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Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual ContentJan Almngaa University of Gothenburg, Sweden

To cite this Article Almng, Jan(2008) 'Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual Content', International Journal ofPhilosophical Studies, 16: 2, 161 177

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International Journal of Philosophical Studies

Vol. 16(2), 161177

International Journal of Philosophical Studies

ISSN 09672559 print 14664542 online 2008 Taylor & Francishttp://www.tandf.co.uk/journals

DOI: 10.1080/09672550802008583

Affordances and the Nature ofPerceptual Content

Jan Almng

Taylor and FrancisRIPH_A_301024.sgm10.1080/09672550802008583International Journal of Philosophical Studies0967-2559 (print)/1466-4542 (online)Original Article2008Taylor & [email protected]

Abstract

According to John McDowell, representational perceptual content is concep-tual through and through. This paper criticizes this view by claiming that thereis a certain kind of representational and non-conceptual perceptual contentthat is sensitive to bodily skills. After a brief introduction to McDowellsposition, Merleau-Pontys notion of body schema and Gibsons notion of

affordance are presented. It is argued that affordances are constitutive ofrepresentational perceptual content, and that at least some affordances, theso-called conditional affordances, are essentially related to the body schema.This means that the perceptual content depends upon the nature of the bodyschema. Since the body schema does not pertain to the domain that ourconceptual faculties operate upon, it is argued that this kind of perceptualcontent cannot be conceptual. At least some of that content is representa-tional, yet it cannot feature as non-demonstrative conceptual content. It isargued that if it features as demonstrative conceptual content, it has to becaptured by private concepts. Since McDowells theory does not allow for theexistence of a private language, it is concluded that at least some representa-

tional perceptual content is non-conceptual.Keywords: McDowell; Merleau-Ponty; nonconceptual; perception; content;

affordance

Introduction

According to some philosophers, most prominently John McDowell,

1

representational perceptual content is conceptual. What does this mean? It

means that the content of a perception is conceptual through and through,and that this content represents certain conditions and facts as obtaining inthe world. The purpose of this paper is to challenge that view. I shall arguethat there is at least a special subclass of representational perceptualcontent that is not conceptual. The general structure of my argument willbe that at least a special kind ofaffordance

is representational and

non-conceptual. An affordance, to use the term coined by the perceptualpsychologist J. J. Gibson, is a perceived feature of the environment which

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

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indicates a possible action in the environment for the perceiver. Whereasaffordances have been discussed before in this context, no one has to myknowledge successfully argued that they can be both representational and

non-conceptual. The paper is divided into three parts. The first part

presents the problem, and elucidates in particular the notions of represen-tational and conceptual content. The second part introduces the notions ofbody schema and affordance and argues that the latter depends upon theformer. The purpose of the second part is to demonstrate that the bodyschema can function independently of our capacity for rational thought,and that consequently affordances can feature as non-conceptual content,though not necessarily as representational content. It also contains adiscussion of previous attempts to show why affordances have to be non-conceptual. I argue that these fail since they do not establish that affor-

dances feature as non-conceptual representational

content. The third partof the paper draws upon the conclusions reached in the second part, andpresents a novel argument for the position that some affordances canindeed be representational and non-conceptual.

The Problem

According to McDowell, representational perceptual content is conceptual.But what does it mean to say that a perceptual experience is representa-

tional? Initially, it is important to note that it does not

mean that what weare directly aware

of is a representation of the world. That is a differentissue. To say that a perceptual experience is representational means that itscontent is available for cognition. The perceptual state represents certainstates of affairs. It is something that has a direct bearing on the beliefs of theperceiver and something that the perceiver can think of. A perceptualrepresentation is not a belief-state itself, but it can provide reasons forholding a particular belief.

There can also be non-representational perceptual content. This may, forexample, be the case when perceptual information influences our behav-iour, but is not available for cognition. In these cases we have in some senseregistered features of the perceived environment, yet we do not represent itin the sense given above. In one psychological experiment, for example,normal subjects were placed in a dark room and asked to press a target thatwas illuminated and stationary. After the subjects had initiated their move-ment with their hand towards the target, the target occasionally changedposition, i.e. the illuminated target was darkened and a dark target close bywas lit up. The change of position was large enough to require an adjust-ment of the movement, which the subjects managed without any loss of

time. Yet the subjects were unaware of the change!

2

What this experimentindicates is that some perceptual information (the change) is not availablefor cognition and is thus non-representational. Yet it is still perceptual

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AFFORDANCES AND THE NATURE OF PERCEPTUAL CONTENT

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content, since this information is picked up by our senses, or else it could nothave influenced the action of the subjects.

On some accounts, perceptual content has to be in some sense phenome-nally conscious. If this is correct, there may well be no non-representational

perceptual content in the sense described above. My way of framing thedistinction between representational and non-representational perceptualcontent is intended to steer clear of that particular discussion. The notion ofcontent as it is used here simply means an informational state that makessome features of the world available for cognition and / or guides thesubjects conduct in the world. States carrying information that is availablefor cognition

and which may guide the conduct of the subject have represen-tational content. States which are not

available for cognition but which carryinformation that can guide the actions of the subject have on this account

non-representational content.According to McDowell, conceptual capacities are drawn on in

receptiv-ity.

