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Information Warfare 21st century

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UnderstandingUnderstandingInformation AgeInformation AgeWarfareWarfare

David S. AlbertsJohn J. Garstka

Richard E. HayesDavid A. Signori

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Understanding information age warfare / David S. Alberts … [et al.]. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 1-893723-04-6 (pbk.) 1. Information warfare. 2. Electronics in military engineering--United States. 3.Military planning--United States. I. Alberts, David S. (David Stephen), 1942-U163 .U49 2001355.3’43--dc21 2001043080

August 2001

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Table of ContentsAcknowledgements ...................................xi

Preface .......................................................xiii

Chapter 1: Introduction ..............................1

Chapter 2: The Language of InformationAge Warfare .................................................9

Chapter 3: Information in Warfare ..........35

Chapter 4: Fundamentals of InformationSuperiority and Network CentricWarfare .......................................................53

Chapter 5: Information Domain...............95

Chapter 6: Cognitive Domain ................119

Chapter 7: Command and Control ........131

Chapter 8: What Is Collaboration? .......185

Chapter 9: Synchronization ...................205

Chapter 10: Growing Body ofEvidence ................................................. 239

Chapter 11: Assessment and the WayAhead ........................................................285

Bibliography.............................................301

About the Authors...................................309

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List of FiguresFigure 1. From Theory to Practice ............6

Figure 2. The Domains .............................11

Figure 3. Domain Relationships:Sensing ......................................................15

Figure 4. Domain Relationships:Information .................................................16

Figure 5. Domain Relationships:Knowledge .................................................17

Figure 6. Domain Relationships:Awareness..................................................19

Figure 7. Domain Relationships:Understanding ..........................................20

Figure 8. Domain Relationships:Decision .....................................................21

Figure 9. Domain Relationships:Action ........................................................ 22

Figure 10. Example: Entity OODALoop........................................................... 23

Figure 11. Domain Relationships:Information Sharing ..................................24

Figure 12. Domain Relationships: SharedKnowledge .................................................26

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Figure 13. Domain Relationships:Shared Awareness ...................................27

Figure 14. Domain Relationships:Collaboration ............................................28

Figure 15. Domain Relationships:Synchronization ........................................29

Figure 16. Hierarchy of Measures ...........32

Figure 17. Information War: Value ofKnowledge .................................................35

Figure 18. Carl von Clausewitz ...............36

Figure 19. Impact of Fog and Friction onEffectiveness .............................................38

Figure 20. Advances in the InformationCapabilities ................................................40

Figure 21. The Information Domain ........47

Figure 22. Richness, Reach, and Qualityof Interaction..............................................48

Figure 23. Value Creation.........................61

Figure 24. Network Attributes .................63

Figure 25. Network Comparison .............64

Figure 26. Commercial Example .............65

Figure 27. Comparing BusinessModels ....................................................... 66

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Figure 28. Military Value Chain ...............67

Figure 29. Comparing WarfightingModels ........................................................69

Figure 30. Networking the Force.............69

Figure 31. Networking the Force(con.) ......................................................... 70

Figure 32. Platform vs. Network-CentricAwareness..................................................71

Figure 33. New Mental Model ..................72

Figure 34. Domain Interactions ...............73

Figure 35. Information Elements.............73

Figure 36. Cognitive Elements ................74

Figure 37. Physical Elements ..................75

Figure 38. Network Centric Warfare ValueChain ...........................................................76

Figure 39. Value Chain Links ofInformation Superiority and NetworkCentric Warfare .........................................77

Figure 40. Linkage Models and Indicantsof Information Value .................................80

Figure 41. Determination of System’sUtility ...........................................................92

Figure 42. Information Domain: Attributesof Information Richness...........................96

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Figure 43. Information Domain: Attributesof Information Reach ................................99

Figure 44. Information Domain: Quality ofInteraction ................................................101

Figure 45. Information Domain: KeyRelationships ...........................................104

Figure 46. Relative InformationAdvantage ............................................... 108

Figure 47. Impact of InformationOperations................................................110

Figure 48. Information Needs ................111

Figure 49. Information Domain:Measuring an InformationAdvantage ............................................. 116

Figure 50. Reference Model: ConceptualFramework ...............................................120

Figure 51. Reference Model: TheSituation .................................................. 121

Figure 52. Battlespace Awareness .......122

Figure 53. Reference Model: Componentsof Situational Awareness .......................124

Figure 54. Shared Awareness ...............126

Figure 55. Achieving SharedAwareness.............................................. 127

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Figure 56. Traditional View of C2: OODALoop ..........................................................132

Figure 57. Joint Hierarchical and CyclicalOperational Activity Model ....................135

Figure 58. Traditional C4ISRProcess .................................................. 137

Figure 59. C4ISR Process Today ..........146

Figure 60. Greater Integration ...............149

Figure 61. Greater Integration and ImpliedDecision Types ........................................153

Figure 62. Overall AnticipatedIntegration .............................................. 158

Figure 63. Structure, Function, Capacity,and Their Impacts ...................................164

Figure 64. Historical Choices Among C2System Philosophy .................................170

Figure 65. Capacity Requirements forDifferent Command Arrangements ......176

Figure 66. Spectrum of C2 OrganizationOptions .....................................................181

Figure 67. Information Age C2Organizations ..........................................183

Figure 68. How Does Networking EnableSynchronization? ....................................216

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Figure 69. What Is the Role of Planning inSynchronization? ....................................221

Figure 70. What Type of C2 Concept IsAppropriate for a Given Mission?.........224

Figure 71. Illustrative Attributes for KeyInformation Superiority Concepts Relatedto Hypotheses RegardingSynchronization ......................................229

Figure 72. Synchronization Value .........232

Figure 73. Synchronization Profiles .....234

Figure 74. Growing Body ofEvidence ................................................ 235

Figure 75. Assessment of the EmergingEvidence ...................................................240

Figure 76. Network Centric MaturityModel ....................................................... 241

Figure 77. Air-to-Air: ImprovedInformation Position ...............................245

Figure 78. Coupled OODA Loops: VoiceOnly ...........................................................246

Figure 79. Air-to-Air: Tactical Situation: 4vs. 4 ...........................................................247

Figure 80. Voice vs. Voice Plus DataLinks .........................................................248

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Figure 81. Coupled OODA Loops: VoicePlus Data ..................................................249

Figure 82. Air-to-Air: Relative InformationAdvantage ................................................250

Figure 83. Air-to-Air ................................254

Figure 84. Maneuver ...............................271

Figure 85. Theater Air and MissileDefense Process .....................................275

Figure 86. Impact of Network CentricTAMD ........................................................276

Figure 87. Strike: Networking the KillChain .........................................................278

Figure 88. Strike: Improved InformationPosition.....................................................279

Figure 89. Split-Based Operations........280

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Acknowledgements

This book was, in a very real sense, a communityeffort. When the CCRP sponsored the formation of

the Information Superiority Metrics Working Group(ISMWG) in early 2000, it was our hope that the collegialexchanges would take the discussion of InformationSuperiority and Network Centric Warfare to the nextlevel—a level where these ideas could be rigorouslytested both analytically and experimentally. We are verypleased that this turned out to be the case.

This book attempts to capture, for a wider audience,the insights, suggestions, and discussions that haveoccurred both at an ISMWG workshop and the regularmonthly meetings of the ISMWG. The list ofcontributors to this book, the members of the ISMWG,are listed on the following page. It should be notedthat the ISMWG is a volunteer organization, and assuch its very existence is due to the generosity of boththe individual members and the organizations for whichthey work. It should be recognized that the timedevoted by ISMWG members is above and beyondtheir already formidable obligations, both professionaland personal. We know that we speak not only forourselves but also for the community when we expressour sincere appreciation for their contributions. Thesubject addressed by this book is a difficult one, andcontributions will be required from all of us if we are tocontinue to make progress.

We owe a huge debt of thanks to John McDaniel forworking with us to develop the annotated briefingwhich served to solidify our thoughts, and to Margita

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Rushing for her work to turn this into a polishedmanuscript and prepare it for the printers.

Finally, the authors deeply appreciate the opportunityto write this book. We hope we have done justice tothe deliberations of the ISMWG and that in extendingthese we have added to an understanding of thischallenging subject.

Information Superiority Metrics Working Group (ISMWG)

Dave Alberts OSD Tom Altshuler DARPA

David Anhalt OSD James Baxfield IDA

Bill Bowling OPNAV/N6C Peter Brooks IDA

Keith Catanzano Booz Allen & Hamilton Dennis Damiens SAIC

Gene de Mark OPNAV/N6C Dan de Mots Booz Allen & Hamilton

John Dickman Naval War College Gary Edwards ISX

Ward Evans MITRE Marco Fiorello SYYS

Colleen Gagnon Metron John Garstka Joint Staff

Greg Giovanis DISA Priscilla Glasow MITRE

Ray Haller MITRE Tim Hanley Joint Staff

Dick Hayes EBR Paul Hiniker DISA

Joseph Jennings MITRE Hans Keithley OSD

Mike Letsky ONR Cliff Lieberman JFCOM

Julia Loughran ThoughtLink Mark Mandeles J. de Bloch Group

Geoffrey Maron AFSAA/SAAI Ken McGruther WBB

Donald McSwain SYYS John Mills JFCOM

Greg Parnell Toffler Associates Ed Peartree OSD

Peter Perla CNA Dennis Popiela JFCOM

Todd Riebel OSD Steve Rudder OSD

Dave Signori RAND Ed Smith Boeing

Stephen Soules Booz Allen & Hamilton Fred Stein MITRE

Bill Stevens Metron Stu Starr MITRE

Joe Tatman Litton TASC Chuck Taylor OSD

Mark Tempestilli OPNAV/N6C Gary Toth ONR

Gerald Tunnicliff NSA Frank Vaughan JHU/APL

Gary Wheatley EBR Larry Wiener OPNAV/N6C

Doug Williams Litton TASC

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Preface

Understanding the EmergingTheory of Warfare

The age we live in is full of contradictions. It is atime unlike any other, a time when the pace of

change demands that we change while we are still atthe top of our game in order to survive the next wave.It is a time when our analysis methods are becomingless and less able to shed light on the choices weface. It is a time when the tried and true approachesto military command and control, organization, anddoctrine need to be re-examined.

Fortunately, we are not alone. Organizations in everycompetitive space and individuals in every area ofhuman endeavor are grappling with the relentlessdemands of our age. In the private sector, Darwinianprinciples are ruthlessly at work. Organizationalgenetics are producing mutations that are beingmercilessly tested in the marketplace. Evolution isabout the adaptation of the species throughcompetitive selection. Individual organisms are notexpected to adapt; rather those organisms that survivepass on their proven or adapted genetic material tothe next generation.

Industries are like species in that they can adapt as awhole, even as many individual organizations fail, aremerged, and are acquired. The role of militaries asthey relate to national security and the way militaries

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will be organized and equipped will undoubtedlyundergo transformation as they adapt to theInformation Age. While each of us harbors some ideaabout how militaries will respond to a myriad ofInformation Age pressures, it is safe to say that therewill be surprises along the way. Progress will not beorderly, nor will it be predictable. This will be hard formany to understand and accept. Cherished notionsof long-range planning and ways of introducing newtechnology are arguably outdated.

This book presents an alternative to the deterministicand linear strategies of the planning modernizationthat are now an artifact of the Industrial Age. Theapproach being advocated here begins with thepremise that adaptation to the Information Age centersaround the ability of an organization or an individualto utilize information. This book identifies what thisdeceptively simple Information Age characteristicactually entails and how learning to use information isan inherently complex and disruptive process. It arguesthat innovation, discovery, and experimentation arefundamental Information Age competencies. Given thedynamics and complexities of our time and theincredible pace of change, planning is truly—as theold adage goes—all about the process, not the plan.

If this book helps you understand why InformationSuperiority and network-centric concepts are at theheart of all Information Age organizations, challengesthe way you think about the future of DoD, providesyou with an idea or two about how to capitalize on theinformation we have or could have, or simply makesyou think again about how we change, it will haveaccomplished what the authors set out to do.

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Background

Armed with a general understanding of the conceptsof Information Superiority and Network Centric

Warfare, enterprising individuals and organizations aredeveloping new ways of accomplishing their missionsby leveraging the power of information and applyingnetwork-centric concepts. Visions are being createdand significant progress is being made. But to datewe have been only scratching the surface of what ispossible. A great deal of what has been done is“picking low-hanging fruit” by direct application of newtechnology with existing practice. Progress is also “hitand miss,” in that progress has not been systematicor achieved across the board. Hence we have onlybegun to take advantage of the opportunities affordedby rapidly advancing information technology. Thereare a number of reasons for this. Two stand out. First,there is the complexity of the task. This involves beingable to deal with the coevolution of mission capabilitypackages consisting of a concept of operations,approach to command and control, organization,doctrine, corresponding C4ISR, weapons, and logisticssystems. Second is the lack of maturity of ourunderstanding of basics of Information Superiority andNetwork Centric Warfare.

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Progress in science and its application to a domainalways involves a mutually re-enforcing spiral of theoryand practice. With respect to Information Superiorityand Network Centric Warfare, we are still in the initialspiral. For many, Information Superiority and NetworkCentric Warfare remain abstract concepts, theirapplicability to military operations and organizationsunclear, and their value unproven. Others have seenthe benefits but are unable to adequately “connectthe dots” between improved information (and/or itsdistribution) and outcomes in a rigorous (scientificallyrigorous, meaning both valid and reliable) way.

Moving into the next spiral requires that we improveour understanding of how Information Superiority iscreated and how Network Centric Warfare conceptscan translate Information Superiority into increasedcombat power and military effectiveness.Accomplishing this requires progress in three specificareas. First, we need to articulate the key conceptsunderlying Information Superiority and Network CentricWarfare and the ways they are interrelated. Second,we need to be able to measure the degree to whichthese concepts are realized. Third, we need to be ableto systematically explore the relationships betweenthe realization of key concepts and the conduct andresults of military operations.

Purpose

The purpose of this book is to contribute to our abilityto move to the next spiral by providing a more detailedarticulation of Information Superiority and NetworkCentric Warfare. Toward this end, this book proposesworking definitions, defines the specific characteristics

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and the attributes of key concepts, specifies (andhypothesizes) the relationships among them, andoffers ways to measure the degree to which theseconcepts are realized and the impact they have onthe conduct and effectiveness of military operations.

Foundations of Understanding

As the title of this book is Understanding InformationAge Warfare, it is fitting that we begin with a discussionabout the nature of understanding and the necessaryprocesses and tools to achieve it.

Nature of Understanding

Developing an understanding of how and why things workas they do, or could work, is fundamental to being able tosystematically improve functionality. Without such anunderstanding, progress will continue to be a hit or missproposition. Understanding enables us to focus attentionon making those changes that are most promising.

The initial journey on the road to understanding ishaphazard, characterized by fits and starts. The firstreal sign of progress involves the emergence andacceptance of a special language to describe and talkabout the problem. This language identifies anddefines the primitives needed to build a theory. Itenables meaningful discussions and comparisons.

Next, the theory coalesces. The initial articulation ofthe theory identifies and describes the relationshipsthat are hypothesized to exist among the primitives.The theory may be quite profound, even if there areonly a small number of primitives (e.g., E = mc2).

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Theories are merely unproven conjectures (or perhapssets of related, but untested, hypotheses). They needto be tested. Sometimes this is very difficult, as it waswith Einstein’s theory of relativity. To test a theory (oran integrated set of hypotheses), the primitives mustbe clearly defined and measured. Measurementrequires two things: a definition of what is to bemeasured (validity), and instruments capable ofmeasuring it consistently (reliability).

Progress Toward Understanding

Developing an understanding of the complexrelationships among information quality, knowledge,awareness, the degree to which information is shared,shared awareness, the nature of collaboration, andits effect on synchronization, and turning thisunderstanding into deployed military capability,requires an iterative process. At this point in time wehave a highly immature notion (concept or model) ofhow these primitives are interrelated and the natureof the effects they have on the accomplishment ofmilitary tasks. The existence of a set of primitives anda set of integrated hypotheses about the inter-relationships satisfies the minimum specifications fora conceptual framework or model. With the firstinstance of a model, we can now begin a process thatwill mature our model and with it our understanding,thereby enabling us to more systematically fieldimproved operational capabilities.

However, we cannot afford to wait until we develop afull understanding of how information and networkingcan be leveraged before fielding new and improvedmission capability packages for two reasons. The first

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is that we should take advantage of our existingunderstanding (however limited) to make significantlow-risk improvements. The second reason really goesto the heart of the scientific process. We will neverdevelop a complete understanding unless we learnfrom practical experience and empirical observation.Hence we need to field capabilities so that we canlearn to improve them. This is not a problem that canbe completely solved in a laboratory, but rather onethat will require a tremendous amount of interactionbetween theory and practice. Humans are central tothe problem, and we have no fully valid and reliablemodels that will allow us to forecast human andorganizational behaviors. Even if we had such models,the military arena is so complex and the number ofrelevant factors so large that we could not account forall of them in any set of models or simulations. Hence,we must find practical, empirical approaches in orderto advance understanding and turn ideas into usefulsystems and practices.

From Theory to Practice

The spiral shown in Figure 1 illustrates the effortsinvolved in getting one application of the theory intopractice. Just as the theory evolves iteratively as aresult of incorporating the learning from research andexperimental activities and feedback from applications,so each application of the theory should go through aspiral development process of its own.

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nderstanding Information A

ge Warfare

Figure 1. From Theory to Practice

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The application starts as a concept for a missioncapability package identifying the (a) concept for waythe operation will be conducted; (b) the command andcontrol approach to be employed; (c) the relevantorganization and doctrine, collaborative arrangements,and information flows; (d) the nature of the educationand training required; and (e) the specification of theforces and assets. The important thing to note is thatthis initial version of the concept is only a point ofdeparture for a series of discovery experiments thatwill help us explore ways to make the basic idea behindthe concept work.

Out of this series of discovery experiments will comea set of preliminary hypotheses that will serve as thedrivers for a series of experiments designed to testthem. Several series of experiments may be necessaryto sort out all of the issues involved. Ultimately, asuccessful concept (as modified and refined) may bedemonstrated. Along the way some concepts andprocesses will be eliminated. Others will be foundapplicable only under some circumstances.

Once the concept has been successfullydemonstrated, it is ready to be implemented. Theadvantage of this spiral process is that it serves tocoevolve each of the elements of the mission capabilitypackage so that these work together synergistically.

With this overview of the process that takes us fromtheory to practice in mind, we will now turn our attentionback to the beginning—the development of a languagewith which to construct a theory of InformationSuperiority and Network Centric Warfare.

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Organization of Book

This volume began with a discussion of the foundationsof understanding, which is followed by introductorymaterial on the language of Information Superiority andNetwork Centric Warfare. The book goes on to discussthe fundamental role of information in warfare, as wellas what is different in Information Age command, control,communications, and intelligence (C3I). The fundamentalconcepts of Information Superiority and Network CentricWarfare are explored next, followed by a discussion ofthe three domains where C3I occurs: the physicaldomain, the information domain, and the cognitivedomain. This is followed by consideration of the keyarenas of awareness, shared awareness, collaborativeplanning, and synchronized actions. Applications of thesetheories are discussed next, including summaries of keyportions of the accumulating body of evidence thatdemonstrate the importance and impact of InformationAge approaches. Finally, a brief assessment of the stateof the art and practice is used to introduce key ideasabout the way ahead—how we can move from a betterunderstanding of Information Age Warfare towards itseffective practice.

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CHAPTER 2

The Languageof Information

Age Warfare

The Language of InformationSuperiority and NetworkCentric Warfare

C reating a special language that allows us toexpress our ideas about Information Age Warfare

concepts in somewhat precise and unambiguousterms is a necessary prerequisite to useful discourseand meaningful exploration. For example, as we writethis, definitions of Information Superiority abound.Each one is an attempt to convey some importantaspect or facet of this complex concept. Thismultiplicity of definitions can be frustrating. There havebeen many calls for a definitive statement of whatInformation Superiority really means. We wouldsuggest that this is and needs to be a work in progress.The first order of business is to develop a usefullanguage that contains the basic ideas from which adeeper understanding of Information Superiority andNetwork Centric Warfare can be built. That is not tosay that we will refrain from offering our view of what

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Information Superiority means, expressed in thelanguage that we develop here, but that we considerthese definitions to be points of departure rather thanetched in stone.

In this section we introduce the domains that arecentral to an understanding of the nature and impactof information and a set of primitives that define thebuilding blocks from which an indepth understandingof Information Superiority and Network Centric Warfarecan be developed.

The Domains

To understand how information affects our ability toperform military operations it is necessary to thinkabout three domains—the physical domain, theinformation domain, and the cognitive domain.1

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hapter 2

Figure 2. The Domains

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The physical domain is the place where the situationthe military seeks to influence exists. It is the domainwhere strike, protect, and maneuver take place acrossthe environments of ground, sea, air, and space.2 It isthe domain where physical platforms and thecommunications networks that connect them reside.Comparatively, the elements of this domain are theeasiest to measure, and consequently, combat powerhas traditionally been measured primarily in thisdomain. In our analyses and models, the physicaldomain is characterized as reality, or ground truth.Important metrics for measuring combat power in thisdomain include lethality and survivability.

The information domain is where information lives. Itis the domain where information is created,manipulated, and shared. It is the domain thatfacilitates the communication of information amongwarfighters. It is the domain where the command andcontrol of modern military forces is communicated,where commander’s intent is conveyed.

The information that exists in the information domain mayor may not truly reflect ground truth. For example, a sensorobserves the real world and produces an output (data)which exists in the information domain. With the exceptionof direct sensory observation, all of our information aboutthe world comes through and is affected by our interactionwith the information domain. And it is through theinformation domain that we communicate with others(telepathy would be an exception).

Consequently, it is increasingly the information domainthat must be protected and defended to enable a forceto generate combat power in the face of offensiveactions taken by an adversary. And, in the all important

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battle for Information Superiority, the informationdomain is ground zero.

The cognitive domain is in the minds of the participants.This is the place where perceptions, awareness,understanding, beliefs, and values reside and where,as a result of sensemaking, decisions are made. Thisis the domain where many battles and wars areactually won and lost. This the domain of intangibles:leadership, morale, unit cohesion, level of training andexperience, situational awareness, and public opinion.This is the domain where an understanding ofcommander’s intent, doctrine, tactics, techniques, andprocedures reside. Much has been written about thisdomain, and key attributes of this domain haveremained relatively constant since Sun Tzu wrote TheArt of War. The attributes of this domain are extremelydifficult to measure, and each sub-domain (eachindividual mind) is unique.

Note that all of the contents of the cognitive domainpass through a filter or lens we have labeled humanperception. This filter consists of the individual’sworldview, the body of personal knowledge the personbrings to the situation, their experience, training, values,and individual capabilities (intelligence, personal style,perceptual capabilities, etc.). Since these humanperceptual lenses are unique to each individual, weknow that individual cognition (understandings, etc.) arealso unique. There is one reality, or physical domain.This is converted into selected data, information, andknowledge by the systems in the information domain.By training and shared experience we try to make thecognitive activities of military decisionmakers similar,but they nevertheless remain unique to each individual,with differences being more significant among

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Each of these primitives will be defined and depictedgraphically in relationship to the three domains. Thisdepiction is useful because it forces us to think aboutwhere (in which domain(s)) one must measure aparticular primitive.

Sensing

Two modes of sensing are portrayed in Figure 3: directsensing and indirect sensing.

Direct sensing takes place when humans experiencean object or event in the physical domain with one oftheir senses (such as seeing, hearing, or smelling),and the sensing registers directly in the cognitivedomain. Indirect sensing takes place when a sensorof some type is employed by a human to facilitatesensing some aspect of the physical domain.

individuals from different Services, generations, andcountries than they are among individuals from thesame unit or Service.

Primitives

We have identified a relatively small number ofprimitives that are needed to develop a theory of howinformation affects the performance of individuals andorganizations. These primitives are:

Sensing Awareness Decisions

Observations (data) Understanding Actions

Information Sharing Synchronization

Knowledge Collaboration

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Figure 3. Domain Relationships: Sensing

This figure portrays indirect sensing as being mappedfrom the physical domain onto the information domain,and passing through the information domain before itis filtered by human perception. Direct sensing isshown as a mapping from the physical domain directlyinto the cognitive domain.

For thousands of years, direct sensing was the primarymode of gathering information about the battlefield.Starting in the 17th century, direct sensing wasfacilitated by technology in the form of telescopes andfield glasses. In World War II, new sensors, in the formsof radio detection and ranging (radar), and sounddetection and ranging (sonar) were employed. Thesegreatly increased the ability to see the battlefield andreduce uncertainty with respect to the position ofairplanes and submarines which where virtuallyinvisible before. Today, we use a rich suite of sensors(night vision goggles, heat sensors, satellitetechnologies, etc.) to help us sense the battlespace.When technology is used to extract data, it forms part

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Figure 4. Domain Relationships: Information

Data is a representation of individual facts, concepts,or instructions in a manner suitable for communication,interpretation, or processing by humans or byautomatic means. Examples of data include radarreturns, sensor reports, and recorded observations.The term processed data is often used, though, in fact,all data is processed. When this term is used it is meantto imply additional processing. Note that information

of the information domain. An observation, or dataitem, is created. This data is perceived only after itpasses through the human filter and enters thecognitive domain.

Information

The word information is commonly used to refer tovarious points on the information spectrum from datato knowledge. However, as a primitive term,information is the result of putting individualobservations (sensor returns or data items) into somemeaningful context.

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is created whenever indirect sensing is used. As thefigure illustrates, some observations may be lost, leftinside the information domain, or filtered out by theperceptual lenses of individuals.

Knowledge

Knowledge involves conclusions drawn from patternssuggested by available information. Knowledge of thesituation results from conclusions that can be drawnfrom information about, for example, the types andlocations of battlespace entities.

Knowledge exists in both the information and thecognitive domains. Some knowledge is pre-existing.For example, doctrine is often a means of fittingtogether information about a situation and theappropriate or desired actions given that situation.Knowledge is accumulated in the cognitive domainas the result of learning and is stored in the informationdomain where it is potentially widely available.

Figure 5. Domain Relationships: Knowledge

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Knowledge can be loaded into the cognitive domainof an individual via several possible paths, including:

1. previous education, training, or experience

2. direct experience with the physical domain

3. interaction with other humans

4. interaction with the information domain

Knowledge can also be mapped from the cognitivedomain into the information domain, which occurswhen it is being transferred to other humans, asinstructions or rules to machines, or for storage andretrieval in computers.

Awareness

Awareness exists in the cognitive domain. Awarenessrelates to a situation and, as such, is the result of acomplex interaction between prior knowledge (andbeliefs) and current perceptions of reality. Eachindividual has a unique awareness of any given militarysituation. Here, again, professional education andtraining are used in an effort to ensure militarypersonnel with the same data, information, and currentknowledge will achieve similar awareness.

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Figure 6. Domain Relationships: Awareness

Understanding

Understanding involves having a sufficient level ofknowledge to be able to draw inferences about thepossible consequences of the situation, as well assufficient awareness of the situation to predict futurepatterns. Hence, situation awareness focuses on whatis known about past and present situations, whileunderstanding of a military situation focuses on whatthe situation is becoming (or can become) and howdifferent actions will impact the emerging situation.

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Figure 7. Domain Relationships: Understanding

Decisions

Decisions also take place in the cognitive domain.They are choices about what is to be done. Decisionsare acted upon and/or conveyed via the informationdomain for others to act upon, resulting in or influencingactions in the physical domain and/or other decisions.While they occur at all levels in the organization, theemphasis traditionally has been focused onheadquarters’ decisions. In order to adequatelyexplore Information Age concepts, we will need toexpand our view of decisions to include all those thatsignificantly affect battlefield outcomes. For example,orders may tell a force what to do, where to do it, andwhen to do it. A decision to assign a new mission tosubordinate forces may, in contrast, cause thatorganization to undertake new decision processes. Onthe other hand, subordinates may implement acommander’s intent (not explicit command decisions)by making a series of decisions.

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Figure 8. Domain Relationships: Decision

Although decisions are depicted here as a result of anunderstanding,3 decisions can obviously be madeabsent any understanding. However, such decisionswould essentially be random rather than purposeful andwould, therefore, be unlikely to prove effective in amilitary context. We assume here that militarycommanders and the forces they command (theindividuals we are concerned about) will always possesssome level of knowledge and some level of situationalawareness. Implicitly, therefore, they have situationalunderstanding and their decisions are purposeful.

Actions

Actions take place in the physical domain. They aretriggered by decisions in the cognitive domain thateither are directly translated into action or have beentransported through the information domain to others.This figure portrays an individual’s state of knowledgeas influencing the state of awareness, situationunderstanding, and the decisionmaking process. This

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diagram also highlights awareness of a specificsituation as an input to the decisionmaking process.

Figure 9. Domain Relationships: Action

Figure 10 portrays the observe-orient-decide-act(OODA) loop.4 Boyd developed and initially applied theconcept in an attempt to understand how a competitiveadvantage could be achieved by pilots engaged in air-to-air combat. Boyd’s initial application of the OODAloop was to a platform-centric warfighting environment,where he observed that the speed with which a pilotmoves through the OODA process can serve as asource of competitive advantage. He developed thisinsight by trying to understand all the factors thatcontributed to the 10-to-1 kill ratio that American pilotsflying F-86s were able to establish over their NorthKorean and Chinese adversaries flying MiG-15s.5 TheOODA is a sequential process and reflects neither theway experts are thought to make decisions, nor theway collaborative decisions are made.6

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Figure 10. Example: Entity OODA Loop

The OODA loop is most applicable for direct action,action which is taken by the decisionmaker. In fact, itis useful to make distinctions between different kindsof decisions. Simple decisions are those that involvea selection from a set of options with the simplest onesinvolving whether to act (e.g., shoot) or not. Complexdecisions involve the development of a set of options,the criteria for choosing among them, and thecombination of rules by which those criteria areintegrated. For example developing, assessing, andselecting courses of action at the Joint Task Forcelevel is generally a complex decision. This distinctionis important in understanding future C3I and how itmust be supported. It is developed in more detail later.

For many simple decisions the OODA loop is short-circuited because observations may be mapped directlyonto decision options. The application of network-centricconcepts changes both the topology of decisions anorganization makes and the kinds of decisions (simple

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Figure 11. Domain Relationships: Information Sharing

This diagram describes an interaction between entitieswhere information is exchanged. The concept ofsharing extends, or course, beyond two entities. Anynumber of entities may be involved and the form ofthe sharing can vary significantly. This theme is alsotreated in greater detail later.

or complex) that are made. Hence the term operatinginside the enemy OODA loop cannot be taken literallyas we move to replace sequential planning andexecution with more dynamic alternatives.

Information Sharing

The sharing of information is an interaction that cantake place between two or more entities in theinformation domain. These could be between humans,databases, or programs such as planning or fire controlapplications. The ability to share information is key tobeing able to develop a state of shared awareness, aswell as being able to collaborate and/or synchronize.

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When two or more people are located in closeproximity, information can be exchanged by voice viaface-to-face conversation. Other techniques thatemploy body movement, such as hand signals, canalso be employed. Body language can also be usedto communicate information, but it is easy to miss ormisunderstand these signals. In some cases, visualaids can also be used to enhance ideas or conceptsof communication.

When two or more people are geographicallyseparated, some type of technology must be employedto share information (e.g., telephone, e-mail, videoteleconferencing). Over time, various types and kindsof technologies have been developed to capture, store,and transmit information. As is discussed in detail later,information technology defines the boundaries andcapabilities of the information domain.

Shared Knowledge

Shared knowledge exists to some degree in all humanefforts to work together. However, the extent of thissharing varies dramatically. Training and doctrine havebeen employed throughout history to develop a highdegree of shared knowledge among troops so thatthey will understand and react to situations in apredictable way. This predictability is essential soindependent elements of a force can coordinate theiractions. It becomes vital when forces attempt tocoordinate their actions without communications orattempt self-synchronization.

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Figure 12. Domain Relationships: Shared Knowledge

The degree to which shared knowledge can bedeveloped has a significant influence on the nature ofcommand and control that can be employed, thenature and amount of communications that are neededto develop and maintain shared awareness, and theease and degree to which forces can be synchronized.

Shared Awareness

Shared awareness is a state that exists in the cognitivedomain when two or more entities are able to developa similar awareness of a situation. The degree ofsimilarity required (or difference tolerable) will dependon the type and degree of collaboration andsynchronization needed.

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Figure 13. Domain Relationships: Shared Awareness

Multiple factors influence the degree to which a stateof shared awareness can be developed between twoor more entities. These certainly include the degreeof shared information and knowledge, but are alsoheavily influenced by similarities and differences inworldview, culture, language, and perceived interests.Shared awareness is an important prerequisite for theability to synchronize actions in the physical domainin the absence of a detailed plan.

Measuring a state of shared awareness is morecomplex than measuring a state of shared information.It cannot be measured directly. Rather, it must bemeasured and assessed indirectly based on observablebehaviors and direct questioning of subjects.

Collaboration

Collaboration is a process that takes place betweentwo or more entities. Collaboration always impliesworking together toward a common purpose. Thisdistinguishes it from simply sharing data, information,

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knowledge, or awareness. It is also a process thattakes place in the cognitive domain. In Figure 14, thecollaboration process is represented as a dotted boxbetween two entities. Collaboration requires the abilityto share information. One of the key benefits of anetwork-centric environment is the ability to shareinformation and collaborate over distance.

Figure 14. Domain Relationships: Collaboration

Synchronization

Synchronization takes place in the physical domain(reality). Synchronization is the meaningful arrangementof things or effects in time and space. Suchsynchronization can be the result of detailed planningand conscious coordination or collaboration. However,it can also result from shared situational awarenessthat provides an adequate guideline for action. Thedetailed orchestration of Operation Overlord and otherAllied plans during World War II are excellent examplesof formal synchronization. The simple practice of“marching to the sound of the guns” in 19th centurywarfare is an example of guidelines that enabled

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commanders to support one another, or synchronizetheir actions, without detailed prior coordination.

Figure 15. Domain Relationships: Synchronization

Summary of Primitives

This completes the introduction of the set of primitivesfrom which the concepts that lie at the heart ofInformation Superiority and Network Centric Warfarecan be constructed. As noted earlier, this discussionmakes the language used in the rest of the volumeexplicit. The authors remain open to better ideas ormore useful definitions. In order to make theseprimitives useful, however, we need to explain moreabout them, particularly how they can be observedand measured. A discussion of metrics will set thestage for more detailed discussions about theprimitives and the relationships between them.

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Role of Metrics

Each of the primitives introduced in the previous chapterhas a set of attributes associated with it that help usmeasure its value (e.g., information quality) or the degreeto which it is realized (e.g., degree of synchronization).Each of these attributes represents a feature orcharacteristic that is important in understanding thenature, impacts, and/or value of information. Latency,for example, is an attribute of information.

A metric is a standard of measurement: measuringspecifically the dimensions, capacity, quantity, or othercharacteristic of an attribute so that comparisons can bemade. Hence, without a set of metrics associated withthe primitives, we do not have a standard means ofmeasuring and comparing their characteristics. Withouta standard way of measuring attributes of interest, wecannot link theory to practice. We would not be abletherefore to trace an effect back to a cause or set ofconditions necessary and sufficient to achieve an effect.

This describes the current state of affairs all too well.In the experiments that the community has run so far,a number of technical capabilities are introduced thatare hypothesized to have some effect on the wayindividuals and organizations behave, which in turn ishypothesized to impact performance positively. Theseexperiments are almost universally declaredsuccesses. However, because we were not able toinstrument them fully, we cannot know exactly whathappened or why. This greatly limits the usefulnessof these events and squanders opportunities tocontribute to our understanding of how information canbe effectively leveraged.

