
7
0.000
0.005
0.0
01
0.03
0.002
0.001
0.005
0.0
1
0.01
[0.0
16]
[0.0
03]
[0.0
05]
[0.0
03]
[0.0
19]
[0.0
17]
[0.0
06]
[0.0
06]
[0.0
10]
[0.0
05]
Foreignfirms
0.0
2
0.01
0.003
0.0
1
0.002
0.01
0.01
0.004
0.01
0.002
[0.0
05]
[0.0
01]
[0.0
01]
[0.0
01]
[0.0
05]
[0.0
03]
[0.0
01]
[0.0
02]
[0.0
02]
[0.0
01]
Sectordummie
sincluded?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Timedummies
included?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Growthav.sch
ooling,age,
tenureandsh.
females
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
Ftest:Futureforeign
acquisitions=Foreign
firms(Pvalue)
0.0
0
0.11
0.68
0.11
0.07
0.52
0.35
0.17
0.0
4
0.05
N
384,8
02
384,80
2
384,8
02
384,802
384,8
02
384,8
02
384,802
363,223
139,094
344,439
Rsquared
0.0
1
0.01
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.0
8
0.00
Thenumbersincolumn(1)representthecoefficientsofaregressionofemploymentgrowthonadummyvariableifafirmw
illbecomeacquiredbyforeignersan
donadummy
variableifthefirmisforeignowned.Controlsfortw
odigitsectordummiesandyeardum
miesareincluded(Eq.
(4.2
)inthetext).
Incolumns(7)to(9)controlsfo
rthegrowthin
averageschooling,age,tenureandfemalesareincluded.Standarderrorsareclusteredatthefirmlevel.Nisthesamplesize
ineachregression.Pvaluesareforthetestthatthe
coefficientonthefutureforeignacquisitionsisequaltothatofforeignownedfirms.The
coefficientsforemployment,hourso
fworkandaveragehourlywages(av
erage,lowand
high)areinterp
retedaspercentagedifferences(logdependentvariable).E.g.,
0.07incolumn(1)impliesthatfutureforeignacquisitionsgrow7percentagepointsabovetheaverage
domesticfirminthesectortwoyearsbeforetheac
quisitiontakesplace.0.0
05incolumn(3)impliesthatthegrowthintheaverageyearsofschoolinginfirm
sacquiredby
foreignersis0.0
5percentagepointslowerthanintheaveragedomesticfirminthesecto
r.
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not significantly affected. Moreover, after controlling for the human capital characteristics of the
workforce, average hourly wages remain constant following the acquisition. This result is robust
within education groups. Column (10) reports an increase in the price-cost margin by 0.4 percent-age
points for the whole sample, suggesting that productivity increases following the foreign acquisition.To keep the comparability with papers in the literature, panel B reports the results of estimating
Eq. (4.1) only for manufacturing firms. I find evidence that employment increases by 10.1% and
that there are very small changes in the human capital composition of the average worker in the
firm.27 Average hourly wages increase by 1.7% following the acquisition (reflecting an increase
in average wages and of hours of work by 2.6% and 1.2%, respectively). Hourly wages for the
high educated workers increase by 3.5% following the acquisition and average hourly wages for
the low educated workers remain unchanged.
In sum, my findings show that following the foreign acquisition there are no substantial changes
in the human capital of the workforce or on the average wages of acquired firms. There is also
evidence that firms increase total employment following the acquisition, even though this estimateis likely to be upward biased since acquired firms were growing at faster rates in the pre-acquistion
period. For manufacturing firms, there is evidence of an increase in average hourly wages for the
high educated workers, after controlling for changes in the quality of the workforce. I interpret
these findings as consistent with a model where foreign firms are relatively risk averse and enter a
new market where learning and adjustment costs are high. Foreigners are more likely to buy the
best performers since they are already similar to their own characteristics. Otherwise, they would
face very high costs of adapting the technology, the workforce or by gaining experience in the host
country. Furthermore, acquired firms only account for a very small share of total employment. As a
result, changes in the labor demand of these firms will not affect the equilibrium wages in the
economy and most of the observed changes will be on the employment margin. Foreign investmentmay lead to an increase in the productivity of the labor force and to a rise in labor demand but, if
wages are fixed, employment will increase. In the manufacturing sector foreign acquisition leads to
an increase in wages of the more educated workers. This could happen if foreign firms provide
more training to these workers than domestic firms, making them different from other educated
workers in the rest of the economy, and therefore paying them higher wages. Alternatively, if there
are rigidities in the labor market for educated workers, it is also possible that foreign acquisitions
lead to higher wages due to an increase in labor demand, even in the absence of training.
