HILARIA SIKAT, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. JOHN CANSON, Defendant-Appellee.

G.R. No. L-45152    

April 10, 1939

I. Facts: On February 15, 1904, Hilaria Sikat and John Canson contracted marriage in

the town of Bayambang, Pangasinan. They lived together as husband and wife until

1911 when they separated. In 1929, Canson went to Reno, Nevada, United States of

America, and on October 8, of that year, he obtained an absolute decree of divorce on

the ground of desertion. On June 1, 1934, the present action was instituted by the

plaintiff-appellant to obtain the liquidation of the conjugal partnership which is

predicated on the existence of a final decree of absolute divorce rendered by the court

of Reno, Nevada, since 1929. The court below dismissed the action.

II. Issue: Whether or not the divorce obtained in Nevada is valid.

III. Holding: No, the divorce decree is not valid.

IV. Reasoning: The courts in the Philippines can grant a divorce only on the ground of

"adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband" as

provided for under section 1 of Act No. 2710. The divorce decree in question was

granted on the ground of desertion, clearly not a cause for divorce under our laws.

V. Policy: The laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition, and

legal capacity of persons, are binding upon Spaniards even though they reside in a

foreign country; and prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts and their

property, and those intended to promote public order and good morals shall not be

rendered without effect by any foreign laws or judgments or by anything done or any

agreements entered into a foreign country.

FILOMENA DEL PRADO vs. TIRSO DE LA FUENTE

G.R. No. 9274

September 14, 1914

I. Facts: The present action deals with the petition for divorce presented by Filomena

del Prado, asking that she be separated from her lawful husband Tirso de la Fuente,

with whom she contracted marriage on June 17, 1893. Her claim is based on the fact

that, after they had lived together from their marriage up to the year 1910, in June of

that year her husband separated from and abandoned her and went to Basilisa Padilla;

and therefore in the petition for divorce formulated by the wife of the defendant the

ground therefor was stated to be the concubinage committed by her husband, in that

he was illegally united with another woman who was not his wife.

II. Issue: Should the petition for divorce be granted?

III. Holding: Yes, the petition for Divorce is granted.

IV. Reasoning: According to the Laws 2 and 3, title 9, of the fourth Partida, authorize the

husband to prosecute his wife for adultery and the injured wife as well to prosecute

her husband for said crime, which is classified later in the modern law as

concubinage; and once the charge that the wife has committed adultery, or the

husband concubinage, has been proven, the courts can decree the divorce in

accordance with the provisions of law 3, title 2, of the fourth Partida.

V. Policy: The intimate life together and carnal relations of a man other than his wife

constitute concubinage. Therefore, it is a ground for divorce.

Brady v. Brady

Court of Appeals New York

February 14, 1985

I. Facts: Plaintiff Edward Brady and defendant Dorothy were married in 1956 and have

four children who were born between 1957 and 1966. However, on 1976, their

relationship began to deteriorate. Plaintiff alleged that his wife struck him with

objects, including a lamp and a vase, threatened him with a knife and would not

engage in sexual relations. On 1981, plaintiff commenced divorce proceedings

against his wife. His verified complaint set forth two causes of action, one for

abandonment and other for cruel and inhuman treatment. The Trial Court granted the

divorce but the Appellate Court and the Supreme Court reversed the decision.

II. Issue: Whether or not Plaintiff had established constructive abandonment and cruel

and inhuman treatment.

III. Holding: No. The court ruled that the plaintiff had not established abandonment and

cruel and inhuman treatment.

IV. Reasoning: The New York Supreme Court found that under New York law, a person

must establish a cause of action for divorce. Under Section 170 of the Domestic

Relations Law of New York, there were only six possible causes of action for

divorce, one of which is the cruel and inhuman treatment of the plaintiff by the

defendant such that the conduct of the defendant so endangers the physical or mental

well being of the plaintiff as renders it unsafe or improper for the plaintiff to cohabit

with the defendant. In this case, the Court found that in order to establish cruel and

inhuman treatment, there must be a showing of serious misconduct, not just mere

incompatibility.

V. Policy: In New York, the longer the duration of the marriage the more severe the

level of cruelty must be in order to establish grounds under cruel and inhumane

treatment. It is because a divorce after a long duration marriage is likely to have more

economic consequences than a short duration marriage.