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Hierarchy of Measures

Figure 16 depicts the primitives in the context of ahierarchy of measures that can be employed tounderstand the Information Superiority/NetworkCentric Warfare value chain. Neither InformationSuperiority nor Network Centric Warfare are ends untothemselves. Their value depends upon the impact theyhave on military tasks and missions. This hierarchyconsists of four bands of measures: richness, reach,command and control (C2), and value. The measuresin each band address a key portion of the value chain.The first band, richness, contains measures thataddress the quality of the information content as itexists in both the information and cognitive domains.These measures, in effect, can be used to tell us ifthis is the right information. The second band, reach,contains measures that focus on the ability of anorganization to share information and develop sharedawareness. These measures assess whether or notwe are getting the information to the right people. Theyalso reflect how well individuals are being educatedand trained, the quality of information sharing, andthe collaborative processes designed to help developa common perception of the situation. The third band,command and control, measures the products of acommand and control process—the quality of thedecisions that are made and the synchronization thatis achieved. Finally, the fourth band provides measuresthat address the bottom line value of information-related capabilities; that is, the ability to accomplishmilitary missions and to use that military missioneffectiveness to achieve policy success.

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nderstanding Information A

ge Warfare

Figure 16. Hierarchy of Measures

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This hierarchy of measures is more comprehensivethan the measures that have been traditionally usedin C4ISR-related studies, analyses, and models. Thestate of the practice employs system performance and/or rudimentary measures of information quality thatare hypothesized to be directly linked to task andmission performance. No attempt is normally made toinstrument or parameterize the intermediate links inthe chain. Issues related to how information may beperceived, what prior knowledge might exist, and howinformation sharing affects the process are not usuallyaddressed. These are but a few of the many factorswhich affect the nature of the impact that informationhas on the battlespace. Without explicit considerationof all of the important links in the value chain, it isimpossible to state with any authority thecircumstances under which information is of value andwhen it is not. Further, no light is shed on the weaklink in the value chain. In point of fact the hypothesisthat higher quality information will improve taskperformance is, in reality, a set of linkage hypothesesthat trace the effects and impacts of information qualitya link at a time through the hierarchy in Figure 16.Developing an understanding of Information AgeWarfare depends upon our ability to trace information-related impacts and relate them to measures of value.This hierarchy provides a point of departure for effortsdesigned to do just this.

The value of information is, as was pointed out earlier,highly dependent upon its application andcircumstances. The search to understand the valueof information to warfighters would therefore be greatlyaided if we had an appreciation of the role that

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information has played in warfare and could play inthe future. This is the subject of the next chapter.

1John J. Garstka, “Network Centric Warfare: An Overview ofEmerging Theory,” PHALANX (December 2000).2Mark Herman, Measuring the Effects of Network-CentricWarfare, Vol. 1, technical report prepared for the Director of NetAssessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense (McLean, VA:Booz Allen & Hamilton, April 28, 1999).3Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).4Col. John R. Boyd, USAF, Patterns of Conflict (UnpublishedLecture, 1977). Col. John R. Boyd, USAF, “A Discourse onWinning and Losing.” A collection of unpublished briefings andessays (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Library, 1976-1992).http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/boyd/essence/eowl_frameset.htm (January 1996).5Franklin C. Spinney, “Genghis John,” Proceedings of the U.S.Naval Institute (July 1997), pp. 42-47.6Gary Klein, Sources of Power (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).

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CHAPTER 3

Informationin Warfare

Information in War: Valueof Knowledge

Information has been at the core of military operationsthrough the ages. Throughout history, military leaders

have recognized the key role of information as acontributor to victory on the battlefield. Commandershave always sought—and sometimes gained—adecisive information advantage over their adversaries.The writings of both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz reflectthe key role of information in warfare. Sun Tzu, writing2,500 years ago, emphasized the importance ofknowledge in war.

Figure 17. Information War: Value of Knowledge

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Figure 18. Carl von Clausewitz

The general unreliability of allinformation presents a special problem:all action takes place, so to speak, in akind of twilight,…like fog. War is therealm of uncertainty; three quarters ofthe factors on which action in war isbased are wrapped in a fog of greateror lessor uncertainty…The commandermust work in a medium which his eyescannot see, which his best deductivepowers cannot always fathom; andwhich, because of constant changes, hecan rarely be familiar.

—From Carl von Clausewitz’s On War

As a result of this enduring characteristic of war,military organizations have, for centuries, beendesigned to accommodate the lack of availableinformation, that is, how to deal with the fog of war.Fog is all about uncertainty. Uncertainty about whereeveryone is, what their capabilities are, and the nature

The writings of Carl von Clausewitz are famous fortheir articulation of the fog and friction of war.

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of their intentions. Until recently a commander couldnot even have a timely and accurate picture of hisown forces let alone be comfortable in his knowledgeof where the enemy was and what they were up to.

Friction is all about the glitches that occur in carryingout plans to synchronize forces or even to accomplishthe most simple tasks. Some of this friction can beattributed to fog, some to poor communications, andsome to a lack of shared knowledge.

To compound the problem, decisionmaking in warcarries with it an extremely high cost of error.Therefore, it is not surprising that military concepts ofoperation, organizations, doctrine, and training havealways been preoccupied with reducing the effects andrisks associated with fog and friction.

Taken together, these enduring characteristics of warhave shaped our traditions, our military culture, andour thinking. Departure from these norms will bedifficult and will require a high degree of proof that thenew way is not only better, but is also robust.

Recent advances in technology offer an opportunityto reduce fog and friction. However, despite all of theadvances that have and will likely be made, significantresidual fog and friction will persist. The nature of thisresidual uncertainly is, as yet, unclear and itsimplications are not fully understood. Nevertheless,there is an historic opportunity to reconsider how bestto deal with the fog and friction that will persist, andthis is likely to have profound implications for militaryoperations and organizations.

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Figure 19. Impact of Fog and Friction on Effectiveness

The Information Age gives us an opportunity to moveinto the white area. We must recognize that there is alimit to our ability to reduce the fog and friction of warand that in many cases it may not even be possible.We have witnessed the complexity of 21st centurymissions in Somalia and Bosnia as well as ourlimitations in being able to collect, process, anddistribute needed information for allied air attacks onBelgrade during Operation Allied Force.

Hence, our goal in examining the role of informationin warfare is to better understand not only how to create

Impact of Fog and Friction

Figure 19 illustrates the relationship between theamount of fog and friction and the level ofsynchronization that is likely to be achieved in militaryoperations, which is directly related to effectiveness.For almost all of recorded history, we have operatedin various parts of the shaded area depicted in Figure19, trying to avoid the worst parts of this space (thelower right).

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and leverage an information advantage, but also howto better deal with the residual uncertainty that willsurely exist.

Visionaries who have proclaimed that we will havetotal awareness or that we will eliminate the fog ofwar are indeed false prophets—and dangerous onesat that. This is not only for the obvious reason thatthey could lead some down an unproductive road, butperhaps more importantly, they are poisoning the wellfor ideas to capitalize on emerging information andnetworking capabilities that will provide realopportunities to improve our military effectiveness.

Coping with Fog and Friction

As a direct result of the considerable uncertainty, thelimits on our ability to effectively communicate on thebattlefield, and the very high cost of error, informationflows have historically been tied to the commandstructure and battlefield behaviors were consciouslycircumscribed and scripted.

Commanders traditionally have dealt with uncertaintythrough approaches that minimized risks, most notablythe risk of being surprised. Success often came to theside that made the least errors, not the side that wasimaginative or bold. However, the price for hedgingagainst fog and friction have been high because thesesolutions carry some significant drawbacks. They lackthe ability to exploit opportunities, lack responsiveness,and cannot easily adapt to changing circumstances. Theyare also highly resource inefficient. In short, thesetraditional adaptations are 180 degrees out of phase withthe desirable attributes of an Information Age military.

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Advances in the InformationDomain

For the better part of history information processingtook place only within the brain and communicationswere limited to runner, rider, semaphore, drums, orcarrier pigeon.

Until recent times, the capability to collect, record, store,process, and disseminate information was extremelylimited. Note the relatively similar capabilities thatexisted in the times of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz incontrast with the dramatically different situation thatexists today. The comparative lack of informationtechnology in Sun Tzu’s and Clausewitz’s times limitedthe ability of commanders to know what was going onand their ability to communicate and collaborate withtheir subordinates. These limitations affected the waysin which militaries were able to operate. Even thoughmany advances have taken place, particularly since theintroduction of the telegraph in the 19th century, ourability to collect, process, and disseminate informationcontinues to constrain how we operate today.

Figure 20. Advances in the Information Capabilities

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In the section on command and control we explorethe various ways forces have organized, the mannerin which command and control has been exercised,and the relationships among organization, commandand control, and information and communicationstechnologies. Here we will very briefly review thenature of the advances in information-relatedtechnologies, the most significant of which, arguablythose related to the Internet, have taken place only inthe last 10 years.

Information and theAdvantage in Warfare

The chronicles of warfare are replete with examplesof victory being denied to the side with the presumedcompetitive advantage. Analyses of these situationsshows that the presumed victor was usually the sidewith the relative force advantage; that is, an advantagein the physical domain (e.g., numbers, equipment).The causes of these upsets form the basis for muchof military education. A contemporary student ofwarfare knows that these upsets were not upsets atall but the result of a failure to recognize thatcompetitive advantage is not necessarily equivalentto force advantage.

A competitive advantage derives from a synthesis ofa critical mass of relative advantages in severalarenas: information, knowledge, understanding,decisionmaking (command and control), which areaddressed in this book and other arenas includingmorale and leadership which have been treatedextensively elsewhere. A failure to achieve a relativeadvantage in any one of these areas or a failure to

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synthesize these relative advantages into a coherentoperation exposes one to failure. In these terms, suchhistoric upsets usually resulted from the underdoghaving a relative advantage in at least one of thearenas enumerated above and/or a failure of thefavorite to develop and execute a concept ofoperations that accommodated for this particular lackof a relative advantage.

To give them the credit they deserve, both Sun Tzu(importance of knowing) and Clausewitz (fog) identifiedthe existence of relative advantages in the informationand cognitive domains. However, these ideas haveyet to be regularly factored into many net assessmentsthat compare two sides. The emphases of theseassessments unfortunately remain focused on forcestructure. With the increasing importance ofInformation Superiority as a fundamental enabler ofemerging operational concepts (e.g., Joint Vision2020), it is hoped that more attention will be focusedon the arenas identified here in the information andcognitive domains. Exactly what we mean by relativeadvantage is described and illustrated in the followingsections, beginning with a description of the conceptof a relative information advantage.

Understanding that competitive advantage is thesynthesis of a number of relative advantages leads toa recognition of the importance of the development ofmission capability packages that properly balance andintegrate capabilities from all of the domains.

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Key Capabilities for a 21stCentury Military

As we prepare for an uncertain future, and as we continueto undertake the kind of missions that defined militaryoperations in the final decade of the 20th century, weneed to develop exactly the kind of qualities that (1) areenabled by improved information and communicationstechnologies and (2) have been lacking in traditionalconcepts of operation, military organizations, andapproaches to command and control.

We increasingly need to be highly responsive,adaptable, flexible, and precise in our application offorce. The fog and friction of war may be significantlyreduced but they will never go away. They will continueto be enemy number one. Learning how we can reducethem where possible and how to deal with themeffectively if necessary is the fundamental challengeof Information Age Warfare.

The stakes are high, and we must find a way to balancetwo critical risks—the risks associated with abandoningtried-and-true methods of dealing with the fog andfriction of war without thoroughly understanding thenew ways of doing business and the risks associatedwith failing to attain the capabilities that the new waysof doing business provide. If history is a guide, we willerr on the side of not embracing the new ways of doingbusiness rapidly enough. Only time will tell what thetrue cost of this error will be.

Given this institutional inclination our only hope lies intrying to accelerate progress toward a betterunderstanding and acceptance of what we can do with

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the incredible capabilities that the Information Age isgiving to us.

What’s Different?

In order to put the Information Age into focus it isnecessary to identify those things that are (or soonwill be) different. This section addresses technologicalcapabilities, the economics of information andcommunications, emerging concepts that are designedto leverage information, and the pace of change.These are the key attributes that distinguish theInformation Age from previous eras.

Information Age Technologies

Technological advances in recent years have vastlyincreased our capability to collect, process, disseminate,and utilize information. Airborne and space-basedsensors are, for example, capable of providing real-time pictures of increasing dimensionality (hyper-spectral) and resolution. Perhaps the most significantadvances have come in the technologies related to thedistribution of information. Our ability to broadcastinformation, distribute it to a large audience, or to deliverit in a more focused manner (narrowcast), even toindividuals on the go, has dramatically increased.However, despite considerable advances in our abilityto process information, these advances have not beenrapid enough to keep pace with the increases incollection. Humans are still required to make sense ofwhat is collected. That will remain the case for sometimeto come. However, help is on the way. Technologicaladvances in pattern recognition, analysis tools, andvisualization techniques are making it increasingly

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easier for humans to increase their throughput as wellas their ability to extract what they need from theavailable data and information. We can expectcontinuing advances, perhaps even at acceleratingrates. This, in effect, will give us sooner rather thanlater the ability to provide access to useful informationon almost any subject, anywhere, anytime.

Of perhaps even more importance, technology is bridgingdistances and providing the capability for individuals tobe able to interact with each other in increasinglysophisticated ways, making it easier for individuals andorganizations to share information, to collaborate ontasks, and to synchronize actions or effects.

But technological advances alone do not define theInformation Age. Of ultimate importance is what isbeing done with these newly provided technicalcapabilities. That is, enabling individuals andorganizations to create value in new ways. Of mostimmediate interest to the conduct of warfare are newconcepts of organization. These new organizationalforms involve changes in the way authority is exercisedand the way that control is maintained. In numerousinstances these new organizational forms haveoutperformed their more traditional competitors. Oneof the features of these new organizational forms thatis of great interest to military organizations is theirincreased ability to adapt to a dynamic environment.Of equal importance is the virtual nature of theseorganizations that gives them the ability to beassembled rapidly, to minimize travel (to moveinformation—not people), and to compress time bybeing able to effectively maintain 24-hours-per-day,7-days-per-week (24 X 7) operations.

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Richness and Reach

The explosion of information and communicationstechnologies has dramatically altered the economicsof information. In Blown to Bits, Evans and Wursterintroduced the concepts of information richness andreach to explain how the Internet has changed theeconomics of information.1 They defined informationrichness as an aggregate measure of the quality ofinformation and information reach as an aggregatemeasure of the degree that information is shared.Historically, one was forced to choose between a richinformation exchange with very limited reach (e.g.,face-to-face discussion aided by graphics, maps) or arestricted information exchange that had a wider reach(e.g., memos, dispatch).

This choice was forced because in the past theeconomics of information dictated an inverserelationship between the richness of the informationthat could be exchanged and the number of individualsit could be exchanged with. This inverse relationshipcan be described by a tradeoff as illustrated in Figure21 showing the boundary between Industrial Age andInformation Age possibilities. The key variables thatinfluence the shape and location of this curve are thestate-of-the-art information technology and itsunderlying economics.

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Figure 21. The Information Domain

As individuals and organizations have become betterable to extend their reach, they have begun to focuson the quality of reach as well as simply the quantitativeaspects of reach. The quality of interaction hastherefore been added to the richness/reach constructin Figure 22. It has only been within the last decade orso that individuals and organizations have been ableto provide all three—high quality information easilydisseminated to those who need it in a way thatfacilitates the exchange. To illustrate progress in thequality of interaction, consider the nature of theexchanges in military operations that take placebetween and among battlespace entities. As the stateof the art in information technology advanced, militarycommunications progressed from runners to smokesignals and signal flags to telegraph to radio totelephone to video teleconferencing to a fullyfunctioning collaborative work environment.

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Figure 22. Richness, Reach, and Quality of Interaction

Information Age Opportunities

Being able to move into a new part of the threedimensional space depicted in Figure 22 providesmilitary organizations with an opportunity to significantlyimprove the key links in the value chain that linkinformation technology to mission effectiveness. Theopportunity now exists for a military organization tomake enormous gains in its ability to share information(extend reach). This is because technology now enablesorganizations to distribute and share information withoutsignificantly degrading its richness. Improvements inthe ability to share information will contribute toimprovements in the ability to generate and maintainshared awareness which in turn, together with thegreatly enhanced facilities to collaborate (quality ofinteraction), will contribute to improved synchronization.Thus, advances in the information domain that resultfrom an improved ability to push the envelope in therichness, reach, and interaction space will affectprocesses in the cognitive domain which in turn will bereflected in the physical domain in the form of

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responsiveness, adaptability, agility, and flexibility.These competencies will provide a source of competitiveadvantage in the Information Age.

Accommodating Change by Coevolution

It is not only the new capabilities and concepts thataccompany the Information Age that are different, butalso the nature of the technology itself and the everincreasing rate of change that make our times verydifferent. The discomfort associated with the natureof the changes combined with the incredibly rapid paceof change and the very high cost of error associatedwith decisions that involve our national security createa formidable set of challenges. The usual bureaucraticreaction is paralysis. In these circumstances, however,this reaction only puts us further behind and makes itmore difficult to respond to the national securitychallenges ahead.

Both blitzkrieg and carrier aviation can and should beviewed as disruptive innovations because over timethey first threatened and then disrupted the establishedvalues and processes of their respective organizations.In the case of the German Army, it was the infantrythat was threatened and disrupted. In the case of theU.S. Navy, it was the battleship admirals.

As will become clear in the sections that follow,Network Centric Warfare can and should be viewedas a disruptive innovation. Key aspects and attributesof Network Centric Warfare are fundamentallydisruptive in nature. For example, information sharingand collaboration disrupt existing organizationaldecisionmaking processes, authorities, and values.

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Allocating resources to networks threatens existingplatform-centric power structures. If existing platformsand their associated tactics, techniques, andprocedures were clearly decisive in Operation DesertShield, Desert Storm, why should Network CentricWarfare be relevant? In the present absence of a peercompetitor, the compelling rationale for pursuingdisruptive innovation in the form of Network CentricWarfare may be lacking.

Since the beginning of the Information Age,commanders have been concerned about howinformation technologies would affect information flowon the battlefield. A look at The UnintendedConsequences of Information Age Technologies,2

(requested by General John Shalikashvili, a formerChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) concluded thatchanges in the flow of information could bedysfunctional if these changes were not alsoaccompanied by changes to concepts of operation,doctrine, organization, command concepts, training,and other elements of a mission capability package.

The solution lies in the concept of coevolution ofmission capability packages. A mission capabilitypackage consists of a concept of operations and anapproach to command and control, along with tailoredorganization, doctrine, education and training,systems, and material (including weapons andplatforms).3 4 This concept works because it explicitlyencourages and facilitates tuning all of the elementsnecessary to develop and deploy an operationalconcept designed to leverage new capabilities.Information Age technologies and the innovations theyenable are disruptive because they require that key

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elements of a mission capability package change inorder to reap the benefits that the new capability canprovide. Command concepts and organizational formshave, in the past, proven to be very resistant to change,yet it is critical that they adapt if information is to befully leveraged. Thinking about mission capabilitypackages rather than technology insertion causes usto focus on the need for change to take placesimultaneously in a number of dimensions.Coevolution dramatically reduces the time it takes todevelop and field integrated solutions and allows fora continuing process that is better able to keep pacewith the changes that are taking place.

1Phillip B. Evans and Thomas S. Wurster, “Strategy and the NewEconomics of Information,” Harvard Business Review(September-October 1997).2David S. Alberts, The Unintended Consequences of InformationAge Technologies: Avoiding the Pitfalls, Seizing the Initiative(Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996).3David S. Alberts, John J. Garstka, Frederick P. Stein,“Implications for MCPs,” Network Centric Warfare: Developingand Leveraging Information Superiority, 2nd Edition (Revised)(Washington, DC: CCRP Publication Series, 1999).4INSS Strategic Forum, Number 14, January 1995, http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/z1405.html

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CHAPTER 4

Fundamentalsof Information

Superiority andNetwork

Centric Warfare

This chapter provides definitions of InformationSuperiority (IS) and Network Centric Warfare

(NCW) to serve as a point of departure for a moredetailed understanding of these concepts. Thesedefinitions are meant to provide the reader with ageneral sense of these concepts in preparation for adetailed discussion of each of the key conceptsassociated with these terms and the relationshipsbetween Information Superiority and Network CentricWarfare and between Network Centric Warfare andmission effectiveness.

Fundamentals of InformationSuperiority

Information Superiority is a state of imbalance in one’sfavor (relative advantage) in the information domain1

that is achieved by being able to get the right

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information to the right people at the right time in theright form while denying an adversary the ability to dothe same.2 This way of thinking about InformationSuperiority combines a specific outcome associatedwith Information Superiority and the method that isused to achieve it.

Information Superiority derives from the ability to createa relative information advantage vis-à-vis anadversary. The concept of an information advantageis not new. Commanders have always sought—andsometimes gained—a decisive information advantageover their adversaries. Indeed surprise, one of theimmutable principles of war, can be viewed as a typeof information advantage that one force is able toestablish over another.

Information Advantage

Some have mistakenly thought of an informationadvantage simply in terms of the information andcommunications capabilities that one force has incomparison to an adversary. This idea leads to anover emphasis on information processes—collection,analysis, dissemination, and so forth. But this is notwhat information advantage is all about. Rather, it isimportant to assess a force’s information capabilitiesrelative to their needs. Concepts of operation;command approaches; organizational forms; doctrine;tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs); rules ofengagement (ROEs); level of education and training;and the characteristics of weapons systems (takentogether these all form a mission capability package)determine a force’s information-related needs. Theability of a force to successfully carry out a military

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operation depends in large part on the degree to whichits information needs are met.

Information needs can vary considerably. Throughouthistory military organizations, doctrine, commandconcepts, and tactics, techniques, procedures (TTPs)were designed to minimize the amount of informationand communications required because capabilities inthese areas were very limited. The information-relatedcapabilities we currently have allow us to developmission capability packages that can take advantageof our advanced information capabilities, but do notforce our adversaries to mirror us in this regard.Therefore, there is no information gap or informationarms race that we can force on an opponent.Consequently we will face adversaries whoseinformation-related needs will be asymmetrical to ours.What will matter is which force does a better jobsatisfying their respective information needs, not whichside has better information-related capabilities. Thusthe advantage is determined by comparing each side’sinformation capabilities relative to their needs.

Simply minimizing one’s information-related needs is,however, not a winning strategy. However, matchingconcepts of operations to information-relatedcapabilities is a prerequisite for success. Advantagesaccrue to organizations that successfully master theart of creating and leveraging an informationadvantage. Using Information Age technologies,organizations can put Information Age concepts towork moving information rather than people,conducting distributed operations, and substitutinginformation for mass. The key is to find the rightbalance in which information-related capabilities are

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matched with a concept of operations, organization,approach to command and control, and the capabilitiesof the people and the weapons systems.

An information advantage can:

• Be persistent or it can be transitory.

• Exist in some areas of the battlespace but notothers.

• Be measured in the context of a task or set oftasks.

• Be created by taking actions to reduce ourinformation needs and /or increase theinformation needs of an adversary.

• Be achieved through the synergistic conduct ofinformation operations, information assurance,and information gain and exploitation.3

There is historic precedence of the impact that thepossession of relative information advantage can havein warfare. During World War II, a key contributor tothe success of Operation Overlord, the Allied invasionof Europe in June of 1944, was the ability of Alliedforces to establish and maintain an informationadvantage at the operational level of war. The abilityof the Allied intelligence apparatus to break Germancodes and keep Allied codes secure gave Senior AlliedCommanders confidence that the vast deceptionoperation that had preceded Operation Overlord hadsucceeded.4 Furthermore, at the time of the invasion,Allied forces were aware of the geographic positionsof all but 2 of the 40-plus divisions of German ArmyGroups B and G.5 6 This significant informationadvantage, combined with aggressive deception

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operations, enabled Allied Forces to achieve surpriseand a decisive force advantage on the beaches atNormandy and the surrounding countryside.7

Nevertheless, at the tactical level, there were severalinstances during the invasion where Allied forces didnot have an information advantage, landing craftattacked the wrong beaches, paratroopers from the82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions were dropped (orlanded) in the wrong places, and attack aircraftbombed the wrong targets.8

Fundamentals of Network Centric Warfare

Network Centric Warfare is warfare. To understandwhat is different about Network Centric Warfare onehas to simultaneously focus on the three domains ofwarfare and the interactions among them. NetworkCentric Warfare involves networking in all threedomains. In its fully mature form, Network CentricWarfare possesses the following characteristics:

Physical Domain:

All elements of the force are robustly networked achievingsecure and seamless connectivity and interoperability.

Information Domain:

The force has the capability to share, access, andprotect information to a degree that it can establish andmaintain an information advantage over an adversary.

The force has the capability to collaborate in theinformation domain, which enables a force to improveits information position through processes ofcorrelation, fusion, and analysis.

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Cognitive Domain:

The force has the capability to develop high qualityawareness and share this awareness.

The force has the capability to develop a sharedunderstanding including commanders’ intent.

The force has its capability to self-synchronize its operations.

In addition, the force must be able to conduct informationoperations across these domains to achievesynchronized effects in each of these domains.

The central hypothesis of Network Centric Warfare isthat a force with these attributes and capabilities willbe able to generate increased combat power by:

• Better synchronizing effects in the battlespace;

• Achieving greater speed of command; and

• Increasing lethality, survivability, andresponsiveness.

To date, thinking about and experimenting withNetwork Centric Warfare concepts has tended to focuson the tactical and operational levels of warfare, butthey are applicable to not only all levels of warfare butto all types of military activity from the tactical to thestrategic. When network-centric concepts are appliedto operations other than war, we use the term network-centric operations. At the operational level, network-centric operations provide commanders with thecapability to generate precise warfighting effects atan unprecedented operational tempo, creatingconditions for the rapid lockout of adversary coursesof action.

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Network Centric Warfare concepts dramaticallyimprove a force’s ability to quickly, efficiently, andeffectively bring to bear all of its available assets toaccomplish assigned missions. These improvedwarfighting capabilities result in part from the ability ofa force to achieve a high degree of integration acrossa number of dimensions, the ability to substituteinformation for mass, and the ability to moveinformation instead of moving people and material.Network Centric Warfare allows forces to adapt morequickly to a dynamic environment.

Network Centric Warfare Hypotheses

The fundamental characteristics of Network CentricWarfare can be described with a set of integratedhypotheses that can be systematically tested inwarfighting experiments. These hypotheses can beorganized into three classes.

Hypotheses of the first class deal with the relationshipsamong information sharing, improved awareness, andshared awareness.

Hypotheses in the second class include those thatinvolve the relationship between shared awarenessand synchronization. For example, the effect ofdifferent degrees of shared awareness or collaborationon synchronization.

The third class of hypotheses involves the link betweensynchronization and mission effectiveness.

While at a high level of abstraction these NetworkCentric Warfare-related hypotheses may seemobvious—for example, that improved sharing ofinformation will result in more shared awareness—

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there are a host of specifics that need to be betterunderstood before Network Centric Warfare conceptscan be translated into real operational capabilities. Forexample, it is important to understand:

1. The specific conditions under which the shared information—shared awareness hypothesis is true;

2. The shape of the transfer function between information sharing and shared awareness;

3. The variables that influence this relationship (e.g., nature of the information exchange, quality of the information, degree of shared knowledge among the participants);

4. Barriers—such as information overload—that prevent shared information from becoming shared awareness; and

5. Approaches for overcoming these barriers.

Value Creation

Information Superiority and Network Centric Warfareconcepts enable warfighters to create value (combatpower) from information. This is nothing new. However,the information environment in which today’sorganizations operate is markedly different than it wasjust a few years ago. The richness and reach constructdeveloped by Evans and Wurster provides a relativelystraightforward approach for understanding the natureof the information environment and its relationship tothe ability to create value.9 As described in the previouschapter, this approach (at a high level of abstraction)describes the information environment as a two

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dimensional space with one axis being informationrichness (what we would call the quality of information)and the other axis being information reach (part ofwhat we mean by information sharing). They arguethat value is a function of both richness and reach.

Figure 23. Value Creation

They observe that in the past information environmentsrequired tradeoffs between richness and reach (thetraditional trade envelope) and that only recently havewe been able to simultaneously get more of both—and by doing so are able to move to a new part of theinformation environment space (the part of the spacein Figure 23 that is called the new competitive space).

Organizations that have learned to operate successfullyin this new portion of the information environment have,in fact, been able to create an information advantageand turn it into a competitive advantage.

Value and Networks

A clear analogy can be drawn between ongoingdevelopments in the “dot.com” space (the domain of

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commerce) and the emergence of Network CentricWarfare (the domain of warfare). Both seek to exploitthe power of the network, which has rendered thetraditional trade envelope a relic of the early phase ofthe Information Age. To first order, networks enablenew approaches for creating value by changing theeconomics of information that govern the costs ofreach by which a fixed level of information richnesscan be accessed or shared. However, in both domains,key relationships between information and value arenot immediately obvious. As will be discussed later inthis section, much of the trial and error that has takenplace in the “dot.com” space to date has revolvedaround trying to figure how to create sustainablebusiness models that leverage the new economics ofinformation to create value.

In network-centric operations, the power of the networkis manifested in the following ways, some of which donot, as yet, appear to have direct commercial analogies.

1. Increasing Richness through Increased Reach: Networks enable information richness to be increased by enabling information from multiple sources to be shared, correlated, fused, and accessed.

2. Increased Shared Awareness: Networks contribute to the generation of shared awareness by enabling richness to be shared.

3. Improved Collaboration: Networks enable information sharing which transforms shared awareness into collaborative planning and synchronized actions that create a competitive advantage.

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Network Attributes

Different networks and related services can becompared using the diagram depicted in Figure 24.The circle is divided into three regions—one forrichness, one for reach (including quality of interaction),and one for value. Attributes of richness, reach, andvalue are represented by radii.

Figure 24. Network Attributes

Network Comparison

The richness and reach attributes of two networks,the voice network (the telephone system) and theInternet (which is, in fact, a value-added network ridingon top of a phone-like network) are compared in Figure25 (this type of diagram is sometimes referred to as a“Kiveat Diagram”). Note that the two richness andreach profiles do not overlap completely. One cannotsay which is better or which creates more value withouta specification of the attributes of value associatedwith a given individual or organization and with a giventask to be performed or decision to be made. For many

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situations and tasks, the telephone system providesthe right mix of richness and reach. Similarly, in othersituations and tasks, the richness and reach providedby the Internet can provide increased value.

Figure 25. Network Comparison

Comparing Business Models

The information positions of Borders, a brick andmortar company, and Amazon.com, an e-business,are portrayed in Figure 26. Note that, to first order,Amazon.com achieves both greater informationrichness and reach. The value propositions of thesetwo companies are compared in Figure 27. This figureportrays key relationships among richness, reach, andvalue. Each value proposition has dominant attributes.For example, consider a customer decision topurchase a book. If a customer wants to browse abook before purchasing (a type of richness), thenbricks and mortar wins hands down. If a customer isinterested in reading customer reviews of a book, thenonline dominates. If there is some sense of urgency

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associated with the purchase (e.g., an upcomingbirthday party), then bricks and mortar dominates. Ifselection is important, then online provides a keyadvantage. The largest bricks and mortar bookstoresstock approximately 300,000 books, while the largeronline stores have a selection of over 6 million. If costis an issue, than online may or may not have theadvantage. If total time spent on the transaction (minusdelivery) is important, than online dominates. Whentime for wrapping and mailing are factored in, thenonline can be even more compelling. From thisanalysis, it is clear that the decision that a customermakes with respect to where to purchase a book is afunction of their individual preferences (weight that thecustomer places on specific attributes).

Figure 26. Commercial Example

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Figure 27. Comparing Business Models

Military Value Chain

The approach for describing the relationship betweenrichness, reach, and value in the commercial sectorcan be applied to describe key relationships in themilitary value chain. Figure 28 portrays keyrelationships in the military value chain. In this diagram,richness and reach are used to describe-an informationadvantage, command and control is represented withquality of interaction, and combat power is the valuemetric. This graphical technique enables multi-dimensional relationships between the informationdomain, the cognitive domain, and the physical domainto be visualized.

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Figure 28. Military Value Chain

An advantage in the information domain can bedescribed using the attributes of richness and reach.An advantage in the cognitive domain can bedescribed using the attributes of increased awarenessand shared awareness. Both of these attributes areimportant because particular innovation may onlyincrease the quality of awareness or only share apreviously achieved level of awareness. Someinnovations may, in fact, affect both either positivelyor negatively. Command and control is, among otherthings, concerned with communicating the nature ofthe mission and circumstances with others. Thedegree to which members of the force can shareinformation is related to the degree of interoperabilitythat exists, while the manner in which they operate isrelated to the degree of collaboration. Figure 28provides a number of attributes associated with combatpower. These attributes are logically arranged fromright to left as the degree of synchronization may berelated to the operational tempo that can be achieved,

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which in turn may affect lethality and survivability whichmay be related to the time required to achieve themission. The attributes for combat power that areselected will depend upon the situation.

Comparing Warfighting Models

An idealized network-centric warfighting model iscompared with a platform-centric model in Figure 29.Because of the increased access to information thata network-centric model provides to battlespaceentities, those entities can have both better informationand an improved ability to generate shared awarenessthan a platform-centric model, which restricts the flowof information. A network-centric model can alsoachieve higher levels of interoperability andcollaboration. As a result, the network-centric modelcan do a better job of synchronizing actions. This inturn makes it possible to achieve increasedOPTEMPO, survivability, and lethality as well asreducing the time required for missionaccomplishment. While Figure 29 is a notional view,these assertions (testable hypotheses) are fullysupported by the emerging evidence which isdiscussed later in this volume.

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Figure 29. Comparing Warfighting Models

Figure 30 depicts an improved information position thatis made possible by improvements in both richness andreach enabled by networking the force. Thus, thenetworked force has access to a region of theinformation domain that was previously unattainable.

Figure 30. Networking the Force

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The relative locations in the information domaindetermine the nature of the advantage. In this examplethe gains in richness and reach are presumed to beroughly proportional, though there is no reason tobelieve that the impact of a particular innovation willbe symmetric. Many of the similar improvements(changes in communications technologies) are largelyimprovements in reach or the quality of interactions.Others provide greater richness. Building informationadvantages will often require conscious choices aboutthe balance among these factors.

Figure 31. Networking the Force (con.)

One key difference between the alternative warfightingmodels is depicted in Figure 32. The difference(represented by the upper left hand quadrant of thecircle in Figure 29) is in the quality of awareness andthe ability to share it—the richness and rich dimensionsin the information and cognitive domain. This can onlybe achieved by robustly networking the force.

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Figure 32. Platform vs. Network-Centric Awareness

New Mental Model

A network-centric concept of warfighting is not simplyan improvement or extension of a platform-centricmodel, but involves a new way of thinking aboutmilitary operations—a new mental model—as depictedin Figure 33. This new mental model is focused uponsharing and collaboration to create increasedawareness, shared awareness, enabling collaboration,and, as a result, improved synchronization. This modelmodifies the existing linear, sequential model in whichinformation is collected, processed, and provided to adecisionmaker for decision and then action. The newmental model serves to integrate military operationsand provides an opportunity to employ new, moreresponsive approaches to command and control.

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Figure 33. New Mental Model

Domain Interactions

A great deal of attention has been focused upon thesemantics of information, information advantage, andInformation Superiority. Until the defense communityreaches a consensus on a common language, it will beincreasingly burdened by the need to define terms andthe promulgation of insights that are not really insightsat all but are a result of differences in semantics. Figure33, New Mental Model, utilizes terms from differentdomains. That is because it is designed to make thepoint that, in the final analysis, military operations areabout trying to achieve effects in cognitive domain ofan adversary (e.g., surrender, cease hostilities). Toachieve this, synchronization must take place in thephysical domain (potentially in the information domainas well, in the case of information operations) to createeffects in the battlespace. In order to achieve this, wemust first achieve effects in the cognitive domain. Thenew mental model captures the interactions amongeach of the domains—the information, the cognitive,and the physical (Figure 34). Figures 35, 36, and 37further illustrate these views. The views differ in regard

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to the nature of what is being shared, the nature ofcollaboration, and the object of synchronization.