The most credible solution to the endogeneity problem of foreign acquisitions would be to find an
external instrument to the foreign acquisition. This instrument had to be uncorrelated with all the
outcomes of interest except through the acquisition itself but such an instrument does not exist in thedata. Alternatively, I could estimate a VAR model and test whether foreign ownership Granger
causes firm characteristics. Unfortunately, the panel dimension of the data is not sufficiently long to
allow me to estimate a specification without serial correlation in the error terms.28
5. Robustness tests
One possible concern is that the findings in Table 3 are driven by the 10% threshold imposed to
define foreign ownership. Mansfield and Romeo (1980) argue that the transfer of foreign technology
27 The only quantitatively important change is associated with a decrease in the share of females in 1.4 percentage
points.28 Details on the results using this approach are available in appendix B at http://econ.worldbank.org/staff/ralmeida.
There, I also discuss other robustness tests for the main findings in the paper.
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Table3
Fixedeffectsestimatesoftheeffectsofforeignacquisitionsusingascontrolgroupdomesticfirms
Employment
Hourswork
peremployee
Yearsof
schooling
Age
workforce
Tenure
workforce
Females/
totalworkers
Hourly
wage
Loweducated
hourlywage
Higheducated
hourlywage
Price-cost
margin
(1)
(2
)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
A.A
llSample
Foreignownership
0.145
0.017
0.0
08
0.7
6
0.3
2
0.004
0.004
0.001
0.008
0.0
04
[0.0
35]
[0.0
04]
[0.0
60]
[0.1
57]
[0.1
08]
[0.0
06]
[0.009
]
[0.0
10]
[0.0
16]
[0.0
01]
Timedummies
included?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Av.schooling,
age,
tenure,sh.females
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
N
638,896
638,896
638,896
638,8
96
638,896
638,8
96
638,89
6
608,551
248,671
571,6
05
Rsquared
0.94
0.68
0.90
0.8
8
0.91
0.9
3
0.85
0.86
0.85
0.7
2
B.Manufacturing
Foreignownership
0.101
0.012
0.0
22
0.7
73
0.4
65
0.014
0.017
0.009
0.035
0.0
05
[0.0
18]
[0.0
07]
[0.0
50]
[0.1
71]
[0.1
06]
[0.0
05]
[0.009
]
[0.0
08]
[0.0
17]
[0.0
01]
Timedummies
included?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Av.schooling,
age,
tenure,sh.females
No
No
No
No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
N
133,985
133,985
133,985
133,9
85
133,985
133,9
85
133,98
5
132,775
49,9
65
122,9
87
Rsquared
0.96
0.63
0.85
0.9
1
0.93
0.9
7
0.85
0.87
0.85
0.7
2
Thenumbersincolumn(1)representthecoefficien
tsofaregressionoflogemploymen
tatthefirmlevelonadummyvaria
blethatequalstooneifthefirmisforeignowned,
controllingfor
yearandfirmtimeinvarianteffects(Eq.
(4.1
)inthetext).Incolumns(7)
to(9)thespecificationincludesasexplanatoryvariableaverageyearsofschooling,age,
tenureandsharefemalesintheworkforce.Standarderrorsareclusteredatthefirmlevel.N
isthesamplesizeineachregression.
Thecoefficientsforemployment,hoursofworkand
averagehourly
wages(average,lowandhigh)areinterpretedaspercentagedifferences(logdependentvariable).E.g.,
0.1
4inco
lumn(1)impliesthatfollowingafore
ignacquisition
theemploymen
tinacquiredfirmsisonaverage14p
ercentagepointshigherthantheaverageemploymentinadomesticfirm.P
anelAincludestheestimatesforallthefirmsinthe
sampleandPanelBincludesonlymanufacturingfirms.