3

This means that they are not exercised upon some non-conceptualstate that is given, but that perceptual states are conceptual from the verybeginning. McDowells point is that we do not form concepts through aprocess of abstraction from a non-conceptual perceptual state, a sensiblemanifold. The conceptual capacities of a perceiver are involved already inthe process of receptivity.

4

The conceptual capacities which are drawn on in receptivity would

according to McDowell not be conceptual in the proper sense of the word ifthey were only used in receptivity. They would not be recognizable asconceptual capacities at all unless they could also be exercised in activethinking.

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The reason for this is that an empirical experience representscertain conditions as obtaining in the world. As a consequence, an empiricalexperience is related to the rational capacities of the perceiver. Theperceiver may, for example, judge that a certain perception is an illusion. Orthe perceiver may draw inferences that are based on the (conceptual andperceptual) representation of the world:

Quite generally, the capacities that are drawn on in experience arerecognizable as conceptual only against the background of the factthat someone who has them is responsive to rational relations, whichlink the contents of judgments of experience with other judgeablecontents.

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This is a point that McDowell returns to several times. Our conceptualcapacities belong to a network of capacities for active thought, a networkthat rationally governs comprehension-seeking responses to the impacts of

the world on sensibility.

7

According to McDowell, perception, belief and thought can only be ratio-nally connected if the same conceptual capacities are drawn upon in thought

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and

in sensory receptivity. Since perceptual experiences are conceptual, itcan be rational to form a belief based upon such a perceptual experience.And since it is the same conceptual capacities which are formative ofboth perceptual experience and active thinking, the link between empirical

experience and active thinking can be rational. If this were not the case,McDowell fears that the link between thought and perception would bebroken, in the sense that perceptual states would not be able to present uswith reasons

for holding certain propositions to be true.McDowells account has been criticized from several quarters. One

important discussion has been about the nature of perceptual content andthe role of demonstrative concepts. It has in particular been questionedwhether a conceptualist can explain the fact that our ability to make percep-tual discriminations is finer in grain than our capacity to describe our

perceptual experiences in non-demonstrative terms. We can, for example,perceptually experience more shades of red than we have concepts of red,and we can also perceptually experience more shapes of squares than wehave concepts of shapes of squares.

8

McDowells response to this problem is that the perceptual content inthese cases consists ofdemonstrative

or recognitional

concepts. A particu-lar shade of red is, for example, experienced as that

shade of red. Primafacie, this looks like an ad hoc solution, but that is according to McDowellan unwarranted accusation. For underlying such experiences is a recogni-

tional capacity that endures over time albeit perhaps over a short stretchof time. If, for example, one is presented with the same shade of red twice,but with a short temporal interval, one can recognize the shade as beingthe same because it is captured by the same demonstrative concept.

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McDowell claims that the very identity of one of these possibly short-term recognitional capacities is tied to a particular case of the kind ofimpact on sensibility that is supposed to be captured by the associatedconcept.

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It is important to note in this context that our recognitional capacities aretied to aspecific

impact on sensibility. In a trivial sense, all concepts that aredrawn upon in a perceptual experience are of course also activated by animpact on sensibility. But the identity of non-demonstrative concepts is nottied to a specific kind of impact on sensibility. Consider, for example, theconcept of bird. Needless to say, certain impacts on sensibility activate theconcept of bird, but the various impacts on sensibility that do so activatethe concept need not have anything interesting in common apart, ofcourse, from thus activating the concept of bird. Birds can, and often do,differ a lot in shape, size and colour. But when we perceive something as abird it is still the same kind of concept that is drawn upon, regardless of its

sensory presentation. But this is not the case with demonstrative concepts.They are tied to aspecific

impact on sensibility. That shade is activatedonly if a specific shade is sensed, and so on.

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According to McDowells theory our conceptual capacities are drawnupon in receptivity, and employed in active thought. McDowell also claimsthat intentional bodily actions are actualizations of our active nature inwhich conceptual capacities are inextricably implicated.

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This means that

bodily actions are also in some way related to our conceptual repertoire.The claim, strictly speaking, involves two separate claims. First of all,McDowell claims that intentional bodily actions are always related to ourcapacity for rational thought. Secondly, McDowell claims that rationalthought is always conceptual. I believe that both claims are erroneous, butfor the sake of argument, I shall not challenge either claim. I do, however,believe that my conclusion offers grounds for rejecting the second claim.

The Assumptions

In this section I shall explicate the nature of intentional bodily actions andits relationship to perceptual content from a Merleau-Pontyian perspec-tive.

13

My point of departure will be Merleau-Pontys notion of bodyschema

.