Figure 34. Domain Interactions

Information Elements

To understand the new mental model one needs to startwith the view from the information domain (Figure 35)with the sharing of information and with collaborationdesigned to help ensure quality information (e.g., identifyand resolve conflicting information). The result is whatwe would call a common operational picture—that is witha synchronized set of information across the battlespace.

Figure 35. Information Elements

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Cognitive Elements

The next step in understanding the new mental modelis to move to the view from the cognitive domain(Figure 36). It is here that the distinction betweeninformation and awareness is made. From thisperspective, it is awareness and shared awarenessthat are increased by sharing and collaboration withdecisions (across the battlespace) being the object ofeffects to synchronize.

Figure 36. Cognitive Elements

Physical Elements

In the physical domain view (Figure 37), it is resources thatare being shared, actions that are the object of collaboration,and battlefield effects that are being synchronized.

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Figure 37. Physical Elements

Network Centric Warfare Value Chain

Thus, the new mental model is really a synthesis ofwhat needs to occur in each of the domains. Figure38 depicts the relation between the results of sharingand collaboration integrated across the domains andour goal of achieving a competitive advantage.Working back from this desired result, a competitiveadvantage derives from achieving both decisionsuperiority and the ability to execute.

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Figure 38. Network Centric Warfare Value Chain

Decision superiority is enabled by an informationadvantage, which can be thought of as having lessfog compared to an adversary, and executionsuperiority enabled by less friction.

Key elements of the Network Centric Warfare valuechain and their relationship are portrayed in Figure39. This figure highlights the links in the value chainas they relate to key Information Superiority andNetwork Centric Warfare concepts and also placesthese concepts in the appropriate domain.

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hapter 4

Figure 39. Value Chain Links of Information Superiority and Network Centric Warfare

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Thus the new mental model can be described with a setof linkage hypotheses, each of which deals with a specificlink in the value chain. While each of these linkagehypotheses may seem reasonable or even tautologicalto some, they need to be explicitly tested to understandthe nature of the relationships between and among thelinks in the value chain and the conditions under whichthese relationships exist. Equally important, efforts togather empirical evidence about these hypothesis andthe circumstances where they apply will provide importantevidence about how they can be realized. It should benoted that these hypotheses are both within and acrossdomains, with the domain providing a clue as to whereand what to instrument.

Information Quality

The information domain serves both as the linkagebetween reality and the cognitive domain (inside people’sheads) and as the medium by which information(technically data, information, pre-real time knowledge,images, and understandings about the current andprojected situation) is stored, retrieved, and disseminated.The information domain can be interpersonal (voice, faceto face) or manifested in machines, such as computersand communications systems.

The discussion that follows first addresses the conceptof information quality and how it has been measuredin the past. These basic measures and attributesremain relevant in the information age, although theycan and should be organized and understood in somenew ways to better reflect current thinking and futureapplications. The information domain’s majordimensions are then explored: information richness,

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information reach, and the quality of interactions inthe information domain. Finally, the difficult topic ofmeasuring information advantage is addressed insome detail.

Linkage Models and Indicants of Information Value

A classic description of how information has beenvalued successfully was taken from work done twodecades ago.10 This approach recognizes a distinctionbetween the attributes of the information itself and thesystems that supply, store, retrieve, and disseminateinformation. It also notes that information qualityimpacts a variety of decision variables, within theC4ISR system, that do not, themselves, representvalue to the military organization. Rather theseintermediate decision variables enrich the C4ISRprocess and improve the likelihood of effective forceperformance. This intermediate level of measures ofsystem performance is expected to correlate withbetter decisions because the higher quality processes(faster decisions of equivalent quality, greater varietyof futures considered, more options generated andevaluated, etc.) have been shown (in small groupresearch, research into decisionmaking under stress,and some studies of military decisionmaking) tocorrelate with better (more effective) decisions. Whilethese intermediate measures occur and must bemeasured in the cognitive domain, their impact (thetrue value of information) is in the reality, or physical,domain and must be measured there.

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Figure 40. Linkage Models and Indicants of Information Value

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This same figure also illustrates some of the morestraightforward linkages among these sets. For example,one way an information system is seen as better isthrough path redundancy. This attribute is a majoradvantage of network-centric systems. Given that greaterredundancy, the likelihood that any given message willbe received goes up, making the typical currency andcompleteness of information higher for all commandcenters and actors that are connected to the system.This, in turn, increases both the quality of awareness ofthe actors in the field and that of the intermediatedecisionmakers, and the degree of shared awarenessamong them. Note, however, that these processes arenot automatic. The quality of the information itself and ofthe information systems must be augmented byappropriate doctrine, training, organization, leadership,and education in order to improve mission effectivenessin any given mission context.

Direct measurement of value added is impossible.Good command arrangements can, however, berecognized by a variety of indicants, or measures, thatreflect good process but are not success in and ofthemselves. For example, good decisionmaking isassociated with:

• Reflecting the uncertainty inherent in situationsthat consider multiple possible futures;

• Keeping the number of alternatives considered(futures assessed and courses of actionconsidered) within the cognitive limits of mostparticipants—3 to 7 alternatives at most;

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• Gathering information from, and involving indecisionmaking councils, all the actors who arerelevant; and

• Looking ahead at potential counter-measuresfrom opponents of any particular course ofaction, including coalition partners.

In essence, these types of measures are defensesagainst failure to consider complex interactions orunintended consequences and other errors that creepinto complex decisionmaking systems.11

Measuring Information Quality

Measuring the quality of information actually requiresdealing with three interrelated issues:

• How good are the individual items in theinformation system (i.e., the specific items ofdata and information that are present);

• How good is the security of the informationsystem being used; and

• How good is the underlying information system withrespect to features not directly related to security.

Note, also, that information quality and the qualitiesof the supporting information systems are never, inand of themselves, going to impact effectiveness(mission accomplishment, force effectiveness, etc.).Rather information and information system qualitiesare always measures of performance. In other words,better information is never an end in itself. Therefore,measures of information performance must be relatedto measures of effectiveness such as command andcontrol, force, and policy effectiveness.

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However, better information is explicitly hypothesizedto improve important components in other domains:

• Situation Awareness (SA) in the cognitive arena;

• Decisionmaking (DM) in the cognitive domain;

• Planning (including collaboration planning) in thecognitive domain; and

• Synchronization of actions in the reality domain.

Hence, better information and better informationsystems are expected to improve effectivenessindirectly, and those impacts should be measured whensuch research is possible. This permits diagnosticanalysis of whether the better information andinformation systems are associated with better success.

Quality of Information Items

Research reaching back to the early 1980s hasconverged on a relatively simple set of measures forassessing the quality of the information available abouta situation. This work originated with the HEAT(Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool)program begun by DISA (then DCA) and the JointDirectors of Laboratories and was extended into theACCES (Army Command and Control EvaluationSystem) research sponsored by the Army ResearchInstitute. The approach has proven robust, supportingapplications to real world crises and combat situationsin historical reconstructions, exercises, andexperiments more than 50 times, covering more than150 command centers. Applications have includedJoint Task Forces, US Army Corps, Divisions, andBrigades, Naval Fleets and Battle Groups, as well as

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non-military decisionmaking by Department of StateTask Forces and corporate crisis management.

The five crucial dimensions for measuring the qualityof information available within a command center are:

• Completeness (are all the relevant itemsavailable, including entities, their attributes, andrelationships between them);

• Correctness (are all the items in the system faithfulrepresentations of the realities they describe);

• Currency (age of the items of information, oftentermed their latency);

• Accuracy or Level of Precision (which is conditionalon the purpose the user has in mind); and

• Consistency across different command centers,functionally specialized arenas, and applications.

These five attributes are independent. Information canbe complete but incorrect, current but inconsistent,inaccurate but complete, and so forth. Indeed, trade-offs between these five attributes are commonplace.For example, research in the HEAT and ACCESprograms showed that efforts to make data morecomplete were often associated with lower correctness.

All of these attributes may, at times, be conditionedon the needs of a particular mission or aspect of thebattlespace. For example, tolerable latency may beseconds (missile defense), minutes (outer air battle),hours (logistics close to the front), days (theaterlogistics), or weeks (mobilization). Commands oftenestablish standards for latency depending on thephysical limits on information capture and processing,

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the physics of the mission area, their organizationalcapacity, and other factors. When that occurs, themetrics may be wisely designed to reflect thosecommand standards. However, since these may bethe results of doctrine or experience that does notreflect the capacity of modern information systems,assessors of information quality should normally planon capturing and reporting detailed data (e.g., latency)as well as information about the degree to whichcommand standards were met or violated.

Timeliness is another factor that depends on thesituation. It reflects the relationship between the ageof an information item and the tasks or missions itmust support. In simple, physics dominated cases,timeliness requirements can be calculated. Forexample, the lead time necessary to knock down anincoming missile can be postulated, as can the timeneeded to place fire on an artillery battery that is stillfiring before it can move. In many cases, however,fixed timeliness requirements are incalculable becausethe problem is dominated by adversary decisions. Forexample, an infantry operation may have a limitedwindow of opportunity for moving onto key terrainbefore it is occupied by the enemy. However, thelength on the window is determined in part by theadversary. Does he recognize the crucial nature ofthe terrain? What type of force (if any) is he sendingto occupy it? By what route? In what strength? Is theresome other maneuver or action that either side cantake that will reduce the importance of occupying thisground? Thus, if and when key terrain is occupied isboth a function of the physics of a situation as well ascognitive factors that may be influenced by doctrine,training, and offensive information operations.

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Hence, reliance on timeliness as a fundamentalattribute of information places a major burden on theanalyst to demonstrate that the target value (when isthe information timely?) has been established in a validand reliable way.

Security of Information (Information Assurance)

Regardless of the quality of information available withinan information system, the assurance characteristicsof the system remain a crucial concern.Decisionmakers acting on false or corrupt informationare expected (hypothesized) to make worse decisionsthan those working on valid and reliable information(even if there are only a small number of informationitems which are false). Some HEAT and ACCESresearch has shown that even a small amount of wronginformation can have a major impact on the quality ofsituational understanding and lower the chances ofhigh-quality military decisions. Perhaps equallyimportant, users must be able to trust the data andinformation in the systems supporting them and haveconfidence in the system’s ability to provide them withneeded information. Users who do not trust the qualityof information available or do not have confidence intheir information systems are believed (hypothesized)to both act more cautiously (create and select actionssets that are risk averse in that they will work even ifthe available information is incorrect, late, inconsistent,etc.) and more slowly (waiting for confirmatoryevidence before they act on emerging patterns,deliberate longer, etc.).

In general, there are five fundamental dimensions ofinformation assurance viewed from the perspectiveof the information system itself: privacy, availability,

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integrity, authenticity, and nonrepudiation. Takentogether, these attributes describe a system that userscan trust.

Privacy means just that—no one except authorizedusers has access and each user’s access isappropriate for their roles and responsibilities. In theideal system, no one except authorized users has anyopportunity to get into the system. When that cannotbe avoided (e.g., long haul communications arerequired), the system itself must be designed to keepout unauthorized users and to detect, with a highdegree of confidence, efforts to penetrate the system.

Availability means that all the authorized users haveaccess all of the time. This is necessary if currentinformation is to be shared and if the user communityis to develop trust and confidence in using theinformation in the system. An unreliable system (onethat goes down or has links in it that tend to fail) bothreduces user willingness to use it and also offersoutsiders more opportunities for penetration. A highlyreliable system, on the other hand, permits users toplace trust in it and to plan on using its features,whether they are databases, images, informationflows, or knowledge representations. Clearly gracefuldegradation is preferable to system collapse and bothmean time between failures (from the user perspective)and mean time to repair are important characteristics.

Integrity is the coherence of the system and itscontents. Where privacy focuses attention on whetherunauthorized actors have access to the system,integrity deals with whether outsiders have the abilityto tamper with the contents—deleting records,introducing false information or data, and so forth. The

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ideal system is tamper proof, but also monitors forefforts at tampering and contains countermeasuresto prevent meddling.

Authenticity refers to the degree to which the data,information, and knowledge in the system are validand reliable representations of what was supplied bythe authorized users. Information systems aredesigned to accept inputs from a variety of sources.In many cases, there are authoritative actors(workstations or roles within the system) that areresponsible for the quality and currency of those inputs.They are authentic when they have come from thoseauthorized actors and not from others. Note that thisdoes not deal with the quality of the information (itmay still be incomplete, incorrect, old, etc.) but onlywith the appropriateness of its source(s).

Nonrepudiation is a simple characteristic. It means thateach item in the information system can be traced backto its origin, through an assigned pedigree or someother technical means. Nonrepudiation is importantto information assurance because it provides the roadmap by which users gain confidence in their data. Ifan insider were to be corrupted and seek to tamperwith information in the system that was outside thatactor’s area of authority, they would want to be ableto disguise or repudiate those actions within thesystem. Similarly, if an outsider penetrates the systemand misuses a work station to tamper with itemsbeyond the purview of that work station, the inabilityto repudiate the action within the system would allowinformation operations personnel to trace the damageback to the guilty work station. In essence, this featureprevents hiding your trail.

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Measuring the security of an information system hasbecome both a major challenge and also an arenawhere a great deal more work is needed. Manyexercises are conducted without attacks on theinformation system, often because those organizingand directing the exercises are focused on traininggoals that would be poorly served if the informationsystems were compromised or taken down.Reluctance to reveal what is known about likely typesof attacks is also a factor restricting exerciseapplications. Information systems are often tested inan ad hoc fashion, with a creative group ofknowledgeable people given free reign to attack thesystem within selected time frames. Systematicreviews of all the information assurance dimensionsare rare and need to become more common.

Other Desirable Qualities of Information Systems

Information systems also have a variety of attributesthat, while they are not closely related to either thequality of the information in them or informationassurance, make them more desirable. These otherqualities can and should be measured.

Ease of use is an important quality of an informationsystem. Its human factors should have been craftedso that its use is intuitive. This was the quality thatfirst made “point-and-click” technologies successful.Ease of use can be measured in terms of the trainingtime required to achieve some measurable level ofproficiency. It can also be measured in terms of thetime a trained or experienced operator requires toperform specific functions. This can be compared withbaseline performance without the system. Ease of useis also related to the percent of the capabilities of the

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system that are actually used. In the case where usersonly take advantage of a small percentage of asystem’s capabilities, the investment in its otherfeatures has clearly been wasted.

Systems that are easy to use will also help userscombat stress and fatigue. Command and controlsystems will often be used in sustained crisis actionor warfare arenas. Hence, human lives will be at stakeand the operators under considerable stress, perhapseven direct threat of attack. Those same operatorswill also be working long hours, whether the missionis humanitarian assistance, peace operations, or war.Better systems will prove their ease of use under thesedifficult conditions.

Differences in the cultures of users will also test asystem’s ease of use. U.S. doctrine for the new centuryanticipates coalition operations in the vast majority ofmilitary missions. Perhaps equally challenging, militarypersonnel can anticipate working alongside civilauthorities (both U.S. and foreign), non-governmentalorganization personnel, and international organizationofficials. These people often have organizationalcultures very different from the military. Hence, systemsthat can be used by very different people, with littlecommon background and training, are more desirable.

Command and control systems also need to be robust.They need to work in a wide variety of environments(physical, cultural, and threat environments), for a widevariety of purposes. In many ways, this robustness iswell served by redundancy. The old, stovepipesystems are giving way to networks in part becauseof the inherent redundancy (and therefore robustness)of networks. Redundancy also helps to ensure that

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the information system degrades gracefully when it isunder attack or experiences problems.

The most desirable information systems also fuse,correlate, and aggregate data or information frommultiple sources to make it more useful to humansand facilitate integrated operations. This certainlymeans that they facilitate sharing data items,databases, images, information, and existingknowledge. At the same time, they must also enablecollaboration over space, time, function, and echelon.All collaboration, except face-to-face, passes throughthe information domain. Hence, the ideal systemmakes that process faster and better.

The credibility of the system is also important. Whiledependent on information assurance properties, thesystems credibility is, in fact, a perception. It must,therefore be measured by interviewing or surveyingusers. The ideal system engenders considerable trustin users—they believe it will support them effectively.

Finally, the speed of an information system issignificant in many command and control applications.Delay in moving data, images, or information meanshigher risk. Adversary activities that are not knownimmediately to a commander can be dangerous tothe force and to mission accomplishment. Delay alsoforces decisionmakers into selecting less risky options.Delay translates into greater uncertainty at the timedecisions must be made, which generally means thatthe commander must hedge his decisions and not takethe risk of acting precipitously. An emphasis on thespeed of the information system is one of theconsequences of the Information Age.

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Figure 41. Determination of System’s Utility

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1Joint Vision 2020, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Directorfor Strategic Plans and Policy, J5, Strategy Division (Washington,DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 2000).2Information Superiority: Making the Joint Vision Happen, Officeof the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control,Communications, & Intelligence) (Washington, DC: Pentagon,November, 2000).3Ibid.4Anthony Cave Brown, Body Guard of Lies (New York, NY:Bantam Books, 1976), pp. 1-10, 647-687.5Ibid., p. 664.6John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to theLiberation of Paris (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1982), pp.335-340.7Anthony Cave Brown, Body Guard of Lies (New York, NY:Bantam Books, 1976), pp. 647-687.

Determination of System’s Utility

Bringing all these elements (richness, reach, andquality of interaction) together to provide anassessment of information system utility also requirescontexts. As Figure 41 indicates, the range ofoperational environments where a given informationdomain capacity is expected to perform must besampled (Scenarios 1…n) at the levels of mission,function, and task. Too narrow a frame for assessmentwill result in serious suboptimization. Given thepotential for changes in the mission arena, a premiumwill ultimately be placed on system flexibility,adaptability, and the resultant life cycle costs. Manymilitary systems have been reborn because they couldbe changed as missions and operating environmentsevolved. These analyses are by and large the provinceof budgetary specialists, but the basic informationabout information quality, richness, reach, and qualityof interaction are essential to their efforts.

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8John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to theLiberation of Paris (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1982), pp.69-114, 131-132.9Phillip B. Evan and Thomas S. Wurster, “Strategy and the NewEconomics of Information,” Harvard Business Review(September-October 1997).10David S. Alberts, “C2I Assessment: A Proposed Methodology,”Proceedings for Quantitative Assessment of the Utility ofCommand and Control System (McLean, VA: MITRECorporation, 1980), pp. 67-91.11Irving L. Janis, Groupthink: Psychological Studies of Decisionsand Fiascoes (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982).

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InformationDomain

Focus of the Discussion

The key attributes of the information domain canbe subdivided into three major dimensions or

vectors: the richness or quality of the informationdomain, the reach or distribution of the informationdomain, and the quality of interaction within theinformation domain. Each of these is, of course,multidimensional in its own right.

Attributes of Information Richness

The richness, or quality, of information has eight attributesthat measure important elements of information richnessand are displayed on a kiveat diagram. As discussedearlier, the attributes of information quality that have beenin use for decades comprise the majority of thoseincluded in Figure 42, specifically:1

• Information completeness,

• Information correctness,

• Information currency,

• Information accuracy or precision, and

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• Information consistency.

Figure 42. Information Domain: Attributes of Information Richness

However, three new attributes are also present, havingbeen deduced from characteristics of the situation.These are, therefore, both conditional (dependent onthe type of situation and actions) as well as dynamic(change over time). These three attributes arerelevance, timeliness, and information assurance.They are seen as crucial additions as we move to theInformation Age.

Commanders and staffs do not have the time or energyto pay attention to everything in their operating arenas.Hence, they exercise strong filters that enable them tofocus on that information necessary for success.Relevance is a dynamic attribute, which makes itchallenging to measure. However, it must beunderstood as a crucial element defining the informationneeds (richness required) to be satisfied by C4ISRsystems. There is no correct or absolute answer to whatconstitutes relevant information—it varies across

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situations and times. Information Age systems must bedesigned to (a) provide commanders with what doctrineand their experience suggest is relevant, (b) identifychanges in their information needs rapidly, and (c) allowthem to acquire new information easily and promptlyby shifting perspective, drilling down, or conductingrapid, intuitive searches. Errors in deciding what isrelevant and systems that make it difficult for key staffand commanders to shift their perspectives or drill downwhen necessary are often associated with difficultiesin being able to quickly understand a situation and withproblems in decisionmaking.

Information timeliness has also been derived from theneeds of commanders and key staff. While militarypractitioners generally agree that more recentinformation is preferable, they also have longrecognized that the value of information often dependson its availability with respect to some military threator opportunity. Theater ballistic missile defensedepends on fractions of seconds, air defense oftenon seconds, tank and other direct fire battles requireshooting solutions in seconds, and maneuverinformation in minutes. At the opposite end of the scale,theater command typically deals with days and majortheater logistics in weeks.

Information assurance is recognized as necessary togenerate user trust and confidence in the information.Hence, surveys and other instruments designed toassess user attitudes toward the information andinformation systems are an important element of thisdimension. As discussed in the previous chapter,information assurance has a number of components,including: privacy, integrity, authenticity, availability,and nonrepudiation.

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Information completeness has been broken down inthis figure to show some of its key attributes. The mostbasic element is the identification of relevant entitiesand sets. A commander who is unaware of key partsof the enemy force, or key weather and terrain, is atperil. The correct classification of what has beenobserved and its correct location (both in general andin relation to other entities and sets) is also critical.Finally, the correct status (general as in strength andcurrent mission or specific as in food, fuel, morale,water, or ammunition) and activity (attacking, diggingin, rearming, etc.) often provide important insights intothe military situation.

Attributes of Information Reach

Reach, or distribution, deals with the number andvariety of people, work stations, or organizations thatcan share information. These vary across a somewhatsurprising set of dimensions in the information domain,many of which are impacted directly by the increasedcapacity of modern information systems:

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Figure 43. Information Domain: Attributes of Information Reach

• Geographic range: satellite and other long-haulsystems cover more of the globe than theirpredecessors;

• Continuity over time: fewer gaps in coverage andmechanical failures than previous systems;

• More nodes active or available at the same time;

• More sharing at different levels of security;

• Less latency—sharing information sooner, oftenby having it routed automatically to a variety ofusers rather than a central processing locationbefore distribution;

• More sharing across military components andechelons;

• Sharing across broader alliance and coalitionorganizations; and

• Sharing across more functional arenas.

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Note that what occurs in the information domain issharing, not collaboration. Sharing means providingdata, information, images, knowledge, orunderstandings to another actor. Collaboration, on theother hand, involves active engagement by two ormore parties toward a common purpose. (More aboutthis in the Collaboration chapter). Hence, when data,reports, orders, or other items are provided to differentactors, information sharing has occurred. The massiveimprovements in information dissemination madepossible by Information Age systems are the mosttypical way that information reach changes. Changesin reach occur either when new technologies makesomething new possible or when the economics ofinformation management or distribution changes.

Quality of Interaction

In addition to the quality or richness of informationcontent and its reach is the nature of the interactionamong actors. In the 18th century, the British Admiraltywas able to control fleets around the world, but theirmechanisms for interaction were extremely limited:meetings with commanders before they deployed,written orders (usually at the mission level), reportsfrom the fleet dispatched by fast sloops, ordersreturned the same way, and senior officers sent outto convey instructions.

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Figure 44. Information Domain: Quality of Interaction

Today, the quality of information sharing can be almostunlimited if we make the necessary investments inC4ISR. The nature of information exchanges variesconsiderably. Each of the following is a way ofexchanging information:

• Data exchange,

• Text exchange,

• Voice,

• Static images,

• Dynamic images,

• Degree to which exchanges are interactive orreciprocal,

• Level of information assurance about theexchanges, and

• Whether the exchange is real time or delayed (byhow much).

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Some of these dimensions focus on sharing information,others either support or require genuine collaboration—working together toward a common purpose.

C4ISR systems have suffered from a variety of limitsthat are no longer technically necessary. Rather thanhaving to choose between voice and data or dynamicimages and secure images, particularly at the tacticallevel in the field, the bandwidth and computing powernow exists to allow high quality interactions. However,they must be designed and implemented along withthe key elements of organization, doctrine, training,maintenance capability, and other elements that makethem both cost effective and useful in the field.

Application of Metrics:Attributes for a SingleIntegrated Air Picture (SIAP)

The attributes of information richness, reach, andquality of interaction have been applied to characterizethe Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP).2 The SIAP isan instantiation of a construct in the informationdomain. Such constructs are developed in order tosatisfy demands for mission-related information. TheSIAP is focusing upon improving the following fiveattributes of information quality:

• Completeness—The percentage of real tracksthat are included in the SIAP.

• Correctness—Data accurately reflects true trackattributes (position, kinematics, and identity).

• Commonality—Track attributes of shared dataare the same for each SIAP user.

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• Continuity—Proper maintenance of trackattributes over time.

• Timeliness—Data is where it is needed, when itis needed.

However, these constructs are broken down intodozens of very specific measures that reflect theinformation requirements of the users of the SIAP.Timeliness, for example, is broken into elements thatreflect information dissolution in the context of specificapplications. This type of detailed work is essential ifmeaningful research designs, simulations, and modelsare to be built and applied.

Information Needs

An information need is defined as the measurable setof information (and its quality, reach, and interactioncharacteristics) required to plan and/or execute amission or task. Clearly this can cover a wide range ofdifferent items and sets of information. The informationnecessary to plan a theater level campaign is broadand general, with stress on the combat environment(physical features, weather, order of battle, political,social, and economic factors). The information requiredto strike a set of fixed targets with precision munitionsneeds to be quite accurate, while the informationrequired to strike mobile targets needs to be bothaccurate and current.

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Figure 45. Information Domain: Key Relationships

The minimal information needed is defined as that setrequired to accomplish the task at hand, which includesachieving the level of effectiveness specified in themission statement. This may also require efficiencymetrics that reflect limits on the resources to be usedin achieving that level of effectiveness.

SCUD missiles, for example, have relatively simpleinformation needs. They might be targeted on the capitalcity of an adversary. Hence, the grid location for thecenter of mass of the enemy’s capital is adequate tomeet their needs. However, a commander on the otherside, asked to conduct theater missile defense, has avery different set of needs. This commander needs toknow (a) the locations of launchers, (b) storage locationsfor missiles and launchers, (c) possible movementroutes, (d) firing positions, and (e) in the extreme case,precise flight path information so that incoming missilescan be targeted.

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Information needs must be expressed in terms of therichness, reach, and quality of interaction required.Targeting precision guided munitions, for example,requires location accuracy down to a few meters. Theinformation must be current if the target is mobile or ifits use can change from military to civilian. Hence,there are minimum needs for richness. Reach isrequired to deliver the information to the targetplanners and the shooters. Interaction is needed tokeep the information up to date, particularly when thetarget has dynamic features. Late updates on targetlocation or character (e.g., from police station tolocation where hostages are held) can be crucial tomission success.

At a somewhat higher level focus, a commanderdeveloping a course of action wants a rich descriptionof the operating environment, including the dispositionof all forces as well as the terrain, weather, and otherfactors shaping the battlespace. This same set of basicinformation should be available to commanders at alllevels and across all parts of the battlefield with notime delay (information reach), although they mayrequire different levels of detail given their functionaland geographic responsibilities. Having this set ofinformation available helps ensure that the informationis consistent across the battlespace. Finally, the abilityof commanders and key staff, wherever they arelocated, to ask questions about battlespaceinformation, point out apparent anomalies, and offerupdates is also crucial.

In non-traditional missions the range of informationthat must be available to the commander and staffextends across political, military, economic, social, andinformation (media, etc.) arenas. Failure to recognize

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the full range of these information needs can createserious problems. For example, failure to understandthe importance of clan structures proved costly to U.S.and UN operations in Somalia.

Information Position andSituation

The Information Position of an actor is defined as itsinformation state (an aggregate of its richness, reach,and the quality of interaction) at a given point in time.In essence, this is a summary of how much informationthe actor possesses.

The Information Situation of an actor, by contrast,reflects the difference between an actor’s informationposition and the information needs of the situation. Thisdifference between them can be calculated if the needsand position are measured in the same way. However,this calculation may prove cumbersome unless somesimplifying system (assumptions, multi-attribute utilityvalues, or other explicit system to integrating the keydimensions and attributes) is applied.

Key Relationships

The relationships between information needs,information position, and information situation aredepicted in Figure 45. The three conceptualdimensions underlying these graphics correspond withinformation richness, reach, and quality of interaction.The shape itself, a cube, is unrealistic, both in thatthese three values would not necessarily be equal(though needs could be normalized to make them

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equivalent) and the information position would almostnever be fully symmetric.

In the example shown, the actor has a negativeinformation position—the information available is lessthan the minimum required. This concept hasconsiderable power, despite the practical issuesinherent in operationalizing it. However, it does notprovide any meaningful insight into the value of extrainformation. The information situation can be describedin terms of the volumetric difference between needsand position. Because of the definition of informationneeds, a force that does not achieve that level can beexpected to have problems accomplishing its mission.However, the implications of a positive informationposition are not theoretically obvious. That a forcecould gain a great deal of advantage from this excessinformation may be obvious, but there is no way toestimate its value without establishing a link betweeninformation needs and performance.

Given this formulation, a superior information positionis achieved by undertaking three types of actions:

• Enhancing collection, processing, informationmanagement, and dissemination of neededinformation;

• Providing information assurance to protect thoseactivities; and

• Acting to degrade the adversary’s informationposition through offensive informationoperations.

Maintaining and enhancing one’s own informationposition is a dynamic, two-sided effort in most real-

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Figure 46. Relative Information Advantage

world situations because adversaries are alwaysseeking to deny crucial information or damage ourinformation position. Achieving Information Superioritymeans seeking to maximize the difference betweeninformation positions, thereby maximizing theinformation advantage of friendly forces.

Relative Information Advantage

As illustrated in Figure 46, relative informationadvantage must be conceptualized and measured interms of the different forces’ information positions, nottheir information situations. In the case shown, Bluehas a much greater information need, but hasnevertheless come closer to fulfilling those needs thanhis adversary. While both forces are in a negativeinformation position, the Red force has been muchless successful relative to its own requirements.Hence, Blue would be seen as having a relativeinformation advantage.

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Impact of Information Operations

Information Age Warfare will place a premium oninformation operations. Both sides will seek to employa range of tools to ensure achieving and maintainingan information advantage. These will include classicmilitary techniques, such as destruction of assets orinformation denial and deception; technicalapproaches, such as jamming and interception;computer techniques, such as viruses and Trojanhorses; as well as the use of public communicationsmedia. Information operations also include exploitationof the information systems of the adversary or itemstaken from it. The goal, however, remains the same—creation of a decisive information advantage.

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Figure 47. Impact of Information Operations

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Symmetric/AsymmetricInformation Needs

As illustrated by Figure 48, symmetric informationneeds occur when the forces of two or morecompetitors have equivalent requirements. Thisgenerally implies that they have similar forcestructures, doctrines, and levels of training. By way ofcontrast, asymmetric information needs arise whenone force requires more information to achieve itsmissions than the other.

Figure 48. Information Needs

Hence, more modern forces (and the United Stateswill typically field the more modern force in mostsituations) will often have a greater information needthan their adversaries. These needs extend not onlyto the richness, reach, and interaction quality neededin the information domain, but also to protecting theinformation system and its contents. At the same time,the more modern force should also have someadvantage in terms of its abilities to collect and process

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data and information, and to attack the adversary’sinformation systems and their contents. This may bethe crucial difference when two forces have verydifferent information needs.

Determinants of InformationNeeds

A number of factors influence the level of informationneed for a given force and hence the likelihood thatan asymmetric situation will occur. These include, butare not limited to:

• Offensive or defensive orientation,

• Differing doctrines,

• Differing concepts of operation,

• Different types of weapons and platforms,

• Willingness to accept risk,

• Willingness to accept casualties and losses ofequipment, and

• Differing levels of desire to minimize collateraldamage.

Here, again, the United States, as the more modernforce with the greatest desire to avoid casualties andcollateral damage, and relying on platforms andweapons that are based on leading edge informationsystems, will almost always find itself with the largerneed for information.

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Examples

The classic examples of symmetric informationoperations occur across air, land, and sea warfare. Inan air-to-air battle, two forces with modern platformsand C4ISR systems share the same informationneeds—their needs are symmetric. They areinterested in the locations of each other’s aircraft andother assets in the fight. Similarly, a tank battlebetween modern forces provides a symmetric demandfor information—where are the enemy forces, whatare they doing, etc. Naval battles, largely conductedwith aircraft and missiles, share this symmetricinformation structure.

Guerrilla warfare, particularly when it uses terrorismas a tactic, on the other hand, is the classic case ofasymmetric information needs. The insurgent forcesrequire relatively little information, and most of whatthey need is not time sensitive. They can plant bombs,lay mines, and set ambushes without knowing whenthey will actually launch attacks and often withoutconcern about collateral damage. Conventional forcesfighting them, however, need quite precise informationin order to locate and defeat them. Even moreinformation is needed if collateral damage, which oftenalienates the general population, is to be avoided. Asthe Russians have learned in both Afghanistan andChechnya, and the Americans learned in Vietnam, thisinformation can be exceptionally difficult to obtain andkeep up to date. In these situations, the moreconventional force often finds it advantageous to adaptits tactics in order to reduce its dependence oninformation. For example, small unit operations thatdepend upon local/organic information capabilities

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have proven effective in many guerrilla conflicts, suchas in Malaysia and the Philippines.

Estimating Information Advantage

As noted earlier, finding meaningful metrics and waysof making them comparable for any of the keyelements of information advantage (information needs,information situation, or information position), orreliable and valid ways to compare them and interpretthe results, will be a challenge.

The symmetric case is probably somewhat easier. Herethe two forces’ needs are assumed to be approximatelythe same, so estimating relative information positionrequires only a valid and reliable approach to estimatingeach side’s information situation. The three key driversare the same as for estimating needs—richness, reach,and quality of interaction—although the effectivenessof each side’s offensive information operations may bea complicating factor. Even in this situation, however,interpretation of the results will require careful thought.Either side in a negative information position must, bydefinition, be assumed to have great difficulty achievingits mission. On the other hand, if both forces are in apositive information position, they are seen as havingadequate information to achieve their mission. Even ifone has a considerably greater information position,and therefore a relative advantage, the other cannotbe assumed to fail since it has at least adequateinformation to achieve its own mission.

The same factors make operationalizing relativeinformation advantage even more difficult when theinformation needs are asymmetric. However, this case

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is worse since positive information positions are verydifficult to compare. In essence, this problem arisesfrom the fact that once the threshold value of adequateinformation necessary to achieve the mission isreached, there is no readily available standard bywhich additional information can be valued. Theobvious quantitative answer, express the gain as apercentage of the information need, has no logicalrelationship to likelihood of mission success except tosimply say the likelihood has increased. Hence, thesevalues cannot be compared across cases. Only in thevery narrow knowledge domains where the informationsituation can be modeled in detail with considerablevalidity can information advantage be estimated.However, that argument does not negate the value ofthe concept or the general guidance that can beinferred from it.

Measuring an InformationAdvantage

Figure 49 portrays how the respective informationpositions of two competitors can be portrayed using avariety of information attributes.

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Figure 49. Information Domain: Measuring an Information Advantage

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1Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool “HEAT” User’sManual (McLean, VA: Defense Systems, Inc., 1984).2The SIAP, defined in the Theater Missile Defense CapstoneRequirements Document (TMD CRD), is the product of fused,common, continual, unambiguous tracks of airborne objects inthe surveillance area. The SIAP provides the warfighter the abilityto better understand the battlespace and employ weapons totheir designated capabilities. The SIAP, a critical enabler ofimproved battlespace management and enhanced situationalawareness, will feed the aerospace component of the GlobalInformation Grid. The Department’s effort to advance defense-wide efforts to improve joint battle force management andsituational awareness falls under the responsibility of the SIAPSystem Engineering Task Force (SIAP SE). William S. Cohen,Secretary of Defense, Annual Defense Report to the Presidentand the Congress (Washington, DC: January 2001).

