Revolution, Counter-Revolution andRevisionism in Postcolonial AfricaWhenMozambiquessixteen-year-longarmedconictendedin1992,itwascon-sideredoneofthemostviciouswarsinindependentAfrica.Thewartookonemillionlives,devastatedthecountryseconomy,brutalizedthepopulationandleftmostpeopledestitute.Ononesidestoodthegovernment,dominatedbyFrelimo,therulingpartywhichhadwonMozambiqueitsindependencefromPortugalin1975. On the other was Renamo, a proxy army created and used by the dying whitesupremacist regimes of the region to destabilize Mozambique. The war produced noclearvictorandaninternationally-brokeredpeacedealguaranteedRenamo,widelyrecognizedasthemainperpetratorofwartimeatrocities,aplaceinMozambiquespost-war political system.Revolution,Counter-RevolutionandRevisionisminPostcolonialAfrica examinesthegovernmentsattemptstorevisepostcolonialMozambiquestraumaticpastwithaviewtonegotiatingthepresent.AliceDinermanstressesthepath-dependenceofmemorypracticeswhiletracingtheirdivergenttrajectories,shiftingmeaningsandvariedcombinationswithinrulingdiscourseandperformance.Thisgroundbreak-ing study investigates dening themes in the eld of social memory studies as theybear on the politics of post-Cold War, post-apartheid Southern Africa. These themesinclude the interplay between past and present, the dialectic between rememberingandforgetting,thedynamicsbetweenpopularandofcialmemorydiscourses,andthepoliticsofacknowledgment.DinermansoriginalanalysiswillbeofinteresttostudentsofmodernAfrica;thesociologyofmemory;ThirdWorldpolitics;andpost-conict societies.AliceDinerman receivedherMAinPoliticalSciencefromYorkUniversityinTorontoin1989,andherPhDinPoliticsfromtheUniversityofOxfordin1999.Shehastaughthigh-school-levelEnglishandMathematicstoex-combatantsandwar victims of the apartheid-era regional conict in Zimbabwe; served as an externalconsultant to the Africa Ofce of the National Council of the Churches of Christ inthe USA; and held academic posts at the Evergreen State College and the Henry M.Jackson School of International Studies at the University of Washington. This bookis based on her doctoral research when she was a research associate of the Center forAfrican Studies at the University of Eduardo Mondlane in Maputo.Routledge studies in modern history1 IsolationPlaces and practices of exclusionEdited by Carolyn Strange and Alison Bashford2 From Slave Trade to EmpireEuropean colonisation of Black Africa 1780s1880sEdited by Olivier Ptr Grenouilleau3 Revolution, Counter-Revolution and Revisionism in PostcolonialAfricaThe case of Mozambique, 19751994Alice DinermanRevolution, Counter-Revolutionand Revisionism in PostcolonialAfricaThe case of Mozambique, 19751994Alice DinermanFirst published 2006by Routledge2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RNSimultaneously published in the USA and Canadaby Routledge270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an imforma business 2006 Alice DinermanAll rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted orreproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical,or other means, now known or hereafter invented, includingphotocopying and recording, or in any information storage orretrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.British Library Cataloguing in Publication DataA catalogue record for this book is available from the British LibraryLibrary of Congress Cataloging in Publication DataA catalog record for this book has been requestedISBN10: 0-415-77017-3 (hbk)ISBN13: 978-0-415-77017-0 (hbk)This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006.To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledgescollection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.In memory of Helen Schneider Dinerman (19201974)and James Dinerman (19211999)ContentsList of maps xAcknowledgments xiNotes on the text xivGlossary and acronyms xviIntroduction: the making and unmaking of the Namapa Naparamas 1Mozambique as a bellwether 12Post-socialist Mozambique, recent historiographical debate and contemporary forms of mnemonic legitimation 191 Myth as a meaning-making device in post-independenceMozambique 32Policy, politics and historiography 35The state-idea in post-independence Mozambique 47The Frelimo revolution 49Renamo and counter-revolution 54Ofcial history, Frelimo ideology and Mozambican studies 61Synopsis of argument and a key assumption 77Nampula Province and Erti/Namapa District 79Overview, scope and sources 832 Aspects of precolonial and colonial Nampula 90Precolonial Nampula 90Colonial chieftaincy 93The colonial cotton regime 96Erti District, c.18301974 1063 From abaixo to chiefs of production, 19751987 115The context 119All in the family? 125Economic crisis, war and chiefs of production 1384 The context, 19871994 152Overview: 19871994 152Post-1994 developments 155Civil war and its legacies 161Rural markets, capital and the PRE/PRES 163The budget crisis and the state 165Moves toward scal reform 167Marginality and law enforcement 169Pre-election instability 1705 Multipartyism, the retraditionalization of local administration and the apparent duplication of state authority: the case of Nampula Province 171The secretary as interloper 172The state as Leviathan? 176The state, the party and chieftaincy, 19901994 1796 Labor, tribute and authority 193The provenance, ambiguities and uncertainties of chiey political ascendancy 195Traditional versus community courts and other struggles over tribute 197Succession struggles and territorial disputes 202Contending royals and the centrality of the state 205Chiefs, the state and capital 207Chiefs and the populace 213Conclusion 2157 In the name of the state 219Researching rural political authority 224Representing chieftaincy 226The secretary as fall-guy 229The local and its limits 234Evidence of early negotiations and compromise 240The roots of rural anarchy reconsidered 243Conclusion 256viii Contents8 Roots, routes and rootlessness: ruling political practice and Mozambican studies 259The enemies of the people revisited 259The politics of acknowledgment, 19891994 261The electoral campaign 264The petty bourgeoisie unbound 272Conclusion 283Notes 289Bibliography 345Index 377Contents ixMaps1 Mozambique xxi2 Provncia de Nampula (Nampula Province) xxii3 Principal roads, towns, rivers and mountains (inselbergs) in Erti District xxiii4 Population density by circle (crculo) in Erti District, according to the 1980 census xxiii5 Colonial map of the regedorias and ethnic division of what is present-day Namapa District xxivAcknowledgmentsManypeopleandinstitutionshavecontributedtothemakingandshapingof this book, which is a direct outgrowth of my doctoral thesis. I would liketoacknowledgeandthanktheBeitFund,theArnold,BryceandReadModernHistoryFunds,theNormanChesterFundandtheCommitteeforGraduate Studies at the University of Oxford, the Raymond Carr Fund at St.AntonysCollege,andtheOverseasResearchStudentsAwardsSchemefortheir generous nancial assistance while I was a PhD candidate at Oxford.GavinWilliams,mydoctoralsupervisor,gavemetheintellectualspacetowritefreelywhilesubjectingtheproducttoacarefulreadingandclosecriticism.Hisfriendlyguidanceandinsistenceontheworthinessofthisprojecthelpedmepressontothenishline.Gavinstimelyinterventionsduringthenalstagesofpreparingthemanuscriptwereextremelyusefuland much appreciated.ResearchclearanceandsupportwereprovidedbytheCenterforAfricanStudiesattheUniversityofEduardoMondlane,Maputo,whereIwasaresearchassociatefromFebruary1994throughJanuary1995.Iwouldliketo express my gratitude to Isabel Casimiro and Alexandrino Jos, the Direc-tor and Deputy Director of the Center, respectively, at the time of my visit:they provided me with a congenial institutional home, helped me to negoti-atethestatebureaucracyandafrmedthevalueofthisstudy.IwouldalsoliketothankMariaInsNogueiradaCosta,DirectoroftheArquivoHistricodeMoambique(AHM)inMaputo,andthestaffatAHMforfacilitatingmyresearchoncolonialNampula.IoweaparticulardebttoAntnio Sopa, who was enormously helpful in assisting me in navigating thearchives and suggesting pertinent materials to consult.While this study does not spare the Mozambican state from criticism, itwould not have been possible without the cooperation and assistance of theProvincialGovernmentofNampulaand,especially,withoutthehelpandencouragement of then Governor, His Excellency, Alfredo Gamito. For thissupport,mysincerethanks.ThecollaborationofLeonardoWhite,PedroCavala and Jos Monteiro, who served as my interpreters and research assis-tants,wasessentialtotheexecutionofeldresearch.Theworkoftenentailed extended absences from their families, long walks and bicycle ridesoverhillanddale,lessthanplushaccommodation,theuncertaintiesofcatching(ornotcatching)liftsandmorethanafewtensemoments.Iamdeeply appreciative of the diligence, integrity, good humor and resourceful-nesstheyshowedthroughout.Obviously,mygreatestdebtistomyinfor-mants,whotooktimeoutoftheircrowdedschedulestoextendmyknowledgeandenrichmyunderstanding.Manydidsoatconsiderableriskto themselves. To them, I pay tribute.Severalotherindividualsdeservespecialmention:amongthemareJohnSaul,forintroducingmetothehistoryandpoliticsofSouthernAfricaandfor ring my interest in the region; Prexy Nesbitt, for helping me to land aconsultancy for the Africa Ofce of the National Council of the Churches ofChristintheUSA,apositionwhichaffordedmetheopportunitytovisitMozambiqueforthersttimein1990andthustosurveytheterrainforfuture research; Arlete Calane, for graciously hosting me in Maputo, for pro-vidingvitalback-upsupportofallkindsandformakingmeconversantinPortugueseinashortspaceoftime;LiaRaitt,forhelpingmewiththetoughtranslationcalls;themissionariesofNamapa,fortheirhospitality,helpandencouragement;VeraFutscherPereiraandCristinaFutscherPereira,forhostingmeinLisbonovertheyearsandfortheirinterest,supportandfriendship;mythesisexaminers,MeganVaughanandLandegWhite, whose pointed comments and queries helped to clarify for me whatneededtohappentoreworkthetextintoabook;mybrother,RobDiner-man,whoprovidedcrucialeditorialinputatallstagesofproduction;andTomBrass,editoroftheJournalofPeasantStudies,whorecommendedthisbooktoRoutledgeandwhokeptthefaithasItransitionedtomotherhoodand as the gestation period for the manuscript continued to lengthen, seem-ingly without end.The writing of Chapter 3 would not have been possible without the assis-tanceandcooperationofthelateJosBernardodeFariaLobo,whogener-ouslyopeneduphishomeandhisprivatearchiveinGalizes,Portugal.During my visit, Faria Lobo answered my innumerable questions about therecenthistoryofNampulaProvinceandhisownroleinitsmakingwithadmirablecandorandinnitepatience.BillMinterandChuckSchultzendeavored to persuade me to write in shorter sentences and a more access-ible manner. While it is unlikely they will think I have gone far enough, Ihope they will be able to detect at least some movement in the right direc-tion.BillMinteralsoofferedgentlebutmuchneededcriticismofmyrststabatrevisingtheIntroduction.Toallthesepeople,Ioweadebtofgratitude.I would also like to thank the following friends, colleagues and acquain-tancesforstimulatingmythinking,helpingtodeneandfacilitatingmyresearch,lendingasympatheticearand/orprovidinghospitalityandcom-radeshipalongtheway:UlisseAlberto,JocelynAlexander,FreddyArana,Consuelo