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is greater in fully owned foreign firms, specially when competitive advantage of the foreign firm is
based on intangible assets. Larger technological transfers from foreign firms increase productivity
and can possibly increase the use of more educated workers or average wages in the acquired firm. In
this case, the choice of the 10% threshold could be biasing the results against the finding on any effecton wages and workforce composition. I reestimate Eq. (4.1) considering foreign firms only those
firms with full foreign ownership. Given that most of the firms in the sample have majority
participations the results in Table 3 do not change significantly (results are available upon request).
A different concern, specific to the effect of foreign ownership on hourly wages, relates to
possibility that the foreign acquisition changes the composition of the workforce in some unobservable
workforce characteristics (e.g. worker's ability). In Section 2 I showed that foreign and domestic firms
differ significantly with respect to the human capital profile of the workforce. This heterogeneity is
likely to be much more important when comparing different firms rather than when comparing the
same firms over time (which is my approach in Eq. (4.1)). In fact, if the workforce were to be constant
over time, the unobserved ability of the workforce would be perfectly captured by a firm time invarianteffect. However, with a changing workforce this needs not be the case. Moreover, depending on the
correlation between ability and the foreign acquisition the sign of the bias in Table 3 is unclear.
To address this concern, I exploit the fact that in the data firms and workers are matched in each
point in time and that both can be traced over time.29 The best way to account for the bias would be
to compute average wages for those workers that have remained in the firm throughout the entire
period the firm is observed.30 This approach ensures that the set of workers remains constant over
time and one can fully isolate the effect of the foreign acquisition from the effect of omitted ability.
The problem with this approach is that there are very few firms with at least one worker that
complies with this criteria, mostly because of large measurement error in worker identifiers. In
particular, the total number of acquired firms for which there is information on wages is reducedfrom a total of 1381 to approximately 360 firms. An alternative to this approach which
simultaneously mitigates the omitted ability problem and maximizes the information available
over time, is to keep the composition of the workforce fixed only before and after the acquisition.
To do this I compute average wages for a moving window of workers across three consecutive
periods. For existing firms, I identify the group of workers that are currently employed in the firm
and that were employed in the previous year as well as in the following year. For new firms I
identify the group of workers that are currently employed in the firm and that will remain employed
in the following year. For example, consider a domestic firm that exists for the period 19931997
and that is acquired in 1995. The (moving) average wages obtained for this firm in 1994 and 1995
(used to identify the effect of the foreign acquisition) use information for the same set of workersexcept for those workers that were in the firm in 1993 but are no longer there in 1996 and vice-
versa. Using this criteria, I am able to compute the average wages for 1, 346 acquired firms in the
sample, which is approximately 95% of the total number of acquisitions in the data.31
29 The Portuguese data is a matched employer-employee data set. For a review of the litertaure using matched employer
employee see Abowd and Kramarz (1999).30 The worker identifier in this data is the worker's social security number. This identifier is much less reliable than the
firm identifier because the Ministry of Labor, specially in the first years of the sample, did not check the validity of the
codes provided. I have excluded workers without a unique identifier within a firm when tracing the workers over time.
This criteria could still present some problems (e.g., workers with non-valid social security numbers might remain in the
sample as long as they only show up once within each firm) but it maximizes the number of workers for which there is
information. The share of workers that are not unique according to this definition is between 12% (1991) and 7% (1998).31 Using this criterion, between 42% (1998) and 32% (1992) of the workers in the sample in each period are used to
compute average wages.
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Table 4 report the results of estimating Eq. (4.1) for the average wages for this group of workers.