The information position of one competitor (Blue) isportrayed with the solid contour, and the informationposition of the second competitor (Red) is portrayedwith the striped contour. It is clear from this graphicthat a relative information advantage can beestablished along one or more axes. It is not difficultto envision a situation where Red dominates Blue onsome axes, Red dominates on other axes, and theremaining axes are a draw.

Creating realistic examples of this type, in which thekey attributes of information reach, richness, and qualityof interaction are operationalized and the informationpictures of adversaries composed, would be a valuablecontribution to our understanding of Information AgeWarfare. Analyses of well-understood historical casesmight provide valuable insights, but systematicexperimentation and well-constructed wargaming willbe needed if this crucial issue is to be understood inlight of current and potential technologies.

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CognitiveDomain

Reference Model: ConceptualFramework

One of the key challenges facing commanders andtheir forces is developing an awareness of the

situation as it exists in the physical domain, theinformation domain, and the cognitive domain. Thisprocess is two-sided, but focused on a single reality.The differing information domains of the two sides andtheir different cognitive orientations (worldviews,doctrine, etc.) guarantee cognitive awarenesses willdiffer. All contribute to a complex phenomenon we referto as the situation, which is part reality, part information,and part cognition.

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Figure 50. Reference Model: Conceptual Framework

Reference Model: The Situation

When the term situational awareness is used, itdescribes the awareness of a situation that exists inpart or all of the battlespace at a particular point intime. In some instances, information on the trajectoryof events that preceded the current situation may beof interest, as well as insight into how the situation islikely to unfold. The components of a situation arehighlighted in Figure 51 and include missions andconstraints on missions (e.g., ROE), capabilities andintentions of relevant forces, and key attributes of theenvironment. Relevant elements of the environmentinclude: terrain, weather, social, political, and

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economic elements. For most military situations, timeand space relationships (e.g., weapon ranges, ratesof advance across different terrain) and theopportunities and risks relevant to the forces are alsocrucial elements.

Figure 51. Reference Model: The Situation

Battlespace Awareness

Battlespace Awareness is the result of the activitieswe undertake to enhance our information and protectit. Awareness always exists in the cognitive domain.It covers not what the information systems know, butwhat the people (commanders, key staff, etc.) knowand are aware they know.

Figure 52 depicts the view to be provided for a U.S.Army Force XXI Brigade commander. Informationconsistent with the picture seen by this commanderwill also be available to others in the battlespace. Thisis the concept we call a common operational picture.

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Figure 52. Battlespace Awareness

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Note that the forces are not lined up, and that a FEBA(or forward edge of the battle area) is a concept thathas limited meaning in this environment. In fact, theforces are intertwined with enemy forces, much ascivilians and neutrals currently are intertwined inKosovo. Hence, the potential for the commander’sawareness to be incomplete or failure to recognizeimportant differences is a significant elementdistinguishing the information system from awareness.

Reference Model: Componentsof Situational Awareness

As illustrated in Figure 53, when a human in thebattlespace develops situational awareness, thisawareness is developed in the cognitive domain. Forexample, a Tactical Action Officer standing watch ona U.S. Navy Ship in the Persian Gulf developssituational awareness by combining real-timeinformation with knowledge that he or she has acquiredas a result of operational experience. In this situation,relevant knowledge would consist of the capabilitiesof other nations’ sea and air forces (e.g., Iran), as welltheir tactics, techniques, and procedures. In addition,within the cognitive domain, there are patterns andrelationships that the human has developed to helpmake sense of complex situations.

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Figure 53. Reference Model: Components of Situational Awareness

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The fusion of information and knowledge enables thewatch officer to perform pattern recognition and tocontinually update an estimate of an adversary’s intent,as well as make and maintain a real-time assessmentof risks and opportunities.

With network-centric operations, state information onobjects in the information domain can be sharedbetween platforms. This ability to share informationcan play a key role in increasing both awareness andthe degree to which it is shared. As Figure 54illustrates, shared awareness typically involves sharinginformation and shared knowledge, and may besupported by a variety of information media (e.g.,voice, data, and imagery).

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Figure 54. Shared Awareness

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Shared Awareness

Shared awareness can be achieved in many ways,as is depicted in Figure 55. For example, as in Case1, two individuals can both independently observe thesame object or event in the physical domain; or, as inCase 2, they can both have access to independentsensor information regarding an object or event.Another way would be for one person to have observedan event and passed the information to anotherperson, as in Case 3. Finally, as depicted in Case 4,independent sensor observations are shared and thefused results are available to two individuals.

Figure 55. Achieving Shared Awareness

When, as in Case 4, the participants not only receivethe same information, but also have an opportunity todiscuss it or use it together in collaboration, theawareness may be both shared and enriched. Thisenrichment occurs when they process the informationin the context of other relevant information or priorknowledge. In this case, the shared awareness

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achieved is more than simple common understandingsbut extends to new inferences. The value ofcollaboration (working together to solve a problem orproduce a product) lies in this capacity to create higherknowledge and understanding in order to organizemore effective and efficient activities.

Measurement and Assessment

The cognitive domain presents special problems inmeasurement and assessment. We have very limitedand very intrusive tools to observe cognitive activities.For all practical purposes, we are limited to observingbehaviors and asking commanders and staff to provideinformation about their awareness, shared awareness,shared knowledge, and collaboration.

• Traditional systems of observation, such asHEAT and ACCES, have proven able to capturebehaviors that provide indications of awareness.For example, HEAT captures situationalbriefings to senior commanders and assessestheir information quality. HEAT and ACCES alsocapture some qualities of interaction such as thenumber of staff sectors participating in planning.1

• RAND’s Arroyo Center has recently publishedefforts to create new means of InformationSuperiority within the land warfare arena.2

• The Command Post of the Future program inDARPA has pioneered measuring situationawareness by systematic debriefing ofparticipants in command centerexperimentation.3

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• Recent work sponsored by ONR has identifiedfour dimensions for the content of/and evaluatingcollaborative processes on conflict.4

Continuing combinations of innovative metrics and tried-and-true methods will be needed if we are to capturethe cognitive dimensions of Information Age Warfare.

1Headquarters Effectiveness Assessment Tool “HEAT” User’sManual (McLean, VA: Defense Systems, Inc., 1984). Richard E.Hayes, T.A. Hollis, Richard L. Layton, W.A. Ross, and J.W.S.Spoor, “Enhancements to the Army Command and ControlEvaluation System Task 1 Final Report” (FT Leavenworth, KS:U.S. Army Research Institute, 1993). Headquarters EffectivenessProgram Summary Task 002, prepared for C3 Architecture andMission Analysis, Planning, and Systems Integration Directorate,Defense Communications Agency (McLean, VA: DefenseSystems, Inc., September 1983).2Richard Darilek, Walter Perry, Jerome Bracken, John Gordon,and Brian Nichiporuk, Measures of Effectiveness for theInformation-Age Army (Santa Monica, CA and Arlington, VA:RAND, 2001).3John E. Kirzl, Diana G. Buck, and Jonathan K. Sander,“Operationalizing the AIAA COBP for Joint C2 Experimentation,”Proceedings of the Command and Control Research andTechnology Symposium 2000 (Monterey, CA: June 2000).4David Noble, Diana Buck, and Jim Yeargain, “Metrics forEvaluation of Cognitive-Based Collaboration Tools,” Proceedingsof the 6th International Command and Control Research andTechnology Symposium 2001 (Annapolis, MD: June 2001).

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CHAPTER 7

Command andControl

Focus

New ways of thinking about command and control(C2) are at the heart of Information Age Warfare.

As used here, the term C2 applies to the organizations,people, processes, and systems that enablecommanders to understand a situation and provideintent, plans, and/or direction. The term C4ISR hasevolved from C2 to emphasize the important role thatcommunications, computers, intelligence, surveillance,and reconnaissance play in C2.

This section is organized into two elements: adiscussion of how Information Age C2 differs from (butremains anchored in) the traditional approach and ananalysis of C2 organizations and the key role ofcommander intent and C2 philosophy embedded in it.

Traditional View of Commandand Control Processes: theOODA Loop

John Boyd introduced the Observe, Orient, Decide,and Act (OODA) loop in order to support analysis of

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pilot decisionmaking at a tactical level.1 The idea(illustrated in Figure 56) is that decisions begin byobserving the physical domain and are then placed inthe context of other information and prior knowledgein order to orient the individual (or place theobservations in context so they become usefulinformation), which (in turn) allows the individual todecide what is to be done and act accordingly. Theconcept has proved to have considerable intuitiveappeal and has been used for decades as the basisof both analysis and training. The phrase “turninginside the enemy’s OODA loop,” while originating inair-to-air combat, has become the shorthand way ofunderstanding that speed of C2 process can provideadvantage in combat situations.

Figure 56. Traditional View of C2: OODA Loop

In our language, the act of observation must begin inthe physical domain, may pass through some fusionwith other observations, and is brought to theindividual’s attention through the information domain.The process of orientation occurs in the cognitive

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domain as the information content of the observationsis internalized and placed in the context of theindividual’s prior knowledge, experience, and training.This is seen as providing the basis for a decision—also a cognitive activity. Finally, the decision itself mustpass through the information domain (the controls ofan aircraft, the directives of a commander) in order tobecome the basis for action.

The OODA loop has proven seductively robust andhas been applied not only to pilot’s activities in air-to-air combat, but also to organizational behavior at alllevels. In our view, this is an error. As we discussbelow, the OODA loop both oversimplifies thecommand and control process in ways that confoundanalysis and also reifies military organizations—implying that they have a single mind and make asingle, coordinated decision across echelon andfunction. We believe that the OODA loop is outdatedbecause it fails to differentiate crucial elements of theC4ISR process that must be considered in InformationAge analyses.

Moreover, the OODA loop greatly oversimplifies thejoint hierarchical model underlying military operations.Figure 57 places the cyclical OODA loop process intothe larger context of joint operations. The five levelsof command normally involved in U.S. joint operationshave been shown as a hierarchy, with the NationalCommand Authority (NCA) superior to a Commanderin Chief (CINC), which in turn controls a Joint TaskForce (JTF) made up of warfare arena Joint ForceComponent Commanders (JFCC) that are made upof the units that carry out the taskings within theoperation. While there is only one NCA and onesupported CINC controlling the operation (other

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supporting CINCs are normally involved, but notpictured here), major operations often involve morethan one JTF and almost always involve multiple JointForce Components and units. Maritime, Air, Land, andSpecial Forces are the traditional components. Forsimplicity’s sake (the graphic is, in any case, very busy)each level of command is shown only once, and eachis assumed to be located at a single site.

Time moves from left to right. The small OODA loopsindicate decision cycles at the different echelons ofcommand. The other symbols indicate C2 activities,which have been grouped into operations, logistics,and intelligence functions. For example, symbolscontaining M’s indicate monitoring activity, or reportsfrom the physical domain. Symbols containing P’sindicate planning activities. Arrowheads indicate spotreports moving between command centers.

The frequency of all these C2 activities increased asyou move down from the NCA level toward the unitlevel. Given that there are also many units and multipleJFCCs, these frequency differences become massive.The smaller number of decision cycles at the seniorlevels implies that they must look further into the futureduring each of their decision cycles.

The functional specialization (here simplified tooperational, logistic, and intelligence) has alsotraditionally led to stovepipes (or specialized systemsthat link only selected elements of the C4ISR arena),to interoperability problems that make it difficult forfunctional specialists to share information even whenthey want to, and also to situations where informationis available to different command centers and elementswithin the same command center. Hooking these

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Figure 57. Joint Hierarchical and Cyclical Operational Activity Model

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systems together, particularly because the time cyclesappropriate to different systems are quite different,almost guarantees that the elements of the force willhave serious problems coordinating their efforts. Theshaded waves in this figure highlight the fact that theinformation available to senior headquarters and theguidance provided by those senior headquarters hastraditionally been temporally misaligned, contributingto the fog and friction of war.

An Information Age View ofTraditional C4ISR Processes

Figure 58 provides an Information Age view of thetraditional C4ISR process as it has been understoodfor several decades. However, it uses much richerconstructs than those in the OODA loop. In thisapproach, C4ISR is seen as an adaptive controlsystem seeking to influence selected aspects of anoperating environment. That adaptive control systemis supported by a variety of information systems. ThisC4ISR process is made up of half a number ofinteracting parts:

• Battlespace Monitoring

• Awareness

• Understanding

• Sensemaking

• Command Intent

• Battlespace Management

• Synchronization

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• Information Systems

Figure 58. Traditional C4ISR Process

Operating Environment

The operating environment includes everything outsideof the C4ISR processes and the systems that supportthem. The physical environment (terrain, weather, etc.)is one key dimension. Adversary forces form another.Own forces, to the extent that they are not part ofC4ISR processes, are also in the environment. Theyrepresent the most controllable factors in theenvironment, but even they are imperfectly controllabledue to the fog and friction of war. Other, neutral forcesmay also be present in the portion of the operatingenvironment of interest. Their potential involvementor interference must also be considered. The operatingenvironment also includes a host of political, social,and economic factors and actors, ranging from refugeepopulations to the infrastructure (communications,transportation, etc.) in the area.

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Command at any level does not exist in isolation froma higher authority. The assigned mission and missionconstraints also form part of the operatingenvironment. The overall mission of a force is typicallyassigned by a political authority—the NationalCommand Authority in the United States, but possiblysome other entity like the UN or NATO when coalitionwarfare, peace operations or humanitarian missionsare involved. Mission statements often includeconstraints such as rules of engagement or geographiclimitations. While a military commander ofteninfluences the mission assigned and may be able tonegotiate over the mission constraints, this is an arenawhere they do not have the final word.

Battlespace Monitoring

The process of monitoring the battlespace is the firstpart of the C4ISR process. This process starts in thephysical domain with sensings (radar returns, satelliteimages, etc.) and reports (e.g., observations by scoutsor units in contact). Imbedded in the informationdomain elements of this process are the fusionmechanisms by which data are stored, retrieved, andshared; data are placed in context and converted intoinformation; and information is aggregated to form newknowledge or combined with previously documentedknowledge (for example, adversary order of battle),as well as where coherent descriptions and picturesof the battlespace are developed and displayed.

Battlespace, as used here, refers to whatever missionenvironment the organization is working within,including humanitarian assistance, peace operations,counter-drug operations, or traditional combat.Monitoring includes information about all aspects of

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the operation—intelligence, own force status andactivities, weather, terrain, and so forth. The quality ofbattlespace monitoring is reflected in the quality andage of the available information. This is the domainwhere information richness, reach, and quality of reachare most easily seen in the C4ISR process.

Awareness

Awareness exists only in the cognitive domain. It dealswith what is “between the ears” after passing throughperceptual filters. Those perceptions of the militarysituation will be strongly affected by the prior knowledgeand belief systems that the people in the system bringfrom their education, training, and experience.

Battlespace awareness is not what is on the display,rather it is what is in one’s head. Battlespaceawareness is not static but a rich, dynamiccomprehension of the military situation and the factorsthat drive it. High quality awareness is complete(includes the relevant information and actors), current,correct (does not include wrong information), andconsistent (does not differ from one command centerin the C4ISR system to another). Good battlespaceawareness also envisions more than one potentialfuture and recognizes uncertainty as a key element ofthe military situation.

Traditional C4ISR analyses have not differentiated theinformation domain from the cognitive domain or theprocess of battlespace monitoring from the awarenessachieved. Data and information delivered to acommand center were assumed to be known to allthe individuals and organizations engaged in theC4ISR processes. Failures due to misperceptions or

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failures to incorporate new information were notconsidered. When such failures occurred, they wereseen as aberrations and errors in the C2 process andnot the products of a cross-domain transfer. Difficultiesin generating shared awareness given the differingbackgrounds, experiences, roles, and responsibilitiesof those involved in C4ISR processes continue to posea major problem.

Understanding

Understanding—the comprehensive knowledge of themilitary situation—is both the last element inbattlespace awareness and the first element insensemaking. There is ample evidence thatunderstanding a situation is the beginning ofsensemaking. Experts typically jump directly fromclassifying a situation into the solution space(s) thatcan be used to control or resolve it. Indeed, empiricalresearch into both real-world military decisionmakingand exercises have shown frequent use of acommander’s shortcut, by which an experiencedcommander with confidence in his knowledge of asituation bypasses formal decision processes to matchthe patterns arising from battlespace monitoring,awareness, and understanding to directly select acourse of action and begin planning for itsimplementation. Thus, understanding straddlesawareness and sensemaking.

Some choices may be hard wired in the brain, a sort ofconditioned reflex. Even when this does not occur and amore reflective decision process is employed, theunderstanding often forms or shapes the basis fordeveloping and analyzing alternatives. Indeed, empiricalanalysis of hundreds of real and exercise decision cycles

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has shown that the quality of the understanding achievedis the single best predictor of the likelihood good decisionswill be made and the military mission will beaccomplished. That evidence cuts across the tactical andoperational levels of command. Understandings areclearly in the cognitive domain, but can be shared throughinteractions in the information domain in the form ofdiscussions, reports, plans, statements of commandintent, and other written documents.

Sensemaking

Once an understanding of a situation that requiresattention has been reached, individuals andorganizations engage in a process best understoodas sensemaking, in which they relate theirunderstanding of the situation to their mental modelsof how it can evolve over time, their ability to controlthat development, and the values that drive theirchoices of action. In essence, they seek to accomplishthree interrelated activities—generating alternativeactions intended to control selected aspects of thesituation, identifying the criteria by which thosealternatives are to be compared, and conducting theassessment of alternatives. These three steps can bethe subject of very formal staff processes or as simpleas one officer examining a situation and making uphis mind. When the decisions to be made arecomposed of well understood alternatives and explicitcriteria for choosing (simple decisions) the processmay be rapid and the error rate low for well trainedofficers. However, many military problems involveconsiderable uncertainty and novel features thatrequire creative thought all the way from generatingalternatives through the evaluation process. While

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supported by information and information systems,sensemaking takes place in the cognitive domain.

Research conducted on individual and groupsensemaking, decisonmaking under stress, and smallgroup decisionmaking has generated some guidelinesthat have also been validated by work on militarydecisionmaking. For example, all other things beingequal, complex decisions are best made by smallnumbers of individuals who have differentbackgrounds and views of the situation. The moreindividuals who participate in a complex decision, thelonger the process takes. Similarly, networks ormulticonnected systems of communication areassociated with better complex decisions but areslower than hierarchical structures.

Good sensemaking will also have examined thedynamics expected in the battlespace if each alternativeis chosen. For example, likely enemy reactions to eachalternative should be considered. Similarly, analysesshould probe for key assumptions and dependenciesin each course of action. In addition, good analyseslook ahead, linking planned engagements together intoa campaign and military activities into rich sets ofpolitical-military goals. However, these formal,structured analytic processes are often performedrapidly, even subconsciously by individuals. Given thatmilitary organizations typically require coordinatedactivities by a number of individuals or componentorganizations, shared sensemaking becomes a crucialpart of the C4ISR process.

Command Intent

In contrast to the logic in the simpler OODA loopconstruct, which sees the output of the cognitive

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processes as a decision, or a choice amongalternatives, the Information Age C4ISR process isunderstood to generate a richer product—commandintent. This choice of language has two important, directimplications. First, the product is much richer than achoice among alternatives. In most command centersthe results of sensemaking is high level guidance, butis far from a detailed plan. These products typically takethe overall form and outline of a plan—specifying theobjectives to be achieved, the major organizationsinvolved, the general responsibilities of each, linkagesamong and schemes of maneuver for thoseorganizations, and major constraints on them. Theseitems will have formed the focus of the sensemakingdiscussion when courses of action were developed andassessed. Second, more than one individual is involved.Realistically, the commander’s intent of traditionalperspectives is replaced today by an intent that arisesfrom dialogue between commanders and key staff atmore than one level.

Like understanding, command intent is a linkingfunction in the military C4ISR process—both the laststep in sensemaking and the first step in battlemanagement. It occurs in the cognitive domain, but iscommunicated through the information domain.

Synchronization

When command intent is established, a processdesigned to synchronize effects is initiated. Its goalsare to reflect the intent in a plan, to disseminate thatplan promptly and clearly, to monitor itsimplementation, and to support timely recognition ofthe need for either adjustments to the plan or theinitiation of a new C4ISR cycle.

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Military plans take many forms (from verbal directivesto lengthy written documents with elaborate annexes).However, at their core, they always specify five things:

• What is to be accomplished (the military missionor missions assigned to subordinates);

• What assets (forces) are to be used, includingcommand arrangements (who commands whom,who has priority, etc.);

• Schedules (which may involve specific times[e.g., jump off at 0430] or sequences [take Hill472 and be prepared to attack Northwest onorder to cut the enemy’s lines ofcommunication]);

• Boundaries (who is responsible for whichgeographic and functional area); and

• Contingencies (recognized situations in whichchanges to one or more of the previous fouritems are appropriate).

Plans are converted into directives, which must beclear and disseminated in time for subordinateorganizations to prepare their own plans and organizetheir efforts. These plans also typically include specificelements intended to ensure battlespace awarenessas they are implemented and permit adjustments asthe situation develops over time.

Information Systems

In the traditional adaptive control, cyclic decision cycle,the information systems were very specialized. Forexample, intelligence systems have been separatedfrom the C2 systems both to improve security and

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because these two different functions would interferewith each other’s use of the limited bandwidth andcomputing power available in the theater of operations.Similarly logistics, personnel, and other combat supportfunctions developed specialized communications andinformation systems so they could maintain data filesand conduct their portion of the operation without beingin the way of the command networks.

These differentiated information systems arerepresented in Figure 56 by the irregular spikes thatpenetrate the environment, effects synchronization,decisionmaking, and battlespace awareness functions.

Summary of Traditional C4ISR Process

In summary, the traditional C4ISR process was cyclicand designed to achieve adaptive control over selectedaspects of the environment. Those aspects varied withthe military mission: from denying an enemy keyterritory to inflicting casualties, to creating a stablesecurity environment in peace enforcement missionsor delivering food, water, shelter, and medicine inhumanitarian crises. This process almost guaranteesdifficulties arising from disjoint decision cycles anddiffering information across time, space, and echelonof command. Information Age systems, combined withnew ways of thinking about C4ISR that are enabledby them, offer major opportunities to reengineer theentire process.

C4ISR Today

As Figure 59 indicates, the primary changes in C4ISRimplemented today deal with the information systems.

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Decades of efforts, in some ways arising from theexperiences in Grenada, have begun to increaseinteroperability and break down stovepipecommunications systems. These processes havebeen hastened by changing information technologies.The massive increases in storage, computationalpower, and bandwidth over the past two decades haveenabled greater sharing of data, information, andimages. Improved sensors, new collection platforms(from satellites to UAVs), and improved fusionalgorithms and approaches enabled by greatercomputing power have combined to increasebattlespace awareness and reduce uncertainty inmany contexts.

Figure 59. C4ISR Process Today

Less impact has been felt in decisionmaking and battlemanagement. Concepts like “ring of fire” and NetworkCentric Warfare point the way to greater reliance onsystems which support these functions, but the real-world systems being employed have not yet either

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achieved the needed levels of precision and reliabilityor been embraced by the forces in the field.

While the information systems have penetrated moredeeply into each of the key functional arenas, theirimpact on doctrine, organizational structures, tactics,techniques, and procedures has been minimal. Forexample, analysis of the NATO operation in Bosnia,undertaken by the NATO Joint Assessment Team(JAT), showed that staff work was heavily dominatedby PowerPoint presentations created in traditionalfunctional structures, rather than integrated data andinformation sets. Similarly, the first exercise conductedby CINCPAC in its new command center during April2000 used traditional staff structures—J-1 through J-6, supplemented by a Crisis Action Team (CAT).Collaboration technologies were employed within theJ-4 functional area to link logistics personnel on theCAT floor with their reach-back teams with access tothe detailed databases needed to coordinate effortsin the theater.

All the Services continue to conduct exercises andexperiments to explore the use of self-reportingsystems (platforms that generate information abouttheir location, fuel status, ammunition, and need forrepair), collaboration tools that link staffs acrossfunction and echelon of command, and new ways toexchange information within the battlespace (linkingsensors to shooters, for example), but none have yetimplemented more than incremental changes in theirfielded systems.

Even though the progress has been limited, and limitedlargely to linear extensions of old practices, C4ISR hasalready begun to improve. The Kosovo operation, while

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hardly perfect, was more efficient (fewer sorties for moredelivered weapons) and demonstrated greater abilityto control forces in the field than has been previouslypossible. Tools such as video teleconferencing andbroader bandwidth for sharing more information, if onlyin the form of PowerPoint slides, have increased thespeed and consistency of understandings and led toricher decisionmaking. Similarly, decision processeshave become faster and have generated a morecommon grasp of what is to be done—speeding andimproving the quality of battle management.

Greater Integration

The future of C4ISR lies in greater integration. As shownin Figure 60, this integration will occur over time, space,function, and echelon. Moreover, it will occur becausethe information systems cease to be outside the C4ISRprocesses and become embedded in them. Thisnetworked C4ISR process will differ not only in degree(more data, information and knowledge, betterintegrated and available to more actors in more differentforms) but also in kind. The very nature of the C4ISRprocess will be transformed, which will have massiveimplications for doctrine, organization, and training.

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Figure 60. Greater Integration

Integration Across Echelon

This is the most advanced element of the changestaking place. The same types of technology that allowpeople to share information, collaborate and searchintelligently on the Internet are also becoming availablefor battlespace awareness and management. As istypical of innovations, this one has taken hold first withintraditional organizations and structures. Hence, theintelligence community has begun to rely on SIPRNET,a simple, but secure, analogy to the Internet. However,even this simple advance has naturally grown to includeintelligence cells at customer sites (CINCs, Joint TaskForces, etc.)—speeding access to new information andmaking cross-talk easier. Moreover, as a secureenvironment, SIPRNET has also attracted a variety ofnon-intelligence users. Similarly, the ubiquitousMicrosoft Office software and PowerPoint presentationslides have made it easier to share the informationoffered to commanders. Video technologies have also

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emerged as tools for creating rich linkages betweensenior headquarters. U.S. planning for politicallysensitive operations such as Haiti has relied heavily onvideo teleconferencing to link senior military officers withone another and with the political leaders, particularlyon the complex issue of defining appropriate militarymissions. Video from UAVs can also be delivered tomore than one level of command simultaneously. Richlinkages across echelons have also developed in thecombat service support functions such as logistics(movement and sustainment), personnel, andmanaging medical support.

As rich as these systems are today, they will matureinto richer linkages over time. In a richly integratedsystem, planning will be virtually simultaneous acrossechelons of command. In fact, the current mapping ofechelon with level of war is in the process of change.With these unlinked, the meaning of echelons willundoubtedly change.

The system today, illustrated earlier in Figures 57 and58, requires subordinate echelons to wait for plansfrom higher echelons before they can undertake thedetailed planning and physical actions required toimplement the plans from senior headquarters. Asystem of warning orders is used to inform subordinateheadquarters of the kinds of mission changes beingconsidered so they can comment or begin roughplanning. In the future, computational power andbandwidth will exist to involve multiple echelons directlyin the initial thinking throughout collaborativeprocesses. This will mean a richer battlespaceawareness, a more rapid and effective decisionmakingprocess, and more agile and better focused battlemanagement. Commanders will be able to use

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collaborative tools that can both speed up and betterintegrate their plans as well as provide greater leadtime and richer understanding of the commander’sintent at all levels.

Integration Across Function

While some progress has been made in this area, thegreatest gains are yet to come. Recent developmentshave primarily focused on breaking down stovepipesso that the specialists in different functions can haveaccess to a common operational picture. This thinkinghas now extended to a common relevant operationalpicture, which means they can each have tailoredinformation based on the same underlying data,information, and knowledge bases.

Experimental efforts have also been made so that keyplatforms will be self-reporting—their locations, fuelstatus, ammunition status, maintenance posture,damage, and other key features are known to acommon database. This primarily assists battlespacemanagement by linking current operations to logisticsand sustainment functions. However, currently thesesystems are neither reliable enough nor secureenough to support real-world operations, nor are theyjoint. Research and development continue, with greatpromise, but limited scope.

Network Centric Warfare concepts push informationtechnologies even further—using networkedinformation to directly link sensors to shooters andprecision munitions to deliver weapons at stand-offranges that minimize the risks to friendly forces. Thisapproach can, if the information generated is of highenough quality and integrated rapidly enough, permit

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very agile operations using emergent behaviors or self-synchronized forces to accomplish missions. Theseconcepts dramatically alter the C4ISR processes—turning hierarchical centralized structures intodinosaurs, enabling collaboration across functionalarenas, and making senior commands primarilyresponsible for creating the conditions necessary fortheir subordinates to be successful.

Greater Integration and Implied Decision Types

The impact of this level of integration transforms thedecisionmaking process. On the one hand, a wholeset of decisions emerges where, given adequatequality and currency of information, and confidence inthat quality and currency, the decisions are obvious.In other words, to know is to both decide and to act.These are automatable decisions on Figure 61. Forthem, any distinctions among battlespace awareness,decisionmaking, and battle management are artificial.These decisions can be automated, at least underparticular rules of engagement. For example, theaterballistic missile defense during war is likely to be fullyautomatic and may have to be in order to work quicklyenough to be successful. These can occur by simplylinking observations from the physical domain to presetalgorithms or rules in the information domain.

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Figure 61. Greater Integration and Implied Decision Types

Simple decisions, on the other hand, are those forwhich the set of appropriate choices are fully knownand articulated, and the criteria by which selectionswill be made among them are also understood,although some human judgment is required. Forexample, contingency plans are typically designedaround well understood conditions, but a human isrequired to (a) ensure the conditions have occurred(and that the information about them is correct andreliable), and (b) decide that the circumstances aresimilar enough to those envisioned when thecontingency plan was designed that the action remainsappropriate. These decisions are also based onobservations from the physical domain and processedin the information domain, but must involve humancognition before they can be made. These are thesimplest sensemaking cases because they involverecognition of patterns that have been imbedded inprior knowledge.

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Doctrine, tactics, and procedures are often written inorder to transform otherwise complex decisions intosimple decisions in the field. While a commander mayhave an infinite number of maneuvers that can bemade in given circumstances, doctrine will organizethem into a few alternatives (vertical envelopment,flanking movement, etc.) and provide criteria forselecting the correct class of maneuver across a widerange of situations.

Complex decisions are common in military affairs andinvolve having to (a) create the set of relevant options,(b) identify the criteria by which they will be compared,and (c) specify the process or method by which adecision will be made. This last step involves decidinghow the information related to criteria will be integrated,including not only weightings, but also the role ofuncertainty. The formal course of action analysisapproach taught in military schools is designed to helpsenior commanders with complex decisions. C4ISRprocesses and systems cannot do anything more thanprovide support to complex decisions. Capabilitiessuch as rapidly, currently, and correctly providingresponses to the Commander’s Critical InformationRequirements (CCIRs) and generating richvisualizations that both integrate information from awide variety of sources and also focus the commanderand key staff on the crucial decisions required in thebattlespace will be required. Note that even in complexdecisions there is some very real overlap between thefive key C4ISR functions: battlespace monitoring,awareness, understanding the military situation, thesensemaking process, developing command intent,and battle management.

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Perhaps most significantly, new collaborationtechnologies will make it possible to consult withfunctional experts, commanders and staffs at all levelsand at distant locations, and existing data orknowledge bases rapidly and efficiently. Complexdecisions are those where collaboration has beenshown, in laboratory research and some militaryexercises, to be most likely to improve decision quality.

Integration Over Time

The natural consequence of the tighter integrationacross function and echelon is greater integration overtime. As the currency of battlespace monitoring andawareness improves, the length of time required torecognize that a change in command intent is neededdeclines, while the opportunity to see decisionrequirements ahead of time increases. Similarly, asdecision transparency increases due to the network,the distinction between command intent and executionblurs and these processes become merged. Ratherthan seeking to create command intent that will last along time in order to give subordinates an opportunityto plan for and execute them properly, the C4ISRprocess is postured to make many interrelateddecisions that form a coherent whole and can berapidly updated at irregular times depending onsituational development. As the need for hierarchicalcoordination declines, the potential for collaborationand coherent patterns of action across echelons andfunctions increases. This increased speed results inimproved agility and adaptability. Obvious indicatorsthat this integration is occurring are increasingnumbers of contingencies within the plans, focusedinformation or intelligence requirements that enable

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the force to recognize the conditions identified in thosecontingency plans, and more rapid adjustments whenimportant developments occur in the battlespace. Inessence, a better adaptive control system is createdand more self-synchronization is enabled.

Integration Across Geography

The extension of the argument to greater integrationacross geographic space should be obvious. Fewercontrol measures (boundaries of action) are requiredbecause all the units are aware of the locations, status,and actions of the others. For the same reason,providing support across distance becomes easier.For example, an overhead sensor may be able toprovide general location information for a target thatis used to vector a UAV to get more precise locationinformation and guide a stand-off weapon to the target.While these assets have historically been controlledby different command centers, their use of a commonnetwork enables the sensor-to-shooter function to besupported with little regard to who owns the sensor,the shooter, or which piece of the battlespace.Similarly, ground units fighting near the seam betweencommands will be able to coordinate their tactics asthough they had a common commander.

At higher levels of command (operational, for example),this greater integration across geography will simplifycreating a coherent understanding of the battlespaceand its dynamics, enable coherent sensemaking thatlinks adjacent and multiple echelon command intentand plans into a coherent whole, and enable much moreagile and responsive synchronization of effects. Inparticular, the ability to tie different types of forces and

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weapons (from direct fire to information weapons) intoa coherent package will be greatly enhanced. Hencethe greater integration will occur both in the informationdomain and in the cognitive domain. However, the mostvaluable impact will be greater synchronization ofactions and hence effects.

Overall Change

Figure 62 illustrates the overall integration that canbe anticipated. As the C4ISR system becomesnetwork-centric, integration will naturally occur acrossgeographic space, over time, across echelons ofcommand, and across functional arenas. Obviously,this will transform the structure of the C4ISR systemand process into one dependent on the capacity tocollaborate, and often to one that will depend on self-synchronization. Done well, this can be foreseen togenerate much faster C4ISR as well as more effectivemilitary forces. All this assumes, of course, that thenecessary technological investments are made andthat the forces have personnel, training, and doctrineto exploit these advantages in information.

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Figure 62. Overall Anticipated Integration

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Vulnerabilities and Remaining Issues

Beyond the relatively simple questions of developingand integrating the technologies needed, two familiesof key issues must be addressed if network-centricC4ISR is to be as successful as envisioned. First, thequality of information needed for such a system mustbe made available. Second, adequate informationassurance is necessary.

Information quality is crucial because the entire C4ISRprocess depends on correctly perceiving the militarysituation and in creating a common perception acrossall the actors. Not only must the situational monitoringbe common, it must also be correctly perceived. Theseperceptions must not only be common and correct,but they must also be perceived as credible in theeyes of the users. If commanders and key staffperceive major uncertainties, they can be expected to(and as military commanders should) proceedcautiously, using their actions to develop betterawareness and contingency plans to ensure agility astheir knowledge of the battlespace changes with thereceipt of new or corrected information. Moving froma world, as Van Creveld discusses, where the goal ofthe C4ISR systems is to reduce uncertainty, to one inwhich its principal function is to exploit high qualityinformation assumes improved information anddecisionmakers who believe that information. If thesystem fails to meet that need or to create confidencein its products, the process will not be transformed.

Similarly, information assurance is an essentialassumption of these changes. If adversaries are ableto capture or corrupt the information in the C4ISRsystem, both wrong-headed actions and paralysis ofdecisionmaking become distinct possibilities. Hence

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the integrity of the data and information systemsbecome a primary concern and limit on thetransformation of C4ISR.