de Arana, Maurcio Barros, Sidney Bliss, Fernando Jorge Cardoso,LurdesCardoso,AntnioCarvalhoNeves,MariaEugniadeCarvalhoPen-xii Acknowledgmentsteado,HumbertoCoimbra,RafaeldaConceio,PauladaCosta,ManuelFernando Cotiro, Teresa Cruz e Silva, Harri Englund, Maria Teresa VarrosoFariaLobo,JamalHabib,MargaretHall,SeanHanlon,DavidHedges,Franz-WilhelmHeimer,KennethHermele,AdelinoZacariasIvala,AndreaKoch,KjellKnutsson,MarkLeopold,GaryLittlejohn,SisterDanielaMaccari, JoAnn McGregor, Titos Macie, Augusto Mangove, His Excellency,AguiarMazula,EricMorier-Genoud,AntnioNatividade,BridgetOLaughlin,AnnieNielsen,AndersNilsson,MikaelPalme,JoanaPereiraLeite,TerryRanger,RozanneRants,NotkerReinhart,SaraRichDorman,RuiSampaio,JudyScully,TirsodosSantos,MarcelinodaSilva,PedroSimes, Roberto Tibana, Raquel Toledo, Alberto Viegas, the Most ReverendDom Manuel Vieira Pinto, Bernhard Weimar, Ken Wilson and Phil Wood-house.Finally,thankstomyfamily,FranciscoAlvarado,ourdaughter,JovannaHeliaAlvarado,andRobDinermanfortheirforbearanceandmuch,muchmore.Oneofthedownsidesoftakingsolongtodeliverthegoodsisthatnoteveryoneisabletostickaroundtoseethenalresults.Myfather,mylongest-running, most constant and most enthusiastic cheerleader, died sud-denly shortly after I defended my thesis. My longtime, beloved friend SusanTepper lost her ve-year-long, spirited battle against breast cancer in 2003.Intheyearsbeforeherdeath,shetooktheleadinhelpingmetogetreset-tled in the Pacic Northwest following a seven-year absence. Arguably morethananyone,Susantaughtme,simplybypursuingherdailyroutineandprobablywithoutevenrealizingit,howonemightgoaboutconceivingofand building community in the late twentieth century and beyond.I dedicate this book to the memory of my parents, Helen Schneider Din-erman and James Dinerman, whose love and support knew no bounds. Bothencouragedmetoaskquestions,largeandsmall;bothencouragedmetofollow my star; and both, each in her and his own way, taught me a thing ortwoaboutthevalueandvagariesofpersonalandhistoricalmemory.Theirexamples continue to sustain, to guide and to inspire.Acknowledgments xiiiNotes on the textTerminologyColonial Mozambique, considered an overseas province by the Portuguese,was divided into districts which, in turn, were divided into circumscriptionsandcouncils.Afterindependencecircumscriptionsandcouncilswererenamed districts and districts were renamed provinces. In keeping with theadministrative designations adopted in independent Mozambique, I refer tocolonialdistrictsasprovincesandtocircumscriptionsandcouncilsasdis-tricts.The triangular tract of territory bounded by the Lrio river to the north,the Ligonha river to the south and the Indian Ocean to the east was knownastheDistrictofMozambiqueduringthecolonialperiod.Afterindepend-ence it took on its current name, Nampula Province. Throughout, I use thepost-independence appellation.NamapaDistrict,thefocusofmyresearch,wasbornasaresultofanational reorganization of territorial administration in 1986. Previously, theterritory was part of Erti District, which, with the modication of Mozam-biques administrative map, was divided in two: the larger, more populous,andmoreeconomicallystrategicnorthernpartbecameNamapaandthesouthern part became Nacara District. I refer to Namapa as Erti when dis-cussing the area prior to the mid-1980s.Thepresentstudydepartsfromthepremisethatthequaliertradi-tionalrequiresinterrogationandexplication,ratherthanface-valueaccep-tance,whenusedtodescribetwentieth-centuryinstitutions,ideologiesandpractices which actually or purportedly derive from pre-conquest Africa andwhosecontemporarylegitimacyissustainedbytheseorigins,allegedorotherwise. I use the term in scare quotes when I am stressing its problematicnature.Whennosuchemphasisisbeingmade,Irefrainfromtakingthisrecourse.Thetermtraditionalauthoritiesanditsfunctionalequivalents(e.g.traditionalleaders,traditionalhierarchies)refertotheentireensemble of people mpw, mahumu, apuiamuene, rgulos, cabos, capites, etc. whoassertclaimstothemantleofprecolonialand/orcolonialroyaltitles.Theidentitiesofinformantswhoareclassiedinthismannerinthefoot-notes are specied in section IX of the bibliography in the event these iden-tities were revealed to me by the informants themselves.Iusethewordchieflooselytodenoteanyonewhoholds,hasheldorclaims rights to the title of rgulo and/or mapw. In general, the word elderisalsousedinthebroadsensetodenoteolderpeopleratherthansocialseniors of historically dominant lineages although the precise meaning ofthe term is contingent upon the context in which it appears.OrthographyThereisnostandardizedorthographyofMakua-Lomw,theprimarylan-guagespokeninNampulaProvince.Forthesakeofconsistency,Ihave,where possible, relied on ofcial spellings (which are often the same as colo-nialones)ofpropernames.These,however,werenotalwaysavailableand,wheretheywere,therewasoftenmorethanone.AlternativespellingsforbothpropernamesandotherMakuawordsappearinparenthesesdirectlyafter the rst reference in both the footnotes and the text, or, where applica-ble, in the glossary. Where applicable, these are repeated in section IX of thebibliography.CurrencyBetween1910andJune1980,thecurrencydenominationinMozambiquewastheescudo;thereafter,themetical (pl.meticais)wasadopted.Aconto isathousand escudos or meticais. All currency conversions are done at the rates ofexchange which prevailed at the time in question. All conversions and calcu-lations are approximate.Notes on the text xvGlossary and acronymsabaixo, down with (e.g. down with initiation rites)ADN (Administrao do Distrito de Namapa), Namapa District AdministrationAGP (Acordo Geral de Paz), General Peace AccordAgricom, parastatal agricultural marketing boardAHM (Arquivo Histrico de Moambique), Mozambique Historical ArchivesAIM(AgnciadeInformaodeMoambique),MozambiqueInformationAgency; also known as Mozambique News Agencyaldeia,village;inpost-independenceMozambiqueoftenusedasshorthandfor aldeia comunalaldeia comunal, communal village (pl. aldeias comunais)ambulante, itinerant trader in the rural areasANC, the African National Congress of South Africaanimador, animator; grassroots leader of the Catholic Churchapuiamuene (apwyamwene, apiyamwene, pia-muene), a female notable vested withritualpowers;usuallytheeldestsisterorthemotherofthemapwand/or the rguloassimilado/a,anAfricanormestio/a whowasconsideredbythecolonialgovernment to have assimilated to Portuguese civilization and who, inprinciple, enjoyed Portuguese citizenship rightsAWEPA,EuropeanParliamentariansforAfrica(formerlyAssociationofWest European Parliamentarians Against Apartheid)bairro, neighborhood; short for bairro comunalbairro comunal, communal neighborhood (pl. bairros comunais)banja, public meeting (literally: a family)cabo,popularparlanceforchefedegrupodepovoaes;alsousedtodenote theterritorial jurisdiction of a chefe de grupo de povoaescaderneta, colonial identity card for AfricansCAM (Companhia dos Algodes de Moambique), Mozambique Cotton Companycapataz, foreman or overseercapito, popular parlance for chefe de povoao (pl. capites)capites, see capitocapulana,brightlycoloredclothusedbyAfricanwomenasawrap-aroundskirt or as a means of securing babies on their backsCCPSC(ComissoCoordenadoraProvincialparaaSocializaodoCampo),ProvincialCoordinatingCommissionfortheSocializationoftheCoun-trysideCDAC(ComissoDistritaldasAldeiasComunais),DistrictCommissionforCommunal VillagesCDE (Comisso Distrital de Eleies), District Elections CommissionCEA (Centro de Estudos Africanos), Center for African Studies, Eduardo Mond-lane University, Maputochefe, chief, head or bosschefe de grupo de povoaes, head of a group of settlements; the colonial designa-tionforthemiddletierofthestate-recognizedtraditionalhierarchy;cabo in popular parlancechefedoposto,headofpost;incontemporaryMozambique,thegovernmentofcialinchargeofanadministrativepost,thetierofadministrationdirectly below the district governmentchefe de povoao, head of a settlement; the colonial designation for the lowest tierof the state-recognized traditional hierarchy; capito in popular parlancecipaio, colonial designation for an African policemanCNE (Comisso Nacional de Eleies), National Elections Commissioncolono, Portuguese settler; also used to designate the colonizer, regardless ofoccupation (formerly an African farmer)concentraoalgodoeira,cottonconcentrationorcommunity;typeofsettle-ment formed by the Portuguese in the 1950s and 1960s to improve theagriculturalperformanceofAfricansmallholders(pl.concentraesalgo-doeiras)concentration or cotton concentration, see concentrao algodoeiraconto, a thousand escudos or meticaiscooperante, foreign development worker or techniciancurandeiro, traditional healercurandeirismo, the art of traditional healingDA (Departamento de Assistentes), Department of AssistantsDDA (Direco Distrital de Agricultura), District Directorate of AgricultureDN (Distrito de Namapa), District of NamapaDPA(DirecoProvincialdeAgricultura),ProvincialDirectorateofAgricul-tureDPAC(DirecoProvincialdeApoioeControlo),ProvincialDirectorateofAssistance and ControlDPCCN (Direco de Preveno e Combate s Calamidades Naturais), Directoratefor the Prevention and Combat of Natural DisastersDPF (Direco Provincial de Finanas), Provincial Directorate for FinancesEEAN(EmpresaEstataldeAlgododeNampula),StateCottonFarmofNampulaEIU, Economist Intelligence Unitenquadrador,stateagriculturalextensionagent;alsotheofcialtermforcapatazGlossary and acronyms xviienquadramento, incorporation or integration; the act of incorporating or inte-gratingepotha, slave in precolonial Makua society; also used to refer to descendantsof slavesescudo,currencydenominationusedinMozambiquebetween1910and1980; thereafter, the metical was adoptedFAM (Foras Armadas de Moambique), Mozambique Armed Forces; originallyFPLM (Foras Populares de Libertao de Moambique)feiticeiro, sorcerer, magicianFGG (Fundo do Governo-Geral), General Government Fund at the AHMFLEC (Frente de Libertao do Enclave de Cabinda), Front for the Liberation ofthe Enclave of CabindaFNLA (Frente Nacional de Libertao de Angola), National Front for the Liber-ation of AngolaFrelimo(FrentedeLibertaodeMoambique),FrontfortheLiberationofMozambique; formerly FRELIMOGD (grupo dinamizador), dynamizing groupGDP, Gross Domestic ProductGPN (Governo da Provncia de Nampula), Government of Nampula ProvinceGRANDUCOL, Socit Colonial Luso-Luxembourgeoiseguia de marcha, an ofcial travel documentHIPC, Heavily Indebted Poor Countryhumu (nhumu), chief of a lineage segment (pl. mahumu); shorthand for humu-chefe de terrahumu-chefe de terra, head of a mutthetthe (referred to in popular parlance and intext simply as humu)IAM (Instituto de Algodo de Moambique), Mozambique Cotton InstituteIFI, international nancial institutionIMF, International Monetary Fundindgena, native; term used to designate non-assimilated Africans during thecolonial periodIRN (Imposto de Reconstruo Nacional), National Reconstruction TaxISANI(InspecodosServiosAdministrativoseNegciosIndgenas),FilesonInspection of Administrative Services and Native Affairs at the AHMJBFL, private archive of Jos Bernardo de Faria LoboJEAC(JuntadeExportaodeAlgodoColonial),ColonialCottonExportBoardJFS, Joo Ferreira dos Santos, a private