Columns (1) to (3) report the results with least squares ignoring the firm fixed effects (cross
section) and columns (4) to (6) report the results with firm fixed effects. As before, the least squares
estimates of the effect of foreign ownership are always above the firm fixed effects estimates. This
finding suggests that the cherry picking of the foreign investors of domestic firms is robust to
keeping the workforce composition constant. The main difference of keeping the composition
fixed (relatively to Table 3) is that there are slightly larger effects of foreign ownership for averagewages in manufacturing (panel B). In particular, average wages following the acquisition increase
by 2.2% for the low educated workers and 4.3% for the high educated workers.32 However, the
magnitude of these effects are very small when compared to the least square estimates. These
results suggest that the firm expands following the foreign acquisition but that the average quality
of the new entrant is slightly below the quality of the average worker. This is consistent with
foreigners buying the domestic firms with the best workers and hiring the immediately next to the
best when they are expanding in the years following the acquisition (Table 3 shows that average
schooling, age and tenure decrease slightly following the acquisition).
Table 4
Estimates of the effects of foreign acquisitions on wages only for workers that remain in the firm (stayers)
Estimation method: All Low
Educated
High
Educated
All Low
Educated
High
Educated
OLS Fixed effects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
A. All sample
Foreign ownership 0.36 0.27 0.43 0.009 0.015 0.025
[0.014] [0.013] [0.017] [0.009] [0.009] [0.015]
Sector dummies included? Yes Yes Yes No No No
Time dummies included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Av. schooling, age, tenure, sh. females Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 550,288 514,406 182,036 550,288 514,406 182,036
R squared 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.86 0.86 0.88
B. Manufacturing
Foreign ownership 0.23 0.18 0.32 0.028 0.022 0.043
[0.018] [0.017] [0.026] [0.013] [0.012] [0.023]
Sector dummies included? Yes Yes Yes No No No
Time dummies included? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Av. schooling, age, tenure, sh. females Yes Yes Yes Yes Ye Yes
N 123,715 122,031 37,633 123,715 122,031 37,633
R squared 0.42 0.42 0.36 0.85 0.87 0.87
Table reports the foreign wage premium of all the workers that remain in the same firm throughout 3 consecutive periods. The
table reports the least squares estimates of Eq. (4.1) in the text ignoring firm fixed effects in columns (1) to (3) and including
them in columns (4) to (6). Columns (1) and (4) report the results for all the workers, columns (2) and (5) for all the low
educated workers and columns (3) and (6) for the high educated workers. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.Nisthe
sample size in each regression. Panel A reports the results for the whole sample and Panel B includes only manufacturing firms.
32 I thank the editor for one possible explanation for why there could be a higher increase in average wages for the high
educated workers. If following the acquisition total rents increase and the high educated workers have higher bargaining
power (due to the accumulation of firm specific skills), then their wage adjustment could be higher. Unfortunately my
data does not allow me to test this hypothesis.
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One concern that could still remain with these findings relates to the whether they could be
attributed to the foreign ownership or if they can attributed to the acquisition itself, independently
of the nationality. To the extent that domestic firms also cherry pick the acquired firms, my
results for the selection and for the evolution following the acquisition would be driven by theacquisition itself and not by the foreign acquisitions. As discussed in Section 4 it is difficult to
extract strong predictions about the post acquisition firm performance from the extensive
theoretical literature on mergers and acquisitions. Unfortunately, in the Portuguese data I cannot
identify domestic acquisitions of domestic firms even though I can identify the group of domestic
acquisitions of foreign owned firms.33 To address this concern, I estimate the following model:
yjt kj bFAjt hDAjtXT
t1
gtDt jt 5:1
where FAjt is a dummy variable that assumes the value one in the periods following a foreign
acquisition of a domestic firm, DAjt is a dummy variable that assumes the value one in the periodsfollowing a domestic acquisition of a foreign firm and Dt are year dummies.
34 The results are
reported in Table 5. The findings suggest that the effects on employment are different for foreign
and domestic acquisitions. While employment in the firm increases between 10% and 15%
following a foreign acquisition, in the domestic acquisitions, there is a 5% reduction in total
employment (which fails to be statistically significant but is in line with Conyon et al., 2002b).