Nothing we have said about the potential of technologyshould be understood to suggest either the removalof the element of uncertainty or a reduction in the roleof the military commander and staff. Uncertainty willbe a part of any foreseeable future battlespace. Betterinformation technology and more integrated C2processes should, however:

• Reduce the uncertainty;

• Help commanders and staffs be aware of andunderstand the residual uncertainty; and

• Take steps to overcome the effects ofuncertainty.

Similarly, improved C4ISR should enable thecommander and key staff to focus their time andattention on more complex problems and use theirjudgment and expertise more effectively.

In addition, the increased integration of future C4ISRshould not be understood to suggest a lack ofspecialization. Indeed, some of the most advancedconcepts for applying information technologies, suchas “ring of fire” and Network Centric Warfare, actuallyenvision more specialized sets of assets interacting inways that allow synchronized effects. Admiral ArthurCebrowski has argued, for example, that one implicationof new information technologies is that unmannedsensors will be put at risk while personnel and fightingplatforms are kept farther from harm.2 Similarly, inOOTW the improved information systems capabilitymakes it possible to more correctly assign

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responsibilities to appropriate specialized organizations(e.g., medical NGOs, NGOs providing food, hostgovernment agencies providing shelter, military forcesproviding security) and to synchronize their efforts overtime and space. Indeed, better information technologiesand more integrated C2 processes enable gains in bothefficiency and effectiveness.

C2 Organization

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of C2 in theInformation Age is the way it will alter C2 organizations.The military culture, both in the U.S. and in foreignmilitaries, is firmly anchored in a functionallydecomposed structure, both in terms of fightingelements (the division of responsibilities acrossServices and within Services across branches suchas armor and artillery on land or air, surface, andsubsurface in naval warfare) and in terms of staffelements (personnel, intelligence, operations, etc.).These divisions are engrained in traditions, training,and experience. They represent a significant elementof the military culture and the self-definition of manyofficers and non-commissioned officers. Hence, theywill be resistant to change.

However, these current organizational decompositionsare products of the technologies and informationcapabilities that were available to the military whenthey were developed. For example, weapons platformshave for generations carried their own sensors ordepended on the five senses of their operators. In theInformation Age, sensors can be decoupled fromweapons platforms and, in many cases, from mannedplatforms. Hence, the sensors can be placed at risk,not the people. Organizationally, information from

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sensors can be made available to potential shootersfar from the threat. In such circumstances, andparticularly when the need for rapid reaction is crucial(targets are increasingly fleeting, stand-off weaponswith terminal guidance are increasingly available, etc.),the artificial distinction between intelligence assets(sensors) and operations assets (shooters) makes littlesense. Once priorities are set and the criteria formatching weapons to targets are understood (includingthe quality of the information available to ensure onlythe correct targets are served and collateral damagehas been considered), the fewer organizationalbarriers to collaborative planning and synchronizationof activities that remain, the better.

Change in C2 organization is crucial to achieving thebenefits available in the Information Age. This can beexpected to be a long pole in the tent because of thecultural impediments as well as the perceived highcost of getting it wrong. The very great difficulty oftrying out novel organizational approaches (findingcommanders and staffs who can undertakeexperimental approaches without creating problemswith their current training and levels of skill, findingfacilities that can support such tests, etc.) has alreadyemerged as a practical issue. In the end, however,the full impact of Information Age concepts andtechnologies cannot be achieved without appropriatechanges to C2 organization and empirical datacollection in structured war games, exercises, andexperiences. As argued earlier, human behavior issimply too complex to model or treat by assumption.

Organization can be understood as simply a numberof entities, having specific responsibilities, and unitedfor a common purpose. Note that the entities do not

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have to be different. For example, tank formations maydeploy with some elements screening for others whoare organized into a main battle force. On the otherhand, typical military organizations are made up ofquite specialized entities with functionally different, butinterrelated, purposes. For example, theater air forceelements include strike aircraft, escort aircraft withmissions such as suppression and air-to-airinterception, tankers, air control aircraft, photographicaircraft, and others.

Regardless of force composition, C2 organizationshould be understood to be the interaction betweenthree very different aspects:

• The structure of the organization;

• The functional distribution of roles; and

• The capacity of the entities and systems thatmake up the C2 system.

Military organizational structures have traditionallybeen seen as hierarchical, with the distribution ofauthority identical to the distribution of information.Even today, formal correspondence intended for anymember of a military command is addressed to thecommanding officer of the organization (a practice thatis disappearing as an Internet-based model of e-mailemerges as common practice). However, oneimmediate impact of Information Age Warfare hasbeen to decouple the flow of information from themilitary hierarchy. As more and more networks havebeen introduced and stovepipes have been removed,the commander’s role, and that of the headquarters,has been altered in very fundamental ways.

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Figure 63. Structure, Function, Capacity, and Their Impacts

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Perhaps more important in the long run, the principlethat form follows function means that this new, lesscentralized information flow will inevitably lead tochanges in the work patterns. Business process re-engineering in modern corporations is all aboutmanaging this process intelligently rather than havingit emerge with unintended consequences. Militaryorganizations are beginning to see changes in the waythey do business as Information Age technologiesbecome available and as Information Age conceptsare adopted. But they are not always in control of thischange. Some of the more business-like militaryfunctions, such as sustainment, scheduling long-haultransportation, and medical support, have begun tobenefit from relatively straightforward adoption of newbusiness models. However, the management of forcesengaged in real-world missions is only beginning toexperience these changes. Ultimately, major changes(flattening of organizations, including removal of wholelevels of command; elimination of redundant functions,such as battle damage assessment in a battlespacethat is constantly monitored; use of collaboration toenable integration; and automation of simpledecisions) will occur. However, the issue remains openwhether they will occur (a) as a result of deliberatechoices by the U.S. military or as unintendedconsequences or (b) as a result of changes initiatedby adversaries or efforts by the United States tocapitalize on its Information Age potential.

The distribution of functional roles is the second wayin which organizations differ. The classic descriptionof a bureaucracy includes increasingly specializedelements with interlocking roles. Military structureshave that feature. One way C2 organizations can be

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different is by adding new elements (e.g., a civil-militaryoperations center to manage the interface with privatevoluntary organizations, non-governmentalorganizations, and international organizations),combining elements in new ways (merging theintelligence and own force monitoring functions intoan information officer), or eliminating redundant orunnecessary functions.

However, functional differences also occur whencommanders or headquarters are tasked to performthe same activities at different levels of detail. Forexample, Information Age senior headquarters areexpected to generate more general directives thatspecify only missions or objectives and leave thedetails of how they are to be accomplished up tosubordinate organizations. The sensor-to-shooter loopin which targets are serviced by assets from anywherein the battlespace is a very simple form of this change.Given that target types have been prioritized and rulesor algorithms exist to allocate weapons to targets, highquality information about targets can be processedwithin that guidance with no further action from thesenior headquarters or the commander.

However, the structures and functions within a C2organization must also be designed with the capacityof the C2 systems in mind. Capacity, as used here, isthe ability to perform work. It varies with a number offactors including the inherent capabilities of theindividuals in the organization, their training andexperience, the processes and procedures they use,as well as the information processing andcommunications technologies available to supportthem. Taken together, these capacities enable the

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organization to perform at different levels ofeffectiveness and efficiency.

Note that the three key elements of C2 organization(structure, functions, and capacity) are highlyinterdependent. Hence, changing any one element ora significant part of an element will enable (and mayrequire) changes in the others. Failure to make thethree realms consistent will at least result in lostopportunities and may well reduce overall performancebecause the C2 system loses coherency. The primaryimpact of Information Age technologies on the militarywill not be their direct functionality, but rather thechanges they enable in structure, function, and otheraspects of capacity, as well as their impacts on theability to accomplish missions.

Information Age military organizations will enablecomponents to share knowledge and collaborate onkey issues and plans, as well as synchronize theiractions. However, in order to work together, theseorganizations will still require guidance. Part of thatguidance can be developed independent of themission in the form of shared prior knowledge:common education and training, doctrine, tactics,techniques, and procedures. However, the missionspecific element of that guidance will be reflected inthe specific commander’s intent. This crucial elementprovides the purpose essential for individuals andentities to unite their efforts.

Commander’s Intent

Commander’s intent is a simple statement that goesbeyond the mission to communicate how that missionis to be accomplished. It focuses on the decisive

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elements of how the mission is to be accomplished.At the same time, it is a very general statement, leavingroom for initiative and interpretation by individualcommanders. Establishing clear and meaningfulcommander’s intent is at the heart of any C2 system.It provides the means for subordinate commandersand functional commands to focus their efforts. Inessence, when everyone has a commonunderstanding of the commander’s intent, they arebetter able to make mutually supporting decisions.

This enables both the delegation of decisions anddecisionmaking arenas. These can be contingencies(reactions to pre-established variations in the operatingenvironment, such as the enemy force committing itsreserve in a particular sector) or simply choices aboutthe best way to achieve selected goals. In addition,clear commander’s intent allows all the friendly actorsto recognize circumstances that call for changes inplans or behaviors.

In order to be effective, the commander’s intent mustbe established and disseminated very early in theprocess. Once it has been established, all the actorsin the C4ISR system possess the essentialunderstanding of how the organization will approachthe problem and can work efficiently and effectivelyboth individually and in collaboration. Changes incommander’s intent mean fundamental changes in theway the overall organization behaves and must,therefore, be disseminated quickly and simultaneouslythroughout the military organization.

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Approaches to C2

Two decades ago the Defense Information SystemsAgency (DISA, at the time called the DefenseCommunications Agency) sponsored broad research ona variety of historical systems approaches to commandarrangements,3 including that of the United States (inWWII, Korea, Vietnam, and various crises), UK (in WWIIand the modern period), the USSR (in WWII and themodern period), Israel (in 1956, 1967, and 1973), China(in the modern period), NATO, and others perceived tohave effective military establishments. Lessons learnedand changes made by outstanding commanders suchas Eisenhower, Nimitz, and Bradley, as well as withinsignificant commands (such as the 12th Air Force andthe British Fighter Command during World War II), werealso examined.

One product of that historical and comparativeresearch was the identification of three major types ofC2 approaches, each with at least two importantsubtypes. All six approaches have been successful,but each is more appropriate for some types of forcesthan others. Figure 64 shows these subtypes and therelative headquarter’s capacity (information processingand military art capability) required to apply themsuccessfully. The key distinction is the level ofcentralization required, ranging from the heavilydistributed control-free to the inherently centralizedcyclic approaches. The three categories of directivespecificity reflect the level of detail required in thedirectives issued by headquarters in each type ofsystem, ranging from mission-specific to objective-specific to order-specific.

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Figure 64. Historical Choices Among C2 System Philosophy

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Control-free command centers (the most distributedapproach) seek to assign missions to theirsubordinates, who are then expected to employ allthe assets available to them to accomplish themissions. This requires a military organization wherethe lower echelons are competent and trusted implicitlyby the higher echelons. The system designed by theGermans for World War II is the case that fits mostclearly in this category. The success of Germany’sblitzkrieg was due not only to the superior weaponsand mobility of the German forces, but also to thecapacity of their officers and non-commissionedofficers to operate independently, even under tryingconditions. (The fact that Hitler and the Nazi party ofteninterfered with this system is one major reason that itdid not work effectively all the time.) This ideaapproaches the self-synchronization concept in thecurrent era.

The Israelis admired the philosophy of the Germanapproach, but felt that it was perhaps toodecentralized, particularly given their narrow marginfor error in wars that threatened their national security.As a result, the Israelis have developed selective-control systems in which senior headquarters alsoissue mission-type orders and expect subordinates totake broad and deep initiatives. However, their seniorheadquarters follow the battle in detail and areprepared to intervene in the event of a majoropportunity or major threat that the lower-levelcommand does not perceive or cannot manage. Thisapproach requires great discipline on the part of thesenior commanders, who have tactical-levelinformation and considerable skill as tacticalcommanders but only intervene when operational or

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strategic issues emerge. In essence, the Israelis preferrapid reaction on the battlefield but seek to maintainthe capability for central intervention.

Taken together, the control free and selective controlsystems comprise the more general class of mission-oriented command and control arrangements. Eachlevel tends to assign missions to its subordinates andpermit them to define further details of the militarysituation, beginning with selecting the objectivesnecessary to accomplish their missions. Thepresumption is that the commander on the scene hasmore current and accurate information than seniorheadquarters and has adequate resources to exploitlocal opportunities and protect the force whileaccomplishing the mission. This assumption is betterin today’s information-rich operating environment thanit has been in the past. Lower-level commanders canbenefit from information that has traditionally been heldat higher levels and from direct feeds from platformssuch as UAVs. Moreover, through a combination ofdoctrine, training, experience, and mission orders, thesubordinate commander is presumed to understandthe intent and overall concept of the operation of thesenior commander so that local actions will not beinconsistent with the larger military mission or theactions of other commanders.

UK doctrine can best be understood as problem-bounding. That is, the senior headquarters tend tocompose their directives in terms of the objectives tobe accomplished but couch them in very general terms.Hence, directives are more specific than mere missionassignments and some explicit boundaries (deadlinesfor achieving some objectives, guidance on risks thatmight be accepted or avoided, etc.) are articulated.

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British plans for an operation tend to be less detailedthan those of Americans, often by a factor of three toone, reflecting this lack of detail.

For their parts, the U.S. Army and Navy have, sinceWorld War II, tended to issue problem-solvingdirectives in which missions and objectives arearticulated for two levels of subordinates andsubstantial guidance about how the objectives are tobe achieved is also included. Although this approachprovides more detailed direction than the Britishphilosophy, considerable room remains for lower-levelinitiative and creativity in accomplishing the objectives.At the same time, however, the high-technology assetswhich U.S. forces tend to employ often mean thatsubordinates are heavily dependent on seniorcommanders for key assets such as lift, intelligence,supplies, and precision munitions.

Together the problem-bounding and problem-solvingapproaches comprise the objective-oriented approachto command arrangements. They assume some levelof trust, creativity, and initiative in subordinatecommands but stress synchronization of assets andactions. As a result, they assume greater coordinationand more continuous contact between superior andsubordinate and among subordinate commands. Thisprovides greater control. These systems were broughtto fruition by the resource-rich, in attrition wars, wheresuperior material and technology were applied to weardown adversaries with limited resources (such as Axispowers in World War II).

Ultimately someone in every military system issuesorders to subordinates (directives that tell units andpeople what to do, where to do it, how and when it is

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to be done). However, this is only done byheadquarters above the tactical level in verycentralized systems (or in cases where politicallysensitive assets such as nuclear or chemical weaponsare involved). These have historically been systemswhere the commanders at lower levels are consideredweak, unable, or unlikely to take the initiative ordevelop effective courses of action on their own.

The Cold War era Soviet system, for example, canbest be described as interventionist, in that it reliedheavily on central authority to issue directives, but alsomaintained very detailed information about the battle(requiring continuous and specific reports fromsubordinates two layers down) and attemptedcentralized control through detailed directives. TheSoviets used exercises and training of front line unitsto ensure that they could execute a variety of quitestandard maneuvers, from breakthrough assaults andriver crossings for land forces to standardized attackpatterns against U.S. carrier battle-groups at sea.Senior headquarters specified the time and place forsuch preplanned operations and controlled themthrough the detailed preplanning process.

The greatest degree of centralization occurs, however,when the senior headquarters issues orders to allsubordinates but does so on the basis of a preset cycletime. The Chinese Army and the Soviet World War IIforces adopted this approach because theircommunications structures could not providecontinuous information to the central headquarters andbecause their subordinate organizations wereculturally unable to display initiative in the absence ofdetailed directives. The U.S. Air Force has followedthe same approach since World War II, but for a very

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different reason—the complexity of air operations hasmeant the information required, coordination needed,and relative scarcity of the assets involved tend todrive the decisionmaking up the chain of command.The USAF has chosen to invest in communicationssystems so they can issue orders at the numbered AirForce level. The 24-hour air tasking order is cyclic,however, in part because the amount of processingneeded to develop these intricate plans requiresrelatively long lead times. Flexibility is created in alltasking orders by creating a variety of on-call missionsand by making adjustments “on the fly” by divertingaircraft from one specific mission to another, higherpriority target, or mission.

The existence of these six distinct types of commandand control systems in prominent militaryestablishments helps to explain why coalitionoperations are plagued by interoperability problemsat the cultural, organizational, and the procedural(doctrinal) levels, to say nothing of the technicalcommunications systems they use. Successful jointand coalition operations will require adoptingconsistent command and control philosophies andcreating command arrangements that enable elementsof the force to operate coherently.

Capacity Requirements for Different CommandArrangements

Major differences exist in the capacities required forthe six types of command arrangements. Figure 65illustrates those differences.

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Figure 65. Capacity Requirements for Different Command Arrangements

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First, assuming that the quality of information providedis constant across all cases, the more centralized thedecisionmaking, the more information required at thesenior headquarters, which means greater detail ineach report and situation update transmitted. However,major differences exist in the frequency with whichupdates are required. Control-free systems, in whichthe central commander is not seeking to control theschedule of events closely, require infrequent updates.

The two approaches that seek to issue objective-specificdirectives, problem-bounding and problem-solving,require moderately frequent updates. Cyclic commandassumes periodic, paced updates, the lowestfrequency. Interventionist and selective control systems,both seeking to assert themselves on an as-requiredbasis, must have almost continuous updates about thesituation, making the capacity required very high.

The information-processing capacity required for thesedifferent approaches also varies widely. Thisrepresents the effort needed to receive the appropriateinputs, transform them into information the C2 systemcan act on, and conduct the necessary operations tosupport decisionmaking. Because the volume of inputand output to be processed is lowest for control-freesystems, the processing capacity required is also low.This grows as the degree of centralization rises.However, cyclic approaches, because they have a lowupdate rate, need less processing capacity than theirinterventionist counterparts, which must be ready toact at any time. In general, greater capability to acquire,integrate, move, and process larger amounts ofinformation rapidly makes more centralizeddecisionmaking possible.

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Indeed, current discussion of the need for new C2approaches in an era of Information Age Warfareexplicitly considers situations where the best (mostcurrent, accurate, and complete) information may nolonger be located at the subordinate commandengaged in the field, but rather may be located atsenior headquarters. This implies a change in the bestapproach to C2, although considerable choice existsin how information is distributed using state-of-the-arttechnologies. The increasing need for reach-backcapability and collaborative tools is a recognition ofthese changes. Whenever speed of decisionmakingbecomes crucial, creation of automated approachesto decisionmaking becomes relevant.

The amount of internal information processing requiredis minimized in control-free systems and maximizedin those systems seeking to issue orders from the top,particularly the interventionist model. The same patterngenerally holds for the quantity of output generatedand, therefore, the coordination and explanation ofwhat is wanted. Here, however, the interventionistapproach (as practiced by the Cold War era Soviets)is able to take advantage of pre-real-time learning bysubordinates so it can, in essence, call plays like afootball team and does not have to provide detailedinstructions in every order. However, this approachlimits the flexibility of the command system, making itdifficult to make subtle adjustments in response toopportunities or threats on the battlefield.

Finally, the different command approaches requirevery different capacities among the subordinatecommanders and their organizations. In general, themore centralized the command arrangements, the lessrequired from subordinates. Competence here refers

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to the ability to plan, coordinate, and execute militaryfunctions. Similarly, the less-centralized systemsrequire more creativity and initiative on the part ofsubordinate commands. In fact, classic cyclic systems(such as that of Stalinist Russia during World War II)are perceived to punish subordinate commands thatundertake creative activities or move off the detailedorders or preplanned activities they are given.

The degree of centralization adopted also influencesthe degree to which automation can be used to achievethe capacity required. Mission-specific systemsprimarily assign highly creative roles to the seniorheadquarters, with selective-control systems bothneeding more overall capacity and having morepotential for automation of those functions theyperform. Objective-oriented systems (which requiresomewhat more capacity) can be more automated. Inparticular, the problem-solving system in whichdetailed guidelines and planning for logistics and othersupport are relatively simple to automate can bemanaged at the higher levels. Interventionist systemsneed the most capacity, but are also the easiest toautomate because they rely more on prior training andare designed to generate prepackaged, good-enough,or suboptimal solutions that can be implementedsuccessfully. Cyclic headquarters are designed to dothe same work as interventionist (issue orders) butperform each task less often, which reduces their needfor overall capacity.

Note, however, that the increased responsibility andauthority delegated to lower units in mission-orientedstructures also means that these units must have (a)greater information, knowledge, and situational

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understanding, and (b) more capacity to collaborateand synchronize their actions.

Spectrum of C2 Organization Options

As Figure 66 indicates, a range of C2 organizationaloptions is available in the Information Age. Thetechnical capability exists to support every option fromfully centralized to fully decentralized (self-synchronization). The case of no organization at allhas been disregarded since it implies no structure,functional specialization, or organizational capacity.Hence, it implies a leaderless mass not connected bycommander’s intent, making cooperation a randomevent. The ideal C2 organization for Information AgeWarfare remains unproven, but is hypothesized to becollaborative and decentralized C2 with the complexityof the mission, the need to cooperate with others(coalitions, non-governmental actors, etc.), the qualityof the supporting information technologies, the needfor specialized functions such as logistics and timecoordination, the quality of the units, and the degreeto which common doctrine, tactics, and proceduresare available, all impacting the best choice. Seriousresearch, including experimentation, will be neededto resolve this issue. This may be the single mostimportant arena where research is necessary. Oldstructures will be seriously depleted unless new onesare shown to be superior.

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Figure 66. Spectrum of C2 Organization Options

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The fact that all of these organizational types remainrelevant is demonstrated in Figure 67. Each of theseideal types, except no organization, havedemonstrable benefits as well as known costs. At leastin theory, decentralized C2, or self-synchronization,holds the greatest promise. We hypothesize, therefore,that Information Age organizational innovation shouldmove in that direction. At the same time, collaborativeC2, which makes less demand on the quality of theunits available and may be a better match for theexisting force structures, also appears to be anattractive target. Note, moreover, that the key issuesappear to be within our control—generating effectiveand efficient collaboration tools and training.

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Figure 67. Information Age C2 Organizations

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Organizational progress can be expected to be a slowprocess, but can also be the focus of important andexciting exploration, research, and experimentation.Programs designed to make progress in this area mustbe a top priority.

1Col. John R. Boyd, USAF, Patterns of Conflict (UnpublishedLecture, 1977). Col. John R. Boyd, USAF, “A Discourse onWinning and Losing.” A collection of unpublished briefings andessays (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Library, 1976-1992),http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/boyd/essence/eowl_frameset.htm, January 1996.2Vadm Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN, and John J. Gartska, “NetworkCentric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,” Proceedings of the NavalInstitute 124:1 (January, 1998), pp. 28-35.3Headquarters Effectiveness Program Summary Task 002(McLean, VA: Defense Systems, Inc., September 1983).

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What IsCollaboration?

Understanding Collaborationin a Military Context

Collaboration, as used here, involves actors activelysharing data, information, knowledge, perceptions

(awareness of facts or factors, understandings ofsituations, etc.), or concepts when they are workingtogether toward a common purpose and how theymight achieve that purpose efficiently or effectively.

Note, first, what collaboration is not. When informationsystems passively (without current, conscious humanintent) share data, information, or knowledge (for exampledoctrinal publications) or make it available to a variety ofusers, no collaboration has taken place. These are simplecases of sharing. Moreover, exchanges that are notrelated to a common purpose should be excluded. Forexample, routine reports on unit status or spot reportson enemy activity are normally only loosely coupled tothe tasks, missions, or objectives of the organization andare shared passively, not actively. Similarly, routinebriefings, such as the “5 o’clock follies” in many commandcenters, are not collaborative events unless the

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participants take advantage of them to interact to resolveparticular issues.

Collaboration, then, requires active communication aspart of working together. The classic military exampleis collaborative planning, where actors with differentfunctional and geographic areas of responsibility focustheir attention on achieving assigned missions. Theirgoals are to create a common (shared) understandingof the situation; take advantage of their differentialknowledge, expertise, information, and capabilities;and organize the activities they control in time andspace such that they will (a) avoid mutual interferenceand (b) have a synergistic effect. In other words, theywant to plan so their actions will be synchronized. Ofcourse, collaboration may well extend into anintegrated process of execution/replanning as themission is pursued.

Integrated product teams are essentially organizationalforms designed to encourage (or ensure) collaborationtakes place. They were created under the theory thatcomplex problems often require functionally differentexpertise. They assume that the costs of thecollaboration (whether time or resources) will more thanbe recovered by the higher quality of the results, whichblend the knowledge available from the differentsources. In some cases they are also seen as morerapid, particularly when they replace serial processeswhere each group waited for another to finish beforethey could begin, or processes that shut down whilepeople rested. In that sense, military command centers,which have employed shifts over time and usedoverlapping duty hours to hand off their knowledge andsituational awareness for decades, were pioneers in

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collaboration. However, most of that collaborationhistorically took place within functional areas.

Finally, inherent in the idea of collaboration in a militarycontext is the notion that a mission will beaccomplished. When the collaboration is used toensure more efficient mission accomplishment, theappropriate metrics are Measures of Performance(MOP) that show how the same level of effectivenesscan be accomplished with fewer resources or higherlevels achieved with the same level of resources.These metrics often focus on residual force levels orcapacity after mission accomplishment, but can alsolook at levels or rates of force expenditure duringmission accomplishment. When the focus is onmission accomplishment itself, the appropriate metricsare Measures of Effectiveness (MOE), and may alsoextend to Measures of Force Effectiveness (MOFE),or Measures of Policy Effectiveness (MOPE).

How Can Collaboration Differ?

The first key to understanding a concept is to define itclearly, the second is to describe it well. Collaborationhas a number of different dimensions, each of whichcan vary. These include media, time required,continuity, breadth, content richness, domain,structure, participant roles, and the linkages acrosswhich it takes place. Small wonder, then, that scholarshave trouble measuring collaboration and its impact.This multidimensional concept must be decomposedand the variety of its significant dimensions must becontrolled in order for researchers to observe andmeasure its quality and its impact.

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Most obviously, collaboration varies by medium. Face-to-face is the standard against which all others aremeasured. Video teleconferencing is the mostelaborate alternative and has been used by senior U.S.commanders in planning and executing complexoperations such as Haiti. White boards and othertechnologies that allow actors to look at the sameimages have also become widely available and areused increasingly. Not only Microsoft PowerPoint, butother types of shared images (maps, overlays, etc.)are now readily available. Voice technologies havelong been a standard on the battlefield and haveproven robust. Teletypes remain available in somecommand centers, though they have largely beensupplanted by computer technologies that allow moreimmediate exchange of written messages, such as e-mail. In some command centers and across echelonsof some commands, e-mail has become the dominantmedium for collaboration. Computer technologies alsoallow common use of data and databases to supportthe collaboration process.

The time required for a given medium to enablecollaboration can also vary. As communicationstechnologies continue to mature and interoperabilityproblems are resolved across warfare arenas andfunctional specializations, this factor will become lessof a constraint on the collaboration process. However,collaborative processes consume time—the actorshave to communicate with one another. They alsoengage in a variety of behaviors inherent in thecollaboration process—exchanging information,establishing agendas and priorities, negotiating aboutthe process and the common ground they will agreeon when addressing the problem, positing alternative

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approaches and solutions, and so forth. All theserequire time.

Collaboration can also differ in terms of continuity, orwhether the process is synchronous or asynchronous.When distributed headquarters are working in differenttime zones or the task is such that one actor isdistracted or unavailable, collaboration tools that donot require continuous participation (such as e-mail)may be preferable. However, they have some impacton the quality of the interaction. Whether that is animprovement (everyone is working on their prime time,actors have a chance to examine inputs and give themthought before responding) or a decrement (lack oftimely inquiry and response, delay, absence ofdialogue or free wheeling discussion) is not wellunderstood. In all likelihood, the impact of continuityand the circumstances under which it is desirable willrequire applied research.

The breadth of collaboration is also important. Thisreflects who participates, including the question ofwhether all the relevant types of expertise are availableduring the collaborative process. Sheer numbers alsomatter. All other things being equal, more people willrequire more time to establish common ground and togenerate consensus on what is to be done as well ashow to go about it.

The richness of the content must also be recognizedas a dimension in collaboration. At a very basic level,individuals may be working together by simply sharinginformation and data. Genuine collaboration, however,requires that they be dealing at the conceptual levelby pooling their knowledge and/or exploring theirunderstandings of the situation. Discussions that seek

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agreement on facts are not as rich as those that seekto place those facts into context, identify the patternswithin them that help the actors to correctly classifythe situation and understand its significance for them,examine ways to influence that situation, and projectthe alternative futures that may arise from it. Mostinstances of collaboration are, therefore, in both thecognitive and information domains. While the creativepart of the process takes place in the brains of theindividuals involved, the actual exchange of ideasrequires the use of the information domain.

Collaboration processes can also differ in structure.This actually implies several possible differences. First,the authority structure can vary. Pure peer groups willoperate very differently than hierarchical groups inwhich leaders are apparent. Groups can also differ ina role when the members are functional specialists orgeneralists for the problem at hand. Structure alsoincludes the communication pattern—whether themembers of the group are multiconnected orconnected by some other pattern. Research by theSoviets has shown that different dynamics occur inhierarchical communication, wheels and spokes,simple stars, and multiconnected systems.1 Finally,structures also differ in terms of task organization.Some collaboration is between individuals withdifferent functional roles who are seeking to coordinatetheir activities, others are conducted betweenindividuals who share functional responsibilities. Suchgroups may also be temporary (brought together onlyfor a time to accomplish a specific task or set of tasks)or permanent.

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The roles of the actors, in ways other than authorityrelationships, can also differ. Specialists andgeneralists play different roles, as do those who areintegrators and facilitators in the team. These roles,in turn, help to determine the types of boundariesspanned. These are most often functional boundaries,but in C4ISR they may also be boundaries betweenechelons of command, across geography (spatialboundaries), or over time (when current operationsare blended with future plans).

Regardless of the type of collaboration, informationtechnologies are only enablers. In many militarysituations collaboration is difficult or impossible unlessspecialized technologies are available. However,whether collaboration occurs at all, and the quality ofthe collaboration is determined by a number of externalfactors, including leadership (is collaboration made apriority, does the commander set a tone of interaction,etc.), organization, doctrine, training, experience,perceived time available, and the established TTP(tactics, techniques, and procedures) of the force.

Collaboration in the InformationDomain: State of the Practice

Traditional collaboration in the information domain hasextended to little more than data sharing in the termsused in this volume. Data was often processed locallyor at very high levels and not really shared acrossechelons or functional arenas. Each command centeracted as a sink for both data and information, soakingup all it could find and expending major effort tointegrate it and come up with a rich understanding of

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the military situation. The lack of automated dataprocessing capability and the limited band widthavailable within and across command centersencouraged functional specialization throughout thesystem. The Napoleonic staff structure, designed todecompose the work of command centers, dominatedorganizational thinking, creating stovepipes both withinand across command centers. Everything wasdesigned to distill essences and present them to thecommanders and key staff members. Drill downcapability, recognized as important at all levels, wasorganized into these same relatively isolated functionalareas. While efforts were made to coordinate both upand down the chain of command and across functionalareas, these efforts were heavily restricted by thecommunications technologies available and also oftencarried on within functional stovepipes.

This traditional system meant that most collaborationtook place in the form of C4ISR products: briefings,reports, displays, plans, orders, etc. These productswere heavily formatted according to doctrine andagreed TTPs. This made them familiar and relativelyeasy to use. However, they also lacked richness—data with differing latencies were mixed together, theuncertainty underlying presentations was not displayedand often known only to those who prepared theproducts. Assumptions (templates when adversaryunit locations were only partially known, rates ofmovement assigned to friendly and adversary forces,etc.) were seldom made explicit.

This austere collaboration capability was made worseby interoperability problems. The intelligence functionhad, for security reasons, independent communicationssystems. The logistic functions, because they involved

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a great deal of traffic, developed another independentset of communications. Fires were controlled onsystems that were also independent of the commandnets, though these two systems could usually bebrought together in an emergency. However, controllersfor close air support were traditionally on a differentsystem from those responsible for ground fire. In manycases commanders would literally call together theirsubordinate commanders and/or key staff to collaboratebecause there was no other way to ensure a richcommon understanding of the mission, commandersintent, and the selected course of action.

Traditional C2, because of weak information sharing,was often a quest to ensure that mutual interferencein the battlespace was avoided. For example, in aseries of division-level U.S. Army exercises in the1980s, a primary problem turned out to be thecoordination of road use in the rear areas. When theseproblems were avoided, unit performance was greatlyimproved. Similarly, when collaboration is heavilyconstrained, the creativity of commanders at all levelsis restricted. This almost guarantees that the onlysynergy that occurs is that already recognized indoctrine or TTP.

Collaboration in the InformationDomain: State of the Possible

When collaboration in the information domain isenriched, considerable improvement can be expected.First, the sharing of data greatly improves the likelihoodof developing a common (shared) picture of thebattlespace. When data is pooled from sensors, thequality of the underlying database can be expected to

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improve. That same database will also be more up todate—the delay inherent in one sitting on a data item,placing it into a product, and disseminating that productall but disappears. In essence, the fusion of informationwhich greatly enhances its richness or quality issignificantly improved by sharing data.

Second, by sharing information more rapidly a similarvalue-generating effect occurs—more commandcenters are aware of more information sooner. Thishas potential synergistic impacts. The information itemis seen from multiple perspectives—for example, itsintelligence, operations, and logistics implications canbe recognized sooner. Similarly, reviewing the datafrom multiple perspectives increases the likelihood ofanomaly detection. This decreases false alarms andguards against bad data. This is very importantbecause even a little bad data goes a long way todegrading one’s information position. Working in ahighly uncertain environment with adversaries who areattempting to conceal their activities and deceive thefriendly C4ISR system makes anomaly detection acrucial tool in maintaining high quality situationawareness. Finally, the more rapid dissemination ofinformation by means of preset automated datasharing also allows for more rapid integration of newdata into battlespace awareness. In the InformationAge, speed of command will often be crucial.

Finally, Information Age systems also allow for betteravailability of prior knowledge. Military forces,particularly technologically sophisticated ones, dependon the doctrine, training, and skills of their personnel.However, not all forces are fully up to speed in all areasall the time. Forces train for a set of operatingenvironments, with an expected set of coalition

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partners, and specific classes of adversaries, as wellas with particular types of equipment. The globalresponsibilities of the U.S. military, however, virtuallyguarantee that some unfamiliar locations, adversaries,equipment, or coalition partners will be encountered.An Information Age military will, however, haveenormous reach-back capability to access knowledgeand examine it both individually and collectively.Access to databases (plans and detailed maps ofurban environments, order of battle data forunanticipated coalition partners and adversaries),manuals (field repairs for specialized equipment orforeign equipment used in the theater), informationsets (symptoms for local diseases or biologicalweapons), and knowledge (local customs, adversarydoctrine, profiles of enemy leaders) all will enableimproved operational effectiveness.

However, this improved sharing of information doesnot come without costs. These costs will primarily bein the form of greater demands for bandwidth to deliverthe shared information and an increased need forcomputational power (either in the rear or forward) toorganize and present it. The human factor problem ofaccepting what comes from a computer as real andfailing to understand the uncertainty inherent in thatcomputer product is an important issue and must beaddressed both in the training of users and in thedesign of information systems and representations.

Perhaps most important, sharing information in thebattlespace will make demands on the time andattention of commanders and key staff members whoare already heavily burdened (physically andcognitively). These individuals will also be tired andunder stress. Early work with computers inside

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armored vehicles has shown that displays can distractkey personnel from their immediate warfighting tasks.Hence, human factors will be a crucial element indesigning effective ways to share information.

Collaboration in theCognitive Domain

All collaboration passes through the information domain,even when face-to-face, collaborators send information(voice, facial expressions) to their partners. However,collaboration—sharing in order to work together towarda common purpose—actually occurs in the cognitivedomain as the partners interact and develop awareness,knowledge, understanding, and concepts that wouldnot have emerged without these exchanges.

