Alasdair tyre Dependent Rational Animals

882019 Alasdair tyre Dependent Rational Animals

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Alasdair MacIntyre Dependent Rational Animals Why Human Beings Need the Virtues The PaulCarus Lectures Chicago Open Court 1999 xiii + 172 pp $2695 (cloth) ISBN 978-0-8126-9452-9

Reviewed by Jeremy David Bendik-Keymer (Department of Philosophy The Colorado College)Published on H-Nilas (June 2002)

Vulnerable Citizens

Vulnerable Citizens

Aristotle gave his Nicomachean Ethics as lecturesand had as his subject elucidating the virtues of

the excellent Athenian citizen His later compiledlectures became one of the great works of moralphilosophy in the world and inaugurated the sys-tematic treatment of the virtues in light of humanflourishing For the past twenty years what isndashstillcontentiouslyndashknown as ldquovirtue ethicsrdquo has tried tobring back the approach to moral philosophy Aristo-tle inaugurated and to have it supplement and chal-lenge rights- or duty-based (deontological) and inter-est maximization (utilitarian or consequentialist) ap-proaches to moral theory Alasdair MacIntyre wasone of the earliest proponents of this reemergence of attention to the virtues in his After Virtue (1981)and worked throughout the 1980s especially in hisWhose Justice Which Rationality (1988) to openup the resources available in our conflicted culturaluniverse for philosophizing in this ancient manner In1997 he gave the prestigious Paul Carus lectures atthe Pacific Division meeting of the American Philo-sophical Association and these were later publishedas Dependent Rational Animals

This book quiet in tone and manner attemptsto replace the vision of the excellent Athenian citizenAristotle introduced into moral philosophy with a vi-sion of a vulnerable citizen whose virtues are corre-

spondingly modified to fit her vulnerability In effectthe book amounts to a rewriting of central stretches of the Nicomachean Ethics from the standpoint of hu-mans who encounter illness disease disability andaging in their lives and so must not only strive forself-sufficiency in order to flourish but must striveas well to have what MacIntyre calls the ldquovirtues of acknowledged dependencerdquo on others In this wayMacIntyrersquos is a subtle and grand undertaking deeplyrevisionary in scope At the same time MacIntyrersquos

book is fascinating from an ecological point of viewbecause it begins by conceiving of humans as animalsdependent on our bodies and associated biologically

in different ways with other members of the animalkingdom In this it remains Aristotelian faithful toAristotlersquos keen biological eye

The bookrsquos thesis can be broken up into two neg-ative arguments pushing us towards an account of the virtues of acknowledged dependence and a multi-part positive account of what these virtues and theirsurrounding communal life are The first negative ar-gument canvasses the first six chapters of the bookand tries to discredit the assumption MacIntyre findsin Western moral philosophy that since we are un likeanimals we are not open to our own bodily and

vulnerable nature nor to our emotional intelligenceMacIntyre argues against this assumption by tryingto show how the line separating humans from otheranimals is blurred and suggests ultimately that webeing animals too exist along a continuum of capa-bilities shared by some of the other animals (or all of the other animals if the capabilities are rudimentaryenoughndasha point MacIntyre does not discuss) Thesuggested result is to have us conceive of ourselvesas animals and so be more open to our bodily andvulnerable nature as well as to our emotional intelli-gence In order for MacIntyre to blur the line betweenhumans and other animals he spends most of these

chapters addressing the charge that animals lack in-telligence because lacking language they lack beliefsas well as practical reason He tries to show using anargument originated by John Searle that there canbe a form of belief without linguistic capability thatsome animals seem to have linguistic capability any-way and also that some animals (eg dolphins) havewhat seem to be creative practical reasoning capac-ities He also points out that in infant-toddler carewe rely on emotional cues to bring infants into our

1



H-Net Reviews

world and use practices not unlike animal trainingIn fact emotional intelligence remains important ourwhole lives as do some forms of emotional training

The second negative argument canvassing theseventh through eleventh chapters of the book triesto show that (a) given that we are disabled or in needof help often in our lives (eg during childhood oldage and illness not to mention when permanentlydisabled) (b) an account of the virtues promotinghuman flourishing that does not acknowledge the dis-ability in human life is inadequate What is called forrather is a robust account of the virtues acknowl-edging both our independence and our dependenceon others MacIntyre discovers inspiration for thisproject in Aquinasrsquos subtle modification of Aristotlevia the virtues of commiseration (a secular virtue)

and also of charityThe multi-part positive account in favor of the

virtues of acknowledged dependence overlaps withthe second negative argument and canvasses chap-ters seven through thirteen (the last chapter in thebook) In the first part MacIntyre explores not onlyhow much of our lives must deal with the vulnerabil-ity of our bodily (which includes our mental health)condition but he also discusses how we are raisedthrough our limited capacities as children to becomeindependent practical reasoners In effect he retracesthe central topic in Aristotlersquos account of the virtuesndash