Moreover, there is also evidence that the effects on average wages are common to the two types of
ownership changes. The estimates in columns (7) to (9) show that, after keeping the composition of
the workforce constant, average wages in acquired firms increase by a very similar magnitude,
independently of the nationality of the acquiring firm (even though I never reject that the increase
in wages in slightly higher in the foreign acquisitions).Perhaps surprisingly, there is evidence that average years of schooling decrease following a
domestic acquisition. This pattern is puzzling even though the magnitude of the effect is very
small (average schooling in the sample is 6.3 years and the standard deviation of 2.3 years). A
further investigation shows that this effect is not driven by the evolution in the years of schooling
in the existent domestic firms. One possible explanation for this can be that the new workers in
firms that become acquired by domestics are less educated than the existing workers in these
firms. Actually, the average years of schooling of an European worker is higher than for a
Portuguese worker. Since approximately 75% of the Portuguese FDI in this period came from the
E.U., these changes could be simply reflecting the exit of some foreign workers following the
domestic acquisition. On the contrary, when a domestic firm is acquired by a foreign
multinational there is no evidence that foreigners change significantly the average schooling of
the firm, perhaps because this is already very close to the one in fully foreign firms.
Finally, another concern with the estimates in Table 3 is that they are capturing the effects of
other firm practices that change simultaneously with the nationality of the ownership. Since
foreign activities tend to take place in bundles, those firms that are acquired by foreigners are likely
to simultaneously become exporters or importers of some of their intermediate inputs (e.g. Tybout,
33 Foreign acquisitions of domestic firms (or foreign acquisitions of domestic firms) are identified when the share of foreign
ownership changes from being less or equal to 10% to being more than 10% (and vice versa). Given that domestic acquisitions
do not necessarily translate into changes in the share private domestic capital, they cannot be identified in the data set.34 A similar analysis than the one reported in Table 1 (not reported) suggests that foreign owned firms that will be
acquired by domestics are smaller in size, pay lower average hourly wages and have a less educated workforce than the
average foreign firm in the same sector. Still, these firms always outperform the typical domestic firm in the sector.
Again, there are no significant differences in the growth of the outcomes of interest in the pre acquisition period.
91R. Almeida / Journal of International Economics 72 (2007) 7596
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Table5
Estimatesoftheeffectsofforeignanddomesticacq
uisitionsusingascontrolgroupdom
esticfirms
EmploymentYearsof
schooling
Price-cost
margin
Hourly
wage
Loweducated
hourlywage
Higheducated
hourlywage
Hourly
wage
Loweducated
hourlywage
Higheducated
hourlywage
Allworkers
Stayers
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6
)
(7)
(8)
(9)
A.A
llsample
Foreignacquisitions
0.145
0.0
07
0.004
0.0
04
0.0
01
0.008
0.009
0.0
15
0.025
[0.0
35]
[0.0
60]
[0.0
01]
[0.0
09]
[0.0
10]
[0.0
16]
[0.0
09]
[0.0
09]
[0.0
15]
Domesticacquisitions
0.016
0.1
75
0.000
0.0
03
0.0
02
0.014
0.008
0.0
16
0.009
[0.0
37]
[0.0
62]
[0.0
01]
[0.0
11]
[0.0
10]
[0.0
19]
[0.0
11]
[0.0
09]
[0.0
16]
Timedummies
included?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Av.schooling,age,tenure,sh.
Femalesincluded?No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Ftest:foreignacquisitions=domestic
acquisitions(Pvalue)
0.000
0.0
18
0.001
0.88
0.9
8
0.64
0.484
0.0
65
0.232
N
641,475
641,4
75
573,938
641,4
75610,8
89
250,914
552,6
93
516,4
69
183,9
84
Rsquared
0.94
0.9
0
0.72
0.86
0.8
6
0.86
0.86
0.8
6
0.88
B.Manufacturing
Foreignacquisitions
0.102
0.0
21
0.005
0.017
0.0
09
0.034
0.028
0.0
22
0.043
[0.0
66]
[0.1
04]
[0.0
02]
[0.0
13]
[0.0
12]
[0.0
25]
[0.0
13]
[0.0
12]
[0.0
23]
Domesticacquisitions
0.050
0.1
73
0.000
0.0
10
0.0
07
0.000
0.015
0.0
17
0.040
[0.0
42]
[0.0
88]
[0.0
02]
[0.0
15]
[0.0
12]
[0.0
36]
[0.0
12]
[0.0
11]
[0.0
29]
Timedummies
included?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Av.schooling,age,tenure,sh.