Clearly collaboration requires communication. Whilethis is often direct, it can certainly be asynchronous.For example, academic authors have long collaboratedby exchanging written drafts, with episodic meetingsand discussions. More recently, e-mail has made thisprocess faster and simpler. However, the quality ofthe interaction can vary greatly, depending on whetherthe collaborators share a common language,background, and culture (national and organizational),the level of engagement of the participants (are theyserious, do they accept the goal), their confidence inthe collaboration medium (including their ability to useit when technical capability is required), and previousopportunities to work together.

The potential benefits of cognitive collaboration areenormous. A better understanding of the militarysituation and the factors that are driving it are the most

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obvious benefits and correspond to a commonunderstanding of the problem in the civilian arena. Theopportunity to improve planning through collaborationis also enormous. Involving both those responsiblefor conducting an operation and those responsible forsupporting it enables the development of a much richerplan as well as the achievement of greater insightsinto the contingencies that can be expected.Collaborative decisionmaking can be expected togenerate better choices, particularly when complexproblems are being addressed. Finally, collaborationwill improve the linkage between planning andexecution. As these two functions merge, effectivecollaboration will provide greater organizationalagility—the capacity to react more effectively in arapidly changing operating environment.

There is one potential drawback that should beanticipated when collaboration is used—a loss ofspeed in the C4ISR process. Research into smallgroup dynamics, decisionmaking under stress, crisisdecisionmaking, and coalition C4ISR indicates thatcollaboration slows decisionmaking.2 Hence,collaboration tools need to be designed with this pitfallin mind. At a minimum, training in the use of acollaborative environment and tools and thedevelopment of new processes that are designed towork in a collaborative environment will be essential ifthis and other potential problems are to be minimized.Increased contingency planning to take advantage ofthe richer interaction and deeper understanding of theproblem is also needed so that novel decisions incomplex situations can be reduced.

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Measuring Collaboration

Learning how to use collaboration effectively willrequire a considerable amount of experimentation,which requires the ability to measure the nature andcharacteristics of the collaborative environment andprocesses being tried. Measuring collaboration is achallenge primarily because of the many dimensionsalong which it varies. While collaboration is not a goalin itself within command and control, the C4ISRanalytic community needs to help design and improvecollaboration tools and to understand howcollaboration, C2, and mission accomplishment arerelated. Like better information, collaboration is a tooldesigned to help decisionmaking, planning, and forcesynchronization. The ultimate payoff is, therefore, ineffective and efficient actions that lead to missionaccomplishment. There is no correct level ofcollaboration in the abstract. The focus of researchshould be to identify those forms and levels ofcollaboration that pay off in military operations.

This implies that collaboration researchers need to beconstantly aware of the context in which collaborationoccurs—what kinds of groups, engaged in what typesof tasks, benefited in what ways, from which types ofcollaboration, supported by what tools. In many cases,the sheer complexity of the environment and the numberof ways collaboration can vary will make it impossibleto measure its impact cleanly. However, it should bepossible to correctly characterize the collaboration toolspresent in a given case and to accumulate researchresults across cases in a multidimensional space thatdescribe collaboration applications.

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Research teams will also have to collect data on thedegree of collaboration that takes place—frequencyof interaction, number of participants, and so forth. Astandard set of metrics for this is possible, thoughcontrolling for the opportunities to collaborate willalways be a challenge. Observers can begin byrecognizing the absence of collaboration. Zerocollaboration can be defined as the absence of workingtogether toward a common goal, regardless of whethersome information sharing occurs. Failure to activelyshare in the cognitive domain (concepts,understandings, and knowledge) would also mean thatno collaboration had taken place, even if theparticipants shared a common goal.

To take a simple example, a submarine or specialforces team that is assigned a mission and then goessilent while they carry it out cannot collaborate withother senior headquarters or other units, but they canself-synchronize their actions if they are able tomaintain an awareness of the situation, even thoughthey may be receiving new information about thesituation. In a more complicated case, twoorganizations reporting through different chains ofcommand and assigned radically different missionsmay not be able to collaborate because they do notshare a common purpose. For instance, an attackasset may destroy an adversary communicationssystem in order to carry out its mission to disruptenemy communications while an informationoperations asset may be intercepting traffic from thatsystem in order to meet its collection requirementsand give the field commander an informationadvantage. It can be anticipated that internal conflictssuch as this will be more likely to be uncovered and

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fixed as attempts are made to increase collaborationthroughout the force.

Maximum collaboration, on the other hand, can onlyoccur when certain specific capabilities exist. Giventhat two or more actors are seen to be sharing at theconceptual level and working together toward acommon purpose, their collaboration can be seen asmaximized if it is:

• Inclusive:

– all the relevant actors are involved; and

– the collaboration cuts across organizational,functional, spatial, and temporal boundaries,including echelons of command;

• Multiconnected (every actor has access to allother actors);

• Unrestricted communication (between thecollaborators);

• Participatory (all relevant actors are engaged inthe process);

• Continuous (actors are engaged withoutdisruption);

• Simultaneous (synchronous);

• Media-rich (face-to-face, with shared images,information, and data);

• Domain-rich (involves both the cognitive and theinformation domains); and

• Content-rich (involves data, information,knowledge, and understandings).

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From a research perspective, each collaborationsituation (experiment, exercise, etc.) can becharacterized both in terms of the kinds of collaborationthat are possible (for example, face-to-face is notuniversally available in distributed command centers)and what actually takes place (for example, continuouscollaboration is enabled, but the actors only collaborate6 hours per day).

Maximum collaboration is, however, only possible ina context that is appropriate in that it both motivatesthe actors and enables them to cooperate. Recentresearch on collaboration in military contexts hasshown that there are structural and situationalimpediments to success.3

First, the collaborators must be in agreement about theimportance and legitimacy of the goal being pursued.This does not mean that they will have complete orprecise agreement on the goal or purpose. Specificationof the goal and reaching consensus on what it really isare often topics of collaboration. However, unless theactors see the goal as legitimate and important, theyare not motivated to work together or to make theinvestments (temporal, informational, mental, orphysical) necessary for success. For similar reasons,the actors must also have at least a general commonunderstanding of the purpose or goal. Without this, thedialogue cannot be joined. Given broad agreement, theparties can have meaningful discussions.

Second, the collaborators need to be able tocommunicate with one another. This implies that theyhave some common language about the problemspace. Here, again, the group can be expected todevelop a more specialized language about the

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particular problem when they collaborate. However,unless they can describe the problem space in a waythey all understand, they will not be able to reachconsensus on how they can proceed. In addition,effective communication implies that the collaboratorshave both competence in using the collaborationtechnology and confidence in the technology itself.When the collaboration process is disrupted by poorhuman factors (lack of training in the use of theenvironment or tools or a mistrust of those tools), theindividuals involved are not likely to be highly motivatedand their communications are likely to be disjointedand potentially dysfunctional.

Maximum collaboration, and the success of thecollaboration that does occur, also depends on theparticipants’ knowledge and understanding of oneanother. This implies that the participants are allfamiliar with one another’s backgrounds, training, andcultures (both national and organizational). When thisprecondition is not met, most groups will find itnecessary to invest some time in introductions anddiscussion of the various perspectives within the group.In addition, the roles of the participants need to bewell understood within the group. This includesknowing who the leaders are, what representationalroles are present (organizational, disciplinary, etc.),specializations within the group, and so forth. Onlywhen these conditions are met does the group find iteasy to collaborate effectively.

1Monograph by V.V. Druzhinin “Concept, Algorithm, Decision (ASoviet View)” (Moscow: Translated and published under auspicesof USAF, USGPO, Volume 6 of “Soviet Military Thought,” SeriesStock # 0870-00344, 1972).

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2David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, CommandArrangements for Peace Operations (Washington, DC: NationalDefense University Press, May 1995).3Julia Loughran and Marcy Stahl, “The DICE Experiment:Creating and Evaluating a Web-based Collaboration Environmentfor Interagency Training” briefing (Vienna, VA: ThoughtLink, Inc.,May 2000), http://www.thoughtlink.com/publications/TLI-DICE99Abstract.htm

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CHAPTER 9

Synchronization

Focus

The previous section covered collaboration enabledby improved networking and quality of information,

its potential role in C2 processes, and its importanceas a means of improving shared awareness and speedof decisionmaking in order to rapidly synchronizeforces and keep pace with the dynamics of modernmilitary operations.

This chapter begins by defining the concept ofsynchronization of forces in terms of its relationshipto the C2 process, its importance to military operations,challenges that must be addressed in achieving it, andpossible means of meeting these challenges throughincreased networking and new C2 concepts. We thenput forth hypotheses that need to be examinedregarding the means of achieving synchronization, aswell as its impact on force effectiveness andoperational outcomes, and identify key attributes ofsynchronization that need to be measured and themetrics necessary to do so. This chapter concludeswith the description of experiments that could beconducted to investigate the validity of thesehypotheses.

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What Is Synchronization?

Synchronization is defined by Webster quite eloquentlyas “the purposeful arrangement of things in time andspace.”1 In a military context, synchronization can bethought of as an output characteristic of the C2processes that arrange and continually adapt therelationships of actions (including moving and taskingforces) in time and space in order to achieve theestablished objective(s). This characterization ofsynchronization implies some important propertiesworth noting.

First, synchronization occurs in the physical domain.It involves the transformation of ideas and conceptsin the heads of commanders, staff planners, and troopsinto real world events through the processing andtransmission of information. It therefore requires fusingthe cognitive, information, and physical domains. Infact, as the speed of decisionmaking and informationflows associated with the C2 process increase, thedynamics associated with the force elements in thephysical domain will define the limits of overallsynchronization. Even as force elements areredesigned for greater speed, there will always besome such limit because they cannot move at thespeed of thought or information.

Second, achieving the necessary degree ofsynchronization will require a C2 organizationalconcept with a level of centralization or decentralizationthat provides the appropriate degree of guidance andflexibility for the type of environment, mission, troops,and information support capabilities being considered.

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Third, synchronization often involves both vertical andhorizontal harmonization. It requires verticalharmonization over multiple echelons of theorganization and aggregation/disaggregation ofactivities that are of interest at these different echelonsin order to ensure that actions at the lowest tacticallevels are consistent with higher level operational andstrategic goals. It requires horizontal harmonizationacross multiple dimensions of the C2 process,including those associated with different organizations,functional areas, types of force, and portions of theoperational space.

Although this chapter will discuss how such propertiescan be achieved through the selection of anappropriate C2 concept, we must begin with adiscussion of why synchronization is becomingincreasingly important to the success of militaryoperations and why, at the same time, it is becomingmore difficult to achieve.

Why Is SynchronizationImportant?

Synchronization has been a fundamental concept inwarfare throughout history. Setting aside conflictsinvolving the animal kingdom, the seeds of strategiesrelated to synchronization can be seen in the skillsdeveloped for hand-to-hand combat between twoadversaries (manifested today in sports such aswrestling, boxing, and other martial arts), where thespeed, sequence, and timing of offensive anddefensive moves relative to those of an opponent wereoften the key to victory. While warfare involving multiple

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combatants is more complex (football and soccerbecome more apt analogies) and the degree ofcomplexity has grown over the years, the ability tosynchronize various aspects of operations hascontinued to be an important, and in many cases thedecisive, factor. In fact, synchronization can contributeto improved force effectiveness and efficiency andincrease the likelihood of successful operationaloutcome in several ways that are consistent with thePrinciples of Warfare. These are summarized below.

Shaping the Battlespace

The key to gaining a decisive advantage in warfare isto capitalize on one’s own strengths while exploitingthe weaknesses of adversaries. This means proactivelyorchestrating events in order to shape the course ofthe battle so that engagements take place on termsthat are most favorable to friendly forces and leastfavorable to enemy forces. This includes controlling thetime and place of engagements to maintain momentumin a manner that is matched to the dynamics of thefriendly forces while exploiting or disrupting the cycle(s)of enemy activity. It also includes coordinating activemeasures with deceptive measures intended to causean adversary to commit his forces in such a way thatthey become vulnerable to friendly forces prepared toexploit such opportunities.

Classic examples abound. Stonewall Jackson’sfamous campaigns in the Shenandoah Valley werebased on superior intelligence (reports of Unionmovements from southern sympathizers), a richappreciation of the terrain (knowledge of key passesand routes), superior speed of movement (his famous

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“foot cavalry”), and the ability to keep Union forcesfrom knowing about his movements. As a result, theUnion forces were spread thin, trying to cover all ofJackson’s possible avenues of advance, and couldbe fought piecemeal. Jackson was therefore able toinflict a series of defeats while pinning down forcesthat were, numerically, far superior.2

The importance of deception and effective maneuverwas also demonstrated by the Japanese in the Battleof Leyte Gulf during World War II. Lacking the forcenecessary to directly penetrate American defensesand disrupt the invasion force moving into thePhilippines, the Japanese Admiral divided his fleet.One element deliberately showed itself and was ableto draw off a major portion of the American naval forceunder Admiral Halsey, thus exploiting his eagernessto destroy the remaining Japanese carriers. A secondJapanese element was then able to attack the lightlyescorted amphibious force, which included severalsmaller escort carriers. This tactic nearly worked andultimately thwarted only the courage and tenacity ofthe personnel fighting the escort carriers andaccompanying destroyers.

Shaping the battlespace is a time-honored tradition,but the Information Age makes it possible to do so innew ways. Perhaps the best recent examples werethe U.S.-led coalition’s large scale deceptionoperations during Desert Shield that were designedto shape the Iraqi posture. Major elements of thatprogram included (a) allowing broad press access toUSMC landing exercises that confirmed Iraqiexpectations of an amphibious assault and thereforepinned major Iraqi forces down along the coast, well

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away from the true attack area; (b) heavy air attacksthat blinded Iraqi forces and reduced their mobility andcommunications capacity, making it impossible forthem to effectively see the preparations for the “lefthook” or maneuver to meet it once it became apparent;and (c) the prepositioning of major forces in front ofan initial bluff attack by heavy forces up a major wadiwhere the Iraqi’s expected a major assault.

Focusing Effects

Another long-standing tactic is to rapidly mass groundforces or focus long-range fires to gain a localadvantage that can be further exploited before theenemy can react. For example, the Soviet concept ofcorrelation of forces required synchronization to ensurethat the concentration of forces at key points alongthe front would be sufficiently high to guarantee thebreakthrough and positioning of second echelonforces, which would arrive and exploit the opportunityto penetrate the opponent’s rear before the breachcould be closed. This Soviet concept was a directoutgrowth of the German blitzkrieg, which they hadexperienced devastating early in World War II.

In a very different warfighting arena, guerrilla warfarefocuses effects as a primary concept. The typicalguerrilla objective is to use small initiatives (destructionof bridges, ambushing supply convoys, raids onisolated elements, mine laying, etc.) that pin downlarge forces and demonstrate the guerrillas’commitment to achieving their objectives. The goal istwofold: to persuade the conventional force that itcannot win and to influence the government (throughhigh casualties and the threat of an endless, bloody

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campaign), so that it will either withdraw that force orgrant autonomy rather than continue to pay the price.Hence, the effect is both far distant from the actualbattlespace and also on a completely different levelfrom the fighting.

Synergy

Finally, the ability to synchronize the application ofdifferent types of force elements permits them to beused in a synergistic manner. For example, thecombined arms doctrine developed by U.S. and Sovietforces calls for the use of armor, infantry, artillery, airsupport, and air defense in a coordinated manner inorder to capitalize on the strengths of each componentwhile minimizing exposure of friendly forces.

The weapons, tactics, and techniques of modern airstrikes are also a classic case of synergy. Theattacking force is made up of specialized elements:electronic surveillance and jamming aircraft to pinpointand reduce the effectiveness of radars and airdefenses; overhead space assets that provideimportant sensor data; attack aircraft with specializedweapons (for example HARM missiles designed tohome in on and kill air defense radars); perhaps stealthaircraft designed to strike the most heavily defendedtargets or key elements of the air defense system;aircraft assigned to destroy adversary fighters on theground or crater runways so they cannot come up andparticipate in the defense; fighters to engage anddestroy interceptors; perhaps long-range stand-offweapons that minimize the risk to platforms; and attackaircraft armed with precision munitions: all coordinatedby airborne platforms such as AWACS. The enormous

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complexity of these enterprises is precisely the kindof opportunity created by increased capabilities in theinformation domain.

The simple, bloody logic of guerrilla warfare and terrorismalso illustrates the use of synergy. Raids, ambushes,and attacks on isolated forces are often linked toambushes of the relief force. Terrorist organizations havelearned to set off one bomb while positioning and timinga second so that it will hurt the security and medicalpersonnel responding to the initial casualties.

As noted above, there are numerous historicalexamples that illustrate the importance ofsynchronization, and it can be expected to becomeeven more important as we ponder warfare in the 21stcentury. Already apparent today are many contributingfactors whose impact can be expected to grow in thefuture. For example, there is increasing pressure forlow casualties and collateral damage that can only beachieved through more precise application of force.

Why It Is Becoming MoreDifficult to Achieve andMaintain Synchronization inMilitary Operations

At the same time that synchronization is becomingmore important in military operations, achievingsynchronization is becoming more challenging for anumber of reasons. These include increasingcomplexity, growing heterogeneity, and a faster paceof events.

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Increasing Complexity

There have always been large numbers of entities withvarying degrees of freedom in military operations.However, today we see an ever increasing desire formore precision and the increasing need for battlefieldentities to work together. Furthermore, because of thegrowing lethality of the battlefield due to improvementsin both sensors and weapons, there is also a trendtoward distributed operations with dispersed forces whomust operate in concert to control the battlespace. Theresultant need for closer coupling and precise effectshas resulted in increased complexity of operations.

Growing Heterogeneity

Coordinating across multiple echelons andorganizational entities with different cultures,processes, perceptions, and response cycles has beena consideration in many past conflicts. However, thecentral role of coalition warfare operations in U.S.national security strategy requires that we be preparedto militarily interoperate with a host of potential alliesto a degree unheard of before. The emergence ofoperations other than war demands that we be ableto interoperate with non-government organizations aswell. Because of uncertainty regarding the threat andtype of operation, it will be difficult to rationalizebeforehand the many differences that must beovercome to achieve the level of interoperabilitynecessary to achieve a high degree of synchronizationin coalition operations. The sheer variety in the natureof the organizations (other than U.S. Government,allies, other coalition partners, NGOs, international

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organizations) combine to make coalition operations,particularly OOTW operations, more challenging.

Faster Pace of Events

Improvements in sensors promise to help U.S. forcescope with the increased pace of events in the modernbattlespace. However, in order to truly capitalize onthe information they provide and deal with the residualuncertainties that are inevitable, C2 processes mustbe extremely adaptive and the associatedsynchronization capability very agile. Depending uponthe size, complexity, and dynamics of the operation,traditional centralized C2 processes are likely to bechallenged and perhaps give way to other forms oforganization and command approaches.

Research sponsored by the Army Research Institutehas shown, for example, that U.S. Army divisions,which were tasked by doctrine in 1988 to produceplans that looked 72 hours into the future, were, infact, during command post exercises, actuallychanging those plans every 9 hours.3 This researchproved insightful. When Desert Storm kicked off,divisions (U.S. and coalition) found that the pace ofevents far outstripped their ability to plan in the waysthey had studied. Instead, they found themselvesengaged in “command and control on the fly” as theystruggled to keep their forces coordinated and theiractivities synchronized. Improved communications andtools for better information sharing and collaborativeplanning will help commanders deal with the increasingpace of battle in the future. Joint and Serviceexperimentation will perhaps discover and refineadaptive planning and C2 approaches and processes.

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Taken together, the growing complexity, heterogeneity,and pace of the battlespace greatly compound theproblem of achieving and maintaining synchronization.Clearly, new approaches must be explored.

How Does NetworkingEnable Synchronization?

Earlier discussion focused on how an integratedinformation infrastructure, including increasednetworking, could help transform the C2 process fromone that involves sequential periodic processes andlimited interactions among largely isolatedcommunities to one characterized by highly parallel,continuous processes that are more collaborative andintegrated vertically across echelons and horizontallyacross disparate functional areas. As indicated inFigure 68, this transformation is enabled by thesimultaneous improvements in richness, reach, andrichness of reach promised by increased networking.Furthermore, the factors that facilitate new C2concepts are the very factors that permit theassociated C2 processes to achieve higher degreesof synchronization. They include:

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Figure 68. How Does Networking Enable Synchronization?

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• Richness of Information: The high qualityinformation (e.g., location, accuracy, timeliness,classification) facilitates precision control of, orhigh degree of, coordination among forceelements.

• Reach: All relevant elements across thespectrum of echelons and functional areas canparticipate dynamically through improvednetworking.

• Quality of Interaction: A high degree ofinformation sharing and collaboration permitdispersed elements to rapidly adjust plans,schedules, and actions in accordance withchanges in the situation.

The bottom line is that the potential exists to achievegreater precision and increased synchronizationacross a broad range of force elements and agility(adjusting to changes in the operational situation in atimely manner).

What Are the Various MeansThat Can Be Used to AchieveSynchronization?

There are a wide variety of means for achievingsynchronization. These vary in the degree to whichforce elements must be prepared before the operation,the degree of centralization/decentralization of the C2process, and the degree of relevant informationsharing and collaboration. The following are briefdescriptions and important examples along thesynchronization spectrum.

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Shared Prior Knowledge

The traditional means of achieving synchronization isthrough the development and promulgation of doctrine,tactics, and procedures. Extensive education andtraining can be used to create a culture of teamworkbased on common understanding of the mission,means of achieving the mission, and language forapplying these means. U.S. Special Operations Forceshave mastered the art of extensive training, detailedplanning (including contingencies), mission rehearsal,and aggressive execution.

Highly Centralized Command and Control

Command and control can be fully centralized so thatnot only is all planning and scheduling done centrally,but detailed direction to the forces is also provided bya central authority. This is generally practical only forsmall operations with a relatively stable environment.However, the USAF traditional Air Tasking Order isan excellent example of a highly centralized, effectiveform of command and control.

Centralized Command and Decentralized Control

More often top-level planning and scheduling isconducted centrally and subsequent decisionsassociated with the details of execution aredecentralized. This is the model underlying both U.S.Army and U.S. Navy command and control as well asa principle built into U.S. Joint and NATO doctrines.

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Collaborative C2

In this case, C2 nodes up and down the chain arecollaborating with each other and the forces tocontinually adjust plans, schedules, and decisionsrelated to execution as important aspects of thesituation change. Perhaps the best extant example isIsraeli command and control practice. However thecollaborative planning process used by U.S. SpecialForces is also a very real example.

Self-Synchronization

One example of this type of highly decentralized C2calls for lower-level decisionmakers to be guided onlyby their training, understanding of the commander’sintent, and their awareness of the situation in relevantportions of the battlespace. In some variants of thisconcept there is a provision for management byexception (i.e., the commander can negate lower-leveldecisions on an exception basis). Submarine forcesoften operate this way in order to avoid communicationsthat might give away the locations or missions.

What Is the Role of Planningin Synchronization?

Since planning and scheduling are usually the primarymeans associated with achieving synchronization, it isworth examining the variations in the types of plansassociated with the different means. For the highlycentralized C2 of large operations, plan-driven C2 is mostoften used. Because these plans tend to be inflexible,they are most appropriate in situations where uncertaintyis low and the situation is fairly stable. However, as is

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often the case, because of the difficulty in accuratelypredicting how combat situations will unfold, plans donot often survive first contact with the enemy. The plansused by Egypt in the 1973 war with the Israelis are aprime example; they did not provide sufficient flexibilityto deal with the Israeli response to Egypt’s initial attack.Indeed, their goal was to achieve initial success and thenhalt to rearm, resupply, and reinforce. The Israeli’s wereable to exploit this scheduled break in Egyptianoperations to regain the initiative.

On the other hand, more general plans that conveyintent can be used as a means of empowering forcesand providing flexibility to accommodate unexpectedchanges in the situation. Admiral Nelson employed amore flexible concept at Trafalgar: an initial plan wasused to engage the Spanish fleet while the trainingand shared understanding of Nelson’s concept forbattle permitted his forces to break through and exploitthe resulting opportunities.

This variation in plan flexibility is summarized in Figure69. Flexibility can be achieved by permitting the detailsof the plan to evolve along with the situation, as in thecase of collaborative C2, or by reducing the level ofdetail provided (e.g., conveying only commander’sintent, as in the case of self-synchronization).

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Figure 69. What Is the Role of Planning in Synchronization?

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Commander’s Intent

The quality of commanders and their ideas are crucial tothe whole theory of command and control. Builder, Bankes,and Nordin make a strong argument for this concept4 whichis familiar to those who study U.S. doctrine.

The qualities of commanders and their ideas are moreimportant to a general theory of command and controlthan the technical and architectural qualities of theirsensors, computers, and communications systems.This theory separates the art of command and controlfrom the hardware and software systems that supportcommand and control. It centers on the idea of acommand concept, a commander’s vision of a militaryoperation that informs the making of commanddecisions during that operation. The theory suggeststhat the essential communications up and down thechain of command can (and should) be limited todisseminating, verifying, or modifying these crucialcommand concepts. The theory also suggests, as anextreme case, that an ideal command concept is onethat is so prescient, sound, and fully conveyed tosubordinates that it would allow the commander toleave the battlefield before the battle commences, withno adverse effect upon the outcome. This theory,developed by Builder, et al., through six historical casestudies of modern battles, explores the implicationsof both the professional development of commandersand the design and evaluation of command and controlarchitectures. The theory should be of interest to thoseinvolved in developing command and control doctrinefor the U.S. military and to those interested in themilitary art and science of command and control.

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What Type of C2 Concept IsAppropriate for a Given Mission?

It is important to note that no single C2 concept isright for all situations. The ideal choice of C2 concept,within the spectrum described earlier, will depend upona number of factors including the complexity of theoperation, the capability of the forces, the commandculture, and the quality of the supporting informationsystems. Establishing rules to guide the selection ofan effective C2 concept is a current topic of explorationwithin the research community. However, as indicatedin Figure 70, some general trends and bounds havebeen conjectured by Perrow and others as a result ofa study of control strategies to minimize accidentsassociated with complex systems.5

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Figure 70. What Type of C2 Concept Is Appropriate for a Given Mission?

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Perrow characterized the variation in systemcomplexity by two factors: type of interaction anddegree of coupling. The type of interaction was definedas linear or complex; in the linear case, the relationshipamong the key variables is transparent and the eventspredictable; in the case of complex systems, smallchanges in key variables can cause big changes inoutcome and unexpected events can occur in spite ofsystem design.

The degree of coupling was described as either looseor tight, where loose meant ambiguous interfaces withsignificant slack that provided flexibility, and tightimplied a high level of interdependence with closelyspecified tolerances that resulted in rigid interfaces.

Perrow concluded from his analysis that centralizedcontrol approaches were appropriate for systems withlinear interactions and tight coupling, and decentralizedcontrol was better suited for systems with complexinteractions and loose coupling. While either approachcould be used for systems that were characterized bylinear interaction and loose coupling, it is important tonote that for systems with complex interaction and tightcoupling, neither is appropriate.

This correlates with the findings from the theory ofcomplex adaptive systems that decentralizedapproaches are better suited for more complexsystems. However, at the high-end of the nonlinearityspectrum, systems are in a state of chaos and cannotbe controlled with any strategy. These conjecturessuggest that, depending upon the situation, there couldexist fundamental limits to our ability to synchronizeforces in military operations. The challenge is tocharacterize these situations in a meaningful way that

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will aid in understanding the level of complexityinvolved and the appropriate type of C2 concept.

While analyses of synchronization and its role inInformation Age Warfare remains in a very early state,several conjectures (not yet rising to the level oftestable hypotheses) have emerged from the work todate and appear worthy of investigation. They include:

• The degree of synchronization of a system canbe characterized by the level of aggregation atwhich the behavior of its entities can bepredicted or controlled.

• The maximum degree of synchronizationachievable is limited by the inherent complexityof the system whose entities are beingsynchronized.

• The actual level of synchronization achieved isinfluenced by:

– Degree of centralization/decentralization ofC2 concept; and

– Extent to which entities are networked.

• Increased networking enables decentralized C2concepts that maximize synchronization for agiven level of system complexity.

Some Hypotheses

The discussion up to this point suggests a number ofhypotheses that need to be explored systematicallyand rigorously by the DoD. Examples of statementsthat seem worthy of experimental focus are identifiedand discussed below:

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• Higher degrees of synchronization will result inimproved operational effectiveness and/orefficiency.

• Increases in networking enable decentralized C2concepts that maximize the degree ofsynchronization achievable for a given level ofsystem complexity.

• Increases in the quality and sharing ofinformation and the degree of collaboration willresult in improved synchronization whendecentralized C2 concepts are employed.

These statements reflect the potential relationshipsand benefits implied by the earlier qualitativediscussion and, as such, represent a useful startingpoint for exploration.

However, it is important to point out that InformationSuperiority capabilities such as quality of information,degree of information sharing, and collaboration areenablers and do not generate operational benefits bythemselves. It is also important to understand (1) thefactors that can keep potential operational benefits frombeing achieved, and (2) the operational conditions underwhich the enabling Information Superiority capabilitiesthemselves are likely to be attained. In either case, it isnecessary to define the key attributes and metricsnecessary to design and conduct experiments toexplore and test these hypotheses so that we will bebetter able to understand the key relationships, factors,and conditions that characterize them.

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Illustrative Attributes forKey Information SuperiorityConcepts Related toHypotheses RegardingSynchronization

Figure 71 depicts the relationship among InformationSuperiority concepts as embodied in the collection ofhypotheses related to synchronization. It also includesexamples of attributes that need to be measured inorder to explore these hypotheses. Networking andcoordination are enablers and their attributes (andmetrics) have already been discussed. The commandand control concept is also an enabler. While theattributes of centralization and decentralization havebeen discussed, the metrics associated with theseorganizational characteristics deserve attention. Oneexample of a metric for measuring the degree ofcentralization or decentralization of a command andcontrol concept is the number of actions taken on thebasis of situation information versus those taken onorders from higher authority. The attributes ofsynchronization itself (i.e., the degree ofsynchronization and agility and the associated metrics)will be the focus of the remainder of this section. Thedegree of operational success and force effectivenessor efficiency are attributes of the operation that mustbe measured in order to determine the value of variouslevels of synchronization.

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Figure 71. Illustrative Attributes for Key Information Superiority Concepts Related toHypotheses Regarding Synchronization

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Note that the five levels depicted in Figure 71 reflectthe hierarchy of measures of merit. Networking itself,made up of richness, reach, and quality of interaction,should be addressed by measures of performance(MOP). Coordination and the appropriateness of theC2 concept are issues at the level of C4ISR measuresof effectiveness (MOE). Synchronization and theoperational outcome, however, are reality domainissues and should be assessed using measures offorce effectiveness (MOFE) and/or measures of policyeffectiveness (MOPE).

Measuring the Degree ofSynchronization

In constructing a measure of the degree ofsynchronization achieved by an organization in theconduct of a particular operation, one must ensurethat the measure accurately reflects the concept notonly at a given point in time, but also the ability tomaintain synchronization throughout the operation.

First, let us consider a static measure ofsynchronization based upon the concepts introducedso far. To begin with, there are a finite number ofindependent entities involved in an operation at a givenpoint in time. Each of these entities is related to everyother entity in one of three ways. That is, any twoentities can be in a state of interference, neutrality, orsynergy. For example, take the situation where thereare three entities: A, B, and C. We can easily anchorthree points on a scale (1, 0, -1). Perfectsynchronization, with a value of +1, would mean thatall three of these entities are cooperating; that is, allof the pair-wise relationships (in this case there are

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two AB and AC) are in a state of synergy. A perfectlack of synchronization, with a value of –1, wouldinvolve all of these pair-wise relationships in a state ofinterference. The origin, with a value of 0, representsa case when all pair-wise relationships are in a stateof neutrality. The following formula generates theabove values for the situations described above.

Our simple example can take on only seven differentvalues for S even though there are 21 individualsituations (cases) that can occur. Figure 72 depictsthe 27 unique situations (3n) that could occur and howthese situations map to the seven possible values.Clearly, the number of possible situations that couldoccur increases dramatically as n increases.

S = n-1 Σ Vι ι = 1 Cn

2

where,

S = degree of synchronization [-1≤S≤+1]Cn

2 = combination of n things taken 2 at a timeVι = 1 if the ιth pair is in a state of synergy

0 if the ιth pair is in a state of neutrality-1 if the ιth pair is in a state of interference

n = case number

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Figure 72. Synchronization Value

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It should be noted that imbedded in these 21 situations(that were generated by considering pair wise states)are two instances of three-way interactions (cases 1and 27). As n gets larger there will be a number ofcases that include synergies and/or interferencesinvolving more than two entities. This formula weightsthese multiple synergies and/or interferences linearity;that is, a three-way synergy is 50 percent better thana two-way synergy. In reality this may or may not bethe case. We anticipate that the results of analysesand experiments will tell us whether or not thismeasure, S, needs to be refined to reflect anexponential weighing for n-way interactions. We wouldsuggest we use this measure for the time beingbecause the relative simplicity of this measure willencourage its use in practice, which representssignificant progress in the state of practice in beingable to quantitatively describe synchronization and itsimpacts on mission effectiveness.

Having developed a static measure of synchronization,we need to consider how to measure the ability of anorganization to maintain synchronization over thecourse of an operation. Figure 73 tracks the level ofsynchronization achieved over time for each of threeoperations. These illustrative curves show why ameasure of the average level of synchronization would,by itself, not be a particularly useful measure. Tounderstand how well synchronization was maintainedover the course of an operation, a measure of thevariation in levels achieved over time is needed. Tounderstand whether or not we were able to improvesynchronization over time, the average slope of thecurve would be useful. Those following threemeasures, taken together, provide a preliminaryunderstanding of the degree of synchronizationachieved in an operation.

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Figure 73. Synchronization Profiles

Figure 74 illustrates the value of these measures forthe curves (cases) depicted in Figure 73. Having thesesynchronization measures available will enable us tocharacterize the nature of synchronization achieved witha given concept of operations, C2 approach, C2 system,etc., and thereby contribute to a better understandingof how these mission capability package designelements relate to mission effectiveness.

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Figure 74. Growing Body of Evidence

Temporal Aspects of Synchronization

Both the time to make and communicate decisionsnecessary for synchronization (e.g., collecting information,planning or scheduling of activities, or collaborativedecisionmaking among force elements), as well as thetime required for forces themselves to be properlyarranged, must be considered. Contrary to frequentobjections this is not a cost, but an attribute of a method ofsynchronization and should be treated separately.

Cost of Synchronization

While a high degree of synchronization can, dependingupon the mission, have significant benefits in terms ofincreased effectiveness or efficiency, any differentlevel of synchronization also has costs that must beunderstood and measured.

One cost that can be incurred with increased levels ofsynchronization is reduced robustness. High degrees

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of synchronization generally require dependence oninformation and the associated infrastructure thatprovides it. Both of these could be potentially disruptedor degraded by an adversary. Also, as the precisionof synchronization increases so does sensitivity toerrors that can creep in from a variety of sources.

The degree to which the costs that are associatedwith achieving synchronization are consideredsignificant (and worthy of further attention) will varywith the degree of synchronization required, type ofC2 employed, and the particular operation undertaken.These ideas need further development.

Concepts for Experiments

The metrics described here could be used in a seriesof experiments to test the validity of the hypothesespostulated earlier. This could be achieved by meansof the following three step approach:

1. Develop an initial set of alternative C2 concepts that vary in the degree of centralization/ decentralization. These options could be similar to those discussed earlier.

2. Evaluate the impact of these options on a spectrum of operations that vary in complexity by including such factors as number of force elements, degree of coupling, and the dynamics of operation.

3. For each alternative, vary key parameters relative to Information Superiority. These should include: quality of commander’s intent, quality of

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situation information, degree of information sharing, and degree of collaboration.