practical reasoningndashfrom the standpoint of possibleblocks to our independent exercise of it and suggestsfurther that the very development of its healthy ex-ercise emerges from out of childhood in dependenceupon others who augment onersquos limitations as a rea-soner In the second part MacIntyre moves out frommarking our dependence on others to discuss the vi-sion of community it implies namely a community inwhich people must rely on each other at crucial junc-tures of their lives so as to flourish and even reasonwell This vision in effect subverts the image of co-operative society in Aristotlersquos account of the virtueswhich is of a society of nobles aspiring to magnanim-

ity who positively decry dependence on others (be-cause it shows they are less than self-sufficient andso in Aristotlersquos mind less than the most virtuous theymight be) In the third part MacIntyre briefly triesto show that the vision of the common good he hasthus extrapolated from acknowledged dependence in-volves shared rational inquiry not simply about whateach vulnerable citizen must do for those with dis-ability but also about other areas of shared practicallife Here he suggests that a community of vulner-

able citizens must be Aristotelian friends with eachotherndashlooking out for each otherrsquos goods by reasoningtogether about what is goodndashnot simply out of noble

choice but also out of necessityMacIntyrersquos first negative argument on humans

and other animals is the weakest argument in thebook even though it provides thought-provoking sub-

jects It is unclear what the exact link is betweennot seeing ourselves as animal and seeing ourselvesas self-sufficient Is the claim that because we donrsquotsee ourselves as animal we wonrsquot admit we havevulnerabilities This seems false But to the degreeit is the first six chapters of the book are argumen-tatively unmoored Also confusing is why showinganimals are like us should make us think we are likethem Why not begin by showing we are animals

Next it is unclear whether the strongest import of MacIntyrersquos argument is to extend moral standing tomore animals But that seems a tangential issue tothe main argument of the book (notwithstanding thelink between respect for the disabled and other ani-mals in animal liberation literaturendashsomething Mac-Intyre does not explicitly address) Finally MacIn-tyre wants to emphasize our use of the emotions suchas sympathy in raising and living with each otherBut there are many ldquoanimalrdquo emotions and it is un-clear why sympathy should represent our animality assuch

Much stronger is MacIntyrersquos second negative ar-gument and it is the real argumentative center of the book Clearly we humans do experience disabil-ity or limited capability for a good portion of ourlivesndashin childhood old age and in any short- or long-term illness or disability An ethics of human flour-ishing that is blind to that is blind to our human-ity and so is not a good candidate for a successfulethics of human flourishing From out of this sec-ond and successful negative argument MacIntyrersquospositive account of the virtues of acknowledged de-pendence is strong Especially strong are the firstand second parts of the positive account detailing

virtues in child rearing (eg good mothering or fa-thering and good teaching) commiseration and evenin the care of the severely infirm or disabled Alsobrought on stage here is what does seem to be calledfor given such virtues namely a community of in-

ter dependent citizens who help each other out wheneach is disabled or limited in capacity Given our life-cycles and human fate it is right to claim we need acommunity that weaves together people through thevirtues of acknowledged dependence such as those

2



H-Net Reviews

just alluded to In this positive account the thirdpart is the weakest for all his argument from disabil-ity has solidly grounded so far is the need for common

reasoning about how to care for disability so thatnorms of care are at large and shared in a commu-nity Other areas of common reasoning seem besidethe point as his first negative argument was

For those interested in a broadly ecological orien-tation to life MacIntyrersquos book may prove suggestiveeven if his central contention concerning our likenesswith many other animals seems unnecessary for hisoverall argument MacIntyre sets up his book witha picture of humanity in mind This picture dawnsslowly across the whole of the book and is largelytacit MacIntyre envisions humanity as living within

the animal kingdom in close biological affiliation with

other animals This affiliation occurs through at-tention to our bodies which bear the marks of oursimilarity to other animals and remind us especiallythrough our vulnerabilityndashbut one could also add ourpleasure and vitalityndashthat we are subject to the con-ditions of life The upshot of this vision of humanityis to unsettle a number of important visions in thehistory of Western philosophy from Platorsquos vision of our humanity residing in a soul detachable from ourbodies to Descartesrsquos vision of our separate rationalbeing to Kantrsquos understanding of our humanity re-siding in our rational naturendasha nature seemingly sep-

arable from our bodily drives and being In this waywhile MacIntyrersquos book is most successful as a re-visionary work in virtue ethics it is also helpful in

filling out indirectly a picture of a more ecologicalhumanity

In sum what is remarkable about this book iswhat it does in its second negative argument and inthe first two parts of its positive account of the virtuesaddressing human disability These parts of the bookin themselves promote a deep reorientation of virtueethics away from a strictly Aristotelian inheritanceand toward a more Thomistic one This is timelyOnly recently political and moral theory have seen aflowering of work on disabled lives from Eva FederKittayrsquos work on raising disabled humans to MarthaNussbaumrsquos presidential address to the 2000 Central

Division American Philosophical Association Meet-ing criticizing John Rawls for his blindness to thisissue to recent interdisciplinary publications such asan issue of the journal Public Culture devoted exclu-sively to disability criticism MacIntyre should becommended for not only helping to inaugurate virtueethics in 1981 but for now challenging virtue ethicsto be more human attentive to the life-form of ouranimal species Even more important is his challengeto moral philosophy today to work with a truth of thehuman condition and so to begin by acknowledgingthat we are vulnerable