Atherton v Atherton

181 U.S. 155 (1901)

U.S. Supreme Court

I. Facts: Mary G. Atherton, plaintiff, was married to herein respondent Peter Lee Atherton

on October 17, 1888. Immediately after the marriage, the parties went to and resided at

Louisville, Kentucky. Subsequently, their relationship got sour and the wife, without fault

on her part, left the respondent taking the child with her. She returned to her mother in

Clinton and became a resident and domiciled in the State of New York. Plaintiff filed for

a divorce from bed and board, for the custody of the child of the parties, and for the

support of the plaintiff and the child, on the ground of cruel and abusive treatment of the

plaintiff by the defendant. Respondent denied the allegations and filed divorce against his

wife which was granted by the court in Kentucky. However, the court in New York

decided that the decree was inoperative and void and gave judgment in favor of the wife.

II. Issue: Whether or not the divorce decree obtained in Kentucky should be recognized in

the state of New York.

III. Holding: Yes. The divorce obtained by the husband in Kentucky should be recognized in

New York.

IV. Reasoning: Article 4 section 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America states

that “Full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the public acts, records, and

judicial proceedings of every other state, and the Congress may, by general laws,

prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and

the effect thereof”. This section was intended to give the same conclusive effect to the

judgment of all the states, so as to promote certainty and uniformity in the rule among

them. The regulation of divorce belongs to the legislature of the domicile of the parties.

(Rhyms v. Rhyms, 7 Bush, 316)

V. Policy: Divorce decree obtained by a spouse should be given due recognition in another

state even if the defendant spouse have already abandoned their matrimonial residence. It

would be unreasonable if a faithless spouse could, by leaving the state, deprive his spouse

of a power of obtaining divorce at their matrimonial place.

Hessen v Hessen

Court of Appeals of New York

February 21, 1974

I. Facts: Jules J.L. Hessen, plaintiff and Penelope Hessen, respondent got married in

1946. After more or less twenty five years of marriage, the husband filed a divorce

against his wife on the grounds of cruelty. The cruelty charged by the husband is that

his wife, in the presence of their children, friends, relatives and business associates

made false and embarrassing accusations of infidelity and illicit activities on his part.

The wife denied the charges. The court commented that the husband’s accusations

were not bolstered by the testimony of witnesses who heard the accusations.

II. Issue: Whether or not the false and embarrassing accusations of the wife constituted

cruelty which is a ground for divorce.

III. Holding: No. The court ruled that the false and embarrassing accusation is not

equivalent to cruelty.

IV. Reasoning: Cruelty and inhuman treatment as a ground for divorce must show

serious misconduct by the defendant spouse. Such cruelty must cause danger to the

plaintiff’s physical or mental well being and that cohabitation between them would be

improper. In this case, the trial court had qualifiedly found provocative conduct by

the wife but also determined that her conduct was not wanton and had not endangered

the husband's well-being.

V. Policy: The New York State Court of Appeals holds that in order to grant a divorce

under cruel and inhuman treatment, longer marriages will be held to a higher standard

of proof than a short marriage. The reason is that what might be considered

substantial misconduct in the context of a marriage of short duration, might only be

"transient discord" in that of a long-term marriage.

Strack v Strack

Supreme Court, Essex County

February, 3 2011

I. Facts: Plaintiff Judith A. Strack and defendant Jeremiah F. Strack wedded on May 25,

1963. Plaintiff filed divorce proceedings against her husband stating that their marriage

has broken down such that it is irretrievable and has been for a period of at least six

months. Plaintiff further alleged that she and her husband had no emotion in their

marriage, and has kept largely separate social schedules and vacation schedules. She also

claims that they have not lived as husband and wife for a period of time greater than six

months. The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint.

II. Issue: Whether or not the contention of the wife in her divorce complaint is valid.

III. Holding: Yes. The contention of the wife in her divorce complaint is valid.

IV. Reasoning: Under the newly enacted ground for divorce, the state of New York permits

divorce where the relationship between husband and wife has broken down irretrievably

for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has so stated under oath.