Because of the broad ranging scope of thehypotheses, this experimentation process should beviewed as a long-term, multiphase undertaking thatallows for the evolution of C2 concepts as experienceis gained. Analytic discovery experiments could beused to help focus limited objective laboratory tests,as well as broad field experiments. Over time, theexploration process could migrate across the spectrumof missions/operations. Consistency in the broad typesof C2 concepts assessed and the metrics used forevaluation would permit the development of a body ofknowledge that would contribute to an understandingof the conditions under which the hypotheses mightbe true and provide a basis for establishing a set ofbest practices for tailoring C2 processes to the situationat hand.

1Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, Tenth Edition(Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, Inc., 1995).2Robert G. Tanner, Stonewall in the Valley: Thomas J. “Stonewall”Jackson’s Shenandoah Valley Campaign, Spring 1862(Mechanicsville, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996).3“Systematic Assessment of C2 Effectiveness and ItsDeterminants,” Proceedings of the 1994 Symposium onCommand and Control Research and Decision Aids (June 1994),pp. 425-452.4C.H. Builder, S.C. Bankes, and R. Nordin, Command Concepts:A Theory Derived from the Practice of Command and Control(RAND Corp. MR-775-OSD, 1999).5Charles Perrow, Normal Accidents: Living with High RiskTechnologies (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1984). Thomas J.Czerwinski, Coping with the Bounds: Speculations on Nonlinearityin Military Affairs (Washington, DC: National Defense UniversityPress, 1998).

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Growing Bodyof Evidence

There is a growing body of evidence that providesan existence proof for the validity of each of the

different classes of Network Centric Warfarehypotheses (delineated in Chapter 4).

• Hypotheses of the first class deal with therelationships among information sharing,improved awareness, and shared awareness.

• Hypotheses in the second class include thosethat involve the relationship between sharedawareness and synchronization. For example,the effect of different degrees of sharedawareness or collaboration on synchronization.

• The third class of hypotheses involves the linkbetween synchronization and missioneffectiveness.

The most compelling evidence identified to date existsat the tactical level in a broad range of mission areas.This evidence has been assembled from a variety ofService and combined experimentation andoperational demonstrations, as well as high-intensity,tactical conflict situations. The following examplesidentified are supported by the relationships between:

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• Improved networking capabilities and increasedinformation sharing

• Increased information sharing and increasedshared situational awareness

• Increased shared situational awareness andimproved collaboration and synchronization

• Increased mission effectiveness as a result ofthe presence of one or more of these factors

The strongest evidence uncovered to date exists inseven mission areas: air-to-air, maneuver, CounterSpecial Operations Forces (CSOF), theater air andmissile defense (TAMD), strike, and split-basedoperations. Figure 75 provides a framework fororganizing the evidence.

Figure 75. Assessment of the Emerging Evidence

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Evaluating the Evidence andMeasuring Maturity of NetworkCentric Warfare Concepts

The maturity of a network-centric application is relatedto the interaction between two key dimensions: thedegree to which the command and control system(including the humans as part of that system) is ableto share information and develop shared situationalawareness and the degree to which that same system(including the doctrine and organizational elementsof the system) is able to move toward self-synchronized forces. The patterns resulting from theinteraction of these two dimensions are illustrated inFigure 76 which labels the expected progression ofNetwork Centric Warfare capabilities with values from0 through 4.

Figure 76. Network Centric Maturity Model

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Each of the values for the maturity of a network-centricwarfighting capability is defined by considering thesetwo aspects of network-centric behavior. The first, theprocess of developing shared situational awareness,is meant to be a reflection of the degree to whichinformation and awareness are shared. The second,the nature of command and control, is meant as asurrogate for how shared awareness is leveraged.Platform-centric operations anchor the network-centricwarfare value at 0. At the other end of this scale (value4) are mature network-centric operations that involvewidespread information sharing, the development ofa fully integrated common operational picture (COP)that promotes shared awareness, collaborativeplanning processes, and a self-synchronizingapproach to command and control.

Moving from Value 0 (platform-centric operations) toNetwork Centric Warfare maturity Value 1 involves theability to share information. Information sharing isassumed to be associated with improved awareness.Moving from Value 1 to Value 2 involves the addition ofsome form of collaborative planning among theparticipants. Movement from Value 2 to Value 3 involvesricher collaboration, involving more actors andintegrating more aspects of the operation. In manycases, there is less communication among theparticipants because of the shared situationalawareness achieved (though early in the process oflearning to collaborate, there may be more. In addition,cases have been reported where communication staysthe same, but has richer content). Movement from Value3 to Value 4 requires a mission capability package thatallows integration across doctrine, organization, training,

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material, and other aspects of the force and itssupporting systems that permit self-synchronization.

The ability to conduct network-centric operations canvary widely depending on the capabilities of the forces,the command and control systems that support them,and the command arrangements. A useful analogyfor describing these concepts is provided by soccer.Soccer has few rules and few opportunities to restartthe play on favorable terms. Each player must beaware of the field, who has control of the ball and whereit is on the field, the capabilities and positions of theother players (friendly and adversary), and the dynamicinteractions among those factors. Young players aretaught to play specific roles and to react to standardsituations. More experienced players are given bothmore freedom and more responsibilities—for example,defenders are taught to recognize opportunities to slipforward into the attack and create numerical andpositional advantages for their team. At the highestlevel of soccer the play is fluid, with constantlychanging shapes for both the attack and the defense.Their ability to read and react to these dynamics, withminimal verbal communication (for example, callingfor the ball attracts the attention of the defense), oftendetermines match outcomes.

Of course, Network Centric Warfare concepts aremuch more complex than soccer, which has only 11players on a side. Network Centric Warfare situationscan vary greatly in size and complexity, from singleservice squads at the tactical level to theater-level jointforces and coalition operations. The examples ofNetwork Centric Warfare concepts and capabilitiesdescribed in this chapter vary in scope and complexity

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from tactical air-to-air engagements (1 vs. 1 to 8 vs.16) to multi-brigade ground maneuvers with 7,000 plussoldiers opposed by an active OPFOR. In addition,the degree to which the various elements of the forcehave been networked varies considerably, as well asdegree to which information sharing and sharedsituational awareness were achieved. In addition, thematurity of the tactics, techniques, and proceduresemployed by the forces varied from very changes inTT&P to new TT&P that effectively leverage the powerof the network.

The maturity matrix combined with the scope and scaleof network-centric applications will allow us to interpretthese examples and measure progress toward a forcewith network-centric warfighting capabilities.

Air-to-Air Mission: Offensiveand Defensive Counter

Compelling evidence exists in the air-to-air missionarea for the Network Centric Warfare linkagehypotheses. In this mission area, the networking ofsensors and shooters with data links, such as Link-16, enables a force to operate in the network-centricregion of the information domain. The improvedinformation position that can be achieved withnetworking is portrayed in Figure 77.

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Figure 77. Air-to-Air: Improved Information Position

The tactical foundation for the air-to-air missionconsists of Basic Flight Maneuver (BFM) Tactics.These tactics call for a pilot to first observe anadversary with onboard sensors or the naked eye.Then the pilot predicts a course of maneuver for theenemy based on an assessment of the adversary’senergy state, knowledge of the enemy’s tactics,aircraft, and relative advantage in position. Next, thepilot assesses a maneuver needed for himself in orderto defeat an adversary’s or counter an adversary’sdefensive move while on the offensive. Finally, amaneuver is accomplished with great speed, which isdesigned to be unpredictable. This cycle is repeatedas required through the engagement. If a pilot iscapable of maneuvering with enough quickness thatan adversary cannot react with appropriate counter-maneuver, then he or she will be decisive.1 The tacticsdescribed above are referred to as OPAM, forObserve, Predict, Assess, and Maneuver (a rephrasingof the Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act loop, fromwhich they are derived). In the rest of this volume, theclassic OODA formulation is used.

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Salient aspects of the tactics described above can berepresented graphically, as shown in Figure 78, usingthe primitives discussed previously in Chapter 2. Thisrepresentation of two coupled OODA loops canrepresent either two pilots or pilot and controllersharing information via voice traffic. Air controllers aretypically located on command and control aircraft suchas an E-3 AWACS (Airborne Warning and ControlSystem), or in typical naval operations an E-2 Hawkeyethat carries a broad area sensor. Their systemstypically form the basis for the information positionavailable to controllers for observing and orienting.

Figure 78. Coupled OODA Loops: Voice Only

Consider the tactical situation in the 4 vs. 4engagement portrayed in Figure 79. A representativeplatform-centric information position that is availableto a fighter pilot via heads-up display is portrayed onthe left side of Figure 80. In this operational situation,the lead aircraft in Blue’s defensive formation can onlysee those Red aircraft in a very narrow field of viewdirectly to its front—the zone covered by its onboard

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radar. Consequently, when orienting and trying toestablish the general positions, speeds, and vectorsof attacking and defending aircraft, the pilot mustcombine his organic information position withinformation communicated by voice from other pilotsor controllers. His orientation is facilitated byknowledge of Blue and potentially Red tactics,techniques, or procedures (TTPs) as well as preflightmission briefs.

Figure 79. Air-to-Air: Tactical Situation: 4 vs. 4

Prior to tactical closure, controllers are cycling throughthe OODA process and sharing information with pilotsvia voice as they vector fighter aircraft to an attackpositions and attempt to put Blue pilots in the mostadvantageous attack positions while simultaneouslyattempting to control the actions of all the defendingaircraft to ensure that a sound defensive posture ismaintained. If these command and control platformsare not available, direction may come from a surfacevessel or ground control radar station. If this controlfunction is not performed, mission performance maybe degraded for one or more of the following reasons:

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• Attacking aircraft may slip through the defensivescreen because the organic sensors of thedefending aircraft themselves are short rangeand local, leaving gaps in coverage. This canresult in leakers or attack aircraft that penetratethe air defenses.

• To compensate for the lack of control, moreaircraft may have to be put on station to detectand intercept attacking aircraft, resulting in loweroperational tempo and less efficient use ofassets.

• Speed of tactical decisionmaking may be slowerwith respect to the pace of the air-to-air battlebecause information about attacking aircraft willtake longer to generate and deliver to those whoneed it.

• Loss ratios may be less favorable becauseinterceptions occur under less favorableconditions.

Figure 80. Voice vs. Voice Plus Data Links

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In contrast to platform-centric operations, which aredominated by voice traffic, network-centric operationsare dominated by data traffic augmented by voice. Thenetworking of sensors and shooters with data linkssuch as Link-16 creates a robustly networked forcethat has the ability to share information among allplatforms and create significantly improved informationpositions vis-à-vis platform-centric operations.

The source of the increase in combat power that canresult from the ability to share digital information canbe understood by once again employing the primitives.Figure 81 portrays two coupled OODAs that cancorrespond to two pilots, or a pilot and a controller. Itis clear from this diagram that the OODA loops of thesetwo individuals are tightly coupled because the datalink allows the pilots to share crucial data andinformation on a continuing basis. If the sensors ofone aircraft detect a target (observe), then this trackinformation can be shared along with positioninformation of both Blue aircraft. The result ofinformation sharing is a dramatically improvedinformation position, which is portrayed in Figure 82.

Figure 81. Coupled OODA Loops: Voice Plus Data

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Figure 82. Air-to-Air: Relative Information Advantage

This dramatically improved information position allowsBlue force pilots and controllers to orient on the sameposition location information. The sharing of additionalinformation, such as weapons loading and fuel status,as well as the status of the current engagement, resultsin the creation of a significant information advantage.This information advantage enables pilots andcontrollers to more rapidly orient themselves by usingcommon information. This has several observableeffects. Most obviously, the information directly availableto every pilot to orient with is richer. For example, theheads-up display on the right side of Figure 80 illustratesthe fact that the lead Blue pilot now has a richer view ofthe Red aircraft (he sees all four of them, not just thetwo in front of him). As a result, during the orientationprocess, the pilot can more effectively locate himself,his wingman, and a trail flight of two other blueinterceptors to form a mental three-dimensional picture.This picture can be merged with other engagementinformation, prior knowledge (e.g., the capabilities ofeach type of aircraft involved in the action), and situation

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understanding (from mission briefings, etc.) to createimproved situational awareness.

This improved situational awareness enables two ormore pilots (and others on the network) to form similarmental patterns of the engagement that aid them intactical decisionmaking (decide) and influences Bluepilot actions (act) in several important ways. First, thepilots themselves can make decisions that are mutuallyreinforcing about how to approach the Red aircraftand gain advantageous positions for the interceptionand battle that follows. Second, they can see oneanother’s actions. As a result, the trail flight can actindependently and intelligently to support the actionsof the lead flight. Perhaps equally important, there isless talk on the radio. Rather than having to vectoraircraft and describe what cannot be seen via voice,the supporting platforms are largely just feeding basicinformation over Link-16. This reduces the load onthe controllers, and very importantly, reduces thecognitive load on the pilots of the interceptors. Lessvoice traffic is needed, which means pilots canconcentrate on the battlespace and their actions.

The overall effect is one that enables the pilots to self-synchronize their efforts, though they also have theability to talk with one another and the controllers. Ata minimum, these pilots have the capacity to increasetheir awareness of the battlespace and, in theory, togreatly improve their shared awareness since they allsee the additional information.

The operational benefit of employing F15-C aircraftequipped with Link-16 was explored in an OperationalSpecial Project (OSP) undertaken by the U.S. Air Forceduring the 1990s. The JTIDS OSP compared mission

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effectiveness for voice only vs. voice plus Link-16 in awide range of tactical situations (1 vs. 1 to 8 vs. 16) inday and night operations. Data was collected during morethan 12,000 sorties and 19,000 flying hours. In daylightoperations, the average kill ratio increased from 3.10:1to 8.11:1, a 2.61 x improvement. During night operationsthe average kill ratio increased from 3.62:1 to 9.40:1, a2.59 improvement.2 For both day and night operations,this translates to an increase of over 150 percent, a majorgain by any standard. While the actual increases inawareness and shared awareness were not measured,the observables reported anecdotally (less use of tacticalradios, supporting maneuvers without discussion, etc.)support the conclusion that there were significantchanges in these attributes of the cognitive domain.

At the qualitative level, the JTIDS OSP Report toCongress summarized the impact of data links toaugment voice communications in air-to-air combatin this way:

• Each flight member was able to see thedisposition of flight members, regardless of theirseparation.

• This shared awareness made split tactics easier,led to greater flight effectiveness, and affordedquicker rejoins when desired.

• The mutual support enhancements proved evenmore significant against a non-equippedadversary in night and weather conditions sincethe adversary formation either had to staytogether or substantially degrade mutualsupport.

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• When voice was used, the pilots often referred toa common picture making the voice moremeaningful.

• In testing with the data link, a perfect sort wasroutine with four (and two) ship flights. This hadstrong positive implications concerning first passkill results, fighting outnumbered, survivability,and cost effectiveness employing expensiveaircraft/missiles. When an F-15 inadvertentlylocked onto another flight member, the error wasgraphically displayed (by the lock line going tothe friendly fighter), and the pilot lost little time indetermining the error and avoiding possiblefratricide.3

The relevant values for information sharing, improvedinformation position, shared awareness, increasedOPTEMPO, and an increased kill ratio (for daylightoperations) are portrayed in Figure 83. Embeddedin this relationship are the new tactics, techniques,and procedures that were developed by the pilotsthat participated in the JTIDS OSP to dramaticallyincrease combat power by taking advantage ofimproved shared awareness.

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Figure 83. Air-to-Air

Maneuver

The evidence from exercise, experiments, andanalyses that have dealt explicitly with maneuverdemonstrates both the challenges and payoffs ofnetwork-centric operations. During the early phasesof experimentation, U.S. Army units were not able tofield a high performance tactical network or developand employ mature TTPs that could enable them toleverage high quality shared awareness. However, therecently completed Division Capstone Exercise—Phase I showcased the increased combat power thatmaneuver forces employing more mature NetworkCentric Warfare capabilities can achieve. Thediscussion that follows clearly highlights the progressthe Army has made in understanding both thechallenges and the opportunities faced by maneuverforces in leveraging the power of the network.

The U.S. Army’s Advanced Warfighting Experiments(AWEs) have been key to putting digital technologieson the battlefield. These experiments, as well as

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experiments conducted by U.S. Army battlelaboratories and research and development centers,have provided the Army with a means for exploringand gaining insight into the feasibility of NetworkCentric Warfare technologies and the related doctrinaland organizational implications. AWEs have providedvaluable lessons learned as well as some of the firstanalytical underpinnings to support the theory ofNetwork Centric Warfare as a combat multiplier.

The U.S. Army conducts a variety of activities underthe umbrella of Advanced Warfighting Experiments(AWEs). They conduct staged engagements at theBrigade level with experimental systems, capabilities,and concepts (e.g., Task Force XXI). They alsoconduct Command Post Exercises (CPXs) with realstaffs and real command and control systems andsimulated forces (e.g. Division AWE). In addition, theyalso conduct extensive analyses and simulations (e.g.,pre- and post-experimentation analysis as they didbefore and after the Task Force XXI AWE). The resultsof these different kinds of experiments and exercisesare not strictly comparable, but a careful examinationof their findings provides support for the hypothesesdiscussed earlier.

The U.S. Army’s first Advanced WarfightingExperiment(AWEs), the Desert Hammer VI AWE, wasconducted in April of 1994. The purpose of this initialAWE was to examine the impacts of a Battalion TaskForce with digital communications across eachBattlefield Operating System (BOS). The results of thisAWE, and several subsequent AWEs, when viewedin hindsight, highlight the significant progress the U.S.Army has made in developing and maturing NetworkCentric Warfare capabilities. The anticipated benefits

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of digitization and networking: increased lethality,survivability, and OPTEMPO were slow to materializein initial experiments. A number of factors wereidentified that influenced the divergence betweenpotential performance and observed performance.These factors formed the basis for insights and lessonslearned that paved the way for future success. Theseinsights included:

• The importance of a high performancecommunications network

• The need for adequate training with new digitalcapabilities

• The importance of unit collective training timewith digital capabilities

• The importance of limiting the number ofcapabilities introduced prior to a givenexperiment

• The need to screen digital capabilities formaturity.4

The Task Force XXI Advanced Warfighting Experiment(AWE) was conducted at the National Training Center(NTC), Fort Irwin, California in March of 1997. Althoughthe results from the Task Force XXI AWE were lessthan conclusive, the results of the Division AWEconducted at Fort Hood in 1997, subsequent trainingoperations with digitized forces after the Task ForceXXI AWE, the results of Allied exercises, and Phase Iof the Division Capstone Exercise conducted in Aprilof 2001 have highlighted that significant gains incombat power that can be achieved with network-centric operations.

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Task Force XXI AWE

The objective of Task Force XXI was to explorewhether a digitized force with properly integrateddoctrine and technologies would attain increases inlethality, operational tempo and survivability. TaskForce XXI was the first effort to integrate tactical radioswith commercially based routers, thus providing anetworking capability at lower echelons to rapidly sharecommon situation awareness. The Army demonstratedtechnologies that shared friendly situational awarenessdown to the individual platform level, improvedcommand and control, and, for the first time, showedthat time-sensitive information could be sharedhorizontally rather than having to follow the traditionalchain of command path.

Task Force XXI also demonstrated the power ofnetworking multiple sensors and rapidly turning sensordata into useful information. The full range of digitalweather support was delivered from garrison to thefield through satellite communications links. Thedivision Analytical Control Element received battlefieldinformation from maneuver unit spot reports andvarious Army and Joint sensor platforms. Analystsused the All-Source Analysis System to correlate andfuse this information into a coherent, timely enemypicture that was used to update the COP not only atthe TOC but also down to the individual digitizedweapons platform. For the first time, soldiers in thetank could see what was happening around them. TheExperimental Force (EXFOR) for the Task Force XXIAXE consisted of an armor battalion, a mechanizedinfantry battalion, a light infantry battalion, and varioussupport units. Within the EXFOR’s two heavy

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maneuver battalions were 873 digitized and networkedplatforms, consisting of M1A1 tanks and M2A2 Bradleyfighting vehicles equipped with appliques. TheEXFOR’s light infantry battalion contained 186dismounted soldier systems and was equipped withthe Javelin anti-tank missile system. A battalionM109A6 Paladins provided field artillery support, andthe Aviation Task Force consisted of eight AH-4AApaches, two AH-64D Apache Longbows, and eightOH-58 Kiowa Warriors.

The EXFOR prepared for the AWE at Fort Hood byconducting platoon, company, and battalion collectivetraining, as well as a culminating brigade exercise thattook place in December of 1996. During this training, asignificant amount of time was dedicated to the masteryof the hardware and software that digitized andnetworked the platforms. An undesirable consequenceof this focus on new hardware and software was adecrease in the time available for unit training.

During the AWE, the EXFOR conducted a total of eightmissions against the opposing OPFOR at the NTC.These missions included: movement to contact,deliberate attack, and hasty defense. Of the eightmissions, three were similar to missions conductedby non-digitized forces during normal training rotations,and five were characterized as unique missionsdesigned for the digital force. The size of EXFOR wasrelatively constant for all eight missions and tacticsemployed by the EXFOR did not vary significantlyacross the missions. However, the EXFOR wasdispersed to a greater degree than normal during thefive unique missions.

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The performance of the EXFOR’s network during theAWE was limited by hardware and software problems,which resulted in an information position that wassignificantly degraded from what could have beenachieved with a higher performance network. Forexample, the message completion rate for digitalmessage traffic was under 30 percent. The net resultwas that situational awareness did not increase to thedegree achieved in the air-to-air mission in the JTIDSOSP. However, it is interesting to note that the mostsignificant Blue victory, which took place in the finalbattle, was directly attributable to the excellentperformance of UAVs linked to the attack helicoptersduring the battle. This gave the Blue force a localinformation advantage that they were able to effectivelyexploit. These results were similar to outcomesobserved in most rotations at the NTC. However, oneof the key observations made by the EXFOR was thevalue of increased Blue situational awareness that wasresulted from the use of the tactical Internet, with about75 percent of platoons visible at the battalion commandpost. This increased positional location capability wasused by combat support units to find the vehicles theyneeded to rearm and refuel, as well as mark and avoidminefields and chemical strike areas. In addition,shared positional information helped artillery units seewith some certainty the location of the friendly forces,which assisted them in clearing fires.

U.S. Army Division AWE

The U.S. Army conducted a Division AWE at Fort Hoodin 1997 with the objective of determining the warfightingeffectiveness of a digitized division-sized force. This AWE

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was conducted over a period of 9 days with elements ofan Infantry Division in the context of a Battle CommandTraining Program (BCTP) command post exercise. Thisexercise differed from previous exercises in that it wasconducted largely through the use of the Corps BattleSimulation, a computer-assisted wargame. The focus ofthe exercise was the command and control of digitizedforces. Consequently, all units smaller than commandposts were simulated, and the division and brigadecommand posts were deployed in the garrison area ofFort Hood and connected via radio and landline links.

The Division AWE wide area network architectureemployed at Fort Hood was up to 48 times faster thanthe wide area network developed for Task Force XXI.Similarly, local area networks inside each Division AWEcommand post were markedly better than those usedin Task Force XXI. This augmented network supportedadditional applications such as video teleconferencingand higher volume, faster data transfers. The networkalso supported previously used network applications,such as exchanging formatted messages, client-serveroperations, and web-based operations.

As in Task Force XXI, there were striking examplesduring the Division AWE of commanders and staffmembers perceiving the battlespace with greaterclarity than ever before and then acting on thatperception with great speed. This time, digitization ofthe battlefield led to the Experimental Force (EXFOR)achieving and sustaining situational awareness andinformation dominance over the World Class OpposingForce (WCOF). In turn, this permitted the ExperimentalForce to conduct distributed, non-contiguousoperations over an extended battlefield. As the enemy

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attempted to maneuver, the Experimental Force wasable to locate and track the enemy’s most critical forcesand bring massed, destructive fires on them. Thesubsequent close fight allowed cohesive, mobileExperimental Force brigade combat teams (BCTs) toengage and defeat the disrupted and attrited OpposingForce units.

Despite numerous problems along the lines of thosediscussed previously (software interoperabilityproblems, need for adequate training on newcommand and control systems) the followingimprovements relative to the results of previouswarfighters (CPXs) were observed:

• Operational tempo: division-level plandevelopment time was reduced from 72 hours to12 hours, making a six-fold increase inOPTEMPO possible.

• Speed of calls for fire: time required forprocessing calls for fire was reduced from 3minutes to 0.5 minutes, again a six-fold increasein the potential for bringing fire assets to bear,with increased potential lethality as well aspotential for saving friendly lives and improvingthe pace of battle or friendly OPTEMPO.

• Planning time for deliberate attacks at thecompany level was cut in half, from 40 to 20minutes. Substantial improvements inOPTEMPO and the ability to operate within theadversary’s OODA loop were thereforedemonstrated.5

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UK Exercise Big Picture 1

In February of 1997 UK Exercise Big Picture 1 (BP1)demonstrated the potential combat power that can begenerated with a networked ground force. BP1 wasconducted at Grafenwoehr Simulation Center with aUK squadron/company level unit in a simulatedenvironment that overcame many of the observedlimitations of the tactical Internet. During the exercise,18 tank simulators and 17 infantry fighting vehiclesimulators were hardwired in an attempt to replicate alevel of network performance that could theoreticallybe achieved with a high performance tactical Internet.Each simulated digitized platform contained full colormap displays and a touch screen. In addition, a robustexperimental design methodology was employed toremove the effects of geography, level of training, andunit in the estimation of performance gains fromdigitization. These simulators were then manned, andvarious tactical missions were conducted. A keyobservation made by the UK soldiers who participatedin the experiment was the tremendous value ofincreased situational awareness of blue forces thatwas realized through digitization and networking. Thefollowing results were observed in comparison tosimilar simulations with non-digitized forces:6

• Survivability/Lethality: Blue force suffered up to50 percent fewer losses as a proportion of thetotal kills inflicted in the attack mission

• OPTEMPO: Mean time to complete thecommand and control phase of the attacks was40 percent lower

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Observations From U.S. ArmyTraining Exercises

Numerous training exercises conducted with digitizedU.S. Army units have shed insight into the validity ofindividual components of the Network Centric Warfarehypotheses. As research and experimentationproceed, it is expected that these qualitative insightswill be converted into quantifiable findings.

Value of Increased Shared Situational Awareness(SSA) at the Unit Level: Increased SSA enabled byinformation sharing over the network allows unitsat the platoon level to focus more of their mentalefforts on fighting the enemy and less on keepingtrack of their location and the location of the rest oftheir unit. This increase in SSA has the potential,yet unmeasured, to result in increased survivabilityand lethality.7

Value of Increased SSA in Increasing OPTEMPO:Increases in SSA have allowed units at the platoonand company level to remain in tactical marchformations longer, utilizing the speed of theseformations to increase the operational tempo ofbattle. On several occasions, this increasedoperational tempo has allowed blue forces tosurprise opposition forces and gain tacticaladvantages. Before the increase in situationalawareness enabled by information sharing, unitshad to move into attack formation earlier to avoidsurprise contact with the enemy and to conservecombat power and greater lethality.

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Value of Increased SA in Maintaining Force Ratio: Atthe brigade and division level, increased situationalawareness has allowed to commanders to leave forcesin contact longer with the enemy. Increased situationalawareness of blue and red forces allows commandersto develop a better real time understanding of thestatus and disposition of their forces, of red forces,and of force ratios. This increased battlespaceawareness gives them the confidence to allow unitsto stay in contact longer with the enemy, resulting inincreased combat power.

Value of Increased SA in Reducing Risk: Both at FortHood and the National Training Center (NTC) units atthe company and battalion level have reportedly beenable to conduct more complex tactical maneuvers withless risk as a result of increased situation awarenessenabled by the network. For example, the double-envelopment maneuver, during which the central partof a ground force retreats or stays in place while theflanks advance to gain superior position and to envelopan enemy force, has proven easier to execute, withless risk. Similarly, passage of lines in which a majornew force passes through a blocking force to occupya key position has been executed more successfullyat the NTC.

Value of Increased SA to Battle Command: Finally,networking the force has reportedly assisted a divisioncommander by giving him the increased situationawareness needed to maneuver against an adversary.In this case, the commander was able to monitor anenemy column on his right that was maneuvering.Rather than being forced to deploy his forces and alterhis scheme of maneuver to engage the force, he wasable to monitor its progress as it moved into an area

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not vital to him. Knowing its location, he was able tofirst complete his primary mission by executing hisoriginal plan, then maneuver his forces to defeat thenow-isolated enemy force.

Division Capstone Exercise—Phase 1

Phase I of the Division Capstone Exercise (DCX) wasconducted in April 2001, at Fort Irwin, California. Thepurpose of this DCX I was to demonstrate and assessthe 4th Infantry Division’s Mechanized and AviationBrigades’ ability to contribute decisively to III Corps’land campaign counteroffensive capability in the contextof a Joint exercise. One of the principle goals of theDCX was the demonstration and assessment of theincreased combat power enabled by multiple ongoingdigitization and equipment modernization programs.The DCX Blue Force (BLUEFOR) was composed ofapproximately 7,500 soldiers in two Brigade CombatTeams (BCTs) consisting of elements of the 2nd and4th Brigades of the 4th Infantry Division, F-16s and A-10s equipped with the Situational Awareness Data Linkfrom the Arizona National Guard for close-air support,and Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System.The DCX Opposing Force (OPFOR) consisted of NTCOPFOR elements fighting with their traditional homefield advantage.

The 2nd BCT comprised a heavy force of threebattalions (three companies each) equipped with state-of-the-art M1A2 SEP Abrams tanks and M2A3 Bradleyfighting vehicles. One of the battalions was composedof three tank companies; another, two tank companiesand one infantry fighting vehicle company; and the

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third, one tank company and two infantry fightingvehicle companies. Supporting the operations of the2nd BCT were an M109A6 Paladin field artillerybattalion, an engineer battalion, and a forward supportbattalion. The 4th BCT consisted of a battalion minus(two companies) of AH-64D Longbow Apache attackhelicopters, a battalion minus of UH-60 Blackhawkhelicopters, two troops of OH-58D Kiowa Warriorreconnaissance helicopters, and an aviation supportbattalion. The DCX also evaluated several new brigadeorganizational structures, including a brigadereconnaissance troop (BRT), three companybattalions, forward support battalions, and organicengineer assets.8

Leveraging the dramatic increases in situationalawareness enabled by the networking of the digitizedforce, the 4th Infantry Division’s two BCTs were moreagile, had greater precision and were able to be moreadaptable in changing situations. Although officialTRADOC findings from the Division CapstoneExercise—Phase I have not yet been released aninitial quick look analysis—highlighted the ability of theBlue Force (BLUEFOR) to significantly improve itswarfighting effectiveness by creating and leveragingan information advantage.9 Qualitative insights supportkey elements of the Network Centric Warfarehypotheses. In comparison with the Task Force XXIAWE, the BLUEFOR that participated in DCX Phase Iappeared to have developed and mastered new TTPwhich enabled it to leverage the power of the networkto significantly increase its warfighting effectiveness.

Information sharing enabled by the network enabledthe BLUEFOR to develop a superior information position

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and exploit this position to gain overmatching sharedsituational awareness. The BLUEFOR was able toleverage this situational awareness advantage to rapidlyfocus lethality with precision maneuver (M1A2 Abrahms,M2A3 Bradley, AH-64D Apache) and conductsuccessful, simultaneous, and decisive operations. Theability of the BLUEFOR to share information over thenetwork and develop a common operational picture hada dramatic impact across all echelons of command. Akey theme was increased speed. Vignettes whichillustrate the employment of Network Centric Warfareconcepts are presented below.

Horizontal Information Sharing—IncreasedSpeed—Improved OODA Performance—Distributed OODA—Armor to Artillery

An M1A2SEP tank identified an OPFOR ArmedPersonnel Carrier (a BMP) during a company raid at 5KM away. Since the BMP was beyond direct fire range,the tank used its far target location capability to preciselylocate the target (OBSERVE) by lazing and selectingthe call for fire template from the reports menu on theFBCB2. The tank commander then digitally relayed aCall for Fire to the company FIST-V and it was relayedto the DS firing battery (ORIENT, DECIDE).

The initial fires achieved a firepower kill on the BMPand the following fire for effect resulted in acatastrophic kill (ACT).

This far target location capability gives the M1A2SEPtank and the M2A3 Bradley an exceptional capabilityto call for accurate, lethal fires out to the limit of theirability to laze.

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Factors Contributing to Reduced OPFORSituational Awareness

Three key factors to contributed to the BLUEFOR’sability to develop a situational awareness overmatchover the OPFOR. The BLUEFOR’s rapid scheme ofmaneuver combined with their ability to conduct boldmaneuvers at night in difficult terrain significantlyreduced OPFORs capability to develop situationalawareness on the status and disposition of theBLUEFOR. The OPFOR stated that it was only ableto develop a 70 percent solution of BN TF areas ratherthan the normal 6-digit grid coordinate for vehicles thatthey had been able to develop during previousrotations. This situation was exacerbated by blue’sability in several instances to attrit the OPFORsreconnaissance capabilities. During one operationalsituation the BCT’s UAV spotted an OPFOR DivisionReconnaissance Company moving south. The BCT’sMilitary Intelligence Company relayed this informationvia FM radio to a Mechanized Company in closeproximity that was escorting a rearward movement ofrefugees. The Mechanized Company moved to anddestroyed seven of the OPFOR’s DivisionReconnaissance Vehicles. This is an excellentexample of self-synchronization enabled by networkingthe force.

Benefit of Multi-Echelon Command and Control(Collaborative OODA)

The shared operational picture enabled the DivisionTactical Command Center to assist the 2nd BCT inperforming command and control (CollaborativeOODA). At one point during the BLUEFOR’s

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maneuver, the command and control element manningthe Division Tactical Command Center was able touse the common operational picture to rapidly identifya situation where elements of a Battalion CombatTeam (BCT) were out of position and provide guidanceto reposition the BCT. In this specific situation, the2nd BCT was in the execution phase of clearing CMFforces/movement to contact up to a Phase Line. Oneof the operators from the Fire Support Elementobserved that several tanks from the 2nd BCT hadmoved north of the Phase Line (the limit of advancefor the 2nd BCT, with the exception of the BRT(Brigade Reconnaissance Troop). This instance ofrapid collaborative command and control enabled 2ndBCT’s forces to relocate themselves to support theCommander’s operational plan.

Shared Knowledge of Commander’s Intent

Digitization and networking has enabled staffs to shareinformation on commanders’ intent to the lowest levels,resulting in the capability of the 4th Infantry Division(ID) to develop a shared knowledge of commander’sintent (in the cognitive domain). During the initialmovement of the 4th ID, the staff was able tounderstand the commander’s intent to the lowest level.Specialist and privates monitoring the battle were ableto understand the big picture. Enlisted soldiers wereable to monitor the battlefield and develop a betterunderstanding of what was going on in the battlefield.

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Sensors (UAV, JSTARS) Contributions toIncreased SA

The BLUEFOR’s ability to employ organic sensors andexploit sensors such as JSTARS has helpedcommanders visualize the enemy and terrain and tosee and strike quickly before the enemy was preparedor when he did not expect to be attacked. Particularlylethal in the deep attack where AH-64 D Apachehelicopters teamed with UAVs to form hunter-killerteams. On several occasions, the Commander was ableuse UAVs to identify OPFOR forces and then maneuverattack helicopters to engage and perform shapingoperations prior to contact OPFOR engagement ofBLUEFOR. In another operational situation, increasedSA of BLUEFOR enabled the ADC-M to rapidly conductinterdicting fires with MLRS and F-16 CAS sorties. Inthe course of the air strikes the pilots identifiedapproximately 45 vehicles in a ravine. The ADC-M thenordered additional strikes on these vehicles beforereleasing the sorties to 2nd BCT control.