company which is the majority ownerof SODANmachamba, cultivated eld or plotMAE (Ministrio da Administrao Estatal), Ministry of State Administrationmahumu, see humumapw,paramountchief;consideredtobeadescendantof,andlegitimateheir to, a precolonial chief (pl. mpw); also known as muenemestio/a, mestizo/axviii Glossary and acronymsmeticais, see meticalmetical, Mozambican currency from June 1980 (pl. meticais)Mf, Mozambiquelemi-jeio, see njeioMIO, Mozambique Information Ofcemitthetthe, see mutthettheMOA (Ministrio de Agricultura), Ministry of AgricultureMOJ (Ministrio da Justia), Ministry of Justicempw, see mapwMPoPB, Mozambique Political Process BulletinMPPB, Mozambique Peace Process BulletinMPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertao de Angola), Popular Movement for theLiberation of Angolamuene (mwene), see mapwmutthetthe (ntthetthe), a well-demarcated territory within which, in principle,lineage segments belonging to different clans intermarry (pl. mitthetthe)mwene, see mapwno-indgena, non-native or civilized status; term used to designate Euro-peans, Asians and assimilados during the colonial periodNaparama (Naprama,Barama,Namparahama),arural,religiouslyinspiredmovementconsistingofindependentmilitiasthatfoughtagainstRenamo in central and northern MozambiqueNGO, non-governmental organizationnihimo, clan (pl. mahimo)njeio, male leader of a lineage sub-segmentNkomati Accord, non-aggression accord signed between South Africa andMozambique in March 1984ntthetthe, see mutthettheOJM(OrganizaodaJuventudeMoambicana),OrganizationofMozambicanYouthOMM(OrganizaodaMulherMoambicana),OrganizationofMozambicanWomenONUMOZ, United Nations Operation in Mozambiqueorientation,Frelimoparlanceforgovernmentguidelines,instructions;widely used at the local level to denote government ordersOTM, Organization of Mozambican Trade UnionsPAICV (Partido Africano da Independncia de Cabo Verde), African Party for theIndependence of Cape VerdePAIGC(PartidoAfricanodaIndependnciadeGuineCaboVerde),AfricanParty for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verdepalmatria, wooden paddle with holes in it used to beat Africans in the colo-nial periodparama (barama), vaccine used to initiate Naparama combatantspicada, secondary (or bush) roadsPN (Provncia de Nampula), Province of NampulaGlossary and acronyms xixpopularpower,termusedvariouslytodenoteFrelimo-installedpoliticalinstitutions, the principles which guided them, and the ultimate goal ofthe revolutionPRE (Programa de Reabilitao Econmica), Economic Rehabilitation ProgramPRES(ProgramadeReabilitaoEconmicaeSocial),EconomicandSocialRehabilitation Programrainha, queen in Portuguese; used to designate apuiamuenerecuperados, civilians who have been forcibly relocated to areas under govern-ment controlregedoria,thetermusedbythePortuguesetodesignatetheterritoryadminis-tered by a rgulo, a state-recognized paramount chief; also known as reguladoregulado, see regedoriargulo, term used to denote state-recognized paramount chiefsRenamo (Resistncia Nacional Moambicana), the Mozambican National Resis-tance; formerly, the MNRRenamo-UE(Renamo-UnioElectoral),Renamo-ElectoralUnion,aRenamo-dominated political coalition that has contested both national and localelections since 1999responsvel, leader, ofceholder, someone in charge (pl. responsveis)revitalize,Frelimoparlancemeaningtopurgeorotherwiseshakeuptheline-up in the leadership of ofcial institutionsRM (Repblica de Moambique), Republic of MozambiqueRPM (Repblica Popular de Moambique), Peoples Republic of MozambiqueSADCC, Southern African Development and Coordination Conference; sincerenamed the Southern African Development Community (SADC)SADF, South African Defence ForceSE (Seco Especial), Special Section at the AHMshh (chh, xh), Islamic religious authoritySODAN (Sociedade de Desenvolvimento Algodoeiro de Namialo), Cotton Develop-ment Society of NamialoSTAE (Secretariado Tcnico de Administrao Eleitoral), Technical Secretariat forElections AdministrationTA/P, Traditional Authority/Power project overseen by the Ministry of StateAdministrationTRC, South African Truth and Reconciliation CommissionUD (Unio Democrtica), Democratic UnionUEM (Universidade Eduardo Mondlane), Eduardo Mondlane UniversityUN, United NationsUNAMO (Unio Nacional Moambicana), Mozambique National UnionUNDP, United Nations Development ProgramUnita (Unio Nacional para a Independncia Total de Angola), National Unionfor the Total Independence of Angolavadio, vagrantZANU, Zimbabwe African National Unionxx Glossary and acronymsMap 1 Mozambique(source:HallandYoung(1997)betweenpages6and7.Reproduced with permission from C. Hurst & Co., London).Map 2Provncia de Nampula (Nampula Province) (source: Reproduction of a map published by Repblica Popular de Moambique,Direco Nacional de Geograa e Cadastro in 1988).Map 3 Principalroads,towns,riversandmountains(inselbergs)inErtiDistrict(source: Illustration 2b in Geffray (1987a: 40)).NoteRio = river.5060405030402030102010Map 4 Populationdensitybycircle(crculo)inErtiDistrict,accordingtothe1980 census (source: Illustration 2b in Geffray (1987a: 41)).1 cm = 12 kmMap 5Colonial map of the regedoriasand ethnic division of what is present-day Namapa District (source: Pegado and Silva (1961)).IntroductionThe making and unmaking of the NamapaNaparamasMyresearchteamandIweredrivingnorthonhighway360innortheastNampula Province in August 1994 when we noticed that an oncoming jeepwas ashing its lights at us. As the vehicle approached, we saw it belongedtoJooFerreiradosSantos(JFS),aprivatermwithlongstandingagricul-turalinterestsinnorthernMozambique.Westoppedtondoutwhatwasup. The JFS driver leaned out and drawled, The Naparamas in Namapa areon strike. He was referring to independent peasant militias that formed inMozambiquescentralandnorthernregionsin19891990todefendruralcommunitiesagainstRenamo.Renamowasthenarebelarmywhichhadfought the government from 1977 to 1992. It had dedicated itself to desta-bilizing the Frelimo government, destroying the Mozambican economy andterrorizingthepopulationinthecountryside.Thewar,whichendedin1992, had left some one million people, mostly civilians, dead, caused someUS$20billionineconomicdamage,andreducedthecountrytoruins.AmassiveUnitedNations(UN)peacekeepingoperationwasunderwaytosecureashakypeaceandtooverseethecountrysrstmultipartyelectionsscheduledforthatOctober.ThefrontrunnerontheballotwasFrelimo,which had monopolized political power since Mozambican independence in1975.ItsmainchallengerwasRenamo,which,thankstoaheftyUNtrustfund, had managed to transform itself from a highly effective ghting forceintoafractured,lessthancoherentbutnonethelessoperational,politicalparty.Initially,theNaparamasspurnedtheuseofrearmsinfavoroftradi-tional weapons, such as spears, knives, machetes and bows and arrows. Forprotection,theyreliedonreligiousritualsandasecretvaccine(parama)derived from wild plants to render them invulnerable to enemy bullets.1ThevaccinesefcacywasvouchedforbytheNaparamafounderandleader,Manuel Antnio, a young, charismatic curandeiro (healer) from Nampula, thebirthplaceofthemovement.Antniosfollowers,some20,000menandboysbytheendof1990,seemedtobuyintohisclaims.Judgingfromthe Naparamasinitialmilitarygains,sodidRenamoguerrillas.Withinayear,theNaparamas,oftenworkinginclosecooperationwiththegovern-mentarmy,haddriventherebelsoutoflargeswathsofZambzia,anagriculturally rich and geo-politically strategic province. They had then pro-ceededtoestablishlocalpeacezones,allowingtensofthousandsoflongdisplaced people to return home.2Thiswasnomeanfeatinawarthat,by1988,waskillingsome88,000Mozambicansannually,wascostingtheeconomyoverUS$1billionayear,and seemed to have no end in sight.3The conict had erupted two years afterMozambique gained independence from Portugal. The new government wasformedbyFrelimo,whichhadprosecutedaten-year-longarmedstruggleagainstcolonialrule.FrelimoimmediatelyofferedsanctuaryandothersupporttonationalistguerrillasghtingtooverthrowIanSmithsillegalwhiteminorityregimeinneighboringRhodesia.Inretaliation,RhodesiasCentral Intelligence Organisation formed a terrorist organization that origin-ally went by the English name, the Mozambican National Resistance (MNR).Thegroup,whicheventuallybecameknownasRenamo,4wouldsoonbewithoutparallelinmodernAfricaasasuccessfulguerrillamovementactu-allyformedbyanexternalpower.5Theformerrebelmovementisnowbelieved to have served as a prototype for the civilian-targeting, terror-sowinginsurgenciesthathaverackedWestAfricainthepost-ColdWarperiod.6Italsoarguablyservedasaforerunnertonon-stateterroristorganizations,including those of global reach and ambition, such as Al Qaeda.7Renamos original core consisted of members of Portuguese special forcesunits who had ed Mozambique before and immediately after independence.InmatesfreedfromFrelimore-educationcampsneartheRhodesianMozambicanborderduringRenamoraidsalsonumberedamongtheearlyrecruits. Up to 1980, Renamos attacks were concentrated in Mozambiquescentralprovinces,ManicaandSofala,bothwithineasystrikingdistanceofRhodesia.8On the eve of Zimbabwean independence in April 1980, Renamowas inherited by South Africa. Thereupon, the rebel army was inducted intoPretoriastotalstrategythenametheSouthAfricanDefenceForce(SADF)gavetothemilitary,political,diplomatic,economic,ideologicalandpsychologicalwarwagedbytheapartheidstateagainstthecountrysblack political opposition both at home and abroad.South Africas policy of regional destabilization was adopted shortly afterP.W.Bothawaselectedprimeministerin1978.Thepolicyreceivedamajor boost over the next two years with the election of Margaret ThatcherasprimeministerofBritainin1979andofRonaldReaganaspresidentoftheUnitedStatesin1980.Thiswasthegoldenageoflow-intensitywarfareandthecounter-revolutionaryfreedomghter,twinpillarsofWashingtonsforeignpolicyresponsetoAmericandefeatinVietnam.Western-backed,anti-MarxistinsurgenciesinThirdWorldcountriesfromNicaraguatoAfghanistanourished.Thesponsorsofsuchinsurgenciesaimed to topple the target regimes or to compel them to alter their domesticpolicies and/or international political alignments.SouthAfricastotalstrategyneatlydovetailedwiththeReaganadminis-trationsdoctrineofrollback.Theapartheidregimecastitsstrategyof2 Introductionself-preservationasadefensivemaneuverinthefaceofatotalonslaughtspearheadedbySoviet-backedcommunistforces.Amongotherthings,itcouldpointtoFrelimosformalembraceofMarxism-Leninismin1977tobolsteritscase.ItcouldalsocitethesignicantinuenceexertedbytheSouthAfricanCommunistPartywithintheAfricanNationalCongress(ANC),themainliberationmovementghtingformajorityruleinSouthAfrica.Thegambitworked.TheWhiteHousedidnot,inanycase,needmuchpersuading,bentasitwasonwagingwaronmilitantnationaliststatesintheThirdWorld,especiallythoseseenasrmlyensconcedwithinMoscowsorbit.TheReaganandG.H.W.Bushadministrationsstronglytended to view the escalating struggle for South Africa through the prism oftheColdWar.Throughout,WashingtonrefrainedfromopenlysupportingRenamoaposturethatcontrastssharplywithUSforeignpolicytowardAngola,whereWashingtonunabashedlysupportedtheapartheid-backedrebelforce,Unita(NationalUnionfortheTotalIndependenceofAngola).And,attimes,itevenissuedwarningstoPretoriatoreininitscontraforcesinMozambique.Butthepolicyofconstructiveengagementeffect-ively