(Domestic Relations Law section 170 par. 7)

V. Policy: The new provision allows a divorce to be granted without a finding that either

spouse is at fault provided that one party seeking the divorce must simply allege that the

marriage has irretrievably broken down for six months or more. However, the court may

not grant the divorce under no fault until all other ancillary issues are resolved.

SYNTHESIS of US CASES

From the above cases, it can be observed that most divorce cases in the United States of

America especially in New York are mainly characterized and based on the ground of cruelty

and inhuman treatment. Grounds for divorce in the state of New York are found in Domestic

Relations Law Section 170. If grounds are not proven, the divorce will be denied and the

marriage will survive.

Spouses have to allege that the other spouse committed cruelty and inhuman treatment or

other misconducts like adultery or abandonment in order for them to file divorce complaints.

Even though divorce laws vary from state to state in the United States, due recognition should be

given by one state to divorce decrees issued by another state.

Vicente Garcia Valdez v. Maria Soteraña Tuason

G.R. No. 14957

March 16, 1920

I. Facts: On April 2, 1918, Vicente Garcia Valdez filed a petition for divorce in the

Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against his wife, Maria SoterañaTuason.

Upon hearing the cause the trial judge found that the charge of adultery was not

sustained by the evidence. The complaint was accordingly dismissed. The petitioner

appealed and insisted that supposing the fact of adultery is to be proved; he is entitled

to decree of judicial separation, entailing its consequences recognized by the law

prevailing in these Islands prior to the passage of Act No. 2710.

II. Issue: Whether or not a limited divorce formerly allowed is in any case procurable

under the new statute (No. 2710) now prevailing in these Islands.

III. Holding: No,it is evident that this statute contains a definitive and exclusive

statement of the effects of adultery considered in its bearing upon the

marital status and civil rights of the parties.

IV. Reasoning: Act No. 2710 provides: SECTION 1. A petition for divorce can only be

filed for adultery of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband, etc.; SEC.

2. No person shall be entitled to a divorce who has not resided, etc.: SEC. 3. The

divorce may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, etc.; SEC. 4. An action for

divorce cannot be filed except within one year, etc.; SEC. 5. An action for

divorce shall in no case be tried before six months, etc.; SEC. 8. A divorce shall not

be granted without the guilt of the defendant being established by final sentence in a

criminal action. The only divorce now procurable under our laws is the divorce

conceded by this Act. The situation here does not require the application of any of the

artificial canons of interpretation, for the language of the statute is so plain that its

meaning is unmistakable. The logical and inevitable force of the words used is such

as to override all inconsistent provisions of prior laws.It is strengthened by a critical

examination of the wording of the entire Act. It is expressed throughout in general

terms without the slightest indication of an intention to preserve any provision of the

former law. The word "divorce" particularly is used without qualification, in

conformity with the usage of civilian authors. Therefore, when this Act declares that a

divorce is procurable only under such and such conditions, this means that no divorce

of any sort is procurable under other conditions.

V. Policy: No court would in the present state of the law permit a decree of divorce to be

entered contrary to the precepts of section 8 of the Act cited. Human society has an

interest in the integrity of the marital state, and it is the duty of the courts to apply the

proper legal provisions in such matters whether the litigants see fit to invoke them or

not.

Juanaria Francisco v. Lope Tayao

G.R. No. L-26435

March 4, 1927

I. Facts: Juanaria Francisco, the plaintiff, and Lope Tayao, the defendant, contracted

marriage in the City of Manila in 1912 but they separated in 1917. The husband then

removed to Zamboanga. There he was later prosecuted for having committed adultery

with a married woman named Bernardina Medrano, wife of Ambrosio Torres, at

whose instance the criminal complaint was instituted. As a result of that proceeding,

they were sentenced by the late Judge Ponciano Reyes to suffer three years, six

months, and twenty-one days imprisonment prision correccional, and to pay the costs.

II. Issue: Whether or not the wife can secure a divorce from the husband, where the

latter has been convicted of adultery and not of concubinage.

III. Held: No, the defendant was prosecuted for, and was convicted of, the crime of

adultery and not the crime of concubinage. The criminal case was instituted on the

complaint of the injured husband. It was not instituted by the injured wife which is

essential for the proper initiation of a prosecution for concubinage.