Femalesincluded?No
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Ftest:foreignacquisitions=domestic
acquisitions(Pvalue)
0.15
0.1
4
0.03
0.36
0.6
7
0.38
0.039
0.0
62
0.071
N
134,736
134,7
36
123,679
134,7
36133,5
18
50,6
21
124,4
37
122,7
36
38,207
Rsquared
0.96
0.8
5
0.72
0.85
0.8
7
0.85
0.85
0.8
7
0.87
Thenumbersin
column(1)representthecoefficients
ofaregressionoflogemploymentat
thefirmlevelonadummyvariableth
atequalstooneifthefirmisacquired
byforeigners,
onadummythatequalsoneifthefirmsisacquiredb
ydomesticsandcontrolsforyearand
firmtimeinvarianteffects(Eq.
(5.1
)inthetext).Columns(1)to(6)reporttheresultsfor
alltheworkers
inthesamplewhilecolumns(7)to(9)reporttheresultsforthestayers.A
llthewageequationsincludeasexplanatoryvariablesaverageyearsofschooling,age,
tenureandsharefemalesintheworkforce.Standarderrorsareclusteredatthefirmlevel.Nisthesamplesizeineachregres
sion.Thecoefficientsforemploymentandaverage
hourlywages(average,lowandhigh)areinterprete
daspercentagedifferences(logdependentvariable).Standarderrorsare
clusteredatthefirmlevel.PanelAincludesallthe
sectorsinthesampleandPanelBincludesonlyma
nufacturingsectors.
92 R. Almeida / Journal of International Economics 72 (2007) 7596
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2000; Bernard et al., 2005). Since the Portuguese data set does not collect any information on
exports it is not possible to check empirically how controlling for these activities would affect the
findings. However, given the findings in the literature on exporting, my results for the post
acquisition performance should not be too much affected by the exporting activity even if it takesplace simultaneously with the foreign acquisition.35 For example, Clerides et al. (1998) and
Bernard and Jensen (1999) find evidence that the best performers self select into exporting
activities and no evidence of significant changes in productivity or wages after the firm becomes an
exporter. The evidence of the effects of importing intermediate inputs are much less studied but
several papers find evidence of a positive correlation between importing intermediate inputs and
firm performance (e.g. Tybout and Westbrook, 1995). Assuming that the effects on productivity
are quantitatively important and if they translate into high wage growth, my estimates for the
changes in average wages could be overestimated. Since I find no or small effects in average hourly
wages, this would imply that foreign acquisition are associated with a decrease in productivity and
wages. This finding would be consistent with a short run decrease in the firm's productivityfollowing a foreign acquisition, which could be caused by assimilation problems when entering
into a new market (e.g. Harris and Robinson, 2002; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987).
6. Conclusion
Foreign firms have a more educated workforce and pay higher wages than domestic firms even
after controlling for worker quality, at a given moment in time. This does not imply that foreign
ownership improves the labor market outcomes of the workers since foreign investment may be
guided by unobservable firm and worker characteristics correlated with schooling or wages. Using a
matched employer
employee data set of Portuguese firms during the nineties, I illustrate theimportance of selection of foreign investment to high wage and high human capital firms and to
isolate the effect of foreign ownership on several labor market outcomes. Existing empirical
evidence for European countries is scarce and, apart from evidence for the UK, not much is known
about the impact of foreign acquisitions on the labor markets outcomes. Portugal is an interesting
case, as in the late 1980s and 90s there was a permissive legal framework for the operation of foreign
firms that translated into generous amounts of FDI. Moreover, Portugal is a developed country
although at the tail of the income distribution within the European Union. Therefore, the findings in
the paper may be particularly important to understand the effects of foreign direct investment in the
labor markets of the transition economies as they will soon join the European Union.