encouraged South Africas onslaught on Mozambique, as it did on theregion as a whole.There has been considerable debate over whether Frelimos abandonmentofMarxism-Leninismasitsofcialideology,adecisionittookin1989,attestsmoretothesuccessofexternalaggressionortothefailureofstatesocialism, Frelimo-style. In either case, the results of total strategy were dis-astrous not only for the black majority in South Africa, where the escalatinginternal struggle for power in the 1980s captured the attention of the inter-nationalmedia.Theywereequallycalamitousfortheentiresub-continent,producingahumantragedyofmajorproportionsthathasyettoreceivemuch outside notice. As Terry Bell has recently put it:Throughoutthedecadetheapartheidmilitary,assistedbythepoliceandnationalintelligence,rampagedthroughtheregion.Thenancialcost to countries attacked and undermined as part of the destabilisationcampaign has been estimated at more than $50 billion in 2000 values.Thehumancostofuprootingmillionsofpeople,causingthedeathofhundredsofthousandsofchildren,ruiningagricultureandwreckinginfrastructure nationwide can never be quantied.9Adisproportionateshareofthesecosts,humanandotherwise,fellonMozambique.MozambiquebecamealeadingtargetofSouthAfricastotalstrategyforthree reasons. First, the Frelimo government hosted ANC guerrillas, givingthemdirectaccesstoSouthAfricansoil.Second,MozambiquesportsandrailwaysofferedneighboringstatesapotentialalternativetoSouthAfricastransport system for access to world markets. A major step in the directionof forging such an alternative was taken in 1980. Shortly after ZimbabweanIntroduction 3independence, nine states in the region formed the Southern African Devel-opment and Coordination Conference (SADCC; since renamed the SouthernAfrican Development Community). SADCCs explicit goal was to diminishSouth African economic and technological dominance in the sub-continent.ThisgoalwasunacceptabletoPretoria,whoseobjectivewastoestablishaband of apartheid-friendly, politically submissive and economically depend-ent states along its border.AthirdfactorwasthegalvanizingeffectFrelimosaccessiontostatepowerhadonblackpoliticalactivismwithinSouthAfrica.ThecollapseofPortuguese colonialism and the installation of a militant nationalist regimein Maputo helped spur the revival of black political resistance inside SouthAfrica in the mid-1970s.10Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to con-cludethatSouthAfricahadastakeinensuringthatindependentMozam-bique did not become a beacon of black revolution, socialist or otherwise.As a direct extension of the SADF, Renamo gained a second lease of life,becomingtheprimaryinstrumentofSouthAfricaswaragainstMozam-bique.11Therebelsexpandedtheirghtingforces,theireldofactionandthescaleoftheirattacksdramatically.Afterbeingreducedtosome1,250menin1980,Renamosrankandlestoodatanestimated5,000armedghters by mid-1981. Two years later, the insurgents leaders claimed a fewthousandmoreguerrillastotheirarmysname.RebelunitsmovedbothsouthwardsandnorthwardsfromcentralMozambiqueand,bymid-1983,wereoperatinginallthecountrysprovincessaveforCaboDelgadointhecountrys northeast corner. A little over a year later, the entire national terri-tory had become a war zone.12Peaceinthe1980sprovedelusive.In1984,MozambiqueandSouthAfricahadsignedanon-aggressionpact.Underthetermsoftheagree-ment,knownastheNkomatiAccord,FrelimoagreedtoensurethatANCguerrillasnolongeraccessedSouthAfricaviaMozambicanterritory.TheMozambicangovernmentalsopledgedtoreducetheANCpresencewithinitsborderstoasmalldiplomaticmission.SouthAfrica,initsturn,under-took to stop supporting Renamo. The pact was, however, repeatedly outedby Pretoria and the war escalated in the ensuing years.13Frelimosubsequentlyplacedhighhopesinagovernmentamnestyprogram launched in December 1987. But only a fraction of Renamos ght-ingforceoptedtotakeuptheamnestyoffer.Twoyearslater,theprogramwasdiscontinued.14Inthemeantime,ithadbecomeclearthatneithersidecould prevail militarily. By then, the conict had produced over one millionMozambicanrefugees,anestimated4.6millionpeoplehadbeendisplacedwithinthecountrysbordersandabout7.7millionpeopleabouthalfofMozambiques population needed food aid.15TheappearanceoftheNaparamamovementontheMozambicanscenewasthusthemostvisible,dramaticsignthatordinaryruraldwellershaddecided to take their destiny into their own hands. The years of waiting invain for the two warring belligerents to reach an accord, they appeared to be4 Introductionsaying,wereover.Thetimehadarrivedfordefenselesscivilianstoattemptto rebuild their shattered lives, ceasere or no ceasere.16Nevertheless,theNaparamaswerenotanunmitigatedgood.Therecu-perationofcaptiveciviliansinRenamo-heldzonestogovernment-con-trolledterritoryresultedinthedislocationandforcedresettlementofthousandsofpeople.17Andasthemovementexpanded,agrowingnumberofNaparamainitiatesbeganlevyinglocaltribute,stealing,lootingandsetting up protection rackets. Before too long, the anti-bullet vaccine, whichhadinitiallybeenavailablefreeofcharge,couldonlybesecuredatasteepprice.SomeNaparamaunitsevenbegantorefusetoreturnrecuperados(people who had been recuperated) to their homes until their families paidafeefortheirrelease.AsAntniosarmybecamemoreextractive,italsobecameprogressivelymoreauthoritarianandviolent.Naparamasstrong-armedpeopleintojoiningorsupportingthemovement.Theyimposedagrowingnumberofhighlyrestrictivetaboosandstrictures,ostensiblydesignedtosafeguardthevaccinesprotectivepowers,onbothitsghtersand the communities they served. And, in some areas, they gained notorietyfor killing civilians, especially men, in Renamo zones.18Inthemeantime,RenamosetaboutadjustingitsmilitarystrategytobeatbacktheNaparamaadvanceandtorecouplostterritory.Italsodeveloped its own vaccine to counteract Antnios. At the end of 1991, rebelguerrillasinZambziakilledAntnio.Thereafter,thetensionsandssureswithin the Naparama army became ever more pronounced. Some Naparamaunits took to freelance banditry. A few even defected to Renamo.19In Namapa District, the Naparamas stood accused of a host of abuses andexcesses.Theseincludedattackinggovernmentforcesandinternationalreliefconvoys;perpetratingsomeoftheworstatrocitiesagainstciviliansinRenamo-controlledterritory;extortingfoodfromlocals;andningnon-Naparamaswhofailedtocomplywiththemovementsdictates.Theyhadevenbeenchargedwithdulyexecutingthedistrictadministrationsorderstocoercesmallholderstogrowcotton,historicallyoneofMozambiquesleading export earners and, during the colonial period, a forced crop.20Takenliterally,theclaimthattheNamapaNaparamaswerestagingawork stoppage did not make sense. No Naparama forces had ever been on aformal payroll. And all Naparama units had been out of action since Frelimoand Renamo leaders had signed a peace accord in Rome in October 1992. Itwasnowalmosttwoyearslater.InpopulardiscourseinMozambique,however,beingonstrikeheldwiderconnotationsespeciallyinadvanceofthecountrysrstmultipartypollthenjustafewmonthsaway.Wide-spreaduncertaintyregardingtheelectoraloutcomeanditseffectsonthecountrys fragile peace prevailed. South Africas just-concluded transition toblack majority under an ANC-led government had shored up hopes that thepeace process in Mozambique could likewise be brought to a successful con-clusion.Suchhopeswere,however,shadowedbyfearsthatMozambiquein 1994couldturnintoareplayofAngolain1992.InAngola,asimilarIntroduction 5UN-sponsored electoral exercise designed to crown a war-to-peace transitionhad produced the opposite result. The renewal of armed hostilities betweenthe ruling MPLA (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola) and theSouthAfrican-andUS-backedrebelgroup,Unita,followedUnitasrejec-tionoftheresults,whichreturnedtheformerlyMarxistMPLAtopower.The UN mission in Mozambique had taken great pains to forestall a similardenouementinMozambiquemostnotablybygreatlyexpandingthenumberofpeacekeepingtroops,byofferingsubstantialnancialinduce-ments to Renamo and by taking steps aimed at ensuring that the processesofdemobilizationanddemilitarizationwerecompletedbeforethevotingbegan.Butnoonecouldbesurewhatthenextfewmonthswouldbring.Predictablyperhaps,demobilizedandcantonedtroops,governmentandprivatemilitias,andworkersinstate-ownedcompanieswereseekingtowrestwhateverentitlementstheythoughtweretheirduefromthegovern-mentorfromtheirformeremployersasahedgeagainstanindeterminatefuture.Formonthsthecountryhadbeenawashinstrikesofonekindoranother.In this context, the meaning of the JFS drivers remark was perfectly trans-parent. The Naparamas in Namapa were following the example set by severalhundredoftheircounterpartsinZambziaafewweekspreviously.ThereNaparamashadblockedthemainroadnorthoftheprovincialcapitalforthreedaysandseizedtwenty-fourgovernmentvehicles.Theprotesters,ftyofwhommarchedontheprovincialcapitaltopresstheircause,demandedthesametreatmentasRenamoandgovernmentsoldierswhohadoptedagainst joining the newly formed, unied national army: demobilization and,more importantly, demobilization pay. They also asserted their right to backwages for the military services they had rendered during the war.21Namapa was our destination that day. We were all ears. The Naparamashadthrownuparoadblock,cuttingtheroadbetweenNampulaandCaboDelgadotothenorth,thedriverofthejeepinformedus.Wethankedhimfortheinformationandproceededonourjourneytothepolicecheckpointjust outside of the town of Namapa, the district capital. A few dozen vehi-cleswereparkedthereandstrandedmotoristsweremillingabout.TheNaparamas, we were told, had hauled tree trunks and the chassis of old vehi-clesacrossthehighway.Therewasnogettingthrough.Theyhadalsoassaulted and cleaned out the best-stocked store in town, looted several stallsinthelocalmarketplaceandattackedpassers-by.22Thestrikethrewawrenchinmyresearchplans.IhadhopedtospendanightinNamapabeforeheadingwesttoconductinterviewsonlocalhistoryinNamiraandMuanona,themostremoteadministrativedivisionsinthedistrict.Ihadrented a four-by-four for the purpose and had two weeks worth of food andpetrolintow.InordertosalvagetheseplansIthoughtmyresearchassis-tant,ourdriver(whocamewiththevehicle)andIcoulddoublebacktoAlua,thedistrictssecondlargesttown,whichoffersalternativeaccesstoNamapaswesternlocalities.ButanAluaresidentcounseledagainsttaking6 Introductionsuchacourseofaction.Naparamasfromalloverthedistrictwereonthemarch towards the district seat, he warned, and we would be ill-advised torisk running into them en route.Prudenceseemedlikethebesttack.Wedecidedtoheadbackdowntheroad to the Catholic mission near Alua. There we were offered hospitality forthenight.Withthearrivalofpolicereinforcementsfromtheprovincialcapital that evening, the rioters, whose ranks had been swelled by disaffecteddemobilizedRenamoandgovernmenttroops,edandtheroadblockwaslifted.23Bymorningcalmprevailedandwewereabletoheadintothedis-tricts interior.In the week and a half that followed we had occasion to speak with bothNaparamacommandersandtherankandle,aswellasothers,abouttheNaparamaphenomenon.Welearnedthattheparama vaccinehadenteredthedistrictbytwodistinctroutes.24Tothewestofhighway360,ruralresidentshadheardoftheexistenceofananti-bulletpotioninMecubri,the district to Namapas west. Some communities had acted on this