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According to Merleau-Ponty, our body schema enables us tohabitually perform physical actions such as walking, running, jumping ortyping. Our embodied knowledge of how to do things physically is in otherwords stored in the body schema. But the body schema employs not onlystored skills, but also proprioceptive information of bodily posture and

perceptual information of the surrounding environment. The kind ofmovement required in order to do something depends on our initial bodilyposition in relation to the object towards which we are acting.

I shall advance four claims in this section: first of all, that affordancesfeature in perceptual content and that they depend for their nature onthe body schema of the perceiver. Secondly, that the body schema reliesupon information that is not by necessity made available for cognition.Affordances are in other words not always representational. Thirdly, thatthe body schema does not operate in a way similar to rational thought, andby implication that the same conceptual capacities which are operative inthought are not operative in the body schema. My fourth claim is that affor-dances are not necessarily conceptualized. Most of the section focuses onthe first two claims. The third and fourth are primarily implications of thefirst two. I shall conclude the section by showing that the fourth claim doesnot threaten the conceptualist. But it sets the stage for the next section, inwhich I draw upon the conclusions reached in this section and argue that notall perceptual content is conceptual.

Affordances outline possible actions in the perceptual environment forthe perceiver.

15

The affordances of an environment are what the environ-

ment offers, or affords to, the perceiver, be it good or bad. A floor, for exam-ple, affords walking. Dangerous animals, on the other hand, afford danger,and are thus perceived as something to avoid or flee from. A pen affords

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writing, a chair affords sitting, a fence may or may not afford jumping over,and so on.

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An affordance stands in an interdependent relationship to thebody schema. An affordance depends for its nature on the body schema andon the surrounding environment. At the same time, the body schema would

not function if the agent did not perceive his affordances.Some affordances more or less command some specific actions to be

performed if one were to spot a lion in ones visual field, one would prob-ably feel compelled to avoid the lion. Other affordances are such that theyoutline actions which are possible, but not in any way commanded. I may,for example, see a floor as walkable, even though I have no plans ever toset foot on the floor. And I may also see a glass of water as graspable andas within reach, even though I have no intention of actually reaching forthe glass.

Affordances are constitutive of the perceptual content of an experience.They are in particular constitutive of the functional meaning

17

of aperceived object. They outline the possible function an object or an environ-ment can have for a perceiver, and it is in virtue of this that they are consti-tutive of the perceptual content of an experience. But the functionalmeaning of an object is not, unlike, for example, colours and shapes, tied toaspecific

impact on sensibility. Affordances feature in perceptual content ina similar way to non-demonstrative conceptual content. Two qualitativelydifferent impacts on sensibility can activate the same affordance. A grass

court may activate the affordance walkable. But the same affordance maybe activated by a frozen lake. Identical affordances can differ a lot in theirsensory presentations.

An affordance is an agent-relative property of a perceived object. Theaffordance of an object is always an affordance for someone. It is in virtueof the fact that the affordance of an object invites

18

certain physical actionsthat the object has the affordance. But this means that it is due to the factthat the perceiver is an embodied agent, viz. that the perceiver has a bodyschema, that he can perceive affordances.

19

By implication, the same envi-ronment may have different affordances for different perceivers and forthe same perceiver at different times. A certain hill, for example, can beperceived as being climbable by an experienced alpinist, but not by thepresent author.

Let us now turn to the second claim advanced above: that the bodyschema can function independently of our capacity for rational thought andcognition. It is initially important to point out that the body schema has acomplex relationship to our capacity for rational thought and decision-making. We can explicate the relationship as one in which by thinking wedecide what to do, whereas the action is performed in aspecific way

by the

body schema. But the way the body schema performs an action is not neces-sarily for reasons or by rational thought. It can operate independently of thiscapacity.

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The specific way of performing an action may in itself be a specific action.For actions are normally nested

within each other. Performing an actionnormally means that you pursue an end, the pursuit of which requires thatyou perform other actions, the ends of which are merely a means for your

pursuit of the end of the action in which the action is nested. Of course,actions nested within other actions may have other actions nested withinthem, and so on. Actions nested at the lowest possible level are not normallyperformed on the basis of rational thought, but by the body schema. Ifactions at the lowest possible level were performed on the basis of rationalthought, then the information requisite for performing the action would beavailable for cognition. But a range of ordinary and pathological examplesdemonstrate that this is not a necessary

requirement in order to perform aphysical action.

20

Consider, for example, the case of typing. I am currently writing a paper.I do this by pressing various keys on my keyboard. But pressing the keys ina specific way is not an action that is related to my capacities for rationalthought. In fact, I am unable to report the location of the various keys onthe keyboard. If someone gave me a keyboard with the signs of the lettersremoved and asked me to point out where the letter A normally is I wouldbe unable to answer, unless I was allowed to write on the keyboard andcould observe the movements of my hands. So any beliefs regarding thelocation of the keys on the keyboard cannot be a necessary requirement for

me to type. But this is information that I nevertheless must have. This infor-mation is available for my body schema, but is not accessible for thoughtand cognition.