My findings suggest that most of the cross sectional differences between foreign and domesticfirms are driven by foreigners cherry picking domestic firms to be acquired. Acquired firms have
a more educated workforce, and pay higher wages for a given workforce quality. Moreover, these
firms are already much more similar to the group of existing foreign firms and, following the
foreign acquisition, there are no significant changes in the human capital of the workforce. There
is evidence that the size of the firm increases and that the hourly wages for those workers that
remain in the firm increases slightly following the acquisition by foreigners. Nevertheless, the
increase in average wages are modest (between 2% for the low educated and 4% for the high
educated workers) and well below the cross sectional estimates of the foreign wage premium.
Suggestive evidence shows that it might not be specific to foreign acquisitions since wages go up
by similar magnitudes following domestic acquisitions.
35 Bernard and Jensen (1999) find that employment growth is higher for exporters. Therefore, the estimated increase in
employment following the acquisition is likely to be biased upwards for those firms that export (in addition to the positive
bias caused by selection of foreign investment into high growth firms).
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TableA1
Asummaryofth
eliteratureonforeignwagepremiumusingfirmleveldata
Country/period
Data/samplecoverage
Dep
endentvariable
Numberofacquisitions
Independentvariables
Foreignwagepremium
Firmlevel
W
orkerlevel
Crosssection
Paneldata
Aitken,Harrison
and
Lipsey(1996)
Paneloffirms
Log
averagefirmwage
byskillgroup
N.A.
sector,region,assets,size,ageN
.A.
25%skilled
17%unskilled
14%skilled
9.3%unskilled
Venezuela,
19771989
EncustaIndustrial.
Manufacturing
Girma,Greenaway
andWakelin(1999)
Paneloffirms.
Log
averagefirmwage
N.A.
sector
N
.A.
9.50%
0.40%
UK,
19911996
OneSource.Manufacturing
Conyon,Girma,
Thompsonand
Wright(2002)
Paneloffirms.
Log
averagefirmwage
129foreignacquisitions
and331domestic
acquisitions
assets,sector
averagewages
N
.A.
3.30%
UK,
19891994
OneSource.manufacturing
GirmaandGorg
(2003)
Paneloffirms.
Log
averagefirmwage
bys
killgroup
346foreign
acquisitions
averageregional-sector
wage,averagewagein
complementskillgroup,capitalN
.A.
2%4.9%
skilled2%
2.8%unskilled
U.K.
19801994
ARD.
Electronicsandfood
Lipseyand
Sjoholm(2004)
Crosssectionoffirms.
Log
averagefirmwage
bys
killgroup
sector,region,energy
perworker,inputsper
worker,size,public
ownership
E
ducation,gender
byskillgroup
12%bluecollor,
22%whitecollar
Indonesia,1996
CensusManufacturing
Lipseyand
Sjoholm(2002)
Paneloffirms.
Log
averagefirmwage
bys
killgroup
1045foreign
acquisitions1243
domesticacquisition
s
sector,region,energy
perworker,inputsper
worker,size,publicownership
N
.A.
28%bluecollar
41%whitecollar
17%blue
collar33%
whitecollar
Indonesia,1975
1999
CensusManufacturing
Almeida(2004)
Paneloffirms
(MEEDatfirmlevel)
Log
averagefirmwage
bye
ducationgroup
688foreign
acquisitions505
domesticacquisition
s
sector,size,age,
publicownership.
E
ducation,gender,
age,tenure,
hours
w
orkedbyeducation
group
31%loweducated
46%higheducated
0.1%low
educated
0.8%high
educated
Portugal,19911
998
CensusManufacturingand
Nonmanufacturing
Note:Tablereportsasummaryofthemainpapersthathaves
tudiedtheforeignwagepremiumusingmic
rodata.T
hefirstevidencethatforeignfirmswereassociatedwithhigherwagescamefromstudiesusing
industryleveldata(seee.g.FelicianoandLipsey,1999;Aitk
en,
HarrisonandLipsey,1996).Asdatasetsbecomeavailable,foreignwagepremium
shavebeenestimatedusingplantorfirmlevelinformation.
AppendixA.
94 R. Almeida / Journal of International Economics 72 (2007) 7596
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Appendix B. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at
doi:10.1016/j.jinteco.2006.10.001.
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