informa-tion by sending groups of boys and young men across the district border tobevaccinatedandtrained.Elsewhereinthearea,localshadinvitedNaparamacommandersandcurandeiros intotheirowncommunitiestoorganize grassroots militias. Given that the vaccine had developed in RibuDistrict in western Nampula, it was not surprising that it had migrated toNamapa by this route.Moreunexpectedwastherevelationthatthedistrictadministrationhadservedasaconduitforthevaccinesimplantationinthevicinityofthehighway360corridor.Thedistrictadministrator,ManuelBraga,himselfamilitarycommander,hadheadedLalauaDistrictinwesternNampulabetween 1985 and 1990 when the war raged there and a military administra-tionhadbeeninstalled.Duringthisperiod,Zinco,anelderfromMti,Lalaua,hadconcoctedtheparama vaccine,apparentlyindependentlyofAntnio, and had created his own militias which also became known for theirmilitaryprowess.25In1990,BragahadbeentransferredtoNamapawhereRenamo at the time held the upper hand militarily. Upon sizing up the localsecuritysituation,BragadecidedtobringZincotoNamapa.Zincovacci-nated in the area of the district seat, Alua and the communities in between.It was the Naparama militias under Zincos command that had, towardstheendofthewar,gainedreputationsashighwayrobbers.TheyhadalsoallegedlycommittedsomeofthemostegregiousatrocitiesagainstciviliansinRenamo-heldterritoryinthesoutheasterncornerofthedistrict.26ThesesamemilitiamembersapparentlyaccountedforthebetterpartoftheNaparamaswhoparticipatedintheAugustriot.ThedisproportionaterepresentationofZincosmeninthedisturbancemaywellhavemerelyreectedgeographiccircumstance:thissetofNaparamaswassimplyclosertothedistrictcapital.OtherNaparamasunitswereheadingtoNamapatownorwereconsideringheadinginthatdirectionbuthadchangedtheirplans when they heard that the demonstration had turned violent.Introduction 7After ten days of interviewing, we returned to Namapa with more ques-tionsabouttheNamapaNaparamasthananswers.Thedayafterwegotback, we stopped at a local caf. There we encountered a functionary of thedistrictadministrationhavingadrinkwithayoungmanwhomthefunc-tionary introduced as a Naparama major from Lalaua. We fell into conver-sation.ThetwomeninformedusthattheNaparamasinAluahadthrownuparoadblockandhadraidedthegrainwarehouseofWorldVision,aChristian evangelist non-governmental organization (NGO). The police hadeventuallyintervenedbut,onlastnotice,theroadblockwasstillstanding.Themajorwentontoexplainthathehadbeensentbytheprovincialgovernment to recover some of the looted goods. More interestingly, he hadbeentaskedwithundoingtheparama vaccineasameansofdispensingwith the troublesome Namapa Naparamas once and for all.Aswesubsequentlylearned,themajor,escortedbytheNamapapolice,waseventuallyabletorecoversomesewingmachines, cloth,articlesofclothingandcassettes,amongotherstolengoods.HedidsobybeatingNaparamas believed to have participated in the Namapa and Alua riots andbypronouncinghisvictimsordinarypeoplewhohenceforthpossessednosupernatural powers or special immunities. Those Naparamas who were notsuspectweresimplysprinkledwithaliquidmedicineasameansofdis-pelling the parama vaccines effects.27By morning the roadblock had been lifted and we drove back to NampulaCity, the provincial capital, without incident. One of my rst stops back intownwasthelocalofceoftheMaputo-baseddailynewspaperNotcias.ItwasthereIpickeduptwoweeksworthofnewspapersheldformewhileIwasintheoutback.Irummagedthroughthestack,curiousastowhetherthe Naparama riot in Namapa had made national news and, if so, how it hadbeenreported.Thestoryhadindeedreceivedcoverage.Themoststrikingfeature of the write-up was the manner in which an unidentied governmentsourcecharacterizedtheprotesters.AccordingtoNotcias,thesourcemain-tained that the area of Namapa doesnt have the original Naparamas, thereal Naparamas in Nampula are in Ribu, Mecubri, Chalaua, up to Moma. . ., districts to Namapas west and south.28By discrediting the Namapa Naparamas claims to state assistance in thismanner,thegovernmentrepresentative,itseemedtome,wasobliquelyacknowledgingthestatesownhandintheexpandedreproductionoftheNaparamamovementand,byextension,intheproductionofwhatofcial-dom,inretrospectatleast,sawasfraudulentNaparamas.Forthefunc-tionary in question didnt seem to be charging Zinco with quackery manyoftheNaparamasofMecubrihadalsobeenvaccinatedbyZincoandtheyseemedtopasstheauthenticitylitmustest.29NordiditappearasthoughofcialdomsubscribedtotheviewthatZincosmeninNamapawereimpostersotherwise,theprovincialgovernmentwouldnothavesentintheNaparamamajortoneutralizethevaccinesreputedeffects.IftheNamapaNaparamaswerefakes,theywereapparentlythoroughlyunaware8 Introductionthattheywere.Itseemedlikely,then,thatif,inthegovernmentsestima-tion,theNamapaNaparamaswerenottherealMcCoy,itwasbyvirtueofthestatesownenablingbutalsoadulteratinginterventionintheirformation.Other observers of the Mozambican scene will, no doubt, have their ownreadings of the above occurrences.30For me, the history of the governmentsrelationshiptotheNaparamasinNamapacametostandfor,andtohelprenderintelligible,awholeconcatenationofrulingideologicalpracticedatingfromindependencein1975.Thishistoryneatlyillustratestwocon-stantsinthispracticewhoseconsequenceshaveyettobeadequatelyplumbed. First, the Naparama experience in Namapa points up the mannerin which Frelimos discourse has studiously disavowed the states own com-plicity in shoring up and renewing the very traditional leadership, institu-tionsandpracticesitwaspubliclycommittedtoextinguishing.Second,itdisclosesthewaysinwhichofcialdomhassoughttoderivemaximumpoliticaladvantagefromtheconsequencesofitsunacknowledgedand/orcovertactions.Certainlythiswasthecaseoftheevolutionofthegovern-ments interactions with chieftaincy in Nampula and beyond, as the presentstudy is dedicated to demonstrating.As this book also aims to show, the ideological practices referenced aboveenabledandstructuredrulingmnemonicnarrativesandperformancebothprior to, and following, Frelimos abandonment of ofcial Marxism in 1989andthepromulgationofamultipartyconstitutionthefollowingyear.However,theirmeaningandoveralleffectswerefundamentallyalteredbytheendofsingle-partyruleandthejettisoningofsocialistpretensions.Upuntil the transition to political pluralism, these practices served to bolster atriumphalistdiscourseandtolegitimatethemodernizing,revolutionarystate.Thereafter,theybecamethe organizingprincipleof state-sponsoredretrospectives on why socialism had failed and, especially, why it had failedso abysmally in the outback. In this latter-day incarnation, they formed partofasetofcomplexmnemonicreadjustmentstypicalofpost-conictregimesseekingtodepoliticizeahighlycontroversial,divisivepastandtherebygarnertherequisitemeasureoflegitimacyfortheemergentpost-conictpoliticalorder.31Onemeansofaccomplishingthisobjective,asRichardWilsonnotes,istoexpungetheideologicalmotivationsfortheconict.Thismaybeaparticularlyattractiveoptionincomplicatedcon-texts of political compromise, where neither opposing side in a civil war hadwon an outright military victory.32Mozambique was one of these contexts. The peace accord was a product ofthe military stalemate that prevailed starting in the late 1980s. Predictably,it bore all the hallmarks of a two-way political deal, with signicant conces-sions by both sides. In entering in direct peace talks with Renamo, Frelimohadhadtoabandonitslongstandingstancethattherebelsweremereapartheidproxiesand,assuch,wereunworthynegotiatingpartners.Renamo,foritspart,hadbeencompelledtorenounceitscommitmenttoIntroduction 9overthrowingtheFrelimogovernmentandtorecognizethelegitimacyofthe Mozambican state.Neithertheelectoralresultsnorpoliticalarrangementsoverthepastdecadehaveunambiguouslyvindicatedeitherside.The1994electionsforever buried the notion that Frelimo, as a self-styled vanguard, represen-ted all of the people: Renamo won over 33 percent of the presidential voteandcapturedmajoritiesinveofMozambiqueselevenprovinces,allofwhicharesituatedinthecountryslongmid-section.Thepollshowedunambiguously that Mozambique was deeply divided and that regional dis-parities in economic and educational opportunities, living standards, incomeandlifeexpectancywereonemajorsourceofpoliticaldivision.However,despiteRenamosunexpectedlystrongnishanddespitesubstantialinter-national pressure on Frelimo to follow the example set by the ANC in SouthAfricaandformagovernmentofnationalunity,Renamofounditselfexcludedfromthehallsofexecutivepowerintherstelectedgovernment.ThisscenariowasrepeatedafterMozambiquehelditssecondgeneralelec-tions in 1999 when Renamo, now leading a coalition of opposition parties,signicantlynarrowedFrelimosmarginofvictory,winning48percentofthe presidential vote. In the event, Renamo has had to settle for playing theloyaloppositioninthenationalparliamentandthenotinsignicantperquisites that come with it.33PostwarMozambiqueapproximatesthegeneralscenarioportrayedbyWilsoninanotherrespect:namely,politicalconditionshavebeenripeforthe production of a revisionist history that eliminates ideological considera-tionsfromitsframe.ThepeaceaccordwasnotfollowedbyaMozambicanequivalentoftheNurembergtrials;notruthcommissionwassetup;thusfar,noattempthasbeenmade,byeithertheMozambicangovernmentorprivate citizen groups, to prosecute apartheid-era generals or operatives; thepostwar period has been marked by a dearth of calls, either from the govern-mentorthevariouspoliticalparties,formountinganationwidereckoningwiththepast;anddemandsalongtheselinesthathavebeenvoicedbythepublic have not given rise to a concerted campaign, let alone a social move-ment.34Theoneofcialinquirythatcouldhavepotentiallyshedlighton(andattractedsignicantinternationalpresscoverageof)theapartheidregimesresponsibilityforproducingtheMozambicantragedy,theSouthAfricanTruthandReconciliationCommission(TRC),washamstrungtoagreat extent in its investigations of South Africas border wars by the paucityof amnesty applications submitted by current and former SADF personnel.35In addition, even before peace gained a foothold, there was little separat-ing Frelimo and Renamo ideologically. Both parties are formally committedto creating a liberal democratic order and establishing the rule of law. Bothendorsepoliciesaimedatalleviatingpoverty,restoringsocialservicesandreconstructingthenationalinfrastructure.Bothareforspurringeconomicgrowththroughmarketreforms.Andbothfavorstrongforeigninvestmentand the formation of a national bourgeoisie.10 IntroductionFrelimos ideological reorientation helps explain its uneasy relation to itsrecentpast.Therulingpartyhasevincedlittleappetitefordefendingitssocialist interlude, the early years of which witnessed the consolidation of anauthoritarianregimewhosepoliticswereexclusionary,commandistandoftencoercive,whosepoliciesweretotalizingindesign,andwhoseruralinterventions prejudiced the livelihoods of most smallholders. Of late, somehigh-rankingmembershavegonesofarastoopenlyrueandevendisavowthepartysformerradicalism.36Renamo,foritspart,hasbeenevenlessinclinedtodwellonthedetailsofitshistory:mostnotablythecircum-stancesofitsgenesis,theidentityofitshandlersanditscombattactics.Indeed, Renamos leaders have sometimes seen t to complement their