21

The same conclusion can also be drawn from psychological experiments such as the light-switch experiment described earlier and pathologicalcases. Consider, for example, a by now famous study by David Milner andMelvyn Goodale. They described a patient D. F. who has a damagedperceptual system.

22

She can detect light, but she has no phenomenalconsciousness of shapes and edges. She is also unable to form beliefs abouther surrounding environment on the basis of visual perceptions; herperceptions apparently lack representational content altogether. But sheis able to perform actions which rely on perceptual information. She is, forexample, able to walk in mountainous areas. In one famous experiment,D.F. was asked to post a card through an open slot. This she performedperfectly. But if she was asked in which way a given slot was oriented if itwas oriented updown or leftright or tilted in a specific way she wasunable to answer, unless she was given a card and could observe how herbody tried to fit it into the slot. So whereas she has no beliefs about hersurrounding environment, her body schema must still be able to pick up at

least some affordances.

23

The claim here, it should be noted, is only that the body schema can func-tion independently of our capacity for rational thought. But our capacity for

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rational thought may well be necessary for us to function normally

asembodied agents. Indeed, this is probably also shown by D.F., since she isnot a fully functioning embodied agent.

It is important to note that whether an action is performed for reasons or

by means of the body schema varies from case to case and from individualto individual. An action performed for reasons in one context may beperformed automatically by the body schema in another context. The bodyschema is to some extent sensitive to feedback from cognition and practicalreasoning; it is possible to change the nature of the body schema by moni-toring its operations by rational thought. This may be the case when mydoctor orders me to walk in a new way, since my current way of walking isbad for my back. When this happens, I enter a transitional period in whichI sometimes try to monitor my way of walking and sometimes fall back into

old habits. Gradually, however, I shall presumably start to walk habituallyin the desired way. When this happens, I can once again walk withoutrationally reflecting upon my style of walking; the body schema once againfunctions independently of rational thought.

The exact relationship between the body schema and our capacity forrational thought is a difficult problem, and it may also in practice be difficultto say when the body schema operates independently of rational thoughtand when it does not. Suffice it for our present purposes to note that it canfunction independently of our capacity for rational thought. If this were not

the case, then the body schema would not be able to draw on informationwhich is not available for cognition. But this is the case, as we have seen. Itfollows that whereas the body schema is related to our capacity for rationalthought, it is not reducible to it. It is a separate capacity.

So far I have argued that affordances are constitutive of perceptualcontent, that they depend upon the nature of the body schema, and that thebody schema normally functions independently of our capacity for rationalthought. At this point, it is time to make an assumption explicit. I shallassume that the body schema does not function in a way that is analogousto thinking. This could presumably only be the case if the body schemacould be implemented within the framework of homuncular functionalism.The latter kind of theories are very controversial. I shall simply assume thathomuncular functionalism is an untenable position, at least insofar as it canexplain the nature of the body schema. I have argued against it in a differ-ent context and would stray too far from the subject at hand were I torehearse those arguments here.

24

The third and fourth claims outlinedabove now follow more or less automatically. If the body schema does notfunction in a way analogous to thinking, it does not operate upon concepts.

A fortiori

, affordances are not automatically

conceptual. Note that so far

the account is consistent with McDowells position. It has not been estab-lished that affordances feature in representational perceptual content orthat they do so as non-demonstrative conceptual content. The point so far

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is merely that affordances feature in perceptual content, and thatqua

non-representational perceptual content, they cannot be conceptual.

Some philosophers, most notably Gareth Evans and Merleau-Ponty, and,following closely in their footsteps, Sean Kelly,

25

have argued that the fact

that perceptual content is dependent upon our body schema shows that thiscontent is non-conceptual.

26

Kelly, for example, argues that perceptualcontent is non-conceptual because it irreducibly contains in it dispositionsto act toward the object of perception. Perceptual content is thus non-conceptual precisely because it is constituted by the bodily sensitivity to avariety of situationally defined aspects of the motor intentional object.

27

This means according to Kelly that affordances

28

are dependent uponmotor intentional identification. Motor intentional identification is consti-tuted by a bodily preparation to grasp a particular object in a particular way

toward a particular end.

29

This may all be true, and my account so far is consistent with Kellysposition. But this kind of argument does not establish that these affor-dances are constitutive of the representational

content of the perceptualexperience. For, as we have seen, a bodily preparation to do a certain thingis not necessarily something that is available for rational reflection. And ifthat is the case, then the corresponding affordance need not be availablefor cognition either.

30

Indeed, it seems that we are often unable to reflectrationally upon the specific affordances of the environment. So McDowell

can argue that what Merleau-Ponty et al. have shown is at best that there isnon-representationalnon-conceptual content.