If there is additional discussion of this review you may access it through the list discussion logs athttph-netmsueducgi-binlogbrowsepl

Citation Jeremy David Bendik-Keymer Review of MacIntyre Alasdair Dependent Rational Animals

Why Human Beings Need the Virtues H-Nilas H-Net Reviews June 2002URL httpwwwh-netorgreviewsshowrevphpid=6408

Copyright copy 2002 by H-Net all rights reserved H-Net permits the redistribution and reprinting of thiswork for nonprofit educational purposes with full and accurate attribution to the author web location dateof publication originating list and H-Net Humanities amp Social Sciences Online For any other proposeduse contact the Reviews editorial staff at hbooksmailh-netmsuedu

3



H-Net Reviews

world and use practices not unlike animal trainingIn fact emotional intelligence remains important ourwhole lives as do some forms of emotional training

The second negative argument canvassing theseventh through eleventh chapters of the book triesto show that (a) given that we are disabled or in needof help often in our lives (eg during childhood oldage and illness not to mention when permanentlydisabled) (b) an account of the virtues promotinghuman flourishing that does not acknowledge the dis-ability in human life is inadequate What is called forrather is a robust account of the virtues acknowl-edging both our independence and our dependenceon others MacIntyre discovers inspiration for thisproject in Aquinasrsquos subtle modification of Aristotlevia the virtues of commiseration (a secular virtue)

and also of charityThe multi-part positive account in favor of the

virtues of acknowledged dependence overlaps withthe second negative argument and canvasses chap-ters seven through thirteen (the last chapter in thebook) In the first part MacIntyre explores not onlyhow much of our lives must deal with the vulnerabil-ity of our bodily (which includes our mental health)condition but he also discusses how we are raisedthrough our limited capacities as children to becomeindependent practical reasoners In effect he retracesthe central topic in Aristotlersquos account of the virtuesndash

practical reasoningndashfrom the standpoint of possibleblocks to our independent exercise of it and suggestsfurther that the very development of its healthy ex-ercise emerges from out of childhood in dependenceupon others who augment onersquos limitations as a rea-soner In the second part MacIntyre moves out frommarking our dependence on others to discuss the vi-sion of community it implies namely a community inwhich people must rely on each other at crucial junc-tures of their lives so as to flourish and even reasonwell This vision in effect subverts the image of co-operative society in Aristotlersquos account of the virtueswhich is of a society of nobles aspiring to magnanim-

ity who positively decry dependence on others (be-cause it shows they are less than self-sufficient andso in Aristotlersquos mind less than the most virtuous theymight be) In the third part MacIntyre briefly triesto show that the vision of the common good he hasthus extrapolated from acknowledged dependence in-volves shared rational inquiry not simply about whateach vulnerable citizen must do for those with dis-ability but also about other areas of shared practicallife Here he suggests that a community of vulner-

able citizens must be Aristotelian friends with eachotherndashlooking out for each otherrsquos goods by reasoningtogether about what is goodndashnot simply out of noble

choice but also out of necessityMacIntyrersquos first negative argument on humans

and other animals is the weakest argument in thebook even though it provides thought-provoking sub-

jects It is unclear what the exact link is betweennot seeing ourselves as animal and seeing ourselvesas self-sufficient Is the claim that because we donrsquotsee ourselves as animal we wonrsquot admit we havevulnerabilities This seems false But to the degreeit is the first six chapters of the book are argumen-tatively unmoored Also confusing is why showinganimals are like us should make us think we are likethem Why not begin by showing we are animals

Next it is unclear whether the strongest import of MacIntyrersquos argument is to extend moral standing tomore animals But that seems a tangential issue tothe main argument of the book (notwithstanding thelink between respect for the disabled and other ani-mals in animal liberation literaturendashsomething Mac-Intyre does not explicitly address) Finally MacIn-tyre wants to emphasize our use of the emotions suchas sympathy in raising and living with each otherBut there are many ldquoanimalrdquo emotions and it is un-clear why sympathy should represent our animality assuch

Much stronger is MacIntyrersquos second negative ar-gument and it is the real argumentative center of the book Clearly we humans do experience disabil-ity or limited capability for a good portion of ourlivesndashin childhood old age and in any short- or long-term illness or disability An ethics of human flour-ishing that is blind to that is blind to our human-ity and so is not a good candidate for a successfulethics of human flourishing From out of this sec-ond and successful negative argument MacIntyrersquospositive account of the virtues of acknowledged de-pendence is strong Especially strong are the firstand second parts of the positive account detailing

virtues in child rearing (eg good mothering or fa-thering and good teaching) commiseration and evenin the care of the severely infirm or disabled Alsobrought on stage here is what does seem to be calledfor given such virtues namely a community of in-

ter dependent citizens who help each other out wheneach is disabled or limited in capacity Given our life-cycles and human fate it is right to claim we need acommunity that weaves together people through thevirtues of acknowledged dependence such as those

2



H-Net Reviews














3



H-Net Reviews














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Alasdair tyre Dependent Rational Animals