strat-egyofavoidancewithoneofblanketdenial.37Politicaldevelopmentsoverthepastdecadehavenodoubtheightenedthetwosidesmutual,ifdiver-gent,interestinglossingaviolentandtraumatizingpast.WhileFrelimocontinues to dominate Mozambican politics, the emerging political dispen-sationalsoexhibitssomeofthedeningcharacteristicsofanelitepower-sharingregime,withRenamoasFrelimospower-sharingpartner.38Theentrenchmentofsuchpatternsofpoliticalinteractioncouldhaveonlystrengthened the tendency toward erasure.39However, purging the conict of ideological content was not the primarypurpose of mnemonic revisions that took place in the 1990s. Rather, it wastominimizethegovernmentsownresponsibilityforengenderingandaggravating the national trauma of dictatorship and war by shoehorning thatresponsibility into a single source: Frelimos initial hostility to tradition andespeciallyitsanimustowardchieyrule.Atthenationallevel,memorypracticesdesignedtopromotethisversionofeventswereconjoinedwithattemptstoredenetheconictsprotagonistsinideologicallyanodyneterms terms more suitable to the post-Cold War global order. In the earlystages of destabilization, party propagandists portrayed armed hostilities as ashowdownbetweentheforcesofglobalsocialistrevolutionandthoseofcounter-revolution. In contrast, by the 1990s, Frelimo politicians tended todepicttheconfrontationaspittingdefendersofMozambicansovereigntyagainstthoseimplacablyopposedtonationalindependenceandblackrule,alongwithahandfuloflocalswhohadlongagosoldouttothem.Atthisstage,onefoundaratherdifferentensembleofstorylinesinNampula.There,state-sponsoredinquiriesintothecrisisofstatelegitimacyintheruralareastookacurioustwist:moreoftenthannottheydeletedRenamo,andbyextensionforeigndestabilization,fromthepicturealtogether.Thismaneuvereffectivelyeliminatednotonlytheideologicalimpetusesforthewarbutalsothefactofthewarsoccurrence.Theratherperplexingupshotwasthatthegovernmentandasupposedlytradition-boundpopulationbecame the sole protagonists of post-independence conict. This book exam-inesthegenealogyofofcialandstandardizingmnemonicpractices,counter-intuitive or otherwise, and chronicles these practices varied combi-nations and signications.Introduction 11Mozambique as a bellwetherOneoftheprimaryobjectivesoftheFrelimorevolutionwastoeliminaterural-based social practices and institutions that the ruling party deemed tobeembarrassingholdoversfromanoppressive,feudalprecolonialpast. InFrelimos estimate, some of the legacies of feudalism had been rendered evenmore degenerate, corrupt and obscurantist after the 500-year-long colonialencounter.Chieftaincy,thecornerstoneofPortugueseindirectrule,rankedforemostamongthem.Accordingly,chieyrulewasstatutorilyabolishedandchiefswhohadservedthecolonialadministrationwereinitiallybarredfrom holding public ofce.Inabrogatingchieyprivilegesandprerogatives,Frelimowasfollowingin the tradition of the late Julius Nyerere, the rst president of independentTanzania. Nyerere was instrumental in the founding of Frelimo in 1962, oneyearafterhisowncountrygainedindependence.HealsofacilitatedFrelimosarmedstrugglebyofferingTanzanianterritoryasasaferearbasefromwhichtolaunchandprosecuteguerrillaoperations.Priortothat,ontheeveofdecolonizationinmostofBritish-andFrench-ruledAfrica,NyereredistinguishedhimselfamongAfricannationalistsastheforemostchampionofasingle,uniedcitizenship,bothderacializedanddeethni-cized,inapostcolonialpoliticaldispensation.40Deracializationmeantextinguishing the invidious, race-based legal distinction between citizen andsubjectthat,acrossthecontinent,differentiatedbetweennatives,ontheonehand,andwhitesettlerpopulationsandassimilatedorevolvedAfricans,ontheother.Deethnicization(ordetribalization)meantdis-solving ethnic-based distinctions that had dened and divided colonial sub-jectsruledbytheNativeAuthorityundertheauspicesofsupposedlytribal chiefs. In calling for deracialization, Nyereres voice formed part of acontinent-widechorus.TheTanzanianleadersinsistenceonweddingdera-cializationtodeethnicization,however,resonatedmuchlesswidely.Theconsequences of African nationalisms differential response to the question ofdetribalization were soon to become apparent:Deracialization signied the general achievement [of post-independencereform];itwasatendencycharacteristicofallpostindependencestates,conservativeandradical.Theouterlimitofpostindependencereformwasmarkedbydetribalization,atendencycharacteristicofonlytheradical states.41Frelimo arguably pushed the envelope the furthest in establishing that outerlimit. It not only dismantled the dualist juridical system inherited from thecolonialregime,dispensingwiththecustomaryasaseparate,residualbody of law. It also established a network of newly created peoples tribunalswhichwerepresidedoverbylocallyelectedjudges.Thebriefofthesetri-bunals was to nurture the positive aspects of customary law and suppress the12 Introductionnegativeonesinaccordancewithconstitutionally-enshrinedrevolutionaryprinciples.42Frelimosuncompromisingstandonthequestionofruralpoliticalandjuridical authority, and its dim view of many rural-based cultural practices,gave rise to numerous excesses and abuses. In the rst years of independencelobola (bridewealth), polygyny, initiation rites, rainmaking ceremonies, div-ination, witchcraft accusations and exorcism were subjected to repeated of-cial denunciation and, in many localities, to government proscription. Manychiefs,irrespectiveoftheirpersonalandpoliticalhistories,wereridiculedandpoliticallyrepressed.WhenRenamoarrivedonthescene,traditionalauthoritieswereoftenviewedbyFrelimoofcialswithsuspicionorwereautomatically branded as collaborators. Some were killed.The dark side of detribalization did not come to the attention of an inter-national audience until the late 1980s, the eve of the Naparamas formation.TheextenttowhichFrelimorepresentatives,atvariouslevelsofauthority,struckearlycompromiseswithchieyhierarchies,ortoleratedoractivelyencouragedsucharrangements,alsoremainedbelowtheradarscreenofmany viewers. Rather, the stories that circulated were those that the leader-shipwantedtheoutsideworldtohearstoriesthattandfurtheredtheepic, heroic narrative the ruling party was busy propagating. These emphas-izedthatthemostpoliticallyconsciouselementwithinthepopulationhadgained local leadership posts.43Such stories also highlighted the determina-tionofruralinhabitantstooutparty-nominatedcandidatesforlocalrepresentative bodies who, unbeknownst to the Frelimo authorities, had col-laboratedwiththecolonialregime.Chiefsandothertraditionalauthoritiesreportedlyrankedhighamongthosewhowereexposedandrejectedbynewlyenfranchisedvoters.44Thepropagandaworked.Leftistsandprogres-sivesworldwidelionizedFrelimostangiblecommitmenttotranscendingthe legacy of indirect rule. They trumpeted its apparent ability to act on thiscommitment in a manner that seemed designed to foster democratic practiceatthegrassroots.Andtheyapplaudedtheruralpopulationsfavorableresponse to the new governments objectives on this front.Frelimos position on chieftaincy and custom was not the only one thatearnedthepartyinternationalacclaim.Therulingpartyspoliticalprojectwaspartofasecondwaveofsocialismthatsweptoverthecontinent.45Like their co-religionists, Frelimo leaders were as critical of the ideology ofAfrican socialism, as espoused by the likes of Nyerere, Leopold Senghor ofSenegalandKennethKaundaofZambia,astheywereofthefalsedecolo-nizationembracedbyconservativepostcolonialregimes,suchastheIvoryCoast,NigeriaandKenya.Likeotherdevoteesofscienticsocialismonthe continent, Frelimo leaders were highly skeptical of the African socialistclaim that, prior to colonial conquest, a communitarian ethos had held swayfrom the Cape to Cairo. To the extent that such an ethos had existed, partyintellectuals argued, it had all too often served as a cover for the relations ofdomination that had characterized a feudal society. They were dismissive ofIntroduction 13thenotionthatgenuinelyegalitariancommunaltraditionshadnotbeenseriouslyimpairedbythemomentoussocio-economicchangeswroughtbycolonial occupation and capitalist development. Foremost among these wereprocessesofclassformation,ahistoricaldevelopmentAfricansocialistsstronglytendedtodownplayorcompletelyoverlook.Asadirectcon-sequence of these changes, Frelimo leaders reasoned, there was little prospectthat,onceliberatedfromtheyokeofcolonialoppressionandexploitation,the continent would evince a natural proclivity to evolve in a socialist direc-tion,astheAfricansocialismsproponentslikedtothink.Rather,atrulysocialistsocietycouldonlyemergeasaconsequenceofavanguard-led,peasant- and worker-driven class struggle against entrenched domestic inter-ests that would actively oppose such a denouement. Whereas proponents ofrst-wavesocialismdenedthecontinentsmainnemesisasexternallybased,emanatingasitdidfromthemetropolitancountries,Frelimo,likeother professedly Marxist parties, insisted that Western imperialist interestsworkedwithandthroughlocally-rootedclients,whoconstitutedtheinternal enemy.46Withrespecttothespeciccaseofpost-independenceMozambique,Frelimoguredasfollows.Sincemostofthe250,000-strongsettlercommunityhadboltedintheyearsleadingupto,andintheimmediateaftermathof,independence,theinternalenemyconsistedofwhateverrem-nantsofthecolonialbourgeoisiehadstayedputpluselementswithintheAfricanpettybourgeoisiethatwerenotwillingtocommitsuicideasaclass.47Both groups were constitutionally antagonistic to socialist politics.AlthoughFrelimosaccessiontopowerhadleftthempoliticallyweakenedandoffbalance,therewastheever-presentdangerthattheycouldregroupwith a view to subverting the revolution. Under the circumstances, nothingless than a knock-out blow would do.FrelimosapplicationofclassanalysistoMozambiquesdomesticland-scapereceivedhighmarksfrompoliticalprogressivesofvariousstripes.Bythe time Frelimos Marxism began to crystallize in the late 1960s, the ideo-logy of African socialism was on the wane.48The reasons for this were mul-tiple. First, the weight of the evidence produced both by historical researchandcontemporarysocialscienticanalysisbeliedtheassertionthatAfrica,either in the past or present, was classless. Second, some of the governmentsmostcloselyassociatedwithanon-Marxistsocialistpathwaywereregister-ing less than impressive economic results. Moreover, certain of their numberhad shown themselves to be no less prone to political malaise and instabilitythan their neo-colonial neighbors. Accordingly, many observers had cometo the conclusion that African socialist ideology was simply devoid of gen-uinely transformative strategies.49Frelimosunsentimentalappraisalofthesocialrelationsthathadcharac-terized precolonial Africa, its much more sharp-eyed view of the fundamen-tal transformations engendered by colonial and capitalist penetration and itsembraceoftheuniversalcorpusofsocialistthoughtwerethreefactorsthat14 Introductionconspiredtomakepost-independenceMozambiqueabellwetherforthefutureofsocialisminAfrica.50Therewereothers,mostnotablyFrelimosrecordasanationalliberationmovementbetween1962and1974,whenacoup staged by the armed forces in Lisbon paved the way for the independ-ence of Portugals African colonies.Theofcialstoryofthisperiodrunsasfollows.51Inguerrilla-capturedterritory,orliberatedzones,thereemergedasynergistic,mutuallytrans-formativedynamicbetweenthenationalistguerrillasandthelocalpeasantpopulation. Force