Benefit of Improved Situational Awareness toLogistics and Support

Greater situational awareness played a key role inincreasing the effectiveness of logistics and supportunits and creating a force multiplier. For example, theincreased situational available to logistics and supportunits improved their ability to find and fix broken anddisabled platforms and increased velocity of repair.The net result was increased combat effectiveness ofthe 2nd BCT. An additional demonstrated benefit oftotal asset visibility and anticipatory logistics was theability to employ modular and tailorable approaches

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that resulted in smaller logistics footprints and reducedlift requirements.

Operational Benefits

The anticipated operational benefits of digitization andnetworking for maneuver are portrayed in Figure 84.While the gains in information quality, informationsharing, situation awareness, shared awareness,collaboration, and synchronization must be estimated,the data on planning speed, mission outcomes, callsfor fire, and force lethality are consistent with thehypothesized patterns.

Figure 84. Maneuver

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Counter Special OperationForces Mission

One of the most significant examples of the power ofnetwork-centric operations to date occurred when FleetBattle Experiment (FBE) Delta was conducted by theU.S. Navy in conjunction with Combined ForcesCommand Korea. This command faces majorwarfighting challenges in three mission areas: CounterFire, Counter Special Operations Forces (CSOF), andTheater Air and Missile Defense. Each of these missionswas addressed in Fleet Battle Experiment Delta,conducted in October 1998 in conjunction with ExerciseFoal Eagle ’98, an annual joint and combined exercisesponsored by Combined Forces Command Korea.

In this experiment, the results with the greatestoperational significance were generated in the CSOFmission area, where the seemingly intractable problemof countering hundreds of North Korean specialoperations boats (a CSOF mission) was dealt with ona timeline previously not thought possible.

In this experiment, elements of the Army’s 2nd InfantryDivision, AH-64 Apache Helicopter Squadrons fromthe 6th Combat Air Brigade, a range of Navy andMarine Corps units, and a Maritime Air SupportOperations Center were networked via a wide areanetwork to form a land-sea engagement network.Operating on this network were two command andcontrol applications, the Army Deep Attack OperationsControl System (ADOCS) and the Land Attack WarfareSystem (LAWS), a prototype software applicationderived from ADOCS. The use of these applicationsenabled all elements to share information and develop

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a common operational picture, resulting in improvedcoordination between Naval, Air, and GroundComponent Commanders.10 The ability of networkedforces to develop a common operational pictureenabled them to simultaneously achieve a very highlevel of shared situational awareness that, whencombined with new tactics, techniques, andprocedures, allowed these forces to synchronize theirefforts from the bottom up to achieve dramaticallyincreased combat power and to accomplish theirmission in half the time required with traditionalplatform-centric operations.11

The empirical results from FBE Delta and subsequentmodeling and simulation are as follows:12

• Average Decision Cycle Time was reduced from43 to 23 minutes.

• Average Mission Timeline (command and controltime plus operational time) was cut in half.

• Shooter effectiveness (kills per shot) wasincreased 50 percent.

• Assets scrambled was decreased by 15 percent.

• Leakers (special operations vessels that passedthrough the engagement zone to theiroperational destinations) were decreased by afactor of 10.

The qualitative implications of this experiment are veryimpressive. The network increased shared awarenessto such an extent that the units involved could self-synchronize. That process increased operationaltempo and shooter effectiveness, which in turn, saved

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assets. The consequences of an order of magnitudedecrease in the number of special operations vesselsreaching their intended destination is also ofsignificance in that it would greatly simplify thedefensive operations on the South Korean peninsula.

CINCPAC, Admiral Blair, highlighted the implicationsof FBE Delta during a speech at WEST 2001 in SanDiego in January of 2001, where he stated:

FBE Delta unlocked the potentialcombat power that was latent in the jointtask force, but had been wasted due tosegmentation of the battlespace.13

Theater Air and MissileDefense (TAMD)

In the TAMD mission, networking was shown to enablea force to significantly improve its warfightingcapability. In this mission, sensors play a key role ingenerating battlespace awareness (Figure 85). Stand-alone radar sensors, such as the E-2 Hawkeye, andsensors on weapons platforms, such as AEGIS radar,detect and track objects ranging from aircraft to cruiseand ballistic missiles. When these sensors areemployed in the battleforce in stand-alone (platform)mode, scattering effects and environmental factors cancombine and interact to degrade both detection andtracking quality. These problems are most seriousagainst stressing targets, those characterized by highspeed and/or low observables. This may mean lossof track continuity, unacceptably slow trackconvergence, or even failure to initiate a track againstcertain types of objects. The net result is poor

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situational awareness in the cognitive domain, whichcan significantly impact mission performance.Operational performance can be significantlyincreased through employment of the Network CentricWarfare concepts of Sensor and Engagement Grids.These concepts are operationalized with theCooperative Engagement Capability.

Figure 85. Theater Air and Missile Defense Process

The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC)networks battle force sensors and enables the forceto share information and improve its informationposition by overcoming the limits of individual sensors.CEC is a unique battle force sensor netting systemconsisting of cooperative engagement processors anddata distribution systems on all cooperating units: ship,air, and shore. Utilizing highly advanced data transferand processing techniques, CEC is able to integratethe air defense sensors of CEC equipped surfaceships, aircraft, and land sites into a single compositenetwork that generates fire control quality information(An example of increased information richness

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enabled by increased reach). CEC integrates the radarand IFF measurements on each platform anddistributes the measurement data to all cooperatingunits. This provides each cooperating unit an identical,real-time air picture based on all CEC battle forcesensors. CEC’s greater track accuracy, betteridentification (lower uncertainty), and decreased timeto achieve a given level of track accuracy combine togive battle force commanders a higher quality ofinformation to work with. Equally important, detectionranges are extended, which allows further timecompression and more rapid achievement ofengagement quality battlespace awareness, asportrayed in Figure 86.

Figure 86. Impact of Network Centric TAMD

Tactical decision making in the TAMD arena isimproved directly by facilitating key decisions: whichtarget to engage, when to engage it, and which shooterand which weapon should be used to maximize theprobability of a kill. New TTPs are emerging to allowcommanders to exploit the significantly improved

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battlespace awareness that can be achieved in thismission area through the employment of CEC. Forexample, Fire of Remote Data, in which a shooterengages a target it never acquires directly, but ratheruses information provided by an external sensor, holdsconsiderable promise for improving battle force assetutilization and TAMD mission effectiveness.14

Strike

Network centric concepts are also enabling newwarfighting capabilities in the strike arena. DuringOperation Allied Force, the Kosovo air operation, U.S.and coalition air crews flew more than 36,000 sortiesin support of a wide range of missions. Numerous firstswere achieved, including the first combat deploymentof the B-2 Spirit and the largest employment ofUnmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) in history. The UAVswere employed as stand-alone platforms and inconjunction with a wide range of other ISR(intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)assets, including JSTARS, RIVET JOINT, AWACS,U-2, and other coalition and sister-service sensors.15

One of the major challenges faced by Allied Air Forceswas finding, fixing, targeting, and engaging mobileground targets. JSTARS operators, who had beenextremely successful during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm at deterring and tracking moving groundtargets in the desert, found that weather, terrain, andother factors made it very difficult to identify andclassify possible targets in Kosovo. Moreover, ForwardAir Controllers (FAC) and strike aircraft found it difficultto identify small, mobile targets from 15,000 feet (theapproximate altitude needed to reduce vulnerability

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Figure 87. Strike: Networking the Kill Chain

to surface-to-air missiles in the theater) with theironboard sensors.16

In an attempt to overcome some of these obstacles,the kill chain was networked, as is illustrated in Figure87. This linked sensors, analysts, decisionmakers, andshooters in new ways. The Predator (UAV) operatedby the U.S. Air Force’s 11th ReconnaissanceSquadron was deployed to Tuzla Air Base in Bosnia.Imagery from the UAV was transmitted via SATCOMto a ground station in England, then via fiber opticcable to a processing facility in the United States. Theprocessed information was then transmitted to theWashington, D.C., area, where it was up-linked to aGlobal Broadcasting System (GBS) satellite andtransmitted back into the operational theater. Thisinformation was received at the CAOC (Combined AirOperations Center) in Vicenza, Italy. Targetinginformation was then communicated to controllersaboard an airborne command and control aircraft,which then provided it to the FAC. The FAC, in turn,provided the information to strike aircraft in accordancewith established TTPs.

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The employment of this network-centric kill chainenabled the force to significantly improve itsinformation position as portrayed in Figure 88. Byemploying reach-back linkages to generate analysisand targeting decisions promptly, the delays that oftenenable mobile targets to avoid detection and attackwere minimized.

Figure 88. Strike: Improved Information Position

Split-Based Operations

The final example, taken from Air Forceexperimentation efforts in Expeditionary ForceExperiments (EFX) 98 and 99, highlights the power ofcollaboration and synchronization. During theseexperiments, the Air Force, supported by joint andcoalition partners, explored more than 50 concepts,processes, and technology initiatives.17

Employing networks to increase combat power wascentral to both EFXs. A core theme was distributedoperations. During JEFX 99, a forward CAOC, whichconsisted of approximately 300 people, was linked to

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and supported from a much larger, CONUS-basedOperations Support Center (OSC).18 The operationalbenefits of this organizational arrangement aresignificant. In the past the forward deployedorganization employed 1,500 to 2,000 people asshown in Figure 89. These personnel needed to betaken into theater along with the equipment theyneeded to do their jobs. This forward organization alsomakes major demands on transportation (reportedly10 C-17 loads) during the early phases of an operation,reducing the lift available to move shooters andessential logistics to support them into the theater.Not only Air Force personnel and material, but alsothose of other Services must compete for this lift.Hence, learning to network the force at this level andoperate with an effective and efficient split-basedCAOC will pay major dividends in combat power. Whilethe Air Force has reported key operational challengesbased on the JEFX experience, they have also madea commitment to operationalizing this concept.

Figure 89. Split-Based Operations

The ability to use networks to increase situationalawareness in control aircraft, fighters, bombers, andother support aircraft (fuel tankers, jammers, etc.) has

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also been a core theme during both EFX 98 and JEFX99. At its limits, this will enable us to launch long-rangebombers from secure bases in CONUS and to eitherprovide specific targets or update target lists while theyare en route to the operational theater.19 This canimprove our ability to conduct effective and efficientair operations in any corner of the planet.

Observations and Conclusions

These examples clearly demonstrate that U.S. andAllied Armed Forces are beginning to understand thepotential power of network-centric concepts,approaches, and capabilities. The evidence showsthat, enabled by a sufficient degree of connectivity andinteroperability, a variety of organizations haveachieved increased awareness, created sharedawareness, and leveraged this by developing newways of doing business that increase the speed ofcommand and the tempo of operations.

While the breadth of these mission areas is impressive,it should be pointed out that this evidence comes froma limited portion of the mission spectrum. As noted inthe introduction to this volume, efforts to developevidence about Information Age Warfare remainscattered or hit and miss, rather than focused orsystematic. The fact that few of these examplesactually reach across whole mission areas and thatnone of them really deal with the complexity inherentin Joint Task Force, operational level missions, or theOperations Other Than War (OOTW) that dominatepractical experience today, mean that a great deal ofresearch remains to be done.

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However, the importance of this evidence should notbe minimized. The significant improvement in combatpower documented here lends considerable weightto the central hypotheses of Network Centric Warfare.Clearly, there is a benefit to employing a moresystematic approach to organizing research; collectingevidence in operations, exercises, experiments, anddemonstrations; and in assessing that evidence. Inaddition, there is also a compelling benefit to goingbeyond traditional combat to explore the full range ofcommand and control concepts enabled by InformationAge technologies.

1AFTTP 3-3.4: Combat Aircraft Fundamentals—F-15. The AirForce Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (AFTTP) 3-3 seriespublications are the primary aircraft fundamental referencedocument for the USAF. This series provides a comprehensive,single-source document containing fundamental employmentprocedures and techniques necessary to accomplish variousmissions.2JTIDS Operational Special Project (OSP) Report to Congress,Mission Area Director for Information Dominance, Office of theSecretary of the Air Force for Acquisition (Washington, DC:Headquarters U.S. Air Force, December 1997).3Ibid.4This information and the subsequent discussions of Task ForceXXI AWE and the U.S. Army Division AWE are drawn from RobertC. Holcomb, “Some Lessons Learned While Digitizing theBattlefield,” Proceedings of the Battlefield Systems InternationalConference (London, 1998).5BG William L. Bond, USA, Army Digitization Overview, Briefingto Dr. Jacques Gansler, USD (A&T), at the Pentagon(Washington, DC, May 20, 1998).6Exercise Big Picture 1 Final Report, Defense Evaluation andResearch Agency (October 1997).7This section is drawn from NCW—Emerging Lessons Learnedfrom the First Digital Division, Presentation by COL (Ret) FredStein at conference on “Network Centric Warfare: Missions,Needs, Opportunities, and Challenges” (Washington, DC,October 21-22, 1999).

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8Scott R. Gourley, “Redefining War,” Military InformationTechnology, Volume 5, Issue 5 (June 2001), pp. 22-23.9Frederick P. Stein, Presentation on “DCX-Phase I” to NetworkCentric Warfare…Understanding the Operations and Systemsof the Revolution in Military Affairs, AFCEA Course 513(Washington, DC, June 1, 2001).10Fleet Battle Experiment Delta Quick Look Report (Newport, RI:Maritime Battle Center, Naval Warfare Development Command,November 2, 1998).11VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, Written testimony to hearing onDefense Information Superiority and Information Assurance—Entering 21st Centery, held by the House Armed ServicesCommittee, Subcommittee on Military Procurement (February23, 1999).12Fleet Battle Experiment Delta Quick Look Report (Newport, RI:Maritime Battle Center, Navy Warfare Development Command,November 2, 1998). An Assessment of IT-21 Warfighting Value-Added (March 1, 1999).13ADM Dennis Blair, CINCPAC, remarks during keynote addressat WEST 2001 (San Diego, CA, January 23, 2001).14“The Cooperative Engagement Capability,” Johns Hopkins APLTechnical Digest 16, 4 (1995), pp. 377-396.15Earl H. Tilford, “Operation Allied Force and the Role of AirPower,” Parameters (Vol. 29, Issue 4, Winter 1999/2000), pp.24-38. Jacques de Lestapis, DRONES, UAVs Widely Used inKosovo Operations, http://www.periscope.ucg.com/docs/special/archive/special-199907011327.shtml16David A. Fulghum, “DARPA Tackles Kosovo Problems,”Aviation Week and Space Technology (August 2, 1999), pp. 55-56. John A. Tirpik, “Short’s View of the Air Campaign,” Air ForceMagazine (September 1999), pp. 43-47.17EFX Fact Sheet, http://efx.acc.af.mil/factsheet.htm, accessedSeptember 17, 1998.18JEFX 99 Final Report, http://jefxlink.langley.af.mil/milfinal99/main.htm, accessed January 1, 2000.19Ibid.

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CHAPTER 11

Assessment andthe Way Ahead

In the previous chapter, we reviewed some of theemerging evidence that supports the central

hypothesis of the new mental model. In this chapter,this evidence will be put into an overall context and itsimplications for DoD will be discussed.

There is good news, better news, and cause for concern.

The good news is that we are on to something big.Information Superiority and Network Centric Warfareconcepts really do translate into combat effectiveness(in the case of combat and improved operationalcapabilities in non-traditional military missions). Thevalue of the new mental model has beendemonstrated. In addition, the power and importanceof coevolving mission capability packages is beingconfirmed and attests to the importance of ouremerging program of experimentation. This is clearlygood news.

The very good news is that we have hardly scratchedthe surface of what is possible. We have been, for themost part, focused on relatively safe extensions ofcurrent concepts and processes. We have only had avery limited amount of pair-wise interoperability to workwith. In other words, we have only just begun to explore

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the possibilities. However, there are ominous cloudson the horizon.

Infostructure

First, our infostructure (information infrastructure) willnot be ready to support network-centric operations.We are becoming more dependent on a fragile andvulnerable infostructure. Interoperability problemspersist within each of the Services and in the Jointarena. The increasing importance of coalitionoperations is still not adequately mirrored by an effortto achieve coalition interoperability. In short, there isa disconnect between the future concepts beingdeveloped and the planned reality of the infostructurein the same time frame. Finally, there are a number ofsignificant impediments to progress.

There are many impediments that are affecting ourability to make progress on the development andfielding of a secure, reliable, and interoperableinfostructure. Progress on this infostructure is beingconstrained by:

• Lack of infostructure visibility;

• Inadequate requirements definition;

• Program-centric planning;

• Insufficient integration;

• Delays in deploying technology; and

• Lack of Joint systems commands and labs.

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Infostructure Disconnects

Our future warfighting concepts, built upon leveragingInformation Superiority, are predicated upon theexistence of a secure, reliable, and interoperableinfostructure. We are, in effect, banking on aninfostructure, one that will not be there unless we focusour collective efforts on making it happen. We havethe right vision, but this vision is not yet being translatedinto reality. We need to pay the entry fee! If not, ourfuture will be full of shortfalls including:

• Lack of connectivity

• Interoperability

• Bandwidth to the last mile

• Security

• Mobility

• Survivability

Vulnerabilities

The DoD infostructure is funded and managed not asa single integrated entity, but as a collection orfederation of systems and capabilities that belong tothe Services and Defense Agencies. As the DefensePlanning Guidance observes, a vulnerability ordeficiency in one of these systems affects everyone.In other words, a risk accepted by one is a risk imposedupon all.

As we adopt a network-centric approach, it is importantthat we pay more attention to the end-to-endfunctionality of our federation of systems and

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capabilities to ensure that the resulting infostructureis indeed robust, secure, and has the functionality tosatisfy our information needs.

Innovation and ConceptDevelopment

The conditions that result in our focusing on safe ideas,if not altered, will inhibit truly innovative ideas! Progresson design of information-enabled mission capabilitypackages is being constrained by:

• Lack of understanding of future capabilities;

• Lack of information-enabled experimentalvenues; and

• Lack of harvesting of small experiments.

Fielding of New Capabilities

Our current policies and processes make it difficult tomove rapidly from idea to demonstration to fieldedcapability. Progress on the balanced development ofmission capability packages is being constrained by:

• Continued emphasis on platform-centricinvestments and concepts;

• Separate and unequal treatment of missioncapability package elements;

• Lack of mission capability package visibility andanalysis; and

• Failure to work the nexus between organizations,doctrine, and information technology.

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These factors, taken together, highlight the fact thatour approach to innovation and the infostructure thatsupports it is not up to the challenge. We can no longerafford to continue business as usual. For if we do, wewill forgo many of the most promising opportunities ofthe Information Age. We need to rethink our approachto innovation, experimentation, and the process ofcoevolving DoD infostructure mission capabilitypackages, build in a higher degree of infostructurevisibility, and take steps to ensure the emergence ofa coherent infostructure.

Given the evidence to date about the importance ofthe coevolution of mission capability packages, wemust address existing impediments to coevolution andprovide sufficient degrees of freedom for them to reachtheir full potential.

In addition to suffering a large opportunity loss, weare exposing ourselves to an unnecessary risk. Therisk is that our fragile and vulnerable infostructure willbe degraded in times of need, with particularly severeadverse mission consequences.

The Way Ahead

This is a time for deeds, not words. The early evidenceis in, and our strategic vector is clear. Only the detailsremain to be worked out. This is, of course, the refrain ofthe visionary and the optimist. The pessimist frets that“the devil is in the details.” The truth, of course, liessomewhere in between. Progress will depend upon muchmore than having a strategic vector. It will also dependon the development of an understanding of the basics—

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how to create shared awareness, effective collaboration,and meaningful synchronization in the battlespace.

At the most fundamental level, we need to ensure thatour information systems, including the humanprocesses involved in them, are reengineered toensure interoperability. This has been a growingpriority and point of emphasis for DoD policy over thepast decade. The idea of a Joint Technical Architectureemerged as a recognition that not everything wasbeing born joint and that some means to ensureinteroperability was needed. The subsequent streamof C4ISR Support Plans and the 1999 assignment ofTitle 10 responsibility for interoperability to the DoDCIO have resulted in several formal policy initiativesto further that goal. At this writing the need for genuinereengineering processes focused on interoperabilityhas become obvious. This is essential if the set oflegacy and new systems is to be federated in waysthat makes sense not only from the perspective ofcommunications engineers, but also in terms of themilitary mission packages needed to move towardInformation Superiority.

Thus, DoD’s journey into the future is inextricably tiedto progress in our understanding of how to create andleverage Information Superiority. This is not simply atechnical problem that, once solved, can be packagedin a “black box” and deployed. Rather, it is a constantquest involving an ongoing dialogue amongtechnologists, scientists, analysts, and operators. Inorder to make meaningful progress, we need to keepup with a continuous stream of ever-increasingcapabilities that advances in technology provide, andalso to keep ahead of our adversaries in bringing what

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are essential commercially available capabilities to thebattlefield. We must do the following:

• Create the conditions needed to spawninnovative ideas;

• Provide venues and tools to rigorously test newideas and theories;

• Streamline the process that transforms validatedideas into military capability; and

• Conduct systematic research in areas that areneeded to improve our understanding of the newmental model.

Innovation can be inhibited in a number of ways,including the existence of institutional disincentivesthat actually punish departures from the accepted view.It will not be enough simply to reduce these barriers.A climate for innovation is necessary, but not sufficient.In order to think of innovative ways of accomplishinga task, individuals must be aware of the possibilitiesthat exist and have some level of understanding aboutwhat Information Superiority and Network CentricWarfare are all about.

While there is a fair amount written on the InformationAge and its possibilities, the overwhelming bulk of thatmaterial is devoted to experiences and opportunitiesfound in the private sector. While these certainlyprovide food for thought, a parallel literature, dealingwith the full spectrum of military operations andnational security challenges and opportunities, needsto be encouraged and made widely available.

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To make these ideas more concrete, DoD needs tobe committed to providing a critical mass of secureinteroperability that allows individuals throughout DoDto experience opportunities to network, and a level ofsophisticated information-related capabilities thatallows those individuals to understand the nature oftheir information needs. Appropriate education andtraining, along with an organizational focus on thinkingabout exploiting these opportunities to rethink the waymilitary operations are done, complete the package.

As sciences go, the science of information is very muchin its infancy. DoD needs to greatly increase theattention paid to research in the ways individuals andteams use and share information, develop awarenessand shared awareness, and make decisions. Newapproaches to command and control merit a significantinvestment in research that goes far beyond thetechnology orientation of the past. Models andsimulations (M&S), at their best, capture ourunderstanding of the processes they represent.Currently the best of these are woefully inadequate intheir representations of information flows, informationuses, and the relationships that affect decisions. Theyalso do a very poor job of representing thecharacteristics and impacts of command and controlprocesses on military operations. While the developersof M&S could do a lot better than they are currentlydoing, much of this lack of M&S capability can berelated to a more systemic lack of understanding ofinformational, cognitive, and organizational processes.The existence of appropriate and useful metrics is partof the problem and why we, in this book, devoted somuch of our attention to this subject. Clearly muchmore needs to be done.

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Metrics are key because they form the bridge betweenreality and theory. They are the conduits of feedbackfrom field experiments to researchers. They are theessence of the communication between analysts andthe users of analysis. They focus us. Metrics for theInformation Superiority value chain must continue toevolve over time from trial, error, and inspiration.Without the heavy spade work of applying metrics tothe problems at hand, progress will not occur. To aidthis process, we must insist on the collection andsharing of quantitative data from all of our research,experiments, field trials, and actual operations.

Of course, what one collects is more important thanhow much is collected. The primitives and relatedmetrics presented in this book are intended to providea sound starting point. They are an attempt to measurewhat is important, not just what can be readilymeasured. We recognize that in the beginning it willbe hard for individual projects to do a satisfactory jobof measuring all of the Information Superiorityattributes of interest. However, if we stick to it, thingswill improve. Someday these concepts will be routinelymeasured and contribute to increasing ourunderstanding of the value of information and thepower of networking. Meanwhile, the databasesresulting from serious projects will provide a foundationfor future work and innovation.

New venues are needed to facilitate the explorationand testing of ideas. These will serve as test ranges forInformation Superiority and Network Centric Warfare.Like weapons ranges, these venues need to providean environment that supports the collection of qualitydata and the control of selected independent variables.Expert teams of analysts are needed to help ensure

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that the tests are well conceived, well conducted, andwell analyzed. A wide assortment of models,simulations, and analytic tools are needed to completethe picture. Unlike test ranges, however, these venuesneed to be able to provide trained personnel who canassume a variety of roles so that it is the ideas that arebeing tested, not the individual participants.

Finally, there needs to be an improved process thatfocuses the research on the high priority areas anddevelops synergy from individual research andexperimental efforts. This process needs to bringtogether traditional science and technology programswith experimentation and command and control relatedresearch. Above all, it must help us gain insight intothe human elements—cognitive processes,organizational dynamics, the role of perceptions,doctrine, and training.

Implications

Earlier we asserted that the strategic vector was clear.Joint Vision 2020 provides such a vector. The implicationsfor concepts of operation, command and control, forcestructure, and supporting processes are profound. Withthe realization that the details still need to evolve out of asystemic effort to understand and experiment with newways of doing business that are designed to leveragethe value of information and the power of networking,we conclude this book with a discussion of theimplications of the Information Age for military operationsand organizations. These implications should be thoughtof as hypotheses that need to be tested, refined, andretested as part of a process designed to coevolve futuremission capability packages.

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We will move to a networked force. Entities will beconceived and built net-ready to connect, with thepresumption that they will increasingly depend uponnon-organic information for their preferred mode ofoperations. Battlespace entities will not only receiveinformation, but will be suppliers of information as well.Hierarchical flows of information will be streamlined,and peer-to-peer flows greatly increased.Interoperability will migrate down to lower and lowerechelons. Security will be designed and built in. Wewill think differently about what we acquire and deploy.The infostructure or Global Information Grid will beseen as an enterprise capability and will be treated assuch in the Planning, Programming, and BudgetingSystem process and will be managed as such.

We will stop thinking about systems and start thinkingabout systems of systems or federations of systems.The concept of software maintenance will be replacedwith the concept of evolutionary systems. Thus, wewill no longer buy a system, but set aside a fundingwedge to develop and evolve a specific set ofcapabilities. Testing will evolve to a continuous activitythat supports coevolution, and its focus will shift fromsystem testing to end-to-end testing.

Achieving the right balance among the variouselements of a mission capability package (conceptsof operation and concepts for command and control,information flows, organization, and doctrine,education and training, weapons, logistics, andsupporting systems) will be our primary challenge. Ourcurrent preoccupation with material will slowly changeto a holistic approach. Information and itstransformation into knowledge in support of distributeddecisionmaking will emerge as a unifying theme that

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connects the elements of the mission capabilitypackage. We will invest in mission capability packagesand portfolios designed to deliver them (not individualprograms). The concept of tooth-to-tail will be replacedby a focus on the efficient delivery of effects.

A new understanding of command and control, basedupon dynamically managing complex adaptivesystems, will replace traditional cyclical approachesto command and control, resulting in the ultimatemerging of the planning and execution processes.Information operations will quickly move from fantasyto reality, with IO capabilities being integrated intooperations all across the conflict spectrum.

But most important of all, tradition will not be thoughtof as doing things the way they have always beendone, but as a continuing effort to strive for increasedunderstanding and innovation.

Understanding and Doing

The nature of the relationship between understandingand doing is a function of: a) the rate of change, andb) the degree to which the change or innovation issustaining or disruptive.

During times when the rate of change is comparable to orslower than an organization’s ability to adopt new technologyand methods, understanding and doing are sequentialactivities. Lessons are learned from doing, better ways ofdoing things are developed, perfected, turned into doctrine,and then reflected in training and exercises.

The time required for an organization to changedepends, of course, on the nature of the change. The

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introduction of new technology that improves upon,but does not significantly alter, existing processes andorganizations (innovations that sustain the status quo)can be accomplished far more quickly than changesthat are discontinuous and disturb establishedrelationships, alter the distribution of responsibilities,and require new ways of thinking about accomplishingthe tasks at hand. On the other hand, when the changeinvolves not only the introduction of new technology,but also changes in the concept of operation alongwith associated changes in organization and doctrine,then the time required to adapt increases.

At this point in our history, the U.S. military faces themost stressing situation possible—one in which therate of change exceeds our ability to change rapidlyenough to keep pace, even if we were to choosemerely to keep abreast of technological advances. Butwe cannot settle for just keeping pace with advancingtechnology because information technologies are bytheir very nature disruptive. They alter the environmentin which organizations operate and demand that wecoevolve concepts of operation and associatedmission capability packages. This last statementwarrants further explanation as to why the introductionof advanced information technologies demanddisruptive change in military organizations.

Simply put, military organizations operate the way theydo today because traditional concepts of commandand control have evolved over time to deal with thefog and friction of war. Hence, military organizationshave adapted themselves to operating in a worlddominated by uncertainty and a lack of ability to rapidlyand accurately convey information effectively acrossthe force. Thus, in order to avoid blunders and to

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marshal mass, deliberate centralized planning becamethe mainstay of military operations. The planningprocesses that have evolved serve not only to conveycommander’s intent, but also to convey detailedinformation regarding the situation and what to doabout it.

Advanced information technologies alter thefundamental assumptions upon which traditionalcommand and control concepts, organization, anddoctrine are based. These technologies create a vastlyimproved ability to develop and share situationawareness as well as enabling distributed collaborativeenvironments. Thus, they fundamentally alter theinformation that can be provided to individualsthroughout the organization. These technologies alsoprovide us with the ability to increase the precision,stand-off ranges, and rate of fire of our weapons. Inaddition, offensive IO capabilities are and will continueto be added to our arsenal.

The proliferation of militarily significant informationtechnologies will be far quicker and more pervasivethan the proliferation of previous generations of militarytechnologies since they are, in essence, driven by thecommercial marketplace. This will result in a verydynamic threat environment, which, in and of itself, isdisruptive. Potential adversaries may be highlymotivated and/or better positioned to leap ahead byusing new technologies in new ways. Their embracingdisruptive innovation would have serious implicationsfor the continuity of the threat environment.

Thus, we in DoD are faced with a situation in whichour ability to change falls short of our need to change—and with a traditional linear process to technology

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insertion and change, which has becomeunsatisfactory and will only grow more unsatisfactoryover time.

Clearly, we need to rethink not only our approach toC2, but also how we innovate, how we acquiretechnologies, and how we train. We believe that thesolution lies in understanding the critical roles ofinnovation and real experimentation, the need tocoevolve mission capability packages, and the needfor a DoD-wide infostructure that is robust, reliable,interoperative, and secure.

As we begin the 21st century, we have an opportunityto step back and consider fundamental changes inthe way we invest in, acquire, equip, and train ourforces. The dynamics of the Information Age will punishus if we do not adapt to a new way of doing business.The brave and dedicated members of our armed forcesdeserve better. They deserve a DoD that can take fulladvantage of the opportunities afforded by InformationAge concepts and technologies. To give them this,we must be prepared to endure disruptive change.

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About theAuthors

Dr. Alberts is currently the Director, Research andStrategic Planning, OASD (C3I). Prior to this he wasthe Director, Advanced Concepts, Technologies, andInformation Strategies (ACTIS), Deputy Director of theInstitute for National Strategic Studies, and theexecutive agent for DoD’s Command and ControlResearch Program. This included responsibility for theCenter for Advanced Concepts and Technology (ACT)and the School of Information Warfare and Strategy(SIWS) at the National Defense University. He has morethan 25 years of experience developing and introducingleading-edge technology into private and public sectororganizations. This extensive applied experience isaugmented by a distinguished academic career incomputer science, operations research, andGovernment service in senior policy and managementpositions. Dr. Alberts’ experience includes serving as aCEO for a high-technology firm specializing in the designand development of large, state-of-the-art computersystems (including expert, investigative, intelligence,information, and command and control systems) in bothGovernment and industry. He has also led organizationsengaged in research and analysis of command andcontrol system performance and related contributionsto operational missions. Dr. Alberts has had policyresponsibility for corporate computer andtelecommunications capabilities, facilities, andexperimental laboratories. His responsibilities have also

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included management of research aimed at enhancingthe usefulness of systems, extending their productivelife, and the development of improved methods forevaluating the contributions that systems make toorganizational functions. Dr. Alberts frequentlycontributes to Government task forces and workshopson systems acquisition, command and control, andsystems evaluation.

John J. Garstka is currently the Chief TechnologyOfficer, Directorate for C4 Systems, the Joint Staff(JCS/J6). He is a recognized thought leader in thearea of Network Centric Warfare. In addition to co-authoring, with Vice Admiral Cebrowski, “NetworkCentric Warfare—Its Origin and Future” (Proceedingsof the U.S. Naval Institute, January 1998), he is theauthor of “Network Centric Warfare: An Overview ofEmerging Theory (Phalanx, December 2000), and isa co-author along with David Alberts and Fred Steinof Network Centric Warfare: Developing andLeveraging Information Superiority (CCRPPublications, 1999). Mr. Garstka is an internationallyrecognized speaker and has lectured at GeorgetownUniversity, Harvard University, and the Naval WarCollege. Prior to joining the Joint Staff, Mr. Garstkaled consulting assignments for Cambridge ResearchAssociates and served as an officer in the U.S. AirForce, with assignments at the Pentagon and U.S.Air Force Space Systems Division. He is aDistinguished Graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academyand studied as a Hertz Fellow at Stanford University,where he earned an M.S. in Engineering-EconomicSystems. Mr. Garstka is also currently an officer inthe U.S. Air Force Reserve.

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As President and founder of Evidence BasedResearch, Inc., Dr. Hayes specializes inmultidisciplinary analyses of command and control,intelligence, and national security issues; theidentification of opportunities to improve support todecisionmakers in the defense and intelligencecommunities; the design and development of systemsto provide that support; and the criticism, test, andevaluation of systems and procedures that providesuch support. His areas of expertise include crisismanagement; political-military issues; researchmethods; experimental design; simulation andmodeling; test and evaluation; military command,control, communication, and intelligence (C3I); anddecision-aiding systems. Since coming to Washingtonin 1974, Dr. Hayes has established himself as a leaderin bringing the systematic use of evidence and theknowledge base of the social sciences into play insupport of decisionmakers in the national securitycommunity, domestic agencies, and majorcorporations. He has initiated several programs ofresearch and lines of business that achieved nationalattention and many others that directly influencedpolicy development in client organizations.

Dr. Signori is a research leader for C4ISR andInformation Technology at the RAND Corporationwhere he directs studies that address leading-edgeissues of broad interest to DoD (e.g., Assessment ofthe Contribution of C4ISR Capabilities to the Successof Military Operations). He is active in numerousrelated DoD initiatives (e.g., the OASD (C3I) C2Research Program). Prior to joining RAND, Dr. Signoriserved DoD in senior executive positions that dealtwith analyzing, planning, engineering, developing, and

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implementing C4ISR and related information systems.From 1995 to 1998, he was the Special Assistant tothe Director of DARPA for Warfare InformationTechnology where his duties included directing theAdvanced Battlespace Information System Study,which was conducted jointly by DDR&E and JCS inconjunction with Joint Vision 2010. As a deputy in theInformation Systems Office, he helped focus theDARPA C2 research program and led initiatives toaccelerate integration and transition of advancedtechnology to the Defense Information Infrastructure.From 1981 to 1995, Dr. Signori served at the DefenseInformation Systems Agency, where the positions heheld included the Deputy Director of DISA, ViceManager of the National Communication System,Associate Director for Engineering and Technology,and Director of the Center for Command and Controland Communication Systems. During this period heplayed a leadership role in formulating numerousC4ISR initiatives and transforming the DefenseCommunications Agency into a full service DefenseInformation Systems Agency. Prior to serving in DoD,Dr. Signori served as the Associate Director of theSystems Evaluation Division at the Institute of DefenseAnalyses, where he directed a number of studiesdealing with the application of advanced technologyto conventional warfare. He served as a Captain inthe Army Signal Corps from 1968 to 1970.