IV. Reasoning: In the Philippine Islands, the causes for divorce are prescribed by statute.

(19 C. J.,36; Benedicto vs. De la Rama [1903], 3 Phil., 34, reversed by the United

States Supreme Court for other reasons). The grounds for divorce are two: Adultery

on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. (Villanueva, La Ley

de Divorcio, pp. 27, 46, and 47.) The Philippine Divorce Law, Act No. 2710, is

emphatically clear in this respect. Section 1 of the law reads: "A petition for divorce

can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the

husband . . . ." Note well the adverb "only" and the conjunctive "or." The same

thought is again emphasized in section 3 of the Divorce Law which provides that

"The divorce may be claimed only by the innocent spouse, provided there has been no

condonation of or consent to the adultery or concubinage, as the case may be. . . . "

Later on comes section 8 providing that "A divorce shall not be granted without the

guilt of the defendant being established by final sentence in a criminal action"—that

is, in relation with section 1 of the same law, by final sentence in a criminal action for

adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband. Act No.

2716, amendatory of article 437 of the Penal Code, adds nothing to the Divorce Law

except as it clarifies the meaning of concubinage.

V. Policy: What counsel also desires this court to do is to add a third cause for divorce to

the law and to insert two words in section 1 of the Divorce Law so that it will read:

"A petition for divorce can only be filed for adultery on the part of the wife or

husband or concubinage on the part of the husband." This likewise the court cannot

do. It would amount to judicial amendment of the law.

William Ong v. Lucita G. Ong

G.R. No. 153206

October 23, 2006

I. Facts: Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong

(Lucita) were married on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They

have three children: Kingston, Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age

of majority. On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under

Article 55 par. (1) of the Family Code alleging that her life with William was marked

by physical violence, threats, intimidation and grossly abusive conduct.

II. Issue: Whether or not Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal

separation.

III. Holding: Yes, Lucita was able to prove adequately the presence of a ground for legal

separation.

IV. Reasoning: The main issue raised in the present petition is factual; the findings of

both lower courts rest on strong and clear evidence borne by the records; this Court is

not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when confirmed by the CA are

final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; the contention of William

that Lucita filed the case for legal separation in order to remove from William the

control and ownership of their conjugal properties and to transfer the same to Lucita’s

family is absurd; Lucita will not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the

companionship of William and her children just to serve the interest of her family;

Lucita left the conjugal home because of the repeated physical violence and grossly

abusive conduct of petitioner. The claim of William that a decree of legal separation

would taint his reputation and label him as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does

not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would be such a smear on his reputation

then it would not be because of Lucita’s decision to seek relief from the courts, but

because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.

V. Policy: Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has

abandoned the family, a decree of legal separation should not be granted, following

Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code which provides that legal separation shall be

denied when both parties have given ground for legal separation. The abandonment

referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without justifiable cause for more

than one year. As it was established that Lucita left William due to his abusive

conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said provision.

Digna Najera v. Eduardo Najera

G.R. No. 164817

July 3, 2009

I. Facts: Digna Najera and Eduardo Najera were married on January 31, 1988 in

Bugallon, Pangasinan. They are childless. When respondent arrived home from his

ship voyage, he continued to be jealous, he arrived home drunk and he smoked

marijuana. One time, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her

with a bolo. Respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal

belongings. Dr. Gates concluded that respondent is afflicted with a Borderline

Personality Disorder as marked by his pattern of instability in his interpersonal

relationships, his marred self-image and self-destructive tendencies, his

uncontrollable impulses.

II. Issue: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that

respondent is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations

of marriage.

III. Holding: No. The totality of the evidence submitted by petitioner failed to

satisfactorily prove that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with

the essential obligations of marriage.

IV. Reasoning: The root cause of respondent’s alleged psychological incapacity was not

sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically permanent or

incurable. Psychologist Cristina Gates’ conclusion that respondent was

psychologically incapacitated was based on facts relayed to her by petitioner and was

not based on her personal knowledge and evaluation of respondent; thus, her finding

is unscientific and unreliable. The basis of the declaration of nullity of marriage by

the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal is not the third paragraph of Canon 1095

which mentions causes of a psychological nature, but the second paragraph of Canon

1095 which refers to those who suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment

concerning essential matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and

accepted. In Canon 1095 of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, the following are incapable

of contracting marriage: (a) those who lack sufficient use of reason; (b) those who

suffer from a grave lack of discretion of judgment concerning the essential

matrimonial rights and obligations to be mutually given and accepted; (c) those who,

because of causes of a psychological nature, are unable to assume the essential

obligations of marriage.