of circumstance played no small part here. The guerrillasneeded to secure the active cooperation of rural residents to advance militar-ilyandtoconsolidatetheirterritorialgains.Theyreliedonthelocalsforfood, intelligence, ferrying supplies to and from Tanzania, fresh recruits andpersonnelforpopularmilitia.Thelocals,intheirturn,dependedontheguerrillastoprotectthemfromPortuguesereprisals.Theylikewisedepended on Frelimo to help them reorganize their lives and livelihoods inthe radically altered circumstances of a rural insurgency.Getting rural assistance and allegiance required political work both priorto the inltration of Frelimo ghters to areas under Portuguese control andfollowing the capture of new territory. But the process of politicization wasnot a one-way street. In the course of moving and living amongst the peas-antry,theguerrillaslearnedaboutlocalneeds,grievances,experiencesandaspirations. As a result, they acquired a deeper understanding of the struggletheywereprosecuting,aswellasoftheformanddirectionthatstruggleshould take. The upshot was that the guerrillas radicalized the peasants andthe peasants further radicalized the guerrillas. This self-reinforcing dynamicfoundtangibleexpressioninthespreadofcollectiveformsofagriculturalproductionintheliberatedzones.Indeed,Frelimowouldlaterclaimthat,by the early 1970s, a proto-socialist agriculture had, by and large, displacedhousehold farming in these areas.52Theemergingpeasantguerrillaalliancewasakeydeterminantintheoutcome of power struggles at the summit of the movement. Internal polit-ical tensions, which dated from Frelimos inception, erupted into an escalat-ingconfrontationaftertheadventofthearmedstrugglein1964.Atissuewere differences regarding strategy and tactics, as well as concerning how toadministertheliberatedzonesinCaboDelgadoandNiassa.ThelongbrewinginternalcrisiscametoaheadwiththeassassinationofEduardoMondlane, Frelimos rst president, in 1969.According to ofcial history, these internal feuds pitted reactionary (orliberal-reactionary)nationalistsagainsttheirrevolutionarycounter-parts.Intheformercampstoodblackracists,aspirantcapitalistsandelit-ists.Secessionistsandtribalistsalsoguredprominentlywithinitsranks.Inthecaseofthelattergroup,ethnicexclusivismwasinextricablyboundup with its members vested interest in perpetrating patriarchal social rela-tions. The reactionaries tended to oppose mounting a protracted peopleswarthatwould,intheirview,undulypoliticizethepopulace.TotheirIntroduction 15mind, national liberation boiled down to deracialization and nothing more.ThiscampthusstrenuouslyopposedtransformingsocialrelationsintheliberatedzonesorinafutureindependentMozambique.Thecounter-revolutionaryfactionalsotendedtofavormaintainingastrictseparationbetweenthepoliticalandmilitaryarmsofthemovementandacommandstructureinwhichtheguerrillaarmywouldbesubordinatetoacivilianleadership.The opposing camp consisted of anti-tribalists and anti-racists who cham-pionedwomensrightsandatransethnic,territory-widenationalism.Thisgroup, the revolutionary wing, equated decolonization with sweeping socio-economictransformationandbelievedthatsocialrelationsintheliberatedzonesshouldheraldthefuturepostcolonialsocialorder.Theradicalsalsoinsistedthattherelationshipbetweencombatantsandnon-combatantsshouldbeoneofabsoluteparityandthatallcadresshouldundergobothpolitical and military training. The reason the revolutionary wing wound upcarrying the day and succeeded in expelling its political adversaries from themovementwasbecauseithadbeenbolsteredpoliticallybythedecisivesupportof the ever more robust and ever more radicalized alliance betweenFrelimo guerrillas and the peasantry in the newly liberated zones.Even some of Frelimos early supporters were willing to concede that theline-ups in Frelimos internal battles were not as xed as ofcial history latermadethemouttobeandthatfactorsotherthanpurelyideologicaloneswere in play.53Frelimos critics and non-partisan scholars have gone further,interpreting the power struggles that racked the movement and their even-tualresolutioninawhollydifferentlight.Intheirmajority,theyhavetendedtoportraytheconictsas,rstandforemost,aproductofethnic,ethno-regionalorregionally-andsociologically-distinctcreoleelites.(Some analysts have also added personal rivalries to the mix.54)According to one inuential account,55the revolutionary faction prevailedbecause its leaders commanded the loyalty of the guerrillas. On this reading,the alliance that powered the radical wing to victory was not that between theguerrillas and the peasantry. Rather, it was between an assimilated elite, thepreponderanceofwhosemembershailedfromMozambiquessouth,andaguerrillaarmy,whoserankswerelleddisproportionatelybyMakonde-speakers who formed the bulk of the population of northern Cabo Delgado,where the armed struggle was launched. By the same token, the merging ofthefrontspoliticalandmilitarywingsin1966andthesubsequentascen-dancyoftherevolutionarylineweresignsofthemovementsprogressivemilitarizationratherthanofitsleftwardtiltandtheradicalizationofitspeasant base. Army commander Samora Machels accession to the presidencyof Frelimo in 1970 unambiguously exemplied this trend.Thiscounter-narrativeinsiststhat,attheveryleast,Frelimohypeditsaccomplishmentswithintheliberatedzones.Farmingoperationsintheseareasremainedpredominantlyafamilyaffair.Collectiveagriculture,totheextentthatitwaspracticedatall,wasalwayssubordinateto,anddictated16 Introductionby,thestrategicimperativesofthearmedstruggle.Communalundertak-ingsweremerelyonewayofguaranteeingthesubsistenceoftheguerrillas,whoalsocontinuedtorelyonproduceharvestedfromhouseholdelds.Followingthetriumphoftherevolutionaryfaction,FrelimosDefenseDepartmentassumedsoleresponsibilityfortheorganizationandcontrolofcollective production, a development that pregured both Frelimos milita-rizationandthestatizationofpost-independenceMozambique.Socialrela-tions in the liberated zones could be accurately described as socialist only totheextentthatahistorically-contingentandevanescentwarsocialismemerged,astateofaffairsinwhicheverythingmustbeshared:objectives,resources, sacrices, aspirations and fears.56Thehistoricalrecordvindicatesmanyaspectsoftheaboveaccount,themain lineaments of which have been outlined by scholars belonging to whatI call the revisionist school. The evidence shows that Frelimo exaggerateditsaccomplishmentswithintheliberatedzones,theamountofterritoryitseized and the number of people living under its pre-independence adminis-tration.HistoricalresearchalsobolstersthethesisthatFrelimogravitatedtowardstatist,highlycentralizedandcommandistsolutionstothechal-lengesposedbydevelopmentpriortoindependenceandingthatseri-ouslyundercutsargumentsthatassignalargemeasureofblameforthisorientationtothebanefulinuenceexercisedbythelegionofSovietandEastEuropeanadviserswhoarrivedontheMozambicansceneafter1975.57Atthesametime,post-independencedevelopmentshavegreatlystrength-enedthecasethatthearmedstruggleleftadebilitatinglegacyofmili-tarism.Inaddition,thesedevelopmentsleavelittledoubtthatofcialhistoryandpro-Frelimoscholarshipgaveshortshrifttonon-ideologicalfactors in their renderings of Frelimos formative years.Thatsaid,thearmedstruggleachievedconsiderablenationalistsuccess,58asmeasuredbyFrelimosdemonstratedabilitytoachievethefollowing:(1)buildandmaintainnationalistunity;(2)mobilizeruraldwellers politically; (3) defend the civilian population in the liberated zonesfrom colonial military reprisals; (4) work diplomatic circuits to its politicaladvantage; and (5) sustain its commitment to the primacy of politics in pur-suingthegoalofdecolonizationonthetermsofitschoosing:namely,theimmediatetransferoffullsovereigntytoFrelimoitselfwithoutanycon-ditionsattachedincludingtheconditionofanelectoralmandateofanykind.59On the basis of these criteria, the efcacy of Frelimos armed strugglewas, in the context of Africa in the 1970s, second only to that of the PAIGC(African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde), the nation-alistmovementthatfoughtacontemporaneousguerrillawartoliberateGuinea-Bissau and Cape Verde from Portuguese rule.It is also widely accepted that the years of nationalist armed struggle pro-ducedaleadershipthatwasremarkablyunied,disciplined,politicallyastuteanddiplomaticallyadroit;atindependence,Frelimowasforward-looking;anditwasbentonpursuingaprogramofradicalreformintheIntroduction 17nameofsocialistconstruction.MostcloseobserverswouldalsoagreethatMachel, the rst president of independent Mozambique,was a politician very similar to the rst generation of African nationalistleadersforwhomtheidealsofanti-colonialstruggleandofnon-tribal,non-racial nationalism were a real motivating force, in marked contrasttothemilitarydictatorsandcorruptpoliticianswhoweresoontosucceedthemandwhowereprotectedbythesuperpowersduringtheCold War.60Ifinthemid-1970sthreeformerPortuguesecolonies,Guinea-Bissau,Mozambique and Angola, were seen as the last great hope of Third Worldsocialism,61by 1980, the burden of that hope was shouldered by Mozam-bique alone. In Guinea-Bissau, the PAIGC had, by that stage, opted againstassumingthemantleofavanguardafterindependence,settlinginsteadonapolicyofnationalunity.TheLeninistmodelofrevolution,thePAIGCconcludedatits1977congress,wasprecludedbytheabsenceofaprole-tariat in the sense of a class conscious of its interests and prepared to assumeitshistoricalresponsibilities.Whilethecongressdidntsayso,nationaldemographicsnodoubtalsoguredintheequation:outofatotalpopu-lation that was then well shy of one million, the industrial labor force was amere1,800-strongandonlysome24,000peopleenjoyedthebenetofregularemployment.62By1980,thePAIGCsnationalistlegitimacyhadlargelydissipatedandlongstandinginternaldivisionseruptedinacoupthat year which splintered the movement.63InAngola,theMPLAhadmanaged,withtheaidofCubantroopsandSovietarmament,torepulseacombinedandcoordinatedassaultmountedby South Africa and two rival independence movements, Unita and the US-backedFNLA(NationalFrontfortheLiberationofAngola),onAngolascapital,Luanda,ontheeveofindependenceinNovember1975.Withtheassistance of its foreign allies, the MPLA had even forced the SADF to with-draw its armored columns from Angolan territory altogether in March 1976.Victory over the South Africans did not, however, spell a halt to the securitychallengesfacedbyLuanda.Thenewgovernmentremaineddistractedbysmall-scalebutdestabilizingguerrillaattackslaunchedfromZaireanterri-tory by remnants of the FNLA and by FLEC (Front for the Liberation of theEnclaveofCabinda),asecessionistmovementseekingindependencefortheoil-rich province of Cabinda in the north. In May 1977, the government sus-tained an abortive but bloody coup attempt, in which several MPLA cabinetmemberswerekilled.TheputschgreatlyheightenedtheMPLAssenseofsiegeandcontributedtotheAngolanstatesauthoritarianandrepressivetendencies.And,ontheheelsofZimbabweanindependence,SouthAfricanmilitary incursions into southern Angola recommenced, along with renewedattacksbyUnita,which,followingthevirtualcollapseoftheFNLA,stoodpoised to become a US, as well as a South African, client.6418 IntroductionAsWilliamMinternotes,WhileAngolawasfacingthisnewconven-tional