31

The Argument

The previous section tried to establish that affordances depend upon thebody schema, and that the body schema functions independently of rationalthought. A reasonable conclusion is that in virtue of providing informationfor the body schema, affordances have to be non-conceptual. In order tothreaten McDowells position, however, affordances need to feature asrepresentational non-conceptual content. The purpose of this section is toargue that this is the case. Initially I shall attempt to show why it is notparticularly controversial to assume that affordances at least sometimesfeature as the representational content of a perceptual experience. Indeed,McDowell himself would presumably agree that this is so. A more problem-atic issue is whether affordances qua representational

content are non-conceptual. The major part of this section will attempt to establish why thisis the case at least sometimes.

Representational content presents the way the world is for a perceiver. It

makes the world available for cognition. The previous section discussedcases in which affordances feature as non-representational perceptualcontent. But this is not always the case. Sometimes we are able to form

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judgments based on perceptual observations of what the environmentaffords for us. If, for example, you are walking and encounter a small brook,you may pause and reason whether you can jump over the brook. Inthis case you judge that the brook affords jumping over. Or, trivially, you

might see directly that the brook is jump-over-able, and explicitly form thejudgment that that is the case, and so on.

Moreover, affordances need not be related only to the perceivers capac-ity to act, but can also be related to other subjects and their capacity to act.They can be intended as obtaining for other agents, although not for theperceiver herself. If I have a visitor who is in another part of the room, I shallquite naturally ascribe different affordances to him and to me. Objects thatare within reach of him are not within reach of me, and so on.

But while there is ample evidence from the phenomenology of perceptual

experience that affordances can feature as representational content, it is farfrom clear that they do so as non-conceptual

content. McDowell could easilyaccept the claims that affordances depend upon the body schema and thatthe body schema can function independently of rational thought, and yetstill claim that affordances as they feature inrepresentational

content do thatas conceptual content. The critical point in McDowells enterprise is tosecure the link between representational content and cognition, and heargues that that link is established by the fact that the conceptual capacitieswhich are involved in cognition are involved at the level of perceptual

content too. So McDowell would presumably claim that it is not asufficient

condition for affordances to feature in representational content that theyget their nature from the body schema. In virtue of being representationalcontent, they are necessarily conceptualized.

According to McDowell, the network of concepts that is drawn upon inperception is the same network of concepts that govern our capacity foractive and rational thought. But affordances such as jump-over-able,within reach and walkable appear to correspond to the conceptsjump-over-able, within reach

and walkable

, or at least that is the approach to theproblem one would expect McDowell to take. Hence, if all the concepts ofa perceiver are drawn upon in perception, affordances pertain to theconceptual content of a perceptual experience.

But there is a second kind of affordances which is also operative inperceptual experience, and which is presumably the genetic origins of thefirst kind of affordances though the latter point is unimportant in thiscontext. These affordances are too specific and context-sensitive to becaptured by any ordinary non-demonstrative concept.

What I have in mind is the kind of experience we have when we experi-ence a situation or an object as affording something if we do so and so

,

whereso and so

cannot be described using any ordinary non-demonstrativeconcepts. The point in question is that the perceptual content couldbe described as an affordance that is conditional upon the action being

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performed in some specific way, where our normal linguistic abilities do notsuffice for a description of the way the action is performed.

I can, to give an example, perceive a dangerous object that is quicklyapproaching me as avoidable

if I do so and so. If I am riding my bicycle and

suddenly encounter someone cycling in the opposite direction on a courseto collide with me, I can perceive the situation as avoidable if I move in avery specific way, but not otherwise. This specific way can to some extent beconceptually described, but not in a way sufficient to capture the detail ofmy knowledge of my movement. I may know that I should initially move mybody to the left, in order to change the course of my bicycle slightly. But Ihave no way of expressing in detail my knowledge of how much I shouldmove my body to the left, or of the exact way that I should do this, or myknowledge of the intended consequences of the change of direction of my

bicycle. Nevertheless, I perceive the situation as avoidable if I performsucha movement. The point is that the conditional so and so in this and similarcases is clearly experienced as realizable by a certain kind of embodiedaction, even though this experience cannot be conceptually described in anyrelevant sense of the term.

There are two very natural objections at this point. The first is that whatI have been describing is not a case of representational content. The secondis that conditional affordances feature as demonstrative conceptual contentin a perceptual representation. Turning to the first objection, it could be

argued that these affordances, the conditional affordances as I shall callthem, are not available to active and rational thought and, in particular, thatthey are not perceived as representing certain facts as obtaining. They repre-sent on the contrary information that is only available to the body schema.

For three reasons, I believe that this objection is erroneous. My first argu-ment is that the perceiver can in some cases see a conditional affordance asobtaining for someone else, though not for herself. This may, for example,be the case when the perceiver is watching a cyclist in the example above.The perceiver would thus see the collision as avoidable for the cyclist if thecyclist moves in thatspecific way. In this case, she perceives a conditionalaffordance as obtaining for the cyclist, because the conditional affordancewould obtain for her if she were in the position of the cyclist.