V. Policy: Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family Code is to

harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of our people, it stands to reason that

to achieve such harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to decisions

of such appellate tribunal. Ideally – subject to our law on evidence – what is decreed

as canonically invalid should also be decreed civilly void.

Judgment on the Admissibility of Divorce Sought by a Spouse Responsible for Divorce

1986(0)No.260

September 2, 1987

I. Facts: This is a case of divorce in Japan. Appellant-husband and the Appellee-wife

married on February 1, 1937. Since they were not able to bear a child, they adopted

two girls from a certain C in 1948. Although their marriage progressed tranquilly in

the beginning, they have become estranged from each other since 1949, when the

Appellee became aware of the Appellant's extramarital relationship with C. They

have lived separately to date since August 1949 when the Appellant started to cohabit

with C. The appellant filed a divorce at the Tokyo District Court in 1951 but the court

did not grant it. The court ruled that he is a responsible spouse because his

extramarital relationship with C and purposeful abandonment of the Appellee to

cohabit with C caused the failure of their marriage. In addition, when the appellant

asked the appellee’s consent for divorce, she did not agree.

II. Issue: Whether or not divorce is admissible when sought by the spouse responsible

for the failure of marriage and whether or not divorce can be obtained when one of

the spouses do not consent to it

III. Holding: Divorce is admissible even when sought by the spouse responsible for the

failure of marriage and even when one of the spouses do not consent to the divorce

IV. Reasoning: Article 770 of the Civil Code provided restrictive causes for judicial

divorce. Item 5 paragraph 1 of the said Article provides that one of the spouses may

seek divorce against the other when they have become unable to pursue cohabitation,

which is the purpose of marriage, and there are no prospects of reconciliation. Even if

the claim for divorce was by the responsible spouse, when the separation of the

husband and wife has reached a substantially long period and and when they have no

immature children, the claim should not be denied unless it is contrary to social

justice such as when the other spouse would be in a mentally, socially, or

economically harsh situation. In addition to the institutions of divorce through mutual

agreement (Article 763 of the Civil Code), divorce through conciliation (Article 17 of

the Law for Determination of Family Affairs) and divorce through determination

(paragraph 1, Article 24 of the said Law), the institution of judicial divorce is

available for the cases where one of the spouses does not consent to divorce.

V. Policy: The substance of marriage is the carrying on of communal life with serious

intent for the purpose of spiritual as well as physical conjugation. When one of the

spouses or both decidedly has lost these without the chance of restoration, it would be

unnatural to continue the marriage.

Satish Sitole v Ganga

Civil Appeal No. 7567 2004

October 7, 2008

I. Facts: On May 5, 1992, the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife were married

according to Hindu rites and customs. After two years, the respondent left the

matrimonial home and went back to her parents. The appellant sent a notice to the

respondent asking her to return. She responded with a complaint against the appellant

and his family members under the Indian Penal Code alleging demand of dowry. The

appellant and his family have not complied with this until 8 years. However, he

moved the Court of the Sub- Divisional Magistrate for issuance of a search warrant

consequent upon which the respondent appeared before the Magistrates' Court and

agreed to return to the appellant but she did not return as agreed. No settlement and

not even the existence of their child could bring about reconciliation between the

parties. They lived separately for the next 14 years.

II. Issue: Whether a marriage which is otherwise dead emotionally and practically

should be continued

III. Holding: A marriage which is practically dead should not be continued

IV. Reasoning: The marriage between the parties is dead for all practical purposes and

there is no chance of it being retrieved. The continuance of such marriage would itself

amount to cruelty. Under Article 142 of the Constitution the marriage of the appellant

and the respondent shall stand dissolved.

V. Policy: Marriage is an essential institution in the society. Divorce must only be

resorted to if all means of reconciliation and retrieval of marriage have been resorted

to. However, if these are proved futile, marriage can be severed as its continuance

would itself amount to cruelty.