assault, Mozambique was celebrating the independence of ZimbabweandchalkingupmilitaryvictoriesagainsttheremnantsoftheMNR.In1980, Renamo attacks were still small-scale, and largely limited to remoteareasofManicaandSofalaprovinces.65Itwasnotuntilthefollowingyearthat rebel military activity gradually began to pick up and low-level harass-ment gradually deepened into a massive sustained assault.66At the top ofthedecade,then,itwasreasonabletoconjecture,asCrawfordYoungdid,thatAnultimateverdictontheAfro-Marxistpathwaywillprobablyhingeon the political evolution and economic performance of Mozambique inthe1980s. . .OnlyinMozambiquearealltheelementsoftheexem-plaryexperienceassembled:asophisticatedandunitedleadership;arelativelyclear-cutideologicalidentity;acoherentpoliticalunderpin-ning in FRELIMO. The 1980s will be a critical decade for this interest-ing experiment in political economy.67Post-socialist Mozambique, recent historiographicaldebate and contemporary forms of mnemoniclegitimationThe 1980s did indeed prove decisive but not in the way Frelimos cham-pionshadhoped.ThedecadewitnessedtherapidunravelingoftheMozambicanrevolutionandtheonsetofalarge-scalehumanitariancata-strophe. Once considered a virtually peerless pioneer in forging a socialistpathway in Africa, Mozambique now enjoys an equally exceptional, if dia-metricallyopposed,status:todaythecountryis,intheeyesoftheInter-nationalMonetaryFund(IMF)andtheWorldBank,aflagshipofneoliberalprinciplesonanotherwisegrowth-challenged,hopelesslyneo-patrimonialcontinent.Thedefacto two-partysystemthathasevolvedsince1992enjoysafurtherdistinction:itisconsideredbyinternationaldiplomatsasaparagonofUN-sponsoredpacification,nationalreconciliation and democratization.Theseself-congratulatoryimagessoft-pedalorignoreseveraldisconcert-ing realities. By the time the peace accord was signed, Mozambique was oneof the poorest and most aid-dependent countries in the world; the economyandinfrastructurehadbeendevastated;two-thirdsofthepopulationhadbeenreducedtoextremepoverty,aconditionfromwhichthey,intheirmajority,haveyettoexit;disparitiesinlivingstandardsbothbetweenandwithin regions were widening, a trend that continues to the present day (andiswidelybelievedtohavefedthewar);andofcialcorruption,whichhadbeen inconsequential up until the mid-1980s, had become endemic. In addi-tion, Mozambique stood on the cusp of effectively becom[ing] a free-tradearea,whereallmannerofsmugglingoperations(primarilytoandfromIntroduction 19SouthAfrica)ourished;andtheundergroundnetworksinvolvedintheseoperations would, in short order, generate powerful crime syndicates, whosesway over state institutions has become notorious.68MozambiquesbreathtakinglyspeedytransformationfromaColdWar,ThirdWorldbattlegroundtoamodelofpost-conict,capitalistdevelop-ment has, it bears emphasis, occurred on Frelimos watch. Predictably, manyleading government and party ofcials rank among the primary beneciariesofthenewpoliticalandeconomicdispensation.Thosewhoenthusiasticallypromised that Mozambique would be turned into a graveyard of capitalismare now leading advocates of, and avid accumulators in, capitalisms recent,full-blown resurrection.ThebigsurprisehasbeenRenamosremarkabletransformationfromamilitaryproxyatitsinceptionintoapostwarpoliticalpartythat,since1994, has dominated oppositional politics both within and beyond the hallsof the national parliament. And, despite severe organizational defects, a longhistory of fractiousness and a weak political program, the former rebel armyhas,untilrecently,posedanunexpectedlystrongchallengetotherulingparty at the ballot box.69ThedemiseofFrelimossocialistexperiment,combinedwithRenamosstunningmetamorphosis,theapparenteaseofFrelimosconversiontoneoliberaldoctrineandtherulingpartysabilitytomaintainitsgriponpower,haveraisedmanyquestionsconcerningthenature,meritsanddemerits of the Mozambican revolution; the various factors, both structuralandconjunctural,thatcontributedtotherevolutionsdefeat;thecharacterandcausesofruraldissent;andthemaindeterminantsinRenamosevolu-tionandpostwarstayingpower.Hereweconneourselvestothoseques-tions relating to Frelimos politics, policies and practice.TowhatextentdidFrelimosversionofstatesocialismanditsoftenheavy-handedtacticsenhanceMozambiquesinheritedvulnerabilitytoexternal aggression and facilitate Renamos wartime military success? To theextentthatmountingruralalienationwiththeFrelimostateplayedintoRenamoshands,howmuchofthiscanbechalkeduptowidespreadindif-ference to both parties to the conict and how much to rural peoples align-mentwithand/oractivesupportfortherebels?Towhatextentwasbroad-based opposition to the regime, especially in the rural areas, a reactionto the specically socialist content of state interventions? A backlash againstgovernmentcounter-insurgencymeasures?Aresponsetothegovernmentsfailure to deliver on its pledges and/or to defend the civilian population fromrebel atrocities and predations?Mozambiquesrathersingularpost-independencetrajectoryhasalsoprompteddiscussionanddebateastothemeaningandtheauthenticityofFrelimoscommitmenttosocialism.ThereisgeneralagreementthatFrelimos embrace of the socialist option is only intelligible within the spe-cicgeopoliticalcircumstancesarisingfromtheColdWar.Duringthearmedstruggle,membersoftheNorthAtlanticTreatyOrganization20 Introduction(NATO)spurnedMondlanesappealsformilitaryassistanceandalignedthemselves unambiguously with Portugal. This was hardly surprising giventhat Portugal was itself a NATO member and, in the era of superpower con-frontation,NATOwasunwillingtojeopardizeitsaccesstostrategically-situated military bases in the Azores. In the event, Frelimo was compelled toseek aid and assistance elsewhere. In the early stages of the war for independ-ence,itgotmilitaryhardwareandtrainingprimarilyfromnon-alignedcountries,suchasEgypt,Algeria,ZambiaandTanzania.Subsequently,ChinaandtheSovietUnionsuppliedthelionsshareofmoney,armsanddiplomatic support.70There is also scholarly consensus that the prevailing international climate,howevercritical,onlyprovidesapartialexplanationforFrelimosradical-ization. The leaderships ideological dispositions were no mere opportunisticbidforsuperpowerresourcesinabipolarworld.Hadthatbeenthecase,Frelimowouldnothavejoinedthenon-alignedmovement;norwouldithaverefusedtheSovietUnionsrequest,followingindependence,tohostaRussiannavalbase;norwouldithaveresistedpressuretotakeupsidesintheSino-Sovietdispute(astancethatmadeitoneofthelonehold-outsamongliberationmovementsthroughoutthecontinent);nor,inalllikeli-hood, would it have retained its socialist identity following Moscows rejec-tion of Mozambiques application to join the Council for Mutual EconomicAid(Comecon)in1981bywhichpointChinahadsharplyrecededfromthe picture.71Inviewofthishistory,mostpoliticalanalystshavesoughttoidentifydomestic political and sociological factors that contributed to this outcome.FrelimosympathizershavetendedtoadoptFrelimosexplanationforitsideologicaltrajectoryastheirown.TheycitetheradicalizingeffectofLisbonsobstinaterefusaltodecolonize,ofthebrutalnatureofPortuguesecolonialismandoftheextremelyrepressiveconditionsinwhichpopularstruggleswithinandagainstthissystemofdominationandexploitationwerewaged.72Inresponse,therevisionistshaveraisedaseriesofpointedquestions.WasthelanguageofMarxismandvanguard-ledrevolutionmerelyanideologicalpatinaonwhatwas,atbottom,astraightforwardlynationalistproject?TowhatextentdidFrelimosradicaloratoryservemerelytolendlegitimacytothecoreoftheleadership,mostofwhosemembershailedfromanumericallyinsignicant,cosmopolitan,subalternelite one drawn to the cause of armed nationalism73primarily because itsupwardmobilitywithinthecolonialorderhadbeenfrustratedbyinstitu-tionalizedracismandwhiteracialprejudice?Ifrulingpoliticalrhetoricchieyservedalegitimatingfunction,towhatdegreewastheleadershipconvincedofitsownpropaganda?Andinwhatways,ifatall,diditsrhetoric shape, rather than merely legitimate, policy choices?Many of the debates that swirl around the foregoing lines of inquiry bearintimatelyonquestionsrelatingtohistoricalchangeandcontinuity.TowhatextentdidtherevolutionaryFrelimostatemarkaradicalbreakfromIntroduction 21itscolonialpredecessor?Inwhatrespectsdoesthepost-socialistFrelimostaterepresentadeparturefromtheself-styledrevolutionaryregimethatprecededit?Whichfeaturesoftheemergingpostwarpoliticaleconomyunravelthechanges(whetherunderstoodasgainsorotherwise)enactedbyFrelimoinitssocialistincarnationandwhichareconstantsdatingbacktothe colonial period?Such questions inform M. Anne Pitchers criticisms of the argument thatmarket reforms have produced patterns of economic ownership and produc-tionrelationsthatharkbacktotheperiodofPortugueseoccupation.Shemaintains that the recolonization thesis, a staple of many radical critiquesof post-socialist Mozambique, misleads insofar as it understates the degree ofcontinuitythatcharacterizedthetransitiontoindependenceand,byandlarge,isblinkeredtotheenduringlegacyofthecommandeconomy.74According to Pitcher, what the recolonization thesis fails to appreciate is thepath-dependencyofthecountryshistoricaldevelopment.Thisfailureundulycomplicatesthetaskofdistinguishingadequatelybetweeninter-rupted continuities, as manifested, say, by the re-emergence in the 1990s ofacolonial-stylecottonconcessionarysystem(describedinChapter2),andlong-term, unbroken continuities, such as the history of state intervention inthe economy.75WheredoestheNaparamaphenomenontintoallofthis?Theconven-tionalwisdomisthattheNaparamastorystarklyrevealedthatFrelimoslongstandingoffensiveagainstruralobscurantismhadquietlyfallenbythewayside.WriterssuchasR.M.A.GonalvesandMalynNewitthaveemphasizedthewaysinwhichthegovernmentsalignmentwithAntnioswarriors unambiguously signaled a sea change in the governments stance onthingstraditional.76TheimprobablemilitarypartnershipthatensuedshowedasmuchasanythingthatFrelimohadcompletelyforsakenitsproject of remaking the rural populace in its own image that is, as assimil-ated,universalizingcosmopolitans.Indeed,FrelimosenlistmentoftheNaparamasinitscounter-insurgencystrategydemonstratedthattherulingpartyhadbowedtothepressureofpopularculturetoensureitsownsur-vival.Thatpressure,othershaveargued,likewiseresultedintherealign-mentofofcialandchieyauthorityinthelate1980s,effectively,ifnotofcially, reversing Frelimos detribalization policy.But,asIhavealreadysuggested,theNaparamaexperienceinNamaparecounts a rather different tale, one which conveys hitherto underappreciatedcontinuities,whoseimplicationshaveyettobefullyunderstood:namely,the proclivity of state and party representatives to conveniently overlook therole of ofcial institutions in reproducing obscurantist practices and even,asinthiscase,facilitatingtheirgeographicspreadwhile,atoneandthesame time, capitalizing on the consequences of these past actions to furtherruling political interests in the present. This aspect of Naparama story is onemanifestationofarecurringsyndromewhoseoriginslieinthe oftenover-looked realitythatFrelimosdetribalizationpolicywasseverelycompro-22 Introductionmised from the outset. The cumulative weight of three closely related factorsensuredthisoutcome: (1)thelimitedcapacityofstateinstitutions;(2)therefractorinessofruralsocialrelations;and(3)whatpoliticals