Apprehending the conditional affordances of others is presumably doneby what Merleau-Ponty called a transfer of the body schema; we appre-hend what the other can do in a given situation by apprehending what wecould do if we were in the position of the other.

32

So this by itself would notestablish that we can perceptually represent the conditional affordancesof others. But two considerations indicate that the conditional affordancesof the other can feature as representational content. First of all, there is

phenomenological evidence to the effect that we can rationally reflect onthe affordances of the other, and this applies to conditional affordances aswell as non-conditional affordances. The second consideration concerns

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the function of a body-schematic transfer. Were it not the case that wecould rationally reflect upon both the conditional and the non-conditionalaffordances of the other, a lot of useful information for human agentswould be lost. For, presumably, the body schema itself has no use for all

the information it can gather about the affordances of the other. It isprimarily interested in the affordances of the other, in so far as theyconcern the affordances of the agent herself.

But if conditional affordances of other agents can be representational,there are no reasons why conditional affordances of the perceiver herselfshould not be representational. For if they can be made available for cogni-tion in the first place, there should be nothing that hinders them from beingavailable for cognition in the second place.

The second argument relies on phenomenological evidence: it is a brute

fact of representational perceptual content that they contain conditionalaffordances. Let us assume that you are out walking and for some reasonhave to jump over a fence and you see two specific ways of doing so. In thiscase you may perceive the fence as jumpable if you performthis

movementor that

movement.

33

But you may nevertheless be able to reflect rationallyon which movement you should perform; there may, for example, be differ-ent advantages and disadvantages connected with the options, and youwould need to reflect on which option you prefer. So in these cases it is quiteclear that the conditional affordances are available for active and rational

thought, and by implication that they are constitutive of the representationalcontent of a perceptual experience.A third argument for the representational status of conditional affor-

dances concerns the difference between conditional affordances andnormal affordances, which it should be rather uncontroversial to assumecan feature in representational content. The critical difference is clearly thatwe have non-demonstrative concepts for the latter kind of affordances. Butthis is due to a linguistic contingency rather than to any non-linguistic essen-tial difference between the nature of these two kinds of affordances. It isthus very likely that what is a conditional affordance for the language usersof one linguistic community can be a normal affordance for the languageusers of another linguistic community. So unless we assume from the outsetthat only affordances which can be captured by non-demonstrative conceptscan feature in representational content, there are no reasons to assume thatconditional affordances have a nature that prevents them from featuring inrepresentational content.

So far I have argued that conditional affordances are representational,but that they are too fine-grained to feature in non-demonstrative concep-tual content. What about the second objection outlined above? Is it possible

that conditional affordances feature as demonstrative conceptual content,i.e. that they are constitutive of conceptual content in the same way asspecific shades and shapes?

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It is logically possible, but it is unlikely, because as I shall now proceed toshow, the only way for the conceptualists to allow affordances to feature asdemonstrative conceptual content is to accept the existence of a privatelanguage. But this is a conclusion that McDowell and other conceptualists

cannot afford to draw. For if there can be a private language, there are noreasons to believe that perceptual content is conceptual through andthrough in the first place.

A conditional affordance is something that exists in virtue of a specificrelation between the perceived environment on the one hand and the bodyschema of someone (normally the perceiver) on the other hand. In thisrespect it differs from normal demonstrative conceptual content, whichrefers to features (shapes and shades) of the perceived environment whichobtain independently of the perceiver

34 and are only perceived in virtue of

a specific impact on sensibility.Since conditional affordances exist in virtue of a relationship between anenvironment and the body schema of an agent, they are not necessarilyintersubjective. For example, it is perfectly possible that two normalperceivers perceive the same environment from the same perspective andpossess the same conceptual network and yet perceive the situation differ-ently with regard to the conditional affordances that obtain. Indeed, theirsensory system may be stimulated in identical ways, yet they may stillperceive different conditional affordances. This will inevitably happen if

they have different body schemas. So conditional affordances cannot be tiedany more than normal affordances to a specific impact on sensibility, for thesame impact may give rise to different conditional affordances for twoagents or at different times for the same agent. The converse, that the sameconditional affordance may correspond to different impacts on sensibility isalso true. A brook and a snake may both be perceived as jump-over-able ina specific way. But brooks and snakes rarely have anything interesting incommon with regard to the sensible impacts they make.

But at this point we run into a problem that should be severe for McDowell.For if the above account is correct, then the presumed conceptual contentof conditional affordances will have to be private. In short, anyone commit-ted to the idea that conditional affordances can be analysed as a kind ofdemonstrative conceptual content is also committed to the existence of aprivate language. But if a private language is in principle possible, then thequestion arises as to why we should assume that representational perceptualcontent is conceptual in the first place. So the argument is in short that ifaffordances can feature as demonstrative conceptual content, then the bestargument that perceptual content has to be conceptual evaporates.

Let us turn first to the claim that if conditional affordances can feature as

demonstrative conceptual content, they have to be private. A concept isprivate if it is, as McDowell puts it, constituted by a justificatory relation toa bare presence, since forming such a concept would be tantamount to

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giving oneself a private ostensive definition.35 Concepts which are formedby a private ostensive definition are private because in these cases we areunable to communicate the content of the concepts. The definition is by itsvery nature not public and the corresponding concept is thus private by

nature.It is important to note that demonstrative conceptual content as it

features in McDowells theory is not private in that sense. For in the case ofshades and shapes, one can always point to specific shades and shapes in apublic environment. Demonstrative concepts picking out shades and shapesare constituted by publicly accessible ostensive definitions. But this is nottrue of conditional affordances. For conditional affordances obtain in virtueof a relationship between the environment and the body schema of theperceiver. As we have seen, the same environment may afford different

actions for different perceivers or for the same perceiver at different times.So it is not possible to point to any public property or object in order tocommunicate the content of a putative demonstrative concept of a condi-tional affordance. In fact, it is not possible at all to make a publicly accessibleostensive definition of a conditional affordance. Even though affordancesare by their very nature perceived to be properties of the environment, theynevertheless depend upon the body schema of the perceiver. And sincebody schemas differ from perceiver to perceiver, conditional affordanceswill too. Conditional affordances may possibly be picked out by demonstra-

tives as embodied knowledge of how to perform a specific action in a specificway, but only if the demonstrative does not refer to any publicly accessibleobject or property, but rather to an embodied knowledge of how to do thingsin certain situations.

This account, it should be noted, does not preclude that different perceiv-ers with different body schemas may at some time perceive that the environ-ment has the same conditional affordances. And neither does it precludethat a perceiver may ascribe a conditional affordance to another agent. Butthis ascription can only be made on the basis of an analogical process, inwhich case the perceiver infers which conditional affordances would obtainfor her if she were in the position of the other. In this respect ascribingconditional affordances to the other differs from ascribing most othermental states. With regard to propositional attitudes, normal affordancesand sensations, it is possible to communicate verbally to others what onesmental states are. But this is not the case with conditional affordances. Forthe content of conditional affordances cannot be verbally communicated.

If the above account is correct, then conditional affordances can only beconstitutive of private concepts and not of public concepts. So if anyonewants to defend the claim that all representational perceptual content is

conceptual, he or she will also have to admit that there can be a privatelanguage. But this is a conclusion the conceptualists cannot afford to draw.For if there can be a private language, there seems to be no reason to

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assume that perceptual content is conceptual in the first place. This is apoint that McDowell himself is explicit upon. The private language argu-ment is according to him not a particular rejection of the idea that there canbe a non-conceptual perceptual content, a Given, from which concepts

can be formed. It articulates the very idea that perceptual content isconceptual through and through: So the Private Language Argument justis the rejection of the Given, in so far as it bears on the possibilities forlanguage; it is not an application of a general rejection of the Given to aparticular area.36

The logic behind McDowells position as it bears on the private languageargument is that any private concept has to be constituted by a privateostensive definition. This is after all what makes the concept private andincommunicable. But if that is the case, then the perceiver has to be able

actively to conceptualize perceptual content that is in itselfnon-conceptual.For if the perceptual content were already conceptualized, it would not benecessary to give a private ostensive definition of the concept in the firstplace. The concept would on the contrary already be present in the percep-tual content. So if private concepts are possible at all, then perceptualcontent cannot be conceptual through and through.

I have argued that a special class of affordances, the so-called conditionalaffordances, features in representational perceptual content. While theseaffordances can in principle feature as demonstrative conceptual content,

they can only do that qua private concepts. So if they feature as conceptualcontent at all, then private concepts have to be possible. But privateconcepts presuppose a private ostensive definition, which in its turn presup-poses that some representational content is non-conceptual. If this iscorrect, the only way for the conceptualists to defend the claim that percep-tual content is always conceptual is to admit that some perceptual content isnon-conceptual. This is, however, a self-contradicting position. I concludethat at least some perceptual content is non-conceptual.37

University of Gothenburg, Sweden

Notes

1 For McDowells position, see his 1994. Since he is the most influential of theconceptualists, I shall limit my discussion of their view to him.

2 See Jeannerod, 1997.3 McDowell, 1994: p. 9.4 Ibid., p. 10.5 Ibid., p. 11.6 Ibid., pp. 11f.

7 Ibid., p. 12.8 The argument was originally made by Gareth Evans. See Evans, 1982: p. 229.9 See, for example, McDowell, 1994: pp. 56ff.

10 Ibid., p. 59.

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11 Strictly speaking, McDowell needs to frame the distinction in other terms. For itmight well be that when I move closer to an object, I shall continuously perceiveit as having the same shape, even though its impact on my sensibility keepschanging. If this is the case, and I think that it is, then recognitional concepts arenot tied to a specific impact on sensibility, but rather to aspecific disposition of

the perceived object to have a specific impact on the sensorial stimulation of theperceiver given certain perceptual conditions. And it is in this respect that theydiffer from non-demonstrative concepts. But this way of framing the distinctiondoes not help McDowell avoid the problems we are about to discuss, so I shallfor the sake of simplicity use McDowells way of framing the distinction in thispaper.

12 McDowell, 1994: p. 90.13 See especially Merleau-Ponty, 1996. It should be noted that whereas my account

is inspired by Merleau-Ponty, it is not necessarily exegetically faithful.14 As Shaun Gallagher has pointed out, the English translation of Merleau-Ponty

by Colin Smith is erroneous with regard to the notion of body schema, since it

translates schema corporel as body image. See Gallagher, 1995: p. 232.15 The term affordance is employed both in the sense that it refers to an objective

property that is out there irrespective of whether or not it is picked up and inthe sense that it is constitutive of perceptual content. It should be clear from thecontext which sense is being employed.

16 For the notion of affordance, see in particular Gibson, 1986: pp. 127ff. Needlessto say, Merleau-Ponty would have no objections to this view of perception.

17 I borrow this term from Harry Heft. See Heft, 1989: p. 3.18 The concept of affordance is a loose translation of the gestalt psychologist Kurt

Lewins termAufforderung, invitation or exhortation.19 Needless to say, this observation has been made before, not least by Heft, 1989.

20 Merleau-Ponty makes a strong argument that it is not a sufficient conditioneither. See Merleau-Ponty, 1996.

21 See Merleau-Ponty, 1996: pp. 143f.22 Milner and Goodale, 1995; Goodale and Milner, 2004.23 Milner and Goodale famously concluded that there are two visual pathways

from the eyes, one leading to a centre for cognition, and the other leading to theaction centre.

24 See Almng, 2007: Ch. 7.25 See Kelly, 2001, Merleau-Ponty, 1996, and Evans, 1985. For a similar kind of

analysis, see Cussins, 2003.26 Merleau-Ponty is, however, the only one of them who would express this relation

in terms of the body schema.27 Kelly, 2001: p. 86.28 Kelly does not employ this term in this context, but it captures roughly what he

is after.29 Kelly, 2001. p. 86.30 And Kelly, it should be noted, does not claim that to be the case. The point is

not merely that no active or conscious cognitive processing goes on, but that itis not in terms of calculations or deductions or any other cognitive processesat all, whether they are consciously experienced or not, that our perceptualinformation gets the content it does. Ibid., p. 73.

31 This appears to be Alva Nos position. See No, 2004: p. 201.

32 For an elaboration and defence of this theory, see Almng 2007: Ch. 8.33 This is not to say that the thought of them is a thought consisting of demonstra-

tive concepts. There may well be non-conceptual kinds of thinking. I do not want

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to take a stand on the issue, but it is impossible to describe this case without theuse of demonstrative concepts.

34 In the case of shades, this could be questioned by philosophers who deny thatcolours are properties of objects.

35 McDowell, 1994: p. 20.

36 Ibid.37 Thanks are due to Alexander Almr, Jonas Axelsson, Kent Gustavsson, Helge

Malmgren and an anonymous referee for valuable comments.

References

Almng, J. (2007) Intentionality and Intersubjectivity, Gteborg: Acta UniversitatisGothoburgensis.

Cussins, A. (2003) Content, Conceptual Content and Nonconceptual Content, inY. H. Gunther (ed) Essays on Nonconceptual Content, Cambridge, Mass. and

London: The MIT Press: 133163.Evans, G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference, ed. J. McDowell, Oxford: OxfordUniversity Press.

(1985) Molyneuxs Question, in Collected Papers, Oxford: Clarendon Press:364399.

Gallagher, S. (1995) Body Schema and Intentionality, in J. L. Bermudez, A. Marceland N. Eilan (eds) The Body and the Self, Cambridge, Mass. and London: TheMIT Press: 225244.

Gibson, J. J. (1986) The Ecological Approach to Visual Perception, Hillsdale andLondon: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Goodale, M. A. and Milner, D. A. (2004) Sight Unseen: An Exploration of Conscious

and Unconscious Vision, Oxford: Oxford University Press.Heft, H. (1989) Affordances and the Body: An Intentional Analysis of GibsonsEcological Approach to Visual Perception, Journal for the Theory of SocialBehaviour19(1): 130.

Jeannerod, M. (1997) The Cognitive Neuroscience of Action, Oxford: Blackwell.Kelly, S.D. (2001) The Relevance of Phenomenology to the Philosophy of Language

and Mind, New York and London: Garland.McDowell, J. (1994), Mind and World, Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard

University Press.Merleau-Ponty, M. (1996) Phenomenology of Perception, trans. C. Smith, London

and New York: Routledge.

Milner, D. A. and Goodale, M. A. (1995) The Visual Brain in Action, Oxford:Oxford University Press.No, A. (2004) Action in Perception, Cambridge, Mass. and London: The MIT Press.Do

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Documents

Almang - 2008 - Affordances and the Nature of Perceptual Content